CASE Name: Funa vs Agra

Ponente: Bersamin, J.
FACTS
March 1, 2010 Arroyo appointed Hon. Alberto C. Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice
March 5, 2010 Arroyo appointed him as Acting Solicitor General
April 7, 2010 Petitioner filed a case as a taxpayer, alleging that the appointments were prohibited under Section 13 Art VII of the
1987 Constitution (prohibits the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants from
holding any other office or employment during their tenure unless otherwise provided in the Constitution), and
Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, which bans any appointive official from holding any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries, unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position.
August 5, 2010 During the pendency of the suit, Benigno Simeon Aquino III appointed Atty. Jose Cadiz as Solicitor General and the
latter commenced his duties
(Agra says: he was then the Government Corporate Counsel when President Arroyo designated him as the Acting Solicitor General
in place of Solicitor General Devanadera who had been appointed as the Secretary of Justice;
That on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated him also as the Acting Secretary of Justice vice Secretary Devanadera who had
meanwhile tendered her resignation in order to run for Congress representing a district in Quezon Province in the May 2010
elections; that he then relinquished his position as the Government Corporate Counsel; and that pending the appointment of his
successor, Agra continued to perform his duties as the Acting Solicitor General.)
Respondents contend that Agras concurrent designations were only in a temporary capacity, the only effect of which was to confer
additional duties to him. Thus, as the Acting Solicitor General and Acting Secretary of Justice, Agra was not holding both offices in
the strict constitutional sense (which must be regular and permanent and not a mere designation)
Respondents further contend that, even on the assumption that Agras concurrent designation constituted holding of multiple
offices, his continued service as the Acting Solicitor General was akin to a hold-over; that upon Agras designation as the Acting
Secretary of Justice, his term as the Acting Solicitor General expired in view of the constitutional prohibition against holding of
multiple offices by the Members of the Cabinet; that under the principle of hold-over, Agra continued his service as the Acting
Solicitor General until his successor is elected and qualified10 to prevent a hiatus in the government pending the time when a
successor may be chosen and inducted into office;
And that during his continued service as the Acting Solicitor General, he did not receive any salaries and emoluments from the OSG
after becoming the Acting Secretary of Justice

Petitioner counters that there was no prevailing special circumstance that justified the non-application to Agra of Section
13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution;

And that Agras invocation of the principle of hold-over is misplaced for being predicated upon an erroneous presentation
of a material fact as to the time of his designation as the Acting Solicitor General and Acting Secretary of Justice
ISSUES
1.Whether or not petitioner has locus standi
2.Whether or not the case is moot and academic by virtue of the appointment of Cadiz as SolGen
3.Whether or not the designation of Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General,
violated the constitutional prohibition against dual or multiple offices for the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and
assistants
HELD (including the Ratio Decidendi)
(1) Yes:
oThis case before Us is of transcendental importance, since it obviously has far-reaching implications, and there is a need to
promulgate rules that will guide the bench, bar, and the public in future analogous cases.
(2) Yes, BUT:
othe Court did not desist from resolving an issue that a supervening event meanwhile rendered moot and academic if any of the
following recognized exceptions obtained, namely: (1) there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case involved a
situation of exceptional character and was of paramount public interest; (3) the constitutional issue raised required the formulation
of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4) the case was capable of repetition, yet evading review.
(3) Yes:
The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General was unconstitutional
and void for being in violation of the constitutional prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General, therefore, Agra was
undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article VII, supra, whose text and spirit were too clear to be differently read. Hence, Agra could

not validly hold any other office or employment during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor General, because the Constitution has not
otherwise so provided.
oIn this regard, to hold an office means to possess or to occupy the office, or to be in possession and administration of the office,
which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office.
oTo be sure, Agras concurrent designations as Acting Secretary of Justice and Acting Solicitor General did not come within the
definition of an ex officio capacity***. Had either of his concurrent designations been in an ex officio capacity in relation to the
other, the Court might now be ruling in his favor.
o
The OSG are neither required by the primary functions nor included by the powers of the DOJMEANING, one position was
not derived from the other.

RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari and prohibition; ANNULS AND VOIDS the designation of Hon. Alberto C.
Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice in a concurrent capacity with his position as the Acting Solicitor General for being
unconstitutional and violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution; and DECLARES that l-Ion. Alberto C. Agra was a de
facto officer during his tenure as Acting Secretary of Justice.
In order to be clear, therefore, the Court holds that all official actions of Agra as a de facto Acting Secretary of Justice, assuming that
was his later designation, were presumed valid, binding and effective as if he was the officer legally appointed and qualified for the
office. 54 This clarification is necessary in order to protect the sanctity of the dealings by the public with persons whose ostensible
authority emanates from the State.
NOTES
*** Ex officio likewise denotes an act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other
appointment or authority other than that conferred by the office. The ex officio position being actually and in legal contemplation
part of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in
the said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal
office.

Carpio vs. Executive Secretary

206 SCRA 290 Political Law Control Power Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency
In 1990, Republic Act No. 6975 entitled AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES was passed. Antonio Carpio, as a member
of the bar and a defender of the Constitution, assailed the constitutionality of the said law as he averred that it only interferes with
the control power of the president.
He advances the view that RA 6975 weakened the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) by limiting its power to administrative
control over the PNP thus, control remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the NPC and the PNP were placed;
that the system of letting local executives choose local police heads also undermine the power of the president.
ISSUE: Whether or not the president abdicated its control power over the PNP and NPC by virtue of RA 6975.
HELD: No. The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential power of control over the
executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. Equally well
accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency. As the President
cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his
Cabinet members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person on the exigencies of
the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts
of the Chief Executive.

Thus, and in short, the Presidents power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and
by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department.
Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative
realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated
law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created under the assailed Act, the funding of the PNP being in large part
subsidized by the national government.
PANGASINAN TRANSPORT CO. VS. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION GR NO. 47065, June 26, 1940
FACTS:
This is a case on the certificate of public convenience of petitioner Pangasinan Transportation Co. Inc (Pantranco). The petitioner has
been engaged for the past twenty years in the business of transporting passengers in the province of Pangasinan and Tarlac,Nueva
Ecija and Zambales. On August 26, 1939, Pantranco filed with the Public Service Commission (PSC) an application to operate 10
additional buses. PSC granted the application with 2 additional conditions which was made to apply also on their existing business.
Pantranco filed a motion for reconsideration with the Public Service Commission. Since it was denied, Pantranco then filed a
petition/ writ of certiorari.
ISSUES:
Whether the legislative power granted to Public Service Commission:- is unconstitutional and void because it is without
limitation- constitutes undue delegation of powers
HELD:
The challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid and constitutional because it is a proper delegation of legislative
power, so called Subordinate Legislation . It is a valid delegation because of the growing complexities of modern government,
the complexities or multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering the laws.
All that has been delegated to the Commission is the administrative function, involving the use of discretion to carry out the will of
the National Assembly having in view, in addition, the promotion of public interests in a proper and suitable manner.
The Certificate of Public Convenience is neither a franchise nor contract, confers no property rights and is a mere license or privilege,
subject to governmental control for the good of the public. PSC has the power, upon notice and hearing, to amend, modify, or
revoked at any time any certificate issued, whenever the facts and circumstances so warranted. The limitation of 25 years was never
heard, so the case was remanded to PSC for further proceedings. In addition, the Court ruled that, the liberty and property of the
citizens should be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to
present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights that he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented. When private property is affected with a public interest, it ceased to be juris privati or private use only