REPUBLIC ACT No.

6397
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE INTEGRATION OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR, AND
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR.

RULE 139-A
Integrated Bar of the Philippines

Section 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to
effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the bar to discharge its
public responsibility more effectively.
Section 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the
National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such sums
as may be necessary for the same purpose shall be included in the annual appropriations for the Supreme
Court.
Section 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved: September 17, 1971

Section 1. Organization. There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the
"Integrated Bar of the Philippines," composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be
included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
Section 2. Purposes. The fundamental purposes of the Integrated Bar shall be to elevate the standards
of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively.
Section 3. Regions. The Philippines is hereby divided into nine Regions of the Integrated Bar, to wit:
(a) Northern Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Abra, Batanes, Benguet, Cagayan, Ifugao,
Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela, Kalinga-Apayao, La Union, Mountain Province, Nueva
Vizcaya, and Quirino.
(b) Central Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Bataan, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga,
Pangasinan, Tarlac, and Zambales;
(c) Greater Manila, consisting of the City of Manila and Quezon City;
(d) Southern Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Batangas, Cavite, Laguna, Marinduque,
Occidental Mindoro, Oriental Mindoro, Quezon, and Rizal;
(e) Bicolandia, consisting of the provinces of Albay, Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur,
Catanduanes, Masbate, and Sorsogon;
(f) Eastern Visayas, consisting of the provinces of Bohol, Cebu, Eastern Samar, Leyte,
Northern Samar, Samar, and Southern Leyte;
(g) Western Visayas, consisting of the provinces of Aklan, Antique, Capiz, Iloilo, Negros
Occidental, Negros Oriental, Palawan, Romblon, and Siquijor.
(h) Eastern Mindanao, consisting of the provinces of Agusan del Norte, Agusan Del Sur,
Bukidnon, Camiguin, Davao del Norte, Davao del Sur, Davao Oriental, Misamis Oriental,
Surigao del Norte, and Surigao del Sur; and
(i) Western Mindanao, consisting of the cities of Basilan and Zamboanga, and the provinces of
Cotabato, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Misamis Occidental, South Cotabato, Sulu,
Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur.
In the event of the creation of any new province, the Board of Governors shall, with the approval of the
Supreme Court, determine the Region to which the said province shall belong.

Section 4. Chapters. A Chapter of the Integrated Bar shall be organized in every province. Except as
hereinbelow provided, every city shall be considered part of the province within which it is geographically
situated.
A separate Chapter shall be organized in each of the following political subdivisions or areas;
(a) The sub-province of Aurora;
(b) Each congressional district of the City of Manila;
(c) Quezon City;
(d) Caloocan City, Malabon and Navotas;
(e) Pasay City, Makati, Mandaluyong and San Juan del Monte;
(f) Cebu City; and
(g) Zamboanga City and Basilan City.

Section 6. Board of Governors. The Integrated Bar shall be governed by a Board of Governors. Nine
Governors shall be elected by the House of Delegates from the nine Regions on the representation basis of
one Governor from each Region. Each Governor shall be chosen from a list of nominees submitted by the
Delegates from the Region, provided that not more than one nominee shall come from any Chapter. The
President and the Executive Vice President, if chosen by the Governors from outside of themselves as
provided in Section 7 of this Rule, shall ipso facto become members of the Board.
The members of the Board shall hold office for a term of one year from the date of their election and until
their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified. No person may be a Governor for more than
two terms.
The Board shall meet regularly once every three months, on such date and such time and place as it shall
designate. A majority of all the members of the Board shall constitute a quorum to do business. Special
meetings may be called by the President or by five members of the Board.
Subject to the approval of the Supreme Court, the Board shall adopt By-Laws and promulgate Canons of
Professional Responsibility for all members of the Integrated Bar. The By-Laws and the Canons may be
amended by the Supreme Court motu propio or upon the recommendation of the Board of Governors.
The Board shall prescribe such other rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper to carry out the
purposes of the Integrated Bar as well as the provisions of this Rule.

Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a
member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or area where his office, or, in the
absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than one
Chapter.

Section 7. Officers. The Integrated Bar shall have a President and an Executive Vice President who
shall be chosen by the Governors immediately after the latter's election, either from among themselves or
from other members of the Integrated Bar, by the vote of at least five Governors. Each of the regional
members of the Board shall be ex officio Vice President for the Region which he represents.

Each Chapter shall have its own local government as provided for by uniform rules to be prescribed by the
Board of Governors and approved by the Supreme Court, the provisions of Section 19 of this Rule
notwithstanding.

The President and the Executive Vice President shall hold office for a term of one year from the date of
their election and until their successors shall have duly qualified. The Executive Vice President shall
automatically become the President for the next succeeding full term. The Presidency shall rotate from
year to year among all the nine Regions in such order or rotation as the Board of Governors shall
prescribe. No person shall be President or Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar for more than
one term.

Chapters belonging to the same Region may hold regional conventions on matters and problems of
common concern.
Section 5. House of Delegates. The Integrated Bar shall have a House of Delegates of not more than
one hundred twenty members who shall be apportioned among all the Chapters as nearly as may be
according to the number of their respective members, but each Chapter shall have at least one Delegate.
On or before December 31, 1974, and every four years thereafter, the Board of Governors shall make an
apportionment of Delegates.
The term of the office of Delegate shall begin on the date of the opening of the annual convention of the
House and shall end on the day immediately preceding the date of the opening of the next succeeding
annual convention. No person may be a Delegate for more than two terms.
The House shall hold an annual convention at the call of the Board of Governors at any time during the
month of April of each year for the election of Governor, the reading and discussion of reports including
the annual report of the Board of Governors, the transaction of such other business as may be referred to it
by the Board, and the consideration of such additional matters as may be requested in writing by at least
twenty Delegates. Special conventions of the House may be called by the Board of Governors to consider
only such matters as the Board shall indicate. A majority of the Delegates who have registered for a
convention, whether annual or special, shall constitute a quorum to do business.

The Integrated Bar shall have a Secretary, a Treasurer, and such other officers and employees as may be
required by the Board of Governors, to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Board, and to
hold office at the pleasure of the Board or for such terms as it may fix. Said officers and employees need
not be members of the Integrated Bar.
Section 8. Vacancies. In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his duties shall be performed
by the Executive Vice President; and in the event of the death, resignation, or removal of the President, the
Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting President during the remainder of the term of the office
thus vacated. In the event of the death, resignation, removal, or disability of both the President and the
Executive Vice President, the Board of Governors shall elect an Acting President to hold office until the
next succeeding election or during the period of disability.
The filling of vacancies in the House of Delegates, Board of Governors, and all other positions of Officers
of the Integrated Bar shall be as provided in the By-Laws. Whenever the term of an office or position is
for a fixed period, the person chosen to fill a vacancy therein shall serve only for the unexpired term.

Section 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the
Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to
ten percent (10%) of the collection from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled
members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.
Section 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default
in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated
Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
Section 11. Voluntary termination of membership; re-instatement. A member may terminate his
membership by filing a written notice to that effect with the Secretary of the Integrated Bar, who shall
immediately bring the matter to the attention of the Supreme Court. Forthwith he shall cease to be a
member and his name shall be stricken by the Court from the Roll of Attorneys. Reinstatement may be
made by the Court in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by the Board of Governors and
approved by the Court.
Section 12. Grievance procedures. The Board of Governors shall provide in the By-Laws for grievance
procedures for the enforcement and maintenance of discipline among all the members of the Integrated
Bar, but no action involving the suspension or disbarment of a member or the removal of his name from
the Roll of Attorneys shall be effective without the final approval of the Supreme Court.
Section 13. Non-political Bar. The Integrated Bar shall be strictly non-political, and every activity
tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. No lawyer
holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election of appointment to any position in the
Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his position as of the
moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or accepts appointment to any
judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof.
Section 14. Positions honorary. Except as may be specifically authorized or allowed by the Supreme
Court, no Delegate or Governor and no national or local Officer or committee member shall receive any
compensation, allowance or emolument from the funds of the Integrated Bar for any service rendered
therein or be entitled to reimbursement for any expense incurred in the discharge of his functions.
Section 15. Fiscal matters. The Board of Governors shall administer the funds of the Integrated Bar
and shall have the power to make appropriations and disbursements therefrom. It shall cause proper Books
of Accounts to be kept and Financial Statements to be rendered and shall see to it that the proper audit is
made of all accounts of the Integrated Bar and all the Chapters thereof.
Section 16. Journal. The Board of Governors shall cause to be published a quarterly Journal of the
Integrated Bar, free copies of which shall be distributed to every member of the Integrated Bar.
Section 17. Voluntary Bar associations. All voluntary Bar associations now existing or which may
hereafter be formed may co-exist with the Integrated Bar but shall not operate at cross-purposes therewith.
Section 18. Amendments. This Rule may be amended by the Supreme Court motu propio or upon the
recommendation of the Board of Governors or any Chapter of the Integrated Bar.

Section 19. Organizational period. The Commission on Bar Integration shall organize the local
Chapters and toward this end shall secure the assistance of the Department of Justice and of all Judges
throughout the Philippines. All Chapter organizational meetings shall be held on Saturday, February 17,
1973. In every case, the Commission shall cause proper notice of the date, time and place of the meeting
called to organize a Chapter shall constitute a quorum for the purpose, including the election of a
President, a Vice President, a Secretary, a Treasurer, and five Directors.
The Commission shall initially fix the number of Delegates and apportion the same among all the
Chapters as nearly as may be in proportion to the number of their respective members, but each Chapter
shall have at least one Delegate. The President of each Chapter shall concurrently be its Delegate to the
House of Delegates. The Vice President shall be his alternate, except where the Chapter is entitled to have
more than one Delegate, in which case the Vice President shall also be a Delegate.
The Board of Directors of the Chapter shall in proper cases elect additional as well as alternate Delegates.
The House of Delegates shall convene in the City of Manila on Saturday, March 17, 1973 for the Purpose
of electing a Board of Governors. The Governors shall immediately assume office and forthwith meet to
elect the Officers of the Integrated Bar. The Officers so chosen shall immediately assume their respective
positions.
Section 20. Effectivity. This Rule shall take effect on January 16, 1973.

.......
-

dated January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not Civil

Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.

This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies
that only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing,
is entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides
that "default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension
of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall
be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys."

SECOND DIVISION
[A.C No. 4749. January 20, 2000]
SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent.

Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the
bar standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the
IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a member.
Jksm

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he
does not indicate any PTR for payment of professional tax.

This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against
respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.

Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an
attorney may be done not only by the Supreme Court but also by the Court of
Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing some of these
courts).

In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a
member of the bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate
sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now,
has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of
issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has
been using this for at least three years already, as shown by the following attached
sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals available)

Ann
ex A
.......
-

"Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated

December 1, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-25253,
RTC, Br. 224, QC

Ann
ex B
.......
-

"Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated

November 13, 1996 in Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC
Br. 259 (not 257), Paraaque, MM

Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown
by:
1........his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No.
1037-CJ En Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 ( in SCRA )
2........his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No.
11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of the Order dated February 14,
1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of the conviction which is purportedly
on appeal in the Court of Appeals).
Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13, 1996, and
January 17, 1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears to be respondents
signature above his name, address and the receipt number "IBP Rizal 259060." 1[1] Also attached was a
copy of the order,2[2] dated February 14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying respondents motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in
Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

1
Ann
ex C

"An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of

Time to File Required Comment and Opposition"

On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification3[3] dated March 18, 1997, by the then president of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondents "last payment of his IBP
dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to
the present."

honestly believe in view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a
limited practice, the subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is
covered by such exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights as an IBP member
to vote and be voted upon.

On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days from receipt of
notice, after which the case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. In his
comment-memorandum,4[4] dated June 3, 1998, respondent alleged:5[5]

Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if
only to show that he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and
refused compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all
past dues even with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to
tender such fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again
irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the complainant,
but as an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such
dues despite his candor and honest belief in all food faith, to the contrary. Esmsc

3. That with respect to the complainants absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996
and 1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically
no longer a member in good standing.
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the
bar who is in good standing is entitled to practice law.
The complainants basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good
standing, were as above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of
dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC,
concealment of encumbrances. Chief

On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution 6[6] adopting and approving the
report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three months and until he pays his IBP dues.
Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a resolution, 7[7]
dated April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for
final action on the decision of the IBP ordering respondents suspension for three months.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:

As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and
reversed and respondent was even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to
Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.

On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondents non-indication of the

proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of
the letter complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least
three years."

Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was
appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still pending.

The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal
Chapter President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondents last payment of his IBP
dues was in 1991."

Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as
a Judge was never set aside and reversed, and also had the decision of conviction
for a light felony, been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned himself
would surrender his right or privilege to practice law.

While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by respondent,
he has invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally
exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect in 1992 in the
payment of taxes, income taxes as an example."

4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in
his dues.

....

Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up
to the present, that he had only a limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax
Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares orchard
and pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.

The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact,
respondent admitted that he is still in the practice of law when he alleged that the
"undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income tax Return up
to the present time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of
Respondents Memorandum).

Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since
1992, is legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992,
in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being thus exempt, he

Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines. Esmmis

3
4

On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court about
his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at
least six years and therefore liable for his actions. Respondent in his memorandum
did not discuss this issue.

Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed
merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondents advanced age, his express willingness to
pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law,8[8] we believe the penalty of one year
suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.

First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having paid his
IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court,
he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and
1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years in
which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and
that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A.
No. 7432, 4 as a senior citizen since 1992.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE
(1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision be attached to
Atty. Llamas personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.

Rule 139-A provides:

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

SO ORDERED.

Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such
annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the
Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from
each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the
Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of
this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for
one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues,
and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, 4 grants senior
citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable
income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and Development
Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include payment of membership or association
dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and
the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY
AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Esmso
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO
THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

In his reply[4] dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is questioning is the IBP Board of
Governors Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues of lawyers regardless of
whether or not they are engaged in active or inactive practice. He asseverates that the Policy of NonExemption in the payment of annual membership dues suffers from constitutional infirmities, such as
equal protection clause and the due process clause. He also posits that compulsory payment of the IBP
annual membership dues would indubitably be oppressive to him considering that he has been in an
inactive status and is without income derived from his law practice. He adds that his removal from
nonpayment of annual membership dues would constitute deprivation of property right without due
process of law. Lastly, he claims that non-practice of law by a lawyer-member in inactive status is neither
injurious to active law practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the community where the
inactive lawyers-members reside.
EN BANC
[B.M. No. 1370. May 9, 2005]
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF
IBP DUES.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues filed by
petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter,[1] dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP dues in the
amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after
being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine Civil Service from July
1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the
year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in the
Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of ones profession while in
government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years when he was working in the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment.[2]
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment[3] stating inter alia: that membership in the IBP is
not based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as
long as he continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a member is the payment of
annual dues as determined by the IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as
provided for in Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on
the IBP members has been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and that
the policy of the IBP Board of Governors of no exemption from payment of dues is but an implementation
of the Courts directives for all members of the IBP to help in defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It
maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues as requested by
respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary termination and reinstatement of membership. It asserted that
what petitioner could have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so
that his membership in the IBP could have been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have
been stopped. It also alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing proposals for
the creation of an inactive status for its members, which if approved by the Board of Governors and by
this Court, will exempt inactive IBP members from payment of the annual dues.

Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues
during the time that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from
1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-2003?
We rule in the negative.
An Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
association organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of
the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his
shares in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities.
Organized by or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all
lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the
governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective
discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional
responsibility, breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper
cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member.[5]
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population. This
requires membership and financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of
law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.[6]
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend
the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of his annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to
foster the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that
the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory program the lawyers.[7]
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and
duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the integration of the
Philippine Bar[8] - which power required members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a
reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is
quite apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for
carrying out the noble objectives and purposes of integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the Philippine Bar,[9] thus:
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court is attempting to
levy a tax.

A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax purpose of a tax is a
revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation,
it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar
program without means to defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it
the power to impose such exaction.
The only limitation upon the States power to regulate the privilege of law is that the regulation does not
impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far
outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member resulting from his required payment of the annual dues.
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt.
This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as ones membership in the
IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership dues. At most,
as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his
intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have been
terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have been discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of
discussing the situation of members under inactive status and the nonpayment of their dues during such
inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty bound to comply with his obligation to pay membership
dues to the IBP.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount to a deprivation of
property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon,[10] in this wise:
. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a
license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the
police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence,
the respondents right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a
penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void
as unreasonable or arbitrary.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as
such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyers public
responsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions,[11] one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails
the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.
WHEREFORE, petitioners request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is ordered
to pay P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as membership fees for the years 1977-2005, within a
non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of this decision, with a warning that failure to do so
will merit his suspension from the practice of law.

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, AustriaMartinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court for recorrection and re-evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar Examinations question, Oscar
Landicho who flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of 70.5%,
65.35% and 67.55%, respectively invited the attention of the Court to "The starling fact that
the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one reason
or another, before the bar results were released this year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.).
This was confirmed, according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon C.
Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He further therein stated "that there
are strong reasons to believe that the grades in other examination notebooks in other subjects
also underwent alternations to raise the grades prior to the release of the results. Note that
this was without any formal motion or request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar candidates
concerned. If the examiners concerned reconsidered their grades without formal motion, there is
no reason why they may not do so now when proper request answer motion therefor is made. It
would be contrary to due process postulates. Might not one say that some candidates got unfair
and unjust treatment, for their grades were not asked to be reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the
discrimination? Does this not afford sufficient reason for the Court en banc to go into these
matters by its conceded power to ultimately decide the matter of admission to the bar?" (p. 2,
Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975

IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court,
respondent.
A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975
IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, respondent.

Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar
Examinations and found that the grades in five subjects Political Law and Public International
Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law of a successful bar
candidate with office code No. 954 underwent some changes which, however, were duly initialed
and authenticated by the respective examiner concerned. Further check of the records revealed
that the bar candidate with office code No. 954 is one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar
candidate, who flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a grade
of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971
bar examinations with a grade of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of
74.15%, which was considered as 75% as the passing mark for the 1971 bar examinations.
Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar Confidant
Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar examiners concerned to submit their sworn statements
on the matter, with which request they complied.
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having brought the five
examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the circumstances under which the same
was done and his reasons for doing the same.

A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975

IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL TOMACRUZ,
ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members, 1971 Bar Examining
Committee, respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:
Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo for disbarment; Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty.
Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo,
Jr. for disciplinary action for their acts and omissions during the 1971 Bar Examinations.

Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-evaluated
and/or re-checked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him
by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee
concerned failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing.
Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal investigation, the Court
required, in a resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause
within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys"
(Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the re-evaluation of the examination papers
of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain
a passing average in the 1971 bar examinations, the Court likewise resolved on March 5, 1971
to requires him "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners

concerned were also required by the Court "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why
no disciplinary action should be taken against them" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.).
while respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19,
1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the hearing on
August 27, 1973, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in
amplication of, his answer filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).
Respondent Galang filed his unverified answer on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp.
100-104, rec.). He was required by the Court to verify the same and complaince came on May
18, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110,) rec.).
In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent Bernardo Pardo who
re-evaluated and/or re-checked examination booklet with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law
and Public International Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo
Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercise, who was asked to help in the
correction of a number of examination notebooks in Political Law and Public International Law to
meet the deadline for submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty.
Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was likewise included as respondent in Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon.
Bernardo Pardo remainded as a respondent for it was also discovered that another paper in
Political Law and Public International Law also underwent re-evaluation and/or re-checking. This
notebook with Office Code No. 1662 turned out to be owned by another successful candidate by
the name of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further investigation resulted in the discovery of another reevaluation and/or re-checking of a notebook in the subject of Mercantile Law resulting in the
change of the grade from 4% to 50% This notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by
another successful candidate by the name of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz
and the latter's father were summoned to testify in the investigation.
An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request of the
Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee as Investigation Officer, showed that one
Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of Law of Manuel L.
Quezon University, was, on September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of slight physical injuries
in the Municipal Court of Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student of the same
university. Confronted with this information at the hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21,
32, rec.), respondent Galang declared that he does not remember having been charged with the
crime of slight physical injuries in that case. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).
Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations, did not make mention of
this fact which he is required under the rules to do.
The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and was terminated on
October 2, 1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents were required to submit their memoranda.
Respondents Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo submitted their respective memorandum on
November 14, 1973.
Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent residence in Australia,
where he is believed to be gainfully employed. Hence, he was not summoned to testify.
At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who offered as evidence
only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as
their direct evidence the affidavits and answers earlier submitted by them to the Court. The
same became the basis for their cross-examination.

In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as their direct testimony in
the investigation conducted by the Court, the respondent-examiners recounted the
circumstances under which they re-evaluated and/or re-checked the examination notebooks in
question.
In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:
2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was correcting
the examination notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me
that it is the practice and the policy in bar examinations that he (Atty.
Lanuevo) make a review of the grades obtained in all subjects and if he
finds that candidate obtained an extraordinary high grade in one subject
and a rather low one in another, he will bring back the latter to the examiner
concerned for re-evaluation and change of grade;
3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought back
to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, because
according to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could
reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the
practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so in the further belief that I
was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and
reconsidered the grade to 75%;
5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such reevaluation and upon verifying my files I found that the notebook is
numbered '95;
6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the answers
were based on the same standard used in the correction and evaluation of
all others; thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with original grades of 7% each was
reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and No. 8
with 8% to 10% (emphasis supplied).
His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his April 11, 1972
affidavit with following additional statements:
xxx xxx xxx
3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not reconsidered
as it is no longer to make the reconsideration of these answers because of
the same evaluation and standard; hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10 remainded at
5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;
4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet No.
951 I did not know the identity of its owner until I received this resolution of
the Honorable Supreme Court nor the identities of the examiners in other
subjects;

5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief
that I am authorized to do so in view of the misrepresentation of said Atty.
Lanuevo, based on the following circumstances:
a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about
October 16, 1971, relationship between Atty. Lanuevo
and myself had developed to the point that with respect
to the correction of the examination booklets of bar
candidates I have always followed him and considered
his instructions as reflecting the rules and policy of the
Honorable Supreme Court with respect to the same;
that I have no alternative but to take his words;
b) That considering this relationship and considering
his misrepresentation to me as reflecting the real and
policy of the Honorable Supreme Court, I did not bother
any more to get the consent and permission of the
Chairman of the Bar Committee. Besides, at that time, I
was isolating myself from all members of the Supreme
Court and specially the chairman of the Bar Committee
for fear that I might be identified as a bar examiner;

that it might have been possible that I had given a particularly low grade to
said examinee.
Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's representations to
me, and as it was humanly possible that I might have erred in the grading of
the said notebook, I re-examined the same, carefully read the answer, and
graded it in accordance with the same standards I had used throughout the
grading of the entire notebooks, with the result that the examinee deserved
an increased grade of 66. After again clearing with the Bar Confidant my
authority to correct the grades, and as he had assured me that the code
number of the examinee in question had not been decoded and his name
known, ... I therefore corrected the total grade in the notebook and the
grade card attached thereto, and properly initia(l)ed the same. I also
corrected the itemized grades (from item No. 1 to item No. 10) on the two
sets of grading sheets, my personal copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant
brought with him the other copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with
him the other copy the grading sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.;
emphasis supplied)
In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation", respondent
Bernardo P. Pardo adopted and replaced therein by reference the facts stated in his earlier
sworn statement and in additional alleged that:

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx
e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return for
such recorrection, and as proof of it, I declined to consider and evaluate one
booklet in Remedial Law aforesaid because I was not the one who made
the original correction of the same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political Law and
Public International Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:
On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain from
me the last bag of two hundred notebooks (bearing examiner's code
numbers 1200 to 1400) which according to my record was on February 5,
1972, he came to my residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding in a Vokswagen
panel of the Supreme Court, with at least two companions. The bar
confidant had with him an examinee's notebook bearing code number 661,
and, after the usual amenties, he requested me if it was possible for me to
review and re-examine the said notebook because it appears that the
examinee obtained a grade of 57, whereas, according to the Bar Confidant,
the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest
of which was 84, if I recall correctly, in remedial law.
I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-examinee the
notebook as I had submitted the same beforehand, and he told me that I
was authorized to do so because the same was still within my control and
authority as long as the particular examinee's name had not been identified
or that the code number decode and the examinee's name was revealed.
The Bar Confidant told me that the name of the examinee in the case
present bearing code number 661 had not been identified or revealed; and

3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and

international law, code numbered 661, I did know the name of the
examinee. In fact, I came to know his name only upon receipt of the
resolution of March 5, 1973; now knowing his name, I wish to state that I do
not know him personally, and that I have never met him even up to the
present;
4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to make
such review, and had repeatedly asked the Bar Confidant whether I was
authorized to make such revision and was so assured of my authority as the
name of the examinee had not yet been decoded or his identity revealed.
The Bar Confidant's assurance was apparently regular and so appeared to
be in the regular course of express prohibition in the rules and guidelines
given to me as an examiner, and the Bar Confidant was my official liaison
with the Chairman, as, unless called, I refrained as much as possible from
frequent personal contact with the Chairman lest I be identified as an
examiner. ...;
5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock in the
evening at my residence, I felt it inappropriate to verify his authority with the
Chairman. It did not appear to me that his representations were
unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed, the Bar Confidant was riding in the
official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a Volkswagen panel, accompanied by
two companions, which was usual, and thus looked like a regular visit to me
of the Bar Confidant, as it was about the same hour that he used to see me:
xxx xxx xxx

7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same condition
as when I submitted the same. In agreeing to review the said notebook
code numbered 661, my aim was to see if I committed an error in the
correction, not to make the examinee pass the subject. I considered it
entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that particular
notebook on December 31, 1971, considering especially the representation
of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades in
other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in remedial law, if I recall
correctly. Of course, it did not strike me as unusual that the Bar Confidant
knew the grades of the examinee in the position to know and that there was
nothing irregular in that:

5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee concerned"
(Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the word of
the Bar Confidant in good faith and without the slightest inkling as to the identity of the examinee
in question who up to now remains a total stranger and without expectation of nor did I derive
any personal benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated April 14, 1972, that:
xxx xxx xxx

8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the

examinee with notebook code numbered 661 was 57%. After review, it was
increased by 9 points, resulting in a final grade of 66%. Still, the examinee
did not pass the subject, and, as heretofore stated, my aim was not to make
the examinee pass, notwithstanding the representation that he had passed
the other subjects. ...
9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners'
Committee consensus was that where an examinee failed in only one
subject and passed the rest, the examiner in said subject would review the
notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular. At the time of the Committee's
first meeting, we still did not know the names of the candidates.
10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had absolutely no
knowledge of the motives of the Bar Confidant or his malfeasance in office,
and did not know the examinee concerned nor had I any kind of contract
with him before or rather the review and even up to the present (Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 12, 1972:
1. xxx xxx xxx
2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect
examination books to my residence at 951 Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong,
Rizal.
3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the
books in Criminal Law and was helping in the correction of some of the
papers in another subject, the Bar Confidant brought back to me one (1)
paper in Criminal Law saying that that particular examinee had missed the
passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his paper in
Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75% then he would make the
general passing average.
4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving a
raise of, if I remember correctly, 2 or 3 points, initialled the revised mark and
revised also the mark and revised also the mark in the general list.

2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February 1972,
Attorney Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw me in my
house at No. 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an
examinee's notebook in Remedial Law which I had previously graded and
submitted to him. He informed me that he and others (he used the words
"we") had reviewed the said notebook. He requested me to review the said
notebook and possibly reconsider the grade that I had previously given. He
explained that the examine concerned had done well in other subjects, but
that because of the comparatively low grade that I had given him in
Remedial Law his general average was short of passing. Mr. Lanuevo
remarked that he thought that if the paper were reviewed I might find the
examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr.
Lanuevo particularly called my attention to the fact in his answers the
examinee expressed himself clearly and in good enough English. Mr.
Lanuevo however informed me that whether I would reconsider the grades I
had previously given and submitted was entirely within my discretion.
3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant
to address such a request to me and that the said request was in order, I, in
the presence of Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate each
and every item of the paper in question. I recall that in my re-evaluation of
the answers, I increased the grades in some items, made deductions in
other items, and maintained the same grades in other items. However, I
recall that after Mr. Lanuevo and I had totalled the new grades that I had
given after re-evaluation, the total grade increased by a few points, but still
short of the passing mark of 75% in my subject.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated the contents of
his sworn statement, adding the following:
xxx xxx xxx

5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing the

total grade of the examinee-concerned in Remedial Law from 63.75% to
74.5%, herein respondent acted in good faith. It may well be that he could
be faulted for not having verified from the Chairman of the Committee of Bar
Examiners the legitimacy of the request made by Mr. Lanuevo. Herein
respondent, however, pleads in attenuation of such omission, that
a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first
time, he was not aware, not having been apprised
otherwise, that it was not within the authority of the Bar
Confidant of the Supreme Court to request or suggest
that the grade of a particular examination notebook be
revised or reconsidered. He had every right to
presume, owing to the highly fiduciary nature of the
position of the Bar Confidant, that the request was
legitimate.
xxx xxx xxx
c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee
concerned, herein respondent carefully evaluated each
and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the
answers by the criteria laid down by the Court, and
giving the said examinee the benefit of doubt in view of
Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that
particular subject that the said examine failed, herein
respondent became convinced that the said examinee
deserved a higher grade than that previously given to
him, but that he did not deserve, in herein respondent's
honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade of 75%.
It should also be mentioned that, in reappraising the
answers, herein respondent downgraded a previous
rating of an answer written by the examinee, from
9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 17,
1972:
xxx xxx xxx
That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee after
the Bar Examinations were held, I was informed that one Bar examinee
passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law;
That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to reevaluate the paper of this particular Bar candidate;.
That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's
notebook (No. 1613) showing a grade of 61%;

That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers of this
particular Bar candidate I decided to increase his final grade to 71%;
That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes in
the grade sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the contents of his sworn
statement of April 17, 1972, and
xxx xxx xxx
2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that I reevaluated the examination notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613 in
Mercantile Law in absolute good faith and in direct compliance with the
agreement made during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners
Committee that where a candidate fails in only one subject, the Examiner
concerned should make a re-evaluation of the answers of the candidate
concerned, which I did.
3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the
aforementioned re-evaluation that notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile Law
pertained to bar examine Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and
that I have never met up to this time this particular bar examinee (Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated:
xxx xxx xxx
As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading
sheets and the posting on the record of ratings, I was impressed of the
writing and the answers on the first notebook. This led me to scrutinize all
the set of notebooks. Believing that those five merited re-evalation on the
basis of the memorandum circularized to the examiners shortly earlier to the
effect that
... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight
should then be given to clarify of language and
soundness of reasoning' (par. 4),
I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for reevaluation and/or re-checking.
It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the release of
the results of the examinations, we are usually swarmed with requests of
the examinees that they be shown their notebooks. Many of them would
copy their answers and have them checked by their professors. Eventually
some of them would file motions or requests for re-correction and/or reevaluation. Right now, we have some 19 of such motions or requests which
we are reading for submission to the Honorable Court.

Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they
have to be denied because the result of the examinations when released is
final and irrevocable.
It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that motivated
me to bring those notebooks back to the respective examiners for reevaluation" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:
That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners concerned in
his hotest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in so doing, it was
not his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as bar
confidant but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; that
neither did he act in a presumptuous manner, because the matter of
whether or not re-evaluation was inorder was left alone to the examiners'
decision; and that, to his knowledge, he does not remember having made
the alleged misrepresentation but that he remembers having brought to the
attention of the Committee during the meeting a matter concerning another
examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a grade below
50% in Mercantile Law. As the Committee agreed to remove the
disqualification by way of raising the grade in said subject, respondent
brought the notebook in question to the Examiner concerned who thereby
raised the grade thus enabling the said examinee to pass. If he remembers
right, the examinee concerned is one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la
Cruz".
Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would stir
such serious charges as would tend to undermine his integrity because he
did it in all good faith.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed another
sworn statement in addition to, and in amplification of, his answer, stating:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned into
believing that the examinee involved failed only in their respective subjects,
the fact of the matter being that the notebooks in question were submitted to
the respective examiners for re-evaluation believing in all good faith that
they so merited on the basis of the Confidential Memorandum (identified
and marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly that portion marked as Exh. 1a-Lanuevo)which was circulated to all the examiners earlier, leaving to them
entirely the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order,
2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the notebooks in
question:

Sometime during the latter part of January and the early

part of February, 1972, on my way back to the office
(Bar Division) after lunch, I though of buying a
sweepstake ticket. I have always made it a point that
the moment I think of so buying, I pick a number from
any object and the first number that comes into my
sight becomes the basis of the ticket that I buy. At that
moment, the first number that I saw was "954" boldly
printed on an electrical contribance (evidently belonging
to the MERALCO) attached to a post standing along the
right sidewalk of P. Faura street towards the Supreme
Court building from San Marcelino street and almost
adjacent to the south-eastern corner of the fence of the
Araullo High School(photograph of the number '954',
the contrivance on which it is printed and a portion of
the post to which it is attached is identified and marked
as Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the number "954" as Exh. 4a-Lanuevo).
With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza
Sta. Cruz to look for a ticket that would contain such
number. Eventually, I found a ticket, which I then
bought, whose last three digits corresponded to "954".
This number became doubly impressive to me because
the sum of all the six digits of the ticket number was
"27", a number that is so significant to me that
everything I do I try somewhat instinctively to link or
connect it with said number whenever possible. Thus
even in assigning code numbers on the Master List of
examinees from 1968 when I first took charge of the
examinations as Bar Confidant up to 1971, I either
started with the number "27" (or "227") or end with said
number. (1968 Master List is identified and marked as
Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the figure "27" at the beginning of
the list, as Exh. 5-a Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as Exh.
6-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the
list, as Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as Exh. 7Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list
as Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo; and the 1971 Master List as Exh.
8-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the end of the list as
Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).
The significance to me of this number (27) was born out
of these incidents in my life, to wit: (a) On November
27, 1941 while with the Philippine Army stationed at
Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, I was
stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the
Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result. As will be
recalled, the last Pacific War broke out on December 8,
1941. While I was still confined at the hospital, our
camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on
December 13, 1941 resulting in many casualties. From
then on, I regarded November 27, 1941 as the
beginning of a new life for me having been saved from

the possibility of being among the casualties;(b) On

February 27, 1946, I was able to get out of the army
byway of honorable discharge; and (c) on February 27,
1947, I got married and since then we begot children
the youngest of whom was born on February 27, 1957.
Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying
the ticket, I resumed my work which at the time was on
the checking of the notebooks. While thus checking, I
came upon the notebooks bearing the office code
number "954". As the number was still fresh in my mind,
it aroused my curiosity prompting me to pry into the
contents of the notebooks. Impressed by the clarity of
the writing and language and the apparent soundness
of the answers and, thereby, believing in all good faith
on the basis of the aforementioned Confidential
Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)
that they merited re-evaluation, I set them aside and
later on took them back to the respective examiners for
possible review recalling to them the said Confidential
Memorandum but leaving absolutely the matter to their
discretion and judgment.
3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have reference to
either of the two cases which I brought to the attention of the committee
during the meeting and which the Committee agreed to refer back to the
respective examines, namely:
(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing
general average but with a grade below 50% (47%) in
Mercantile Law(the notebooks of this examinee bear
the Office Code No. 110, identified and marked as Exh.
9-Lanuevo and the notebook in Mercantile Law bearing
the Examiner's Code No. 951 with the original grade of
4% increased to 50% after re-evaluation as Exh. 9-aLanuevo); and
(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline
general average of 73.15% with a grade below 60%
(57%) in one subject which, at the time, I could not
pinpoint having inadvertently left in the office the data
thereon. It turned out that the subject was Political and
International Law under Asst. Solicitor General
Bernardo Pardo (The notebooks of this examinee bear
the Office Code No. 1622 identified and marked as Exh.
10-Lanuevo and the notebook in Political and
International Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 661
with the original grade of 57% increased to 66% after
re-evaluation, as Exh. 10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook in
Political and International Law is precisely the same
notebook mentioned in the sworn statement of Asst.
Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).

4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding paragraph,
only one (1) subject or notebook was reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only
Mercantile Law in the former; and only Political and International Law in the
latter, under the facts and circumstances I made known to the Committee
and pursuant to which the Committee authorized the referral of the
notebooks involved to the examiners concerned;
5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to review
or re-check some 19, or so, notebooks in his subject but that I told the
Committee that there was very little time left and that the increase in grade
after re-evaluation, unless very highly substantial, may not alter the outcome
since the subject carries the weight of only 10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp.
45-47, rec.).
The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact that Lanuevo's story
is devoid of truth. In his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize all the set of
notebooks" of respondent Galang, because he "was impressed of the writing and the answers
on the first notebook "as he "was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the
grading sheets and the posting on the record of ratings." In his affidavit of August 27, 1973, he
stated that the number 954 on a Meralco post provoked him "to pry into the contents of the
notebooks" of respondent Galang "bearing office code number '954."
Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among others;
1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former BarConfidant
Victorio Lanuevo and never met him before except once when, as required
by the latter respondent submitted certain papers necessary for taking the
bar examinations.
xxx xxx xxx
4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to
reconsider "failure" cases; after the official release thereof; why should it
now reconsider a "passing" case, especially in a situation where the
respondent and the bar confidant do not know each other and, indeed, met
only once in the ordinary course of official business?
It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly
manifests a reasonable doubt to which respondent is richly entitled?
5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's
resolution dated March 5, 1973, had no knowledge whatsoever of former
Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo's actuations which are stated in particular in
the resolution. In fact, the respondent never knew this man intimately nor,
had the herein respondent utilized anyone to contact the Bar Confidant
Lanuevo in his behalf.
But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as
stated in the Resolution, which are evidently purported to show as having
redounded to the benefit of herein respondent, these questions arise: First,
was the re-evaluation of Respondent's examination papers by the Bar

Examination Committee done only or especially for him and not done
generally as regards the paper of the other bar candidates who are
supposed to have failed? If the re-evaluation of Respondent's grades was
done among those of others, then it must have been done as a matter of
policy of the Committee to increase the percentage of passing in that year's
examination and, therefore, the insinuation that only respondent's papers
were re-evaluated upon the influence of Bar Confidant Lanuevo would be
unjustifiable, if not far fetched. Secondly, is the fact that BarConfidant
Lanuevo's actuations resulted in herein Respondent's benefit an evidence
per se of Respondent's having caused actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo
to be done in former's behalf? To assume this could be disastrous in effect
because that would be presuming all the members of the Bar Examination
Committee as devoid of integrity, unfit for the bar themselves and the result
of their work that year, as also unworthy of anything. All of these inferences
are deductible from the narration of facts in the resolution, and which only
goes to show said narration of facts an unworthy of credence, or
consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make this
Respondent Account or answer for the actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo
as well as for the actuations of the Bar Examiners implying the existence of
some conspiracy between them and the Respondent. The evident
imputation is denied and it is contended that the Bar Examiners were in the
performance of their duties and that they should be regarded as such in the
consideration of this case.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).
I
The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo systematically and
cleverly initiated and prepared the stage leading to the re-evalation and/or recorrection of the
answers of respondent Galang by deceiving separately and individually the respondentsexaminers to make the desired revision without prior authority from the Supreme Court after the
corrected notebooks had been submitted to the Court through the respondent Bar Confidant,
who is simply the custodian thereof for and in behalf of the Court.
It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971, just before
Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the latter
was in the process of correcting examination booklets, and then and there made the
representations that as BarConfidant, he makes a review of the grades obtained in all subjects
of the examinees and if he finds that a candidate obtains an extraordinarily high grade in one
subject and a rather low one on another, he will bring back to the examiner concerned the
notebook for re-evaluation and change of grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 5556; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondentexaminer Pamatian an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, representing that the
examinee who owned the particular notebook is on the borderline of passing and if his grade in
said subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said examine will get a passing average.

Respondent-examiner Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word and under the belief that was
really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court and in his further belief that he was just
manifesting cooperation in doing so, he re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the examinee's
grade in said subject to 75% from 64%. The particular notebook belonged to an examinee with
Examiner's Code Number 95 and with Office Code Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. Respondent Pamatian did not know the identity of the
examinee at the time he re-evaluated the said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects including
Civil Law. After such revision, examinee Galang still failed in six subjects and could not obtain
the passing average of 75% for admission to the Bar.
Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February, 1972, respondent
Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street,
Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law, which respondent Manalo and
previously corrected and graded. Respondent Lanuevo then requested respondent Manalo to
review the said notebook and possibly to reconsider the grade given, explaining and
representing that "they" has reviewed the said notebook and that the examinee concerned had
done well in other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade given said
examinee by respondent Manalo in Remedial Law, the general average of said examinee was
short of passing. Respondent Lanuevo likewise made the remark and observation that he
thought that if the notebook were reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find the examinee
deserving of being admitted to the Bar. Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the
attention of respondent Manalo to the fact that in his answers, the examinee expressed himself
clearly and in good English. Furthermore, respondent Lanuevo called the attention of
respondent Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that read as follows:
4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge of legal
fundamentals, and ability to analyze and solve legal problems rather than a
test of memory; in the correction of papers, substantial weight should be
given to clarify of language and soundness of reasoning.
Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the matter of
reconsideration was entirely within his (Manalo's) discretion. Respondent Manalo, believing that
respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the authority to make such request and further
believing that such request was in order, proceeded to re-evaluate the examinee's answers in
the presence of Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the examinee's grade in that particular
subject, Remedial Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%. Respondent Manalo authenticated with his
signature the changes made by him in the notebook and in the grading sheet. The said notebook
examiner's code number is 136, instead of 310 as earlier mentioned by him in his affidavit, and
belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).
But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could not make the passing
grade due to his failing marks in five subjects.
Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent Lanuevo went to
deliver to respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a new batch of examination
papers in Political Law and Public International Law to be corrected, respondent Lanuevo
brought out a notebook in Political Law bearing Examiner's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo,
Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66, rec.), informing respondent Pablo that particular examinee who

owns the said notebook seems to have passed in all other subjects except in Political Law and
Public International Law; and that if the said notebook would be re-evaluated and the mark be
increased to at least 75%, said examinee will pass the bar examinations. After satisfying himself
from respondent that this is possible the respondent Bar Confidant informing him that this is
the practice of the Court to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject respondent
Pablo acceded to the request and thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said notebook.
Respondent Pablo thereafter re-evaluated the answers, this time with leniency. After the reevaluation, the grade was increased to 78% from 68%, or an increase of 10%. Respondent
Pablo then made the corresponding corrections in the grading sheet and accordingly initialed the
charges made. This notebook with Office Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-46, rec.).
After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average was still below the
passing grade, because of his failing marks in four subjects.
Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent Lanuevo brought back
to respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet in Criminal Law, with the former informing the
latter, who was then helping in the correction of papers in Political Law and Public International
Law, as he had already finished correcting the examination notebooks in his assigned subject
Criminal Law that the examinee who owns that particular notebook had missed the passing
grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his grade in Criminal Law would be raised a few
points to 75%, then the examinee would make the passing grade. Accepting the words of
respondent Lanuevo, and seeing the justification and because he did not want to be the one
causing the failure of the examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from 64% to 75%
and thereafter, he initialed the revised mark and also revised the mark in the general list and
likewise initialed the same. The examinee's Examiner Code Number is 746 while his Office Code
Number is 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66 and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by respondent Lanuevo
when the latter approached him for this particular re-evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo
declaring to him that where a candidate had almost made the passing average but had failed in
one subject, as a matter of policy of the Court, leniency is applied in reviewing the examinee's
notebook in the failing subject. He recalls, however, that he was provided a copy of the
Confidential Memorandum but this was long before the re-evaluation requested by respondent
Lanuevo as the same was received by him before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).
However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general average to a passing
grade because of his failing mark in three more subjects, including Mercantile Law. For the
revision of examinee Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo neatly set the
last phase of his quite ingenious scheme by securing authorization from the Bar Examination
Committee for the examiner in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said notebook.
At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972, respondent
Lanuevo suggested that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the
examiner concerned would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular and the
Committee adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164,
pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).
At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent Montecillo was
informed by respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed all other subjects except Mercantile
Law. This information was made during the meeting within hearing of the order members, who

were all closely seated together. Respondent Montecillo made known his willingness toreevaluate the particular paper. The next day, respondent Lanuevo handed to respondent
Montecillo a bar candidate's notebook with Examiner's Code Number 1613 with a grade of 61%.
Respondent Montecillo then reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers,
decided to increase the final grade to 71%. The matter was not however thereafter officially
brought to the Committee for consideration or decision (Exhs. A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that the particular
examinee failed only in his subject and passed all the others, he would not have consented to
make the re-evaluation of the said paper (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise
added that there was only one instance he remembers, which is substantiated by his personal
records, that he had to change the grade of an examinee after he had submitted his report,
referring to the notebook of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with
Examiner's Code Number 1613 and with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).
A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of
respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200 notebooks, respondent Lanuevo
returned to the residence of respondent Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of the Supreme
Court of the Philippines with two companions. According to respondent Lanuevo, this was
around the second week of February, 1972, after the first meeting of the Bar Examination
Committee. respondent Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an examinee's notebook bearing
Examiner's Code No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual amenities, requested
respondent Pardo to review and re-examine, if possible, the said notebook because, according
to respondent Lanuevo, the examine who owns that particular notebook obtained higher grades
in other subjects, the highest of which is 84% in Remedial Law. After clearing with respondent
Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the answers of
the examine concerned, resulting in an increase of grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook has
number 1622 as office code number. It belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).
II
Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.
A
UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG,
alias ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own initiative the five
examiners concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, that eventually resulted in the increase of Galang's average from 66.25% to the passing
grade 74.15%, or a total increase of eight (8) weighted points, more or less, that enabled Galang
to hurdle the 1971 Bar examinations via a resolution of the Court making 74% the passing
average for that year's examination without any grade below fifty percent (50%) in any subject.
Galang thereafter took his lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond dispute that he had no authority
from the Court or the Committee to initiate such steps towards the said re-evaluation of the
answers of Galang or of other examinees.

Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent Galang
failed only in their respective subjects and/or was on the borderline of passing, Respondent
Lanuevo sought to justify his actuations on the authority of the aforequoted paragraph 4 of the
Confidential Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51,
Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the members of the Bar Examination
Committee. He maintains that he acted in good faith and "in his honest belief that the same
merited re-evaluation; that in doing so, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust
reposed in him as BarConfidant but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned;
and that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner because the matter of whether or not reevaluation was in order was left alone to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm.
Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).
But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said confidential
memorandum was intended solely for the examiners to guide them in the initial correction of the
examination papers and never as a basis for him to even suggest to the examiners the reevaluation of the examination papers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such
suggestion or request is not only presumptuous but also offensive to the norms of delicacy.
We believe the Examiners Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian
whose declarations on the matter of the misrepresentations and deceptions committed by
respondent Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each other.
For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-examiners (Adm. Case No.
1164) and clarified by extensive cross-examination conducted during the investigation and
hearing of the cases show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the passing of
examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar Examinations. It is patent
likewise from the records that respondent Lanuevo too undue advantage of the trust and
confidence reposed in him by the Court and the Examiners implicit in his position as
BarConfidant as well as the trust and confidence that prevailed in and characterized his
relationship with the five members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who were thus
deceived and induced into re-evaluating the answers of only respondent Galang in five subjects
that resulted in the increase of his grades therein, ultimately enabling him to be admitted a
member of the Philippine Bar.
It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevo's wellstudied and well-calculated moves in successively representing separately to each of the five
examiners concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his particular subject and/or
was on the borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the unauthorized re-evaluations were
made, Galang failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects while his general
average was only 66.25% which under no circumstances or standard could it be honestly
claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on the borderline of passing. In fact,
before the first notebook of Galang was referred back to the examiner concerned for reevaluation, Galang had only one passing mark and this was in Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises, a minor subject, with grade of 81%. The averages and individual grades of Galang
before and after the unauthorized re-evaluation are as follows:
BAI
1. Political Law Public
International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points

BAI
Labor Laws and Social
Legislations 67% 67% = no reevaluation made.
2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points
or 33 weighted points.
Taxation 74% 74% = no reevaluation made.
3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points.
4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or
22 weighted points.
5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =
11 pts. or 44 weighted points.
Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises 81% 81% = no reevaluation made.

General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%

Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in the five
(5) subjects under the circumstances already narrated, Galang's original average of 66.25% was
increased to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the great damage and prejudice of
the integrity of the Bar examinations and to the disadvantage of the other examinees. He did this
in favor only of examinee Galang, with the possible addition of examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only one notebook was re-evaluated for each of the latter who
Political Law and Public International Law for Quitaleg and Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.
The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the reevaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark
before or after their notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After the corrected
notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners, his only function is to tally the individual
grades of every examinee in all subjects taken and thereafter compute the general average.
That done, he will then prepare a comparative data showing the percentage of passing and
failing in relation to a certain average to be submitted to the Committee and to the Court and on
the basis of which the Court will determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc.
The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot
assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He is
not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the examiner. Any request for
re-evaluation should be done by the examinee and the same should be addressed to the Court,
which alone can validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such initiative, exposes himself
to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as well as the image of the Court.

Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any intention of
betraying the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly
invite belief in the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he singled out Galang's papers for reevaluation, leaving out the papers of more than ninety (90) examinees with far better averages
ranging from 70% to 73.9% of which he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which
could be more properly claimed as borderline cases. This fact further betrays respondent
Lanuevo's claim of absolute good faith in referring back the papers of Galang to the Examiners
for re-evaluation. For certainly, as against the original weighted average of 66.25% of Galang,
there can hardly be any dispute that the cases of the aforesaid more than ninety (90) examinees
were more deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice to Galang, as claimed by
respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was inflicted on the other examinees of the 1971 Bar
examinations, especially the said more than ninety candidates. And the unexplained failure of
respondent Lanuevo to apprise the Court or the Committee or even the Bar Chairman of the fact
of re-evaluation before or after the said re-evaluation and increase of grades, precludes, as the
same is inconsistent with, any pretension of good faith.
His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and International Law of
Ernesto Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his
actuations in the case of Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over ninety
examinees who were far better situated than Galang would not give him away. Even the reevaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the
agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee to re-evaluate when the
examinee concerned fails only in one subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and
three (3) subjects respectively as hereinafter shown.
The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to Galang's
notebook, unveiled for the first time by respondent Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn
statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the investigation
with this Court as to why he pried into the papers of Galang deserves scant consideration. It only
serves to picture a man desperately clutching at straws in the wind for support. Furthermore, it
was revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the first time only on August 27, 1973 or a period of
more than five 95) months after he filed his answer on March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm.
Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing that it was just an after-thought.
B
REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW
TO RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF
EXAMINEE ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER
BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS GRADE
IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.
Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the aforesaid
notebooks on Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto
Quitaleg to the Examiners concerned.
The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela Cruz
and Quitaleg were referred back to the Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed
that these two cases were officially brought to the Bar Examination Committee during its first
meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to refer them back to the Examiners
concerned for re-evaluation with respect to the case of Quitaleg and to remove the
disqualification in the case of Ty dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo

further claimed that the date of these two cases were contained in a sheet of paper which was
presented at the said first meeting of the Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a
record of the dates of every meeting of the Committee was made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol.
VI, p. 28, rec.). The alleged sheet containing the date of the two examinees and record of the
dates of the meeting of the Committee were not presented by respondent Lanuevo as,
according to him, he left them inadvertently in his desk in the Confidential Room when he went
on leave after the release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It appears, however,
that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court in the Confidential Room of respondent
Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol.
VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).
Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was only one notebook
in Mercantile Law which was officially brought to him and this is substantiated by his personal file
and record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this notebook's examiner code number is
1613 (Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It appears,
however, that the original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz was changed to 50%
as appearing in the cover of the notebook of said examinee and the change is authenticated
with the initial of Examiner Montecillo. He was present when respondent Lanuevo presented in
evidence the notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner code number 951 and Office Code
Number 110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed
out, replaced by the figures 50 bearing the initial of Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo
(Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo did
not interpose any objection to their admission in evidence.
In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a case of an
examinee presented to the Committee, who obtained passing marks in all subjects except in one
and the Committee agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the notebook in the subject
in which the examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot recall the subject, but he is
certain that it was not Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is not
aware of any case of an examinee who was on the borderline of passing but who got a grade
below 50% in one subject that was taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).
Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code Number 1613
(belonging to Galang) which was referred to the Committee and the Committee agreed to return
it to the Examiner concerned. The day following the meeting in which the case of an examinee
with Code Number 1613 was taken up, respondent Lanuevo handed him said notebook and he
accordingly re-evaluated it. This particular notebook with Office Code Number 954 belongs to
Galang.
Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was Mercantile Law that
was taken up by the Committee. He is not certain of any other case brought to the Committee
(Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.). Pardo declared that there was no case of an examinee that was
referred to the Committee that involved Political Law. He re-evaluated the answers of Ernesto
Quitaleg in Political Law upon the representation made by respondent Lanuevo to him.
As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of the members
of the Committee that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed all the others,
the Examiner in whose subject the examinee failed should re-evaluate or recheck the notebook
(Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. AMontecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. Case
No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).

At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of 57% was referred
back to Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other failing grades in three (3) subjects, as follows:

Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "

Labor Laws 3%

Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%

Taxation 69%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).

Mercantile Law 68%

The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the answers of Ty dela Cruz in
Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee in February, 1971,
which violation was due to the misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo.

Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation of his grade in
Political Law are as follows:
BA
Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27
weighted points
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation
Civil Law 75% 75% = "
Taxation 69% 69% = "
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "
Criminal Law 78% 78% = "
Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "

Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.)
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was referred to Examiner
Montecillo to remove the disqualification grade of 47% in said subject, had two (2) other failing
grades. These are:
Political Law 70%
Taxation 72%
His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was removed are as follows:
BA
Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation
Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Taxation 72% 72% = "
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
weighted points
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
Remedial Law 88% 88% = "

It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law to Examiner
Montecillo can hardly be said to be covered by the consensus of the Bar Examination
Committee because even at the time of said referral, which was after the unauthorized reevaluation of his answers of four (4) subjects, Galang had still failing grades in Taxation and
Labor Laws. His re-evaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law was considered 75% under the
Confidential Memorandum and was so entered in the record. His grade in Mercantile Law as
subsequently re-evaluated by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.
Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct of having betrayed the trust
and confidence reposed in him as Bar Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar
examinations and undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He should be disbarred.
As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or their names
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed that they should be required to show cause and
the corresponding investigation conducted.
III
Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, respondent.
A
The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should likewise be stricken
off the Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of the un-authorized re-evaluation of
his answers in five(5) major subjects Civil Law, Political and International Law, Criminal Law,
Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.
The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession, which
necessarily involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules and
principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3)
a decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan
Flunkers' Petition for Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The determination of
whether a bar candidate has obtained the required passing grade certainly involves discretion
(Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).
In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee, composed
of a member of the Court who acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as
examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to each. Acting as a sort of
liaison officer between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the individual

members of the Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the same time a deputy
clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the Committee in connection with the exercise of
discretion in the admission of examinees to membership of the Bar must be in accordance with
the established rules of the Court and must always be subject to the final approval of the Court.
With respect to the Bar Confidant, whose position is primarily confidential as the designation
indicates, his functions in connection with the conduct of the Bar examinations are defined and
circumscribed by the Court and must be strictly adhered to.
The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of respondent
Galang in five (5) subjects, as already clearly established, was initiated by Respondent Lanuevo
without any authority from the Court, a serious breach of the trust and confidence reposed by
the Court in him as Bar Confidant. Consequently, the re-evaluation that enabled respondent
Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity.
The Bar Confidant does not possess any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of
examinees to the Bar. He is not clothed with authority to determine whether or not an
examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or re-evaluation or whether the Examiner's appraisal of
such answers is correct. And whether or not the examinee benefited was in connivance or a
privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether the proceedings or incidents that led to
the candidate's admission to the Bar were in accordance with the rules.
B
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among others, with
the character requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that "every applicant
for admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character, and that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are
pending in any court in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a bar
applicant was required to produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good
moral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound to lay before
the Court all his involvement in any criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable
the Court to fully ascertain or determine applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to what
crime involves moral turpitude, is for the supreme Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of
laying before or informing the Court of one's personal record whether he was criminally
indicted, acquitted, convicted or the case dismissed or is still pending becomes more
compelling. The forms for application to take the Bar examinations provided by the Supreme
Court beginning the year 1965 require the disclosure not only of criminal cases involving moral
turpitude filed or pending against the applicant but also of all other criminal cases of which he
has been accused. It is of course true that the application form used by respondent Galang
when he took the Bar for the first time in 1962 did not expressly require the disclosure of the
applicant's criminal records, if any. But as already intimated, implicit in his task to show
satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral character is his obligation to reveal to the Court all
his involvement in any criminal case so that the Court can consider them in the ascertainment
and determination of his moral character. And undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records
before it, the Court will be in a better position to consider the applicant's moral character; for it
could not be gainsaid that an applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or
terminated by its dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his
character or fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when respondent Galang took
the Bar for the second and third time, respectively, the application form provided by the Court for
use of applicants already required the applicant to declare under oath that "he has not been
accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any offense involving moral
turpitude; and that there is no pending case of that nature against him." By 1966, when Galang
took the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the application form prepared by the Court for use

of applicants required the applicant to reveal all his criminal cases whether involving moral
turpitude or not. In paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is required under oath to declare that
"he has not been charged with any offense before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or
accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any crime involving moral
turpitude; nor is there a pending case against him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet,
respondent Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court his criminal
case of slight physical injuries which was then and until now is pending in the City Court of
Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention of the same in his applications to
take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.
All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently
concealing and withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries in
1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he committed
perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely
representing to the Court that he had no criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang was
allowed unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to
take his oath.
That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact
that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his
license to practice law is well settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus:
[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the respondent, in
withholding from the board of law examiners and from the justice of this
court, to whom he applied for admission, information respecting so serious
a matter as an indictment for a felony, was guilty of fraud upon the court
(cases cited).
[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the judge to
whom he applied for admission, been apprised of the true situation, neither
the certificate of the board nor of the judge would have been forthcoming
(State ex rel. Board of Law Examiners v. Podell, 207 N W 709 710).
The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was required to surrender to
the clerk of court the license issued to him, and his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys
(p. 710).
Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:
[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the discretion of
the Appellate Division.' In the exercise of the discretion, the court should be
informed truthfully and frankly of matters tending to show the character of
the applicant and his standing at the bar of the state from which he comes.
The finding of indictments against him, one of which was still outstanding at
the time of his motion, were facts which should have been submitted to the
court, with such explanations as were available. Silence respecting them
was reprehensible, as tending to deceive the court (165 NYS, 102, 104;
emphasis supplied).
Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).

Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case despite his
having been apprised by the Investigation of some of the circumstances of the criminal case
including the very name of the victim in that case(he finally admitted it when he was confronted
by the victim himself, who was called to testify thereon), and his continued failure for about
thirteen years to clear his name in that criminal case up to the present time, indicate his lack of
the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of
becoming a member of the noble profession of law.
While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution of the Court requiring
him to explain why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, respondent
Galang was, as early as August, 1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to the Court his
pending criminal case. Yet he did not offer any explanation for such omission.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was
allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he passed the
Bar, WE have no other alternative but to order the surrender of his attorney's certificate and the
striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said in Re Felipe del Rosario:
The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who
demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of
sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal
law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is
questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of
its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself as a duly authorized
member of the bar (citing American cases) [52 Phil. 399-401].
What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this present
case is not without any precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had on several occasions in the past
nullified the admission of successful bar candidates to the membership of the Bar on the
grounds, among others, of (a)misrepresentations of, or false pretenses relative to, the
requirement on applicant's educational attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the Supreme
Court striking off the name of Juan T. Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the
findings of the Court Investigators contained in their report and recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962;
In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of good moral character [In re: Peralta, 101
Phil. 313-314]; and (c) fraudulent passing of the Bar examinations [People vs. Romualdez -- re:
Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and People vs. Castro and Doe, 54
Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the Court found that the grades of
Mabunay and Castro were falsified and they were convicted of the crime of falsification of public
documents.
IV
RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI Judge),
Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, now deceased)Atty.
Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr.,
respondents.
All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation and/or recorrection of the papers in question upon the misrepresentation of respondent BarConfidant
Lanuevo. All, however, professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or increased the grades
of the notebooks without knowing the identity of the examinee who owned the said notebooks;

and that they did the same without any consideration or expectation of any. These the records
clearly demonstrate and WE are of the opinion and WE so declare that indeed the respondentsexaminers made the re-evaluation or re-correcion in good faith and without any consideration
whatsoever.
Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of admission of members to
the Bar, the respondents bar examiners, under the circumstances, should have exercised
greater care and caution and should have been more inquisitive before acceding to the request
of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. They could have asked the Chairman of the Bar
Examination Committee, who would have referred the matter to the Supreme Court. At least the
respondents-examiners should have required respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them the
complete grades and/or the average of the examinee represented by respondent Lanuevo to
have failed only in their respective and particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing
to fully satisfy themselves that the examinee concerned was really so circumstances. This they
could have easily done and the stain on the Bar examinations could have been avoided.
Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so declared under
oath that the answers of respondent Galang really deserved or merited the increased grades;
and so with respondent Pardo in connection with the re-evaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg's
answers in Political Law. With respect to respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it would appear that
they increased the grades of Galang in their respective subject solely because of the
misrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo. Hence, in the words of respondent Tomacruz: "You
brought to me one paper and you said that this particular examinee had almost passed,
however, in my subject he received 60 something, I cannot remember the exact average and if
he would get a few points higher, he would get a passing average. I agreed to do that because I
did not wish to be the one causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp. 60-61, rec.; see also allegations 3
and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis ours). And respondent
Pablo: "... he told me that this particular examinee seems to have passed in allot her subject
except this subject and that if I can re-evaluate this examination notebook and increase the mark
to at least 75, this particular examinee will pass the bar examinations so I believe I asked him 'Is
this being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the practice used to be done before to help out
examinees who are failing in just one subject' so I readily acceded to his request and said 'Just
leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left it with me and what i did was to go over
the book and tried to be as lenient as I could. While I did not mark correct the answers which
were wrong, what I did was to be more lenient and if the answers was correct although it was
not complete I raise the grade so I had a total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did was to correct
the grading sheet accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-evaluations made by
respondents Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo notwithstanding their declarations that the
increases in grades they gave were deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a certain
extent influenced by the misrepresentation and deception committed by respondent Lanuevo.
Thus in their own words:
Montecillo
Q And by reason of that information you made the reevaluation of the paper?
A Yeas, your Honor.

Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own

accord in the absence of such information?
A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report
at that time" (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.; see also allegations in
paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5, Affidavit of April 17, 1972, Exh.
B-Montecillo; allegation No. 2, Answer dated march 19,
1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 4041, and 72, rec.).
Pamatian
3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought back to
me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation because according
to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider
his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the
practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so and in the further belief
that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper
and reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 55, rec.); and
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief
that I am authorized to do so in view of them is representation of said Atty.
Victorio Lanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34,
rec.).
Manalo
(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein
respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the
notebook. Testing the answer by the criteria laid down by the Court, and
giving the said examinee the benefit of the doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's
representation that it was only in that particular subject that said examinee
failed, herein respondent became convinced that the said examinee
deserved a higher grade than that previously given him, but he did not
deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing
grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Pardo
... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I
corrected that particular notebook on December 31,1971, considering
especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee
had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84%
in Remedial Law, if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62, rec.;
emphasis supplied).

With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent Lanuevo to induce
the herein examiners to make the re-evaluation adverted to, no one among them can truly claim
that the re-evaluation effected by them was impartial or free from any improper influence, their
conceded integrity, honesty and competence notwithstanding.
Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased grades given after
the said re-evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).
At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the respondents-examiners,
which were earlier quoted in full, that their actuations in connection with the re-evaluation of the
answers of Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the imposition of any
disciplinary action. WE find their explanations satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE are constrained to
remind herein respondents-examiners that their participation in the admission of members to the
Bar is one impressed with the highest consideration of public interest absolute purity of the
proceedings and so are required to exercise the greatest or utmost case and vigilance in the
performance of their duties relative thereto.
V
Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November 14, 1973, claimed
that respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this unfounded cause, or lending undue
assistance or support thereto ... was motivated with vindictiveness due to respondent's refusal to
be pressured into helping his (examiner's) alleged friend a participant in the 1971 Bar
Examinations whom said examiner named as Oscar Landicho and who, the records will show,
did not pass said examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's memo, Adm. Case No. 1162).
It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and integrity of the late
Justice Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot refute
Lanuevo's insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out during the
investigation which in his words is "essential to his defense. "His pretension that he did not make
this charge during the investigation when Justice Pamatian was still alive, and deferred the filing
of such charge against Justice Pamatian and possibly also against Oscar Landicho before the
latter departed for Australia "until this case shall have been terminated lest it be misread or
misinterpreted as being intended as a leverage for a favorable outcome of this case on the part
of respondent or an act of reprisal", does not invite belief; because he does not impugn the
motives of the five other members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who also affirmed
that he deceived them into re-evaluating or revising the grades of respondent Galang in their
respective subjects.
It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, Oscar
Landicho, who failed in that examinations, went to see and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian
for the purpose of seeking his help in connection with the 1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner
Pamatian advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee.
Examiner Pamatian mentioned in passing to Landicho that an examination booklet was reevaluated by him (Pamatian) before the release of the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec).
Even though such information was divulged by respondent Pamatian after the official release of
the bar results, it remains an indecorous act, hardly expected of a member of the Judiciary who
should exhibit restraint in his actuations demanded by resolute adherence to the rules of
delicacy. His unseemly act tended to undermine the integrity of the bar examinations and to
impair public faith in the Supreme Court.
VI

The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of respondent
Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was committed for valuable
consideration.
A
There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the official
release of the 1971 Bar examinations in February, 1972, which may be out of proportion to his
salary as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.
1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the BF
Homes, Inc. a house and lot with an area of 374 square meters, more or
less, for the amount of P84,114.00. The deed of sale was dated March 5,
1972 but was notarized only on April 5, 1972. On the same date, however,
respondent Lanuevo and his wife executed two (2)mortgages covering the
said house and lot in favor of BF Homes, Inc. in the total amount of
P67,291.20 (First mortgage P58,879.80, Entry No. 90913: date of
instrument April 5, 1972, date of inscription April 20, 1972: Second
mortgage P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914: date of instrument April 5,
1972, date of inscription April 20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.].
Respondent Lanuevo paid as down payment the amount of only
P17,000.00, which according to him is equivalent to 20%, more or less, of
the purchase price of P84,114.00. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that
P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was his savings while the remaining the
P12,000.00 came from his sister in Okinawa in the form of a loan and
received by him through a niece before Christmas of 1971 in dollars ($2000)
[Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]
It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and P12,000.00
loan from his sister; are not fully reflected and accounted for in respondent's
1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities which he filed on January 17,
1972.
In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank
deposit in the amount of only P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement, his bank
deposit listed under Assets was in the amount of P1,011.00, which shows
therefore that of the P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in his 1971 statement
under Assets, only the amount of P989.00 was used or withdrawn. The
amount of P18,000.00 receivable listed under Assets in his 1971 statement
was not realized because the transaction therein involved did not push
through (Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent Lanuevo from
1965 to 1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).
Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from his
married sister in Okinawa is extremely doubtful. In the first place, said
amount of $2000 (P12,000.00) is not reflected in his 1971 Statement of
Assets and Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972. Secondly, the alleged note
which he allegedly received from his sister at the time he received the $200
was not even presented by respondent during the investigation. And
according to Respondent Lanuevo himself, while he considered this a loan,
his sister did not seriously consider it as one. In fact, no mode or time of
payment was agreed upon by them. And furthermore, during the

investigation, respondent Lanuevo promised to furnish the Investigator the

address of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise was not fulfilled as borne out
by the records. Considering that there is no showing that his sister, who has
a family of her own, is among the top earners in Okinawa or has saved a lot
of money to give to him, the conclusion, therefore, that the P17,000.00 of
respondent Lanuevo was either an ill-gotten or undeclared income is
inevitable under the foregoing circumstances.
On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their BF
Homes house and lot to the GSIS for the amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No.
4992: August 14, 1972 date of instrument; August 23, 1972 date of
inscription). On February 28, 1973, the second mortgage in favor of BF
Homes, Entry No. 90914, was redeemed by respondent and was
subsequently cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry No. 30143. Subsequently,
or on March 2, 1973 the first mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No.
90913 was also redeemed by respondent Lanuevo and thereafter cancelled
on March 20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the
mortgage in favor of GSIS remains as the encumbrance of respondent's
house and lot. According to respondent Lanuevo, the monthly amortization
of the GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a month, but that since May of 1973, he
was unable to pay the same. In his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities,
which he filed in connection with his resignation and retirement (filed
October 13, 1972), the house and lot declared as part of his assets, were
valued at P75,756.90. Listed, however, as an item in his liabilities in the
same statement was the GSIS real estate loan in the amount of P64,200.00
(1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities).
2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities is a
1956 VW car valued at P5,200.00. That he acquired this car sometime
between January, 1972 and November, 1972 could be inferred from the fact
that no such car or any car was listed in his statement of assets and
liabilities of 1971 or in the years previous to 1965. It appears, however, that
his listed total assets, excluding receivables in his 1971 Statement was
P19,000.00, while in his 1972 (as of November, 1972) Statement, his listed
total assets, excluding the house and lot was P18,211.00, including the said
1956 VW car worth P5,200.00.
The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971 Bar
examinations and the acquisition of the above-mentioned properties, tends
to link or tie up the said acquisitions with the illegal machination committed
by respondent Lanuevo with respect to respondent Galang's examination
papers or to show that the money used by respondent Lanuevo in the
acquisition of the above properties came from respondent Galang in
consideration of his passing the Bar.
During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had informed respondent Lanuevo
of the serious irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations alleged in Oscar Landicho's
Confidential Letter and in fact, after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 his sworn
statement on the matter, as ordered by the Court, respondent Lanuevo surprisingly filed his
letter or resignation on October 13, 1972 with the end in view of retiring from the Court. His
resignation before he was required to show cause on March 5, 1973 but after he was informed
of the said irregularities, is indicative of a consciousness of guilt.

It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar
examinations, respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave from March 16, 1972 to
January 15, 1973, obtaining the case value thereof in lump sum in the amount of P11,000.00. He
initially claimed at the investigation that h e used a part thereof as a down payment for his BF
Homes house and lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he bought on April 5, 1972.
Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a & e) in
relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:
(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an
act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by
competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the
latter, or allowing himself to be presented, induced, or influenced to commit
such violation or offense.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evidence bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.

approved on March 16, 1954, retroactive as of the date of waiver July 31, 1951, which is also
the date of filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).
It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all the time attended to
the availment of the said educational benefits and even when he was already in Manila taking up
his pre-law at MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955, respondent Galang was
already 19 years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he was employed as a technical assistant in the
office of Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during the investigation, he
claimed that he was the private secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It
appears, however, that a copy of the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the Philippine Veterans
Board to the MLQ Educational Institution on the approval of the transfer of respondent Galang
from Sta. Rita Institute to the MLQ Educational Institution effective the first semester of the
school year 1955-56 was directly addressed and furnished to respondent Ramon E. Galang at
2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).
Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the Office of the Philippine
Veterans to follow up his educational benefits and claimed that he does not even know the
location of the said office. He does not also know whether beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill of Rights
educational benefits are required to go to the Philippine Veterans Board every semester to
submit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent Galang admits that he had gone to the
GSIS and City Court of Manila, although he insists that he never bothered to take a look at the
neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and imposing Philippine Veterans
Building is beside the GSIS building and is obliquely across the City Court building.

Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or removal of a public officer
once it is determined that his property or money "is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as
such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately
acquired property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act 3019).

2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine Veterans Board, he

investigated claims for the several benefits given to veterans like educational benefits and
disability benefits; that he does not remember, however, whether in the course of his duties as
veterans investigator, he came across the application of Ramon E. Galang for educational
benefits; and that he does not know the father of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and has never met him
(Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).

It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements of Assets

and Liabilities were not presented or taken up during the investigation; but they were examined
as they are part of the records of this Court.

3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry operating
at Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49,
rec.). Later he joined the guerrilla movement in Samar.

He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while working with the
Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).

There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between respondent Ramon E.
Galang and/or his father and respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo before the latter become the bar
Confidant.
1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights educational program
of the Philippine Veterans Board from his high school days 1951 to 1955 up to his pre-law
studies at the MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ University) 1955 to 1958. From 1948 to
1958, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected with the Philippine Veterans Board which
is the governmental agency entrusted with the affairs of our veterans including the
implementation of the Veterans Bill of Rights. From 1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo
successively held the position of Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims Investigator, Supervising
Veterans Investigator and Veterans Claims Investigator (Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No.
1162). During that period of time, therefore, respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with
applicants and beneficiaries of the Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang's educational benefits was

He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's father belonged.
During the Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit was operating in Samar only and he had no
communications with other guerrilla organization in other parts of the country.
He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in Samar only and does
not remember having attended its meeting here in Manila, even while he was employed with the
Philippine Veterans Board. He is not a member of the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor (Vol.
VII, p.51, rec.).
On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army stationed at
Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken with pneumonia and was
hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and was still confined there when

their camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 (Sworn
statement of respondent Lanuevo dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).
German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal Guerilla Forces,
otherwise known as the Banal Regiment. He was commissioned and inducted as a member
thereof on January 16, 1942 and was given the rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was attached
and served into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div., US Army, stationed
headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with the 38th Division, US army stationed at
Corregidor in the mopping-up operations against the enemies, from 9 May 1945 date of
recognition to 31 December 1945, date of demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated
December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).
It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to the
Bar Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority
from the Court. Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong disapproval of the
actuations of the bar examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164 as above delineated.
WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D.
LANUEVO IS HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE
ROLL OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT RAMON
E. GALANG, alias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS NAME
ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Esguerra, Muoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.
Antonio, J., is on official leave.
Concepcion and Martin, JJ., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

B.M. No. 810 January 27, 1998

IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH BY ARTHUR M. CUEVAS, JR.
RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:
Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., recently passed the 1996 Bar Examinations 1. His oath-taking
was held in abeyance in view of the Court's resolution dated August 27, 1996 which permitted
him to take the Bar Examinations "subject to the condition that should (he) pass the same, (he)
shall not be allowed to take the lawyer's oath pending approval of the Court . . ." due to his
previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide. The conviction stemmed
from petitioner's participation in the initiation rites of the LEX TALIONIS FRATERNITAS, a
fraternity in the SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW, sometime in September 1991, where Raul I.
Camaligan, a neophyte, died as a result of the personal violence inflicted upon him. Thereafter,
petitioner applied for and was granted probation. On May 10, 1995, he was discharged from
probation and his case considered closed and terminated.
In this petition, received by the Court on May 5, 1997, petitioner prays that "he be allowed to
take his lawyer's oath at the Court's most convenient time" 2 attaching thereto the Order dated
May 16, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 of Antique discharging him from his
probation, and certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and law abiding character issued
by: (a) the Mayor of the Municipality of Hamtic, Antique; (b) the Officer-in-Charge of Hamtic
Police Station; (c) the Sangguniang Kabataan of Pob. III, Hamtic, through its chairman and
officers; (d) a member of the IBP Iloilo Chapter; (e) the Parish Priest and Vicar General of St.
Joseph Cathedral, San Jose, Antique; and (f) the President of the Parish Pastoral Council,
Parish of Sta. Monica, Hamtic, Antique. On July 15, 1997, the Court, before acting on petitioner's
application, resolved to require Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan, father of the deceased hazing victim
Raul I. Camaligan, to comment thereon. In compliance with the Court's directive, Atty. Gilbert D.
Camaligan filed his comment which states as follows:
1 He fully appreciates the benign concern given by this Hon. Court in
allowing him to comment to the pending petition of Arthur M. Cuevas to take
the lawyer's oath, and hereby expresses his genuine gratitude to such
gesture.
2 He conforms completely to the observation of the Hon. Court in its
resolution dated March 19, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 712 that the infliction of
severe physical injuries which approximately led to the death of the

unfortunate Raul Camaligan was deliberate (rather than merely accidental

or inadvertent) thus, indicating serious character flaws on the part of those
who inflicted such injuries. This is consistent with his stand at the outset of
the proceedings of the criminal case against the petitioner and his codefendants that they are liable not only for the crime of homicide but
murder, since they took advantage of the neophytes' helpless and
defenseless condition when they were "beaten and kicked to death like a
useless stray dog", suggesting the presence of abuse of confidence, taking
advantage of superior strength and treachery (People vs. Gagoco, 58 Phil.
524).
3 He, however, has consented to the accused-students' plea of guilty to
the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting to the homicide,
including the petitioner, out of pity to their mothers and a pregnant wife of
the accused who went together at his house in Lucena City, literally
kneeling, crying and begging for forgiveness for their sons, on a Christmas
day in 1991 and on Maundy Thursday in 1992, during which they reported
that the father of one of the accused died of heart attack upon learning of
his son's involvement in the case.
4 As a Christian, he has forgiven the petitioner and his co-defendants in
the criminal case for the death of his son. But as a loving father, who lost a
son in whom he has high hope to become a good lawyer to succeed him,
he still feels the pain of his untimely demise, and the stigma of the
gruesome manner of taking his life. This he cannot forget.
5 He is not, right now, in a position to say whether petitioner, since then
has become morally fit for admission to the noble profession of the law. He
politely submits this matter to the sound and judicious discretion of the Hon.
Court. 3
At the outset, the Court shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan and commiserates
with the untimely death of his son. Nonetheless, Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan admits that "[h]e is
not, right now, in a position to say whether petitioner since then has become morally fit . . ." and
submits petitioner's plea to be admitted to the noble profession of law to the sound and judicious
discretion of the Court.
The petition before the Court requires the balancing of the reasons for disallowing or allowing
petitioner's admission to the noble profession of law. His deliberate participation in the senseless
beatings over a helpless neophyte which resulted to the latter's untimely demise indicates
absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar. And as the practice of law is a
privilege extended only to the few who possess the high standards of intellectual and moral
qualifications the Court is duty bound to prevent the entry of undeserving aspirants, as well as to
exclude those who have been admitted but have become a disgrace to the profession. The
Court, nonetheless, is willing to give petitioner a chance in the same manner that it recently
allowed Al Caparros Argosino, petitioner's co-accused below, to take the lawyer's oath. 4
Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr.'s discharge from probation without any infraction of the
attendant conditions therefor and the various certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful
and civic-oriented character prove that he has taken decisive steps to purge himself of his
deficiency in moral character and atone for the unfortunate death of Raul I. Camaligan. The
Court is prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general

tendency of the youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating. 5 Let it be stressed to herein
petitioner that the lawyer's oath is not a mere formality recited for a few minutes in the glare of
flashing cameras and before the presence of select witnesses. Petitioner is exhorted to conduct
himself beyond reproach at all times and to live strictly according to his oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility. And, to paraphrase Mr. Justice Padilla's comment in the sister case
of Re: Petition of Al Agrosino To Take Lawyer's Oath, Bar Matter No. 712, March 19, 1997, "[t]he
Court sincerely hopes that" Mr. Cuevas, Jr., "will continue with the assistance he has been giving
to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other
services to the more unfortunate members of society" 6.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby resolved to allow petitioner Arthur M.. Cuevas, Jr., to take the
lawyer's oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys on a date to be set by the Court, subject to the
payment of appropriate fees. Let this resolution be attached to petitioner's personal records in
the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Panganiban and Martinez, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Held on September 7, 14, 21, and 28, 1996, at De La Salle University, Taft
Avenue, Manila, with Associate Justice Ricardo J. Francisco as Chairman of
the Bar Committee.
2 Manifestation With Motion To Take The Lawyer's Oath, p. 2.
3 Comment, pp. 1-2.
4 Re: Petition of Al Argosino To Take The Lawyer's Oath, Bar Matter No.
712, March 19, 1997.
5 Id.
6 Id., at p. 5.

EN BANC

In his Answer,11[3] Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by
Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his
misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the said
Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in the College of Law, Meling
considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident and involving the same parties as
closed and terminated. Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not
involve moral turpitude.

[B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004]

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE
2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE
PHILIPPINE SHARIA BAR,

As regards the use of the title Attorney, Meling admits that some of his communications really contained
the word Attorney as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation12[4] dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge of nondisclosure against Meling in this wise:

ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,

RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe while the other
has been rendered moot by a supervening event.

The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to take the Bar
Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can
dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still
pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to
disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar
Examinations are made under oath, and should not be taken lightly by an applicant.
The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his act of concealing
them which constitutes dishonesty.

The antecedents follow.

In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) a Petition9[1] to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and
to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation,
and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling
allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and
other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez wife causing the injuries to
the latter.

It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation
or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the
place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective
reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely
enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common
honesty.
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also answerable under
Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall be answerable for
knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for
admission to the bar.13[5]
As regards Melings use of the title Attorney, the OBC had this to say:

Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title Attorney in his communications, as
Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar. Attached to
the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that Meling used the appellation and appears on its face
to have been received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.

Anent the issue of the use of the appellation Attorney in his letters, the explanation of Meling is not
acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as attorney
whoever may have typed the letters.

Pursuant to this Courts Resolution10[2] dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.

11
9

12

10

13

Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is, he is signing his
communications as Atty. Haron S. Meling knowing fully well that he is not entitled thereto. As held by the
Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the appellation attorney may render a person liable for
indirect contempt of court.14[6]
Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath and sign the
Roll of Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that Melings
membership in the Sharia Bar be suspended until further orders from the Court. 15[7]
We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did not pass the
2003 Bar Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from taking the
Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.
On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the appropriate sanctions upon
him as a member of the Sharia Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be acted upon.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Sharia Court, is not a matter of right but merely a
privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to
possess good moral character.16[8] The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the
practice of law.17[9]
The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar Examinations requires
the applicant to aver that he or she has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule
or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted
by any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case
or charge against him/her. Despite the declaration required by the form, Meling did not reveal that he has
three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done under oath at that.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of
good moral character of the applicant.18[10] The nature of whatever cases are pending against the
applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a
lawyer. By concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the
cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character
of the applicant.
Melings concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against him speaks of his
lack of the requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed upon him
as a member of the Sharia Bar.

14

Moreover, his use of the appellation Attorney, knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its use, cannot
go unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya,19[11] the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of the use of
the title Attorney by members of the Sharia Bar who are not likewise members of the Philippine Bar. The
respondent therein, an executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Sharia District in Marawi City, used the
title Attorney in several correspondence in connection with the rescission of a contract entered into by him
in his private capacity. The Court declared that:
persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence, may only
practice law before Sharia courts. While one who has been admitted to the Sharia Bar, and one who has
been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered counselors, in the sense that they give
counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an attorney. The title attorney is reserved to
those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar
Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in
good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction. 20[12]
The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case. The solemn task
of administering justice demands that those who are privileged to be part of service therein, from the
highest official to the lowliest employee, must not only be competent and dedicated, but likewise live and
practice the virtues of honesty and integrity. Anything short of this standard would diminish the public's
faith in the Judiciary and constitutes infidelity to the constitutional tenet that a public office is a public
trust.
In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his application to take the
Bar examinations and made conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result, we found the respondent
grossly unfit and unworthy to continue in the practice of law and suspended him therefrom until further
orders from the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions
upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron
S. Meling in the Philippine Sharia Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the
suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from
taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is
DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.
Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Sharia Courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

15
16

SECOND DIVISION

17

19

18

20

This administrative case concerns a lawyer who is claimed to have hurled invectives upon
another lawyer and filed a baseless suit against him.

ATTY. BONIFACIO T. BARANDON, JR.,A.C. No. 5768

The Facts and the Case

Complainant,
Present:

On January 11, 2001 complainant Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. filed a complaint-

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,

affidavit21[1] with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) seeking

- versus -

the disbarment, suspension from the practice of law, or imposition of appropriate disciplinary action

BRION,

against respondent Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. for the following offenses:

DEL
CASTILLO,
ABAD, and

1.On November 22, 2000 Atty. Ferrer, as plaintiffs counsel in Civil Case
7040, filed a reply with opposition to motion to dismiss that contained abusive,

PEREZ, JJ.

offensive, and improper language which insinuated that Atty. Barandon presented a
ATTY. EDWIN Z. FERRER, SR.,

falsified document in court.

Respondent.

Promulgated:

2.

Atty. Ferrer filed a fabricated charge against Atty. Barandon

in Civil Case 7040 for alleged falsification of public document when the document
allegedly falsified was a notarized document executed on February 23, 1994, at a
date when Atty. Barandon was not yet a lawyer nor was assigned in Camarines

March 26, 2010

Norte. The latter was not even a signatory to the document.

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
3.

On December 19, 2000, at the courtroom of Municipal Trial

Court (MTC) Daet before the start of hearing, Atty. Ferrer, evidently drunk,
threatened Atty. Barandon saying, Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan,

DECISION

kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na abogado sa Camarines

Norte, ang abogado na rito ay mga taga-Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa
Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito.

ABAD, J.:

4.

Atty. Ferrer made his accusation of falsification of public

document without bothering to check the copy with the Office of the Clerk of Court

21

and, with gross ignorance of the law, failed to consider that a notarized document is

guilty of the charges. Atty. Barandon was forum shopping when he filed this

presumed to be genuine and authentic until proven otherwise.

disbarment case since it referred to the same libel and grave threats subject of the
criminal cases.

5.

The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his first disbarment

case against repeating his unethical act; yet he faces a disbarment charge for sexual
harassment of an office secretary of the IBP Chapter in Camarines Norte; a related
criminal case for acts of lasciviousness; and criminal cases for libel and grave

In his reply affidavit,22[2] Atty. Barandon brought up a sixth ground for disbarment. He alleged

threats that Atty. Barandon filed against him. In October 2000, Atty. Ferrer asked

that on December 29, 2000 at about 1:30 p.m., while Atty. Ferrer was on board his sons taxi, it figured in a

Atty. Barandon to falsify the daily time record of his son who worked with the

collision with a tricycle, resulting in serious injuries to the tricycles passengers. 23[3] But neither Atty.

Commission on Settlement of Land Problems, Department of Justice. When Atty.

Ferrer nor any of his co-passengers helped the victims and, during the police investigation, he denied

Barandon declined, Atty. Ferrer repeatedly harassed him with inflammatory

knowing the taxi driver and blamed the tricycle driver for being drunk. Atty. Ferrer also prevented an

language.

eyewitness from reporting the accident to the authorities.24[4]

Atty. Ferrer raised the following defenses in his answer with motion to dismiss:

Atty. Barandon claimed that the falsification case against him had already been dismissed. He belittled the
citations Atty. Ferrer allegedly received. On the contrary, in its Resolution 00-1, 25[5] the IBP-Camarines
Norte Chapter opposed his application to serve as judge of the MTC of Mercedes, Camarines Sur, on the
ground that he did not have the qualifications, integrity, intelligence, industry and character of a trial judge

1.

Instead of having the alleged forged document submitted for

examination, Atty. Barandon filed charges of libel and grave threats against him.

and that he was facing a criminal charge for acts of lasciviousness and a disbarment case filed by an
employee of the same IBP chapter.

These charges came about because Atty. Ferrers clients filed a case for falsification
of public document against Atty. Barandon.
2.

The offended party in the falsification case, Imelda Palatolon,

vouchsafed that her thumbmark in the waiver document had been falsified.

On October 10, 2001 Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the IBP-CBD submitted to this
Court a Report, recommending the suspension for two years of Atty. Ferrer. The Investigating
Commissioner found enough evidence on record to prove Atty. Ferrers violation of Canons 8.01 and 7.03

At the time Atty. Ferrer allegedly uttered the threatening

of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He attributed to Atty. Barandon, as counsel in Civil Case 7040,

remarks against Atty. Barandon, the MTC Daet was already in session. It was

3.

the falsification of the plaintiffs affidavit despite the absence of evidence that the document had in fact

improbable that the court did not take steps to stop, admonish, or cite Atty. Ferrer in

been falsified and that Atty. Barandon was a party to it. The Investigating Commissioner also found that

direct contempt for his behavior.

4.

Atty. Barandon presented no evidence in support of his

allegations that Atty. Ferrer was drunk on December 19, 2000 and that he degraded
the law profession. The latter had received various citations that speak well of his
character.

22
23
24

5.

The cases of libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed

against Atty. Ferrer were still pending. Their mere filing did not make the latter

25

Atty. Ferrer uttered the threatening remarks imputed to him in the presence of other counsels, court

his arguments before the IBP. Further, he presented certified copies of orders issued by courts in

personnel, and litigants before the start of hearing.

Camarines Norte that warned Atty. Ferrer against appearing in court drunk. 33[13]

On June 29, 2002 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XV-2002-225, 26[6] adopting

The Issues Presented

and approving the Investigating Commissioners recommendation but reduced the penalty of suspension to
only one year.
The issues presented in this case are:
Atty. Ferrer filed a motion for reconsideration but the Board denied it in its Resolution 27[7] of
October 19, 2002 on the ground that it had already endorsed the matter to the Supreme Court. On
February 5, 2003, however, the Court referred back the case to the IBP for resolution of Atty. Ferrers
motion for reconsideration.28[8] On May 22, 2008 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the

1.

Whether or not the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP Investigating

Commissioner erred in finding respondent Atty. Ferrer guilty of the charges against him; and

Report and Recommendation29[9] of the Investigating Commissioner that denied Atty. Ferrers motion for
reconsideration.30[10]
2.

If in the affirmative, whether or not the penalty imposed on him is justified.

On February 17, 2009, Atty. Ferrer filed a Comment on Board of Governors IBP Notice of Resolution No.
XVIII-2008.31[11] On August 12, 2009 the Court resolved to treat Atty. Ferrers comment as a petition for
review under Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of Court. Atty. Barandon filed his comment, 32[12] reiterating

The Courts Ruling

26
We have examined the records of this case and find no reason to disagree with the findings and

27

recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors and the Investigating Commissioner.

28
29

The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal
proficiency and morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability. 34

30

[14]

31

33

32

34

The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified language in their pleadings despite
the adversarial nature of our legal system.36[16]
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to conduct themselves with
courtesy, fairness and candor towards their fellow lawyers and avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel. Specifically, in Rule 8.01, the Code provides:
Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins
lawyers to uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession at all times. Rule 7.03 of the Code
provides:
Rule 8.01. A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life behave in
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Atty. Ferrers actions do not measure up to this Canon. The evidence shows that he imputed to
Atty. Barandon the falsification of the Salaysay Affidavit of the plaintiff in Civil Case 7040. He made this
imputation with pure malice for he had no evidence that the affidavit had been falsified and that Atty.
Barandon authored the same.

Several disinterested persons confirmed Atty. Ferrers drunken invectives at Atty. Barandon
shortly before the start of a court hearing. Atty. Ferrer did not present convincing evidence to support his
denial of this particular charge. He merely presented a certification from the police that its blotter for the
Moreover, Atty. Ferrer could have aired his charge of falsification in a proper forum and
without using offensive and abusive language against a fellow lawyer. To quote portions of what he said in

day did not report the threat he supposedly made. Atty. Barandon presented, however, the police blotter on
a subsequent date that recorded his complaint against Atty. Ferrer.

his reply with motion to dismiss:

Atty. Ferrer said, Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya.
1.
That the answer is fraught with grave and culpable
misrepresentation and FALSIFICATION of documents, committed to mislead
this Honorable Court, but with concomitant grave responsibility of counsel for
Defendants, for distortion and serious misrepresentation to the court, for
presenting a grossly FALSIFIED document, in violation of his oath of office as
a government employee and as member of the Bar, for the reason, that,
Plaintiff, IMELDA PALATOLON, has never executed the SALAYSAY
AFFIDAVIT, wherein her fingerprint has been falsified, in view whereof,
hereby DENY the same including the affirmative defenses, there being no
knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of the same, from
pars. (1) to par. (15) which are all lies and mere fabrications, sufficient ground
for DISBARMENT of the one responsible for said falsification and
distortions.35[15]

Wala na palang magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang abogado na rito ay mga taga-Camarines
Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito. Evidently, he uttered these with intent to
annoy, humiliate, incriminate, and discredit Atty. Barandon in the presence of lawyers, court personnel,
and litigants waiting for the start of hearing in court. These language is unbecoming a member of the legal
profession. The Court cannot countenance it.

Though a lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and
respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind
ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. 37[17] Atty. Ferrer ought to have realized that this
sort of public behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation and erode public

35

36

respect for it. Whatever moral righteousness Atty. Ferrer had was negated by the way he chose to express
his indignation.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in Atty. Ferrers personal record as an attorney with the
Office of the Bar Confidant and a copy of the same be served to the IBP and to the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts in the land.

Contrary to Atty. Ferrers allegation, the Court finds that he has been accorded due process. The
essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence

SO ORDERED.

one may have in support of ones defense. 38[18] So long as the parties are given the opportunity to explain
their side, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with. 39[19] Here, the IBP
Investigating Commissioner gave Atty. Ferrer all the opportunities to file countless pleadings and refute all
the allegations of Atty. Barandon.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who are mandated to maintain the
dignity of the legal profession, hence they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. 40[20] Atty.
Ferrers display of improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, and misconduct in the performance of his
duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and the court, was a patent transgression
of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold.

WE CONCUR:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the May 22, 2008 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors in
CBD Case 01-809 and ORDERS the suspension of Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. from the practice of law for
one year effective upon his receipt of this Decision.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
SECOND DIVISION
[A. C. No. 5398. December 3, 2002]

37
ANTONIO A. ALCANTARA, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARIANO PEFIANCO, respondent.

38

DECISION

39

MENDOZA, J.:

40

This is a complaint against Atty. Mariano Pefianco for conduct unbecoming a member of the bar for using
improper and offensive language and threatening and attempting to assault complainant.

The complainant, Atty. Antonio A. Alcantara, is the incumbent District Public Attorney of the Public
Attorneys Office in San Jose, Antique. He alleged that on May 18, 2000, while Atty. Ramon Salvani III
was conferring with a client in the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) at the Hall of Justice in San Jose,
Antique, a woman approached them. Complainant saw the woman in tears, whereupon he went to the
group and suggested that Atty. Salvani talk with her amicably as a hearing was taking place in another
room. At this point, respondent Atty. Mariano Pefianco, who was sitting nearby, stood up and shouted at
Atty. Salvani and his client, saying, Nga-a gina-areglo mo ina, ipapreso ang imo nga kliyente para
mahibal-an na anang sala. (Why do you settle that case? Have your client imprisoned so that he will
realize his mistake.)
Complainant said he was surprised at respondent Pefiancos outburst and asked him to cool off, but
respondent continued to fulminate at Atty. Salvani. Atty. Salvani tried to explain to respondent that it was
the woman who was asking if the civil aspect of the criminal case could be settled because she was no
longer interested in prosecuting the same. Respondent refused to listen and instead continued to scold
Atty. Salvani and the latters client.
As head of the Office, complainant approached respondent and asked him to take it easy and leave Atty.
Salvani to settle the matter. Respondent at first listened, but shortly after he again started shouting at and
scolding Atty. Salvani. To avoid any scene with respondent, complainant went inside his office. He asked
his clerk to put a notice outside prohibiting anyone from interfering with any activity in the Public
Attorneys Office.
Complainant said that he then went out to attend a hearing, but when he came back he heard respondent
Pefianco saying: Nagsiling si Atty. Alcantara nga pagwa-on na kuno ako dya sa PAO, buyon nga klase ka
tawo. (Atty. Alcantara said that he would send me out of the PAO, what an idiot.) Then, upon seeing
complainant, respondent pointed his finger at him and repeated his statement for the other people in the
office to hear. At this point, according to complainant, he confronted respondent Pefianco and told him to
observe civility or else to leave the office if he had no business there. Complainant said respondent
resented this and started hurling invectives at him. According to complainant, respondent even took a
menacing stance towards him.
This caused a commotion in the office. Atty. Pepin Marfil and Mr. Robert Minguez, the Chief of the
Probation Office, tried to pacify respondent Pefianco. Two guards of the Hall of Justice came to take
respondent out of the office, but before they could do so, respondent tried to attack complainant and even
shouted at him, Gago ka! (Youre stupid!) Fortunately, the guards were able to fend off respondents blow
and complainant was not harmed.
Complainant also submitted the affidavits of Atty. Ramon Salvani III, Felizardo Del Rosario, Atty. Pepin
Joey Marfil, Robert Minguez, Herbert Ysulat and Ramon Quintayo to corroborate his allegations.
In his Comment and Counter-Complaint, respondent Pefianco said that the sight of the crying woman,
whose husband had been murdered, moved him and prompted him to take up her defense. He said that he
resented the fact that complainant had ordered an employee, Napoleon Labonete, to put a sign outside
prohibiting standbys from hanging round in the Public Attorneys Office.
Respondent claimed that while talking with Atty. Salvani concerning the womans case, complainant, with
his bodyguard, arrived and shouted at him to get out of the Public Attorneys Office. He claimed that two
security guards also came, and complainant ordered them to take respondent out of the office. Contrary to
complainants claims, however, respondent said that it was complainant who moved to punch him and
shout at him, Gago ka! (Youre stupid!)
Prior to the filing of the present complaint, respondent Pefianco had filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman an administrative and criminal complaint against complainant. However, the complaint was
dismissed by the said office.

The Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines found that respondent
committed the acts alleged in the complaint and that he violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Committee noted that respondent failed not only to deny the accusations against him
but also to give any explanation for his actions. For this reason, it recommended that respondent be
reprimanded and warned that repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely in the future.
We find the recommendation of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline to be well taken.
The evidence on record indeed shows that it was respondent Pefianco who provoked the incident in
question. The affidavits of several disinterested persons confirm complainants allegation that respondent
Pefianco shouted and hurled invectives at him and Atty. Salvani and even attempted to lay hands on him
(complainant).
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility41[1] admonishes lawyers to conduct themselves with
courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity
of the legal profession. They must act honorably, fairly and candidly toward each other and otherwise
conduct themselves without reproach at all times. 42[2]
In this case, respondents meddling in a matter in which he had no right to do so caused the untoward
incident. He had no right to demand an explanation from Atty. Salvani why the case of the woman had not
or could not be settled. Even so, Atty. Salvani in fact tried to explain the matter to respondent, but the
latter insisted on his view about the case.
Respondent said he was moved by the plight of the woman whose husband had been murdered as she was
pleading for the settlement of her case because she needed the money. Be that as it may, respondent should
realize that what he thought was righteous did not give him the right to demand that Atty. Salvani and his
client, apparently the accused in the criminal case, settle the case with the widow. Even when he was
being pacified, respondent did not relent. Instead he insulted and berated those who tried to calm him
down. Two of the witnesses, Atty. Pepin Marfil and Robert Minguez, who went to the Public Attorneys
Office because they heard the commotion, and two guards at the Hall of Justice, who had been summoned,
failed to stop respondent from his verbal rampage. Respondent ought to have realized that this sort of
public behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation and erode public respect
for it. Whatever moral righteousness respondent had was negated by the way he chose to express his
indignation. An injustice cannot be righted by another injustice.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Mariano Pefianco is found GUILTY of violation of Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and, considering this to be his first offense, is hereby FINED in the amount of
P1,000.00 and REPRIMANDED with a warning that similar action in the future will be sanctioned more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

41
42

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 3149 August 17, 1994

CERINA B. LIKONG, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. ALEXANDER H. LIM, respondent.
Florentino G. Temporal for complainant.
Trabajo Lim Law Office for respondent.

PADILLA, J.:
Cerina B. Likong filed this administrative case against Atty. Alexander H. Lim, seeking the latter's
disbarment for alleged malpractice and grave misconduct.
The circumstances which led to the filing of this complaint are as follows:
Sometime in September 1984, complainant obtained a loan of P92,100.00 from a certain
Geesnell L. Yap. Complainant executed a promissory note in favor of Yap and a deed of
assignment, assigning to Yap pension checks which she regularly receives from the United
States government as a widow of a US pensioner. The aforementioned deed of assignment
states that the same shall be irrevocable until the loan is fully paid. Complainant likewise
executed a special power of attorney authorizing Yap to get, demand, collect and receive her
pension checks from the post office at Tagbilaran City. The above documents were apparently
prepared and notarized by respondent Alexander H. Lim, Yap's counsel.
On 11 December 1984, about three (3) months after the execution of the aforementioned special
power of attorney, complainant informed the Tagbilaran City post office that she was revoking
the special power of attorney. As a consequence, Geesnell Yap filed a complaint for injunction
with damages against complainant. Respondent Alexander H. Lim appeared as counsel for Yap
while Attys. Roland B. Inting and Erico B. Aumentado appeared for complainant (as defendant).
A writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the trial court on
23 January 1985, preventing complainant from getting her pension checks from the Tagbilaran
City post office. Yap later filed an urgent omnibus motion to cite complainant in contempt of court
for attempting to circumvent the preliminary injunction by changing her address to Mandaue City.
Upon motion by Yap, the court also issued an order dated 21 May 1985 expanding the scope of
the preliminary injunction to prevent all post offices in the Philippines from releasing pension
checks to complainant.
On 26 July 1985, complainant and Yap filed a joint motion to allow the latter to withdraw the
pension checks. This motion does not bear the signatures of complainant's counsel of record but
only the signatures of both parties, "assisted by" respondent Attorney Alexander H. Lim.
On 2 August 1985, complainant and Yap entered into a compromise agreement again without
the participation of the former's counsel. In the compromise agreement, it was stated that
complainant Cerina B. Likong admitted an obligation to Yap of P150,000.00. It was likewise
stated therein that complainant and Yap agreed that the amount would be paid in monthly
installments over a period of 54 months at an interest of 40% per annum discounted every six
(6) months. The compromise agreement was approved by the trial court on 15 August 1985.
On 24 November 1987, Cerina B. Likong filed the present complaint for disbarment, based on
the following allegations:
7. In all these motions, complainant was prevented from seeking assistance,
advise and signature of any of her two (2) lawyers; no copy thereof was
furnished to either of them or at least to complainant herself despite the
latter's pleas to be furnished copies of the same;

8. Complainant was even advised by respondent that it was not necessary

for her to consult her lawyers under the pretense that: (a) this could only
jeopardize the settlement; (b) she would only be incurring enormous
expense if she consulted a new lawyer; (c) respondent was assisting her
anyway; (d) she had nothing to worry about the documents foisted upon her
to sign; (e) complainant need not come to court afterwards to save her time;
and in any event respondent already took care of everything;
9. Complainant had been prevented from exhibiting fully her case by means
of fraud, deception and some other form of mendacity practiced on her by
respondent;
10. Finally, respondent fraudulently or without authority assumed to
represent complainant and connived in her defeat; . . . 1
Respondent filed his Answer stating that counsel for complainant,
Atty. Roland B. Inting had abandoned his client. Atty. Lim further stated that the other counsel,
Atty. Enrico Aumentado, did not actively participate in the case and it was upon the request of
complainant and another debtor of Yap, Crispina Acuna, that he (respondent) made the
compromise agreement.
Respondent states that he first instructed complainant to notify her lawyers but was informed
that her lawyer had abandoned her since she could not pay his attorney's fees.
Complainant filed a reply denying that she had been abandoned by her lawyers. Complainant
stated that respondent never furnished her lawyers with copies of the compromise agreement
and a motion to withdraw the injunction cash bond deposited by Yap.
At the outset, it is worth noting that the terms of the compromise agreement are indeed grossly
loaded in favor of Geesnell L. Yap, respondent's client.
Complainant's original obligation was to pay P92,100.00 within one (1) year from 4 October
1984. There is no provision in the promissory note signed by her with respect to any interest to
be paid. The only additional amount which Yap could collect based on the promissory note was
25% of the principal as attorney's fees in case a lawyer was hired by him to collect the loan.
In the compromise agreement prepared by respondent, dated 2 August 1985, complainant's
debt to Yap was increased to P150,000.00 (from 92,100.00) after the lapse of only ten (10)
months. This translates to an interest in excess of seventy-five percent (75%) per annum. In
addition, the compromise agreement provides that the P150,000.00 debt would be payable in
fifty-four (54) monthly installments at an interest of forty percent (40%) per annum. No great
amount of mathematical prowess is required to see that the terms of the compromise agreement
are grossly prejudicial to complainant.
With respect to respondent's failure to notify complainant's counsel of the compromise
agreement, it is of record that complainant was represented by two (2) lawyers, Attys. Inting and
Aumentado. Complainant states that respondent prevented her from informing her lawyers by
giving her the reasons enumerated in the complaint and earlier quoted in this decision.

There is no showing that respondent even tried to inform opposing counsel of the compromise
agreement. Neither is there any showing that respondent informed the trial court of the alleged
abandonment of the complainant by her counsel.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Instead, even assuming that complainant was really abandoned by her counsel, respondent saw
an opportunity to take advantage of the situation, and the result was the execution of the
compromise agreement which, as previously discussed, is grossly and patently
disadvantageous and prejudicial to complainant.
Undoubtedly, respondent's conduct is unbecoming a member of the legal profession.
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics states:
9. Negotiations with opposite party.
A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the
subject of controversy with a party represented by
counsel; much less should he undertake to negotiate or
compromise the matter with him, but should deal only
with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most
particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead
a party not represented by counsel and he should not
undertake to advise him as to the law.
The Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or
deceitful conduct.
Rule 8.02 A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the
professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any
lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those
seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
The violation of the aforementioned rules of professional conduct by respondent Atty. Alexander
H. Lim, warrants the imposition upon him of the proper sanction from this Court. Such acts
constituting malpractice and grave misconduct cannot be left unpunished for not only do they
erode confidence and trust in the legal profession, they likewise prevent justice from being
attained.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Alexander H. Lim is hereby imposed the penalty of
SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR, effective immediately
upon his receipt of this decision.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in respondent's personal record as attorney and member
of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

FIRST DIVISION

ANA MARIE CAMBALIZA,

Adm. Case No. 6290

Complainant,
Present:

In a verified complaint for disbarment filed with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on 30 May 2000, complainant Ana Marie Cambaliza, a former

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.,

employee of respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio in her law office, charged the latter with
- versus -

deceit, grossly immoral conduct, and malpractice or other gross misconduct in office.

PANGANIBAN,

On deceit, the complainant alleged that the respondent has been falsely representing herself
to be married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., who has a prior and subsisting marriage with another

SANTIAGO,

woman. However, through spurious means, the respondent and Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., were able to
obtain a false marriage contract, 43[1] which states that they were married on 10 February 1980 in
Manila. Certifications from the Civil Registry of Manila 44[2] and the National Statistics Office (NSO) 45
[3] prove that no record of marriage exists between them. The false date and place of marriage between

CARPIO, and

the two are stated in the birth certificates of their two children, Donnabel Tenorio 46[4] and Felicisimo
Tenorio III.47[5] But in the birth certificates of their two other children, Oliver Tenorio 48[6] and John
Cedric Tenorio,49[7] another date and place of marriage are indicated, namely, 12 February 1980 in
AZCUNA, JJ.

Malaybalay, Bukidnon.

ATTY. ANA LUZ B. CRISTAL-TENORIO,

As to grossly immoral conduct, the complainant alleged that the respondent caused the
dissemination to the public of a libelous affidavit derogatory to Makati City Councilor Divina Alora

Respondent.

Jacome. The respondent would often openly and sarcastically declare to the complainant and her coemployees the alleged immorality of Councilor Jacome.
Promulgated:

43
July 14, 2004

44

X- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X

45
RESOLUTION

46
47

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

48
49

On malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the complainant alleged that the

The IBP referred this case to Investigating Commissioner Atty. Kenny H. Tantuico.

respondent (1) cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband, who is not a member of the
Philippine Bar; (2) converted her clients money to her own use and benefit, which led to the filing of an

During the hearing on 30 August 2000, the parties agreed that the complainant would

estafa case against her; and (3) threatened the complainant and her family on 24 January 2000 with

submit a Reply to respondents Answer, while the respondent would submit a Rejoinder to the Reply.

the statement Isang bala ka lang to deter them from divulging respondents illegal activities and

The parties also agreed that the Complaint, Answer, and the attached affidavits would constitute as the

transactions.

respective direct testimonies of the parties and the affiants.53[11]

In her answer, the respondent denied all the allegations against her. As to the charge of

In her Reply, the complainant bolstered her claim that the respondent cooperated in the

deceit, she declared that she is legally married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr. They were married on 12

illegal practice of law by her husband by submitting (1) the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law

February 1980 as shown by their Certificate of Marriage, Registry No. 2000-9108 of the Civil Registry

Office54[12] where the name of Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is listed as a senior partner; and (2) a Sagip

of Quezon City. [8] Her husband has no prior and subsisting marriage with another woman.

Communication Radio Group identification card 55[13] signed by the respondent as Chairperson where

50

her husband is identified as Atty. Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr. She added that respondents husband even
As to the charge of grossly immoral conduct, the respondent denied that she caused the

appeared in court hearings.

dissemination of a libelous and defamatory affidavit against Councilor Jacome. On the contrary, it was
Councilor Jacome who caused the execution of said document. Additionally, the complainant and her

In her Rejoinder, respondent averred that she neither formed a law partnership with her

cohorts are the rumormongers who went around the city of Makati on the pretext of conducting a

husband nor allowed her husband to appear in court on her behalf. If there was an instance that her

survey but did so to besmirch respondents good name and reputation.

husband appeared in court, he did so as a representative of her law firm. The letterhead submitted by
the complainant was a false reproduction to show that her husband is one of her law partners. But

The charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in office was likewise denied by the

upon cross-examination, when confronted with the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office bearing

respondent. She claimed that her Cristal-Tenorio Law Office is registered with the Department of

her signature, she admitted that Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he and a certain Gerardo

Trade and Industry as a single proprietorship, as shown by its Certificate of Registration of Business

A. Panghulan, who is also not a lawyer, are named as senior partners because they have investments in

Name.51[9] Hence, she has no partners in her law office. As to the estafa case, the same had already

her law office.56[14]

been dropped pursuant to the Order of 14 June 1996 issued by Branch 103 of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City.52[10] The respondent likewise denied that she threatened the complainant with the
words Isang bala ka lang on 24 January 2000.

The respondent further declared that she married Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., on 12 February
1980 in Quezon City, but when she later discovered that their marriage contract was not registered she
applied for late registration on 5 April 2000. She then presented as evidence a certified copy of the

Further, the respondent averred that this disbarment complaint was filed by the

marriage contract issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar General and authenticated by the NSO. The

complainant to get even with her. She terminated complainants employment after receiving numerous

erroneous entries in the birth certificates of her children as to the place and date of her marriage were

complaints that the complainant extorted money from different people with the promise of processing

merely an oversight.57[15]

their passports and marriages to foreigners, but she reneged on her promise. Likewise, this disbarment
complaint is politically motivated: some politicians offered to re-hire the complainant and her cohorts
should they initiate this complaint, which they did and for which they were re-hired. The respondent

53

also flaunted the fact that she had received numerous awards and citations for civic works and
exemplary service to the community. She then prayed for the dismissal of the disbarment case for being
baseless.

54

50

55

51

56

52

57

grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for
the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in
Sometime after the parties submitted their respective Offer of Evidence and Memoranda,

them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The

the complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint on 13 November 2002 after allegedly realizing

complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is

that this disbarment complaint arose out of a misunderstanding and misappreciation of facts. Thus,

in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in

she is no longer interested in pursuing the case. This motion was not acted upon by the IBP.

the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be
suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges.

In her Report and Recommendation dated 30 September 2003, IBP Commissioner on Bar
Discipline Milagros V. San Juan found that the complainant failed to substantiate the charges of deceit

Hence, notwithstanding the Motion to Withdraw Complaint, this disbarment case should proceed

and grossly immoral conduct. However, she found the respondent guilty of the charge of cooperating in

accordingly.

the illegal practice of law by Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility based on the following evidence: (1) the letterhead of Cristal-

The IBP correctly found that the charges of deceit and grossly immoral conduct were not

Tenorio Law Office, which lists Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., as a senior partner; (2) the Sagip

substantiated. In disbarment proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving his case by

Communication Radio Group identification card of Atty. Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., signed by

convincing evidence.59[17] With respect to the estafa case which is the basis for the charge of

respondent as Chairperson; (3) and the Order dated 18 June 1997 issued by the Metropolitan Trial

malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the respondent is not yet convicted thereof. In Gerona

Court in Criminal Cases Nos. 20729 20734, wherein Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., entered his appearance

vs. Datingaling,60[18] we held that when the criminal prosecution based on the same act charged is still

as counsel and even moved for the provisional dismissal of the cases for failure of the private

pending in court, any administrative disciplinary proceedings for the same act must await the outcome

complainants to appear and for lack of interest to prosecute the said cases. Thus, Commissioner San

of the criminal case to avoid contradictory findings.

Juan recommended that the respondent be reprimanded.

We, however, affirm the IBPs finding that the respondent is guilty of assisting in the unauthorized
In its Resolution No. XVI-2003-228 dated 25 October 2003, the IBP Board of Governors

practice of law. A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to misrepresent himself as a lawyer and

adopted and approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner San Juan.

to practice law is guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,

The modification consisted in increasing the penalty from reprimand to suspension from the practice

which read as follows:

of law for six months with a warning that a similar offense in the future would be dealt with more
severely.

Canon 9 A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the

unauthorized practice of law.
We agree with the findings and conclusion of Commissioner San Juan as approved and

adopted with modification by the Board of Governors of the IBP.

Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of
the Bar in good standing.

At the outset, we find that the IBP was correct in not acting on the Motion to Withdraw
Complaint filed by complainant Cambaliza. In Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos,58[16] we declared:
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant does
not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless
of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts
borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This

The term practice of law implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the public
as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his services. Holding ones
self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose like identifying oneself as attorney,
appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the
general practice of law.61[19] Such acts constitute unauthorized practice of law.

rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment
is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a
defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private

59

58

60

In this case, Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he holds himself out as one. His
wife, the respondent herein, abetted and aided him in the unauthorized practice of the legal profession.
SO ORDERED.
At the hearing, the respondent admitted that the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office
listed Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., Gerardo A. Panghulan, and Maricris D. Battung as senior partners.
She admitted that the first two are not lawyers but paralegals. They are listed in the letterhead of her
law office as senior partners because they have investments in her law office. 62[20] That is a blatant
misrepresentation.
The Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card is another proof that the
respondent assisted Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in misrepresenting to the public that he is a lawyer.
Notably, the identification card stating that he is Atty. Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr., bears the signature of
the respondent as Chairperson of the Group.
The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of
law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to
those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on
the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client,
and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to
the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained.
SECOND DIVISION

Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his
name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal
or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a
layman in the unauthorized practice of law. 63[21]
WHEREFORE, for culpable violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional

ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA,

A.C. No. 7269

Responsibility, respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of six (6) months effective immediately, with a warning that a repetition of the same

Complainant,

or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

n
,

Let copies of this Resolution be attached to respondent Cristal-Tenorios record as attorney

in this Court and furnished to the IBP and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts.

- versus BRION,
P

EREZ
,

61
62
63

ATTY. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE,

Promulgated:

Respondent.
November 23, 2011

continue misrepresenting herself as a lawyer with the help of Regine Macasieb (Macasieb), Busmentes
former secretary. Busmente alleged that he did not represent Ulaso in Civil Case No. 9284 and that his
signature in the Answer1 presented as proof by Noe-Lacsamana was forged.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline

DECISION
In its Report and Recommendation,2 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found that Dela
Rosa was not a lawyer and that she represented Ulaso as Busmentes collaborating counsel in Civil Case
No. 9284. The IBP-CBD noted that while Busmente claimed that Dela Rosa no longer worked for him
since 2000, there was no proof of her separation from employment. The IBP-CBD found that notices from
the MTC San Juan, as well as the pleadings of the case, were all sent to Busmentes designated office
address. The IBP-CBD stated that Busmentes only excuse was that Dela Rosa connived with his former
secretary Macasieb so that the notices and pleadings would not reach him.

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana (Noe-Lacsamana)
against Atty. Yolando F. Busmente (Busmente) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

The Antecedent Facts

Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was the counsel for Irene Bides, the plaintiff in Civil
Case No. SCA-2481 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, while Busmente was the
counsel for the defendant Imelda B. Ulaso (Ulaso). Noe-Lacsamana alleged that Ulasos deed of sale over
the property subject of Civil Case No. SCA-2481 was annulled, which resulted in the filing of an
ejectment case before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), San Juan, docketed as Civil Case No. 9284,
where Busmente appeared as counsel. Another case for falsification was filed against Ulaso where
Busmente also appeared as counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that one Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa or Atty.
Liza Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) would accompany Ulaso in court, projecting herself as Busmentes
collaborating counsel. Dela Rosa signed the minutes of the court proceedings in Civil Case No. 9284 nine
times from 25 November 2003 to 8 February 2005. Noe-Lacsamana further alleged that the court orders
and notices specified Dela Rosa as Busmentes collaborating counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that upon
verification with this Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, she discovered that Dela Rosa was
not a lawyer.

Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and was his paralegal assistant for a few years.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosas employment with him ended in 2000 but Dela Rosa was able to

The IBP-CBD rejected the affidavit submitted by Judy M. Ortalez (Ortalez), Busmentes staff, alleging
Macasiebs failure to endorse pleadings and notices of Civil Case No. 9284 to Busmente. The IBP-CBD
noted that Ortalez did not exactly refer to Ulasos case in her affidavit and that there was no mention that
she actually witnessed Macasieb withholding pleadings and notices from Busmente. The IBP-CBD also
noted that Macasieb was still working at Busmentes office in November 2003 as shown by the affidavit
attached to a Motion to Lift Order of Default that she signed. However, even if Macasieb resigned in
November 2003, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until 2005, which belied Busmentes allegation
that Dela Rosa was able to illegally practice law using his office address without his knowledge and only
due to Dela Rosas connivance with Macasieb. As regards Busmentes allegation that his signature on the
Answer was forged, the IBP-CBD gave Busmente the opportunity to coordinate with the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) to prove that his signature was forged but he failed to submit any report from the
NBI despite the lapse of four months from the time he reserved his right to submit the report.

The IBP-CBD recommended Busmentes suspension from the practice of law for not less than five years.
On 26 May 2006, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-271,3 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, with modification by reducing the period of Busmentes
suspension to six months.

Busmente filed a motion for reconsideration and submitted a report4 from the NBI stating that the
signature in the Answer, when compared with standard/sample signatures submitted to its office, showed
that they were not written by one and the same person. In its 14 May 2011 Resolution No. XIX-2011-168,
the IBP Board of Governors denied Busmentes motion for reconsideration.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether Busmente is guilty of directly or indirectly assisting Dela Rosa in her
illegal practice of law that warrants his suspension from the practice of law.
In this case, it has been established that Dela Rosa, who is not a member of the Bar, misrepresented herself
as Busmentes collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284. The only question is whether Busmente
indirectly or directly assisted Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law.
The Ruling of this Court

We agree with the IBP.

Busmente alleged that Dela Rosas employment in his office ended in 2000 and that Dela Rosa was able to
continue with her illegal practice of law through connivance with Macasieb, another member of
Busmentes staff. As pointed out by the IBP-CBD, Busmente claimed that Macasieb resigned from his
office in 2003. Yet, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until 2005. Pleadings and court notices were
still sent to Busmentes office until 2005. The IBP-CBD noted that Dela Rosas practice should have ended
in 2003 when Macasieb left.

Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

Canon 9. A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

The Court ruled that the term practice of law implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the
public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his services. 5 The
Court further ruled that holding ones self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose,
such as identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating
oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice of law.6

The Court explained:

The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of
law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be
limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive
right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he
fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect
the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves
upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession
enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make
possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law
makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law.7

We agree. Busmentes office continued to receive all the notices of Civil Case No. 9284. The 7 December
2004 Order8 of Judge Elvira DC. Panganiban (Judge Panganiban) in Civil Case No. 9284 showed that
Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa was still representing Ulaso in the case. In that Order, Judge Panganiban set the
preliminary conference of Civil Case No. 9284 on 8 February 2005. It would have been impossible for
Dela Rosa to continue representing Ulaso in the case, considering Busmentes claim that Macasieb already
resigned, if Dela Rosa had no access to the files in Busmentes office.

Busmente, in his motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. XVII-2006-271, submitted a copy of the
NBI report stating that the signature on the Answer submitted in Civil Case No. 9284 and the specimen
signatures submitted by Busmente were not written by one and the same person. The report shows that
Busmente only submitted to the NBI the questioned signature in the Answer. The IBP-CBD report,
however, showed that there were other documents signed by Busmente, including the Pre-Trial Brief dated
14 November 2003 and Motion to Lift Order of Default dated 22 November 2003. Noe-Lacsamana also
submitted a letter dated 14 August 2003 addressed to her as well as three letters dated 29 August 2003
addressed to the occupants of the disputed property, all signed by Busmente. Busmente failed to impugn
his signatures in these other documents.

Finally, Busmente claimed that he was totally unaware of Civil Case No. 9284 and he only came to know
about the case when Ulaso went to his office to inquire about its status. Busmentes allegation contradicted
the Joint Counter-Affidavit9 submitted by Ulaso and Eddie B. Bides stating that:

a. That our legal counsel is Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE of the YOLANDO F.

BUSMENTE AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES with address at suite 718 BPI Office Cond.
Plaza Cervantes, Binondo Manila.

b. That ELIZABETH DELA ROSA is not our legal counsel in the case which have been filed
by IRENE BIDES and LILIA VALERA in representation of her sister AMELIA BIDES for
Ejectment docketed as Civil Case No. 9284 before Branch 58 of the Metropolitan Trial Court
of San Juan, Metro Manila.

c. That we never stated in any of the pleadings filed in the cases mentioned in the ComplaintAffidavit that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA was our lawyer;

d. That if ever ELIZABETH DELA ROSA had affixed her signature in the notices or other
court records as our legal counsel the same could not be taken against us for, we believed in
good faith that she was a lawyer; and we are made to believe that it was so since had referred
her to us (sic), she was handling some cases of Hortaleza and client of Atty. Yolando F.
Busmente;
e. That we know for the fact that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA did not sign any pleading which
she filed in court in connection with our cases at all of those were signed by Atty. YOLANDO
BUSMENTE as our legal counsel; she just accompanied us to the court rooms and/or hearings;
f. That we cannot be made liable for violation of Article 171 (for and in relation to Article 172
of the Revised Penal Code) for the reason that the following elements of the offense are not
present, to wit:
1. That offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of
the facts narrated;

g. That from the start of our acquaintance with ELIZABETH DELA ROSA we never ask her
whether she was a real lawyer and allowed to practice law in the Philippines; it would have
been unethical and shameful on our part to ask her qualification; we just presumed that she
has legal qualifications to represent us in our cases because Atty. YOLANDO F.
BUSMENTE allowed her to accompany us and attend our hearings in short, she gave us
paralegal assistance[.] (Emphasis supplied)

The counter-affidavit clearly showed that Busmente was the legal counsel in Civil Case No. 9284 and that
he allowed Dela Rosa to give legal assistance to Ulaso.

Hence, we agree with the findings of the IBP-CBD that there was sufficient evidence to prove that
Busmente was guilty of violation of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We agree with
the recommendation of the IBP, modifying the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, that Busmente should be
suspended from the practice of law for six months.

WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Yolando F. Busmente from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Busmentes personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant. Let a copy of this Decision be also furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and to all courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.

2. There must be wrongful

intent to injure a 3rd party;
3. Knowledge that the facts
narrated by him are
absolutely false;
4. That the offender makes
in a document untruthful
statements in the narration
of facts.
And furthermore the
untruthful narrations of
facts must affect the
integrity which is not so in
the instant case.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 9604

March 20, 2013

RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER, Respondents.
DECISION

SO ORDERED.4

CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This administrative case arose from a Complaint tiled by Rodrigo E. Tapay (Tapay) and Anthony J. Rustia
(Rustia), both employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration, against Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo (Atty.
Bancolo) and Atty. Janus T. larder (Atty. Jarder) for violation of the Canons of Ethics and Professionalism,
Falsification of Public Document, Gross Dishonesty, and Harassment.
The Facts
Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated 14 October 2004 from the Office of
the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of
authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed against them by Nehimias
Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a co-employee in the Sugar Regulatory Administration. The Complaint 1
dated 31 August 2004 was allegedly signed on behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of
the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.
When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of
the case filed against them before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented
Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in person. When Rustia showed him the Complaint,
Atty. Bancolo declared that the signature appearing above his name as counsel for Divinagracia was not
his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign an affidavit to attest to such fact. On 9 December 2004,
Atty. Bancolo signed an affidavit denying his supposed signature appearing on the Complaint filed with
the Office of the Ombudsman and submitted six specimen signatures for comparison. Using Atty.
Bancolos affidavit and other documentary evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a counter-affidavit accusing
Divinagracia of falsifying the signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo.
In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman provisionally dismissed the
Complaint since the falsification of the counsels signature posed a prejudicial question to the Complaints
validity. Also, the Office of the Ombudsman ordered that separate cases for Falsification of Public
Document2 and Dishonesty3 be filed against Divinagracia, with Rustia and Atty. Bancolo as complainants.
Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August 2005 denying that he falsified the
signature of his former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as evidence an affidavit dated 1
August 2005 by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo Law
Office accepted Divinagracias case and that the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman was
signed by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolos instructions. Divinagracia asked that the Office of the
Ombudsman dismiss the cases for falsification of public document and dishonesty filed against him by
Rustia and Atty. Bancolo and to revive the original Complaint for various offenses that he filed against
Tapay and Rustia.
In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for
falsification of public document (OMB-V-C-05-0207-E) for insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive
portion states:
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence, without prejudice to
the re-filing by Divinagracia, Jr. of a proper complaint for violation of RA 3019 and other offenses against
Rustia and Tapay.

The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was also dismissed for lack of substantial
evidence in a Decision dated 19 September 2005.
On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a
complaint5 to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolos law partner. The complainants alleged
that they were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman with the
forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants stated further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the
Complaint was not the only one that was forged. Complainants attached a Report6 dated 1 July 2005 by
the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory 6 which examined three other letter-complaints signed by
Atty. Bancolo for other clients, allegedly close friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the
questioned signatures in the letter-complaints and the submitted standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo were
not written by one and the same person. Thus, complainants maintained that not only were respondents
engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in falsification of documents
used to harass and persecute innocent people.
On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the Disbarment Complaint Due to Additional
Information. They alleged that a certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the Jarder Bancolo Law
Office, forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo.
In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint, respondents admitted that the
criminal and administrative cases filed by Divinagracia against complainants before the Office of the
Ombudsman were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The cases were assigned to Atty. Bancolo.
Atty. Bancolo alleged that after being informed of the assignment of the cases, he ordered his staff to
prepare and draft all the necessary pleadings and documents. However, due to some minor lapses, Atty.
Bancolo permitted that the pleadings and communications be signed in his name by the secretary of the
law office. Respondents added that complainants filed the disbarment complaint to retaliate against them
since the cases filed before the Office of the Ombudsman were meritorious and strongly supported by
testimonial and documentary evidence. Respondents also denied that Mary Jane Gentugao was employed
as secretary of their law office.
Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006. Thereafter, the parties were directed by
the Commission on Bar Discipline to attend a mandatory conference scheduled on 5 May 2006. The
conference was reset to 10 August 2006. On the said date, complainants were present but respondents
failed to appear. The conference was reset to 25 September 2006 for the last time. Again, respondents
failed to appear despite receiving notice of the conference. Complainants manifested that they were
submitting their disbarment complaint based on the documents submitted to the IBP. Respondents were
also deemed to have waived their right to participate in the mandatory conference. Further, both parties
were directed to submit their respective position papers. On 27 October 2006, the IBP received
complainants position paper dated 18 October 2006 and respondents position paper dated 23 October
2006.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP, submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01
of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility while Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of
the same Code. The Investigating

Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years from the practice of law and
Atty. Jarder be admonished for his failure to exercise certain responsibilities in their law firm.

Comment/Reply to Complainants Motion for Reconsideration and Comment Filed by Complainants dated
29 January 2008.

In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner opined:

In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied both
complainants and Atty. Bancolos motions for reconsideration. The IBP Board found no cogent reason to
reverse the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and affirmed Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97 dated
19 September 2007.

x x x. In his answer, respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo admitted that his signature appearing in the
complaint filed against complainants Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia with the Ombudsman were
signed by the secretary. He did not refute the findings that his signatures appearing in the various
documents released from his office were found not to be his. Such pattern of malpratice by respondent
clearly breached his obligation under Rule 9.01 of Canon 9, for a lawyer who allows a non-member to
represent him is guilty of violating the aforementioned Canon. The fact that respondent was busy cannot
serve as an excuse for him from signing personally. After all respondent is a member of a law firm
composed of not just one (1) lawyer. The Supreme Court has ruled that this practice constitute negligence
and undersigned finds the act a sign of indolence and ineptitude. Moreover, respondents ignored the
notices sent by undersigned. That showed patent lack of respect to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline and its proceedings. It betrays lack of courtesy and irresponsibility as
lawyers.
On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the law firm Jarder Bancolo and Associates
Law Office, failed to exercise certain responsibilities over matters under the charge of his law firm. As a
senior partner[,] he failed to abide to the principle of "command responsibility". x x x.
xxxx
Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner, having passed the bar in 1995 and
practicing law up to the present. He holds himself out to the public as a law firm designated as Jarder
Bancolo and Associates Law Office. It behooves Atty. Janus T. Jarder to exert ordinary diligence to find
out what is going on in his law firm, to ensure that all lawyers in his firm act in conformity to the Code of
Professional Responsibility. As a partner, it is his responsibility to provide efficacious control of court
pleadings and other documents that carry the name of the law firm. Had he done that, he could have
known the unethical practice of his law partner Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo. Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder
failed to perform this task and is administratively liable under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.7
On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved
with modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The Resolution
states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent Atty. Bancolos
violation of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.
However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the Board of Governors RESOLVED as it
is hereby RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the case for lack of merit. 8
Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, Atty. Bancolo filed his Motion for
Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007. Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed his separate Consolidated

The Courts Ruling

After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the findings and recommendation of the
IBP Board and find reasonable grounds to hold respondent Atty. Bancolo administratively liable.
Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the
Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a violation of Rule
9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by
law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio,9 where we held:
The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is
founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer
is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of
moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from
the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary
control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and
ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of,
or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law
makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law.
In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation, 10 we held that the preparation and signing of a pleading
constitute legal work involving the practice of law which is reserved exclusively for members of the legal
profession. Atty. Bancolos authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. Although he may
delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under
the Rules of Court, counsels signature serves as a certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the
best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it; and (3) it is not
interposed for delay.11 Thus, by affixing ones signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the
responsibility to certify to these matters and give legal effect to the document.1wphi1
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007, Atty. Bancolo wants us to believe that he was
a victim of circumstances or of manipulated events because of his unconditional trust and confidence in
his former law partner, Atty. Jarder. However, Atty. Bancolo did not take any steps to rectify the situation,

save for the affidavit he gave to Rustia denying his signature to the Complaint filed before the Office of
the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had an opportunity to maintain his innocence when he filed with the IBP
his Joint Answer (with Atty. Jarder) dated 26 January 2006. Atty. Bancolo, however, admitted that prior to
the preparation of the Joint Answer, Atty. Jarder threatened to file a disbarment case against him if he did
not cooperate. Thus, he was constrained to allow Atty. Jarder to prepare the Joint Answer. Atty. Bancolo
simply signed the verification without seeing the contents of the Joint Answer.
In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the communications
and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit with his tolerance.
Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to
affix his signature to a pleading. This violation Is an act of falsehood which IS a ground for disciplinary
action.
The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had knowledge of,
or even participated in the wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his secretary to
sign pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the finding of the IBP Board that Atty. Jarder is not
administratively liable.
In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the practice of law for one year is warranted.
We also find proper the dismissal of the case against Atty. larder.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T. larder for lack of merit.
We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for violating Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year
effective upon finality of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo's record in this Court as
attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for
their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23467

March 27, 1968

AMALGAMATED LABORERS' ASSOCIATION and/or FELISBERTO M. JAVIER for himself

and as General President,
ATTY. JOSEUR. CARBONELL, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND ATTY. LEONARDO C. FERNANDEZ,
respondents.
Jose Ur. Carbonell for and in his own behalf as petitioner.
Leonardo C. Fernandez for and in his own behalf as respondent.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Controversy over attorneys' fees for legal services rendered in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu.
The background facts are as follows:
On May 30, 1956, Florentino Arceo and 47 others together with their union, Amalgamated Laborers'
Association, and/or Felisberto Javier, general president of said union, lodged a complaint 1 in the Court of
Industrial Relations (CIR), for unfair labor practices specified in Sec. 4(a) 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Industrial
Peace Act. Made respondents were their former employer, Binalbagan Sugar Central Company, Inc.
(Biscom), Rafael Jalandoni, its president and general manager; Gonzalo Guillen, its chief engineer and
general factory superintendent; and Fraternal Labor Organization and/or Roberto Poli, its president.
Failing in their attempts to dismiss the complaint (motions to dismiss dated June 30, 1956 and July
6, 1956), 2 respondents Biscom, Jalandoni, and Guillen, on July 9, 1957, answered and counterclaimed.
Respondents Fraternal Labor Union and Poli also filed their answer dated July 12, 1957.

Upon the ten complainants' motion to name an official computer to determine the actual money due
them, CIR, on June 4, 1963, directed the Chief Examiner of its Examining Division to go to the premises
of Biscom and compute the back wages due the ten complainants.
On August 9, 1963, the Chief Examiner reported that the total net back wages due the ten
complainants were P79,755.22. Biscom and the complainants moved for reconsideration: Biscom on
August 17, 1963; complainants on September 24, 1963.
In the interim, Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez (a respondent herein) filed on July 15, 1963 in the same
case CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu a "Notice of Attorney's Lien." He alleged therein that he had been
the attorney of record for the laborers in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu "since the inception of the
preliminary hearings of said case up to the Supreme Court on appeal, as chief counsel thereof"; that he
"had actually rendered legal services to the laborers who are subject of this present litigation [CIR Case
No. 70-ULP-Cebu] since the year 1956, more or less"; that the laborers "have voluntarily agreed to give
[him], representing his attorney's fees on contingent basis such amounts equivalent to 25% thereof which
agreement is evidenced by a Note"; and that the 25% attorney's fee so contracted is "reasonable and proper
taking into consideration the length of services he rendered and the nature of the work actually performed
by him."
On September 25, 1963, Atty. Fernandez filed an "Amended Notice of Attorney's Lien," which in
part reads:
3. That the laborers, subject of this present litigation, sometime on February 3, 1956, had
initially voluntarily agreed to give Undersigned Counsel herein, representing his Attorney's
fees on contingent basis, such amounts as equivalent to Thirty Per Cent (30%) of whatever
money claims that may be adjudicated by this Honorable Court, copy of said Agreement, in the
local Visayan dialect and a translation of the same in the English language are hereto attached
as annexes "A" "A-1" hereof;

With the issues joined, the case on the merits was heard before a trial commissioner.
At the hearings, only ten of the forty-eight complainant laborers appeared and testified. Two of these
ten were permanent (regular) employees of respondent company; the remaining eight were seasonal
workers. The regular employees were Arsenio Reyes and Fidel Magtubo. Seasonal workers were Catalino
Bangoy, Juan Fernandez, Jose Garlitos, Dionisio Pido, Santiago Talagtag, Dominador Tangente, Felimon
Villaluna and Brigido Casas.

4. That subsequently thereafter, when the above-entitled Case was already decided in their
favor, Arsenio Reyes, in behalf of his co-laborers who are also Complainants in this Case
begged from the Undersigned Counsel herein that he reduce his attorney's fees to Twenty-Five
Per Cent (25%) only for the reason that they have to share and satisfy also Atty. Jose Ur.
Carbonell in the equivalent amount of Five Per Cent (5%) although the latter's actual services
rendered was so insignificant thereof;
5. That because of the pleadings of said Arsenio Reyes, who is the President of said Union, the
Undersigned Counsel herein finally agreed and consented that his attorney's fees be reduced to
only Twenty-Five Per Cent (25%) instead of Thirty Per Cent (30%) as originally agreed upon
in 1956.

On November 13, 1962, CIR, thru Associate Judge Arsenio I. Martinez, rendered judgment, which
provides, inter alia, that the two regular employees (Reyes and Magtubo) be reinstated "to their former
positions, without loss of seniority and other benefits which should have accrued to them had they not
been illegally dismissed, with full back wages from the time of their said dismissals up to the time of their
actual reinstatements, minus what they have earned elsewhere in the meantime" and that the eight seasonal
workers "be readmitted to their positions as seasonal workers of respondent company (Biscom), with back
wages as seasonal workers from the time they were not rehired at the start of the 1955-1956 milling
season on October 1, 1955 up to the time they are actually reinstated, less the amount earned elsewhere
during the period of their lay-off."

On October 7, 1963, Atty. Jose Ur. Carbonell (a petitioner herein) filed in court a document labelled
"Discharge" informing CIR of the discharge, release and dismissal thru a union board resolution
(attached thereto as Annex A thereof) of Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez as one of the lawyers of the
complainants in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu, effective February 28, 1963.

Respondents Biscom, Jalandoni and Guillen appealed direct to this Court. 3 On March 28, 1963, this
Court dismissed the appeal, without costs. Ground: Petitioners therein did not seek reconsideration of
CIR's decision of November 13, 1962. The judgment became final.

On October 14, 1963, Atty. Fernandez replied. He averred that the grounds for his discharge
specified in the board resolution were "malicious and motivated by greed and ungratefulness" and that the
unjustifiable discharge did not affect the already stipulated contract for attorneys' fees.

On March 19, 1964, CIR Judge Arsenio I. Martinez resolved Biscom's and complainants' motions
for resonsideration objecting to the Chief Examiner's Report and also respondent Fernandez' Amended
Notice of Attorney's Lien. Judge Martinez' order reads in part:
(b) Respondent company is further directed to deposit the amount representing 25% of
P79,755.22 with the Cashier of this Court, as attorney's fees;
xxx

xxx

xxx

(d) The amount representing attorney's fees to be deposited by the respondent company
is hereby awarded and granted to Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez, and he may collect the same
from the Cashier of the Court upon the finality of this order, subject to existing auditing
procedures; ....
Biscom complied with the order of deposit. 4
On April 10, 1964, Atty. Carbonell moved to reconsider the March 19, 1964 order with respect to
the award of attorneys' fees. Amongst his grounds are that CIR has no jurisdiction to determine the matter
in question, and that the award of 25% as attorneys' fees to Atty. Fernandez is excessive, unfair and illegal.
This motion was denied on April 28, 1964 by CIR en banc.
On June 9, 1964, a motion for reconsideration of the April 28, 1964 resolution was filed by Atty.
Carbonell. This was amplified by a similar motion filed on June 11, 1964.
On June 25, 1964, two things happened: First. CIR en banc denied the motion of June 11, 1964.
Second. On Atty. Fernandez' motion, Judge Martinez authorized the Cashier of the court to disburse to
Fernandez the amount of P19,938.81 representing attorneys' fees and deducting therefrom all legal fees
incident to such deposit.
Petitioners herein, Atty. Carbonell, Amalgamated Laborers' Association, and the ten employees,
appealed from the June 25, 1964 resolution of CIR, direct to this Court.
1. Petitioners press upon this Court the view that CIR is bereft of authority to adjudicate contractual
disputes over attorneys' fees. Their reasons: (1) a dispute arising from contracts for attorneys' fees is not a
labor dispute and is not one among the cases ruled to be within CIR's authority; and (2) to consider such a
dispute to be a mere incident to a case over which CIR may validly assume jurisdiction is to disregard the
special and limited nature of said court's jurisdiction.
These arguments are devoid of merit.
The present controversy over attorneys' fees is but an epilogue or a tail-end feature of the main case,
CIR No. 70-ULP-Cebu, which undoubtedly is within CIR's jurisdiction. And, it has been held that "once
the Court of Industrial Relations has acquired jurisdiction over a case under the law of its creation, it
retains that jurisdiction until the case is completely decided, including all the incidents related thereto." 5
Expressive of the rule on this point is this
4. It is well settled that:

A grant of jurisdiction implies the necessary and usual incidental powers

essential to effectuate it, and every regularly constituted court has power to do all
things reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its
jurisdiction, and for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates, even though
the court may thus be called upon to decide matters which would not be within its
cognizance as original causes of action.
While a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to
effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive
legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate
it (In re Stinger's Estate, 201 P. 693), and, subject to existing laws and constitutional
provisions, every regularly constituted court has power to do all things that are
reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its
jurisdiction, and for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates. So demands,
matters, or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action,
and coming within the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court
and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal
matter, even though the Court may thus be, called on to consider and decide
matters, which as original causes of action, would not be within its cognizance
(Bartholomew vs. Shipe, 251 S.W. 1031), (21 C.J.S. pp. 136-138.)
Thus, in Gomez vs. North Camarines Lumber Co., L-11945, August 18, 1958, and
Serrano vs. Serrano, L-19562, May 23, 1964, we held that the court having jurisdiction over
the main cause of action, may grant the relief incidental thereto, even if they would otherwise,
be outside its competence. 6
To direct that the present dispute be lodged in another court as petitioners advocate would only
result in multiplicity of suits, 7 a situation abhorred by the rules. Thus it is, that usually the application to
fix the attorneys' fees is made before the court which renders the judgment. 8 And, it has been observed
that "[a]n approved procedure, where a charging lien has attached to a judgment or where money has been
paid into court, is for the attorney to file an intervening petition and have the amount and extent of his lien
judicially determined." 9 Appropriately to be recalled at this point, is the recent ruling in Martinez vs.
Union de Maquinistas, 1967A Phild. 142, 144, January 30, 1967, where, speaking thru Mr. Justice Arsenio
P. Dizon, explicit pronouncement was made by this Court that: "We are of the opinion that since the Court
of Industrial Relations obviously had jurisdiction over the main cases, ... it likewise had full jurisdiction to
consider and decide all matters collateral thereto, such as claims for attorney's fees made by the members
of the bar who appeared therein." 10
2. The parties herein join hands in one point - the ten (10) successful complainants in C.I.R Case
No. 70-ULP-Cebu should pay as attorneys' fees 30% of the amount adjudicated by the court in the latter's
favor (P79,755.22).
They are at odds, however, on how to split the fees.
Respondent Atty. Fernandez claims twenty-five per cent (25%) of the 30% attorneys' fees. He
explains that upon the plea of Arsenio Reyes, union president and one of the 10 successful complainants,
he had to reduce his fees to 25% since "they have to share and satisfy also Atty. Jose Ur. Carbonell in the
equivalent amount of Five Per Cent (5%)." Atty. Fernandez exhibited a contract purportedly dated
February 3, 1956 before the 48 employees have even filed their complaint in CIR. The stipulated fee is
30% of whatever amount the ten might recover. Strange enough, this contract was signed only by 8 of the
10 winning claimants. What happened to the others? Why did not the union intervene in the signing of this

contract? Petitioners dispute said contract. They say that Atty. Fernandez required the ten to sign the
contract only after the receipt of the decision.
Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the verbal agreement entered into by the union and its
officers thru its President Javier and said two lawyers, Atty. Carbonell and Atty. Fernandez, is that the 30%
attorneys' fees, shall be divided equally ("share and share alike") amongst Atty. Carbonell, Atty. Fernandez
and Felisberto Javier, the union president.
After hearing, CIR Associate Judge Arsenio I. Martinez awarded 25% attorneys' fees to respondent
Atty. Fernandez. CIR noted that "the active conduct and prosecution of the above-entitled case was done
by Atty. Fernandez up to the appeal in the Supreme Court," and that petitioner Atty. Carbonell manifested
that "Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez was the counsel mainly responsible for the conduct of the case." It
noted, too, that petitioner Atty. Carbonell did not file any notice of Attorney's Lien.
3. We strike down the alleged oral agreement that the union president should share in the attorneys'
fees. Canon 34 of Legal Ethics condemns this arrangement in terms clear and explicit. It says: "No
division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a division of service
or responsibility." The union president is not the attorney for the laborers. He may seek compensation only
as such president. An agreement whereby a union president is allowed to share in attorneys' fees is
immoral. Such a contract we emphatically reject. It cannot be justified.
4. A contingent fee contract specifying the percentage of recovery an attorney is to receive in a suit
"should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, including the risk and uncertainty of the
compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness." 11

The ten complainants involved herein are mere laborers. It is not far-fetched to assume that they
have not reached an educational attainment comparable to that of petitioner Carbonell or respondent
Fernandez who, on the other hand, are lawyers. Because of the inequality of the situation between laborers
and lawyers, courts should go slow in awarding huge sums by way of attorneys' fees based solely on
contracts. 14 For, as in the present case, the real objective of the CIR judgment in CIR Case No. 70-ULPCebu is to benefit the complaint laborers who were unjustifiedly dismissed from the service. While it is
true that laborers should not be allowed to develop that atavistic proclivity to bite the hands that fed them,
still lawyers should not be permitted to get a lion's share of the benefits due by reason of a worker's labor.
What is to be paid to the laborers is not windfall but a product of the sweat of their brow. Contracts for
legal services between laborer and attorney should then be zealously scrutinized to the end that a fair share
of the benefits be not denied the former.
5. An examination of the record of the case will readily show that an award of twenty-five per cent
(25%) attorneys' fees reasonably compensates the whole of the legal services rendered in CIR Case No.
70-ULP-Cebu. This fee must be shared by petitioner Atty. Carbonell and respondent Atty. Fernandez. For,
after all, they are the counsel of record of the complainants. Respondent Atty. Fernandez cannot deny this
fact. The pleadings filed even at the early stages of the proceedings reveal the existence of an association
between said attorneys. The pleadings were filed under the name of "Fernandez & Carbonell." This
imports a common effort of the two. It cannot be denied though that most of those pleadings up to
judgment were signed for Fernandez & Carbonell by respondent Fernandez.
We note that a break-up in the professional tie-up between Attorneys Fernandez and Carbonell
began when petitioner Atty. Carbonell, on November 26, 1962, complained to CIR that respondent Atty.
Fernandez "failed to communicate with him nor to inform him about the incidents of this case." He there
requested that he be furnished "separately copies of the decision of the court and other pleadings and
subsequent orders as well as motions in connection with the case."

Lately, we said: 12
The principle that courts should reduce stipulated attorney's fees whenever it is found
under the circumstances of the case that the same is unreasonable, is now deeply rooted in this
jurisdiction....
xxx

xxx

xxx

Since then this Court has invariably fixed counsel fees on a quantum meruit basis
whenever the fees stipulated appear excessive, unconscionable, or unreasonable, because a
lawyer is primarily a court officer charged with the duty of assisting the court in administering
impartial justice between the parties, and hence, the fees should be subject to judicial control.
Nor should it be ignored that sound public policy demands that courts disregard stipulations for
counsel fees, whenever they appear to be a source of speculative profit at the expense of the
debtor or mortgagor. See, Gorospe, et al. v. Gochangco, L-12735, October 30, 1959. And it is
not material that the present action is between the debtor and the creditor, and not between
attorney and client. As courts have power to fix the fee as between attorney and client, it must
necessarily have the right to say whether a stipulation like this, inserted in a mortgage contract,
is valid. Bachrach v. Golingco, 39 Phil. 138.
In the instant case, the stipulated 30% attorneys' fee is excessive and unconscionable. With the
exception of Arsenio Reyes who receives a monthly salary of P175, the other successful complainants
were mere wage earners paid a daily rate of P4.20 to P5.00. 13 Considering the long period of time that
they were illegally and arbitrarily deprived of their just pay, these laborers looked up to the favorable
money judgment as a serum to their pitiful economic malaise. A thirty per cent (30%) slice therefrom
immensely dilutes the palliative ingredient of this judicial antidote.

Subsequent pleadings filed in the case unmistakably show the widening rift in their professional
relationship. Thus, on May 23, 1963, a "Motion to Name and Authorize Official Computer" was filed with
CIR. On the same day, a "Motion to Issue Writ of Execution" was also registered in the same court.
Although filed under the name of "Carbonell & Fernandez," these pleadings were signed solely by
petitioner Atty. Carbonell.
On September 16, 1963, an "Opposition to respondent Biscom's Motion for Reconsideration" was
filed by petitioner Atty. Carbonell. On September 24, 1963, he filed a "Motion for Clarification" of the
November 13, 1962 judgment of CIR regarding the basic pay of Arsenio Reyes and Fidel Magtubo. On
September 24, 1963, he also filed a "Motion to Reconsider Report of Chief Examiner." These, and other
pleadings that were filed later were signed solely by petitioner Atty. Carbonell, not in the name of
"Carbonell & Fernandez." While it was correctly observed by CIR that a good portion of the court battle
was fought by respondent Atty. Fernandez, yet CIR cannot close its eyes to the legal services also rendered
by Atty. Carbonell. For, important and numerous, too, were his services. And, they are not negligible. The
conclusion is inevitable that petitioner Atty. Carbonell must have a share in the twenty-five per cent (25%)
attorneys' fees awarded herein. As to how much, this is a function pertaining to CIR.
6. We note that CIR's cashier was authorized on June 25, 1964 to disburse to Atty. Leonardo C.
Fernandez the sum of P19,938.81 which is 25% of the amount recovered. In the event payment actually
was made, he should be required to return whatever is in excess of the amount to which he is entitled in
line with the opinion expressed herein. 15
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the award of twenty five per cent (25%) attorneys' fees solely to
respondent Atty. Fernandez contained in CIR's order of March 19, 1964 and affirmed by said court's en
banc resolutions of April 28, 1964 and June 25, 1964, is hereby set aside; and the case is hereby remanded

to the Court of Industrial Relations with instructions to conduct a hearing on, and determine, the
respective shares of Attorney Leonardo C. Fernandez and Attorney Jose Ur. Carbonell in the amount of
P19,938.81 herein awarded as attorneys' fees or both. No costs. So ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ.,
concur.
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.