Arraignment and Plea

PEOPLE v DURANGO
This case has reached the SC by an automatic review from the decision of the RTC of Malabon of
Death Penalty.
Facts: Bonifacio Durango was charged with two counts of rape. During arraignment, Durango
entered a plea of not guilty.
2. During the trial, Durangos defense counsel manifested to the court that Durango wanted to
withdrew his earlier plea of not guilty and substitute it with a plea of guilty.
3. On the basis of the manifestation, Durango was re-arraigned, and this time he pleaded guilty.
After the prosecution had concluded its presentation, the RTC rendered a decision finding the
accused guilty and sentencing him to death.
Issue: Whether the RTC erred in convicting Durango despite his improvident plea of guilty
Held: Yes. When an accused enters a plea of guilty, the trial court is mandated to see to it that
the exacting standards laid down by the rules therefore are strictly observed. It cannot be said
that when a person pleads guilty to a crime there is no chance at all that he could, in fact, be
innocent. The improvident plea, followed by an abbreviated proceeding, with practically no role
at all played by the defense is just too meager to accept as being the standard constitutional due
process at work enough to forfeit human life.
The case was set aside and remanded to the trial court for further and appropriate proceedings.
People v Chua
Facts: On April 13, 1998, Alberto Chua was charged with the crime of rape against her daughter
Chenny Chua, a minor.
2. On April 20, 1998, Alberto Chua was arraigned and he pleaded "not guilty." At the pretrial
conference, however, appellant, through counsel, manifested that he was withdrawing his plea
and changing it to "guilty" as charged.
3. The trial court questions the voluntariness of his change of plea and his comprehension of its
consequences. Satisfied with appellant's response, the court ordered his rearraignment.
Appellant, with the assistance of counsel, withdrew his plea of "not guilty" and entered a plea of
"guilty" as charged. Thereafter, the court ordered the prosecution to present its evidence.
The trial court found appellant guilty of the offense and sentenced him to death.
Alberto Chua claims that the trial court accepted his plea of guilt without following the procedure
laid down in the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether the RTC erred in convicting Chua guilty of the offense and sentencing to death
Held: Yes. When the accused enters a plea of guilty to a capital offense, the trial court must do
the following: (1) conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and the
accused's full comprehension of the consequences thereof; (2) require the prosecution to present
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and (3) ask
the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.
This procedure is mandatory and a judge who fails to observe it commits grave abuse of
discretion.

the court did not probe carefully and thoroughly into the reasons for appellant's change of
plea and his comprehension of the consequences of said plea.

the trial court did not explain the essential elements of the crime with which appellant was
charged. Appellant was convicted of incestuous rape but did not specify under what
particular paragraph of Article 335 the charge was made.
trial court did not only neglect to make the searching inquiry, it also failed to inquire from
appellant whether he desired to present evidence in his behalf. This is the third
requirement under Section 3, Rule 116

Motion to Quash
People v Gopio
Facts: Agustin Gopio, by means of violence, force and intimidation, have carnal knowledge with
Ma. Princess Millano (11yo)
2. Giopio pleaded not guilty when arraigned.
3. The offense charged was committed sometime between the months of May and June 1995 in
Obando, Bulacan. At that time, the barangay was celebrating its fiesta.
4. Gopio, on the other hand, testified that it was impossible for him to commit the crime of rape
against the victim in May and June of 1995 because he was then in Novaliches, Quezon City.
Gopio explained that he has been selling fish there almost every day since 1994.
5. Trial Court rendered its decision, finding accused-appellant guilty of a crime of statutory rape
as charged and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
6. On appeal in the SC, Gopio alleged that:
a. the trial court erred in not finding that the information is insufficient to support a
judgment of conviction for its failure to state the precise date of the offense charged; and
b. the trial court gravely erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged.
Issue: WON the trial court has correctly ruled the case?
Held: Yes. The trial court correctly ruled that accused-appellant Agustin Gopio is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory rape.
Under Rule 110, 6 and 11 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, an information is sufficient as long
as it states the statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constituting the
same, since in rape cases, the time of commission of the crime is not a material ingredient of the
offense.
SC also held that: It is now too late to question the form or substance of the information because
when he entered his plea at his arraignment, accused-appellant did not object to the sufficiency
of the information against him. The rule is that, at any time before entering his plea, the
accused may move to quash the information on the ground that it does not conform
substantially to the prescribed form. The failure of accused-appellant to assert any
ground for a motion to quash before he pleads to the information, either because he
did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be
deemed a waiver of the grounds for a motion to quash, except when the grounds are that
no offense was charged, the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged,
the offense or penalty has been extinguished, and the accused would be twice put in jeopardy.

Recebido v People
Facts: Sometime in 1990, Caridad Dorol went to the house of her cousin, Aniceto Recebido, at
San Isidro, Sorsogon to redeem her property, an agricultural land which Caridad Dorol mortgaged
to Recebido sometime in April of 1985. Recebido and Dorol did not execute a document on the
mortgage but Dorol instead gave petitioner a copy of the Deed of Sale dated June 16, 1973
executed in her favor by her father, Juan Dorol.
2. Recebido refused to allow Caridad Dorol to redeem her property on his claim that she had sold
her property to him in 1979. Caridad Dorol maintained and insisted that the transaction between
them involving her property was a mortgage.
3. Caridad Dorol verified from the Office of the Assessor in Sorsogon but the questioned Deed of
Sale was found that the signature was falsified.
4. Caridad Dorol filed her complaint against Aniceto Recebido with the NBI, Legaspi City and its
Questioned Documents Division conducted an examination in the original copy of the Deed of
Sale in question allegedly signed by Caridad, particularly her signature affixed thereon.
5. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Sorsogon filed the information indicting petitioner for
Falsification of Public Document with the RTC Sorsogon.
6. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.
7. Trial court rendered the decision against Recebido
8. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirms the RTC decision.
Issue: Whether or not the crime charged had already prescribed at the time the information was
filed? (issue on motion to quash)
Ruling: The defense of prescription, although not invoked in the trial, may, as in this case, be
invoked on appeal. Hence, the failure to raise this defense in the motion to quash the information
does not give rise to the waiver of Recebido to raise the same anytime thereafter including
during appeal.
Nonetheless, we hold that the crime charged has not prescribed. Under Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the
crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, x x x.
Denied for lack of Merit.
Note: SEC. 8. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. The failure of the
accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said
motion shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds of no
offense charged, lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of the offense or
penalty and jeopardy

People v Duran
Facts: An information was filed in the Justice of Peace of Samar by the assistant provincial fiscal
accusing Mayor Duran of the crime of serious slander by deed.
2. Duran was accused of boxing and slapping Ignacio Amarillo (councilor) in the presence of
many people and during a meeting at the Municipal Building.
3. Duran moved to quash the information or, alternatively, for a reinvestigation, claiming that the
complaint and the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses filed with the inferior court did not
state that the accused ever slapped the offended party so that the offense charged did not
constitute grave serious slander by deed, while the information filed in the court of first instance
sufficiently charged the offense. The motion was not expressly resolved but must have been
denied, because the case proceeded to trial.
4. After the prosecution had rested its case, the defense moved to dismiss the charge on the
ground that the guilt of the accused had not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The court,
Honorable Emilio Benitez presiding, ordered the dismissal of the complaint, but on the ground
that it did not acquire jurisdiction.
5. From this order of dismissal, the prosecution appealed to SC.
Issue: WON the dismissal was erroneous?
Ruling: Yes.
In dismissing the information for not having been filed by the offending party, that required all
prosecutions for the crime of injuria committed against private persons to be instituted only upon
the complaint of the aggrieved party. However, this law has already been repealed by
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code.
The erroneous dismissal of the complaint notwithstanding, we cannot now remedy the error
because, as correctly argued by the appellant, this appeal by the government places him in
double jeopardy. Settled is the rule that where a trial court has jurisdiction but
mistakenly dismisses the complaint or information on the ground of lack of it, the
order of dismissal is unappealable because an appeal by the government therefrom
would place the accused in second jeopardy for the same offense. The only exception to
this rule is where the dismissal was made with the consent of the accused. It cannot be said that
the appellant herein consented to the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,
because his motion to quash after the prosecution has presented its evidence was based on
another ground, namely, that the prosecution had failed to establish his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Cudia v CA
Facts: Renato Cudia was arrested in Mabalacat, Pampanga for the crime of Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunition.
2. He was brought to Sto. Domingo, Angeles City which a preliminary investigation was
conducted and as a result the City Prosecutor filed an information against him.
3. Upon his arraignment, the court called the attention of the parties and contrary to the
information, Renatio Cudia had committed the offense inMabalacat and not in Angeles City.
4. Thus the judge ordered that the case should be assigned to a court involving crimes
committed outside Angeles City consequently it was assigned to Branch 56 of the Angeles City
RTC.
5. However, the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga filed an information charging Cudio with the
same crime and it was likewise assigned to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC which resulted into
two Information filed with the same crime. This prompted the City Prosecutor to file a Motion to
Dismiss/ Withdraw the Information which the trial courtgranted.
6. Renato filed a Motion to Quash the criminal case filed by the Provincial Prosecutor on the
ground that his continued prosecution for the offense of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition for which he had been arraigned in the first criminal case, and which had been
dismissed despite his opposition would violate his right not to be put twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense.
The trial court denied the motion to quash; hence, petitioner raised the issue to the Court of
Appeals. Theappellate court, stating that there was no double jeopardy, dismissed the same on
the ground that the petition could nothave been convicted under the first information as the
same was defective. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration wasdenied; hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it found that the City Prosecutor of
Angeles City did not have the authority to file the first information.
Ruling: No. It is plainly apparent that the City Prosecutor of Angeles City had no authority to file
the first information, the offense having been committed in the Municipality of Mabalacat, which
is beyond his jurisdiction. Presidential Decree No.1275, in relation to Section 9 of the
Administrative Code of 1987, pertinently provides that:
Sec. 11. The provincial or the city fiscal shall:

b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and

violations of all penal laws and ordinances within their respective jurisdictions and have the
necessary information or complaint prepared or made against the persons accused. In the
conduct of such investigations he or his assistants shall receive the sworn statements or take
oral evidence of witnesses summoned by subpoena for the purpose.
It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who should prepare
information for offenses committed within Pampanga but outside of Angeles City. An information,
when required to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another. It must be
exhibited or presented by the prosecuting attorney or someone authorized by law. If not, the
court does not acquire jurisdiction.
In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former
prosecution. As the fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first
information would not be a bar to petitioner's subsequent prosecution. As the first information
was fatally defective for lack of authority of the officer filing it, the instant petition must fail for
failure to comply with all the requisites necessary to invoke double jeopardy.
Thus Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.