Figes: Red Army and Mass Mobilization

The Past and Present Society
The Red Army and Mass Mobilization during the Russian Civil War 1918-1920
Author(s): Orlando Figes
Source: Past & Present, No. 129 (Nov., 1990), pp. 168-211
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Past and Present Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/650938 .
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THE RED ARMY AND MASS

MOBILIZATION DURING THE RUSSIAN
CIVIL WAR 1918-1920
The Red Armybeganlifein 1918as a smallvolunteer
forceof
of
Bolshevik
from
the
urban
citadels
major
powerin
proletarians
Russia.Bytheendofthecivilwaragainstthe
northern
andcentral
intheautumn
Whitesandthevariousarmiesofforeign
intervention,
of 1920,it had grownintoa massconscript
armyof fivemillion
75 percentofthempeasants1
soldiers,
bybirth- a figure
roughly
in Russia.2
to thesizeofthepeasantpopulation
proportionate
thisrepresented
a tremendous
socialchange.
FortheBolsheviks,
to theworkingIn October1917theirsupporthad beenconfined
ofthebig industrial
classdistricts
cities,theBalticFleet,and the
ofnorthern
andarmies
andwestern
(soontobedemobilized)
garrisons
in thecountryside,
wherethevastmajority
Russia.Without
support
tohold
theBolsheviks
ofthepopulation
lived,no onehadexpected
itwaswidely
on topowerformorethana fewweeks.The peasants,
assumed,wouldriseup againstthem,joiningthevariousarmiesof
theRedArmy
won
toexpectations,
counter-revolution.
Yet,contrary
becauseofitssuperior
thecivilwar,anditdidso precisely
success,
millionsof peasantsfor
comparedwiththeWhites,in mobilizing
"In thissocialfact",concluded
was"rooted
service.
Trotsky,
military
thefinalcauseofourvictories".3
ofthepeasantry
of
The massconscription
gaverisetoa number
Most
within
the
Bolshevik
Bolsheviks
viewed
debates
major
party.
as an alienforce,hostileto thesocialistrevolution
thepeasantry
here(and throughout)
as household
members
ofsmallI "Peasants"aredefined
scalefamily
farms.
2 N. Gorlov,
krasnoi
armii"[OntheSocialStructure
strukture
ofthe
"O sotsial'noi
Red Army],
Politrabotnika
(1922),no. 2, p. 55. The 1920censusoftheRed Army
of77 percent:see V. Efremov,
"ProfesandNavygavetheslightly
higherfigure
armiii flotapo perepisi
1920g." [TheProfessional
sostavkrasnoi
Composional'nyi
totheCensusof1920],Biulleten'
TsSU
sitionoftheRedArmyandFleetAccording
totheRedArmy
census,only66 percentofsoldiers
(1922),no. 66,p. 2. According
as theirmainoccupation:
Biulleten'
TsSU (1922),no. 59, p. 41.
registered
farming
mainoccupation
as their
a significant
Peasants
domestic
industry
counting
represented
of theRed Army.Military
servicewas also a popularmeansofsocial
component
toothersocialgroups,especially
fromthepeasantry
thebureaucracy.
mobility
theRevolution
Armed,trans.B. Pearce,in TheMilitaryWritings
3 L. Trotsky,How
5 vols. (London, 1979), i, p. 15.
and SpeechesofLeon Trotsky,

THE RED ARMY AND MASS MOBILIZATION 1918-1920 169
nature
becauseofits"petty-bourgeois"
towards
(itssocialinclination
small-scale
property
rightsand marketrelations).The Bolshevik
partyhad alwayssupportedthe ideal of a "class" army- one
as opposedto an armybasedupon
dominated
by theproletariat,
universal
therapidescalation
ofthecivil
military
Although
service.4
of 1918had forcedtheBolsheviks
warin thesummer
to adoptthe
latterprinciple,
toexpresstheirbelief
manyin thepartycontinued
thata smallbut"pure"proletarian
army,liketheRed Guardsor
of1917,wouldprovemorereliableandeffective
militia
than
factory
a massconscript
andweakened
armyinfiltrated
bynon-proletarian
elements.This was one of thecentralarguments
of theMilitary
intheBolshevik
toTrotsky's
Opposition
party
policyofconstructing
a regular
conscript
armycommanded
by"bourgeois"
military
specialistsunderthepoliticalsupervision
of Bolshevik
The
commissars.5
needto preservethehegemony
of theindustrial
workeroverthe
consideration
forthose(including
peasantwas also an important
- as soon
who
stressed
the
of
Trotsky
himself)
desirabilitymoving
as themilitary
situation
from
the
mass
permitted away
conscript
a militiasystem.6
armytowards
Theseissueswentfarbeyondthequestion
ofmilitary
organization.
Theprinciples
the
which
Red
was
upon
Army builtservedas a model
fortherestoftheSovietsystem.
The centralization
oftheBolshevik
stateapparatusranparallelto similarchangesin theRed Army's
thetransition
politicaland commandstructure.
Trotsky
compared
from
workers'
toone-man
control
in
withthe
managementindustry
transfer
ofmilitary
in
the
Red
from
elected
officers
authority
Army
tomilitary
the
Counspecialists,
appointed
by Revolutionary
Military
cil oftheRepublic(RVSR).7The experience
ofmassmobilization
the Red Armyfundamentally
gainedby the Bolsheviks
through
attitudes
notonlyduringtheperiodof
shapedtheirgovernmental
WarCommunism
was
(1918-21),whenthewholeofSovietsociety
butalsoduringtheStalinist
militarized,
period.Eventhelanguage
- withitscontinual
oftheBolsheviks
references
to "campaigns",
and "brigades"- hadmilitary
overtones.
"combats","fronts"
The problems
of military
associatedwiththemass
organization
4 Ibid.,i, pp.
134,420-1,iii,pp. 4, 8,passim.
and theRed Army,1918-1922(Cambridge,1988),p.

5 F. Benvenuti,TheBolsheviks
66.
6 J. Erickson,
"SomeMilitary
andPolitical
ofthe'MilitiaArmy'ControAspects
in C. Abramsky
and B. Williams(eds.), Essaysin Honourof
versy,1919-1920",
E. H. Carr(London,1974),p. 217.
How theRevolution
Armed,ii, p. 105.
7 Trotsky,

170
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 129
ofthepeasantry
hadparticular
tothesebroader
relevance
conscription
issuesofgovernment.
The difficulties
ofregistering
theruralpopulationeligibleformilitary
serviceand ofenforcing
theRed Army
in thecountryside
thegeneralprobconscriptions
pointedtowards
lemsofadministration
whichtheBolsheviks
wereboundtoconfront
in themajorindustrial
outsidetheirstrongholds
cities.The tasksof
theunrulypeasantrecruits
and disciplining
servedas an
training
lessonin themethods
ofruleforthose(mostly
Bolshevik
important
officers
whoweretoentertheprovincial
andworking-class)
organs
ofSovietgovernment
intheirthousands
after
theendofthecivilwar.
andhatredfeltbymanyoftheproletarian
The contempt
officers
for
wasexpressed
in suchbrutalpunishments
thepeasantry
(sanctioned
codeoftheRed Army)as hitting
in the
soldiers
bythedisciplinary
with
the
of
thisnakedviolence
teeth
butt a rifle.Beneath
laya deeper
as D. D. F. Whiteputit,"between
theanarchistic,
political
struggle,
ofthevillageandthecentralist,
anti-centralist
tendencies
dictatorial
oftheCommunist
It
not
was
trends
a
conflict
between
party.
merely
with
different
economic
and
interests.
It
was
a deepgroups
political
twodifferent
between
twowaysofliving,
rootedantagonism
cultural
and concepts".8
practices
thisconflict
in hisbrilliant
IsaacBabelsymbolized
Konnaia
story,
armiia(Red Cavalry),in theepisodewhenone ofBudenny's
61ite
ona groupoftheir
ownpeasant
cavalry
brigades
charges
infantrymen,
themwithwhipsto asserttheirsuperiority
overthem.
thrashing
of military
associated
withthe
Of all theproblems
organization
nonewas as serious,or had as
massconscription
ofthepeasantry,
forthecivilian
asthedifficulties
ofmilitary
sector,
manyconsequences
a
of
The
decision
to
maintain
Red
five
million
soldiers,
Army
supply.
themilitarization
rather
thanoneor twomillion,
necessitated
ofthe
tosupplyitwithfood,uniforms,
Sovieteconomy
(WarCommunism)
ButtheRed Army
andmedicalservices.
boots,weapons,transport
capacityof theeconomy.
grewmuchfasterthanthe productive
in thearmyincreased.
Material
deterioLivingconditions
shortages
accelrated.Diseasesspread.Disciplinebrokedown.Anddesertion
eratedout of control,so thathastilymobilized- and often
- reinforcements
hadincreasingly
tobe senttothefrontuntrained
thesewereprecisely
thosemostlikelytodesert.
lineunits,although
The problem
wasmademoreacutebythefactthatthearmybecame
on
whosetechnical
and
dependent peasantrecruits,
incompetence
8
D. D. F. White,The GrowthoftheRed Army(Princeton,1944), p. 121.

seasonmadethem
naturalhominginstincts
duringtheagricultural
thanskilledindustrial
workers.'
Itwas
hardertotrainanddiscipline
thedecisionof the
thathad largelydetermined
thisconsideration
- to
recruitment"
Bolsheviksto go fora patternof "extensive
of
the
in
ruralpopulation the
mobilizeall thepossibleage groups
ofreliable
number
recruits.
amongthema sufficient
hopeoffinding
ratherthanqualityonlyexacerbated
the
Yet optingforquantity
In
desertion.
the
Red
became
of
and
short,
Army
problems supply
lockedintoa viciouscircle,inwhichitsfighting
capacity
inextricably
of its own socialand
was largelydependent
upon the efficiency
economicorganization.
(See Diagram.)
DIAGRAM
THE VICIOUS CIRCLE OF MASS CONSCRIPTION
Problems
ofsupply
and training
Mass
conscription
Mass
desertion
TheWhitearmiessuffered
similar
oforganization
as they
problems
to
from
their
social
base
of
1918
but
attempted expand
(small wellvolunteer
of
Cossacks
andoffiforces,
disciplined
mainly
consisting
armieswhichwereultimately
cers)intothemasspeasant-conscript
RedArmyunitstendedto havea
9Manysourcesnotedthatthebest-disciplined
in them:see ibid.,p. 105.The Bolsheviks
ofworkers
higher
proportion
pursueda
consciouspolicyof reinforcing
as manymilitary
unitsas possible- especially
- withworkers
thoseon theimportant
fronts
and partymembers.
See Efremov,
Raboche-krest'ianskii
sostav",p. 4; M. A. Molodtsygin,
"Professional'nyi
soiuz,19181920[TheWorkers'
andPeasants'Union,1918-1920]
(Moscow,1987),pp. 149-54.

172
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 129
to decide the militarystrugglesof 1919-20.The morepeasantsthe
theweakertheybecame,as thefamiliar
Whitearmiesrecruited,
and indisciplineincreased.' In
supply,training
problemsofmilitary
would
thesummerof 1919, Lenin predictedthatmass conscription
destabilizeDenikin's army,as it had alreadyweakenedKolchak's
armyduringthe previousspring:
willbe theruinofDenikinas itwasofKolchak;as
mobilization
universal
itwasstrong
whohatedsocialism
longas hehada classarmyofvolunteers
recruitment
he did,ofcourse,
and sound,butwhenhe beganuniversal
butthearmybecametheweaker,
and
morequickly,
getan armytogether
intoDenikin's
Peasants
recruited
lesspronounced.
itsclasscharacter
army
willdo thesamein thatarmyas theSiberianpeasantsdid in Kolchak's
"
intothearmy.
disintegration
army- theybrought
complete
The importanceof the civil war armies' social and economic
can onlybe understoodifwe bear in mindtwospecific
organization
featuresof the Russian civil war. First,therewas the sheerspeed
withwhichthetwoarmieswereforcedto mobilizethepeasants,an
aliensocialelementtoboth.Neitherhad thetimeortheinfrastructure
base amongthepeasantry,as
to establisha solid territorial-military
the Red Armywas able to do in China between1927 and 1940.
fronts
oftheRussiancivilwardisrupted
Secondly,therapidlyshifting
so thatthetwoarmies
regularsupplylinesand local statestructures,
and military
reinforcements
forcedto mobilize
werefrequently
supthe
to
fighting.
plies fromareas close
vastcivilianareas,
The effectofthesetwofactorswas to militarize
so thatterrorand coercionby themilitary
againstthepopulation- became
authorities
as wellas popularrebellionsagainstthemilitary
an integralelementof the civil war. Civiliandead and wounded
accountedfor 91 per cent of all losses in the Russian civil war,
comparedwith63 percentduringtheFirstWorldWar.12The ability
ofthearmiesto mobilizethepeasantryand theireconomicresources
dependedalmostentirelyupon theirrelationswiththe ruralpopuof peasant
lation at large. Indiscriminatelootingand confiscation
followed
was
units
uprisinvariably
by
peasant
by military
property
0oSee, forexample,Posledniednikolchakovshchiny
[The Last Days of theKolchak
ed.M. M. Konstantinov
1926),pp.9-10;facsimile
(MoscowandLeningrad,
Regime],
1919-1926[Kolchakand Siberia:
i issledovaniia,
repr.in Kolchaki Sibir': Dokumenty
2 vols.(Pubns.
ed. D. CollinsandJ.Smerle,
Documents
andResearch,
1919-1926],
oftheStudyGroupontheRussianRevolution,
xi,NewYork,1988);E. Wollenberg,
HowtheRevolution
trans.C. Sykes(London,1978),pp.97-8;Trotsky,
TheRedArmy,
iii,pp. 6-7.
Armed,
" V. I. Lenin,Collected
4thedn.,47 vols.(London,1960-80),
xxix,p. 460.
Works,
12
delo[The CivilWar, theParty

A. Bubnov,Grazhdanskaiavoina,partiiai voennoe
andMilitary
Science](Moscow,1928),p. 29.

of foodand other
ings againstconscriptionand the requisitionings
supplies,as well as an increasein peasantdesertionfromthe army
itself.
It is rathersurprising,in view of all this,thatWesternhistorians
have chosento writeabout the Russian civilwar almostexclusively
fromthe perspectiveof traditionalmilitaryhistory.13
True, its outcome,likeanywar,was decidedby forceofarms.Militaryorganizaon the battlefield
tion,strategyand performance
were,in the end,
decisive.But thecivilwar was also an exercisein mass mobilization
It was a testofhow farthetwomilitary
and state-building.
regimes,
the
the Reds and
Whites,were able to enlistthe supportof the
populationwhichtheyaspiredto rule. Teodor Shaninexplains:
Muchhas beenarguedaboutthereasonswhythe"WhiteCause"(Beloe
thestatedelo)was defeated
by theReds,wholacked,at leastinitially,
theorganized
administrative
know-how,
forces,
military
foreign
support,
and international
... The reasonssince
basicequipment
legitimation
fortheBolsheviks'
oftheirfoes
offered
victory
rangedfromthestupidity
ofLenin'sparty
togeography
andthemarvels
organization,
(thecentrality
ofMoscowandthecountry's
tactics
size)andthemistaken
military
adopted
Allthis,relevant
as itmayhavebeen,disregards
bytheWhiteGenerals.
notbetween
thefactthatthecivilwarwasfought
Bolshevik
members
party
armiesin whichboththesegroups
butbetween
andmonarchist
officers,
ofcivilwarthosearmies'loyalties
In theconditions
werein a minority.
andtheythereby
couldnotbetakenforgranted,
becamea decisive
element
theoutcomeofthebattles.The abilityto mobiliseresources
in defining
wasequallyimportant
forarmyoperations
. . . therecruits
and
necessary
butthequestion
theresources
werenotvolunteered,
washow
continually
howmucheffort
wouldbe spenttaking
muchwouldbe volunteered,
at thedisposalof thearmies'
therest,and howmuchwas eventually
14
command.
in theWesternliterature
This shortcoming
is particularly
surprising in thecase of theWhites,giventheabundantarchivalmaterials
availableon thissubjectin the West. We stilllack a detailedsocial
and itsarmies.Buttheshortcoming
historyofthecounter-revolution
is especiallyapparentin thecase oftheReds, whereaccesstoarchival
materialshas hithertobeen very limitedfor Westernhistorians.
Consequently,therehas been a markedreliancein theWest on the
13Typical of thisapproachare D. Footman,Civil War in Russia (London, 1961);
R. Luckett,TheWhiteGenerals(London, 1971); J.Bradley,CivilWarinRussia,19171920 (London, 1975); P. Kenez, CivilWarinSouthRussia, 1918: TheFirstYearofthe
Volunteer
Army(Berkeley,1971); P. Kenez, CivilWarinSouthRussia,1919-1920:The
DefeatoftheWhites(Berkeley,1977); E. Mawdsley,TheRussianCivil War(London,
1987).
14
T. Shanin,TheRootsofOtherness:
Russia's TurnofCentury,
ii, Russia, 1905-07:
Revolution
as a Moment
corrections
(London,1986),pp. 200-1(grammatical
ofTruth
madeto published
source).

174
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 129
worksofSoviethistorians
forinformation
abouttheorganization
of
theRed Army.Yet the latterhave tendedto underestimate
and
theparticular
facedbytheBolsheviks
inthemass
problems
simplify
of thepeasants.It is to thissubject,in thehopeof
mobilization
someoftheimbalance
intheliterature,
thatthefollowing
redressing
are
devoted.
pages
I
THE RED ARMY IN 1918
Thedisintegration
oftheimperial
theautumn
andwinter
army
during
of1917,andtheabsenceofan adequateadministrative
in
apparatus
thecountryside
toenforce
theconscription
ofthewar-weary
peasants,
oftheRedArmyonvolunteer
necessitated
thefoundation
principles
whoputa
duringtheearlymonthsof 1918.For thoseBolsheviks
ontheRedGuards,formed
in 1917,
workers
bythefactory
premium
as theproletarian
nucleusoftherevolutionary
army,thevolunteer
hadvirtues
initself.'"
volunteer
But,byandlarge,thefirst
principle
oftheRed Armycameintobeingas a pragmatic
andhasty
brigades
to thethreat
ofCossackor other
responseby localrevolutionaries
forces.Mostwereformed
bytheirlocaltown
counter-revolutionary
sovietor tradeunionsto defendtherailways
and roads,although
ruralbrigades
werealsocommon.
Theyweresmall,irregular
infantry
25and1,200partisans,
between
under
numbering
anything
brigades,
The majority
in
theloosecommand
ofelected"officers".
functioned
for
a disorganized
and eccentric
manner.It was not uncommon
ofdriving
theenemyout
plans- whichusuallyconsisted
operative
then
the
oftheimmediate
and
locality
abandoning military
struggle
a
show
of
soldiers'
hands.
Attacks
were
tobe decidedcollectively
by
oftheenemy
sometimes
launched
without
terrain,
adequatescouting
no
more
than
a
school
The
soldiers
in
geography
map.
using
fought
a fiercebut undisciplined
too
to
manner, frequently
succumbing
of
The
ranks
on
first
the
and
up
sight
enemy.
panicfiring breaking
defeatsof May and Juneat thehandsofwell-disciplined
military
oftheBolshevik
CossackandCzechunitsmadeitcleartothemajority
into
needtoreorganize
theRedArmy
wasanurgent
leadersthatthere
anddivisions,
and
withregular
anequallydisciplined
force,
regiments
a centralized
chainofcommand.16
"5See J. Erickson,"The OriginsoftheRed Army",in R. Pipes(ed.), Revolutionary
Russia (Harvard, 1968), pp. 233, 242; Benvenuti,Bolsheviks,
p. 20.
16 0. Figes, PeasantRussia, Civil War: The VolgaCountryside
inRevolution
(1917arkhivoktiabr'skoirevo1921) (Oxford,1989), p. 308; Tsentral'nyigosudarstvennyi
liutsii,Moscow (hereafter
TsGAOR), f. 130, op. 2, d. 120, 1. 27.

THE RED ARMY AND MASS MOBILIZATION
1918-1920
175
fortheRed Armywere
of theearliestvolunteers
The majority
unstableelements
that"- in
or "vagabond,
eitherurbanworkers,
so
numerous
at
that
The
former
words
"were
time".17
Trotsky's
intheminority.
Ofthe306,000RedArmy
volunteers
wereprobably
on 10May 1918,only34,000werefromtheRed Guards,
registered
while24,000werefromvariousotherbrigades(forexample,party
WhereasN. I.
formations
and food-requisitioning
detachments).'8
of Military
had
Affairs,
Podvoiskii,thefirstPeople'sCommissar
from
MoscowtojointheRedArmy
300,000urbanworkers
expected
amounted
tonomorethan
1918,theactualnumber
duringFebruary
was6,000),andeventhesefewhad
thefigure
20,000(in Petrograd
flat
"withtheparty'smilitary
to be recruited
organization
working
- 70 percentaccording
toa survey
out".19Manyofthevolunteers
in theautumnof1918- had
Military
Inspectorate
bytheSupreme
been soldiersin theimperialarmy.20
Theyhad grown
previously
to the harsh
used to military
life,or simplyfoundit preferable
ofpost-war
civilianlife(armed
anddifficult
conditions
adjustments
wastheeasiestwayformanyofthemtofeedthemselves
in
robbery
andhungry
conditions
ofearly1918).21
thesemi-anarchic
Theurban
andcriminal
elements
alsomade
"hooligans"
migrants,
unemployed,
Red Armyvolunteer
ofthefirst
unitsas,
up a largecontingent
revolutionnaire.22
indeed,theyarealmostboundto in anyarmde
of
their
social
the
volunteer
because
origins,
Partly
brigades
proved
form
ofmilitary
Too manysignedup
a highly
unstable
organization.
beforerunning
offhome,or
justto geta gun and someuniform
start
to
sell
their
and
the
over
process again.Consedeserting
booty
was veryhigh.Manyrecruiting
ofvolunteers
quentlytheturnover
stations
wereevenleftwithout
Too
suppliesforthenewvolunteers.23
Armed,i, p. 5.
17Trotsky,How theRevolution
of theRed Army]
krasnoiarmii[The Recruitment
18 N. Movchin,Komplektovanie
(Moscow, 1926), p. 36.
19Ibid., p. 26.
20
Delam [News ofthePeople's ComIzvestiiaNarodnogoKomissariata
po Voennym
no. 10, 16 Jan. 1919,p. 3. See also V. D. Polikarpov,
missariatforMilitaryAffairs],
istorii(1983), no. 2.
"Dobrovol'tsy1918 goda" [The Volunteersof 1918], Voprosy
21
The firstRed Armydetachmentswere knownto rob and loot villagesin many
localities,especiallywheretheywere responsiblefor food requisitioning.See, for
example,TsGAOR, f. 130, op. 2, d. 443, 11.38, 112; f. 393, op. 3, d. 327, 11.278-9,
In
282; d. 334, 1. 105; d. 337, 1. 64; Figes, PeasantRussia,p. 101; I. N. Shteinberg,
theWorkshop
oftheRevolution(London, 1953), pp. 153-5.
22 Movchin,Komplektovanie,
Armed,i, p. 165.
p. 85; Trotsky,How theRevolution
On the Jacobinarmies,which sufferedfromsimilarproblems,see R. Cobb, The
People'sArmies,trans.M. Elliot (New Haven and London, 1987), pp. 150-5.
Armed,i, pp. 138p. 26; Trotsky,How theRevolution
9; White,GrowthoftheRed Army,p. 31.

176
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 129
in responseto theimmediate
manybrigadeswereformed
military
had diedaway.The
threat,
onlyto be disbandedoncethatthreat
foundthatduring
thesummer
of1918
Military
Inspectorate
Supreme
of adultmenvolunteering
theproportion
fortheRed Armyfrom
closetothecivilwarfront
wasfourtimesas highas inregions
regions
further
from
the
Above
came
all, toofewvolunteers
away
fighting.
fromthestablefarming
the
of
the
peasantry, majority
toiling
population.Eveninthepredominantly
ofVoronezh
agricultural
provinces
and Kursk,only49 per centof the Red Armyvolunteers
were
as
whereas
industrial
and
unskilled
workers
registered peasants,
43 percent.In thesemi-industrial
ofTverand
comprised
provinces
as
as
the
latter
62
cent
of
the
recruits.
Moscow,
per
provided many
bachelors
A similar
were
cent
were
than
(68 per
proportion
younger
in
other
men
without
a
words,
thirty-one)
young
peasantfamily
Mostofthosewhohadtheirownfarmweremoreconcerned
farm.24
it to orderafterfouryearsofwarthanto
to workon it and restore
formilitary
volunteer
servicein theRed Army.25
Giventheinadequaciesof thevolunteer
theBolsheviks
system,
had littlechoicebut to opt fora systemof compulsory
universal
mobilization
attheendofMay,whentherevolt
oftheCzechLegion
and theestablishment
a new
of the Samaragovernment
initiated
oftheSoviet
civilwar.In viewoftheweakness
periodoffull-scale
ofcarrying
outa nationwide
mobilandtheimpossibility
apparatus,
the
ization,itwasdecidedtocallup onlythemostreliablerecruits:
21 to 22-year-old
ofMoscowand Petroworkers
(born1897-1896)
inthosemilitary
districts
(1897-1893)
grad;andthe21to25-year-olds
front
Siberia)closesttothemilitary
(Volga,Urals,Western
against
werecalledduringthe
the Samararegime.Similarmobilizations
in thenorthern
andcentral
summer
on a localbasis,mainly
regions
ofRussia(forexample,
in Vladimir,
PermandViatka).Finally,the
ofPoorPeasants)
localparty
cellsandthekombedy
each
(Committees
mobilized,in addition,approximately
fortythousandRed Army
recruits.26
Theresults
reflected
a widediscrepancy
ofthemobilization
be-
24 IzvestiiaNarodnogo
Komissariata
po Voennym
Delam, no. 10, p. 3. See further,
Figes, Peasant Russia, p. 310.
25
This mayhelp to explainwhythe surveyby the SupremeMilitaryInspectorate
noteda generalincreasein thenumberofvolunteersin Septemberand October,after
of volunteerbrigadesby
the end of the agricultural
peak season. The establishment
thekombedy
(Committeesof Poor Peasants)and local partycellsalso accountsforthe
increaseduringthesemonths.
pp. 42-50; Figes, PeasantRussia, p. 311.

1918-1920
177
tweentheabilityof theBolsheviks
to mobilizeworkers
and their
tomobilizepeasants.Ofthefifteen
mobilizations
ability
compulsory
between12Juneand29 August,no lessthanelevenappliedexclusThe mobilization
ofMoscowandPetrograd
ivelytourbanworkers.
workers
bornbetween1897-1896
went"without
a hitch",according
toTrotsky.27
Ofthetentotwelvethousand
recruits
from
anticipated
Moscow,ninethousandactuallyappeared.28
Overall,as manyas
weremobilized
from
MoscowandPetrograd
200,000workers
during
thesummer
andautumnof1918.29
Sinceitwaswellknownthatthe
authorities
lackedthemeans,evenin thebiggestcities,to enforce
theconscriptions
(whichshouldthusbe seenas semi-voluntary),
thesefigures
shouldbe seenas a reflection
ofthewillingness
oflarge
numbers
ofworkers
to signup formilitary
service,
givengrowing
andfoodshortages
inthecities.Theurbanpopulation
unemployment
ofRussiawasatleasthalvedduringthecivilwar,as workers
flooded
intotheRed Armyand thecountryside.3"
Themobilization
ofthepeasants,
bycontrast,
produced
disappointfromthecall-upof
ingresults.Of the275,000recruits
anticipated
inthecivilwarareas,only40,000actually
1897-1893
appeared
during
thefirst
twomonths
Latermobilizations
weremore
(JuneandJuly).31
successful
wereregistered
betweenJune
(overall,890,000recruits
1918and February
thosecalledaftertheagricul1919),32especially
turalseason.Peasantswerereluctant
to leavetheirfarms
before
the
fromtheruralareasduringthe
harvest;mostofthoseconscripted
summercamefromthemobileand proletarian
ofpeasant
margins
under
Also,by theautumnmanypeasantshad suffered
society.33
Whiterulein theVolgaandtheUrals,andwereconsequently
more
terms.34
likelyto supportthe Red Army,at leaston conditional
Armed,i, p. 300.
Trotsky,How theRevolution
44.
[The Soviet Armed Forces: A
istoriiastroitel'stva
Historyof theirDevelopment](Moscow, 1978), p. 49.
30 See generallyD. Koenker, "Urbanizationand Deurbanizationin the Russian
Revolutionand Civil War", Ji. Mod. Hist., Ivii (1985).
Raboche-krest'ianksii
soiuz,p. 57.
3' Molodtsygin,
32 Velikiioktiabr'i zashchitaegozavoevanii
[GreatOctoberand the Defenceof its
Conquests](Moscow, 1987), pp. 41-2.
effecton army
33Figes, Peasant Russia, pp. 310-11. Trotskycited thedevastating
moraleofa telegram
fromVolokolamskuezd(district)inMoscowprovince,threatening
to depriveoftheir"peasantstatus"(i.e. theirrightsin thepeasantcommune)all those
soldierswho failedto returnto theirvillagesby 30 June,thebeginningoftheharvest
season: see Trotsky,How theRevolution
Armed,i, p. 429.
betweenthe peasants' experienceof White rule and their
34 On the relationship
readinessto servein the Red Army,see Figes, PeasantRussia, pp. 177-83,314.
27
p.
29 Sovetskievooruzhenye
sily:

178
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 129
1918theRed Armycontinued
to experience
However,throughout
in mobilizing
thepeasantry.
difficulties
toa secretmemorTherewerethreemaindifficulties,
according
in mid-May
M.
written
D.
andumto Trotsky
Bonch-Bruevich,
by
Council:thelackofadequatefood
head of theSupremeMilitary
accommodation
and
boots,weapons,barracks
supplies,uniforms,
ofofficers
theshortage
totrain
cashtoprovideforthenewrecruits;
intopropermilitary
andorganizetherecruits
units;andthealmost
in thelocalities.35
absenceofa military
The first
apparatus
complete
thecivilwar.36
was a problemfortheRed Armythroughout
The
ofofficers
of1918)was
(putat 55,000in theearlysummer
shortage
overcome
duringthesummerby thecall-upofN.C.O.s
partially
fromtheimperial
army.It waslatereradicated
bythemobilization
from
thesamesource.37
of"military
Butthelast
(officers)
specialists"
- theweakness
ofthemilitary
in
ofthethreeproblems
apparatus
- was probably
themostseriousdifficulty
thelocalities
facingthe
in 1918. All the military
authorities
on the
Bolsheviks
reporting
in theprovinces
ofthemobilization
campaign
duringthat
progress
theabsenceof
as theirmainproblem
summer
andautumnstressed
and instructors.38
Few volosti
administrators,
agitators
experienced
committee
intehadtheirownmilitary
(ruraltownships)
(Voenkom)
ofmilitary
structure
command.
One survey
gratedintothenational
in EuropeanRussiahad
foundthatonly28 percentofthevolosti
a Voenkomas lateas 1919.39
established
to setup a Voenkomin theirlocality
proveda highly
Refusing
to
the
Red
means
for
the
effective
peasants sabotage
Armymobilan
was
for
since
that
ization,
organ exclusively
responsible making
for
the
accountofthepopulation
service,
eligible military
enforcing
therecruits,
andsending
themon
andtraining
recruitment,
arming
wasestablished
at the
Wherea Voenkom
to thehigherauthorities.
volost'level,its workcould easilybe sloweddown- and even
of themir(village
broughtto a halt- by thenon-co-operation
of
those
for
the
since
eligible themilitary
call-up
commune),
register
3 TsGAOR, f. 130, op. 2, d. 120, 11.67-8.
36 See below, sectionIII, pp. 190-8.
p. 48. On the Red Army'smobilizationof N.C.O.s, see White,
37 Velikiioktiabr',
of"Tsaristofficers"
and other
GrowthoftheRed Army,pp. 52-5. On themobilization
na sluzhbe
spetsialisty
personnelfromtheimperialarmy,see A. G. Kavtaradze,Voennye
sovetov,1917-1920gg. [MilitarySpecialistsin the Service of the Soviet
respubliki
Republic, 1917-1920](Moscow, 1988).
38 TsGAOR, f. 130, op. 2, d. 120, 1. 41.
vlastisovetskogo
(1917-1920gg.)[Local
organy
gosudarstva
39A. I. Lepeshkin,Mestnye
Organsof the Soviet State(1917-1920)](Moscow, 1957), p. 257.

1918-1920
179
different
ofinformation,
mostofwhich
up tofifty
categories
required
wereavailableonlyfrom
themir.Throughout
theearlyphasesofthe
civilwar,theRedArmysuffered
from
inaccurate
methods
of
grossly
accounting.
Peoplewereoftencalledup whohaddied,disappeared
oremigrated
andemployment
ontherailways,
weretwo
(migration,
commonwaysto avoidmilitary
morerecruits
service).Sometimes
turnedup at themobilization
The
pointthanhadbeenanticipated.
first
fullregister
ofthepopulation
servicewas
eligibleformilitary
notcompleted
untilthebeginning
of1919,anditwasonlylaterthat
ofroll-call
at
year,withtheintroduction
meetings
(poverochnye
sbory)
Untilthenthe
placesofwork,thatit becameremotely
systematic.
mobilizations
werein effect
compulsory
for,without
semi-voluntary
or a military
reliableregisters
infrastructure
in therurallocalities,
theRed Armycouldnotcompelanyonetojoinit.40
- andhighly
Peasantresistance
tothemobilization
waswidespread
- in 1918.Manyvillagecommunes
effective
and sovietspassed
resolutions
thecivilwaras anunnecessary
"warbetween
condemning
brothers"
and
on
both
sidestoend
(bratoubiistvennaia
voina) calling
it through
Some
even
declared
themselves
"neutral
negotiations.41
or
"neutral
and
formed
their
own
tokeep
republics"
brigades
zones"
the civil war armiesout of theirterritory.42
Othersrefusedto
the compulsory
but allowedvolunteers
mobilization,
implement
to joinup.43Wherethemilitary
authorities
sentrecruiting
brigades
toenforce
theconscription
werelikelytomeetopen,
order,thelatter
and armed,peasantopposition.
In Pskovprovince,
peasantuprisings - manyof themled by bands of deserters- were notedin
dozensofvolosti
theautumn
of1918inprotest
theRed
during
against
mobilization."
Similar
were
noted
November
Army
uprisings
during
and Decemberin Moscow,Tula, Kaluga,Riazan',Tambov,SmoSomeinvolved
lensk,Vitebsk,
MogilevandSamaraprovinces.
peasantsrefusing
tobe conscripted
ortrained.
Othersconsisted
ofnewly
mobilizedrecruitsprotesting
of their
againstthe requisitioning
livestock
ofRedArmysoldiers
werelegally
(thehouseholds
family's
40Movchin,Komplektovanie,
pp. 43, 61, 154-7,162-7.
f. 130, op. 2, d. 120, 1. 54; Figes, Peasant Russia, pp. 312-13;

M. Gavrilova,"Moe uchastiev grazhdanskoivoine" [My Part in the Civil War],
Krest'ianka(1925), no. 5, p. 5.
42 N.
Rabichev,"Krasnaia armiiai rabotana sele" [The Red Armyand Workin
the Village],Proletarskaia
mysl'(1923), no. 2, p. 41.
p. 49.
krasnoiarmiiv Pskovskoiguberniiv 1918-19gg." [From
44 "Iz istoriiorganizatsii
the Historyof the Organizationof the Red Armyin Pskov Provincein 1918-19],
Krasnaia letopis'(1930), no. 34 (1), pp. 73-5, 79.
41'TsGAOR,

180
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 129
exemptfromtaxes),the shortsupplyof uniformsand foodrations,

or simplythe lack of heatingin armybarracks.45A reportby the
chairmanoftheMilitaryRevolutionary
Tribunal,P. G. Smidovich,
to theAll-RussianCentralExecutiveCommittee(VTsIK) on thebig
peasant risingsin Tula and Riazan' provincesduringNovember
concludedthatone oftheirprimarycauseswas thepoororganization
of the Red Armymobilization.Hundreds of horsesrequisitioned
fromthe peasantshad died forlack of feed. Some of the peasant
had been sentback home
recruits,havingbeen forcibly
conscripted,
for want of a gun. Many others,fed up with conditionsin the
barracks,had deserted,takingwith themtheirguns and forming
armeddetachments.These "Greens" (so called because theymade
the woods theirstrongholds)played a leading role in the peasant
thedestruction
ofall local military
recuprisings.Not surprisingly,
ords was one of theirmajor objectives."Where we wentwrong",
concludedSmidovich,
was to declarethemobilization
theregion,
simultaneously
throughout
sincethisenabledthepeasantsto uniteagainstthecentralauthorities,
itdifficult
forthelatter
toconcentrate
whilemaking
their
forces
and
military
toenforce
intervene
therecruitment.
Infuture,
themobilizations
effectively
shouldbe spreadoutovertime,andtheconscripts
takenoutoftheregion
in whichtheysignedup as quicklyas possible.46
II
MASS CONSCRIPTION
The Red Army'scaptureofKazan' on 10 Septemberproveda major

in the historyof the civil war. Until then,the Red
turning-point
Armyhad been in constantretreaton the crucial easternfront,
townaftertownto thesmallbutwell-disciplined
Czech
surrendering
The fallofKazan',
and volunteerforcesof the Samaragovernment.
on 6 August,markedthehighpointoftheanti-Bolsheviks'
fortunes
in the summerof 1918, bringingthemwithinstrikingdistanceof
Moscow itself."For the firsttime", recalledTrotsky,"everyone
realisedthatthecountrywas facingmortaldanger",and thatSoviet
power mightfall.47It was this realization,argued Trotsky,that
broughtdisciplineback intoRed Armyranks,and madepossiblethe
organizationof a mass conscriptarmybased on regularunitswitha
centralizedchain of command.48
45TsGAOR,f. 130,op. 2, d.
PeasantRussia,p. 313.
120,1.45;
1 TsGAOR,f. 130,op. 2, d. 277,1. 183.Figes,
How theRevolution
Armed,i, p. 454.
47 Trotsky,
48
Ibid., pp. 5-6.

THE RED ARMY AND MASS MOBILIZATION 1918-1920
181
an elementof
was a romantic
view,but notwithout
Trotsky's
did indeedmarkthebeginning
ofthe
truth.The Kazan' campaign
Red Army'sgrowthon a mass scale. The experience- or fear- of
of peasantsintojoiningtheRed
Whiterulegalvanizedthousands
thatafter1918 morepeasantswere
Army.It is not coincidental
district
thanfrom
from
theVolgamilitary
mobilized
anyotherinthe
hadgainedmost
SovietRepublic,sinceitwasherethatthepeasantry
ofgentry
landduringtherevolution,
anditwas
fromtheredivision
was greatest,
herethatthethreatof theWhitecounter-revolution
withall the lossesof land thiswouldentailforthe peasantry.49
The Kazan' campaignalso markedthe startof the Red Army's
on moredisciplined
and centralized
lines.At the
reorganization
of
the
Soviet
was
declaredby
Republic
beginning September
the
headed
RVSR
under
theVTsIK tobe a singlemilitary
camp,
by
ofTrotsky.On 11 September,
thedayafterthe
thechairmanship
itsplantoreorganize
the
captureofKazan',theRVSR putforward
withelevendivisions,
intofivearmygroups,
eachconsistRedArmy
plus reserveunits,on threeproperly
ing of six to nineregiments
fronts
and southern)
and a fortified
structured
(eastern,northern
threemonths,as Kolchak's
westernarea.5oDuringthefollowing
Whiteforcesin western
Siberiaand Denikin'sin theDon and the
wereprimarily
Kubanbuiltup, theBolsheviks
concerned
to work
economic
structure
oftheSovietRepubliccould
outhowthefragile
numberof soldiers.On 3 OctoberLenin
supportthe maximum
declaredat an enlargedmeetingof theVTsIK thatit had been
menbythespring;
nowwe
"decidedtohavean armyofonemillion
needan armyofthreemillion.We can haveit.Andwe shallhave
was forcedto
it".51Lenin'sown DefenceCouncil(Sovetoborony)
concludeon 18 DecemberthattheSovieteconomy
couldactually
and300,000horses.52
an armyofonly1.5million,
However,
support
laidtoconscript
andtrainanother
million
plansweresimultaneously
reservesthrough
theVoenkomsof themilitary
districts
(Voennye
thesereserve
unitsdeveloped
we
slowlyatfirst,
Although
okruga).s3
shallsee thattheywereto become- in termsofnumbers
aloneoftheRed Armyin 1919-20.
themostimportant
component
in mobilizing
The Red Armystillexperienced
the
difficulties
49See Figes,PeasantRussia,pp. 126-8,314.
soMovchin,Komplektovanie,
pp. 52-3.
CollectedWorks,xxviii,p. 102.
5' Lenin,
52 Velikiioktiabr',
p. 42.
13TsGAOR,f. 130,op. 2, d.
120,11.50-1,79.

182
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 129
ofthemilitary
peasantry
during1919.Thedisorganization
apparatus
in
continued
to presentproblems,
areas,
especially thefarwestern
liberated
fromGerman
andtheUkraine,
onlyrecently
occupation,54
continued
tobeeffective."5
whereguerrilla
methods
Mostrecruitment
ofuniforms,
stations
boots,weaponsandfood;
experienced
shortages
homewhentheproblem
someevenhad to sendconscripts
became
too acute.56In partsof the northand west,such as Novgorod
and Gomel',it was reported
thatfamineconditions
had madethe
ofthepeasants
Evenmoresothanin 1918,
impossible."
conscription
themobilization
werecommonplace,
peasantuprisings
against
many
ofthemorganized
Attheheight
bythe"Green"bandsofdeserters.
oftheagricultural
reached
season,inJune(whentherateofdesertion
itsseasonalpeak),thewholeoftheRed Armyrearwasengulfed
by
peasantuprisings.In Voronezh,Tambovand Saratovprovinces
severalthousand,
andwerewellarmedin
the"Greens"numbered
totheRedArmy
bandsthatattimesposeda seriousthreat
organized
front.
The presence
of"Green"bandsseveral
rearon thesouthern
anda waveofpeasantuprisings
thousand
againstthemobilstrong,
izationin Gomel',Vitebsk,Minskand Smolensk
were
provinces,
totheRedArmy
onthewestern
a majorthreat
saidtohavepresented
whenit was pushedbacktowardsthe
frontduringthe summer,
In
Polish
forces.
Pskov,Novgorod,Tver,Yaroslavl',
Dnepr by
Moscowand Riazan'provinces,
Kostroma,
Vologda,Cherepovets,
have
in a highly
were
said
to
combined
effective
peasantuprisings
bandstodisrupt
themobilization,
withthedeserters'
manner
destroy
and terrorize
thelocal
the railwaysand linesof communication,
inoneregion,
officials
ofSovietpower:"suppressed
theysoonbroke
outagainin another
sometimes
withwellas large-scale
rebellions,
armedbandsofup to severalthousand
men".s8
theRedArmy
insizeduring
grewrapidly
Despitetheseproblems,
in 1919and
wereenlisted
1919.(See Table 1.) Two millionrecruits
twomillionbytheendof1920,whentheoverallsizeofthe
a further
atoverfivemillion.
Over80percentofthe
RedArmy
wasestimated
54 See thereportsfromVilna and Smolenskat thebeginning
of February1919, in
TsGAOR, f. 130, op. 3, d. 529, 11.2-3, 6.
"
Armed,i, pp. 457-9.
56 TsGAOR, f. 130,
op. 3, d. 449, 11.1-2; d. 529, 1. 12; Molodtsygin,Rabochekrest'ianskii
soiuz, p. 63.
s' TsGAOR, f. 130, op. 3, d. 422, 1. 244; d. 529, 1. 55.
v krasnoi
58TsGAOR, f. 130, op. 3, d. 198, 1. 14. See also S. Olikov,Dezertirstvo
armiii bor'bas nim[Desertionin theRed Armyand theStruggleagainstit](Leningrad,
1926), p. 27; Movchin,Komplektovanie,
p. 138. For similarreportsfrom1920, see
TsGAOR, f. 130, op. 4, d. 281.

1918-1920
183
TABLE 1
THE GROWTH OF THE RED ARMY IN 1919*
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
1920
January
Totalsizeofthearmy
ofmonth
at beginning
800,000
1,000,000
1,400,000
1,500,000
1,700,000
1,900,000
2,100,000
2,300,000
2,400,000
2,500,000
2,600,000
2,800,000
3,000,000
Recruits
joining
thearmyduring
month
65,000
240,000
345,000
110,000
155,000
200,000
200,000
110,000
95,000
70,000
225,000
160,000
* Source: N. Movchin,
of theRed
krasnoiarmii[The Recruitment
Komplektovanie
Army](Moscow, 1926), pp. 100-1.
in 1919wereregistered
as peasants,
a disproporrecruits
mobilized
ofthemfromcentral
Russiaitself."Giventhelimitionatenumber
howcanwe explain
tations
ofBolshevik
powerin thecountryside,
thisrapidnumerical
growth?
themselves.
First,a noteofcautionhastobe addedtothefigures
RedArmy
menatanyonemoment
Thenumber
ofregistered
included
butalsothewoundedandsick,reserves,
notonlytheactivefighters,
thoseon labourdutyand in transit
to thefront.It also
trainees,
includedthose- a numberrunningintotensof thousands
or deserted
fromtheirunitand had notyet
whohad disappeared,
surrendered
orbeencaught.Mostoftheapprehended
deserters
from
theunits- a numberrunningintohundredsof thousands- were
wheretheywereregistered
sentbackto thereserves,
as Red Army
menfora secondtime.SincetheBolsheviks
hadno effective
means
ofchecking,
wholeftfrom
manbyman,thedeserters
oneunitagainst
thosewhoreturned
toanother,
menmusthavebeen
manyRedArmy
countedmorethanonce(andsomeevenmorethantwice).Indeed,
sincetheindividual
unitswerein fierce
witheachother
competition
overscarcesupplies,theyhad a vestedinterest
in concealing
their
lossesthrough
inordertokeepthenumber
desertion
ofmenon Red
Armyrationsartificially
high.Thus theRed Army'srealstrength
9 Thus the Red Armyin the Ukrainewas moreRussian thanUkrainian:Gorlov,
krasnoiarmii",p. 57.
"O sotsial'noistrukture

184
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 129
was a good deal smaller- and morevariable- thansuggestedby
thegrandiloquent
offivemillionmenso oftencitedin both
statistic
SovietandWestern
books.Itreally
tothat
history
onlyapproximated
forthelastthreemonths
number
of1920,after
whichtheRedArmy
wasrapidly
demobilized
soldiers
wereleftbyJanuary
(only1,428,000
At theheightofthecivilwarin thespringof 1919,there
1922).60
were383,000activefighters
on thevariousfronts
outofa totalRed
of
1.8
million
men
force
ratio
of
a
to eatersof
Army
fighters
1:4.7.61Thatratiovariedduring
thecivilwaras a wholefrom
about
1:3 in theunitsin thefieldtoabout1:10intheentireRed Army.It
inlinewiththeratesofdesertion
fluctuated
andthegeneral
seasonally
TABLE 2
"EATERS" AND FIGHTERS IN THE RED ARMY 1920*
Numberon
rations
Troops in the field

1 June 1920
873,829
1 August 1920
948,728
Red Armyin general
1 June 1920
4,587,061
1 August 1920
4,876,110
* Source: Movchin,
Komplektovanie,
p. 229.
Numberof
fighters
Ratio of fighters
to eaters
294,349
393,683
1: 3
1: 2.4
337,620
494,572
1: 13.6
1: 9.9
ofitsstrength,
(See Table2.) Evenattheheight
supplyoffoodstuffs.
inOctober1920,whentheRedArmy
amounted
tonearly
5.5million
whohadstill
men,therewere2,250,000recruits
undergoing
training
notbeenformed
intomilitary
units;391,000inreserve
units;159,000
in labourarmies;and only2,250,000in thearmiesat thefront,
of
whomno morethan700,000wouldhavebeenactivefighters
(and
nomorethan500,000oftheseproperly
Givenitsenormous
armed).62
theRussiancivilwarwas actually
socialand politicalsignificance,
between
miniscule
armies(theforces
deployed
fought
byeitherside
on a givenfrontrarelyexceeded100,000).Proportionate
to the
in
offighters
civilianpopulation,
thiswasno morethanthenumber
theEnglishcivilwarsofthe1640s.63
pp. 237-9, 259.
6 Movchin,Komplektovafiie,
pp. 112-13.
61 Velikiioktiabr',
pp. 228-9. JohnMaynardwas not faroffthe mark
totalledoverfive
whenhe wrote:"Though theRed Armyin theCivilWar ultimately
millionmen,it neverhad morethanhalfa millionrifles,and themaximumnumber
ofcombatantsin it neverexceeded600,000,with700 gunsand 2,800 machine-guns":
H. J. Maynard,The RussianPeasant: And OtherStudies(London, 1942), p. 116.
63 DuringtheEnglishcivilwarsabout 140,000menwereunderarmsout ofa total
populationof aboutfivemillion(2.8 per cent). DuringtheRussiancivilwar perhaps
fourmillionmen were armed and put into activeunitsout of a totalpopulationof
about 160 million(2.5 per cent).

1918-1920
185
oftheRed Armyduring1919-20was facilitated

The growth
by
alThe completion
ofthemilitary
severalpoliticalfactors.
register
"volost'
lowedtheRed Armytoabandonthesemi-voluntary
mobilof
each
volost'
wastoenlist
ization"calledattheend April(whereby
andtoconcentrate
tenandtwenty
instead
andequipbetween
recruits)
ofparticular
mobilization
The
results
on theuniversal
age groups.
of the 118,000recruits
had proveddisappointing:
of the former
pervolost')fromtwenty-seven
(on thebasisof twenty
anticipated
in
provinces EuropeanRussia,only 13,633(11.5 per cent)had
was
actually
appearedbythemiddleofJune.64Partoftheproblem
for
an
burden
mobilization
thatthevolost'
represented unfairly
heavy
whoseauthorities
thusfeltjustified
in ignoring
thesmallervolosti,
ofall themalesborninoneyear,towhichthe
The conscription
it.65
accustomed
had
duringtheFirstWorldWar,was
peasants grown
the
seento be fairersinceit affected
everyone
equally(sometimes
to
who
should
to
the
from
the
lots
see
cast
go
army
age
peasants
fewer
administrative
problems
groupscalledup).66It alsocreated
ofthepeasantcommunes
to
themainone nowbeingthetendency
sendto thearmyonlythoseenlistedfromthebiggesthousehold
wasmore
thatthelossofanadultmaleworker
onthegrounds
farms,
farms.6'
smaller
This
was
said
to have
to
harm
the
family
likely
resultedin "kulak"elements
joiningtheRed Army,whichsome
usedtoexplainthepoormilitary
andperformcommanders
discipline
anceoftheirunits.68
oftheuniversal
mobilization
wasfacilitated
The enforcement
bya
factor:
thegeneral
oftheSovietapparsecondpolitical
strengthening
soviets
atusinruralareas.69
becamemore
During1919-20thevolost'
andbureaucratized
underthedomination
centralized
reliable,
organs,
soiuz, pp. 135, 254.
64Molodtsygin,Raboche-krest'ianskii
65 For thisreason,the instructions
on the volost'mobilizationwere revisedon 20
May to allow the smallervolostito lowertheirrecruitment
quotas: ibid., p. 134.
pp. 72-3; Figes,
6 TsGAOR, f. 130,op. 3, d. 529, 1.61; Movchin,Komplektovanie,
PeasantRussia, p. 314.
67TsGAOR, f. 130, op. 3, d. 529, 11.68, 70, 107. The resultof thisselectionbias
oftheiradult
was thatthelargerpeasanthouseholdstendedto lose a higherproportion
malesto thearmy,whichleftthemwitha muchless favourableratioofconsumersto
workerscomparedwiththesmallerhouseholds,sincetheycontaineda relatively
larger
numberofdependants.Thus themilitary
was likelyto haveencouraged
conscription
the biggerhouseholdsto partition- itselfalreadya mass phenomenonduringthis
expropriation:
Figes,PeasantRussia,pp.
periodbecauseofthethreatofrevolutionary
315-16.
68 Figes, Peasant Russia, p. 314.
69 On thissubjectgenerally,
see ibid.,ch. 5.

PAST AND PRESENT
186
NUMBER 129
oflocalBolshevik
ofthevolost'
partycadres.The wholeapparatus
to theimmediate
sovietwas supposedto be subordinated
tasksof
recruitment
thecall-upperiod.TheheadoftheVoenkom
was
during
to becomethechairman
of thesoviet.The Voenkoms
themselves
wereincreasingly
authorities
rather
bythehigher
appointed
military
thanelectedbythepeasants,
so thaturbanworkers
andparty
memberstendedto becomea dominant
element
withinthem.70A final
oftheRed Armyduring1919-20
behindthegrowth
politicalfactor
- a subject
of Bolshevikpropaganda
was thetremendous
effect
discussed elsewhere."
TheRedArmy
rather
thananintensive
basis.
grewonanextensive
In otherwordsit calledup moreand moreage groupsrather
than
to
the
rate
of
increase
recruitment
from
trying
targetted
groupsor
the
rate
of
desertion
became
a
afterall
(thisonly
reducing
priority
theeligibleagegroupshadbeencalledup). Theextensive
of
system
mobilization
into
a
vicious
and
recurrent
inevitably
developed
cycle:
as thenumberofrecruits
on military
grew,so toodidthepressure
ofdeserters
increased
as a consequence,
so that
supplies;thenumber
moreand morereinforcements
wererequired.As thechairman
of
to
theMilitary
it
"each
new
mobilization
put
Inspectorate
Trotsky:
in thesizeofourarmed
a diminishing
increase
percentage
produces
forces".72
ByJune1919,all theeligibleagegroups- bartheveryyoungest

Thecall-upof1901washeldbackfor
(1901)- hadbeenmobilized.
as longas possible(andwasonlyimplemented
duringthewarwith
Thiswas probably
becauseoftheburdenwhich
Polandin 1920).73
thecall-upofthisagegroupwaslikelytoplaceonmilitary
supplies.
of1898-1897)
Fortheyounger
agegroupstended(withtheexception
to producea higherrateofrecruitment.
(See Table 3.) Whenthe
Frontfounditself
in
CounciloftheSouthern
Military
Revolutionary
needofreinforcements
towards
theendofJune1919,it
desperate
to call up theyoungest
calledon Leninand Trotsky
possibleage
showsthattheoldertheage group,the
groups,since"experience
ofthosecalledup actually
smallertendsto be thepercentage
being
34percentintheyoungest
recruited.
Theshortfall
rangesfrom
years
to 90 percentin theoldest".74
This was no doubtpartly
because
70Ibid., pp. 312-13.
For an introduction
to thissubject,see P. Kenez, The Birthof thePropaganda
State:SovietMethodsofMass Mobilization,1917-1929(Cambridge,1985).
p. 131.
soiuz,pp. 204-5.
7'
74TsGAOR,f. 130,op. 3, d. 529,1. 89.

TABLE 3
MOBILIZATION OF VARIOUSAGE GROUPS 1918-1919*

Yearofbirth
1901
1900
1899
1898
1898-1897
1896-1892
1892-1891
1890-1899
1890-1886
Numberturning
up
forrecruitment
550,000(approx.)
228,546
292,139
341,780
1,056,809
232,848
120,000
130,238
80,666
* Source: Movchin,
Komplektovanie,
pp. 57, 268-9.
mentendedto be morehealthy:
70 percentofthe 1900
younger
cohortpassedtheirarmymedical,compared
withonly56 percent
ofthe1890-1889
cohort."It wasalsobecausea higher
of
proportion
theolderage groupscomprised
familymen,withfarmsof their
own.Theyhad alreadyfought
in the 1914-17war,and werenow
reluctant
tojoinanyarmy.A finalexplanation
ofthis
understandably
enthusiasm
maybe foundin thegreater
phenomenon
revolutionary
oftheyoung,a factor
stressed
"We
himself:
constantly
byTrotsky
mustdrawintotheworkofcreating
thearmy
theyounger
generations,
theyouthwhohavenotyetexperienced
war,and whoarealways
andtheir
bytheilanoftheir
distinguished
revolutionary
spirit
display
ofenthusiasm".76
Thereis another
senseinwhichthegrowth
oftheRedArmy
could
be characterized
as "extensive".
Fromtheearlysummer
of1919,the
Red Armypushedeastwards
intothe Uralsand Siberia,forcing
intoheadlongretreat
bothKolchak'sWhitearmyand theAllied
forces.
autumn
andwinter,
the
interventionary
Duringthefollowing
Redspushedsouthwards,
the
Whites
backintotheDon,and
forcing
thenthrough
theKubanto thecoast.The expansion
of territory
underRed occupation
the
latter
half
of
1919
enabled
the
during
Bolsheviks
to carryoutmobilizations
in theareasrecently
liberated
fromtheWhites.Thismarkeda shift
in theconscription
policiesof
theRed Armyawayfromtheprinciple
ofraising
in
troops therear,
andtowards
thepractice
ofbothmobilizing
andforming
conscripts
unitsdirectly
behindthefront.
In factmobilizations
at the
military
p. 169.
Armed,i, p. 166.
76

188
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 129
fronthad long sincebecomea practicalnecessity

forbothcivil
wararmies,sincetheto-and-fro
movements
ofthefront
disrupted
and supplylinesfromtherear,makingthequestionof
transport
a constant
headacheforthemilitary
raising
adequatereinforcements
authorities.
Less than30 per centoftheRed Army'sdemandfor
on the eastern,southern
reinforcements
and northern
fronts
was
fromitsreararmyreserves
satisfied
of1918-19.77
duringthewinter
andsouthern
fronts
On theeastern
of1919
duringtheearlymonths
thesoldiersin thefront-line
unitsweredeserting
andfalling
sickor
thanreinforcements
wounded
muchfaster
couldbetrained,
equipped
or despatched.
To makematters
of the
worse,a largeproportion
reinforcements
deserted
enrouteto thefront,
or arrived
thereunfit
todo anyfighting
becauseofillness,
orlackofequipment
ortraining.
calledtheRed Armyreversals
on theeastern
front
Trotsky
during
thespringof 1919,whichbrought
Kolchak'sarmytowithin
a few
Much
days'marchoftheRiverVolga,a "crisisofreinforcements".
thesameverdictcouldbe appliedto virtually
all theRed Army's
major defeats.78
as headoftheRVSR,wasreluctant
toallowfront
mobilTrotsky,
izationsto becomea generalpractice
givenall theobviousmilitary
theimportance
ofnotantagonizing
considerations:
thecivilian
populationbehindthefrontthrough
mobilizations
rapidlyimprovised
thatwerelikelyto breakdownintocoercivemethods;thepoor
discipline- and questionablemotives- of so manyof thosere-
atthefront;
cruited
and(forTrotsky
thiswasthekey)thedecentralizationoftheRed Army'smilitary
entailedbythefront
organization
mobilizations
is
the
or
methods
(that adopting "guerrilla" "partisan"
advocated
the
the
winter
of1918by Military
During
Opposition).7
19 theRVSR had sanctioned
frontmobilizations
in cases
strictly
wherethesupplyoftrained
fromtherearhadcomreinforcements
pletelybrokendown.Butas thisbecamethenormin 1919,it was
untrained
forcedto endorsethestop-gapmeasureof despatching
tothefront.
Thiseffectively
armies
the
reinforcements
gavethefront
toform
theirownmilitary
therearreserve
units,whileturning
right
donethisforthem,intono morethan
armies,whichhadpreviously
forthemassof rawrecruits
holding-stations
awaiting
temporary
rezervov
krasnoi
armiiv godygrazhdan"Sozdaniestrategicheskikh
7 P. Dmitrev,
oftheRedArmyintheCivilWar],
ofStrategic
Reserves
skoivoiny"[TheCreation
zhurnal(1974), no. 6, pp. 67-8.
Voenno-istoricheskii
pp. 79, 109-10,272.
Armed,ii, pp. 353, 377.
7 Trotsky,How theRevolution

toonerecent
tothefront.
Sovietsource,"thevast
transfer
According
formations
and unitsduringthecivilwar...
ofmilitary
majority
atthefronts,
inthecourse
notin therear,butdirectly
wereformed
theirownunits,itwasbuta
ofthefighting
Fromforming
itself"'.8
shortstepforthefront
armiesto carryouttheirownmobilizations
as well. Indeed,duringthe courseof 1919,theydid thiswith
oftenwithofficial
increasing
approvalfromthecentral
frequency,
authorities.81
military
in theregionofhalfa millionsoldiers
In all, probably
something
weremobilizedon theRed Armyfronts,
usuallywhenand where
thecivilwarwasatitsfiercest.
Somefront
mobilizations
werecarried
soas nottoleavepotential
outovera wideareapriortoa majorretreat
totheenemy.The entiremalepopulation
recruits
between
theages
ofeighteen
wasusually
in
andforty
these
circumstances.82
conscripted
A morecommontypeoffront
wasthatcarriedoutby
mobilization
individual
unitsin urgent
needofreinforcements.
Wheretherewas
time
for
the
to
establish
structures
andcarry
enough
army
political
outagitation,
suchmobilizations
couldprovemoderately
effective,
sincemanypeasantswereafraidoftheWhites,and couldbe persuadedto jointheRed Armyifitwasseentorefrain
fromviolence
andlooting.83
A typical
carried
outby
examplewasthemobilization
the1stBrigadeofthe41stDivisionduringthestruggle
againstthe
PolesandPetliura's
forces
nearOdessainMay1920.First,
Ukrainian
it mobilizedtheOdessa partyorganization,
whosemembers
were
ofthevariousregiments.
Over
assignedtothepolitical
departments
thenexttwoweeks,itraisedsixhundred
volunteers
through
agitation,
andorganized
themintorecruitment
brigades,
alongwithpro-Communistsoldiersselectedfromtheregularunitsby theirpolitical
Therecruitment
thenwentaround
thevillages,
departments.
brigades
- by
totherevolution"
"traitors
andmobilizing
agitating,
shooting
forceifnecessary theable-bodied
peasants.In thecourseofthree
anda halfmonths,
threethousand
recruits
wereraised,alongwitha
divisionanda 645-man
battalion.
Two light-artillery
heavy-artillery
"Sozdanie",p. 66. S. I. Gusev,oneoftheRedArmy's
topcommanders,
80Dmitrev,
of unitsformed
at thefronts
at abouttwo-thirds:
S. I. Gusev,
puttheproportion
Grazhdanskaiavoinai krasnaiaarmiia[The Civil War and the Red Army](Moscow,
1958),p. 81.
pp. 89, 111-15.

82 Ibid., pp. 90-2.
between
thepeasants'
fearoftheWhites
andtheir
83 On therelationship
willingness
to jointheRedArmy,
see themilitary
inTsGAOR,f. 130,op. 3, d. 449,1.
reports
24. See also Olikov,Dezertirstvo,
Armed,ii, p.
pp. 28-9; Trotsky,How theRevolution
275; Figes, PeasantRussia, pp. 176-83,314.

190
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 129
Of course,itwas commonformobildivisionswerealso reinforced.84

izationsat thefrontto be done in a hurry,withtheuse of coercion.
DuringMay 1919 unitsof the 8thand 13thArmiesin theDonbass
regioncarriedout forciblemobilizationsat theBakhmutcoal-mines
by occupyingthe pits and simplyroundingup at gunpointall the
comminersundertheage of forty.When theBakhmutauthorities
plainedto theDefenceCouncilin Moscowthatthiswouldbringcoal
productionto a halt,Lenin wroteback defendingtheactionsof the
armyas a necessaryevil in timeof civilwar.8"
III
PROBLEMS OF SUPPLY AND DISCIPLINE
A bad-temperedTrotskytold a conferenceof Red Armypolitical

workersin December 1919:
in hundreds
butourbayonets
arenumbered
We havemobilized
millions,
numberof soldiershaveslipped
ofthousands.
Somehow,an enormous
. .. theexpenditure
ofmaterial
thattakesplacein
ourfingers!
through
The figures
oftheindents
madeby
thearmygoesbeyondourresources.
or the CentralArmyProcurement
theCentralSupplyAdministration
tensofmillions
ofpairsofunderwear,
are fantastic:
many
Department
boots- forexample,threeor fourpairsofboots
ofovercoats,
millions
I don'twanttofrighten
you,butI do
peryearperman!.. . Comrades,
downbyDenikinor
wehavenotbeenbrought
wanttosaythat,although
downbyovercoats
or boots.86
Kolchak,we mayyetbe brought
The problemunderlying
Trotsky'sobservationwas quite simple.
The Red Armywas growingtoo quickly- and losingtoo many
deserters- for the Soviet economic systemto supportit. The
problemwentback to thewinterof 1918-19,whentheproliferation
of the civil war on a nationalscale and the move towardsmass
to- the
had coincidedwith- and directlycontributed
conscription
almostcompletecollapseof the Sovieteconomy.The occupationat
thattimeoftheUkraine,theCaucasusandtheUralsbyanti-Bolshevik
forces,togetherwiththe blockadeof the Baltic, the Black and the
Caspian Seas by Allied and Whitenaval forces,deprivedthe Soviet
Republic of vital food and fuel supplies. Industrialdisciplineand
productionfellsharplyin thehungrynorth,as workersfloodedinto
closeddownforwant
in searchoffood,and factories
thecountryside
84 Sbornikvospominanii
uchastnikov
neposredstvennykh
grazhdanskoi
voiny[A Collectionof Reminiscencesby Direct Participantsin the Civil War], ii (Moscow, 1922),
pp. 129-33.
85TsGAOR, f. 130, op. 3, d. 529, 11.33-4, 50. See similarlyf. 130, op. 3, d. 422,
1. 183.
How theRevolution
Armed,ii, pp. 108-9.
86 Trotsky,

1918-1920
191
The transport
of fueland rawmaterials.
systemcameto a virtual
halt- or rather
ceasedto workforthestate,becoming
insteadthe
mainartery
oftheblack-market
network
which
most
Russithrough
the
civil
war.
anssupported
themselves
Without
the
industrial
during
orindeedthepolitical
to
infrastructure
base,thedistribution
system
of
a
market-based
state
relations
with
the
stable
system
organize
usedincreasing
levelsofcoercion
inorder
theBolsheviks
peasantry,
andrecruits
for
their
civil
toobtainthepeasantfoodstuffs
necessary
even
for
the
Red
warcampaign.
Yet,
bymaking
production
Armya
to
the
of
were
millions
with
unable
they
supply
conscripts
toppriority,
medical
uniforms,
boots,weapons,transport,
adequatefoodstuffs,
ofwar.Supplyand distriservicesand all theotherparaphernalia
bution-
ratherthan productionitself-
lay at the heartof the
of moneyand therampant
inflation
of
problem.The devaluation
in
the
their
resulted
sales
to
industrial
food
prices
peasantsreducing
theblackmarket,
whereexchange
thestateandentering
andbarter
withthetownsmen
ThustheBolsheviks
were
provedmoreprofitable.
ofgetting
facedwiththeproblem
constantly
adequatestocksoffood
notonlyto theRed Army,butalso to thoseworkers
in munitions
forthesupplyofbasicmilitary
essential
and otherstateindustries
in fuel-deprived
oftransport
SovietRussia,
goods.The difficulties
especially
duringthewinterand spring,whentheclimatebecame
an addedfactor,
exacerbated
thedistribution
as did the
problem,
ofSovietsupplyofficials.
and voracious
corruption
disorganization
itwas,as Trotsky
analmost
Giventheseobstacles
detected,
becoming
taskto supplyan armyin whichforeveryactivefighter
Sisyphean
fiveorso whohad
therewereteninactive
men,andperhapsanother
alreadydeserted(takingwiththem,ofcourse,theirgunand their
armycoat).
on thesupplysituation
The military
receivedbytheDereports
in
fenceCouncilduring1919-20showedthatvirtually
everydivision
hadatleastsomeunitswithshortages
offood,fodder,
theRedArmy
uniforms,
footwear,
weaponsand bedding,or othergoodsoflesser
suchas soap,tobacco,sugarand salt.It was notlong
importance,
1919(0.4 kg.ofbread
beforetheRed Armyrationsetin February
soldier
as
the
was
recalled
by average
onlya distant
perday)
fantasy.87
too
advanced
farand beencutoff
Someunfortunate
units,having
Kommissariatapo
Voennym
"7The Red Armyrationis detailedinIzvestiiaNarodnogo
Delam, no. 36, 20 Feb. 1919, p. 4. The rationin theimperialarmyduringtheFirst
World War was loweredto thislevel only at the end of 1916; it contributed
to the
mutinyof the Petrogradgarrisonduringthe Februaryrevolutionof 1917.

192
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 129
fromtheirsupplystations,wereforcedto go severaldays,and
sometimes
evenweeks,without
food,duringwhichtimesomemen
Horsesdiedorsimply
fellfrom
exhaustion
inall
inevitably
starved.88
thecivilwar,partly
becauseofdisease,
partsofthearmythroughout
butmuchmoreoftenbecauseofsimpleshortages
offodder.89
The
wasso bad - with60 percent,andevenup to
supplyofuniforms
90 percent,ofthemeninsomeunitsgoingwithout
one- thatfights
oftenbrokeoutbetweenthesoldiers,especially
duringthewinter,
whenthepossession
ofa warmarmycoatcouldmakethedifference
between
lifeanddeath.Thousands
ofRedArmy
menfellill,ordied
fromthecold,duringtheharshwinter
of 1919-20.90
The supplyof
shoeswasnotsucha seriousproblem,
ifonlybecausemostinfantrymenworebastshoes,whichwereeasilyfabricated
bylocalpeasant
Butlackofadequatefootwear
wassometimes
knownto
craftsmen.9'
wholeunitsleavingtheconfines
oftheirbarracks.92
prevent
oftheRed Armyunits
By all accounts,theoutward
appearance
wasragged.93
EvenLeninwastakenabackbythemodeltroops
taking
oftheOctober
partintheRed Squareparadeonthefirst
anniversary
"Look at them,howtheymarch",he washeardto say,
revolution.
"likebagsof sand".94As forthesupplyofweapons,onceTsarist
- especiallyof rifle
stocksran out in 1919, Sovietproduction
- fellincreasingly
ammunition
behinddemand.95
In May 1919,
as his easternand southern
fronts
I.
I.
Main
Vatsetis,
collapsed,
totheDefenceCouncilthatthesupCommander-in-Chief,
reported
washeadingfor"catastrophe".
Whilethearmy
plyofammunition
wasfiring
betweenseventy
andninety
millionroundsa month,
the
mainarsenalat Tula wasproducing
million.Moreover
onlytwenty
armaments
on theeasternfront
factories
important
(forexample,
IzhevskandLugansk)hadrecently
beencaptured
Votkinsk,
bythe
wastolookbackon thisperiodas a critical
Whites.96
Trotsky
crisis,
8 TsGAOR, f. 130, op. 3, d. 192, 1. 30; d. 414, 11.109-13;d. 422, 11.184, 202;
d. 443, 1. 4; Tsentral'nyigosudarstvennyi
arkhivnarodnogokhoziaistva,Moscow
(hereafter
TsGANKh), f. 3429, op. 1, d. 1487, 11.33, 121. For a generalreporton
foodsupplyconditionsin the Red Armyat theend of 1920,see TsGANKh, f. 3429,
op. 1, d. 1586, 11.8 ff.
9 TsGAOR, f. 130, op. 3, d. 414, 11.109-13.
9 TsGAOR, f. 130, op. 3, d. 414, 11.109-13;d. 436, 1. 9.
91 On the supplyof bast shoes and otherproductsto the Red Armyby peasant
see Figes, PeasantRussia, p. 293.
craftsmen,
92TsGANKh, f. 3429, op. 1, d. 1487, 1. 88.
93White,GrowthoftheRed Army,pp. 115-17.
94Ibid., p. 118.
95 Mawdsley,RussianCivil War, pp. 183-4.
dokumentov
krasnoiarmii(1917-1920): sbornik
glavnogokomandovaniia
96 Direktivy
[Directivesof the High Command of the Red Army(1917-1920): A Collectionof
Documents](Moscow, 1969), p. 320; Velikiioktiabr',p. 136.

1918-1920
193
when "everyone of a soldier'sstockof cartridgescounted. . and

when a delay in the arrivalof a special trainbringingammunition
resultedin whole divisionsretreating".97
Anothermajor problem for the Red Armywas the spread of
epidemics.More people died in thecivilwarfromdiseasethanfrom
battle.98
Typhus,influenza,smallpox,cholera,typhoidand venereal
diseases were the main killers,but manymoremen sufferedfrom
various skin rashes, stomachbugs, dysenteryand toothache.On
average,perhapsabout 10-15 per cent of the men in a givenunit
would be ill on any one day. But it was notunusualfora unitto be
takenout of operationby ratesof illnessof up to 80 per cent.99The
inadequacy of medical checks on new recruitsmeant that many
broughtillnesseswiththemintothe army.'"0But the real cause of
the problemlay elsewhere:first,in theunhygienicconditionsofan
armywheresoap was a rarity,and themenwereknownto be on the
move withoutwashingforseveralweeks on end; and secondly,in
the chronicshortagesof doctors,nurses,hospitalspace, transport
facilitiesforthe sick and wounded,medicines,alcohol, bandages,
antiseptic,foodand so on.10'Partof theproblemwas thattherapid
to-and-fro
movementsof the civilwar frontsmade it impossibleto
setup properfieldhospitalsand dressingstationswithgoodtransport
- whichwereall too
connectionsto therear.In thesecircumstances
common(especiallyin the Ukraine)- thesickand woundedcould
neitherbe swiftly
evacuated,nor properlycared forat the front.102
in June1919 about the poor treatment
Trotskycomplainedbitterly
receivedby woundedRed Armymen on the southernfront:
arrived
woundedmenwho
byrailat Liskistation
Transports
containing
werein a frightful
condition.
The trucks
werewithout
bedding.Manyof
themenlay,woundedand sick,without
clothes,dressedonlyin their
whichhad longremained
underwear,
manyof themwere
unchanged:
Armed,i, p. 13.
97 Trotsky,How theRevolution
a
see Mawdsley,RussianCivilWar,pp.
9 For briefsurveyofthepublishedfigures,
285-6.
99TsGAOR, f. 130, op. 3, d. 192, 11.3, 5; d. 347, 11.47, 122, 149, 209, 253, 332;
d. 414, 1. 114; d. 105, 1. 21; d. 436, 1. 15; TsGANKh, f. 3429, op. 1, d. 1487,1. 151;
IzvestiiaNarodnogoKommissariata
Delam, no. 8, 14 Jan. 1919, p. 4.
po Voennym
p. 167.
'0 Movchin,Komplektovanie,
1'0 On such matters,
see particularly
TsGAOR, f. 130,op. 3, d. 414, 1. 114; d. 192,
1. 5; d. 436, 1. 8; f. 5451, op. 3, d. 78, 1. 7; G. S. Pukhov,"Stroitel'stvo
krasnoiarmii
v Petrogradei okruge" [The Developmentof the Red Armyin Petrogradand its
District],Krasnaia letopis'(1929), no. 6 (33), p. 95.
Kommissariata
102 IzvestiiaNarodnogo
Delam, no. 175, 12 Aug. 1919,
po Voennym
p. 1; ibid., no. 192, 3 Sept. 1919, p. 1.

194
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 129
infectious.
Therewereno medicalpersonnel,
no nursesand nobodyin
over400woundedand
chargeofthetrains.One ofthetrains,
containing
sickRedArmy
from
untilevening,
men,stoodinthestation
earlymorning
without
themenbeinggivenanything
toeat.Itishardtoimagine
anything
morecriminal
and shameful!103
Trotskyblamed bad managementand red tape forthe problem.
But therewas in facta policy,at least fromNovember 1919, of
deliberatelynot evacuatingthose with infectiousdiseases, and of
intotheinfectedfront-line
zones,for
forbidding
passengertransport
fearofspreadingthediseasesto thecivilianrear.104 It was thispolicy,
above all, thatwas to blame forthe overcrowding
in hospitalsnear
thecivilwarfronts,
and thetrulyhorrific
scenesofsickand wounded
men sittingfordays on end, withoutfoodor attention,
in unheated
third-classcarriagesat God-forsaken
railwaystations.
The problemsof supplyingthe army fromstoresin the rear
fromlocalarmydepots,
encouragedmanyunitsto supplythemselves
civilianinstitutions
and, indeed,thepopulationitself.Virtually
every
at some pointin its
armyunitwas forcedto practise"self-feeding"
life,especiallywhenitwascutofffromthemainsupplybase becauseit
had advancedintoenemy- or inaccessible- terrain.The Caucasus
ArmyGroup,forexample,havingadvanceddeep intothenorthern
Caucasus(hundredsofmilesfromitssupplybase atTsaritsyn)during
the winterof 1919-20,had littlechoice but to feeditselffromthe
local population;between71 per cent(in the case of millet)and 97
percent(vegetables)ofitsfoodwas suppliedin thisfashionbetween
October 1919 and March 1920.105In partsof the Ukraine,where
was done bypeasant-guerrilla
muchoftheRed Army'sfighting
units
as
without
a
base
at
remained
all, self-feeding
(such Makhno's)
supply
thenormthroughout
thecivilwar.'06Elsewhere,itwas oftenno more
than the sheerincompetenceand corruptionof the Sovietofficials
runningthe armysupplysystemthatforcedtheunitsto feedthemselves fromlocal resources.Trotsky,whose impatiencewith the
"criminalred-tape-ism
of the armysupplyorgans"was notorious,
advocated legalizingindependentprocurements
by the local Red
to overcome
Armyunits- and evenprivatetrade!- in thestruggle
Armed,ii, p. 298.
104TsGAOR, f. 130, op. 3, d. 347, 11.35, 84, 110. It was the Main Militarythat,in November1919,passed theresolution"categorically
SanitaryAdministration
theevacuationfromthefrontto therearofanyoneinfected
withcontagious
forbidding
diseases,withtheexceptionoftheTurkestanfront".Those fromthelatterwereto be
evacuatedonlyas farwestas Syzran',Simbirskor Kazan'.
voina,partiiai voennoedelo,p. 44.
105 Bubnov, Grazhdanskaia
'06 M. Malet, NestorMakhnoin theRussianCivil War (London, 1982), p. 99.
103

1918-1920
195
Thiswasa farcryfromhisviewson strict

centralization,
shortages.
whichhe appliedin all otherareasofmilitary
organization.107
AsintheWhiteArmy
sincetimebegan),
(andnodoubtevery
army
oftenbrokedowninto
the practiceof independent
procurements
uncontrolled
andconflict
between
RedArmy
requisitioning,
looting,
forthelatter
tocarry
aroundwiththem
units.It wasnotuncommon
theirfamilies
theirownsupplies(andsometimes
too)inlonglinesof
the units
carts,forfearof beingleftwithoutthem.Sometimes
inordertocontrol
andfarms
theproduction
occupiedlocalfactories
ofbasicgoods.108
Thisinevitably
thelocalSovietorgans
antagonized
fromrailway
ofpower,as did theRed Army'sseizureoffoodstuffs
and
food
collection
stations,
granaries
pointsunderthe
government
control
ofNarkomprod
Commissariat
of
FoodSupply).
(thePeople's
committees
to thecentral
Hundredsoflocalprovisions
complained
of
the
autumn
and
winter
1918-19
authorities
that
RedArmy
during
unitsinterfered
intheirwork,redirecting
foodstuffs
from
thecivilian
sectorto the military.109
Even greaterfriction
was causedwhen
to requisitioning
theRed Armyresorted
fromthecivilian
directly
as
too
for
all
itself, they
did, thisoftenbroke
population
frequently
downintoviolenceandrobbery.
theRed Armyprobably
Although
to
on
maintain
a
better
record
this
issue
thantheWhites,11
managed
itsrank-and-file
soldiers
became
involved
inviolent
lootfrequently
when
non-Russian
Jewing,especially
passingthrough
(particularly
to bearin mind,was
ish) areas.The Red Army,it is important
Russianin itsethniccomposition.
Evenunitsconpredominantly
in
the
Ukraine
and
other
non-Russian
scripted
(forexample,
regions
the Tatar Republic)werelargelymade up of Russians."'AntiSemitism
forceintheRedArmy
wasa powerful
andgrowing
during
thecivilwar,despitethefactthata Jew,Lev Davidovich
Trotsky
Armed,ii, pp. 72-4 (July1919).
'07Trotsky,How theRevolution
TsGAOR, f. 130, op. 2, d. 743, 1. 118; op. 3, d. 192,1. 34; TsGANKh, f. 3429,
op. 1, d. 857, 11.63-4; d. 1245, 1. 27; d. 1485, 1. 450; Trotsky,How theRevolution
to thetraditions
ofthe
Armed,i, p. 13. It maybe thatsuch practicesowed something
imperialarmybefore1914,whenthesoldiersweremade largelyresponsiblefortheir
own upkeep. Sometimesorganizedinto regimentalartels,theyspentmuch of their
timein economicactivities:J. Bushnell,Mutinyand Repression:
RussianSoldiersin
theRevolution
of1905-06(Indiana, 1985), pp. 11-15.Duringthecivilwar,Red Army
unitsweredeployedforspecificeconomictasks,such as harvestwork,timber-felling
or road-repairs.
109See, forexample,TsGANKh, f. 1943, op. 1, d. 448, 1. 87; d. 223, 11.113, 223,
224, 273, 351; d. 513, 11.99, 242; op. 4, d. 116, 1. 82.
10See D. V. Lehovich,WhiteagainstRed: TheLifeofGeneralAntonDenikin(New
York, 1974), pp. 325-7.
krasnoiarmii",p. 57.
" Gorlov,"O sotsial'noistrukture
108

196
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 129
stoodat itspoliticalhead.Trotsky
receivedhundreds
(Bronstein),
of reports
abouthis ownsoldiers'violenceand lootingin Jewishsomeofwhichhe musthaveknownfrom
Ukrainian
his
settlements,
murders
and
robberies
of
the
were
civilian
Mass
youth.112
population
alsocarriedoutbytheRed Armyin Bashkir
March
regionsduring
between
theRussianregulars
as a resultofantagonisms
1919,partly
unitsalliedtotheReds."3
andBashkirvolunteer
Withinthe Red Armyitself,thepoorand irregular
supplyof
inthefrequent
ofdiscipline.
foodstuffs
andgoodsresulted
breakdown
Drunkenness
was perhapsthe mostcommon- one mightsay
andgeneruniversal form
ofindiscipline,
alongwithcard-playing
intothe
As theRedArmypushedsouthwards
allyrowdybehaviour.
Ukraineduringtheautumnand winterof 1919,one ofTrotsky's
withalcohol
mainanxieties
wasthatthiswasa region"well-stocked
in all itsforms,
andwe maytakea heavyfallas a resultofthat".114
ofRed
wereordered
tobe shotina number
Soldiersfounddrinking
Theother
thiscampaign.'15
unitsonthesouthern
front
Army
during
- therefusal
ofunitsto carryoutorders,or
reallymajorproblem
ofofficers
to recognize
theauthority
appointed
byMoscow- was
also broadlyassociatedwiththe Red Army'sadvanceinto the
of the Sovietregime(or any state
Ukraine,wherethe authority
was almostnon-existent,
and guerrilla-style
warfare
by
authority)
stillpredominated.
Several
blamed
partisan
brigades
topcommanders
thereverses
suffered
by theRed Armyin theUkraineduringthe
summer
of 1919 on the influence
of anarchist
and
early
spring
whose
elements
(forexampleMakhno),
agitation
amongtherankand-file
soldiers,callingon themto obeyonlytheirelectedofficers
in the
ofarmydemocracy
embodied
andto return
to theprinciples
allmilitary
of1917,wassaidtohaveundermined
soldiers'
committees
discipline.Daily reportswerereceivedaboutsoldiersdemanding
into
totakeuppositions;
leaveandbetter
lapsing
provisions;
refusing
and looting;killingarmyofficers,
Jewsand Communists;
banditry
in wholeunitsto therear.Someunitswerealsosaid
anddeserting
to havecalledforUkrainian
independence.116
112
TsGAOR, f. 130, op. 3, d. 192, 11.26-35; d. 422, 11.256, 267; d. 436, 1. 12; d.
449, 11.118-19,142, 143, 180.
"3 TsGAOR, f. 130, op. 3, d. 184, 11.37-8, 72, 76. On the alliancebetweenthe
R. Pipes, TheFormation
Bashkirforcesand the Red Army,see further
oftheSoviet
1917-1923(Cambridge,Mass., 1964),pp. 162-3.
andNationalism,
Union:Communism
How theRevolution
114 Trotsky,
Armed,ii, p. 113. In so faras theWhitesoccupied
the alcohol-richregionsformost of the civil war, it is logical to assume thatthey
suffered
morethanthe Reds fromthisproblem.
"~ TsGAOR, f. 130, op. 3, d. 414, 1. 117; d. 422, 1. 267.
16 TsGAOR, f. 130, op. 3, d. 192, 11.27-30; d. 422, 11.164, 267; d. 449, 1. 139.
(cont.onp. 197)

1918-1920
197
was notlimitedto theUkraine.Virtually

But suchindiscipline
division
had unitsto reportwherethemenhad
Red
every
Army
notto fightuntil
refusedto carryout orders,or had threatened
conditions.
Some
or
better
caseswherethe
leave
reported
promised
in
new
recruits
and prisoners,
men had protested
againsttaking
thatthiswouldentail."117
onfoodsupplies
becauseoftheaddedburden
and administrative
to receive
forofficers
staff
It was commonplace
threats- and become the victims- of physicalviolencefromthe
iftheyweresuspected
rank-and-file
soldiers,especially
(oftenwith
in
of
and
justification)corruption handling
armysupplies wages;or
iftheyweresimply
seentobe toowelldressed,
fedandsupplied
with
ofall- theywereaccusedof
vodkaandwomen;orif- indeed,worst
oftheold imperial
thedisciplinarianism
army,authorizing
restoring
forsoldiersfailing
to carry
and
other
physicalpunishments
capital
out orders. It was oftensaid -
thoughnot proved -
that the
from
theimperial
"Tsaristofficers"
staff
were
byTrotsky
appointed
mistrusted
bythesoldiersbecauseoftheirupper-class
particularly
originsandallegedrecordoftreason."11
werealsowidespread,
mostofthemsparked
Soldiers'uprisings
by
orsomepunishment
official
material
corruption
popularly
shortages,
deemedbythesoldiers
as unjust.Theseuprisings
usuallyculminated
in theoccupation
ofthemilitary
thearrest
ormurder
headquarters,
oftheofficers
andtheelection
ofnewcommanders.
andcommissars,
But somespreadintotheciviliansector,oftenon accountof rumours- manyofthemno doubttrue- thattheSovietorganshad
forsoldiers'families.
heldup military
suppliesor provisions
Army
(n. 116 cont.)
had been largelyto blameforthecollapseof the

Trotskyagreedthat"guerrilla-ism"
forstrictmilitary
centralizaUkrainianfront,perhapsbecauseit suitedhis arguments
tionagainstthedemandsoftheMilitaryOppositionforlooserpartisanunits:Trotsky,
How theRevolution
Armed,ii, pp. 109-10,308, 323.
117TsGAOR, f. 130, op. 3, d. 105, 11.207-8; d. 422, 11.34, 43, 59, 61, 208; d. 449,
1. 97; d. 192, 11.26-7, 34.
118 TsGAOR, f. 130, op. 3, d. 414, 11.17-21,105-6;d. 422, 11.11, 20, 31, 43, 191;
d. 525, 1. 27; f. 4085, op. 1, d. 14, 11.25-6, 63-4; TsGANKh, f. 3429, op. 1, d. 857,
11.57-8. See also Trotsky,How theRevolution
Armed,ii, pp. 113, 116. On thesoldiers'
attitudestowards"Tsaristofficers",see ibid.,p. 140; Benvenuti,Bolsheviks,
pp. 37,
66-70; White,Growthof theRed Army,pp. 50-3, 60-1. In factthereis evidenceto
or others(e.g.
suggestthatthe "Tsaristofficers"wereless likelythan"Red officers"
formerN.C.O.s and untrainedofficers)
to desertto theenemyor commita criminal
offence(such as theftof militarystores).Between3 Augustand 12 November1919
therewere sixtyreportedcases of desertionto theenemyand sixtyreportedcases of
flightfrombattleby former("Tsarist") officers,
comparedwith373 reportedcases of
desertionto theenemyand 416 reportedcases offlight
frombattleby "Red" or other
officers:TsGAOR, f. 130, op. 3, d. 453, 11.2-46.

PAST AND PRESENT
198
NUMBER 129
depotswereseizedand ransacked,or thelocal townoccupied,where

officials
arrested
shopsand storeswereusuallylootedand Communist
or shot. In some towns,especiallywherea garrisonwas situated,
the soldiersinstalledin powera new sovietdominatedby soldiers'
delegates.119
Even wheretheofficers
retainedenoughauthority
to marchtheir
men into battle,theycould do littleto preventthemfromrunning
away as soon as the firstshotswerefired.The Red Army,in more
or less any battle,was likelyto lose more soldiersthroughpanic
of the 294,000 "lost" by the Reds
desertionsthan actual fighting:
betweenFebruaryand April 1920, forexample,only 20,000 were
killedor wounded.20 On severaloccasionsduring1918-19,Trotsky
had cause tocomplainaboutthewaysinwhichRed Armyoperational
reportswere writtento "conceal and cover up one's failuresand
exaggerateone's successes":
thisneverhappens,ifthereports
Whenourunitscapturesomelocality,
thanafter
a fierce
otherwise
battle.Yetthis"battle"is,
aretobe believed,
ofaimlessandfruitless
thannot,an affair
thatis,of
moreoften
shooting,
this
of cartridges
and shells... Whenour unitsretreat,
squandering
onlyas a resultofthe
happens,ifone is to believethesesamereports,
ofsuperior
forces
a battle.Yet
and,again,neverwithout
enemy
onslaught
ofa panicky
whatis oftenhiddenunderthesephrasesis thesad reality
of theirpositionsby largeunitsat thesightof isolated
abandonment
ofpanicand provomounted
patrols,or evenjustundertheinfluence
abouttheenemy's
cationalrumours
approach.121
ofJaroslavHasek's Schweikianhero,Gashek,
All thisis reminiscent
in theBugulmastories.When theWhitesbreak
theRed Commissar
throughhis unit'slineson theRiverIk and attackfromtheright,he
tomilitary
ordershistroopsto retreattotheleft,and sendsa telegram
headquarters:"Great victory.Positions on the river Ik broken
through.We are attackingfromall directions.Cavalryin enemy's
rear. Heaps of prisoners".22
IV
DESERTION
The problemsof supplyand disciplinewerelargelyto blameforthe

ratesof desertionfromtheRed Armyduring1919-20.
astronomical
119TsGAOR,f. 130,op. 3, d. 184,1.4; d. 422,11.4, 31, 107,247;d. 414,1. 25;
op. 2, d. 631,11.4, 6, 8, 13-14,32, 38,42-3;d. 648,11.1, 7, 8, 12; d. 751,1.99.
120
121
122
Movchin,Komplektovanie,
p. 225.
Armed,ii, pp. 287, 288; see also ibid.,i, p. 483.
trans.C. Parrott
J. Hasek,TheRedCommissar,
(London,1983),p. 23.

Table4 showsthatfrom
June1919toJune1920as manyas 2,638,000
forStruggle
deserters
wereregistered
by the CentralCommittee
and itslocalorgans,
againstDesertion(Ts.K. po bor'bes dezertirstvom)
thetableis based.(See Table 4.) Duringthe

uponwhosefigures
size of theRed Armygrewfromabout
the
overall
sameperiod,
increase
of2,700,000.123
to
an
Inotherwords,
1,900,000 4,600,000
desertion
as manymenas itwas
theRed Armywas losingthrough
Ifwe addthebestavailableestimates
forthe
successfully
recruiting.
of1918tothesummer
of1919
from
thesummer
ofdeserters
number
at
halfof1920(500,000),thenwearrive
(576,000),andforthelatter
forthewholeofthecivilwarperiodof3,714,000.124
a roughfigure
deserters
is anyone'sguess- perhaps
The numberofunregistered
in
of
one
million.
the
region
something
inTable4 wereregistered
as "weak-willed"
Mostofthedeserters
slabosti
had
for
less
thanfourteen
they gonemissing
voli),meaning
(po
fourteen
with
or
turned
after
a
"reasonable
excuse".
had
days
up
days,
deserters
weredeemedto be thosewhohad
"Malicious"(zlostnye)
days;runawaywithRedArmy
property;
goneformorethanfourteen
atthetimeofthecall-up;resisted
concealed
themselves
deliberately
morethanonce.'25
arrest;or deserted
in
A commonformof"hiddendesertion"
bythe"weak-willed"
orin someessential
therearwastofinda job in a Sovietinstitution,
ortimber-felling)
sectoroftheeconomy
where,
(suchas therailways
ofmanpower,
it was in theinterests
on accountoftheshortage
of
theiremployer
toapplyontheirbehalftotherelevant
authorities
for
frommilitary
service.126
inthis
an exemption
themajority
However,
"deserters"
were
as
because
category
registered
simply
theyhad
failedtoturnup ontimeattherecruiting
station.
Sometimes
thiswas
forno otherreasonthanthelatearrivalofthearmy'sconscription
and decrees,and
(thatis agitators,
copiesofinstructions
apparatus
so on). S. Olikov,themajorauthority
on desertion
fromtheRed
of
who
first-hand
had
with
it, knewof
experience dealing
Army,
the
civil
war
where
even
wholedistricts
the
of
during
representatives
ofthemobilization
theSovietregimeknewnothing
orders.127
Many
ofthese"deserters"
did eventually
station,
appearat therecruiting
101, 229.
Ibid., p. 130; Olikov,Dezertirstvo,
p. 33.
125 Olikov,Dezertirstvo,
p. 27; Molodtsygin,Raboche-krest'ianskii
soiuz,p. 138.
126
TsGANKh, f. 3429,op. 1, d. 529,1. 10; Olikov,Dezertirstvo,
p. 76; Trotsky,
How theRevolution
Armed,ii, pp. 127, 199; Figes, PeasantRussia, p. 311.
127
Olikov,Dezertirstvo,
pp. 38, 82.
pp.
124

TABLE 4
DESERTION FROM THE RED ARMY 1919-192

Total
1919
June
200
August
September
October
November
284
262
191
170
July
December
1920
January
266
14
18
13
8
172
30
175
25
February
March
137
188
May
214
April
Malicious
129
21
30
22
35
deserters
(in thousands)
Registered
Weak-willedFromunitsin Surrender
military voluntaril
districtsa
192
156
262
17(c)
205
270
244
178
162
40
30
188
155
91
93
150
35
101
142
116
158
107
179
13(c)
14(c)
12(b)
19(b)
22(b)
48
33(b)
87
62
88
42
108
155
220
30
250
28()
June
Total
258
1,531
2,380
2,638
(13 months)
* Notesandsource:Tsentral'nyi
arkhiv
oktiabr'skoi
revoliutsii,
Moscow,f. 130
gosudarstvennyi
70, 72, 100-1,105-6,115,125-6;op. 4, d. 281,11.5, 10, 16-17,21-2,24,26, 30,32,42-3,50-1,5
(a)
Figuresincomplete
(b) Figures
halfofmonth
forfirst
only
(c)
Figuresforsecondhalfof monthonly

Thisexplainsthe
someofthemcallingthemselves
"volunteers".128
inTable4 as havingsurrendered
ofdeserters
registered
largenumber
to theauthorities.
voluntarily
ofthesedeserters
was economic.Some
The primary
motivation
theappalling
ofarmy
conditions
justwanteda temporary
escapefrom
fortheirfamilies,
life.Otherswentofffora fewdaystoprovide
most
ofwhomhadneverreceived
thewelfare
benefits
food
(statepensions,
and
to
and clothing
them
rations, agricultural
assistance)
promised
Butthere
by thegovernment
duringtherecruitment
campaigns.129
wereprobably
as
cases
of
soldiers
to
just many
running
away getfood
whentheirarmyrations
fromthelocalvillages,especially
failedto
A goodpairofarmybootsand a rifle,or a winter
comethrough.
coat,could usuallybuy enoughbreadfora dozenor so hungry
ofRed Armymenwithout
a
largenumbers
men.'30In theautumn,
warmcoatranofftogetoneforthewinter
But
the
level
campaign.'t
oftemporary
desertions
reacheditspeakin thesummer,
whenthe
soldiers
to
their
returned
farms'for
the
season.132
peasant
agricultural
wasobviously
mostpronounced
(SeeTable4.) Thisseasonalvariation
in thecentralagricultural
in themilitary
region(mainlycontained
district
ofOrel),wheretheweeklynumberofregistered
deserters
fromJulyto September
thousand
andforty
thou(betweentwenty
thanthecorresponding
for
sand)wasup totentimeshigher
figures
Octoberto December(twothousandto seventhousand).In the
district
ofMoscow,bycontrast,
semi-industrial
theweekly
military
to twenty-four
summer
wereonly
(fivethousand
figures
thousand)
thantheweekly
forOctober
toDecemoverall,
slightly
higher,
figures
ber(ninethousand
to twelvethousand).'33
Thetendency
ofsoldiers
todesertduring
theharvest
seasonposed
one ofthemajorproblems
of constructing
a nationalarmyoutof
peasantconscripts.
Duringtheearlyphasesofthecivilwar,when
mostofthefighting
wasdoneona localbasis,theRedArmy
partisan
hadmanagedtoretainclosetieswiththevillages:thelatter
brigades
fedand equippedtheirownsoldiers,whoreturned
homebetween
128TsGAOR,
f. 5451, op. 3, d. 113, 1. 8; Olikov,Dezertirstvo,

p. 84.
129Figes, Peasant Russia, pp. 318-19.
130 TsGAOR, f. 130,op. 3, d. 198,1. 113;Trotsky,

How theRevolution
Armed,iii,
fromtheRed Armywereknownto sellforged
ration
p. 18. In thecitiesdeserters
cards:TsGAOR,f. 130,op. 4, d. 281,1. 12.
131Olikov,Dezertirstvo,
p. 29.
132TsGAOR,f. 130, op. 3, d.
Dezertirstvo,
p. 51.
133TsGAOR,f. 130,op. 3, d.
422, 11.22, 59; op. 3, d. 198,1. 35; Olikov,
198,11.18,26, 33, 36, 42, 72, 101,106,115,126.

202
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 129
The spreadofthecivilwar,and consequently

military
campaigns.
oftheRed Armyon a national
thereorganization
scale,threatened
waslikelytobe sentofftofight
theseties,sincethepeasantconscript
a longwayfromhisvillage.Indeeditbecamea matter
ofdeliberate
to sendrecruits
as
againstdesertion,
policy,as partofthestruggle
Hencemanydeserfarawayas possiblefromtheirnativeregion.134
unitsin transit
fromtheirplaceof
tionstookplacefromthemilitary
inthereartothearmiesatthefront
formation
(onesourceestimated
for18 to 20 percentofall desertions)."'
accounted
thatthefigure
in 1919,
authorities
to a surveybytheMoscowmilitary
According
their
had
run
because
unit
of
deserters
23 percent
questioned
away
while44 percenthaddeserted
because
wasdue to go to thefront,
theirunitwas close to - or passingby- theirhomevillage.'36The
numberofsoldierslostfromanyone echelonenrouteto thefront

varied,on average,between10 and 20 percent,butat timesthe
evenhigher,
figure
creptupto50percent,70percentandsometimes
the
ifthemenwerebadlyfedand supervised
during journey.1"
units- a number,
in
fromthefront-line
Fewersoldiersdeserted
5
7
cent
of
the
total
number
of
to
all, representing
per
perhaps
of
Somecameunderthecategory
fromtheRed Army."38
desertions
tothe
sincetheywouldnotreturn
"malicious"
deserters,
voluntarily
off
to
run
if
were
and
arrested,
ranks,
likely
again,perhapsjoining
one of themany"Green"bandswhichroamedthewoods,living
from
thebattlefield
totherearor(less
Panicflight
frombanditry.139
accounted
forthemajority
ofthose
likely)to theenemyprobably
a general
retreat.
from
thefront-line
units,especially
during
deserting
oneoftheRed
"Thenatives
ofdistricts
explained
beingabandoned",
"desertin orderto remainneartheir
Army'stop commanders,
iscontinuously
anoffensive
theadvancing
homes.Thus,during
party
weakis
while
the
retreating
party continuously
strengthened,
ened".140
134 For figures

on the locationof armyrecruitsrelativeto theirplace of birth,see
Movchin,Komplektovanie,
p. 246.
135Ibid., p. 124.
soiuz,p. 141.
137TsGAOR, f. 130, op. 3, d. 184, 1. 34; d. 198, 11.16, 22, 24, 38, 103-4,124; d.
199,11.28-9;d. 422,1. 21; op. 4, d. 281,11.29, 65; d. 282,11.19-21;Olikov,Dezertirstvo,
p.
pp. 30-1; White, Growthof theRed Army,p. 102; Movchin,Komplektovanie,
117.
p. 124.
thousandRed Armydesertersweresaid to have desertedmorethan
139 In all, fifty
once betweenJune1919 and June1920: ibid.,p. 137.
[CollectedWorks],i (Moscow,
proizvedeniia
140M. N. Tukhachevskii,Izbrannye
1964), pp. 41-2.

1918-1920
203
from
thefront-line
Oneofthemaincausesofdesertion
unitsin
and
theWhiteas wellas theRed Army- was thepoortraining
beforebeingdespatched
tothe
givento reinforcements
preparation
and personnel
to organizemilitary
front.4"'The lack of facilities
in
and
the
constant
demandforreinforcements,
the
rear,
training
often
withnomorethana few
meantthatunitsweresenttothefront
without
atall).142Bythe
(andincreasingly
anytraining
daystraining
of1919,only800,000recruits
hadbeentrained
summer
outofa total
Red Armyforceof 2,177,000(37 per cent).Thereafter
spiralling
desertion
anddemandsforreinforcements
dashedallhopesofa fully
trainedarmy.143
In politicalterms,mostof thereinforcements
werealso poorly
Few
had
but
the
dimmest
notion
ofwhy- and
equipped.
anything
whom- theywerefighting.
in the
Therewaslittlepartyagitation
and whattookplacewas all too
unitsaccordingto mostreports,
at
meetings
quicklybrokendownintofree-for-all
(mitingovanie),
tohearsoldiers
whichitwascommon
the
of
rejectoutright authority
in therevolutionary
officers
and politicalcommissars,
spiritofthe
Not
the
front-line
units
earlypartisan
detachments.'"44surprisingly,
couldbe severely
weakened
if
bysuchreinforcements,
especially the
latter
weretakenfrom
closetothefront,
wherethepeasantry
regions
washostile
tothemilitary
A goodexample
authorities.
wasthe202nd
Artillery
Brigadeof the23rdDivision(9thArmy),at thecoreof
whichstooda Communist
ofvolunteer
workbrigadeanda number
ers.Havingsuffered
heavylossesin August1919,itwasreinforced
fromSaratovprovince,
"mostofwhom
bylocalpeasantconscripts
wereinfected
[deserters]".
byGreenelements
Duringa subsequent
brokeofffromthe
attack,twohundredof thepeasantconscripts
mainforce,
killedthepolitical
commissar
ofthebrigade,
anddeserted
to theenemy.The resultwas further
losses,and a collapsein the
moraleof the restof the troops,necessitating
the break-upand
ofthewholebrigade.'45
reformation
Mass desertion
fromtheRed Armywas a directexpression
of
The struggle
generalpeasantprotest
againsttheBolsheviks.
against
wasthestruggle
desertion
towintheactivesupport
ofthepeasantry,
'41On the Whites,see Lehovich,WhiteagainstRed, p. 358.
TsGAOR, f. 130, op. 3, d. 184, 11.4, 8-9; Trotsky,How theRevolution
Armed,
i, p. 482, ii, p. 66; Movchin,Komplektovanie,
pp. 65, 111-15;White,Growthofthe
Red Army,p. 118.
pp. 64-5, 202.
'" TsGAOR, f. 130, op. 3, d. 184, 11.3, 6-7, 34.
145TsGAOR, f. 130, op. 3, d. 449, 1. 68.
142

204
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 129
thesilentmajority
oftheRussianpopulation.
To wagethatstruggle
meansalonewasobviously
futile.
byadministrative
Onlya verysmall
- no doubtthemosthardened,
numberof deserters
anti-Soviet
infamous
orderof
types- wereshot.(See Table 5.) Trotsky's
November
1918toexecute
alldeserters
onthespotwasa propaganda
at a timewhentherewasno realapparatus
exercise
todealwiththe
problem,and it was not - and nevercould have been - carried
out:thereweresimplytoomanydeserters
to shoot.146
Bythesame
fromthecategory
of "malicious"
token,onlythemostdangerous
deserters
before
thecourts,
werebrought
sentintopenalunits(shtrafofimprisonment,
safefrom
(theprospect
nyechasti)or imprisoned
thedangersofwar,wouldhaveencouraged
manymoretodesert!).
The greatmajority
ofdeserters
as "weak-willed")
(thoseregistered
werehandedbacktothemilitary
andformed
intounits
authorities,
fortransfer
to one ofthereararmiesor directly
to thefront.
Even
as "malicious"deserters
thoseregistered
werereturned
totheranks
becamedesperate.
On 20 Auwhenthedemandforreinforcements
staff
1920
the
ordered
that
(Vseroglavshtab)
gust
general
only"the
of
the
malicious"
deserters
should
be
worst
very
formally
punished,
while"as manyas possiblewhocouldfeasibly
return
to thearmy"
units.147
Thepractice
ofreturning
shouldbeputintoreserve
deserters
to theiroriginal
unit- usuallywitha blackarm-band
sewnon to
- hadbeen
theiruniforms
tosetthemapartfromtheothersoldiers
in
but
it
was
out
at
the
of
phased
popular 1919,
beginning 1920,since
itantagonized
whowereknowntobeatup or
therestofthesoldiers,
evenkillformer
deserters.148
unsuccessful
werethepurelypunitive
measures
increasEqually
the
in
areas
closeto
authorities,
especially
inglyadoptedby military
and
land
thefront:confiscating
allotments
from
anyone
property
ofconcealing
as hostages
or
therelatives
deserters;
taking
suspected
of deserters;
thevillagesthought
to be
fellow-villagers
occupying
ofdeserters;
finesonthem;shooting
thevillage
strongholds
imposing
fireto thevillages.Suchmeasuresrarely
leaders;or evensetting
had theintendedeffect,
sincetheywereboundto strengthen
the
ofnotonlythedeserters,
butalsothewholeoftherural
opposition
Wherever
thesemeasures
wereadopted,the"Greens"
population.
Theyoftenunitedwiththepeasants,
invariably
grewin strength.
embittered
andotherBolshevik
bythegrainrequisitionings
policies,
'6
Armed,i, pp. 487-8.

117TsGAOR,f. 130,op. 4, d. 282,1. 10.

148TsGAOR,
f. 130, op. 3, d. 449, 1. 68.

TABLE 5
MEASURESTAKEN AGAINSTDESERTION FROM THE R

sentto
Rejecteddeserters
1919
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
Total
Own
unit
Reserve
unit
38,000
1,000
4,000
6,000
6,000
7,000
4,000
66,000
65,000
159,000
177,000
190,000
131,000
137,000
123,000
982,000
VoenkomUnitassigned Court
tofront
52,000
38,000
17,000
24,000
29,000
13,000
19,000
192,000
* Source: Movchin,
Komplektovanie,
pp. 140, 146.
18,000
32,000
118,000
75,000
29,000
4,000
10,000
286,000

7,000
6,000
6,000
7,000
5,000
3,000
6,000
40,000
To pe
un
12,0
8,0
4,0
6,0
8,0
4,0
13,0
55,0
206
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 129
to turntheirlocalitiesinto"no-go"areas.Railwaysand linesof
localCommunists
andSovietofficials
weredestroyed,
communication
attacks
werelaunched
onpassingunits
andguerrilla
wereterrorized,
in thestruggle
oftheRed Army.'49Muchmoreeffective
against
of a wholeseriesof politicaland
was the introduction
desertion
fortheStrugofCommittees
Theestablishment
measures.
agitational
at all
gle againstDesertionat thevolost'level- and theirmerger
levelswiththeVoenkoms- broughtthepunitivepowerof the
ofdesertion.5`0
Raidson Soviet
statecloserto theruralstrongholds
teamsandother
factories,
stations,
institutions,
timber-felling
railway
withthearmyformanpower
economicorgansin competition
proand flushed
outthousands
ofhidden
ducedmuchthesameeffect,
deserters."'As thenumberof deserters
voluntarily
surrendering
of suchraidsincreased.
declinedduring1919-20,theimportance
andothermeansofmoralpersuasion
were
(See Table4.) Propaganda
of
the
show-trials
to
be
also known
effective,
particularly
captured
ofloyalRedArmy
soldiers
towrite
andtheencouragement
deserters,
nottohelpdeserters.152
totheirfellow-villagers
homeappealing
But
desertion
weretheamnesty
meansofcombatting
themostsuccessful
ofwhichwascalledon 3-9June1919.As many
weeks,thebiggest
that
totheRedArmy
returned
as 98,000deserters
voluntarily
during
measures
wouldbe taken
thatno punitive
weekin theknowledge
wasextended,
them.Duringthenextweek,whiletheamnesty
against
thatdeserters
It is fromthismoment
roseto 132,000.153
thefigure
in
massive
waves.
Red
the
to
to
return
(See Table4.)
Army
began
totheRed
ofdeserters
inthenumber
Thesharpincrease
returning
also
1919
was
of
summer
the
explainedby another
Armyduring
- onewhichsaysa greatdealaboutthenature
ofthecivilwar
factor
wonit.
andwhytheBolsheviks
front
theRed Armyhad
In Mayand June1919on thesouthern
thenumbers
lostdailythrough
shortofrecruits:
beendesperately
ofreinforcethenumber
diseaseandbattlefaroutstripped
desertion,
oftheSouthern
On 6 JulytheCommand
atthefront.
mentsarriving
and
toTrotsky
Frontsentthelastofa longseriesofurgent
telegrams
pp. 53, 61-2; Movchin,
149 Figes, PeasantRussia, pp. 319-20; Olikov,Dezertirstvo,
p. 142. Detailed accountsof the propertyand finesexactedfrom
Komplektovanie,
villagesare in TsGAOR, f. 130, op. 3, d. 198; op. 4, dd. 281, 282.
pp. 17-24.
'51TsGAOR, f. 130, op. 3, d. 580, 1. 21; op. 4, d. 281, 11.12, 15, 57, 66-7; d. 282,
1. 9; Movchin,Komplektovanie,
pp. 142-4.
152 Olikov,Dezertirstvo,
p. 59; TsGAOR, f. 130, op. 3, d. 199, 1. 12.
pp. 27, 42.

1918-1920
207
Lenindemanding
theimmediate
mobilization
ofseveralagegroups
districts
ofKharkov
andOrel,situated
1901)inthemilitary
(including
It wasclaimedthat"fourofourdivisions
on thefront.
immediately
are missing80 per centto 90 per centof theirmen,horsesand
carts".154
Theseshortages
werelargely
toblamefortheWhiteadvance
towards
Moscowduring
Lenin'sfamous
JuneandJuly- prompting
circularof 9 July,"All Out forthe FightagainstDenikin!",in
whichhe calledfortheSovietRepublicto be turnedintoa "single
thisthreat
ofa Whitevictory
military
camp"."' Yetitwasprecisely
thatgalvanized
thousands
ofpeasants,previously
as deregistered
toreturn
totheRedArmy
between
andSeptember
1919.
serters,
July
returned
(See Table 4.) In fact,so manydeserters
duringthese
monthsthata seriousshortage
of riflesand uniforms
resulted."56
The CommandoftheSouthern
Frontdroppeditsdemandforthe
mobilization
ofmorerecruits,
andbegantocomplain
insteadabout
chronicmaterial
A telegram
to LeninsentfromOrelon
shortages.
22 Julycomplained
that:"becauseof the enormousnumbersof
deserters
toourranks,allthereserve
unitsofOrelprovince
returning
are completelyoverfilled. . . New recruitsare arrivingeveryday.
The supplysituation
is critical.Breadshortages
in Mtsenskhave
resultedin rebellions,with the soldiersbreakinginto private
houses".'"1Despitesuchproblems,
themassive
influx
oftheseformer
deserters
the
Red
the
to launcha
gave
Army numerical
strength
successful
counter-offensive
of1919.
duringtheautumnandwinter
Pushedsouthby theReds,and constantly
attacked
in therearby
Makhno'sUkrainian
Denikin'sarmyretreated
peasantguerrillas,
into
the
and
fled
for
the
Kuban,
deep
finally
Crimea,wherein 1920
theWhitesmadetheirlaststandunderWrangel.'58
whoreturned
totheRedArmy
these
Manyofthedeserters
during
monthscalledthemselves
to
"volunteers",
ready fightagainstthe
'54 TsGAOR, f. 130, op. 3, d. 529, 11.82, 89-90. Similarestimatesofthesituation
on the southernfrontby the militarycommandmay be foundin TsGAOR, f. 130,
op. 3, d. 525, 11.118-19.
"'55Lenin, CollectedWorks,xxix, pp. 436-55. The importanceof the Red Army's
has beenneglectedbyWesternhistorians
"crisisofreinforcements"
seekingtoexplain
the Whites' advance on the southernfrontduringthis period. See, forexample,
Mawdsley,RussianCivil War, pp. 166-77.
How theRevolution
'56 Trotsky,
Armed,ii, pp. 315, 361; Movchin,Komplektovanie,
pp. 111, 122.
157 TsGAOR, f. 130, op. 3, d. 529, 1. 111.
'58Again, theinfluxof formerdesertersintotheRed Armyduringthesummerof
1919 has been overlookedby Westernhistoriansseekingto explainthe Bolshevik
victoryagainstDenikin. See, forexample,Mawdsley,RussianCivil War,pp. 202-15;
Kenez, Civil War in SouthRussia.

208
PAST AND PRESENT
NUMBER 129
in 1917-18.
Whitesin defenceofthelandgainedfromthegentry
districts
Thisexplainswhyso manyofthemcamefromthemilitary
ofRussia,where
ofOrelandMoscow,thecentral
agricultural
regions
thebruntoftheirattack
theWhiteshaddirected
duringthesummer
from
thesetwodistricts
alone
of1919.No lessthan230,000deserters
totheRed ArmyduringJulyandAugust- morethan40
returned
These
percentofthetotalforthewholeoftheSovietRepublic.'59
hadmadesubstantial
landgains
inwhichthepeasantry
wereregions
In Orelprovince,
forexample,
from
therevolution.
thegentry
during
theamountof land in peasantuse had increasedby 28 per cent
between1917-19,mainlyas a resultof theseizureof theprivate
hadoccupied23.5percentofall
whichbefore
therevolution
estates,
ofMoscow
land
in
the
In thefiveprovinces
theagricultural
province.
and
district
(Kaluga,Tula, Riazan',Tambov Moscow)the
military
amountoflandin peasantuse hadincreased
byas muchas 35 per
landowners
hadowned
therevolution,
centsince1917.Before
private
landin theseprovinces.160
The
28 per centof all theagricultural
to
the
of
these
threat
ofa Whitevictory
signalled
peasants
regions
oflosingtheirnewlyacquiredlandtothegentry
theprospect
squires,
theofficer
whosesons dominated
corpsof Denikin'sarmy.Such
in the
whosepropaganda
fearswereplayedon by theBolsheviks,
of
as
the
sole
the
Red
Army
protector the
countryside
presented
the
White
counter-revolution.
land
gentry
peasantry's gainsagainst
The factthatso manypeasantsof centralRussiaralliedto the
Red Armyon thetwooccasionswhentheWhitesreallythreatened
on theVolgain 1918;andthenin theOrelregion
Moscow- first
wasnotwithout
The
effect.
thatsuchpropaganda
in 1919- suggests
to
aboveall, bytheirfailure
defeatoftheWhiteswas determined,
of
ofcentral
because
their
winoverthepeasantry
Russia,
opposition
oftheBolsheviks
of 1917-18.The victory
to thelandredistribution
was assuredby theirabilityto call on thepeasantsof thesesame
tobreakthrough
from
their
theWhitesthreatened
whenever
regions
Russian
The
central
were
basesin theperiphery.
bitterly
peasants
butthefact
policiesofWarCommunism,
opposedtotheBolshevik
ofSovietpower,whenthattheywouldtakeup armsin defence
is9TsGAOR,f. 130,op. 3, d. 198,11.18,26, 33, 36.
160 V. P. Danilov,"Pereraspredelenie
velikoi
fondaRossiiv rezul'tate
zemel'nogo
ofRussia'sLandFundas a Resultofthe
revoliutsii"
oktiabr'skoi
[TheRedistribution
statei[The AppliOctoberRevolution],in Leninskiidekreto zemlev deistvii:sbornik
ofArticles]
cationofLenin'sDecreeon theLand:A Collection
(Moscow,1979),pp.
284-7.

andonlywhen- itwasthreatened
bytheWhites,proveddecisive
in determining
theoutcomeofthecivilwar.
thetwocivilwararmies,themass
Of all theproblems
confronting
oftheRussianpeasantry
and
mobilization
provedthemostdifficult,
terms.Thesupport
ofthepeasantry
was
themostdecisiveinmilitary
ofallmilitary
inRussia.Anymass
totheconduct
essential
campaigns
ofpeasants.It wouldhave
armywouldhaveto be madeup largely
tobe fedandeventransported
ofthe
bythem.Yetthevastmajority
its hold on theland and
Russianpeasantry,
havingconsolidated
tobecomeinvolved
villageaffairs
during1917-18,provedreluctant
a civilwar,a "warbetween
infighting
brothers".
Neither
theWhites
in thecountryside
northeReds had anyrealpoliticalauthority
to
ofthepeasantry.
securethemassmobilization
The Whiteleaders
withtheoldlandowning
classtohaveany
weretoocloselyassociated
influence
over
the
The
Tsarist
wornby
peasantry.
epaulettes
lasting
wereassociated
the
with
theWhiteofficers
the
old
by peasants
regime
and thedisciplineof theimperialarmy,bothof whichtheyhad
rejectedin 1917.The Reds, on theotherhand,lackeda reliable
ormilitary
infrastructure
inthecountryside.
political
Theyalsolacked
oftheruralpopulation,
theactivesupport
as wehaveseen,
although,
whenthepeasantssensedtheimminent
threatofa Whitevictory,
of the
theywouldrallybehindtheReds. The peasants'mistrust
itwouldseem,wasnotas powerful,
andcertainly
notas
Bolsheviks,
as
their
hatred
and
fear
of
the
old
landed
order.
ingrained,
The Red Army,
withitsholdoverthedensely
populated
agriculturalregions
ofcentral
inmobilizing
morepeasants
Russia,succeeded
thantheWhites.In thisfact,as Trotsky
wasrooted
acknowledged,
thecauseofitsvictory
duringthecivilwar.Yet becausetheRed
to the
mainlyofpeasants,it was moresusceptible
Armyconsisted
seasonalfluctuations
ofpeasantlifewhencompared
withtheWhite
whichremained
intheircomposition.
In
armies,
largely
non-peasant
the summerpeak seasonof the agricultural
yearthe Red Army
fromhighratesofdesertion,
suffered
as foodstocksrandownand
thepeasantrecruits
ran offto theirfarmsin preparation
forthe
Aftertheharvest,
harvest.
theRed Armysuffered
lessfromeither
Thefood-supply
situation
anddesertion
declined.
problem.
improved
Indeedmanypeasants,havingdeserted
fromtheRed Armybefore
theharvest,
toitforthewinter
returned
lowseasonofthe
voluntarily

210
PASTANDPRESENT
NUMBER
129
thattheRed Army
agricultural
year.Perhapsit is notcoincidental
in thespringandearlysummer,
tendedto suffer
itsworstsetbacks
butusuallymadeadvancesin theperiodimmediately
the
following
harvest.
Atthecentre
oftheRed Army's"peasantproblem"
laytheissues
ofmassconscription,
and
desertion.
The
Bolsheviks'
decision
supply
ofmassmobilization
attheendof1918togo foran extensive
system
ofsupplyand training
withintheRed
createdenormous
problems
brokedownand
deteriorated,
discipline
Army.Materialconditions
sothatuntrained
reinforcements
hadincreasingly
desertion
increased,
units.Themilitary
inshort,
tobe sentintothefront-line
was
system,
Mass desertion
wastheinevitable
outcomeofan
beingoverloaded.
armygrowingtoo fastfortheeconomyto supplyit withall the
means.The largesizeofthearmyinturndictated
theneed
necessary
to maintain
thesystemofWar Communism.
Largesectorsofthe
inordertokeepafloat
an armyfullof
hadtobe militarized
economy
holes.
was decidedin theautumnof
The policyof massmobilization
menwas
1918.Lenin'scallat thattimeforan armyofthreemillion
a threathe
a panicresponseto thethreatof Alliedintervention,
But does thismeanthattheRed
almostcertainly
overestimated.
orthata smaller
armywouldhave
Armywaslargerthannecessary,
as a fighting
force?Thereis no doubtthatthe
beenmoreeffective
ofpeasantrecruits,
oftheRed Armyon largenumbers
and
reliance
of
and
madeitmuchless
theconsequent
problems supply training,
thelatter,theRed
thantheWhitearmies.To overcome
effective
in
at
fourtoone,and
had
to
outnumber
them
soldiers
least
by
Army
to
as
or
even
fifteen
one.
It is logicalto
as
ten
sometimes
by many
of
and
defeat
ludenich
that
after
the
Denikin,at
Kolchak,
suppose
of 1920,theRed Armycouldhavebeenreducedin
thebeginning
Suchreductions
sizewithout
posinga dangerto defenceinterests.
As A.
the
Red
effectiveness.
have
increased
even
Army's
might
Councilof the
Potiaev,a memberof theMilitaryRevolutionary
on 18
to Leninin a memowritten
WesternFront,recommended
andcombatofincreasing
themight
December1919:"In theinterests
itis a thousand
timesmoreexpedient
tohave
oftheRedArmy
fitness
clothed
no morethana millionRed Armymenin all,butwell-fed,
and shodones,ratherthanthreemillionhalf-starved,
half-naked,
of1918,however,
whentheWhite
half-shod
ones".'6'In theautumn
161TheTrotsky
Papers,ed. J.M.
i, p. 797
Meijer,2 vols.(TheHague,1964-71),

andthethreat
oflarge-scale
instrength,
armiesweregrowing
foreign
theBolsheviks
hadnoreal
intervention
probably
appearedimminent,
to themassmobilization
ofthepeasantry,
in spiteofthe
alternative
whichthispolicy
consequences
far-reaching
politicaland economic
wasto havefortheRed ArmyandtheSovietsystem.
OrlandoFiges
College,Cambridge
Trinity
Past and PresentConference

on
PECULIAR SUBSTANCES:
ASPECTS OF THE HISTORY OF
STIMULANTS AND NARCOTICS
to be heldat
The GeologicalSociety,
LondonW1
House,Piccadilly,
Burlington
Tuesday,2 July1991
Furtherdetailsand registration
formwill be availablein
thenextissue.


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The Past and Present Society

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THE RED ARMY AND MASS

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THE RED ARMY AND MASS MOBILIZATION 1918-1920 169

and theRed Army,1918-1922(Cambridge,1988),p.

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PAST AND PRESENT

D. D. F. White,The GrowthoftheRed Army(Princeton,1944), p. 121.

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THE RED ARMY AND MASS MOBILIZATION 1918-1920 171

THE VICIOUS CIRCLE OF MASS CONSCRIPTION

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PAST AND PRESENT

to decide the militarystrugglesof 1919-20.The morepeasantsthe

delo[The CivilWar, theParty

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THE RED ARMY AND MASS MOBILIZATION 1918-1920 173

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PAST AND PRESENT

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THE RED ARMY AND MASS MOBILIZATION

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PAST AND PRESENT

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THE RED ARMY AND MASS MOBILIZATION

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PAST AND PRESENT

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THE RED ARMY AND MASS MOBILIZATION

f. 130, op. 2, d. 120, 1. 54; Figes, Peasant Russia, pp. 312-13;

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PAST AND PRESENT

exemptfromtaxes),the shortsupplyof uniformsand foodrations,

The Red Army'scaptureofKazan' on 10 Septemberproveda major

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THE RED ARMY AND MASS MOBILIZATION 1918-1920

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PAST AND PRESENT

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THE RED ARMY AND MASS MOBILIZATION

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was a good deal smaller- and morevariable- thansuggestedby

Troops in the field

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THE RED ARMY AND MASS MOBILIZATION

oftheRed Armyduring1919-20was facilitated

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PAST AND PRESENT

ByJune1919,all theeligibleagegroups- bartheveryyoungest

74TsGAOR,f. 130,op. 3, d. 529,1. 89.

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THE RED ARMY AND MASS MOBILIZATION 1918-1920 187

MOBILIZATION OF VARIOUSAGE GROUPS 1918-1919*

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PAST AND PRESENT

fronthad long sincebecomea practicalnecessity

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THE RED ARMY AND MASS MOBILIZATION 1918-1920 189

Grazhdanskaiavoinai krasnaiaarmiia[The Civil War and the Red Army](Moscow,

pp. 89, 111-15.

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PAST AND PRESENT