TUUKKA KAIDESOJA - Exploring The Concept of Causal Power in A Critical Realist Tradition

Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 37:1
00218308
Exploring the Concept of Causal Power in a

Critical Realist Tradition
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INTRODUCTION
The historical origins of the philosophical concept of causal power are traceable
to everyday language concepts such as ability, capacity, and readiness. In the
Western philosophical tradition, one of the earliest systematic treatments of this
concept can be found in Aristotles philosophy; his concept of efficient cause can
be seen as an ancestor of the modern concept of causal power. Efficient cause
is, however, only one of the four types of causes (or causal explanations) in
Aristotles classification of them. The others are formal, material, and teleological
cause. From this perspective, it is rather surprising that many current advocates
of the concept of causal power tend to see the variable causal powers of things as
the only kind of causes there is. This assumption is also largely accepted in the
critical realist tradition based on Roy Bhaskars philosophy of science. As is well
known, Bhaskar espoused the concept of causal power along with some other
ideas from Rom Harr, who was his teacher in philosophy. Therefore, the roots
of this concept in the critical realist tradition can be found in the early works of
Harr and his associates (e.g. E.H. Madden, P.F. Secord).
For the sake of clarity, it is useful to distinguish the ontological problem of
causality from the epistemological problem. The former problem concerns the
question: what is causation? A solution of this problem should specify, among
other things, the differentiating characteristics of causal relations from other kind
of relations. I agree with critical realists that the concept of causality cannot be
eliminated from any viable ontology and that the ontological problem of causality
is therefore a genuine one. The latter problem, by contrast, deals with the question:
how is it possible to acquire knowledge concerning causal relations? Here, we are
interested in the empirical identification of causal relations and empirical testing
of hypotheses and explanatory theories that putatively refer to causal relations and
causal mechanisms. Nevertheless, the ontological and the epistemological problems
2007 The Author
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64
Tuukka Kaidesoja
of causality are not entirely independent, as our solution to one of them constrains the domain of possible solutions to the other.
The concept of causal power in the critical realist tradition is designed to address
the ontological problem of causality. Critical realists commonly believe that, in order
to develop adequate epistemological and methodological views, ontological questions must be answered first. Following this order of exposition, I herein analyse
and evaluate the uses of the concept of causal power in this tradition mainly from
the ontological point of view, although I also have occasionally something to say
about the epistemological and methodological implications of these uses as well.
I begin by investigating Harr and E.H. Maddens Causal Powers (CP), in which
they present a detailed analysis of the concept of causal power. Then I examine
the doctrine of human powers that Harr and P.F. Secord put forward in their
book, The Explanation of Social Behaviour (ESB). There is, however, somewhat a
controversial issue as to whether these two books be classified as belonging to the
tradition of critical realism or not. Be this as it may, these books have certainly
been influential in the formation of Bhaskars early philosophy of science and the
critical realist concept of causal power. Indeed, I also attempt to show that some
of the problems that vitiate the applications of the concept of causal power in
Bhaskar and other critical realists works already appear in CP and ESB. Furthermore, I point out that there are also some interesting contrasts between the
concept of causal power found in Harr and his associates early works and the
concept of causal power that is developed in the works of Bhaskar and other
critical realists (e.g. lack of the concept of emergence in CP and ESB). Next, I
turn my attention to Bhaskars first book, A Realist Theory of Science (RTS). I argue
that his transcendental account of the concept of causal power is both ontologically
and methodologically problematic. I also show that his version of the concept of
emergent causal power is ambiguous. Finally, I examine how the concept of
causal power is used in the critical realist social ontology that was first articulated
in Bhaskars book, The Possibility of Naturalism (PN). In this context, I also briefly
address the criticism that Harr and Charles C. Varela (e.g. 1996) raise against
applying the concept of causal power to social structures in the critical realist
social ontology. Although I largely accept their criticism, I nevertheless argue that
the concept of emergent causal power might be applied in a certain way to the
system-level properties of certain kind of concrete social systems. I also try to show
that the relations between the structure of the concrete social system and its
component agents may be considered as causal on the condition that we give up the
idea that there is only one adequate ontological analysis of the concept of causality.
HARR AND MADDEN ON THE CONCEPT CAUSAL POWER
In recent discussions dealing with critical realism, it is sometimes forgotten that

Harr (e.g. 1970) already uses the concept of causal power in the late sixties and
2007 The Author
Journal compilation The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2007
Exploring the Concept of Causal Power in a Critical Realist Tradition
65
early seventies. However, the most detailed analysis of this concept in Harrs
works can be found in CP, which he wrote jointly with E.H. Madden. I think that
the analysis presented in CP is compatible with Harrs earlier accounts of this
concept and for this reason I focus, in this section, on the analysis of the concept
of causal power that was put forward in CP.
According to Harr and Madden, the concept of causal power adequately
represents the metaphysics presupposed by modern natural sciences. They contend that the world studied by natural sciences should not be understood as
merely consisting of passive matter in motion, or regularly conjoined atomistic
events, but rather of causally interacting powerful particulars. They argue that
these powerful particulars generate the observable patterns of events and the
nomic regularities. Furthermore, Harr and Madden argue that powerful
particulars possess essential natures in virtue of which they each necessarily
possess a certain ensemble of powers. They also maintain that, in certain
conditions, the powers of a certain powerful particular manifest themselves in
observable effects necessarily. Examples of such powerful particulars include fields
of potentials, chemical substances, ordinary material objects, and biological
organisms.
Harr and Madden (1975, 86) analyse the ascription of causal power to a thing
as follows: X has the power to A means X (will)/(can) do A, in the appropriate
conditions, in virtue of its intrinsic nature. In other words, causal powers are
properties of concrete powerful particulars, which they possess in virtue of their
natures. One consequence of this analysis is that abstract entities such as numbers,
moral values, meanings, and social classes cannot possess causal powers. However,
the term can incorporated into the previous analysis is meant to secure the
extension of this analysis to the ascription of causal powers to people (ibid. 87).
I will come back to this extension later. By the concept of intrinsic nature, Harr
and Madden (e.g. ibid. 101102) refer to the real essences of powerful particulars.
These real essences are constitutions or structures of particular things in virtue of
which they each posses a certain ensemble of causal powers. They also believe
that it is, in principle, possible to divide objects of natural scientific research into
natural kinds according to their real essences (ibid. 1618, 102).
An important feature of Harr and Maddens account of causality is that they
conceive the relationship between the occasion for the exercise of the certain
power and the manifestations of that power in observable effects as naturally
necessary (ibid. 5). They state that; [t]he ineliminable but non-mysterious powers
and abilities of particular things [ . . . ] are the ontological ties that bind causes
and effects together (ibid. 11). The natural necessity that connects causes to their
effects in causal relations is, according to this view, a real feature of the world
and not a feature that the mind has somehow projected onto reality. Harr and
Madden also argue that the relationship between the ensemble of causal powers
of a powerful particular and that its essential nature is naturally necessary and,
therefore, they also contend that it is physically impossible for a powerful particular
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to act or react incompatibly with its own nature (ibid. 1314). Furthermore,
Harr and Madden (ibid. 1921) distinguish the concept of natural necessity
from the concepts of logical, transcendental, and conceptual necessity. They
nevertheless maintain that the conceptual necessity embedded in our historically
developed conceptual systems may reflect a natural necessity grounded in the
essential natures of things when empirical knowledge, acquired via scientific
research into these natures, is used in real definitions of natural kinds (ibid. 67,
1214, 1618). It follows from this that the propositions describing natural necessities are different from the logically necessary propositions, because the former
are necessarily a posteriori and the latter a priori.
Harr and Maddens notion of natural necessity is compatible with our common sense intuitions concerning causal relations. We do believe, for example, that
it is somehow necessary that a sample of water boils in normal air pressure when
heated to 100C by virtue of its chemical structure (i.e. H2O molecules interacting
in certain ways). Harr and Madden use these kinds of intuitions heavily when
they try to establish the superiority of their position to that of Human regularity
theory, which, according to their interpretation, reduces causal relations to the
constant conjunctions of observable events and denies the existence of the natural
necessities. It is not, however, entirely clear whether Harr and Maddens theory
is in fact an adequate ontological analysis of the concept of causality. For example,
Raymond Woller (1982) argues that this theory is problematic since Harr and
Maddens treatment of the concept of natural necessity is multifarious even
though they use it as it were unified. I propose that there is indeed some wavering
in their use of this concept, but I also contend (contra Woller) that its different
uses are quite tightly related to the two main uses previously mentioned. Be this
as it may, I also suggest that their analysis of the concept of causal power is
problematic or is at least insufficient in other ways.
To picture this more clearly, we need to think of some complex material thing,
say a eukaryote cell, which can be decomposed into parts (e.g. organelles), which
are also complex things that can be further broken down into parts (e.g. organic
molecules) and so forth. Now, it may be asked: what is the intrinsic nature (or
structure) of the eukaryotic cell in virtue of which it necessarily possesses a certain
ensemble of causal powers? If the causal powers of this cell are ontologically
dependent on the non-relational powers of its component organelles, in the sense
that the powers of the cell do not exist unless the powers of its organelles exists,
as it is reasonable to assume, then it may be asked: are the powers possessed by
the cell nothing but the ontological resultants (or mereological sums) of the non-relational powers
of its component organelles? If this is the case, then the powers of the cell are not
ontologically grounded in the nature of the cell, but rather in the natures of its
component organelles due to the fact that the powers of the cell can be ontologically reduced to the powers of its component organelles (i.e. in the last analysis
they are nothing but the resultants of the powers of the organelles). If we assume
for a moment that this view is correct, then it implies, methodologically, that it is,
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in principle possible, to explain the properties of the cell solely by investigating

the non-relational causal powers of its component organelles without considering
their specific and complex organisation (e.g. their non-linear, complex, and
relatively permanent dynamic relationships). If the causal powers of the organelles
are also nothing but the resultants of the powers of their components, then this
ontological reduction can be repeated by reducing their causal powers in a similar
way to the powers of their component organic molecules. The same applies to
the powers of the organic molecules, which can be again reduced ontologically to
the powers of the atoms that constitute them. If the causal powers of the eukaryote
cell and its component organelles, and the component molecules of these component organelles and so forth, are all merely the ontological resultants of the
casual powers of their components, then this regression may go on ad infinitum or
it may stop to such ultimate entities that are plain powers which lack intrinsic
natures or structures. In either case, complex things such as an eukaryote cell are
not able perform any real causal work because, according to this interpretation,
their alleged causal powers are always ontologically reducible to the causal powers
of entities that are ontologically more fundamental.1
It seems to me that Harr and Madden are not ready to accept this ontologically
reductionist analysis of the concept of causal power, which I find problematic.
There are, for example, many passages in CP where they suggest that the specific
organisation of the parts (or structure) of a certain complex thing such as a water
molecule, a biological organism, or a car is somehow relevant regarding the
existence of the causal powers of this thing, although they admit that the powers
of these kinds of complex things are ontologically dependent on the powers of
their parts (e.g. ibid. 56, 104105). They also maintain that the explanation of
a certain power of a certain thing, in terms of its nature, does not explain this
power away nor eliminate the description of it from our description of this thing
(ibid. 11; see also Harr 1986, 285286). As such, it seems to me that Harr and
Madden at least implicitly commit to such a non-reductionist ontological view,
according to which the causal powers of complex things are not ontologically
reducible to the powers of their components. They fail, however, to provide any
sufficient clarification of this position or arguments for it and, consequently, do
not succeed in justifying this position. I think that one possible way to clarify and
defend this position is to introduce the notion of an emergent causal power that
specifies the conditions in which complex material things possess emergent causal
powers that are ontologically irreducible to the powers of their components, and
to provide empirical evidence for the existence of such emergent powers. Among
others, Bhaskar (1978) has developed a concept of emergent causal power, but,
as I will later argue, it is ambiguous and does not meet the previously stated
requirement. Nevertheless, I believe that an adequate concept of emergent causal
power might be incorporated to Harr and Maddens analysis of the concept of
causal power quite easily, although this is not the right place develop such a
concept.2
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Tuukka Kaidesoja
Harr and Madden (ibid. 8687) emphasise that the powers of a certain
powerful particular do not cease to exist outside the conditions where they are
exercised as long as the nature of the particular does not change. Therefore,
according to their view, causal powers should be conceived as causal potencies of
things, which determine what the thing will, or can, do in the appropriate
conditions, rather than the empirical consequences of the exercise of these
powers. This marks the distinction between Harr and Maddens concept of causal
power and reductive analyses of dispositional concepts by using the hypothetical
or conditional statements presented by Gilbert Ryle and others. In other words,
Harr and Madden maintain that the causal powers of things cannot be ontologically reduced to their non-dispositional categorical properties. It is worth noting
that this position is different from the position considered in the previous section,
according to which, the causal powers of a complex thing cannot be reduced
ontologically to the powers of its components.
Harr and Madden (ibid. 8788) distinguish enabling conditions from stimulus
conditions for the exercise of a certain causal power of a powerful particular.
Satisfaction of the enabling conditions ensures that the powerful particular is of
the right nature and in the right state for the exercise of a certain power (ibid.
88). Therefore, the descriptions of enabling conditions refer to the intrinsic structure or constitution of the powerful particular. Harr and Madden also separate
the intrinsic structure of a particular thing from its internal structure, conceived
in a spatial sense, because the former may include some of the particulars relations to its external environment. Satisfaction of the stimulus conditions means,
by contrast, that a certain causal power of the powerful particular (that is already
in the state of readiness) is exercised. In other words, satisfaction of the stimulus
conditions will necessarily lead to the empirical manifestation of the power in
question, if no interfering influences are present.
Furthermore, Harr and Madden (ibid.) distinguish many kinds of causal
powers. These include active powers, passive powers or liabilities, constant powers,
variable powers, ultimate powers, tendencies, abilities, and capacities. Although it
is not necessary to consider these conceptual distinctions in detail here, the
question should be asked: do these various causal powers share a common core?
It seems to me that the answer is negative due to the fact that Harr and Madden
explicitly use at least two rather different conceptions of causal power (see Woller
1982, 627631). They apply the previously presented concept of causal power
to complex things with intrinsic natures. The other concept of causal power
appears in the context of a discussion on the nature of ultimate entities (see ibid.
161185). They state, for example, that; since the natures of ultimate entities are
their powers, no further characterisation of such particulars is possible, because
there is no independent question as to their natures (ibid. 162). Unlike the former,
this latter concept conflates the powers and natures of powerful particulars.
Therefore, the previous analysis of the concept of causal power does not apply to
the powers of ultimate entities. In fact, it follows that the concept of causal power
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developed in CP is not as unified as Harr and Madden sometimes seem to

suggest.
Harr and Maddens account of the concept of causal power is also explicitly
essentialist, although their essentialism is rather sophisticated in the following
respects. Firstly, they do not claim that all entities possess essences but, instead,
restrict their essentialism to the domain of powerful particulars. They also think
that the essences of complex powerful particulars may change, although they
believe that ultimate entities are unchanging powers (ibid. 15057, 161163).
Following John Locke, they move on to distinguish the nominal essences of things
(i.e. observable properties that are normally used in the classification of things)
from their real essences (i.e. usually unobservable intrinsic natures that generate
their manifest properties) and restrict their concept of the essential nature to the real
essences of things (ibid. 1618, 101102). Subsequently, according to their view,
the only changes in the real essence of a powerful particular are those changes in
its essential nature (e.g. ibid. 150). In a similar manner, Harr and Madden
differentiate essential changes from the inessential changes of powerful particulars.
Leaving aside deeply metaphysical questions concerning identity and change,
I think that the concept of essential nature might have some legitimate uses in
certain scientific contexts (e.g. elementary particle physics, chemistry), but it is
inappropriate in many others. For example, biological species do not form such
natural kinds as those that can be separated from each other by referring to the
common essential natures of the individuals belonging to a certain species (see e.g.
Sober 1980). Furthermore, there is controversy surrounding the existence or not
of psychological and social kinds that might be identified by referring to their
essential natures (see e.g. Sayer 1997). Even though these and other examples
suggest that global essentialism is clearly problematic, there might still be some
local candidates (e.g. elementary charges, atoms, and molecules) that possess
something akin to real essences in the sense that Harr and Maddens describe.
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the question of whether a certain
thing possesses an essential nature or not is an empirical one. It follows from this
that the uses of the concept of causal power developed in CP should be either
restricted to such fields where it can be plausibly applied or, alternatively, that this
concept should be redefined without reference to the essential natures of powerful
particulars. I prefer the latter option as, otherwise, the uses of the concept of
causal power in different sciences would be restricted remarkably. Andrew Sayer
(1997) defends a similar position, which he labels as moderate essentialism, but
I think that moderate anti-essentialism is an equally good name for this view.
HARR AND SECORD ON HUMAN POWERS AND HUMAN NATURES
In ESB, Harr and Secord argue that, within the social sciences, human beings
should be understood as active and knowledgeable agents who are capable of
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initiating action. ESB also contains a thorough critique of the behaviouristic

experimental social psychology and a sketch of an alternative ethogenic methodology for social psychology. The basic principle of the ethogenic methodology
states that; [f]or scientific purposes, treat people as if they were human beings
(Harr & Secord 1972, 84). In accordance with this principle, Harr and Secords
ethogenic methodology emphasises the relevance of an agents own accounts of
their actions, negotiations with agents, the episodic nature of social action, and
the importance of rules for the explanation of social action. They base this new
methodology on their anthropomorphic model of man, which conceives human
beings as possessors of certain general powers that are exercised in meaningful
and rule-governed social action. These powers include the power to initiate change,
the power to use language, the power to monitor action, the power to monitor
the monitoring of action, and, finally, the power to provide self-commentaries on
actions (see ibid. 84100).
Moving on, in ESB, Harr and Secord (ibid. 82) write that; identification of
powers and natures must form essential parts of the methodology of the social
sciences just as they do in the natural sciences. They also contend that the
concept of power and concepts like it, can provide a system capable of being
used to bring a unity of an acceptable sort into the whole field of disparate kinds
of knowledge of human beings (ibid. 245). These disparate kinds of knowledge
of human beings include the so-called folk psychology embedded in our ordinary
language concepts, psychological explanations of human behaviours, and actions
and neurophysiological knowledge concerning the human nervous system. Harr
and Secord (e.g. ibid. 253) maintain that different kinds of behaviours and actions,
in which human powers are exercised, should be classified by using the concepts
used in everyday language. In accordance with these views, they suggest, quite
optimistically, that the concepts of ordinary language, elaborated by using the
conceptual system of powers, are capable of providing a secure basis for conceptual
integration in the human sciences (e.g. ibid. 240). This position is closely related
to their previously described anthropomorphic model of man.
Harr and Secord (see e.g. ibid. 248251) assert that the logical structure of
the ascription of human powers fits the general logical structure of the ascription
of powers presented above. Familiar distinctions between enabling and stimulus
conditions (or internal and external stimuli), and between intrinsic and extrinsic
conditions, also appear in ESB. These distinctions are, however, elaborated in a
way that, in certain respects, differs from their use in CP and Harrs earlier
works. In addition, subtle but rather underdeveloped classifications of human
powers (e.g. a distinction between general capacities and specific states of
readiness, permanent and transitional powers, powers and liabilities, long- and
short-term powers, generic and specific powers, powers to act and powers to
acquire powers) are presented in ESB. Consequently, it is not always entirely
clear whether the possessors of certain kinds of powers are biological individuals,
persons, social selves, or social episodes. It is also notable that Harr and
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Secord avoid using the concept of causality in their account of the concept of
human power and, remarkably, restrict its legitimate use in their ethogenic
methodology. For this reason, it is not entirely clear whether human powers
should be conceived as genuine causal powers or, rather, as being analogous with
them only in some respects. Nevertheless, I will proceed as if they were genuine
causal powers.
In what follows, I argue that Harr and Secords account of human powers and
human natures contains two intersecting tensions: (1) between an individualistic
and a collectivist ontology, and (2) between an anti-naturalistic Kantian idea of
autonomous person and a naturalistic conception of human beings as biological
individuals. Similar tensions, as I will later argue, are also visible in the critical
realist social ontology. In addition, my critical remarks concerning the analysis of
the concept of causal power in CP are also, in a large part, applicable to the
concept of human power and human nature developed in ESB. For example, the
lack of the notion of emergent power is problematic in ESB because human
beings are obviously such complex organisms, composed of complex parts and
possessing powers ontologically irreducible to their parts. The essentialist analysis
of the concept of causal power presented in CP is also problematic in the context
of the social sciences. Instead of repeating these remarks here, I will focus on the
previously mentioned tensions that can found in the concepts of human power
and human nature used in ESB.
Harr and Secords account of human powers oscillates between an individualist ontology and a collectivist ontology. In some passages in ESB, human powers
are conceived in plainly individualistic terms. Harr and Secord (ibid. 277278)
note, for example, that from a metaphysical point of view: the whole enterprise
of this book can be seen as the attempt to replace a conceptual system, inherited
from the seventeenth century and based upon the substance and quality, with a
system based upon of an individual with powers. Of course, the term individual
refers here not only to individual human beings but also to powerful particulars
studied in the natural sciences. Harr and Secord do not, however, explicitly treat
social groups or collectives as if they were individuals or analogous with them.
They write, for example, that [t]he processes that are productive of social behaviour
occur in individual people, and it is individual people that they [social psychologists]
must study (ibid. 133). In addition, an individualistic interpretation of human
powers is presupposed in Harr and Secords (see e.g. ibid. 89, 246247, 270
271) view that human powers are tied to the currently unknown internal nature
of human beings, which consist of both psychic and physical (or physiological)
aspects. Furthermore, the metaphysical doctrine of dual-aspect materialism that
they espouse seems to require that human powers are tightly connected to the
physiological structures and processes of individual human beings (see ibid, 24).
As far as I can see, this individualistic interpretation of the concept of human
power does not violate Harr and Maddens (1975) account of the concept of
causal power, although it may contain other problems.
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Tuukka Kaidesoja
Nevertheless, there are other places in ESB that differ from the purely individualistic account of human powers. To begin with, Harr and Secord (e.g. ibid.
275271) distinguish permanent human powers, such as the power to speak
English, from transitory human powers such as moods, attitudes and characters,
and maintain that transitory powers are not tied to the permanent features of
human nature but, rather, to the transitory aspects of human nature (ibid.
281). They also suggest that these transitory human powers are highly dependent
on the social episodes (e.g. a dinner party, quarrel, or lecture) in which they occur
(ibid. 153). Secondly, they separate the concept of human nature from the concept
of biological individual and claim that a certain biological individual may possess
many natures, which, they believe, may be understood as her different social
selves (e.g. ibid. 9295, 127, 143145, 276288). Again, these social selves seem
to be highly dependent on different kinds of social episodes. Thirdly, Harr and
Secord maintain that certain kinds of human actions should be explained by using
concepts such as rule, role, and meaning. It seems to me that they, at least
implicitly, conceive these concepts especially the concept of ruleas referring
to certain kinds of collective entities that enable and guide the actions of individuals, although they admit that the effects of these entities are always mediated by
the actions of self-monitoring individuals (see e.g. ibid. 147204). Furthermore,
they write that; [the institutional] environment is operative both in its effects
upon the natures of people, and in providing opportunities and background for the
display of those natures (ibid. 258). It seems to me that it is presupposed in these
views that rules and institutions possess causal powers that are ontologically
irreducible to those of individuals. Now, it may be concluded from the previous
points that Harr and Secord at least implicitly presuppose that some human
powers are properties of collective entities, although they maintain that these
powers manifest themselves only through the actions of individuals. This collectivist
interpretation of human powers is incompatible with the individualistic interpretation of the concept of human power and I will return to this issue in the context
of critical realist social ontology.
Another tension in Harr and Secords analysis of human powers and natures
can be found between their application of the Kantian conception of person and
the concept of biological individual. One of the central motives behind their book
seems to be the rehabilitation of an anti-naturalist Kantian idea, according to
which, human being are autonomous agents that possess power to initiate action
independently of any antecedent causes. This idea was abandoned by behaviourist social psychologists who advocate a mechanistic conception of human beings.
Harr and Secord argue, for example, that human beings should not be conceived as passive organisms who automatically react to environmental stimuli,
but, rather, as persons capable of initiating action, directing their action, monitoring their action, and monitoring their monitoring of this action (ibid. 2943; 84
100). Moreover, they contend, in a Kantian spirit, that these general human
powers are some kind of transcendental presuppositions that are the necessary
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conditions for something to be a language user (ibid. 84) and derive descriptions
of these powers from a priori philosophical analysis of the concept of person (ibid.
3742; 9192). It seems to me that this also explains why a naturalistic perspective on the phylogenetic and ontogenetic development of these human powers
is missing in ESB. Furthermore, in their discussion of the nature of intentional
action, Harr and Secord distinguish the concept of reason from the concept of
cause and are rather critical regarding a causal explanation of intentional action
(ibid. 1112, 159 162). Despite their conceptual distinction between reasons and
causes, they admit that there are intermediate cases of human action, which they
call enigmatic episodes, where both a reason/rule-following explanation and
causal explanation might be applicable (e.g. ibid. 162, 171, 179181). Nevertheless, they seem to be willing to remove reasons for action from the causal order
of nature. This kind of talk, which conceives human beings as autonomous agents,
also includes an irreducible moral component since, in the Western philosophical
tradition, and in our everyday discourse, the concept of autonomous agent is
tied inseparably to the concept of moral responsibility.3 Although this antinaturalist position is, in a certain sense, individualistic, it assumes that some kind
of transcendental powers separate human beings from the causal order of nature.
Therefore, it seems to be incompatible with the previously discussed more naturalistic interpretation of human powers, in which human powers are ontologically
tied to the nature of individual biological organisms.
In his later works on social ontology, Harr (1990; 1993; see also Harr &
Gillett 1994) has gradually abandoned the concepts of human power and human
nature in favour of concepts such as conversation, discourse, grammar, narrative,
and moral order (see also Shotter 1990). He writes, for example, that; there are
only two human realities: physiology and discourse (conversation)the former an
individual phenomenon, the latter collective (Harr 1990, 345) and that primary
human reality is conversation (ibid. 341). Furthermore, he also complains about
the confusion of causal necessity for moral obligation and suggests that the
concept of causality does not have any applications in the social constructionist
ontology and methodology of the social sciences (ibid. 350352; see also Harr
1993). Harr (1990, 352) also contends that in ESB he and Secord were still
thinking in terms of traditional metaphysics, in which the ontology of human
studies is grounded in human beings, whereas now he concedes that this
approach was misplaced. I will come back to Harrs more recent position on
social ontology when I deal with Harr and Varelas critique concerning critical
realist social ontology. Next, I will turn my attention to Bhaskars RTS.
BHASKAR ON CAUSAL POWERS IN A REALIST THEORY OF SCIENCE
Bhaskar adopted the concept of causal power in his RTS from the philosophical
works of his teacher Rom Harr. For this reason, it is not surprising that there are
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many similarities between Harr and Maddens (1975) analysis of this concept
and Bhaskars own characterisations. Bhaskar (1978) writes, for example, that:
Most things are complex objects in virtue of which they possess an ensemble of tendencies,
liabilities, and powers. (p. 51)
To ascribe a power is to say that thing will do (or suffer) something, under the appropriate
conditions, in virtue of its nature. (p. 175)
The real essences of things are their intrinsic structures, atomic constitutions and so on which
constitute the real basis of their natural tendencies and causal powers. (p. 174)
These statements are almost identical to Harr and Maddens analysis of the
concept of causal power. In RTS, Bhaskar also uses the related concepts of natural
necessity, natural kind, and generative mechanism in a similar way as Harr and
Madden. Furthermore, he presents a sketch of the development of science by
using the concept of causal power in very much the same way as Harr and
Madden (see ibid. 168178). When compared to CP, there are, however, a few
interesting differences in Bhaskars account of this concept in RTS. I focus on
these differences here.
In general, in RTS and his other works, Bhaskar advocates a more openly
ontological (or metaphysical) realism than Harr and Madden in CP and Harr
(see e.g. 1986) in his other works on philosophy of science. Unlike Harr and
Madden, Bhaskar also uses a transcendental method of argumentation in the
justification of his transcendental realist ontological position. He argues in RTS,
for example, that it is a necessary condition of the possibility of scientific experimentation that causal laws/mechanisms, which are ontologically grounded in the
causal powers of things, are categorically distinct from the patterns of events that
they generate (Bhaskar 1978, 3336, 4555). Furthermore, when compared to
Harr and Maddens book-length exposition of the concept of causal power,
Bhaskars account of this concept in RTS is more superficial as it lacks, for example,
clear criteria that would enable powerful particulars to be identified (Varela &
Harr 1996, 318). Bhaskars distinctions between the different kinds of causal
powers are also more modest than those presented in CP. In addition to these
differences concerning their general approach, there are also two specific points
in which Bhaskars account of causal powers differs from Harr and Maddens.
Firstly, as I have previously stated, Bhaskar argues that mechanisms ontologically grounded in the causal powers of things are categorically distinct from the
actual events that they produce. He also states that causal laws conceived as ways
of acting of powerful things must be analysed as tendencies due to the fact that
there are situations in which the exercised causal powers of things fail to generate
manifest effects at the level of actual events (Bhaskar 1978, 14; 50). For this
reason, Bhaskar (ibid. 14) writes that; tendencies may be regarded as powers or
liabilities of a thing which may be exercised without being manifest in any particular
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outcome. Therefore, causal powers are understood in RTS as non-actual and,

consequently, non-empirical features of reality, which, in principle, lie beyond our
unaided perceptual capacities and scientific observations, made by using sense
extending instruments (see e.g. ibid. 4950). It is worth noting that Bhaskar is not
only stating that causal powers exist in the form of the potentialities of things
outside the conditions of their exercise, rather he also suggests that exercised
causal powers are categorically distinct from the actual effects that they produce.
Therefore, according to this view, exercised causal powers also seem to lie beyond
observable phenomena, although their actual effects may be observable in certain
conditions.
I refer to the aforementioned view as a transcendental account of the concept of causal
power because, according to this, (1) the existence of the causal powers of things
belong to the necessary conditions of the possibility of successful scientific
practices and, (2) the causal powers of things exist in a special ontological realm
beyond the realm of the actual events and processes that constitute the possible
objects of our experiences (see also Varela & Harr 1996, 318). It is notable that,
by contrast, Harr and Madden (1975, 4962) argue that, in certain conditions,
it is not just the effects of the exercise of causal powers that are observable, but
also certain causal powers at work can be directly perceived. Therefore, according
to their view, causal powers are not transcendental features of reality by definition,
although they admit that the causal powers of things exists as potentialities outside
the circumstances in which they are exercised, and that, in many cases, the
exercised causal powers that produce observable effects are currently unobservable
features of reality.4
Bhaskars transcendental account of the concept of causal power is problematic, because it locates the causal powers of things in an ontological realm, which,
in principle, lies beyond the realm of actual entities (see also Gibson 1982, 305).
From this perspective, it becomes problematic to answer to the question: how are
causal powers of things related to actual entities (e.g. observable events, processes,
things and states of affairs)? It is not enough to assert that the exercised causal
powers somehow produce the actual objects of observations, because the precise
nature of this relation of production remains inevitably obscure since it is hard to
see how something that is categorically distinct from actual entities could produce
any actual spatio-temporal effects. Consequently, the relationship between the
causal powers of things and actual causation remains obscure in Bhaskars
account (see e.g. Elder-Vass, 331337). This problem seems to be analogous to
the problem of the relationship between things-in-themselves and objects of our
experience (appearances) in the so-called two-worlds interpretation of Kants
transcendental idealism. Nevertheless, it is clear that Bhaskar does not explicitly
advocate this Kantian doctrine because he believes that the causal powers of
things, unlike Kants things-in-themselves, may be possible objects of our knowledge.
Furthermore, at least three problematic methodological implications seem to
follow from Bhaskars transcendental account of the concept of causal power.
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Firstly, it seems to be possible to attribute indefinitely many hypothetical transcendental causal powers to a certain thing. Secondly, it seems to be possible to invent
indefinitely many hypothesis that refer to different kinds of transcendental causal
powers that allegedly explain any actual phenomenon in which we are interested.
Thirdly, it follows from the previous two methodological implications that it is
difficult to empirically evaluate the competing hypotheses regarding the causal
powers that putatively participate in the production of a certain actual phenomenon
due to the fact that it is always possible to invent indefinitely many hypotheses that
allegedly refer to transcendental causal powers of things that explain the phenomenon in question (see also Kourikoski & Ylikoski 2006). The first two problematic
implications concern the lack of empirical or methodological restrictions in
terms of the possible uses of the concept of transcendental causal power. The
third is a variation of the Duhem-Quine underdetermination (of theories by data)
thesis.
Laboratory experiments in physics and chemistry provide, according to
Bhaskar (see e.g. 1978, 163170, 191194), an efficient way of evaluating hypotheses concerning the causal powers of things because they enable scientists to study
a certain generative mechanism in isolation from interfering influences. This view
is, however, problematic because if we accept the notion that causal powers are,
in principle, non-actual properties of things, then laboratory experiments also
seem to be vulnerable to the previous methodological problems. Moreover,
outside laboratory conditions, the situation seems to be even worse due to the fact
that there seems to be few methodological tools available for testing empirically
explanatory theories that allegedly refer to such transcendental causal powers of
things, those that operate in these open-systemic conditions. Nevertheless, it is
not entirely clear whether the rather sketchy epistemological and methodological
views that Bhaskar presents in RTS are consistent with his transcendental account
of the concept of causal power.
The second feature that differentiates Bhaskars view from Harr and Maddens,
is that he uses a concept of emergent causal power. As I have argued above, the
notion of emergent causal power is needed in order to avoid ontological
reductionism regarding the causal powers of complex things. In this respect,
Bhaskars concept of emergent causal power is promising; although he is by no
means the first one to use this concept since its historical roots go back to at least
the nineteenth century (see e.g. Beckerman et al. 1992). Furthermore, this concept
is left remarkably underanalysed in RTS and Bhaskars (e.g. 1979, 1982, 1986,
1989, 1994) subsequent books do not offer much help in this matter (see also
Elder-Vass 2005; Sawyer 2005, 8082). In RTS, Bhaskar uses this concept (1) to
describe the properties of the whole of a particular complex thing, which is
composed of parts related to each other (or organised) in specific ways; and (2) to
describe relations between levels of reality without specifying clearly how these
two uses are related (see e.g. 1978, 113; see also 1979, 124125; 1982, 277, 281
284). In his later works, this concept is also applied in several other contexts
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without, so far as I can see, providing any clear analysis of it, nor the relations
between its different uses (see e.g. Bhaskar 1994, 6788). Moreover, Bhaskar does
not specify in RTS, nor in his subsequent works, whether all of the emergent
properties of complex things are causal powers or only some subset of them. It
also remains unclear whether non-physical (e.g. mental or social) emergent causal
powers of complex things supervene5 on the physical properties of these things (cf.
Sawyer 2005, 81). I think that Bhaskars transcendental interpretation of the
concept of causal power also vitiates his account of the concept of emergent
power because it becomes rather difficult to characterise the relationships
between the emergent powers of a given complex thing and the causal powers of
its constituent parts if both of these kinds of powers are conceived of as lying, in
principle, beyond our observations.
For these reasons, and following Elder-Vass (2005), I think that further development of the concept of emergent causal power requires that Bhaskars categorical distinction between the causal powers of things and the actual events is
loosened, and that the concept of emergent power is explicitly defined as characterising the parts-whole relation of the composition of complex things. I also
believe that the concept of the ontological level of reality should be explicitly
defined by referring to the emergent causal powers of complex things in order
avoid postulating ontologically mysterious entities.
CONCEPT OF CAUSAL POWER IN A CRITICAL REALIST SOCIAL ONTOLOGY
In his book, The Possibility of Naturalism (PN), Bhaskar develops a realist social
ontology in which he largely employs his version of the transcendental realist
ontology first presented in RTS. The concept of causal power is, therefore, a
central feature of the critical realist social ontology that is largely built on
Bhaskars philosophical ideas. Generally speaking, critical realists maintain that
social life does not form its own reality, totally distinct from the natural world
governed by the causal laws of nature, but, instead, that it forms a part of the total
causal structure of reality. Nevertheless, they commonly admit that there are
certain specific ontological features that differentiate social entities from natural
entities and, consequently, hold that the specific methods of natural sciences are
not directly applicable to the social sciences. According to Bhaskar (e.g. 1979, 48
49), activity-dependence, concept-dependence, and time-space-dependence are
such properties that differentiate social structures from natural structures.
Furthermore, critical realists commonly advocate a relationist conception of
society in which social structures are understood as internal relations between
social positions and positioned-practices (see e.g. Bhaskar 1979, 5154; see also
Archer 1995; Sayer 1992; Lawson 1997). Examples used by critical realists of
internally related positions are, typically, those such as; capitalist and worker, MP
and constituent, student and teacher, husband and wife (Bhaskar 1979, 36). The
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idea is that a certain social position, which individual agents occupy, is constituted
by its internal relations to other social positions. Critical realists also emphasise
the point that social reality is stratified in the sense that agents (or persons) and
social structures are ontologically distinct entities in virtue of their sui generis emergent causal powers. Despite this ontological distinction, they nevertheless believe
that structures are continuously reproduced and transformed via the intended
and unintended consequences of agents intentional actions. Furthermore, they
hold that structures are ontologically dependent on the activities of agents in the
sense that structures cease to exist when they are no longer reproduced via the
activities of individual agents. Critical realists also admit that social structures
have historically emerged from the social interaction of such agents, which may
have already passed away, and believe that some pre-existing social structures
always enable and constrain current intentional human actions.6 In addition to
these two basic levels of social reality, namely agents and structures, some critical
realists also distinguish several other levels (see e.g. Archer 1988; 1995; 2000).
For the sake of clarity, it is useful to differentiate three contexts in which critical
realists have used the concept of causal power in their social ontology: (1) the
context of general mental capacities, (2) the context of reasons, and (3) the context
of social structures. In what follows, I briefly evaluate the uses of this concept by
focusing on one context at the time. I argue that all of these uses are beset by
certain problems. I believe that these problems are at least partly due to critical
realists transcendental interpretation of the concept of causal power and their
ambiguous notion of emergent causal power.
In PN, Bhaskar (1979, 103) writes that; I intend to show that the capacities
that constitute mind [ . . . ] are properly regarded as causal, and that mind is a sui
generis real emergent power of matter, whose autonomy, though real, is nevertheless circumscribed. Following Harr and Secord (1972), Bhaskar (ibid. 44, 104)
maintains that these consciously mediated capacities of people (or agents) include
the power to self-monitor ones own activity, power to monitor the monitoring of
action, and the power to manipulate symbols. He also maintains, much like Harr
and Secord (ibid.), that we can derive descriptions of these powers from a priori
conceptual analysis, and that possession of these powers is constitutive of both
human mind and intentional agency (see Bhaskar 1979, 44, 103106). The most
critical realists follow Bhaskar in believing that the existence of these rather antinaturalistically and individualistically interpreted general mental powers to be one
of the ontological presuppositions of such social studies that take agency seriously.
It is not prima facie implausible to state that the mind is constituted of an
ensemble of emergent causal powers. Nevertheless, this view notably remains
underdeveloped in Bhaskar and other critical realists works. They have not provided sufficient answers to the following questions: what exactly are these general
emergent powers that constitute mind? What is the exact relationship between
mental powers and neurophysiological structures and processes? How does social
context shape the development and the exercise of mental powers? How do
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mental powers develop ontologenetically, and how have they evolved phylogenetically? Unfortunately, Bhaskars (see e.g. 1979, 124125) rather sketchy doctrine
of synchronic emergent powers materialism does not provide the required
answers because it is, as I have previously argued, open to many different
interpretations and conceptually ambiguous. Furthermore, Bhaskars reliance on
an a priori philosophical argumentation, as well as his transcendental account of
the concept of causal power, seem to prevent him for providing satisfactory
answers to these questions. Even though I think that the previous questions are
not only extremely difficult but also largely empirical, in the sense that it is not
possible to answer them solely by using a priori philosophical analysis, I nevertheless
believe that they are relevant in regards to the justification of the application of
the concept of causal power to mind.
Critical realists also defend the view that an agents reasons should be conceived of as causes of her/his intentional action. This is where their views differ
from those of Harr and Secord (1972). Bhaskar (1979, 106, 115123), for example,
argues that reasons can be interpreted as generative mechanisms that produce
behaviour in a way analogous to the ways in which the generative mechanisms
studied in the natural sciences produce observable effects. Although he contends
that reasons are possessed in virtue of the exercise of certain general mental
powers, he nevertheless maintains that reasons are sui generis causes of intentional
action (see e.g. ibid. 106). Bhaskar also states that, agents are defined in terms of
their tendencies and powers, among which in the case of human agents, are their
reasons for acting (ibid. 118, see also 106). As such, he conceives the notion of
intentional causality in terms of a theory of causal powers. Now, it seems to be
legitimate to ask here; what is the intrinsic nature of reasons in virtue of which
they possess causal powers? In PN, Bhaskar (1979, 120123) provides quite a
traditional analysis of the concept of reason by using the concepts of desire and belief,
yet it remains unclear how the nature of desires and beliefs, in virtue of which they
allegedly possess causal powers, should be understood. He also states that, Reasons
. . . are beliefs rooted in the practical interests of life (ibid. 123), but does not
develop this idea very far.
Even though Bhaskar does not directly address the previous question, the only
plausible answer available to him seems to be the one in which reason is understood as a certain kind of mental property that supervenes from the neurophysiological properties of the brain. If this is not the case, it becomes impossible to
explain how reasons could produce material effects, which is, according to Bhaskar
(ibid. 117), a necessary condition for their existence, as well as that of causal efficacy.
Although Bhaskar does not use the term supervenience in PN, he explicitly criticises
all kinds of materialistic views that conceive mental states as material properties
of our neurophysiological systems. He argues, among other things, that this doctrine,
which he refers to with the term central state materialism, is necessarily
individualist and reductionist (ibid. 124137). He also states that, I want to argue
[ . . . ] that people possess properties irreducible to those of matter (ibid. 124).
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I think, however, that a non-reductionist materialist view, which sees mental

properties as the non-physical properties of the neurophysological systems that
supervene from the physical properties of such systems, is compatible with the
emergent materialist doctrine, according to which, mental properties, understood
as states of neurophysiological systems, possess system-level emergent powers that
are ontologically irreducible to the powers of their components (e.g. neurons and
glias). In following this view, mental states could be conceived as a specific kind
of non-physical, and yet material (in the broadest sense of the term), properties of
the neurophysiological system (see e.g. Searle 1992). I also believe that this view
can be developed in such a way that would be compatible with the view that
posits the physical and social environments, in which human beings live (and have
lived), as shaping (and having shaped) their plastic neurophysiological systems,
both ontogenetically and phylogenetically. In other words, it is possible to conceive human neurophysiological systems as open systems that are in continuous
and complex interaction with their environments. This does not amount, however, to a denial of the role that genetic factors play in the development of the
neurophysiological system, but, rather, it requires a rebuttal of genetic determinism
in regards to the properties of such a system.
To conclude: I hope to have shown that Bhaskars criticism of the doctrine of
central state materialism is misplaced and that some kind of biologically
informed non-reductionist materialist perspective on the mind is more plausible
than that which is advocated by Bhaskar. I concede, however, that the points
made above require further conceptual elaboration, and that their validity
depends, among other things, on the results of neuroscientific research. Nonetheless, Bhaskar and other critical realists views of mental powers often seem to be
much closer to the problematic Cartesian mind-body dualism than they are
prepared to admit.
Finally, and perhaps most controversially, critical realists have applied the concept of causal power to social structures. For critical realists, the problem of the
causal efficacy of social structures seems to be the pressing question: how do the
internal relations between social positions affect the actions of the agents that
occupy these positions? Critical realists, for example, commonly write about the
enabling, constraining, and motivating effects of social structures in relation to the
actions of the agents that occupy the structural positions. Accordingly, Bhaskar
and other critical realists contend that internal relations between social positions
and positioned practices posses some kind of transcendental and emergent causal
powers (e.g. ibid. 5152; 6869; see also Archer 1995, 165194; Lawson 1997,
163170; Sayer 1992, chapter 3). According to this view, society, understood as a
totality of social structures, is some kind of transcendental entity that is, not
given, but presupposed by, experience (Bhaskar 1979, 68). Examples of such
powerful social structures include the structure of a capitalistic economy (Bhaskar
1979, 6567; Sayer 1992), the demographic structure (Archer 1995), and the
structure of an educational system (ibid.). Bhaskar (ibid. 51) also suggests that the
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concept of social position may be further analysed by using concepts such as

place, function, rule, task, duty, and right, but does not present a
precise analysis of the meaning these concepts .
Bhaskar (e.g. ibid. 4344; see also 2001, 30), however, suggests, using the
Aristotelian distinction between efficient and material cause, that social structures
should be understood as material causes of social activity, whereas people are the
only efficient causes of social activity. This statement seems to be incompatible
with the view that social structures possess causal powers since, as I suggested in
the beginning of this article, the concept of causal power should be interpreted as
an elaborated version of the Aristotelian concept of efficient cause (see also Harr
& Madden 1975, 57; Lewis 2000, 257258; cf. Manicas 2006, 72). Although
Bhaskars position is, in this respect, ambiguous, I assume that the differentiating
feature of the critical realist social ontology is that it sees the powers of individual
agents and the powers of social structures as ontologically distinct because I
believe that this is the most common view among critical realists. This statement
is, however, not intended as a denial of the fact that there are some advocates of
this tradition who do not accept this view (e.g. Manicas 2006).
Harr and Charles C. Varela (1996 see also Harr 2001, 2002a; 2002b; Varela
2001, 2002) have criticised critical realists for their application of the concept of
causal power to social structures. They argue that the attribution of causal powers
to social structures violates the general logic of the concept of causal power as it
is presented, for example, in CP because it requires among other things that
causal powers are illegitimately separated from powerful particulars. They also
argue that if the concept of causal power is adequately understood, then it is clear
that social structures are not such things that may possess causal powers. It is
notable that the arguments presented by Harr and Varela presuppose that the
general logic of the concept of causal power has been already presented in an
adequate way in Harrs earlier works. I have earlier challenged this presupposition.
Nonetheless, I think that Harr and Varela are right to criticise the critical
realist view that social structures possess relatively autonomous causal powers in
relation to the agents that occupy the positions in these structures. To be convinced of this, it should be emphasised that it is certainly a minimum requirement
for the legitimate application of any adequate concept of causal power to a certain
entity that this entity be a concrete and organised material system that is capable
of producing observable effect(s) in certain conditions and in a relatively autonomous way. Social structures, conceived as sets of abstract internal relations
between social positions and positioned-practices, do not seem to meet this
requirement. Therefore, Harr and Varela (1996, 314; see also Harr 2001,
2002b; Varela 2001) are right to insist that, in some cases, critical realists commit
to the reification of the abstract macro-social concepts (e.g. working class) in their
application of causal powers to social structures. However, I am not entirely
convinced that it follows from this, as Harr and Varela (1996, 316, 322; see also
Harr 2001, 2000a, 2002b) seem to suggest, that all kinds of social structures are
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nothing but taxonomic categories, which do not refer to any extra-conversational

entities (see also Manicas 2006, 73). It is also an exaggeration to claim that, in
their social ontology, critical realists have tacitly committed to some kind of
structural determinism that totally undermines human agency (see Harr &
Varela 1996, 316; Harr 2001, 26; 2002b).
In addition, it is important to notice, here, that it does not follow from Harr
and Varelas arguments against critical realist social ontology that Harrs social
constructionist ontology is the only viable social ontology compatible with the causal
powers theory. First of all, it is not clear whether Harrs social constructionism
is in fact compatible with the analysis of the concept of causal power presented
in CP. Harr (see e.g. 1993, 98; see also Harr 2002b; Harr & Gillet 1994), for
example, maintains, in his later social ontology, that people are the only causally
efficacious entities in social reality while simultaneously claiming that people are
conversational constructs. Now, it is not at all clear to me how conversational
constructs could satisfy the minimum requirement for the application of the concept
of causal power. It is surely one thing to say that the conversations, in which biological individuals engage in their lives, in many ways shape and modify their powers,
and another to claim that people are nothing but conversational constructs (see
e.g. Archer 2000; Manicas 2006, 4352). I find the first claim perfectly acceptable
and compatible with causal powers theory and the other problematic.
Moreover, even if we deny that social structures, understood as some kind of
abstract internal relations between social positions and positioned-practices,
possess relatively autonomous powers in relation to the agents that occupy the
structural positions, there may still be some other way to apply the concept of
causal power to concrete social systems. By the term concrete social system, I
refer to the organised groups or collectives of individual agents who communicatively interact with each other in relatively stable ways by using symbols, material
resources, and material artefacts.7 If we think of any given concrete social system
in this way (e.g. factories, families, business firms, hospitals, schools, or political
parties), then it may be said that the system as a whole possesses system-level
emergent causal powers in relation to its environment because it fulfils the minimum
requirement for the legitimate use of the concept of causal power. In other words,
these kinds of concrete social systems can be conceived as organised material
systems, although they are not merely physical systems, because they also possess
non-physical emergent causal powers. The environment of the system may, in
turn, consist of individual agents that do not participate in this system, other
social systems, or ecosystems; although in some cases, it may be difficult to decide
where the boundaries of the system lie. Furthermore, these kinds of concrete
social systems might be modelled by using the theory of complex dynamic systems
that radically differ from the traditional functionalism (e.g. Talcott Parsons) in
sociology (see e.g. Sawyer 2005).
It does not follow from the position outlined above that concrete social systems
possess autonomous causal powers in relation to the agents that form their
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components because the emergent causal powers of the previously characterised

social systems are always ontologically and causally dependent on the causal
powers of the acting agents.8 This is not, however, meant to deny the notion that
these kinds of social systems may have been historically formed through the
activities of different agents to those who currently act as their constituent components: nor does not follow from this that the system-level emergent powers of
the social systems can be ontologically reduced to the powers of individual
agents, because these system-level powers are not only ontologically dependent
on the non-relational powers of the agents but also on the relatively stable
dynamic relations between communicatively interacting agents (and the
relations between them and material resources and artefacts). Furthermore, it is
possible to say that the relational structure of the social system (i.e. the set of
relations between its components) also enables, constrains, and motivates the
actions of the agents. In this sense the positions that agents occupy in this kind
of social systems remain important, although it is not possible to ontologically
separate them from the ongoing interaction between agents. Moreover the
relation between the structure and agents in such systems cannot be, due to the
aforementioned reasons, adequately analysed by using the concept of causal
power. Nevertheless, enabling, constraining, and motivating structural relations
may still be interpreted as causal by using some other analysis of the concept of
cause than the causal powers theory. I shall leave it open here as to whether
the previous analysis can be extended to also cover macro-systems such as
welfare states, capitalist economies, and educational systems. Indeed, I also admit
that the concepts of concrete social system, communicative interaction, and
emergent causal power require further analysis than that which must be omitted
here.
The previously stated argument demands that we give up the presupposition
that there only exists a single adequate ontological analysis of the concept of
causality. Although this move makes things conceptually messier, I nevertheless
believe that it leads to a more fruitful interaction between philosophical
analysis and empirical research. Therefore, instead of searching for a single
ontological analysis of the concept of causality, it seem to be more fruitful to
try to specify different kinds of causal relations that are referred to by different kinds of causal concepts applied in different contexts (see Hitchcock
2003). Some critical realists have already proceeded in this direction by
presenting tentative analyses of structural social causation that employ a different
kind of analysis of the concept of cause to that of the causal powers theory (see
Groff 2004; Lewis 2000; see also Patomki 1991). Bhaskar (see e.g. 1986, 132;
1994, 82) has also recently abandoned the presupposition that the causal powers theory provides an adequate analysis of all kinds of causal relations, although
his discussion of the causal powers of social structures is still quite problematic. However, any evaluation of these suggestions forms the topic of another
article.
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CONCLUSION
Finally, I want to list briefly the major points that I presented in the previous
discussion regarding the critical realist concept of causal power:
The concept of emergence, which refers to the relationship between the
system-level properties of a complex system and the properties of its parts,
is necessarily part of any notion of causal power that is employed outside
elementary particle physics.
The concept of causal power should be analysed in an anti-essentialist way.
The question of whether a certain entity possesses an essential nature or not
is empirical in nature.
Bhaskars transcendental account of the concept of causal power advocated
by most critical realists is problematic, in both the natural and social sciences.
In the context of social ontology, the uses of the concept of causal power
should be restricted to (1) human beings or people conceived as dynamic
biological organisms that are naturally predisposed to, and whose powers
are modified by, social interaction; and, (2) to such concretely structured
groups and collectives (and perhaps combinations of these) that function as
relatively enduring dynamic social systems.
It is not possible to analyse the structural social causality by using the concept of causal power, but might succeed by using another kind of ontological
analysis of the concept of causality. Therefore, it might be fruitful to give up
the presupposition that there only exists one adequate way of analysing the
concept of causality.9
Tuukka Kaidesoja
Department of the social sciences and philosophy
PL 35 (MaB)
40014 University of Jyvskyl, Finland
e-mail: tukaides@cc.jyu.fi
NOTES
1
It should be noted that it is not necessarily problematic to assume that ultimate powers
(or other kind of ultimate entities) do not exist. For example, Schaffer (2001) has quite
convincingly argued that there is no positive or negative empirical evidence available for
the existence of the fundamental level of reality. He also argues that the idea of the infinite
reduction of the properties of complex things to the properties of their constituents is
internally coherent and cannot be rebutted by a priori arguments alone. Schaffer (ibid.)
himself defends an agnostic position regarding the existence of a fundamental level (see
also Bhaskar 1978, 170 171, 182). By contrast, Harr and Madden (1975, 161185)
suggest that physical fields of potentials are the ultimate powers that do not possess any
2007 The Author

85
intrinsic natures or structures. Nevertheless, the problem concerning the existence of

ultimate powers or a fundamental level should be distinguished from the problem of the
ontological reduction of the causal powers of complex things to their constituents. Possible
solutions to these problems are not, however, totally independent since ontological
reductionism (or reductive physicalism), for instance, seems to require the existence of some
kind of fundamental entities (see e.g. Schaffer 2001).
2
Harr (2002b, 144) has recently questioned the notion of emergent causal power by
claiming that, in this universe, there are people performing discursive acts and there are
material poles and charges. That is all. [ . . . ] Elementary charges are [causally] efficacious.
All other material efficacy is product. It seems to me that he has committed here to a
rather dubious ontology that is both ontologically reductionist regarding, for example, the
causal powers of biological organisms, and dualistic in the sense that it separates discursive
reality from physical reality. It should be also noted that the concept of emergent causal
power has been the subject of vigorous debate, especially in the field of the philosophy of
mind and the philosophy of science (see e.g. Beckerman et al. 1992; Elder-Vass 1999; Kim
1999; Sawyer 2005).
3
This aspect of moral responsibility, which is only implicitly present in ESB, becomes
more central in Harrs (see e.g. 1990, 1993) later works on social ontology (see also Shotter
1990; Secord 1990).
4
In his Varieties of Realism, Harrs (1986, 281316) position concerning the
interpretation of the causal powers that belong to the ontological Realm 3 resembles
Bhaskars transcendental account of the concept of causal power. Nevertheless, Harr does
not claim that all causal powers belong to Realm 3.
5
In this context, the concept of supervenience usually includes the following theses: (i)
No two things can differ in their non-physical properties without differing in their physical
properties; (ii) a single thing cannot change its non-physical properties without changing
its physical properties; (iii) if, at a given time (t), a single thing has two different subsets of
non-physical properties, it must have two different subsets of physical properties.
6
Archer (e.g. 1995, 169) has argued that the emergent causal powers of social structures
are not usually ontologically dependent on the activities of the current agents, but, rather,
on the activities of previous generations. As, for example, Sawyer (2005, 9192) has
argued, this view is problematic since it denies that the causal powers of social structures
are supervenient on the properties of the current agents and their activities.
7
Mario Bunge (e.g. 1996; 1998) has defended a similar notion of a concrete social
system from the point of view of the emergent materialist system-ontology, although he does
not use the concept of emergent causal power. According to his CESM view of a system,
a social system is analysable into its composition or membership, environment or context, structure
or relationships and mechanism or the processes that makes it tick (e.g. Bunge 1998, 61).
Bunge maintains that these kinds of social systems are always concrete material entities.
8
This problem is a specific instance of the more general problem concerning the
conceptualisation of downward causation in complex systems that possess system-level
emergent causal powers (see e.g. Beckerman et al. 1992; Elder-Vass 2005; Kim 1996;
Sawyer 2005). Note also that my position differs from that defended by Manicas (2006,
5774) in the sense that his interpretation of the concept of social structure, inspired by
Giddens structuration theory, differs from mine and, unlike him, I am not ready to entirely
give up the notion of structural social causality, although I do admit that this notion cannot
be analysed by using the concept of causal power.
9
I would like to thank Kaj Ilmonen and Petri Ylikoski for their helpful comments on
the earlier version of this article. Some of my interpretations and critical remarks have also
been formed in numerous discussions with Mika Salo. All responsibility for possible errors
is, of course, mine.
2007 The Author
86
Tuukka Kaidesoja
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Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 37:1

Exploring the Concept of Causal Power in a

HARR AND MADDEN ON THE CONCEPT CAUSAL POWER

In recent discussions dealing with critical realism, it is sometimes forgotten that

Exploring the Concept of Causal Power in a Critical Realist Tradition

Exploring the Concept of Causal Power in a Critical Realist Tradition

in principle possible, to explain the properties of the cell solely by investigating

Exploring the Concept of Causal Power in a Critical Realist Tradition

developed in CP is not as unified as Harr and Madden sometimes seem to

HARR AND SECORD ON HUMAN POWERS AND HUMAN NATURES

initiating action. ESB also contains a thorough critique of the behaviouristic

Exploring the Concept of Causal Power in a Critical Realist Tradition

Exploring the Concept of Causal Power in a Critical Realist Tradition

BHASKAR ON CAUSAL POWERS IN A REALIST THEORY OF SCIENCE

Exploring the Concept of Causal Power in a Critical Realist Tradition

outcome. Therefore, causal powers are understood in RTS as non-actual and,

Exploring the Concept of Causal Power in a Critical Realist Tradition

CONCEPT OF CAUSAL POWER IN A CRITICAL REALIST SOCIAL ONTOLOGY

Exploring the Concept of Causal Power in a Critical Realist Tradition

I think, however, that a non-reductionist materialist view, which sees mental

Exploring the Concept of Causal Power in a Critical Realist Tradition

concept of social position may be further analysed by using concepts such as

nothing but taxonomic categories, which do not refer to any extra-conversational

Exploring the Concept of Causal Power in a Critical Realist Tradition

components because the emergent causal powers of the previously characterised

2007 The Author

Exploring the Concept of Causal Power in a Critical Realist Tradition

intrinsic natures or structures. Nevertheless, the problem concerning the existence of

Exploring the Concept of Causal Power in a Critical Realist Tradition

H, R. & V, C.R. (1996). Conflicting Varieties of Realism: Causal Powers and

2007 The Author

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