enter into the definition of the basic characteristics of all the fundamental pa

rticles of current physics.

Moreover, when such fields are highly excited, they too can give rise to qualita
tive transformations in the
particles, while, vice versa, the particles have an important influence on the c
haracter of the fields. Indeed,
the discussion of the quantum theory given in Chapters III and IV shows that fie
lds and particles are closely
linked in an even deeper way, in the sense that both are probably opposite sides
of some still more general
type of entity, the detailed character of which remains to be discovered.* Thus,
the next step in physics may
well show the inadequacy of the simple procedure of just going through level aft
er level of smaller and
smaller particles, connected perhaps by fields which interact with these particl
es. Instead, we may find that
the background enters in a very fundamental way even into the definition of the
conditions for the existence
of the new kinds of basic entities to which we will eventually come, whatever th
ey may turn out to be.
Thus, we may be led to a theory in which appears a much closer integration of su
bstructure and background
into a well-knit whole than is characteristic of current theories. We see from t
he above discussion that the
qualitative infinity of nature is not equivalent to the idea expressed by the we
ll-known rhyme:
Great fleas have little fleas
Upon their backs to bite em;
Little fleas have lesser fleas,
And so ad infinitum.
For, firstly, we are not supposing that the same pattern of things is necessaril
y repeated at all levels; and
secondly, we are not even supposing that the general pattern of levels that has
been so widely found in
nature thus far must necessarily continue without limit. While we cannot decide
this question from what is
known at present, we have already suggested reasons why we may perhaps now be ap
proaching a point at
which the notion of levels will, at the very least, have to be enriched a great
deal by the explicit inclusion of
the effects of a background that is essential for the very existence of the enti
ties in terms of which our
theories are to be formulated. Moreover, it is evidently quite possible that as
we penetrate further still, we
will find that the character of the organization of things into levels will chan
ge so fundamentally that even
the pattern of levels itself will eventually fade out and be replaced by somethi
ng quite different. Hence,
while the qualitative infinity of nature is consistent with an infinity of level
s, it does not necessarily imply
such an infinity. And, more generally, this notion does not require a priori the
continuation of any special
feature of the general pattern of things that has been found thus far, nor does
it exclude a priori the
possibility that any such feature may continue to be encountered, perhaps in new
contexts and in new
forms, no matter how far we may go. Such questions are left to be settled entire
ly by the results of future
scientific research.
There is, however, one general statement that can be made at this point about th

e inexhaustible diversity
of things that may exist in the universe; namely, that they must have some degre
e of autonomy and stability
in their modes of being. Now, thus far, we have always found that such autonomy
exists.* Indeed, if it did
not exist, then we would not be able to apply the concept of a thing and there wou
ld then be no way even
* This is suggested by the wave-particle duality in the general properties of ma
tter, which implies, as we have seen, that
we may have to deal with some new kind of thing that can, under suitable circums
tances, act either like a localized
particle or like an extended field.
* This autonomy may have many origins; e.g. the falling of the propagation of in
fluences of one thing in another with
an increase of separation between them, the decay of such influence with the pas
sage of time, electrical screening, the
existence of thresholds, such that influences
MORE GENERAL CONCEPT OF NATURAL LAW 95
to formulate any laws of nature. For how can there be an object, entity, process
, quality, property, system,
level, or whatever other thing one cares to mention, unless such a thing has som
e degree of stability and
autonomy in its mode of existence, which enables it to preserve its own identity
for some time, and which
enables it to be defined at least well enough to permit it to be distinguished f
rom other things? If such
relatively and approximately autonomous things did not exist, then laws would lo
se their essential
significance (e.g. they could not in principle be tested by altering conditions
with the aid of experiments in
the manner described in Chapter I, Section 3, because the basic things entering
into the laws would change
all their characteristic modes of being with the slightest change of conditions)
.
In conclusion, then, actual scientific research has thus far shown the need to a
nalyse nature in terms of a
series of concepts that involve the recognition of the existence of more and mor
e kinds of things; and the
development of such new concepts has never yet shown any signs of coming to an e
nd. Up to the present,
the various kinds of things existing in nature have, at least as far as investig
ations in the field of physics are
concerned, been found to be organized into levels. Each level enters into the su
bstructure of the higher
levels, while, vice versa, its characteristics depend on general conditions in a
background determined in part
in other levels both higher and lower, and in part in the same level. It is quit
e possible, of course, that
further studies will disclose a still more general pattern of organization of th
ings. In any case, it is clear that
the results of scientific research to date strongly support the notion that natu
re is inexhaustible in the
qualities and properties that it can have or develop. If the laws of nature are
to be expressible in any kind of
terms at all, however, it is necessary that the things into which it can be anal
ysed shall have at least some
degree of approximate and relative autonomy in their modes of being, which is ma
intained over some range
of variation of the conditions in which they exist.