T h e Nation

174

[Vol. 131, No. 3393

W h v , Stalin Won
d

By LOUIS FISCHER
Moscow, July 22
congress just ended was a completevictoryforStalin.Premier
R y h v was unexpectedly retained in the Politburo, and Tomsky and
Bukharin, his Right-wing colleagues, were reelected into the
Central Committee on Stalins own wish. They get another
trial.They
could easily have been eliminated. T h e congress did Stalins bidding. W h a t is the secret of Stalins
unquestioned strength? H e controlseverywheelandscrew
of the party machine, which
is the source of authority and
power inthe SovietUnion.
Thi s is extremelyimportant.
For dynamicenergy,drivingforce,
and discipline the Russian Communist Party is unique the world over, perhaps even
throughout history. But party manipulations are not everything. T o explain Stalins influence by his absolute domination of thepartyapparatus is to neglect the most decisive
psychological and economic factors of the Soviet situation.
Russiatoday is thestrangest combination of brightest
white and darkest black. You may spend oneevening in a
discussion of unpreceg oted,excitingachievementsandthe
next evening-often among foreigners who suffer the leastlistening to distressingtales
of hardships.Both
aretrue.
Communists,however,
are an optimistic,enthusiastic race.
They glory in their accomplishments but wave away difficulties. Thiswasthe
spirit of the delegates who defeated
Rykov, Bukharin, and Tomsky and riotously hailed Stalin as
their chief.
I encountered some of the delegates. If you mentioned
the food shortage they spoke Gf Dnieperstroi, Kuznetzstroi,
Magnitogorsk, andtheother
huge power, iron,andsteel
works which will be larger than any in Europe.
If you reminded them that people cannot buy shoes and textiles they
toldyouthatinthree
yearsRussia
will be the worlds
second-largestproducer of cast iron, that the Soviet Union
is turning out more and more
machines, that its industrial
output is double thepre-waramountandwill
soon be
doubled again, that collectives and state farms will eliminate
the food shortage, that at the end of the Five-Year Plan-in
1933Russiawill
be manufacturingmoretractorsthan
America, that she will then export grain, grow her own cotton,andhaveenough
live stocktosatisfy home demands,
and, finally, that the Soviet Union is quickly ceasing to be a
backward, semi-Asiatic country.
Men in &is optimfstic mood, convinced that theyare
about t o overtake andoutstripcapitalist
nations, and
themselves responsible for the construction now in
progress,
do not want it interrupted, will not listen
t o Cassandra warnings, and will not applaud meek-minded moderates who cautionagainst excessive haste in industrializationand collectivization. T h e Right-wingers irritate them; Stalin, on the
otherhand, makes faithinvictory
a doctrine. This same
faiththen
becomes (anotherfaatorinthat
victory. Stalin
fires his followers with additionalzeal by preaching selfassurance; he increases the construction tasks assimed, intrcduces asportingelementintotheirfulfilment,and
mows
down thedoubters.
Seers of evil, prophets of disaster have

HE sixteenthparty

no place in Bolshevik psychology. This is one of the outstanding subjective weiknesses of the Right cause, and one
of Stalins greatest advantages.
- T h e Right platform stands on three pillars:
( 1 ) more
freedom to the kulak,
or richpeasant, (2) less collectivization, and ( 3 ) stimulation of light industries whfichproduce
goods for immediateconsumption.
Butall these proposals
are impracticable. W h y ? Public recantations do not change
the leopards spots, and Rykov, Tomsky, and especially
Bukharin want t h e upper layer of the peasantryto work with
less official interference. It is Bukharinsoldsummons
to
the mujik to getrich,which
he retracted under pressure
in 1925 but which he obviously still upholds. If thekulak
could become rich every sredniak, or middle peasant, would
follow in his footsteps, for the sredniak, as Trotzky writes,
is thekulak conveyor. ( H e feeds thekulakranks
beltfashion.) And athat would spell theend of collectivization.
Immersedinprivate-capitalisticinstincts,
notwhollyprel
pared psychologically for cooperative cultivation, and not yet
completelyconvinced of the benefits of collective farming,
the sredniak submitted to collectivization because the door t o
individualenrichmentwas
closed by the governments suppression of the kulak. T h e reversal of this policy would
throw the sredniak-40per cent or so of the peasantry-into
theanti-Communistcamp,
suspend collectivization, and obstruct the socialization of the village. A large class of prosperous
individualistic
farmers in Russia would
mean
a
liberal,petty-bourgeoisRussia
with soviets persistingonly
as an outward form.
T h e suppression of thekulak class is thecorollary of
collectivization and vice versa. Collectivization is the cornerstone of Bolshevik agrarian policy. It is inconceivable that
the Communists should suspend or weaken collectivization or
support any leaders who suggest such a measure. The Right
may perform ausefulfunctionin
drawing attention to uneconomic means of collectivizing and to the need of improving the internal organization of collectives, but ,it cannot gain
a wide party following by condemning
collectivization as a
system. For without collectivization there can be no socialism and no Bolshevik solution of the peasant problem.
T h e strength of the Right-wingers lies in the friendly
echo their views arouse among the peasant and petty-bourgeois
masses. But this is the very cause of their downfall within
the party, which sees the dangeroftolerating prominent Communists who advocateheterodox policies with a broad appeal. Forthe same reason, on the other hand,theRight
cannot be dealt with so summarily as the Trotzkyopposition.
T h e Bukharin opposition has roots. Less is achieved by
merely cutting off the plant above the ground. T h e Rightwingers peasant policy demands the stimulation of light industry. T o induce the peasant topartwith- his increased
yield resuIsting fromgreaterindividual
freedom,theysay,
the city must offer him more goods for immediate consumption. T h e impulse thus given tolightindustry
will also
react to the benefit of the urban population.
Now nobody ~vould object t o the alleviation of t h e

August 13,19301

175

The Nation

goods famine if it could be attainedwithoutdamageto

heavy industry. T h e heavy industries must not suffer. They
are the solid foundation which bolshevism is laying for Russias future development. Without them thecountry is dependent,incapable of defense in war, and doomed to a low
standard of living. Moreover, if agriculturaloverproduction continues ,throughout the world, and ,if the Soviet Union
were to remain a predominantlyagrariancountry,
nobody
woulddesire her exports, herforeigntradewouldshrink,
andhergrowthwould
be stunted.Industrialization
is the
historic funcdlon of bolshevism and answers the highest national interests. I n theendthenation
will begratefulto
the Soviet regime for its persistence and courage in carrying
out a difficultprogram despite theterrific costs t o all inhabitants of theUnion.
T h e heavy industrialization base
of the new structure is of course not an end in itself but a
means whereby
light
industry
may
prosper. Ultimately,
more coal, cast ,iron, steel, turbines, chemicals, spindles, locomotives must meanmore shoes, shirts,clothing,andmore
food too. But it is just this ultimate1ythe time element
-that is so trying. While the foundation is under construction the people foregomany- necessities. I n two years, in
three years at the most, the dividends on the present sacrifice investment will probably be paid. Thi s intervening period is inevitably filled with murmurs, complaints, and sour

anecdotes. T h e Rightwing reflects this displeasure.

.
A compromise on .this issue is not impossible. For
whereassurrenderoncollectivizationmight
be disastrous,
a slackening of the pace of heavy industrialization so that
textile, leather-wear, clothing, and-Sood industries would receive moremoney and materials is not precluded, There is
at leastmarginhereformaneuvering.Yet
I do not think
i t realisticto expectanyveryappreciableimprovement
of
lightindustryinthenearfuture.
T h e statecannotwell
discontinue the construction of the great metallurgical plants
at Magnitogorsk,intheKwnetz
basin inSiberia,
and
around Dnieperstroi, nor of the two huge additional tractor
factoriesinCheliabinskandKharkov,nor
sf theNizhni
Novgorodautomobilefactory,nor
of the numerousother
heavy,industrialgiantswhichhave
been startedinthe
past year or two. T h e government, as Kuibishev, repbrting
on industry, told the party congress, must also carry out the
program of 15,000,000 tons of cast iron- by 1932-33 (compared with 5,500,000 tons this year and
4;200,000tons in
1913) , whichrequirescorresponding
increases in k,indred
heavyindustrieslikecoal,oil,electricity,transport.
This
being th e case, little surplus strength or fundswill be left far
light industry.
These and other Soviet econom,ic problems meet at one
focal point-foreign
trade. Althoughthe means of production are being manufactured~in Russia in- mounting quantities, the Bolsheviks must t u r n to foreign countries for^ much
of the equipment of theirbigsteelandelectrical
power
plantsandfor
technicalengineering assistance.. this costs
money. It- mustbe paid for in foreign-currencyor gold,
which Moscow does not possess inabundance.
Further depletion of the solidmetalcover
of therublewouldinduce
further inflation with all its hi ti a l benefits and all its disastrous after-effects. Moscow- must
therefore
husband
its
valuta, force exports even at the expense of prime domestic
necessities, and cut imports to the bone so as t o include little
else than the indispensable needs of heavy industry. This is

the root of the peoples hardships. For instance, Russia must

importcottonfromtheUnited
States. Butit prefers to
spend its dollars on drills, compressors, and- turbines for the
Stalingradtractorworksandsimilarundertakings.Cotton,
consequently, reaches- the Soviet Union in reducedvolume,
the country is textile-hungry,andtextilefactories,
som,e of
them new, close down for want of raw material.
T h e chief hope foranearlyimprovementanthe
internal market lies in foreign credits, which
would make it
unnecessary forRussiato-export
food, tobacco, andother
productsitsownpopulation
needs and at thesametime
allowthegovernment
to importmoreraw
materials-in
addition, of course, to machinery. Foreigncredits, on good
terms,- wouldbring a sigh of relief to Moscow. W e may
therefore see a moreliberal Sovietforeign policy under a
veryinfluentialnew
commissar. But observers whointerpret the first signs of such a~policy as the beginnings of a
swervetotheRightinternallyarequite
mistaken. T h e
contrary istrLe, fortheprinciple
holdsalmostinvariably
that a Left policy which produces the greatest strain
inside
may well becomplemented by a Right strategy to win the
mosthelpabroad.
Special difficulties -arise this yearowing t o the fall of
world prices. Russias exports will expandinvolume,but ~.
oil, lumber, and^ cereals will fetchrelatively less-an
estimated-28 percent less. -Considerablegrain sales to foreign
customers-the
Union
may
export
some 2,500,000 tons
after-the present- harvest-should,
however, repair this loss.
T h e finalsolution of the shortages will come, nevertheless,
notthroughoutside
assistance but from the reorganization
of agriculture.Kuibishevsaidthistotheparty
congress in
almost so manywords.Only-whenthestatefarmsand
collectives yield vastly more live stock, paultry, bread, dairy
products,cotton,tobacco,sugar,vegetables,
flax, fats,and
fruit will the problem of internal supply be settled satisfactorily. Her e again,therefore,everythinghinges
on collectivization-and
on tractors,fertilizer,agricultural
machinery, in other words, on heavy industry.
Heavy industrializan ti on^ andcollectivization are Siamesetwins.-Collectivization implies an- anti-kulak war.
Sincelightindustriescannot
be greatlystimulated,
sincecollectivization
m u s t not be undermined,since
the
kulak will not
be amnestied,- the Right platform
collapses,
theRight-wingers-suffer
defeat, andStalin wins. I think
the Right wing, though convinced of the justice of its negative criticism, fears the possible results of i t s positive recommendations. T o turn back in 1930 mightsignify a retreat
down a decline which offered no opportunities for digging
in at halfway stations. In T h e Nation of ApriI 30, 1930,
I suggested ,that despite therightwardzigzagof^ March
a large potential- of Leftness remained which would
act
as a guaranty against any permanent or far-reaching swing
to ,the-Right. T h i s has certainly been borne out by events
since that date. Andthe
potential of Leftness is far
from exhausted. Nothing but-asevere-economiccrisiswill
force la change oi policy under Stalins leadership.
Psychology and eeonopics are Stdins favorable winds.
H e is also the -party boss. - But .he is, in -addition, the
SovietUnions mist-striking personality. He outranksall
other Russian statesmen in courage, will-power, maneuvering talents,political organizing ability, and -primitivetenacity.
If he lacks t h e intellectualattainments of a Trotzkyor
~

CVol. 131. No. 3397

The Nation

176

BukhaSn his very directness, force, and even crudeness

appeal t o aparty whose membership has changedradically
since 1924 and in which theprerevolutionary highbrow
feels himself slightly out in the cold. Stalins job, of course,
is no bed of roses. But he weathered the mad tempest that
raged in the villages duringJanuaryandFebruary,
and
even emerged fromitstrengthened.
Now he willdowell
to look to the mood of the workers. Their real wages must
notfall below Ithe present level. Pricesshould be pegged,
andthecriminal
inefficiencyof the cooperatives eradicated.
A good friendmight also advise Stalin to put a stop
to the orgy of personal glorification of Stalin which has been
permitted to sweep the country, T h i s is StalinsAchilles
heel. From being the modest, retiringleaderwhomfew
saw or heard-the
silent power behind the throne-he
has in recentmonths stepped forth into the brightest
limelight and seems toenjoy it. H e has become the object of

thickly smeared praise, fawningadulation,and

tasteless
obeisance: Bolshevik politicians go out of their way to sing
extravagant odes toStalins
person (Zinoviev is thelast
todo it). Daily,hundreds of telegramspour
in un him
brimming over with Oriental super-compliments : Thou art
the greatest leader , the most devoted discipIe of Lenin,
,and the like. Three cities, innumerable villages, collectives,
schaols, factories,andinstitutionshave
been named after
him, and now somebody has started it movement to christen
the Turksib the Stalin Railway. I havegoneback
Over
the newspapers from 1919 to 1922; Lenin never permitted
suchantics and he was morepopular than- Stalin can ever
hope to be. It exposes a weakside of Stalinscharacter
which ahis enemies, who are numerous, are sure to exploit,
for i t is as un-Bolshevik as it is politically unwise. If Stalin
is not responsible for ,this performance he at least tolerates it.
H e could stop it by prasing a button.

. .

&Whenthe Senate,s Away-

99

By PAUL Y.ANDERSON

Washington, August 2

CCORDING to my fair-haired colleagues, whom

workingreporters
love t o designate asthe
Boy
Scouts of the Rapidan, recent events have disclosed
a newHooverintheWhite
House. T h e newcomer is
described as a strong, seIf-reliant executive, who purposes
torulewithout
being ruled and as a Presidentwho is
resolved t o endure no more heckling fromthe
Senate.
Well, well. If memory serves me that is precisely how they
described the old Hoover in their dispatches, and hence i t
is rather difficdt to ascertain from their latest reports what
change, if any,hasoccurred.
This is regrettable, because
the public naturally is curious to know how perfection could
be mademoreperfect.Fortunately,bewilderment
is unnecessary. W h a t we actually have is #thesame old Herbert,
operating under changed conditions. It will be observed that
hisdeterminationnot
to endurethe slingsand arrows of
the Senate was reached just after the Senate adjourned. His
new strength and self-reliance, therefore, are explainable on
the simpleground that nobody remains inWashington to
challenge them. I am reminded of theold soak who was
thlown out of a saloon. After the proprietor had dosed up
and departed for the night the unwelcome customer returned,
thunderedbravely at the door,and shouted: Now come
outside and put me out.
%

TT

is significant that one of the first acts of this bigger

and braver Hoover was 40 reveal a e c r e t @hat he had

guarded carefully throughout the sixteen months that Congress was in session: *towit, that he is opposed t o government operation of Muscle Sh,oals and heartily approves the
scheme to Turn that $160,000,000 public p r o p e m over to
privatepower companies. T h e mannerinwhich
heintervened in a Republicanprimarycampaign
in Tennesseein
behalf of Representative Carroll Reece makesit fairly clear
that he inspired the action by which Reece blocked a compromise inthelast
session &atwould have provided for
government operation of the power plant and private opera-

it is interesting
tison of thefertilizerplant.Incidentdly,
to nate that Reece is a political friend and associate of the
lamentedClaudius
Huston,who finally was squeezed out
of the Republican national chairmanship
for getting caught
at the business of collectingfunds for the- Muscle Shoals
lobby andtemporarilydepositingthemin
his stock-trading
account. When Mr. Hoover was runningfor Ithe Presidency he made a speech at Elizaberhton, Tennessee, in which
he said: There are local instances where the government
must enter the business field as a by-product of some great
major purpose, such as impr,ovement of navigation, flood
control, scientific research, or national defense, but they do
not vitiate the general policy to which we should adhere.
Subsequently, replying ,to aewspaper requests that he name
local instances which were exceptions t o rhe rule, he said:
You maysay that means Muscle Shoals, andstill later
he ,added: There is no question about government ownership of Muscle Shoals, as the governmenf already owns both
thepowerandnitrate
plants. T h e major purposes which
were advanced for its construction were navigation, scientific
research, andnationaldefense;inotherwolds,
f o r the
identical purposes which he had said warranted the gave+.nment in entering the business field. But now, it appears,
he is taking advantage of his use of the word ownership
to deny that he ever favored government
operation. One
marvels, then, why he saw fit to discuss the subject in such
terms, since everybody knew the governmentowned
the
plant, and everybody knows the government is not entering
the field of business when i t leases its property t o private
operatnrs.
*

HE truth is thatthis

ix

is a power administration.
be wasevident
to anyone who had
T T h at itwould
studied Mr. Hoovers record on the power question prior to
his Presidentialcampaign in 1928. For years he had been
.the darling of the National Electric Light Association, traveling as far as San Franciscoto deliver the principal address
at one of its sessions. As Secretary of Commerce he trained

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