[G.R. Nos. 138268-69.

June 15, 1999]

JURRY ANDAL et al. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al.

EN BANC

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this

Court dated JUN 15, 1999.

G.R. Nos. 138268-69 (Jurry Andal, Ricardo Andal and Edwin

Mendoza vs. People of the Philippines, Regional Trial Court of
Lemery, Batangas, Branch 5, The Director of Corrections and
the Secretary of Justice.)

Submitted for the Court's consideration is petitioners'

Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and Stay of Execution
due to Ongoing Legislative and NBI Investigation of the case
if Jurry Andal, Ricardo Andal and Edwin Mendoza.

The Omnibus Motion raises the following issues:

1.
That the House of Representatives subcommittee on
the enhancement or protection of human rights as requested

by Director Opinion of the National Bureau of Investigation is

investigating the crimes committed on other women of San
Luis, Batangas, which appear similar to the crime involved in
the case at bar and that the committee needs to locate the
"star witness" for the prosecution Olimpio Corrales in order to
aid the committee in better appreciating the case and in
coming up with legislation on the matter.

2.

That it is not too late to conduct a DNA testing;

3.
That pre-trial identification of the accused-petitioners
violated their constitutional right; and

4.
That the failure of the trial counsel of the accusedpetitioners to present relevant evidence in their defense
violated their right to counsel.

First. The issue of an on-going Congressional investigation of

crimes allegedly similar to the one charged against the
accused-petitioners, being committed on the women of San
Luis, Batangas is irrelevant hereto. Such investigation will not
affect the final and executory judgment of this Court. The ongoing investigation is based on suspicious and suppositions
that cannot overturn a judgment at after a careful
consideration of the evidence presented in a court of
competent jurisdiction. "suspicion cannot give probative
force to testimony which is itself insufficient to establish or
justify an inference of a particular fact --- the sea of suspicion
has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it is without
rudder or compass."1 [People vs. Ganaan, 265 SCRA 260.]

Second. The proposed DNA testing of the semen found on the

victim Nancy Siscar is not ground to re-open the final
judgment in the case at bar. It is not only late and the
probability that it will bring about the acquittal of appellants
is at best, arguable. The conviction of the accused is based
on nothing less than the testimony of an aye-witness whose
credibility has been passed upon by the trial court and this
Court.

Indeed, we have ruled that 'a witness' testimony ought to be

entitled to great weight when the accusing words are
directed against a close relative."2 [Antonio vs. Court of
Appeals, 273 SCRA 328.] And in the case at bar, witness
Olimpio Corales is a brother-in-law of two of the accused.

Third. The issue of the violation of the constitutional rights of

the accused because of the allegedly "tainted" pre-trial
identification, has been addressed in our Resolution issued
on May 26, 1999. We need not engage in reiterations.

rule is that the client is bound by the acts, even mistakes of

his counsel in the realm of procedural technique. The
exception is when the negligence of the lawyer or counsel is
one so gross, palpable, pervasive, reckless and inexcusable
that a party may say he is deprived of his right to counsel."3
[Legarda vs. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 642.] There is no
showing that the counsel for the accused committed such
kind of negligence.

We stress that the guilt of an accused should he established

beyond reasonable doubt, not beyond absolute doubt. By our
applicable rules of evidence, we find that the prosecution
successfully proved the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Nonetheless petitioners may raise the
foregoing issues, especially the need for DNA test, in a plea
for clemency addressed to the President of the Philippines
who under the Constitution, is vested with the pardoning
power.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we resolve to DENY with finality the

petitioners' motion for reconsideration and for stay of
execution. We AFFIRM our Resolution of May 26, 1999.
Panganiban, J., is on leave.

Fourth. We reject the contention that the accused was denied

his right to counsel because the counsel failed to present
Rufino Andal as one of the witnesses for the defense. "The

Very truly yours,

[G.R. No. 121980. February 23, 2000]

DECISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GONZALO

PENASO @ "LULU", accused-appellant.

QUISUMBING, J.:

On appeal is the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of

Tagbilaran City, Branch 1, in Criminal Cases Nos. 6775, 6787,
6788, and 6789, promulgated on March 10, 1995, finding
appellant Gonzalo Penaso guilty of rape in Criminal Case No.
6775, and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua while acquitting him in the other cases. The fallo
reads:

"PREMISES CONSIDERED, in Criminal Case No. 6775, the

Court finds the accused GONZALO PENASO guilty of the
crime of Rape punished under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer an
imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua, with the accessories of
the law and to pay the cost(s).

"The accused Gonzalo Penaso is hereby ordered to indemnify

the complainant Basilisa Lacar in the amount of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) representing indemnity and
moral damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.

"It appearing that the accused Gonzalo Penaso has

undergone preventive imprisonment he is entitled to the full
time of his preventive imprisonment to be deducted from his
term of sentence if he has executed a waiver otherwise he
will only be entitled to 4/5 of the time he has undergone
preventive imprisonment to be deducted from the term of
sentence if he has not executed a waiver.

"In Criminal Cases Nos. 6787, 6788 and 6789 the accused
Gonzalo Penaso is hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes charged,
with cost(s) de officio.

"SO ORDERED."1 [Records, p. 114.]

The facts of this case, as culled from the records, are as

follows:

On April 16, 1990, private complainant, assisted by her

mother Rosalina Lacar, filed with the 8th Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Candijay-Anda, Bohol, a complaint for multiple
rape, docketed as Criminal Case No. 372, stating:

"That on the 16th of November 1989 at about 9:00 in the

morning more or less, particularly in the house of the
accused Gonzalo Penaso, when I, the victim Basilisa Lacar
was there to borrow a book from my classmate which (sic) is
the daughter of the accused, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and felonuously (sic) with the use of superior
strenght (sic) and intimidation, pulled me forcibly and boxed
my abdomen and once in the state of almost unconcious
have carnal knowledge and to the effect caused me to bleed
for he had broken through my virginity, and threatens me of
killing if I tell of what had happened, to my parents, and
repeated the same to my person with the same threats one
week after, and repeated on the third and fourth time on the
month of January 1990 in the fear that he might kill me once
I told everything to my parents, and as a result of his
devil(ish) act caused me to have an unwanted pregnancy of
an unwanted child, to the damage and prejudices to myself
and to my parents.

On July 16, 1990, private complainant gave birth to a baby

boy.

"ACT CONTRARY TO LAW."2 [Id. at 1.]

"That on or about the 16th day of November, 1989, in the

municipality of Candijay, Province of Bohol, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused with lewd designs using force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously succeed in having sexual intercourse with the
offended party one Basilisa Jugarap Lacar, a 15 years old girl,
against her will and without her consent, to the damage and
prejudice of the offended party and her parents in the
amount to proved during the trial.

Following the preliminary investigation on April 25, 1990, the

municipal circuit court issued an order for the arrest of the
accused who, by then, had left Bohol for Misamis Oriental.

Meanwhile, on July 10, 1990, appellant was arrested in

Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental, for illegal possession of
firearms. Notwithstanding the warrant of arrest for rape
against him, he posted bail for the case for which he was
arrested, and then he disappeared.

In August 1990, private complainant filed three additional

complaints for rape with the circuit court, docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 397,3 [Exhibit "B", Exhibit "3", Index of
Exhibits, p. 2.] 398,4 [Exhibit "C", Exhibit "4", Id. at 5.] and
399.5 [Exhibit "D", Exhibit "5", Id. at 8.] These rapes
allegedly took place in November and December 1989. She
likewise amended her complaint in Criminal Case No. 372,
limiting it to just one charge of rape allegedly committed on
November 16, 1989.6 [Supra Note 1, at 63.]

On August 27, 1990, the Provincial Prosecutor of Bohol filed

an information for the first rape complained of, to wit:

"Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 335 of

the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act(s) 2632
and 4111."7 [Id. at 17.]

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 6775 in the RTC
of Tagbilaran City and raffled to Branch 1 of said court.

On September 3, 1990, the Provincial Prosecutor filed with

the RTC three additional informations docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. 6787, 6788, and 6789. Except as to the dates of
the incidents complained of, the informations in these three
cases were virtually identical to the information in Criminal
Case No. 6775.

On April 17, 1991, appellant was arrested in Magallanes,

Agusan del Norte.

On May 5, 1991, appellant escaped from his police escort in

Cebu City while being transported from Agusan del Norte to
Bohol.8 [Id. at 41.]

In March 1993, police operatives in Cagayan de Oro City

finally apprehended appellant.

When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to the four

counts of rape. The cases were consolidated and trial on the
merits ensued. Appellant raised the defenses of denial and
alibi.

After trial, the court summarized its factual findings as

follows:

"a) That on November 16, 1989 at 9:00 oclock in the morning

at the house of the accused Gonzalo Penaso (Criminal Case
No. 6775) the complainant Basilisa Lacar who was then
fifteen years old knocked at the door of the house of the
aforementioned accused Gonzalo Penaso who opened the
door and upon inquiry whether his daughter, who was a
classmate of complainant, was present which the latter told
the complainant that her (sic) daughter was in the kitchen
when in fact and in truth his daughter was out;

"b) That the accused Gonzalo Penaso forcibly pulled the

complainant Basilisa Lacar and pushed her into the bamboo
bed and boxed the abdomen of the complainant Basilisa
Lacar and subsequently took off her panty and inserted his
penis into the vagina of the complainant Basilisa Lacar
causing it to bleed;

"c) That the accused Gonzalo Penaso warned the

complainant Basilisa Lacar not to report to her parents
otherwise he would kill her;

"d) That the complainant reported the incident to her parents

after the accused Gonzalo Penaso escaped to avoid being
arrested;

"e) That the second, third and fourth rape incidents were
committed in the same place in the vicinity of Cogtong
Elementary School;

"f) The defense witnesses and the accused Gonzalo Penaso

vehemently denied the rape charges and interposed the
defense that four men impregnated the complainant Basilisa
Lacar;

"g) The first charge of rape was committed at the house of

the accused Gonzalo Penaso at Cogtong, Candijay, Bohol;

"h) The second, third and fourth charges of rape were

allegedly committed in the afternoon at the same premises
near the Cogtong Elementary School."9 [Id. at 111-112.]

The trial court convicted appellant in Criminal Case No. 6775

and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.

Hence, this appeal with the sole assignment of error, as

follows:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GONZALO PENASO BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
OF THE CRIME OF RAPE.

In his brief, appellant assails the trial court for giving

credence to private complainants account and disregarding
his alibi. He submits that the rape charges against him are
fabricated.

In rape cases the issue, more often than not, is the credibility
of the victim. Rape is generally unwitnessed and very often
the victim is left to testify for herself. Her testimony is most
vital and must be received with the utmost caution.10
[People v. Domogoy, et al., G.R. No. 116738, March 22, 1999,
p. 11, citing People v. Casim, 213 SCRA 390 (1992).] When a
rape victims testimony is straightforward, unflawed by any
material or significant inconsistency, then it deserves full
faith and credit and cannot be discarded. Once found
credible, her lone testimony is sufficient to sustain a
conviction.11 [People v. Caratay, G.R. Nos. 119418, 11943637, October 5, 1999, p. 8.]

In assessing the credibility of witnesses, we are guided by the

following doctrinal principles:

(1) The reviewing court will not disturb the findings of the
lower court unless there is a showing that it had overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of
weight and substance that could affect the results of the
case;

(2) The findings of the trial court respecting the credibility of

witnesses are entitled to great respect and even finality as it
had the opportunity to examine their demeanor when they
testified on the witness stand; and

(3) A witness who testified in clear, positive, and convincing

manner and remained consistent on cross-examination, is a
credible witness.12 [People v. Vergilio Reyes, G.R. No.
113781, September 30, 1999 citing People v. Baago,, G.R.
No. 128384, June 29, 1999.]

Applying these guidelines, we find no reason to disturb the

trial courts assessment of private complainants credibility.
Appellant has shown no reason whatsoever for us to doubt
her testimony. The records show that private complainant
testified as to her ravishment in a categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous, and frank manner. She
positively identified appellant as her rapist. She was
consistent in her narration of how she was dragged inside
appellants house, boxed into submission, and ravished.13
[Records, p. 6-8.] We find that private complainant did not
waiver in her account of her harrowing experience under
intense and grueling cross-examination14 [TSN, August 13,
1993, pp. 12-20; TSN, August 24, 1993, pp. 3-6.] Absent any
showing that the trial courts assessment of her credibility
was flawed, we are bound by its findings.15 [People v.
Mengote, G. R. No. 130491, March 25, 1999, p. 8.]

We also note the finding of the trial court that:

"...in the course of the first trial of the above-entitled Criminal

Cases Nos. 6775, 6787, 6788 and 6789 the accused Gonzalo
Penaso was smiling while the complainant Basilisa Lacar
cried and was seriously and emotionally disturbed (as)
characterized by anger as shown on her facial expression."16
[Records, p. 108.]

A woman who says she has been raped, as a rule, says

almost all that is necessary to signify that the crime has been
committed.17 [People v. Tumala, Jr., 284 SCRA 436, 439
(1998).] More so, if she was crying throughout her testimony,
for we have found the same to be a badge of truthfulness.18
[People v. Mosqueda, G.R. No. 131830-34, September 3,
1999, p. 10; People v. Bea, Jr., G.R. No. 109618, May 5, 1999,
p. 5; People v. Maglantay, G.R. No. 125537, March 8, 1999, p.
7; People v. Ramos, 296 SCRA 559, 570 (1998).]

Appellant argues that he could not have raped complainant

on November 16, 1989 at about 9:00 0clock in the morning,
since the latter was attending classes at the Bohol School of
Fisheries in Cogtong, Candijay, Bohol, while he was in Sun-oc,
Ubay, Bohol making banana chips. Inasmuch as they were in
separate places, the rape could not have taken place. His
wife and another defense witness corroborated his testimony.
The latters testimony, was given scant consideration by the
trial court, as said witness admitted receiving one hundred
pesos (P100.00) from appellants wife before testifying.
Appellant further points to the testimony of his daughter,
Jonalou Penaso, who was the victims classmate, to the effect
that the victim was attending classes with her at the Bohol
Fisheries School at the time and date the rape took place, so
it was impossible for the victim to have been at his house at
that time.

We find complainants testimony credible, while appellants

defenses of alibi and denial are lacking in truth and candor.
Nothing is more settled in criminal law jurisprudence than
that alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive and
categorical testimony of the complainant.19 [People v.
Tabion, G.R. No. 132715, October 20, 1999, p. 18; People v.
Accion, G.R. Nos. 122550-51, August 11, 1999, p. 11.] Alibi is

an inherently weak defense, which is viewed with suspicion

and received with caution because it can easily be
fabricated.20 [People v. Hivela, G.R. No. 132061, September
21, 1999, p. 5.] Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which
must be buttressed with strong evidence of non-culpability to
merit credibility.21 [People v. Hivela, supra. citing People v.
Burce, 269 SCRA 293 (1997).] We find that despite his stance
that several persons watched him demonstrate how to cook
banana chips in Ubay, Bohol in the morning of November 16,
1989,22 [TSN, December 29, 1994, pp. 3-4.] appellant failed
to present any disinterested witness to support his claim. For
alibi to prosper, it is not enough that accused show he was
elsewhere at the time the crime was committed, but there
must also be clear and convincing proof that it was
impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of
its commission.23 [People v. Agunos, G.R. No. 130961,
October 13, 1999, p. 9.]

With respect to the appellants claim that the victim was

attending her classes at the time she was raped, we note
that complainants explanation that it was their vacant
period,24 [TSN, August 13, 1993, p. 11.] was not rebutted by
the defense. All told, we see no reason to depart from the
rule that positive identification of the malefactor prevails
over the defenses of alibi and denial.

Appellant insists that he did not get private complainant

pregnant. He cites the testimony of defense witness Rafael
Libres, a classmate of the victim, to the effect that
complainant admitted to him that appellant had not caused
her pregnancy. According to Libres, complainant identified
either one Willy Guitano or a certain man from Sagumay,
Candijay, Bohol as the possible father of her child. Appellant
also points an accusing finger at private complainants

stepfather as a possible culprit. This attempt to impugn the

victims moral character by the appellant is self-serving and
unsupported by the evidence. Furthermore, the question of
who sired the victims child has no bearing here, for in rape
cases, the identity of the father of the victims child is not an
issue, pregnancy not being an element of the crime.25
[People v. Villaluna, G.R. No. 117666, February 23, 1999, p.
14; People v. Malapo, 294 SCRA 579, 588 (1998); People v.
Sta. Ana, 291 SCRA 188, 214 (1998).]

In a last-ditch effort to win an acquittal, appellant asked for a

DNA test or blood test.26 [Rollo, p. 116.] We find the motion
futile. As held in one case:

"The issue of "DNA tests" as a more accurate and

authoritative means of identification than eye-witness
identification need not be belabored. The accused were all
properly and duly identified by the prosecutions principal
witnessDNA testing proposed by petitioners to have an
objective and scientific basis of identification of "semen
samples to compare with those taken from the vagina of the
victim" are thus unnecessary or are forgotten evidence too
late to consider now."27 [Andal v. People, G.R. Nos. 13826869, May 26, 1999, pp. 4-5.]

Moreover, the records show that appellant escaped from his

police escort while being transported to face charges, and
then remained at large for two years. His claims of abduction
by the members of the New Peoples Army or by relatives of
the victim are both incredible and wanting in substantive
proof, given his admission that he hid out for a while with a
relative in Metro Manila.28 [TSN, February 28, 1995, pp. 12-

13.] Flight is an implied admission of guilt, and appellants

escape betrays both his guilt and his desire to evade
responsibility.29 [People v. Villanueva, 284 SCRA 501, 510
(1998).] A truly innocent person would naturally grasp the
first available opportunity to defend himself and assert his
innocence as to the crime imputed to him.30 [People v. Solis,
291 SCRA 529, 540 (1998).]

The prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt the

pertinent elements of the felony of rape as defined and
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
namely: that appellant Gonzalo Penaso had carnal knowledge
of the victim against her will and through the use of force and
intimidation. No reversible error can be attributed to the trial
court in finding appellant guilty of rape. Hence, his conviction
must be upheld.

We note, however, that the trial court awarded only

P50,000.00 as indemnity and moral damages. Pursuant to
current jurisprudence, the award of P50,000.00 as civil
[G.R. No. 125901. March 8, 2001]

EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R. TIJING, petitioners,

vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Seventh Division) and ANGELITA
DIAMANTE, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

indemnity is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of

rape.31 [People v. Maglente, G.R. Nos. 124559-66, April 30,
1999, p. 36.] In addition, moral damages amounting to
P50,000.00 at the least should be imposed in rape cases
involving young and immature girls between the ages of
thirteen and nineteen, without need of further proof.32
[People v. Batoon, G.R. No. 134194, October 26, 1999, pp. 89.]

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the court a quo

finding appellant Gonzalo Penaso guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that CIVIL INDEMNITY in the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) and MORAL DAMAGES also
in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00)
should be paid by appellant to private complainant, Basilisa
Lacar. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.
For review is the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
March 6, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP No. 39056, reversing the
decision of the Regional Trial Court in a petition for habeas
corpus of Edgardo Tijing, Jr., allegedly the child of petitioners.

Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children. The
youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who was born on April 27,
1989, at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse Lourdes
Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila. Petitioner Bienvenida served as
the laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita Diamante,
then a resident of Tondo, Manila.

According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her

house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job. Since
Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she asked
Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her fourmonth old son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita as she
usually let Angelita take care of the child while Bienvenida
was doing laundry.

When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and

Edgardo, Jr., were gone. Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to
Angelitas house in Tondo, Manila, but did not find them there.
Angelitas maid told Bienvenida that her employer went out
for a stroll and told Bienvenida to come back later. She
returned to Angelitas house after three days, only to discover
that Angelita had moved to another place. Bienvenida then
complained to her barangay chairman and also to the police
who seemed unmoved by her pleas for assistance.

Although estranged from her husband, Bienvenida could not

imagine how her spouse would react to the disappearance of
their youngest child and this made her problem even more
serious. As fate would have it, Bienvenida and her husband
reconciled and together, this time, they looked for their
missing son in other places. Notwithstanding their serious
efforts, they saw no traces of his whereabouts.

Four years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a

tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the
common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains were
lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan. Bienvenida lost no time in
going to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son

Edgardo, Jr., for the first time after four years. She claims that
the boy, who was pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a
brother of the late Tomas Lopez, was already named John
Thomas Lopez.[1] She avers that Angelita refused to return
to her the boy despite her demand to do so.

Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus

with the trial court in order to recover their son. To
substantiate their petition, petitioners presented two
witnesses, namely, Lourdes Vasquez and Benjamin Lopez.
The first witness, Vasquez, testified that she assisted in the
delivery of one Edgardo Tijing, Jr. on April 27, 1989 at her
clinic in Sta. Ana, Manila. She supported her testimony with
her clinical records.[2] The second witness, Benjamin Lopez,
declared that his brother, the late Tomas Lopez, could not
have possibly fathered John Thomas Lopez as the latter was
sterile. He recalled that Tomas met an accident and bumped
his private part against the edge of a banca causing him
excruciating pain and eventual loss of his child-bearing
capacity. Benjamin further declared that Tomas admitted to
him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son and
that he and Angelita were not blessed with children.[3]

For her part, Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother
of the child. She asserts that at age 42, she gave birth to
John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife
Zosima Panganiban in Singalong, Manila. She added, though,
that she has two other children with her real husband, Angel
Sanchez.[4] She said the birth of John Thomas was registered
by her common-law husband, Tomas Lopez, with the local
civil registrar of Manila on August 4, 1989.

On March 10, 1995, the trial court concluded that since

Angelita and her common-law husband could not have
children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an
impossibility.[5] The trial court also held that the minor and
Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity. Accordingly, it
ruled that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one
and the same person who is the natural child of petitioners.
The trial court decreed:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby

rendered GRANTING the petition for Habeas Corpus, as such,
respondent Angelita Diamante is ordered to immediately
release from her personal custody minor John Thomas D.
Lopez, and turn him over and/or surrender his person to
petitioners, Spouses Edgardo A. Tijing and Bienvenida R.
Tijing, immediately upon receipt hereof.

Branch Sheriff of this Court, Carlos Bajar, is hereby

commanded to implement the decision of this Court by
assisting herein petitioners in the recovery of the person of
their minor son, Edgardo Tijing Jr., the same person as John
Thomas D. Lopez.

SO ORDERED.[6]

Angelita seasonably filed her notice of appeal.[7]

Nonetheless, on August 3, 1994, the sheriff implemented the
order of the trial court by taking custody of the minor. In his
report, the sheriff stated that Angelita peacefully surrendered
the minor and he turned over the custody of said child to
petitioner Edgardo Tijing.[8]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the

decision rendered by the trial court. The appellate court
expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus.
In its view, the evidence adduced by Bienvenida was not
sufficient to establish that she was the mother of the minor. It
ruled that the lower court erred in declaring that Edgardo
Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same
person,[9] and disposed of the case, thus:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower court

dated March 10, 1995 is hereby REVERSED, and a new one
entered dismissing the petition in Spec. Proc. No. 94-71606,
and directing the custody of the minor John Thomas Lopez to
be returned to respondent Angelita Diamante, said minor
having been under the care of said respondent at the time of
the filing of the petition herein.

SO ORDERED.[10]

Petitioners sought reconsideration of the abovequoted

decision which was denied. Hence, the instant petition
alleging:

THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A

GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT DECLARED THAT THE PETITIONERS
ACTION FOR HABEAS CORPUS IS MERELY SECONDARY TO THE

QUESTION OF FILIATION THAT THE PETITIONERS HAD

LIKEWISE PROVEN.

II

THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS AND
DIRECTING THAT THE CUSTODY OF THE MINOR JOHN THOMAS
LOPEZ WHO WAS PROVEN TO THE SAME MINOR AS EDGARDO
R. TIJING, JR., BE RETURNED TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
[11]

In our view, the crucial issues for resolution are the following:

(1) Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy?

(2) Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez
are one and the same person and is the son of petitioners?

We shall discuss the two issues together since they are

closely related.

The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal

confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of
his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto.[12] Thus, it is the

proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody

of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third
person of his own free will. It may even be said that in
custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and
involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale
for the availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is
prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of
custody over a child.[13] It must be stressed too that in
habeas corpus proceedings, the question of identity is
relevant and material, subject to the usual presumptions
including those as to identity of the person.

In this case, the minors identity is crucial in determining the

propriety of the writ sought. Thus, it must be resolved first
whether the Edgardo Tijing, Jr., claimed by Bienvenida to be
her son, is the same minor named John Thomas Lopez, whom
Angelita insists to be her offspring. We must first determine
who between Bienvenida and Angelita is the minors
biological mother. Evidence must necessarily be adduced to
prove that two persons, initially thought of to be distinct and
separate from each other, are indeed one and the same.[14]
Petitioners must convincingly establish that the minor in
whose behalf the application for the writ is made is the
person upon whom they have rightful custody. If there is
doubt on the identity of the minor in whose behalf the
application for the writ is made, petitioners cannot invoke
with certainty their right of custody over the said minor.

True, it is not the function of this Court to examine and

evaluate the probative value of all evidence presented to the
concerned tribunal which formed the basis of its impugned
decision, resolution or order.[15] But since the conclusions of
the Court of Appeals contradict those of the trial court, this
Court may scrutinize the evidence on the record to determine

which findings should be preferred as more conformable to

the evidentiary facts.

A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the

evidence presented by Bienvenida is sufficient to establish
that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son, Edgardo
Tijing, Jr.

First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear

children. From her very lips, she admitted that after the birth
of her second child, she underwent ligation at the Martinez
Hospital in 1970, before she lived with Tomas Lopez without
the benefit of marriage in 1974. Assuming she had that
ligation removed in 1978, as she claimed, she offered no
evidence she gave birth to a child between 1978 to 1988 or
for a period of ten years. The midwife who allegedly
delivered the child was not presented in court. No clinical
records, log book or discharge order from the clinic were ever
submitted.

Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves that

Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of siring a son. Benjamin
Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile
because of the accident and that Tomas admitted to him that
John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son. Moreover,
Tomas Lopez and his legal wife, Maria Rapatan Lopez, had no
children after almost fifteen years together. Though Tomas
Lopez had lived with private respondent for fourteen years,
they also bore no offspring.

Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of

John Thomas Lopez was filed by Tomas Lopez instead of the
midwife and on August 4, 1989, four months after the alleged
birth of the child. Under the law, the attending physician or
midwife in attendance at birth should cause the registration
of such birth. Only in default of the physician or midwife, can
the parent register the birth of his child. The certificate must
be filed with the local civil registrar within thirty days after
the birth.[16] Significantly, the birth certificate of the child
stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent were legally
married on October 31, 1974, in Hagonoy, Bulacan, which is
false because even private respondent had admitted she is a
common-law wife.[17] This false entry puts to doubt the
other data in said birth certificate.

Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when the
child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two had strong
similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes.
Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is
competent and material evidence to establish parentage.[18]
Needless to stress, the trial courts conclusion should be given
high respect, it having had the opportunity to observe the
physical appearances of the minor and petitioner concerned.

Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in

Bienvenidas giving birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her clinic.
Unlike private respondent, she presented clinical records
consisting of a log book, discharge order and the signatures
of petitioners.

All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject

minor is indeed the son of petitioners. The writ of habeas
corpus is proper to regain custody of said child.

A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using

conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and
scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the
facility and expertise in using DNA test[19] for identification
and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines
Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis
Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing
using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is
based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2)
copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the
father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child
are analyzed to establish parentage.[20] Of course, being a
novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is

still open to challenge.[21] Eventually, as the appropriate

case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts
should apply the results of science when competently
obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said
result is to deny progress.[22] Though it is not necessary in
this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be useful
to all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and
identity issues.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed

DECISION of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and decision
of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED. Costs against the
private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

People v. Vallejo, GR No. 144656, May 09, 2002

G.R. No. 161434

March 3, 2004

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR.

vs.COMELEC, FPJ and VICTORINO X. FORNIER,

G.R. No. 161634

March 3, 2004

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ vs.FPJ

G. R. No. 161824

March 3, 2004

VICTORINO X. FORNIER, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS and FPJ

Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poes disqualification in the
presidential elections for having allegedly misrepresented
material facts in his (Poes) certificate of candidacy by
claiming that he is a natural Filipino citizen despite his
parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the
petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners
assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending that only
the Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case
under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution.
Issue:

Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had

jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion
in holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions
regarding qualification of a candidate for the presidency or
vice-presidency before the elections are held.
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection
with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, refers
to contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the
Philippines which the Supreme Court may take cognizance,
and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President before
the elections.
2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in
holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen.

The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing

fundamental law on respondents birth, provided that among
the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are
citizens of the Philippines."

Tracing respondents paternal lineage, his grandfather

Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latters death certificate was
identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn
from the presumption that having died in 1954 at the age of
84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1870. In the absence of
any other evidence, Lorenzos place of residence upon his
death in 1954 was presumed to be the place of residence
prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited
from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had
effected in 1902. Being so, Lorenzos citizenship would have
extended to his son, Allan---respondents father.

Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allans son to

Bessie, though an American citizen, was a Filipino citizen by
virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondents
birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on citizenship did not
make a distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the
child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and the
allegation that respondent was born only before the assailed
marriage had no bearing on respondents citizenship in view
of the established paternal filiation evidenced by the public
documents presented.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish

conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would
preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be
held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in
his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in
relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.