13-18 Date at The JMRC NL II

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Decisive Action Training Environment

at the JMRC, Volume II
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DECISIVE ACTION TRAINING ENVIRONMENT AT THE JMRC, VOL. II
Foreword
As we look beyond the counterinsurgency (COIN)-focused decade of operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan toward potential threats to security and stability, the decisive action training
environment has emerged as an ideal platform on which to combine all that we have learned in
the last twelve years with our core tenets of combined arms maneuver and wide area security.
In October, 2012, the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) conducted Operation
Saber Junction, its second decisive action rotation and the largest exercise Europe had seen in
more than 20 years. A year of planning went into crafting a complex operational environment
featuring a near-peer conventional force, irregular and insurgent elements, and more than 6,000
personnel from 19 participating nations arrayed across 2,400 square kilometers of terrain from
the Grafenwoehr to the Hohenfels Training Areas in Germany.
The Germany-based 2nd Cavalry Regiment Dragoons, under the control of a higher
headquarters replicated by the German-Netherlands Corps, entered a demanding scenario
that forced them to simultaneously execute offense, defense, and stability operations while
integrating and synchronizing the capabilities of host-nation, coalition, and interagency/
intergovernmental partners.
Over the course of 16 demanding days, the Dragoons confronted the hurdles of how to shoot,
communicate, and sustain while continuously on the move a challenging departure from the
forward operating base (FOB)-centric operations ingrained in our recent institutional memory. As
the 2nd Cavalry Regiment overcame every obstacle placed in its path, several key observations
were noted during the rotation, to include the following:
Mission command on the move over great distances is exceptionally difficult given the
digital networked capacity of a modern brigade combat team (BCT). Success requires
careful planning, effective triage of information requirements as bandwidth contracts
over distance, and a mission command philosophy of decentralized, mission-type
orders.
While many of our basic field craft skills have atrophied over a decade of FOB-based
operations, our veteran force of combat experienced noncommissioned and junior
officers adapt quickly to changing environments and these skill sets come back when
demanded by the conditions.
Experience, particularly in Operation Enduring Freedom, has shown that future
conflicts may see multinational forces not just fighting side by side but fully integrated
at the BCT level and below. This is a new phenomenon and this most recent rotational
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iii
CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED
experience has taught us that preparing for this level of integration demands changes to
how we train and in some cases, equip our forces.
At the conclusion of Saber Junction, JMRCs observer/coach trainers were proud to stand on
the objective with the Dragoons of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment. This newsletter is a direct result
of their sweat equity and should provide valuable lessons learned as we face the complex and
sometimes uncertain security environment that lies ahead. Train to win!
iv
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DECISIVE ACTION TRAINING ENVIRONMENT AT THE JMRC

Table of Contents
Chapter 1. Fighting a Complex Threat: Ten Observations from the

Decisive Action Training Environment
Chapter 2. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Maneuvering

Brigade-Level Command Posts in the Decisive Action Training
Environment
13
Chapter 3. The Brigade Combat Team Information Collection Rehearsal
25
Chapter 4. Integrating Brigade-Level Targeting into the Operations

Process Across Offensive, Defensive, and Stability Tasks in the Decisive
Action Training Environment
31
Chapter 5. Fire Support Planning in the Decisive Action Training

Environment
39
Chapter 6. Brigade Tactics and Techniques for Inform and Influence

Activities in Decisive Action Training Environments
49
Chapter 7. Integrating Air Defense in the Brigades Military

Decisionmaking Process in the Decisive Action Training Environment
53
Chapter 8. Tackling Communications Challenges During a Decisive

Action Training Environment Rotation
55
Chapter 9. Legal Challenges in the Decisive Action Training

Environment: What Judge Advocates Need to Know about Declared
Hostile Forces, Surrendering Forces, and the Collateral Damage
Methodology
59
Chapter 10. Military Intelligence Company Collection Teams: Creating a

Combat Multiplier
71
Chapter 11. Personnel Recovery in Decisive Action and Other Operating

Environments
77
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Chapter 12. Planning, Preparing, and Executing Stryker Battalion

Sustainment: Logistics for Non-Logisticians
81
Chapter 13. The Sustainers Foxhole and Preparing for Unified Land
Operations
89
Chapter 14. Accelerating the Flow of Human Intelligence Reporting: The

Latest Time Information is of Value
95
Chapter 15. Utilizing the Goat as a Nonlethal Effect in the Decisive

Action Training Environment
101
Appendix A. Collection Reports, JMRC Rotation 13-01, Lessons

Learned, October 2012, Mission Command Focus Observations
105
Appendix B. Collection Reports, JMRC Rotation 13-01, Lessons

Learned, October 2012, Intelligence Focus Observations
113
Appendix C. Collection Reports, JMRC Rotation 13-01, Lessons

Learned, October 2012, Fires Focus Observations
119
Appendix D. Collection Reports, JMRC Rotation 13-01, Lessons

Learned, October 2012, Movement and Maneuver Focus Observations
127
Appendix E. Collection Reports, JMRC Rotation 13-01, Lessons

Learned, October 2012, Protection Focus Observations
131
Appendix F. Collection Reports, JMRC Rotation 13-01, Lessons Learned,

October 2012, Sustainment Focus Observations
137
The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in
the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department.
Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.
Note: Any publications (other than CALL publications) referenced in this product, such as ARs,
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vi
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Center for Army Lessons Learned

Director
COL Thomas H. Roe
Project Analysts
Danny W. Reinick
Marvin K. Decker
MAJ Cyrus Russ
Contributing Authors
LTC Curt Taylor

MAJ Matthew Todd
The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in
the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department.
Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.
Note: Any publications (other than CALL publications) referenced in this product, such as ARs,
FMs, and TMs, must be obtained through your pinpoint distribution system.
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vii
Chapter 1
Fighting a Complex Threat: Ten Observations from the Decisive Action
Training Environment
LTC Curt Taylor, Joint Multinational Readiness Center
In October 2012, the 2nd Cavalry Regiment (2CR) executed the Armys fourth decisive
action training environment (DATE) rotation and the second one at the Joint Multinational
Readiness Center (JMRC), Hohenfels, Germany. With more than 6,000 soldiers from 19 nations
participating, Rotation 13-01 was the largest U.S. training exercise executed in Europe since
1989. Because it was unique, this training event represented an irreplaceable opportunity to
identify critical lessons learned for the Army as it trains and prepares brigade combat teams
(BCTs) for combat operations at this level. This article focuses on 10 of the major issues that
should inform the development of decisive action rotations as well as the doctrine, training, and
materiel solutions that will prepare future BCTs to succeed in this complex environment.
Figure 1-1. Soldiers secure a critical road intersection in a German town.

Observation 1: Mission Command on the Move. If there is one consistent theme from all
four decisive action rotations the Army has conducted so far, it is the fact that its upper tactical
networks are severely challenged in an environment that demands a sustained advance against
an enemy force. As a point of comparison, in March 2003, the 3rd Infantry Division (ID) crossed
the Iraqi border and fought north over 16 days, advancing 650 kilometers to seize the Baghdad
International Airport on 4 April. Our command posts (CPs) have grown considerably since 3rd
ID raced through the Karbala gap a decade ago. The four frequency modulated (FM) radio nets
(command, fires, administration and logistics, and operations and intelligence) have grown into a
multitude of digital and voice networks that connect battalion to brigade and brigade to division
CPs.
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Most of these nodes are optimized for static operations over time. As the communication tether
begins to stretch, it is often the coordinating staff communication, almost entirely reliant on
digital systems, that fails first. While commanders can communicate using FM nets and the lower
tactical Internet, the staff-to-staff coordination essential to shaping the fight grinds to a halt.
In Rotation 13-01, 2CR started the rotation with a sustained movement to contact against an
enemy force covering more than 40 kilometers of complex terrain and more than 148 hours of
continuous movement. Both the tempo of the advance and the sheer size and complexity of the
terrain stretched every voice and digital network to the breaking point. The regiment developed
a number of innovative ways to mitigate the digital challenge such as employing the Force
XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) communication platform to send human
intelligence reports. Unfortunately, 2CR was fighting against the technology instead of the
technology providing solutions to enable mission command in a fluid battlefield. As the Army
continues to work the network integration evaluation process to develop systems that enable true
mission command on the move, this is the most important challenge we must address. Our efforts
must yield a series of networks that enable both voice and data communication on the move or
at the short halt. These systems must allow not just commanders to communicate on the move,
but also the staffs that support them to collaborate with one another and to monitor the rapid
succession of decisions occurring on the command net.
Automatic data logs of FM communications, cloud computing, and staff-to-staff chat
windows on the lower tactical internet are three simple ideas, well within capabilities of current
technology, which would have improved the regiments ability to collaborate and share critical
information on the move.
Observation 2: Brigades Manage Transitions. This 21-day exercise stressed the importance of
simultaneous execution of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks as defined in Army Doctrine
Publication 3-0, Unified Land Operations, October 2011. While elements of all three operational
tasks remained relevant throughout the exercise, their relative emphasis shifted from Big O to
Big D to Big S as the operational environment changed.
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Figure 1-2. As the enemy situation evolved, the operating environment in Rotation 13-01
shifted over the course of the exercise.
The transition among the three phases forced the regimental staff to adjust in some unexpected
ways. Most notably, the role of the staff changed as the environment changed. In the fast-paced,
sustained offensive operations at the start of the exercise, where tempo and distance strained
every communications network, the commander relied on the initiative of troop and squadron
headquarters. Commanders had to understand and execute off the commanders intent two levels
up with very limited guidance as the situation unfolded across the operational environment. The
staff found itself resourcing a decentralized fight against a centralized enemy.
As the regiment transitioned to a deliberate defense preparing for an attack from a near-peer
conventional threat, the same decentralized management style was no longer appropriate.
Effective integration of a regimental defense demanded compliance and coordination with dig
schedules, obstacle emplacement, and engagement area integration all nested across squadrons.
The emphasis shifted from command to control as the nature of the fight shifted from a
decentralized fight to a centralized one against a centralized conventional threat.
As the regiment defeated the enemy conventional forces and transitioned to a wide area security
mission across a large operational environment, the role of the staffs adjusted again. Because
the nature of the conflict changed, rules of engagement, task organization, and battle rhythm
required adjustment as well. The regiment found itself now fighting a decentralized fight against
a decentralized enemy. For example, this change forced the S-2 cell to adjust its process for
assessing the enemy courses of action (COAs) in order to avoid defining the scattered insurgent
forces as a centralized enemy threat with a coherent scheme of maneuver.
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As the lowest echelon of command designed to simultaneously plan and execute tactical
operations, the brigade is the level that must anticipate and manage the transitions in the
operational environment. The staff must anticipate how the nature of the fight will redefine the
staffs role and the role of the brigade headquarters.
Future training events at the BCT and battalion level, whether conducting as a command post
exercise or live, should emphasize the transition phase between operations and force staffs to
adjust to the change in roles and responsibilities as the environment changes.
Observation 3: Understanding the Operational Environment. A decade of counterinsurgency
(COIN) has taught us very valuable lessons about understanding the cultural and demographic
contours of the terrain on which we fight. Identifying underlying sources of instability, a study
once limited to political scientists and post-graduate studies, is now debated at length in our
company command posts among sergeants and lieutenants. This experience has given us an
appetite for unprecedented insight into a culture and what drives it to behave in ways counter
to our war missions. As we expand our mission set to include combined arms maneuver
operations, it is vital that we retain both the desire and the tools to understand why the population
is motivated to act as it does. We should not lose our company intelligence support teams,
our female engagement teams, or any of the other tools developed over the years in Iraq and
Afghanistan that gave us the insight that we now have at the tactical level.
While a population under occupation by an organized-enemy conventional force has one very
big source of instability, we cannot afford to ignore the rest while we deal with that threat.
Brigades must develop systems that allow for the simultaneous execution of multiple lines of
effort even while they still face a major existential threat from a near-peer opponent. This is hard
government work. No commander wants to meet with the local mayor to discuss restoration
of essential services while the enemy is still attacking in brigade strength. However, a review
of recent conflicts from Iraq to Libya will show that it is in the transition from conventional to
post-conflict activities where our strategic objectives so often slip through our grasp. Key to
preventing this is a consistent approach throughout all phases of the conflict to understanding
the underlying sources of instability and addressing them through multiple, well-considered, and
resourced lines of effort. The exercise design of Rotation 13-01 forced this challenge on the 2CR
as it had ongoing tactical- and strategic-level stability responsibilities in its area of operations
while it still faced a major conventional threat.
Success required the regiment to enable its unified action partners with valuable resources that
often had to be diverted from the conventional fight. One of the most important was the reachback capability to contact their country-team or national-level agencies. Commanders down to
company level had to understand both the political situation around them and the commanders
intent two levels up so that they could get the right resource focused on the right problem set.
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Figure 1-3: Engineers construct counter-mobility positions in preparation for the

regimental defense.
Observation 4: The Role of Senior Noncommissioned Officers (NCOs) in the Logistics
Fight. Sustaining a BCT on the move in an immature theater of operations is one of the hardest
things we will ask from our logisticians. Success demands thorough and detailed planning,
triggers for execution of push logistics, and combat logistics patrols that can fight and win
against rear area threats to supply lines. Rotation 13-01 tested every aspect of the 2CR logistics
capability from top to bottom. Successful units put responsibility for the logistics fight, and in
particular, the evacuation of casualties on the battlefield, on the shoulders of their most capable
senior NCOs. Troops with first sergeants who proactively fought for logistics resources and,
more importantly, had the mobility to go and get those resources when the situation demanded
it, fared the best. The same was true of the casualty evacuation effort. With very limited air
medical evacuation resources available in theater, the regiment relied on casualty collection and
ambulance exchange points. It was the first sergeants and the command sergeants major who
made this system work.
Observation 5: Defensive Planning. After action review comments across the combat training
centers (CTCs) from all three preceding DATE rotations have stressed the importance of
defensive planning. Of the skills that have atrophied over 10 years of COIN warfare, the hard
art of defensive planning has suffered the greatest degradation. The 2CR recognized this and
devoted considerable energy to training troop commanders and platoon leaders prior to the
rotation on the seven-steps-of-engagement area development, integration of obstacles and fires,
and positioning of weapon systems to mass effects against the enemy. The real graduate level
of defensive operations, however, is the resourcing and integration of these engagement areas
at the battalion and brigade level. For example, the integration of obstacle planning and Class
IV barrier materiel resourcing between the regimental engineer and S-4 proved to be a critical
contribution of the regimental staff to the fight. Clear priorities of work at every echelon are
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vital. Commanders must be able to visualize the terrain and engagement areas from the enemys
perspective and understand how they will use the terrain to achieve a position of advantage.
Our training at home station should continue to emphasize the critical importance of training
the defense at every echelon. From the preparation of platoon dismounted strong points to the
integration of battalion defenses into a brigade-level defense, every echelon plays a critical role.
Observation 6: Decision Point Planning. Operating in an environment of increasing
complexity demands that tactical forces become masters of adaptation. The fine art of decision
point planning is never as important as it is now as our future opponents have a near endless
menu of options and novel challenges to present to us on the battlefield. Gone are the days
when the Krasnovians would fix in the north and penetrate in the south or fix in the south and
penetrate in the north. No tactical plan can anticipate every enemy reaction, but prudent decision
planning is another of those lost arts that must become a core competency for us to succeed in
this environment.
Where possible, decision points should be structured as an IF-AND-THEN statement tied to
both priority information requirements about both the enemy and the environment and friendly
force information requirements about our own capabilities. These decisions, when activated by
the commander, should trigger a fully integrated COA that involves every warfighting function
(WfF) and accounts for the time required for execution by anticipating appropriate triggers
for action. The sketch in Figure 1-4 provides a possible format for a fully developed and fully
integrated decision point.
Figure 1-4. Technique for developing a fully developed and integrated COA to support a
tactical decision point
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If properly structured, these decision points determine the commanders critical information
requirements and the priorities for the brigade intelligence collection plan. Good decision point
planning is vital to good execution because it takes us out of the unmanned aircraft system
(UAS) whack-a-mole game where targets are attacked as acquired with limited resources while
the critical information that the commander needs to make vital decisions on the battlefield is
ignored or forgotten.
An effective decision support template, however, should begin with a detailed and crossfunctional intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). Without an adequate enemy
situational template that takes into account likely and feasible threat COAs accounting for
known enemy capabilities, it is difficult for planners to develop the specific priority intelligence
requirements that will confirm or deny enemy COAs and the tactical solutions that will defeat
them. IPB against a hybrid threat is too important and too complex to be left entirely to the
S-2. Given a broad variety of tools and methods that the enemy has at his disposal to affect
the environment, it takes the full staff to develop the enemy template. For example, enemy air
capabilities should be templated by the Air Defense and Airspace Management cell, subversion
activities directed against the population should be templated by the S-9 cell, and threat
propaganda by the S-7. A detailed threat assessment representing the joint analysis across all
the WfFs is the single most important output of the mission analysis process because it has such
a significant impact on how the staff conducts the rest of the military decisionmaking process
(MDMP). An integrated IPB drives the development of good decision points that allow the unit
to preempt or respond to enemy actions on the battlefield.
Observation 7: Massing Fires and Close Air Support to Enable Combined Arms Maneuver.
A decade of decentralized operations against a decentralized enemy force has taught us
some powerful habits about how we apportion the brigades pool of lethal shapers including
artillery fires, close air support, and close combat attack rotary-wing aircraft. Adaptation to that
environment forced units to become very good at forecasting requirements and apportioning
resources to support company- and platoon-sized operations over a wide area often planned well
in advance. Continuous and sustained combined arms maneuver, however, turns this model on its
head and requires a different approach to allocation of these resources.
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Figure 1-5. Soldiers from 2CRs fires squadron provide fire support to the regiment.
In a fight against a conventional threat, the BCT has to choose when and where it will mass the
effects of its artillery to defeat critical enemy capabilities. Those actions in turn must be tied
to and rapidly exploited by well-synchronized maneuver actions or the temporary advantage is
often lost.
During the rotation, the imperative to mass lethal effects in a few locations on the battlefield tied
directly to maneuver (the close fight) or to critical enemy capabilities (the deep fight) forced the
regiment to centralize the employment of artillery and close air support and fight the temptation
to fire at every target identified by the UAS. The development of clearly understood attack
guidance and very specific fire support tasks tied to the scheme of maneuver were critical to the
regiments success.
The air mission request model that worked so well in Afghanistan has little relevance for
a brigade in sustained offensive operations when subordinate units could not forecast their
operations out four hours, much less 48 hours. Instead, BCT staffs must request and plan the
employment of both rotary- and fixed-wing assets based on reasonable projections and the
commanders intent, establish rigid check-in procedures, and then centrally manage these critical
resources. The complex airspace management required to simultaneously employ artillery
including high altitude weapons such as EXCALIBUR with rotary-wing aircraft requires detailed
airspace graphics. In 10 years of COIN, we developed an implicit assumption that the airspace
belonged to aircraft unless designated for artillery through activation of a particular restricted
operating zone. This complexity of the decisive action environment forced the regiment to
employ specific graphic control measures for rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft to include air
corridors and aerial battle positions in order to ensure that close combat attack aircraft did not
disrupt the artillery fight.
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Observation 8: Air Defense Planning and Training. Rotation 13-01 presented 2CR with a
real and dangerous manned and unmanned aerial threat. The regiment adapted and became
increasingly proficient at dealing with the threat over the course of the rotation. Units began
taking the air threat into account in the selection of command posts and assembly areas. Tactical
command posts and company assembly areas disappeared into the tree line, Stryker crews started
pulling air guard watch and the regimental staff started considering the employment of radar
and air defense emplacement.
Figure 1-6. Slovenian air defense battery personnel search for enemy rotary-wing aircraft.
Our current technical overmatch assures us at least some level of air superiority very early on in
any future conflict. The recent proliferation of UASs in the hands of our adversaries, however,
should give us pause lest we retire the air defense branch prematurely. With a real enemy UAS
capability out there, both passive and active air defense skills are going to be an important part
of any future conflict. It does not take much imagination to see how a UAS capability combined
with precision-strike rockets could wreak havoc on our large command and logistics nodes that
are distributed throughout the brigades rear area.
Combined arms for air defense techniques are very effective when vehicle crews are trained
on air engagement techniques and practice it on the machine gun range or in simulation.
Identification and dissemination of local air defense warning status play a huge role in helping
units visually identify and discriminate between friend and foe. Effective air defense radar
emplacement based on a sound IPB that considers enemy air avenues of approach also improves
the effectiveness of the air defense fight. As an Army, our passive and active air defense skills
have atrophied over a decade of nonuse; however, this rotation demonstrated how quickly units
adapted when forced to by a serious air threat in the training environment.
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Observation 9: Fighting to Communicate. True knowledge management (KM) is much more

than just getting the units SharePoint page updated with the latest fragmentary orders. KM is all
about getting the right information to the right actor on the battlefield in time for him to make
the right decision. As our digital communications networks have grown over the past decade,
our ability to maintain those networks on the move has not improved. Experience in multiple
recent rotations has shown that once a brigade begins sustained offensive operations, digital
communications often degrade to the point that units just stop using them. In this rotation, the
fine tuning required to build a stable e-mail or Command Post of the Future network could be
measured in days, not hours. With squadron command posts moving every few hours, digital
communications were throttled down to what could be typed in a FBCB2 free text message.
Technical solutions to this problem are on the horizon, but there is plenty of work to do now to
adjust our doctrine to anticipate complex digital networks in immature and mobile environments.
Field Manual (FM) 6.01-1, Knowledge Management, July 2012; and FM 6.02.71, Network
Operations, July 2009, both focus on network operations in a garrison or stable forward
operating base-based network environment. Our doctrine provides very little guidance for a
BCT S-6 planning to operate in a degraded and immature communications environment. Trends
from recent decisive action rotations suggest that building a network in this environment should
start by understanding our information requirements rather than focusing on the technical
capabilities of our systems. Units preparing for this environment should develop an arms room
approach to networks where particular networks are activated on an as needed basis. In
short, the mission should define the shape and complexity of the network, not the other way
around. Our tactical units need a doctrinal process integrated into the MDMP that defines their
KM requirements, assesses the communications operating environment, and then develops a
networking solution that is tailored to that environment.
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Figure 1-7. A Bulgarian Army soldier from the 61st Mechanized Infantry Brigade calls out
enemy movement during Rotation 13-01 at JMRC.
Observation 10: Multinational Integration. We will likely never fight another conflict without
substantial involvement from coalition partners on our flanks, in our higher headquarters, and
within our own formations. With more than 1,800 NATO soldiers involved in the exercise from
19 partnered nations, this rotation afforded the ideal opportunity to test our ability to integrate
our formations in a fast-developing, tactical situation.
While we stress the importance of multinational integration, our doctrine provides limited
guidance on exactly how this process should take place. FM 3-16, The Army in Multinational
Operations, May 2010, pertains mostly to the integration at the operational level. True
tactical-level integration of multinational combat formations is a relatively new phenomenon.
Furthermore, there is no easily accessible information resource for units to understand the
capabilities, systems, and limitations of our multinational partners that will likely fight alongside
us.
The 2CR exerted tremendous effort overcoming the doctrinal, equipment, and cultural
boundaries that inhibited true integration, but this remains a critical skill that requires training
and doctrine. Before 9/11, most of our multinational integration occurred at the brigade level and
above and was little more than deconfliction of adjacent units. The last decade of conflict has
seen the true integration of multinational forces at the company and battalion level. To achieve
synchronization in tactical operations, units must have a solid understanding of the differences
in equipment, doctrine, communications, and national caveats that will affect the operation.
The rotation demonstrated that it takes a tremendous amount of planning and coordination to
integrate a Romanian battalion into your formation in the middle of a deliberate attack or employ
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11
Ukrainian HIND-D helicopters over the top of an attacking squadron. Because of the critical
importance of this integration task, we should continue to encourage multinational involvement
at all of our CTCs so that the first time we learn these lessons it is not on the battlefield.
Conclusion
The 2CR proved that well-trained and well-led formations can adapt to a changing environment
and bridge the skill gap between the environment that we have been fighting in for the past 10
years and the complex decisive action fight of the future. The agility of a professional military
and the ingenuity of the American Soldier remain our greatest asymmetric advantages against the
adversaries of the future. As our Soldiers, small units, and staffs adapt to this environment, it is
imperative that our systems, equipment, and doctrine evolve as well to support that adaptation.
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Chapter 2
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Maneuvering Brigade-Level
Command Posts in the Decisive Action Training Environment
LTC Eric T. Smith, Joint Multinational Readiness Center
The decisive action training environment (DATE) is a vastly different operational environment
(OE) from which we, as an Army, have been operating within for the past 10 years. Over the last
decade, brigade combat teams (BCTs) conducting operations as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) have operated from largely static command posts
(CPs). Planning for mission command at the brigade level has focused on either the utilization
of temporary mission command nodes deployed to support specific operations, or fixed mission
command nodes that support the year-long deployment. In the DATE, CPs must support
combined arms maneuver within a constantly changing OE.
The Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) located in Hohenfels, Germany, has
completed two training rotations using the DATE. Although every rotation is unique, we can
draw on this experience to develop conclusions that will assist other units as they train for future
rotations and contingency deployments. One of the significant differences between the DATE
and OIF/OEF operations is the requirement for brigade staffs to conduct deliberate course of
action (COA) development in support of the organization, location, and movement of CPs. The
establishment and maneuver of brigade-level CPs in the DATE must be deliberately planned,
built to support the unique aspects of the OE, and tailored to the brigade commanders mission
command requirements.
This article discusses the following assessments, based on emerging trends and developed tactics,
techniques, and procedures for employing brigade-level CPs:
Utilizing a CP1 and CP2 methodology provides more flexibility than the main CP and
tactical CP (TAC CP) doctrinal foundations.
A fully-resourced CP2, resourced from the core TAC CP, is capable of providing
mission command for BCT operations in the short-term, but requires augmentation to
enable continuous planning in the mid- and long-terms.
Modularizing CPs increases options for employment and maintains flexibility.
Keeping CP1 and CP2 physically separated, even when they are co-located, reduces
friction when the two are simultaneously employed.
Disruption to the BCT operations (S-3, Plans) integrated cell must be minimized in
order for the BCT to conduct continuous short-, near-, and long-range planning.
Dependent on mission requirements and tempo, CP1 and CP2 can move using alternate
or successive bounds.
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Staffs that develop a modular CP organization prior to initiating operations within the DATE, and
then integrate COA development for the CP maneuver plan into their military decisionmaking
process (MDMP) will be better prepared to meet the challenges inherent in this demanding
environment.
Planning Starts with the Doctrinal Foundation

At the JMRC, brigades have started their operations in the DATE using our doctrinal structure
and modified the implementation through the course of the rotation. Army Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures 5-0.1, Commander and Staff Officer Guide, September 2011, defines four types
of CPs:
Main CP
Tactical CP
Command group
Early entry CP
The main CP contains the majority of the brigade staff, is larger and less mobile than the tactical
CP, and is usually overseen by the chief of staff or executive officer (XO). The TAC CP contains
a tailored portion of the headquarters and is designed to control portions of an operation for a
limited time. The command group consists of the commander and selected staff who assist the
commander in controlling operations away from the CP. And the early-entry CP, not supported
by the brigade modified table of organization and equipment, can be established in the initial
stages of a units deployment to provide mission command until the main CP deploys.
Using these doctrinal foundations as their start point, brigades have habitually begun operations
in the DATE with a large main CP, a small TAC CP, and a command group that assists the
commander in battlefield circulation. Some problems with this construct immediately become
evident as the brigade conducts operations within the DATE.
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Figure 2-1. Airborne BCT early entry (assault) CP
Figure 2-2. Stryker BCT main CP

The main CP quickly becomes too big to be agile and requires increasing amounts of resources
to sustain itself. At the start, BCTs have used the standard model outlined in the 2009 edition
of the Warfighters Command Post Handbook as a baseline and then typically add additional
tentage for subordinate CPs, sleep tents, a dining tent, perimeter wire, a maintenance section,
the headquarters and headquarters company CP, a refueling section, and unit parking areas.
This results in a perimeter footprint that is 300 meters by 100 meters, or 7.5 acres in size. The
increased size creates a requirement for additional units to provide security and transportation
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assets to move the main CP, further enlarging the footprint. Moving the main CP typically takes
12-24 hours, disrupts planning, and degrades the brigades mission command networks.
Figure 2-3. Stryker BCT TAC CP

The commander is thus presented with a dilemma does he leave his CP static and functional,
though increasingly less relevant to his requirements, or does he move it frequently to keep
it relevant, with the associated cost in security, transportation, and reduction in the mission
command network fidelity?
By design, the TAC CP draws personnel and equipment from the main CP, tailored to the
mission. The trend is for staffs to initially allocate the absolute minimal amount of personnel
and equipment to the TAC CP, not wanting to overly degrade the main CPs capabilities prior
to the TAC CPs deployment. When employed, the TAC CP is typically able to perform as
the controlling CP for the brigade in the short term, though planning for near- and long-term
operations is disrupted, as doctrinally, the planning staff is located at the main CP.
The command group is designed to facilitate the commanders battlefield circulation and to allow
the commander to control the brigade while he is not at the main CP or the TAC CP. Initially,
commanders have started with a small command group, but once the capabilities of the main or
TAC CP are degraded during movement, the commander typically begins to increase the size
of the command group with the key leaders he needs. These have included the fires battalion
commander, brigade S-3, intelligence officer (S-2), air liaison officer, and brigade aviation
officer. The command group becomes a mission command node, potentially pulling resources
from the main and TAC CP, while it remains inadequately resourced to meet commanders needs.
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Figure 2-4. Airborne BCT TAC CP

By the midpoint in the rotation, the brigade has started with a doctrinal CP structure and
morphed it into a three-tiered structure: a command group with principal staff officers who assist
the commander in making decisions, a TAC CP with the ability to control short-term operations,
and a cumbersome main CP monitoring decisions made in the command group and the TAC CP
while conducting mid- and long-range planning. This ad hoc structure serves the commander
well in the short term, but the disconnect in planning and marginalization of much of the staff in
the main CP inhibits the brigade from proactively shaping future operations.
Changing the Paradigm: Developing CP1 and CP2

Units preparing for a combat training center rotation in the DATE can bypass the developmental
process described above by establishing a CP construct based on a CP1 and CP2 methodology.
Instead of visualizing the basic structure as a main CP and TAC CP, brigades organize two
CPs one habitually more robust than the other. CP1 is formed from the main CP, capable
of exercising all its functions. CP2 is formed from the TAC CP, augmented with personnel
and equipment to enable it to operate indefinitely as the controlling CP when the main CP
cannot (such as while in transit, due to enemy attack, or due to catastrophic equipment failure).
Modifying the TAC CP to become CP2 builds on its doctrinal foundation as a temporary CP
for a specific purpose, and redefines it as an alternate CP, capable of controlling the brigade and
conducting planning in the short term. This allows brigades to initiate operations with two CPs,
both serving as the controlling CP while supporting continuous planning.
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Figure 2-5. Airborne BCT main CP

A good technique exercised at JMRC during DATE rotations is establishing CP1 and CP2 as
separate entities, with distinct personnel and equipment from the onset. Both CPs learn to operate
independently, with organic personnel and equipment, mitigating the disruption that might have
been caused when CP2 deployed (resourced out of a combined CP1).
Organizing the brigade headquarters into modular sections increases the agility and flexibility
for both CP1 and CP2. Typically, BCTs have started rotations using the Trailer Mounted Support
System-Large (TMSS-L) as the core tent for CP1, with staff sections arrayed around it in
Trailer Mounted Support System-Medium (TMSS-M) tents. The investment in set-up and teardown time and manpower for the TMSS-L inhibits CP1s agility and BCTs have found that a
TMSS-M can adequately support the current operations (CUOPS) integration cell infrastructure
requirements. A single or multiple TMSS-M can be dropped without degrading the CP as a
whole. Planning to modularize CP1 and CP2 within TMSS-M tents and using the TMSS-L for
briefings or rehearsals increases BCT flexibility through modularization.
A basic division of the brigade headquarters into TMSS-M shelters is illustrated in Figure 2-6.
CP1 and CP2 CUOPS are divided from inception, as described above. The military intelligence
company is combined with the brigade staff functional intelligence cell to create an integrated
S-2 intelligence cell. The network operations cell is not depicted in this sketch as it should be colocated with the CUOPS cells for CP1 and CP2. This modularized organization gives BCTs the
ability to easily structure and echelon the CPs.
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Figure 2-6. Brigade headquarters modular build

BCTs that planned for operations using the CP1 and CP2 paradigm built around a modularized
headquarters, vastly increase the flexibility and agility of their CPs. If the commander wants to
operate with a strict doctrinal version of the main CP and TAC CP, this organization facilitates
that COA. If the commander elects to have alternate controlling CPs while executing combined
arms maneuver, this organization fits that COA as well. Inevitably, the OE will change; a
modularized CP1 and CP2 structure enables the staff to adapt quickly.
Maneuvering the Brigade Headquarters

Movement of the brigade headquarters is essentially bounding overwatch, using alternate or
successive bounds with its two maneuver elements, CP1 and CP2. The significant distinction is
that unlike an infantry platoon or armor company, one element is not stationary while the other
moves, but controlling, while the other executes another activity.
Figure 2-7 shows a method for using CP1 and CP2 to move a short distance without disrupting
command and control of CUOPs or planning for the mid/long-term time frames.
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Figure 2-7. Moving the main CP using CP1 and CP2 (alternate bounds)
In Stage 1, CP1 is the controlling CP. CP2 moves forward to a favorable position where it can
support the mission command requirements for the brigade. Once CP2 is fully operationally
capable, CP1 transfers responsibility for control of short-term operations to CP1 through a
deliberate process and CP2 becomes the controlling CP. The commander has the option of
positioning himself at CP1 if the decisive effort is planning, at CP2 if the decisive effort is
ongoing operations, or elsewhere in the area of operations (AO) using the command group.
During Stage 2, personnel in the S-3 (Plans) integrated staff cell move into the command
group tent to continue planning at CP1 while the all-source collection element (ACE) and S-2
consolidates into one tent as the plans and S-2/ACE TMSS-M shelters are moved to CP2. Once
these workspaces are established, the planners and a portion of the S-2/ACE cell move to CP2.
Disruption to mid- and long-term planning is minimal merely the transit time between the two
locations. In addition to controlling short-term operations, CP2 is now capable of mid-term and
select long-term planning.
Stage 3 sees the remainder of the modular cells from CP1 move to CP2. The CP2, still the
controlling CP, is now a fully established main CP capable of exercising all its required
functions. The CP1 CUOPS TMSS-M is the last shelter to move, with the option of either
repositioning with CP2 or moving forward to begin the whole process again.
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Using this technique, the brigade is able to maintain continuous mission command over current
operations with redundant capability, minimize disruption to mid- and long-term planning, and
allow the commander maximum flexibility to position himself on the battlefield where he feels
he needs to be.
Figure 2-8. Brigade S-3 (Plans) tent

A method of maneuvering CP1 and CP2 utilizing successive bounds is shown in Figure 2-9. This
technique is applicable when the brigade is conducting high-tempo operations within a larger
AO. In Stage 1, the headquarters is fully established around CP1 with CP2 deployed forward
to provide improved mission command. Initially, CP1 is the controlling CP until CP2 becomes
fully operationally capable, at which point there is a deliberate handover and CP2 becomes the
controlling CP.
In Stage 2, the S-3 (Plans) and S-2 TMSS-M shelters are moved to CP2. As in Figure 2-7, S-3
(Plans) personnel and S-2/ACE personnel at CP1 temporarily consolidate into other shelters to
continue working. When the S-3 (Plans) and S-2/ACE workspaces at CP2 are fully operationally
capable, the planners and select S-2 personnel move to CP2. This CP now has the capacity to
control current operations and plan for mid- and long-term operations with the only disruption
occurring while personnel are in transit.
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Figure 2-9. Maneuvering CP1 and CP2 with successive bounds
In Stage 3, CP1 bounds forward of CP2, with the majority of the brigade headquarters and
establishes at a favorable location in the AO in which it can control CUOPs. When it is fully
operationally capable, another deliberate handover occurs, this time from CP2 to CP1, and CP1
becomes the controlling CP. The planners located at CP2 move to CP1 and continue working in
the shelters described above, followed by their TMSS-M shelters.
Stage 4 sees the consolidation of the brigade headquarters in one location, with CP1 forming the
core, appropriate shelters arrayed around it, and CP2 co-located though not integrated into
CP1.
Planning During MDMP to Maneuver the Command Post

The staff can modularize the brigade headquarters into CP1 and CP2 as part of its preparation
for operations in the DATE. The refined maneuver plan for the CPs cannot be developed until
the staff executes the MDMP, both in support of the initial operation and subsequent missions.
While executing the MDMP, the first time a staff will doctrinally plan for the establishment of
headquarters is at the end of COA development, while building the task organization. Planners
assign headquarters to groups of forces. This task organization is reflected in the COA sketch/
statement and eventually, following orders production, in paragraph five of the operations order
(OPORD). What our doctrine doesnt describe in detail is the planning necessary to maneuver
CPs, when that should be conducted, and who is responsible. The following technique is
designed to integrate into the MDMP at the brigade level (see Figure 2-10).
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Figure 2-10. CP planning as part of the MDMP

Step 1: Assign Headquarters
During COA development, planners assign headquarters to groups of forces. It is a resourceunconstrained action and usually not linked to specific actions or triggers. Planners may
determine several locations that require mission command nodes at varying times, each of
which may involve a change in task organization. The requirements developed at this point
in the planning are general (for example, provide mission command for two rifle battalions
or conduct liaison with host nation government and rear area security battalion). At the
conclusion of COA development, the COA sketch should include the location and purpose for
CPs.
Step 2: COA Analysis
During wargaming, the staff identifies the specific events (triggers) which generate an action
within a CP or the events (conditions) that determine if a CP should move. These requirements
are articulated on the decision support matrix, refined COA sketch, and synchronization matrix.
The XO must designate a single individual as the proponent for CPs during the wargaming
process. This individual could be a planner, the operations sergeant major, S-6, headquarters
company commander, or a trusted member of the staff who understands the headquarters. It
should not be the XO himself, keeping him free to maintain oversight of the brigade staff as it
works through the MDMP.
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The requirements that the staff develops during COA analysis are more specific than those
developed during the initial arrival of forces. These may include specific actions the CPs are to
perform (control counter-battery fires during the offense, provide mission command at the river
crossing, engage the host-nation government officials). They may include specific triggers for
the movement of the CPs (CP1 will move forward of Phase Line BLUE when CP2 takes over as
the controlling CP; after Passage Point 2 is closed, CP1 will become the controlling CP and CP2
will move 5 kilometers east of CP1). Planners must clearly articulate what the CPs are supposed
to do. This will allow the CP planner to develop the maneuver plan in coordination with other
members of the staff.
Step 3: Orders Production
Following the commanders updated guidance on the selected COA, the planners should
articulate the scheme of maneuver for the brigades CPs, either in paragraph 5.b.(1) (CPs) of
the OPORD, or in an annex to the order if the plan is complex enough to warrant inclusion as a
separate document. This is the most critical and difficult portion of the process. The planner must
integrate the requirements, develop a COA, and synchronize it within the overall plan. The XO
has to ensure the staff is supporting the development of the headquarters maneuver plan while
it is completing its own portions of the final order. In this final rush to publish, it is tempting for
planners to rearticulate the unit standard operating procedures in paragraph 5, rather than invest
in a tailored plan. Succumbing to this temptation will negate all the hard work done up to this
point and relegate CP planning to the short term, as the unit becomes increasingly reactive to
events in the OE.
Conclusion
The DATE is a unique OE for each brigade that operates within it. Staffs must develop a CP
structure designed to serve the commanders requirements. Prior to initiating operations, staffs
can develop a modularized CP1/CP2 structure and integrate it into their standard operating
procedure. This framework will serve the staff well when, during MDMP, the designated CP
planner can use it as a foundation to build the mission-specific maneuver plan. The brigade will
be able to conduct continuous operations in the short-, mid-, and long-term time frames and meet
the commanders requirements.
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Chapter 3
The Brigade Combat Team Information Collection Rehearsal
MAJ Eric M. Walthall, Joint Multinational Readiness Center
Brigade combat teams (BCTs) operating in a wide area security or combined arms maneuver
environment are supported by collection assets available from their organic organizations,
their combined joint task force-level headquarters, their theater headquarters, as well as
national intelligence agencies. Today, brigades must manage more collection support than a
division headquarters was expected to manage prior to 2003. A common technique used at the
division level to synchronize information collection prior to 2003 was the reconnaissance and
surveillance rehearsal (25th Infantry Division [ID] Planning Standing Operating Procedures
[SOP], 5th Edition, 8 February 2002). According to the 25th ID Planning SOP, BCTs should
conduct information collection rehearsals as part of their military decisionmaking process
(MDMP). While not doctrinally required, this practice helps collectors and users understand
how information will be collected and disseminated throughout the operation in support of the
commanders priority intelligence requirements (PIR).
Observations
During their October 2001 Warfighter Exercise, the 25th ID assigned collection assets from every
intelligence discipline, to include assets in the organic military intelligence battalion. Only two
of its collection assets, collecting on then-MG James Dubiks PIR, were airborne one Hunter
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and one EH-60 Quick Fix helicopter (see Figure 3-1).
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Figure 3-1. 25th ID Warfighter Exercise, 261200 October 2001. Annex B (Intelligence) to
25th ID (Light) Operations Order 10-02 (TROPIC STORM).
During the Joint Multinational Readiness Centers Rotation 13-01, a decisive action training
environment rotation, the 2nd Cavalry Regiment had assigned, attached, and in direct support,
collection assets from every intelligence discipline. Five to ten of these assets, from during
different phases of the operation, were airborne assets, to include organic Shadow unmanned
aircraft systems, theater full-motion video, theater measurement and signature intelligence, and
theater signals intelligence (SIGINT).
Timing Options
The first option for the timing of the intelligence warfighting function (IWfF) rehearsal is
immediately following the production of Warning Order 2. Warning Order 2 doctrinally includes
the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) order and information collection plan
(per 25th ID Planning SOP, 5th Edition). The benefit of conducting the rehearsal early in the
MDMP process is that it allows for a quick start to collecting on the commanders PIR. The risk
is that the rehearsal will only be focused on the initial set of PIR, and collectors and customers
will not be able to rehearse events that have not been developed during course of action (COA)
development. Conducting the IWfF rehearsal prior to COA development may be beneficial in
movement to contact or offensive operations in which there is little known on enemy positions.
The early commitment of collection assets may assist in refining enemy COAs prior to COA
development.
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The second option for the timing of the IWfF rehearsal is immediately following the conduct
of the combined arms rehearsal (CAR), prior to the conduct of the fire support rehearsal. The
benefit of conducting the rehearsal following the CAR is that the plan is finalized and the
collection plan should not change. This time will also allow the fires rehearsal to be conducted
with a thorough understanding of the collection plan and how targets will be identified (see
Figure 3-2).
Another option available when operating in a time-constrained environment is to cover key
portions of the information collection rehearsal as part of the CAR. This method will most likely
not get into the detail required to thoroughly synchronize the collection plan and will extend the
amount of time required to conduct the CAR.
The Actors
The IWfF rehearsal should be set up by the brigade S-2 and run by the commanders designated
chief of reconnaissance. This can be the reconnaissance squadron commander or designated
representative, the brigade S-2, or the brigade executive officer. The brigade collection manager,
usually a senior lieutenant or junior captain should not run the rehearsal. Attendees should
include the following:
Brigade
S-2
S-3
Collection manager
U.S. Air Force

ISR LNO
targeting officer
SIGINT technician
S-2X (human intelligence collection)/operational management team
UAV platoon leader or technician
Reconnaissance squadron commander

S-3, or LNO
Artillery battalion S-2 and radar technician
Battalion/squadron S-2s and S-3s or LNOs as available
The Events
The rehearsal should be done by event or phase, in line with the wargame or CAR. For each
event, the actors should brief each asset assigned or task organized, what named areas of
interest they are observing, what indicators they are looking for, and what essential elements
of information and PIRs they are attempting to answer. After briefing each asset using this
method, the actor must then brief what reporting method they are going to use, and on what
communication system (see Figure 3-3 for a recommended rehearsal format).
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Figure 3-2. The military decisionmaking process from Army Field Manual 2-19.4, Brigade
Combat Team Intelligence Operations, 25 November 2008, Figure 2-1.
All information collectors will brief how they are sharing the information they are collecting. Is
the information being input into a digital system? If yes, who is inputting the information? How
will battalions receive information if they are jumping their command post during this event/
phase? Is the information required to be broadcast over the brigade operations and intelligence or
command frequency-modulated radio network?
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Figure 3-3. Recommended information collection rehearsal format
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Following the completion of the events or phases, the rehearsal should include vignettes which
test redundancy in collection and the use of primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency
(PACE) communications plans. Collectors and users should understand from the rehearsal what
the commanders priorities are, and that as a result of these priorities, collection assets may
be moved or reallocated in order to answer PIR. Collectors and users should also have a clear
understanding of the information dissemination PACE plan.
Conclusion
A properly conducted information collection rehearsal will provide the commander, staff, collectors, and subordinate commands with the understanding of the brigade collection and dissemination plans, and how these plans will drive the commanders decision points. Commanders and
staff officers will both understand how and when information will be collected, and to whom
the information collected must be disseminated. This will improve the commanders situational
awareness and result in better synchronized operations and targeting processes.
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Chapter 4
Integrating Brigade-Level Targeting into the Operations Process
Across Offensive, Defensive, and Stability Tasks
in the Decisive Action Training Environment
CW3 Hondo J. Hack, Brigade Targeting Trainer,
Joint Multinational Readiness Center
Midway through the brigades decisive action training environment (DATE) rotation in the
country of Atropia, national-level surveillance and intelligence detects movement of the 11th
Division Tactical Group (DTG) confirming the enemys most likely course of action. The 11th
is the supporting effort of the Arianan attack into the country to seize the capital of Baku; this
enemy unit is heading north towards the brigades southern boundary. The South Atropian
Peoples Army (SAPA) insurgent forces are attacking in the brigades rear area security zone
and are targeting logistics and the regiments main command post (CP). Refugees are beginning
to flee their homes and towns to avoid the advancing Arianan forces while human intelligence
reporting indicates that terrorists want to detonate a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device
in order to kill the mayor of Aghabadhi City. Criminal elements are disrupting relief supplies
by blockading roads and hijacking trucks. There isnt any power or running water in the city of
Kiberly, the largest city in the brigades western area of operations. The brigade has received
an order from its higher headquarters directing it to link up with Atropian forces and coordinate
a defense of Aghabadhi Province while remnants of the Arianan 306th and 304th are attacking
from population centers intentionally using residential areas for cover against potential direct
fire and counterfire from the brigades maneuver units. Bridges and roads are in need of repair.
The U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.S. Department of State want to
meet with the brigade commander, S-7, and S-9 to coordinate stability tasks. All of this occurs
simultaneously and the brigade staff has to describe the operational environment (OE) to the
commander.
The DATE is a dynamic training environment; units can quickly become overwhelmed by
events. A systemic trend for units in a DATE rotation is that they tend to focus on the current
operations (CUOPs) fight and attack targets of opportunity rather than adhere to their approved
criteria; this causes them to desynchronize their combined arms plan and dynamically retask
available collection and joint fires assets. Units also struggle with synchronizing lethal targeting
and inform and influence activities (IIA) that shape and sustain decisive operations. To be
successful in this dynamic training environment, units should consider a holistic approach that
requires detailed integration with simultaneous execution.
To attack or engage both dynamic and planned targets in the DATE, units should conduct
simultaneous targeting for both lethal and non-lethal target sets. To accomplish this, it is
important for units to develop, rehearse, and execute an integrated targeting and operations plan.
As the situation and mission develops, commanders and their staffs make minor adjustments
off of their plans or they run the risk of just reacting to enemy contact. This article discusses an
approach with emphasis on two key points for the brigade staff to consider:
Evolve and adapt to the OE
Integrate simultaneous targeting into the operations process to focus resources and
measure progress.
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Targeting the Complex Threat

The opponent in the DATE is a thinking and adaptable complex threat. This threat reintroduces
a near-peer force that conventional Army units have not faced since the fall of Baghdad in 2003.
The Army is not discarding lessons learned from 11 years of counterinsurgency operations; the
asymmetrical fight has been incorporated into the DATE. Units can expect to target conventional
forces, insurgents, guerrilla forces, criminal elements, and terrorists. Targeting must also focus on
key stability engagements such as provincial authorities, host nation security forces (HNSF), and
internally displaced persons.
Successful targeting in the DATE also results from analysis and understanding of the adversarys
motivations and goals and how enemy operations are affecting conditions in the OE. For
example, not all criminal elements are insurgents; they may have mutual agreements and profit
from providing support to insurgent networks. Guerrilla forces differ from insurgents in that
they are more localized and generally not interested in overthrowing the government. Failure
to holistically analyze the complex threat will cause units to fall into the trap of associating all
threats together and not target effectively to achieve desired outcomes.
Simultaneous Targeting Across Decisive Action Tasks

During deployments, units will conduct decisive action in support of unified land operations
through regular and irregular warfare against complex threats in their OE. Units will accomplish
their tasks through the application of the Armys core competencies of combined arms maneuver
(CAM) and wide area security (WAS) in contiguous and non-contiguous areas of operation.
The mission will determine how the commander weighs the elements of decisive action based
on the staff assessment of changing conditions in the OE and orders from higher headquarters.
For example, units may focus more effort on offensive tasks during the first 24-48 hours of
operations and then transition to defensive tasks. Units must also keep in mind that stability
tasks cannot be put off until a transitional phase of the units mission. Stability tasks, conducted
simultaneously with offensive and defensive tasks, set favorable conditions for a unit to
transition security and governance responsibilities to host nation officials.
During CAM, based on the scenario described above, units conduct operations to defeat enemy
ground forces by targeting high-payoff targets (HPTs) of the 11th DTG, such as 2S19 selfpropelled howitzers, SA6 surface-to-air missile systems, IL220U artillery-locating radar systems,
and T-80 tanks. Although these enemy elements are not yet committed and outside of the units
area of operations, the brigade must work with its higher headquarters to attrit the size of the
enemy force that it will face once the enemy forces enter the brigades area of operations and
become committed.
During WAS, targeting must address the protection of populations, forces, infrastructure, and
activities in order to deny the enemy positions of advantage while consolidating positive gains
to maintain the initiative. Examples of lethal HPTs, based on the scenario, are remnants of the
Arianan 306th and 304th and SAPA elements attacking the brigades rear security area. Nonlethal HPTs are provincial authorities that can mitigate the flood of refugees into the brigades
engagement zones, members of the HNSF leadership who want to coordinate a defense of
Aghabahi Province, and key power brokers who will assist in the restoration of essential services
in Kiberly.
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It is the responsibility of commanders to guide their staffs and synchronize both lethal and nonlethal targeting efforts with operations. The most effective approach to accomplishing this critical
task in the DATE is using the targeting cycle and targeting meetings as the mechanism for the
staff to analyze and synchronize activities. Units develop and allocate priority targets based on
the commanders guidance for fires and approved fire support tasks. The staff identifies close
and rear area targets to engage and must also focus and synchronize their deep targeting with
the higher headquarters in order to shape the brigades close fight with joint fires. Next, the staff
drafts HPTs based on holistic OE analysis and inputs the HPTs into the draft HPT list (HPTL).
The HPTL is a list of recommended and prioritized HPTs that, when engaged, accomplish the
commanders key tasks for each element of decisive action.
Once the commander has prioritized and approved the HPTL, the staff and maneuver units
synergize lethal and non-lethal assets by time, location, and desired effect to support the
commanders objectives. The staff builds the attack guidance matrix with both lethal and nonlethal assets and the target selection standards to set priority of HPT engagement based on
criteria such as target size, target location error, target dwell-time, and desired effect. These
documents form the basis of the target synchronization matrix (TSM), which is an end product of
Annex D (Fire Support) to the units operation order and produced by the brigade fires element.
Integrate and Synchronize Targeting into the Operations Process

The key to conducting simultaneous targeting across the elements of decisive action is the
integration and synchronization of targeting with the operations process. This synchronization
occurs in the brigades main CP to ensure that operations, collections, and targeting are fused
from top to bottom with bottom-up refinement from maneuver units as required.
During the daily targeting meeting, the staff and maneuver element liaison officers synchronize
collection assets to observe named areas of interest (NAIs) and allocate organic and joint fires to
locate and engage HPTs lethally and non-lethally at the direction of the brigade executive officer
(XO). The XO then briefs the brigade commander on the upcoming 24- to 48-hour targeting plan
to gain his approval. For major operations such as defend or counter-attack, the brigade conducts
combined arms and fire support rehearsals. The targeting plan is incorporated into these two
rehearsals to ensure it is nested with maneuver and refined prior to execution of the operation.
While there are several decision support tools that can assist the commander and staff during
execution, three specific matrices provide the staff with the method to conduct simultaneous
targeting: the CUOPs synchronization matrix, the decision support matrix, and the TSM.
The challenge for the staff is bringing all three planning documents together for execution.
The CUOPs matrix is an operations synchronization tool developed and used by the mission
command warfighting function (WfF) elements. The CUOP matrix contains the brigades
collection plan and maneuver tasks. The decision support matrix, also developed by the mission
command WfF, provides a war-gamed course of action with decision points and unit actions for
each decision point. The TSM, developed by the fires WfF elements, provides guidance for the
allocation and employment of collection assets, fire support, joint fires, and IIA in support of
maneuver tasks. Combined, these three matrices become the execution matrices for operations
and targeting at each echelon of the brigade. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0,
The Operations Process, provides guidance on how a unit should utilize an execution matrix
with the decision support matrix (or by WfF), but does not address how to integrate simultaneous
targeting with operations. During execution of operations, doctrine states that it is the
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responsibility of the CUOPs integration cell in the CP to integrate forces and WfFs to accomplish
the mission. The CUOPs integration cell uses the execution matrix to determine which friendly
action to expect forces to execute in the near term or, in conjunction with the decision support
matrix, which execution decisions to make (ADRP 5-0, paragraph 4-21). Figure 4-1 provides an
example of a decision support matrix for a recent DATE rotation which includes lethal and nonlethal decisive action tasks. The staff has included tasks that address simultaneous targeting when
executed as each decision is made by the commander.
Figure 4-1. A sample decision support matrix used during the DATE
What the decision support matrix does not include is the impact of dynamically retasking assets
to attack targets that do not meet indicator requirements or where the commander will accept
risk of not meeting a decision point. The matrix also does not include assessment reporting
requirements to provide the commander and staff with the ability to determine if the decision was
executed according to plan or if it was even effective.
Consolidate Matrices and Execute Integrated Plan

Current Army doctrine does not contain guidance on how units bring these matrices together and
conduct simultaneous targeting across decisive action tasks during a fast-paced DATE rotation.
Units continue to observe breakdowns in simultaneous targeting during the units CUOPs. The
matrices produced by the various WfFs are being executed primarily in a stovepiped manner.
WfFs are focused on their own lanes of the fight and not looking at the bigger picture in terms
of ensuring that the integrated plan they developed together is subsequently being executed
together. Joint and organic assets are dynamically retasked by the CUOPs integration cell as
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the assets become available. As a result, the fires cell loses visibility on collection and joint
fire assets as these assets are retasked. The lack of integration in execution continues to have
cascading effects that impact targeting efforts.
What should be considered is the consolidation of these WfF matrices into a product that is
understood and utilized by each WfF. Figure 4-2 provides an example of an asset synchronization
matrix developed for a contingency operation (CONOP) during a slower-paced mission rehearsal
exercise (MRE). This matrix allocates collection and joint fires to a named operation for a cordon
and search mission. If assets were to be dynamically retasked to support other operations, it is
clear that this CONOP would be impacted and the mission would most likely be canceled. In
the DATE, collection and joint fires are also allocated in the same manner, but the impact of
dynamically retasking assets may not be visible to the CUOPs integration cell. This is where
most simultaneous targeting across decisive action tasks in the DATE breaks down. A CONOP
essentially locks in assets whereas a CUOPs matrix, collection matrix, and the TSM do not.
The CUOPs matrix is used more like a menu from which units select assets based on time and
type rather than task and purpose. Units also do not have enough time in the DATE to develop
CONOPs for each mission to ensure assets are locked in.
Figure 4-2. CONOP asset synchronization matrix used during MREs
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To address this shortfall and accomplish these complex tasks, the CUOPs integration cell must
consider the addition and utilization of the TSM or develop a product, in conjunction with the
fires and intelligence WfFs, that integrates the matrices into one executable document. Figure 4-3
provides an example of a combined decision support matrix, the TSM, and collection plan. The
principles of the targeting methodology of decide, detect, deliver, and assess are overlayed onto
the decision support matrix to provide the CUOPs integration cell with guidance on employing
collection, fires, and joint fires assets for each decision point by priority. The collection asset
allocation provides the cell with guidance on what time organic and joint assets will be available,
what NAIs the asset is to observe, and which decision points the assets are supporting.
Figure 4-3. Combined decision support matrix, TSM, and collection asset allocation
for the DATE
Conclusion
The intent of consolidating the documents is to reduce the amount of dynamic retasking of
organic and joint assets and fuse operations with fires and intelligence in order to integrate and
synchronize targeting into operations. This matrix will provide the CUOPs integration cell with
a tool to conduct simultaneous targeting across decisive action tasks to achieve the commanders
objectives in the DATE.
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Doctrinal References
ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, 16 May 2012.
ADRP 3-09, Fires, 31 August 2012.
ADRP 3-90, Offense and Defense, 31 August 2012.
ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process, 17 May 2012.
ADRP 6-0, Mission Command, 17 May 2012.
Field Manual 3-60, The Targeting Process, 26 November 2010.
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Chapter 5
Fire Support Planning in the Decisive Action Training Environment
MAJ Bryan D. Schott, Joint Multinational Readiness Center
Over the last 10 years of operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation
Iraqi Freedom, the Armys field artillery branch often has been asked to conduct in lieu of
missions or counterinsurgency-centric operations instead of its core fire support mission. While
it has accomplished its assigned missions and performed these tasks well, the effect has been a
degradation of its core fire support planning competencies at all echelons.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the decisive action training environment (DATE) where fire
supporters are required to plan target acquisition, establish and manage radar zones, recommend
fire support coordination measures (FSCMs), establish triggers, conduct battlefield calculus,
develop sensor-to-shooter linkages, create observer plans, manage target lists, and integrate close
air support (CAS) and close combat attack (CCA) while concurrently integrating, coordinating,
and synchronizing it with the maneuver plan.
This article discusses key considerations and focus areas throughout the operations process for
fire supporters to improve their ability to plan, prepare, execute, and assess the fire support plan,
in order to defeat a complex threat in the DATE.
Planning Fire Support Planning and the Military Decisionmaking Process

In the DATE, fire support personnel at all levels must develop fully integrated, coordinated, and
synchronized fire support products that include the required detail and information to ensure top
down fire planning and allow for bottom up refinement. These products include the following:
Annex D (Fire Support)
Fire support execution matrix (FSEM)
Target list worksheet (TLWS)
Attack guidance matrix (AGM)
High-payoff target list (HPTL)
The fires cell responsibility for mission analysis begins before the mission is received and is
continuous in the DATE. It must develop and maintain an accurate staff estimate to quickly
transition between offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. The fires cell also must communicate
clearly the results of the mission analysis and obtain the commanders guidance for fire support.
At a minimum, the fires cell mission analysis and staff estimate should include the following:
Fire support running estimate (gun status/location, mortar tube status/location, radar
status/location, CAS status, etc.)
Specified/implied tasks from higher headquarters
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Draft HPTL
Established/recommended FSCMs
Fire support intelligence preparation of the battlefield status (enemy capabilities,
pattern analysis, likely firing locations)
Fire support capabilities and limitations
Recommended fire support tasks (FSTs) and purposes
The focus of course of action (COA) development is to build the initial execution portion of
the FSTs. This will outline how to accomplish the FSTs. The fire support officer (FSO) should
develop as much of the execution as possible to facilitate his participation in the wargaming
process. The remainder of the details and timing will be finalized during COA analysis.
The key output for the COA development is the development of the FSTs and the draft
fire support products (Annex D, FSEM, TLWS, AGM, HPTL). Skipping or conducting an
abbreviated COA development may result in undeveloped details of these products, which may
hinder analysis of the final details, refinement, validation of capabilities, and synchronization of
the fire support plan during the wargaming process. This further affects the orders production and
operation order brief, as the key details of the concept of fires cannot be briefed or rehearsed.
The outputs from the COA development will directly support the COA analysis. Therefore, the
FSO and members of the staff must finish COA development as completely as possible before
beginning COA analysis.
As the staff goes through the COA analysis/wargaming process, the FSO wargames against the
same enemy COA as the maneuver elements do. The process of wargaming is typically done
by turns. On the first turn, the FSO should use the draft FSEM from the COA development as a
script and should give the initial set for all the fire support assets, such as combat observation and
lasing teams (COLTs), fire support teams, mortars, artillery, radar locations, FSCMs, etc. During
each turn, the FSO must be prepared to give the focus of fires, any FSTs being accomplished,
priorities of fires, targets being fired (to include triggers), primary and alternate observers, active
radar zones, and any other changes that have occurred during that time. If there are no changes,
the FSO just says no changes and keeps the wargaming moving.
The FSO should come out of wargaming with at least an 80 percent solution on the fire support
plan. Then, once the commander selects a COA, all the FSO has to do is refine the wargaming
products and he is ready to publish the fire support annex.
Top-down fire planning is critical in the DATE because it ensures the plan is integrated and
synchronized at the highest level. Fires plans must also be developed in coordination with the
supported staff and tied into the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). If the staff is going
into a time-constrained planning process or receives a directed COA, fire supporters must be
prepared to coordinate directly with other staff members.
Using as a baseline, the Fort Sill White Paper, Fire Support Planning for the BCT and Below, 29
Jan 2009, Figure 5-1 displays a checklist for FSOs and fire support noncommissioned officers to
verify all appropriate products are developed during the MDMP and fires plan.
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Figure 5-1. Fires planning and MDMP checklist
Preparation Rehearsals
Preparation consists of activities performed by units to improve their ability to execute an
operation (Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, Unified Land Operations, 10 October 2011).
Preparation includes, but is not limited to, refinement of the plan, coordination, inspections,
and rehearsals. Rehearsals help staffs at all levels better understand their role in operations and
creates conditions that improve the units chances of success.
Combat rehearsals help units gain agility, ensure synchronization, increase initiative, and
improve depth of knowledge through practice. Both fire support and maneuver actions should be
rehearsed to reinforce the scheme of maneuver and fire plan. During the rehearsal, units should
address specific actions to accomplish tasks and correct problems on the spot. A rehearsal should
both practice and test the plan.
Rehearsal procedures should be established as a part of unit standing operating procedures
(SOPs). As a minimum, SOPs should identify the following:
Who will participate in the rehearsal?
Who is in charge of the rehearsal?
What should be rehearsed?
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What is the sequence of the rehearsal? (Have a predetermined list of items to be

covered.)
What is the priority of the methods for rehearsals? (Use representative or actual terrain,
model, map, sand table, wire, or radio.)
A successful rehearsal will:
Ensure understanding of the plan.
Synchronize fire support with the maneuver plan.
Exercise primary and alternate communications nets.
Ensure redundant observers and attack systems.
Improve responsiveness of fires.
Verify target triggering responsibility.
Validate the plan.
Brigade/battalion fire support personnel may be involved in several types of rehearsals. Two
of the most common types of rehearsals are the fire support rehearsals and combined arms
rehearsals. Multiple rehearsals ensure that maximum synchronization is gained in supporting the
scheme of maneuver with fires. However, when time is limited, units may reduce the number and
scope of rehearsals, focus the rehearsals on key FSTs or particular aspects of the maneuver or fire
support plans, and conduct combined fire support/field artillery rehearsals.
Fire support rehearsals focus on the execution of FSTs, the effectiveness of FSCMs, and the
timing and synchronization of all fire support efforts with each other and with the scheme of
maneuver. Fire support rehearsals serve as tools to prepare for the combined arms rehearsals and
to refine and reinforce key FSTs after the combined arms rehearsal. The fire support rehearsal
and the field artillery technical rehearsal should normally take place before the combined arms
rehearsal. It is imperative that the brigade/battalion fire supporters know they can support the
plan. If a combined arms rehearsal is not conducted, a fire support rehearsal may serve as the
primary preparation for execution of the fire support plan.
A fire support rehearsal may include key maneuver and fire support personnel involved in
planning and executing the fire support plan, to include the direct support field artillery battalion
tactical operations center. The fire support rehearsal may also be limited in scope with only fire
support personnel and field artillery brigade/battalion personnel participating. A technique is
to use the FSEM as a script for executing fires to support the scheme of maneuver. The field
artillery battalion uses and verifies the field artillery support plan.
The brigade/battalion task force (TF) FSO should run the brigade/battalion TF fire support
rehearsal. Include the brigade/battalion TF S-2 to consider enemy actions. Ensure subordinate
FSOs and observers understand their roles in the plan by having them identify the targets and
triggers for which they are responsible, to include how fires will be lifted and shifted during an
operation. The key is to ensure the brigade/battalion TF is able to execute its FSTs.
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While there is no doctrinal template on how to conduct a fires rehearsal, the Fort Sill
White Paper, Fire Support Planning for the BCT and Below, 29 January 2009, lays out a
recommendation. Figures 5-2 and 5-3 provide recommendations for attendees and the outcomes
of the fires rehearsal.
Figure 5-2. Fires rehearsal attendees and outcomes from Fort Sill White Paper, Fire
Support Planning for the BCT and Below, 29 Jan 2009.
Figure 5-3. Fires rehearsal agenda from Fort Sill White Paper, Fire Support Planning for
the BCT and Below, 29 Jan 2009.
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During the combined arms rehearsal, the unit S-3 normally directs the rehearsal using a
synchronization matrix and/or execution checklist; the fire support coordinator (FSCOORD)/
FSO should use his FSEM. In doing so, the rehearsal is normally executed by reciting and/or
performing:
Actions to occur.
Possible friendly initiatives.
Possible reactions to enemy initiatives.
Control measures.
Significant events in relation to time or phases of the operation.
For each phase or time period of the operation, the FSCOORD/FSO should cover the following
as a minimum:
Verify grid locations for critical targets.
Verify trigger points for each target and target engagement criteria.
Confirm a primary and backup observer for each target.
Verify primary and backup communications links for each observer.
Verify that each target has a task and a purpose (what effects are to be achieved) and
that targeting priorities are clearly outlined.
Verify the method of engagement (at my command, time on target, or when ready).
Verify attack guidance is specified for each target (such as unit(s) to fire, shell-fuze
combination, and number of volleys).
Verify the movement plan, specifying when and where units will move.
For units preparing for a DATE rotation, the unit should train on how to conduct proper fire
support and combined arms rehearsals and ensure all participants understand their roles and
responsibilities prior to arrival at a combat training center. Units must make rehearsals part of
all operations, placing emphasis on the outputs of the rehearsals and following through with
adjustments and subsequent fragmentary orders (FRAGOs). Units must also establish primary,
alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) plans for frequency modulated (FM) radio and
digital rehearsals and ensure they are included in the planning timeline.
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Execution Implementation of the Fire Support Plan

During execution, commanders focus their activities on directing, assessing, and leading while
improving the understanding and modifying their visualization (Army Doctrine Reference
Publication 5-0, The Operations Process, 17 May 2012). The staff, through the current
operations, integrates forces and warfighting functions to accomplish the mission and makes
refinements to the plan.
Due to the dynamic nature of the DATE, units must continuously refine their fire support plan
and products in order to keep them current and synchronized. The fires cell, in conjunction with
the staff, should integrate deliberate targeting into their operations process by conducting daily
target synchronization meetings or operational synchronization (OPSYNCH) meetings to further
develop and refine their deliberate targeting efforts for the next 24 to 48 hours.
During these meetings, the staff and fires cell should conduct and assessment of current
operations and allocate or re-allocate intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets,
field artillery, CAS, and CCA to subordinate units in support of the scheme of maneuver.
The subordinate units should then provide bottom-up refinement for named areas of interest,
observers, and priority targets. The end result is an updated target synchronization matrix or
OPSYNCH matrix that can be used to continue current operations.
Prior to a DATE rotation or training event, units must develop a deliberate targeting process that
is supportable within their battle rhythm. It should ensure that the products developed during
the MDMP, such as the Annex D, FSEM, TLWS, AGM, and HPTL, can be quickly refined,
re-synchronized, and redistributed to both higher and subordinate units based on the changing
environment.
Assessment Fires Running Estimate

Assessment is continuous. It precedes and guides operations and consists of monitoring the
current situation, evaluating progress, and recommending or directing action for improvement.
In the DATE, a detailed running estimate is critical to the continuous assessment of the
situation and can be used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the
commanders intent. By employing an effective running estimate, the fires cell can continuously
assess the impact of new information on the conduct of fire support for the operation, updates the
estimate, and determines if adjustments to fire support for the operation are required. It can also
be used in order to monitor the current situation for unexpected fire support successes, failures,
or enemy actions that can prevent the operation from progressing toward the desired end state.
The fires cell must determine what is critical for the fires running estimate during the operation.
The following are some of the key items that may be tracked as part of the fires running estimate
in the DATE:
The task organization of subordinate forces and their missions.
The status and location of field artillery resources, including cannons and multiple
launch rocket system launchers, ammunition, and target acquisition assets.
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The availability and location of other fire support resources, including mortars, naval
gunfire, tactical air support, and Army aviation support.
The allocation of resources, weapons, and munitions for counterfire.
The recommended counterfire priorities for each phase of the battle.
The identification of new HPTs.
Communication status with subordinate units, radars, COLTs, etc.
The availability and condition of roads, trails, and likely position areas. This leads to
the coordination of movement and position areas with the operations staff.
Ammunition consumption and resupply rates, repositioning requirements, and priority
of sustainment.
Changes to survey and meteorological conditions.
Current status of HPTs and battle damage assessment from observers.
After determining what is going to be tracked, the unit must develop a battle drill or SOP on how
it is going to be done and who is responsible for both providing and tracking the information.
Armed with this information, the fires cell can monitor the current operation for opportunities,
threats, and progress and make adjustments to the fires plan as needed.
Conclusion
Units preparing for a future DATE rotation should focus on the following areas during train-up
exercises and during the actual rotation:
Develop SOPs on what information must be tracked and how it will be tracked in order
to maintain an accurate fires running estimate throughout the operation.
Focus on the inputs and outputs for the development of the fire support plan while
conducting the MDMP. Ensure the staff understands the requirements to adequately
coordinate, integrate, and synchronize fires.
Ensure fire support products (Annex D, FSEM, TLWS, AGM, HPTL) include the
required detail and information to ensure top-down fire planning and hold units
accountable for bottom-up refinement.
Conduct fire support and FM fire rehearsals often and ensure all participants understand
their roles and responsibilities. Ensure rehearsals focus on the identified outputs and
follow through with adjustments and FRAGOs. Establish PACE plans for FM and
digital rehearsals and ensure they are included in the planning timeline.
Ensure deliberate targeting is part of the operations process by conducting daily target
synchronization meetings or OPSYNCH to refine the fire support plan and keep it
current and synchronized.
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Acknowledging that every plan will change, ensure staffs and commanders balance the
tendency to abandon the plan too soon against persisting in a failing effort too long.
Use situational understanding and the fires running estimate to assess progress and
make execution and adjustment decisions.
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Chapter 6
Brigade Tactics and Techniques for Inform and Influence Activities in Decisive
Action Training Environments
LTC Kevin Spielman, Joint Multinational Readiness Center
Brigade combat teams (BCTs) face many complex challenges in the decisive action training
environment (DATE). These challenges include having to contend with organized conventional
military forces that have an information warfare capability; a robust media environment;
insurgent groups with appealing narratives; and organized criminal/smuggler networks that,
through their activities, serve as key information conduits to the populace. To effectively
compete in this challenging information environment, units must properly integrate, inform and
influence activities (IIA) enablers and also conduct messaging to achieve desired effects. This
article discusses several key tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that BCTs can utilize to
ensure IIA enablers are effectively employed, and recommends TTP for improving messaging
coordination and overall effectiveness in the information environment.
Integrating Inform and Influence Activities Enablers

BCTs, to include headquarters elements, are required to move often in a DATE. Units are not
operating from fixed locations with established communications, subordinate units most likely
will not have an assigned operational environment (OE) to engage in, and there may not be
other U.S. forces on the ground that the unit can linkup with and get an update of the situation
in the population centers. These conditions make it challenging for the proper integration of
IIA enablers such as military information support operations (MISO) units (formerly known as
psychological operations units), public affairs units, and civil affairs units. BCTs strive to ensure
the most effective use of these assets, but without the proper initial linkup, coordination, and
guidance, these assets will most likely only play a marginal role in effectively influencing the
information environment.
One technique units can utilize to positively affect the initial linkup with non-organic enabler
forces is to establish a deliberate integration plan that includes the use of a checklist. Army
Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0, The Operations Process, May 2012, states
Integration for new Soldiers includes training on unit standing operating procedures (SOPs) and
mission essential tasks for the operation. It also means orienting new Soldiers on their places and
roles in the force and during the operation. Based on ADRP 5-0, the checklist should include,
but is not limited to the following:
Introduction of the new unit(s) to the supported force.
Operational environment and mission briefs.
Exchanging of SOPs and reporting requirements and procedures.
Conducting rehearsals.
Establishing communications links.
Defining logistics support responsibilities.
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By conducting a thorough and deliberate initial integration of IIA enablers, BCTs can facilitate
the effective use of these assets. They can also make these assets better prepared to operate in
a DATE, where they will be continuously challenged by command and control issues while
operating in new or changing information environments.
Units operating in the DATE will face adversarial forces that are in complete control of the
information environment in some areas due to the fact that they have established a foothold
and friendly forces have not yet arrived. This challenges a units ability to conduct messaging
and effectively compete in the information environment. A technique for units to use in
situations like this is to look beyond their own organic IIA enablers and coordinate for the use
of higher headquarters enablers. Getting this accomplished will require good coordination
and communication with the higher headquarters in order to ensure the right message is sent
at the right time by the right asset. A good example of this is requesting messaging ahead of
where friendly forces are located by using an air platform like the EC-130J Commando Solo or
requesting a MISO leaflet for drop over areas where no friendly forces are located.
Integrating IIA enablers above the BCT level increases the units ability to conduct messaging
across a broader array of targets as well as over an increased geographical area, thus increasing
overall effects in the information environment. This puts the BCT in a better position to achieve
not only tactical success on the ground, but also success in the information environment at large.
Soldiers are powerful IIA enablers under a BCTs control. Soldiers often times have direct
access to the population groups and key leaders that we are seeking to inform and influence.
Additionally, Soldiers words and actions are often closely monitored and reported on by the
local populace, the media, and our adversaries. Given this, Soldiers have a tremendous impact
on the information environment. Therefore, they must be briefed on the information environment
they operate in and must be armed to communicate messages which facilitate mission
accomplishment.
To ensure Soldiers understand the information environment, a good procedure is to make it
a mandatory requirement for all leaders to provide a current information environment update
as part of paragraph one (Situation) of their operations order. This update should include
information on the physical dimension of the information environment, which encompasses
things like media broadcast facilities in the area, important meeting places, symbolic objects,
and key organizations and leaders. The information environment update should also include
an assessment of the informational dimension or how information flows in the area and how
accurate the information is currently being disseminated in the OE. Finally, the information
environment update should include information on the cognitive dimension of the information
environment, which would be a review of the values, beliefs, and perceptions of the populace in
the area who are receiving and transmitting information.
Chapter two of Joint Publication 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the OE, 16 June 2009,
is a good reference for units and leaders to use when developing the information environment
update for their orders. BCT S7s, in coordination with BCT public affairs officers (PAOs), should
also provide assistance to subordinate unit leaders in developing this portion of the operations
order.
In addition to increasing Soldier understanding of the information environment, units should also
seek to improve their abilities to effectively communicate. BCT S7s, in coordination with BCT
PAOs, should arm Soldiers with a simple and clear set of talking points for encounters with the
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local populace or media in the area. These talking points should also be reviewed during orders
briefs to ensure Soldiers are aware of the latest messages. Table 1-2 of ADRP 3-0, Unified Land
Operations, May 2012, outlines The Soldiers Rules. A good procedure for units to implement
is to develop talking points cards, which have the units current talking points on one side and
The Soldiers Rules on the other. These cards can be a reference for Soldiers as well as a visual
reminder of the messages they need to communicate and the actions they need to take in order to
ensure mission accomplishment.
The Soldiers Rules

FFSoldiers fight only enemy combatants.
FFSoldiers do not harm enemies who surrender. They disarm them and turn
them over to their superiors.
FFSoldiers do not kill or torture any personnel in their custody.

FFSoldiers collect and care for the wounded, whether friend or foe.
FFSoldiers do not attack medical personnel, facilities, or equipment.
FFSoldiers destroy no more than the mission requires.
FFSoldiers treat civilians humanely.
FFSoldiers do not steal. Soldiers respect private property and possessions.
FFSoldiers should do their best to prevent violations of the law of war.
FFSoldiers report all violations of the law of war to their superiors.
Figure 6-1. The Soldiers Rules, from ADRP 3-0, Chapter 1, Page 1-14, Paragraph 1-86.
Properly preparing Soldiers to be effective IIA enablers increases the chance that real time
engagements on the ground will produce the intended results in the information environment and
facilitate overall mission accomplishment.
Planning for Messaging in the Information Environment

The DATE presents a competitive information environment for BCTs. With multiple actors
conducting messaging it is imperative that the unit effectively plans and prepares its messaging
efforts. IIA input to the military decisionmaking process is critical in ensuring the effective
delivery of unit messages. A key technique for ensuring effective IIA (messaging) is to ensure the
information environment is accounted for during mission analysis and that the significant aspects
of the information environment are included into the intelligence preparation of the battlefield.
Doing this improves situational awareness and understanding across the staff, and also provides
a good indication of the types of messaging (and/or message delivery systems) that will be
required for the mission.
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More TTP are available for BCTs to use: One of these is to ensure that during course of action
analysis (wargame) the task and purpose of IIA enablers are reviewed as well as the key
messages that will be communicated. The BCT S-2, in coordination with the BCT S-7 and PAO,
should also incorporate the task and purpose of adversary information warfare enablers and
adversary key messages as part of the wargame. Including adversary information warfare into the
wargame will allow the unit to refine its messaging efforts as well as better anticipate adversary
actions in the information environment. Conducting formal rehearsals of key IIA events is
another good practice. These rehearsals would be conducted during preparation activities and
should be utilized for major IIA events. A good example of this would be a unit press conference
where multiple local, regional, and international media outlets are present. These events are
unique opportunities for the BCT to deliver messages that will reach audiences not only at the
tactical level, but also have the potential to communicate at the operational and strategic levels
as well. Given this, it is important for BCTs to rehearse their expected actions at these events in
order to improve their performance during the execution of the event, facilitating overall mission
accomplishment.
A final tactic for units to consider when conducting messaging is pre-emptive messaging. This
form of messaging is difficult because it requires BCTs to anticipate future adversary actions/
messaging and get out ahead of them. This requires an in-depth understanding of the OE, and
good coordination with the S-2 section. An example of when to use these TTP is if intelligence
reporting indicated that the enemy force planned to put indirect fires in close proximity to a
heavily populated built up area. The S-7, in coordination with the S-2, and MISO personnel
could develop a line of messaging and audio/video products to blame the enemy force in advance
of them employing the indirect fires. This is a pro-active form of IIA that, in this case, seeks to
ensure the enemy is held accountable for their actions and any associated civilian casualties or
collateral damage. This action would require the BCT S-7 section to maintain a solid linkage
with the S-2. Additionally, the S-7 would most likely be required to work within the next twentyfour to seventy-two hour window in order to ensure required actions and messages get out in a
timely manner.
BCTs are exposed to complex challenges while operating in the DATE. This article suggests and
discusses key TTP for units to utilize to improve their abilities to integrate IIA enabler forces
and conduct effective messaging. Following the procedures and recommendations outlined in
this article should improve the BCTs ability to meet the complex challenges of the DATE, and
facilitate unit success in achieving positive effects in the information environment that ultimately
facilitates overall mission success for the BCT.
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Chapter 7
Integrating Air Defense into the Brigades Military Decisionmaking Process in
the Decisive Action Training Environment
CPT Kyle W. Anderson, Joint Multinational Readiness Center
The two decisive action training environment rotations at the Joint Multinational Readiness
Center have incorporated a robust enemy aerial threat that included rotary-wing, fixed-wing,
and unmanned aircraft systems (UASs). This incorporation of red air has been a key factor in
training units to plan for all aspects of near-peer enemies. From a three dimensional perspective,
future opponents will likely utilize cheap UASs to identify targets for indirect and direct fire
engagements, in addition to any type of conventional rotary- and fixed-wing capabilities. To
counter this threat, short-range air defense (SHORAD) artillery assets have been task organized
to the maneuver training units. However, the reduced focus on SHORAD integration with
maneuver forces over the last decade has decayed both brigade combat team staff planners
and maneuver air defenders ability to integrate and synchronize these assets to support the
overall brigade scheme of maneuver. There are key features throughout each step of the military
decisionmaking process that will enable a better brigade air defense plan and assist in countering
the red air threat.
During the mission analysis phase, the air defense airspace management (ADAM) cell must
work with the brigade intelligence officer to conduct aerial intelligence preparation of the
battlefield (IPB). At a minimum, the ADAM cell and brigade intelligence officer must identify
the enemy air avenues of approach, the enemy air order of battle, enemy sortie generation rates,
aerial weapons capabilities, ordnance release lines, enemy airfields, and hostile threat criteria for
identification purposes. This information not only assists the air defense artillery (ADA) planner,
but should also generate target nominations during the brigades targeting cycles to defeat red
air. Most of this aerial IPB information should be reflected on the brigades enemy situation
template, but the minimum that must be shown includes the enemy air avenues of approach,
ordnance release lines, and projected enemy high-value targets that they will prosecute using
aerial capabilities. After conducting mission analysis, the ADAM cell, in conjunction with the
SHORAD commander, should receive initial guidance from the brigade commander regarding
the brigades priorities for air defense. This guidance will allow them to focus their limited assets
on defending the most critical brigade assets and develop the brigades defended or critical asset
lists.
After finishing mission analysis and conducting aerial IPB, the ADAM cell executes course
of action development. Based on the commanders priorities for air defense, the ADAM cell
should identify the assets or locations that can be defended with the SHORAD assets available
and identify the best locations for radar employment. This also allows the ADAM cell to notify
the commander of where he may have to assume risk or ask higher headquarters for more air
defense assets. After identifying which assets or locations to defend, the ADAM cell must ensure
the appropriate command support relationship is directed for the ADA elements. Failure to do
so may result in poor logistical support, an uncertain engagement authority chain, and confusion
over tasking authority. Once command support relationships are established, the ADAM cell
and SHORAD commander can then develop the scheme of maneuver for the ADA assets. Using
the enemy air avenues of approach, and ensuring that enemy ordnance release lines are factored
in, the ADAM cell and SHORAD commander must identify battle positions (primary, alternate,
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subsequent), sectors of fire, engagement criteria, displacement criteria, radar coverage times
and zones, coverage type (i.e. weighted, overlapping, defense in depth, etc.), and actions upon
change in local air defense warning. This list is certainly not complete, but is a starting point for
planners.
The air defense scheme of maneuver can be tested during the wargaming process. Wargaming
should allow the ADAM cell to identify gaps in coverage that can be exploited by the enemy.
The red cell, or opposing force representative, should actively try to engage critical assets
exploiting the full extent of his aerial capabilities. Once wargaming is complete, the ADAM cell
writes its portion of Annex E (Protection) to the brigade operations order. This annex should
provide clear tasks and purposes for the SHORAD units and highlight the passive and active air
defense measures for the rest of the brigade.
Employing maneuver air defense assets has become a lost art due to the nature of recent
conflicts. However, future wars will likely not have the same level of air supremacy or even air
superiority that has been enjoyed for the last decade. Enemies will utilize a wide array of manned
and unmanned systems, and brigades must be prepared to request, synchronize, and employ
SHORAD assets to support the overall scheme of maneuver and defeat any and all aerial threats.
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Chapter 8
Tackling Communications Challenges During a Decisive Action
Training Environment Rotation
MAJ Edward Norris, Joint Multinational Readiness Center
Maintaining reliable tactical communications in a stable environment is challenging enough;
maintaining communications in a complex and continuously changing environment requires
creative and adaptive tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). Field Manual 6-02.43, Signal
Soldiers Guide, March 2009, advises to support the commander with reliable and vigorous
communications through planning. To conduct such planning, leaders must understand the
dynamics of operating in a decisive action training environment (DATE). There are significant
challenges that units face in providing reliable robust communications:
Speed of maneuver in the offense.
Successful synchronization within echelons throughout a maneuver area.
Use of retransmission (RETRANS) teams.
Command post dynamics and geometry.
The challenge of speed of maneuver in the offense is that units can literally outrun their
frequency modulation (FM) radio communications. Standard RETRANS planning identifies
primary and alternate positions and triggers for the displacement of FM RETRANS teams
without underestimating unit operational tempo. For example, to provide FM coverage and
maintain mission command during a high-tempo movement to contact mission, units can use the
tactic of bounding RETRANS teams. This entails moving one RETRANS team forward after the
other team is set in position, similar to the tactical maneuver of bounding overwatch. Each team
would have recommended positions to establish along a units planned route. The disadvantage
of using this tactic is having to dedicate RETRANS teams to particular units, reducing resources
and RETRANS flexibility throughout the rest of the brigade.
Another technique is to develop and prepare additional contingent RETRANS teams for greater
flexibility and coverage. These teams could be detached from the signal company. Contingency
planning by the signal company should include identifying additional RETRANS vehicles, and
ensuring they have the proper equipment to support when needed.
A third method is to use a rolling RETRANS. The capabilities of the Advanced Special
Improvement Program radio models enable a unit to execute a same-net relay. To accomplish this
technique, selected vehicle crews would connect a RETRANS dog-bone cable to two radios and
configure them as mobile RETRANS stations. This technique has demonstrated excellent results
for lower echelons.
The last procedure is to utilize the TOCNETs (Tactical Operations Center Intercommunications
System) software, Crew Access Unit System, to relay command post net identifications through
the strategic network. Each Warfighter Information Network-Tactical element pulls the FM
through the network, removing the line-of-site requirement. This procedure requires Command
Post Nodes to be up and operating in a stable environment a significant challenge during a
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movement to contact mission. By identifying and implementing these TTP, the signal community
could provide robust communications across a large maneuver area.
A second major challenge units face is the diverse terrain across a maneuver area, which includes
rolling hills, large ridges, and valleys. An S-6 staff officer must understand that the terrain
selected for command post location directly impacts the FM architecture. During each planning
phase, the S-6s at each echelon must actively participate in the selection of each location for
their command posts. Each of these proposed command post locations must meet the operational
planning requirements and provide suitable communications coverage. Upon execution of the
command post displacement, the S-6 section must have a representative with the advance parties
in the event an unplanned location is selected due to constraints related to the factors of mission,
enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations.
If a command post ends up in a communications dead space, this complicates communications
connectivity to all other echelons, and requires the allocation of additional resources to move
the necessary volume of information. The remedy for this deficiency is for the S-6 or one of his
senior personnel to accompany the advance party for each command post movement.
High personnel turnover is always a challenge for units, especially in the turnover of key
positions that require special training. Standing operating procedures (SOPs) or aide-memoire
products must be available for new personnel. To maintain continuity during personnel
transitions, units must establish and update TTP, SOPs, smart books, or any other products that
can be provided to incoming personnel. A RETRANS SOP should cover, but not be limited to the
following:
Terrain.
Reporting procedures.
Priorities of work.
Antenna emplacement.
Systems employment.
Load plans.
Checklists.
Security requirements.
Additional challenges that should be covered include: logistical support, driving TTP,
information flow to and from higher headquarters, and evacuation procedures.
The challenge of planning how to support three simultaneously operational regimental command
posts (the main command post, the tactical command post, and the mobile command group)
requires an understanding of their operations, the commanders preferences, and the information
requirements. While providing communications for command is critical, the communications for
control must be developed to allow staff collaboration. Based on the commanders preferences,
the S-6 must adequately support each element. This requires the S-6 team to train as they will
fight to ensure they have capable coverage at each location.
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Planning considerations during the initial military decisionmaking process requires the S-6 to
understand the role of each command element, the information requirements, and communication
capabilities of each command post. Armed with this information, the S-6 can define how the
communicators can support each command post without overlooking the other two.
Understanding the multiple complexities of a DATE environment is critical in planning for and
providing reliable and robust communications. Ensuring that these lessons learned and TTP are
captured, integrating these TTP into planning, and disseminating them to the lowest level can
reduce risk and supplement planning in a time-constrained environment for future operations.
Knowing the organization and equipment, the training and capabilities of Soldiers, and the
commanders intent are key features in providing the means for a units mission command
communications.
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Chapter 9
Legal Challenges in the Decisive Action Training Environment: What Judge
Advocates Need to Know about Declared Hostile Forces, Surrendering Forces,
and the Collateral Damage Methodology
MAJ Marc B. Washburn, Joint Multinational Readiness Center
Brigade judge advocates (BJAs) in a decisive action training environment (DATE) encounter a
myriad of legal issues not commonly faced by their predecessors during previous deployments in
support of Operations Iraqi Freedom/New Dawn (OIF/OND) and Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF). In recent years, the Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps devoted significant resources
and efforts to prepare deploying judge advocates to identify legal issues in a counterinsurgency
(COIN) environment. BJAs have capitalized on this training provided in these mission-tailored
programs and excelled in deployed environments. BJAs have integrated themselves well within
the structured one-, two-, or three-week targeting cycles of most brigades in OEF or OIF/OND.
However, while the DATE allows BJAs to incorporate many of their lessons learned from
COIN, it also presents them with a host of new challenges to address namely, a near-peer
conventional force adversary (Ariana); a host-nation minority political party (South Atropian
Peoples Party) with a paramilitary structured, disciplined paramilitary force capable of massing
effects (South Atropian Peoples Army [SAPA]); a functioning terrorist organization enjoying
relative safe haven (Shariat Jamat); and numerous criminal elements. In addition, the DATE
presents a host of humanitarian problems, including numerous internal displaced persons and
potential for force majeure-induced humanitarian crises. All of these challenges are presented
within the territory of a functional, albeit politically fragile and stressed, sovereign state in the
Caucasus geopolitical region (Atropia).
The net effect in the DATE is that BJAs now encounter faster, multiple, simultaneous targeting
cycles, while concurrently conducting current operations, future operations, and operational
planning. To be successful in the DATE, BJAs will need to focus preparation on three primary
areas:
Identifying and researching potential legal issues.
Revising pre-deployment law of war (LOW) and rules of engagement (ROE) training
to address the specific challenges encountered in the DATE.
Thoroughly integrating themselves into all facets of the military decisionmaking
process (MDMP) in order to maximize their abilities to proactively address legal
issues.
This article focuses in depth only on the first area to help judge advocates prepare for
potential legal issues. By identifying these issues before training rotations, BJAs will be postured
to tailor the LOW/ROE training for the scenario. They will also be better able to integrate into
the MDMP.
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Positive Identification of Declared Hostile Forces

In the DATE, the National Command Authority typically declares the Arianan Conventional
Forces and SAPA as hostile. Upon such a declaration, the ROE enable units to engage the forces
without observing a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent.1 Once positively identified as
a declared hostile, the force or individual may be engaged unless surrendering or hors de combat
due to sickness or wounds.2
The use of DHF presents the judge advocate with numerous challenges. These factors should be
addressed during the intelligence preparation of the battlefield step of MDMP. First, the judge
advocate will need to advise commanders and Soldiers on how to positively identify a DHF.
Positive identification (PID) is the reasonable certainty that a functionally and geospacially
defined object of attack is a legitimate military target in accordance with the law of war and
applicable ROE.3 Commanders may use any reasonably reliable means to establish PID,
including information derived from human, signal, or electronic sources, radar acquisition,
unmanned aircraft systems, or direct observation.
Typically, units have little difficulty with positive identification of Arianan conventional forces
as DHF. The challenge lies in identifying SAPA. As a paramilitary group, SAPA often operates
from among the population in a hodge-podge variety of civilian clothing. They are difficult to
distinguish from other individuals who are not DHF civilians, criminal elements, and even
terrorists. In the absence of PID, the individual may not be targeted based upon their status as a
DHF, but only upon their actions as a result of committing a hostile act or demonstrating hostile
intent.
Judge advocates in the DATE must identify this issue during mission analysis for the
commander. This may require the commander to establish priority intelligence requirements
devoted to this purpose, which will lead to the S-2 designating named areas of intelligence and
allocating collection assets to the task. Without doing so, the unit benefits little from the tactical
advantage of SAPAs designation as a DHF.
Surrendering Forces
In addition to positively identified DHF, judge advocates must ensure that units and individuals
know the procedures to follow and LOW considerations relating to surrendering DHFs. While
these should be incorporated into initial unit ROE training, judge advocates also have the
opportunity to address the issue with written guidance as part of a fragmentary order issued
during military planning and with rehearsal during wargaming. In all cases, the judge advocate
should be prepared to: (1) clearly articulate that DHF who are surrendering may not be engaged;
(2) reiterate and rehearse the reporting and investigation requirements if DHF have been, or may
have been engaged while in the process of surrendering; (3) provide guidance on ways units and
individuals may determine whether a DHF is actually surrendering; and (4) ensure subordinate
units understand how to detain and process individuals who have surrendered.
International law recognizes that units or individuals can surrender by any means that
communicates the intent to give up.4 There is no clear-cut rule as to what constitutes surrender.
However, most [nations] agree that surrender constitutes a cessation of resistance and placement
of ones self at the discretion of the captor.5 The onus is on the person or force surrendering to
communicate the intent to surrender.6
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Failure to properly prepare for or handle surrendering forces can have adverse operational and
strategic consequences in the DATE. The most critical of these is that enemy units or individuals
will continue hostilities and be unlikely to surrender when they observe or perceive their
adversary violating the LOW by not enabling forces to surrender. This could drastically impact
the units stability tasks in the area.
Inherent Right of Self-Defense and the Collateral Damage Methodology

An emerging trend in the DATE is that new BJAs initially struggle to understand and correctly
apply the CDM. This is in large part to the fact that the CDM is not the primary focus of
instruction during the Judge Advocate Graduate Course and has very little mention in the
Operational Law (OPLAW) Handbook.7 Those who are proficient, gained their understanding
from either prior deployments in an OPLAW position or from attendance at the Joint Collateral
Damage Estimation (CDE) Training and Certification Program.8
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3160.01, No Strike and the
Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology, 13 Feb 2009, is the primary reference for all
judge advocates to review before conducting the DATE. CJCSI 3160.01 reiterates that it is
an inherent responsibility of all commanders . . . and targeting personnel to: (1) establish PID
and accurately locate targets with current military objectives and mission specific ROE; (2)
identify potential collateral concerns prior to munitions release and target engagement; and apply
the CDM with due diligence to mission objectives, force protection and collateral damage.9
The judge advocate clearly falls within the scope of targeting personnel. Only by becoming
proficient in this instruction, can judge advocates effectively advise their commanders and staffs
during targeting.
Inherent Right of Self-Defense
The most common question to judge advocates is whether a formal CDE is required for a
particular target, and if so, who is the correct target engagement authority under the ROE. All too
often, the question arises during a counterfire mission or with troops in contact.
At the outset, JAGs must carefully articulate the difference between the inherent right of selfdefense and applying the CDM during targeting. CJCSI 3160.01 clearly states that the CDM
does not limit a commanders inherent right to self-defense under the LOW.10
When the use of force in self-defense is necessary, including in situation
with troops in contact, the nature, duration and scope of force should
not exceed that which is required to respond decisively to hostile acts or
demonstrated hostile intent. The concept of proportionality in self-defense
is not to be confused with attempts to minimize collateral damage and the
other tenets of LOW during military operations.11
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In situations involving self-defense, unit commanders always retain the inherent right and
obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate action in self-defense
of the commanders unit and other U.S. forces in the vicinity.12 Unless otherwise directed by a
unit commander, military members may exercise individual self-defense in response to a hostile
act or demonstrated hostile intent.13 If time and circumstances permit, commanders should
attempt to de-escalate the situation. Any force used in self-defense must be proportional: It must
be sufficient to respond decisively, it may exceed that of the hostile act or hostile intent, but the
nature, duration, and scope of force should not exceed what is required to respond decisively.14
A common scenario encountered in the DATE involves enemy indirect fires originating from
within population centers; that is, designated restricted-fire areas or no-fire areas.15 Other times,
the point of origin is beyond the designated fire support coordination line. Many times, units fail
to counterfire or incorrectly waste precious time requesting a higher headquarters to approve a
counterfire mission given collateral damage concerns. These units are confusing the concept of
proportionality in self-defense with attempts to minimize collateral damage during offensive
operations.16
Judge advocates must be wary that not every counterfire mission announced in the command
post invokes the inherent right of self-defense. For example, the inherent right of self-defense
exists in a counterfire scenario when a unit is taking effective fire (i.e., a hostile act). Further, it
may exist when the Q36/Q37 radar identifies an active SA2 surface-to-air missile system within
a population center (arguably a hostile act, but at a minimum a demonstration of hostile intent).
However, a non-active SA2 within a population center might not rise to the level of hostile act
or demonstrated hostile intent that would invoke the inherent right of self-defense. In such a
scenario, the judge advocate must work with the other warfighting function staff elements to be
able to substantiate his/her legal opinion.
Judge advocates can assist their units by promptly directing them to the correct proportionality
analysis. They must ask:
Are we taking effective fire?
If so, have we identified the point of origin as enemy?
If not, what facts make this counterfire mission a response to a hostile act or
demonstration of hostile intent?
Does the commander have the time or circumstances to de-escalate?
Provided that self-defense applies, the firing unit is not friendly, and de-escalation is not feasible,
then the JAG should advise that the commander has the inherent right and obligation to respond
with decisive force, but the nature, duration, and scope must not exceed what is necessary.
Collateral Damage Methodology What Judge Advocate Generals Must Know
For all other situations not involving self-defense, the Joint CDM must be applied as
exhaustively and thoroughly as possible relative to commanders guidance and operation
specific constraints, and must be sufficiently flexible to accommodate the pace and tempo of
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operations.17 This enables a commander to mitigate collateral damage, weigh risk against
military necessity, and assess proportionality.
The CDM is a means for the commander to adhere to the LOW. However, the CDM is not
intended to deny a commander the ability to respond to time-sensitive targeting events. Nor
should it be used as the sole justification to impede or delay fires for time sensitive targeting.18
The CDM consists of five mutually dependent CDE levels (CDE 1 through 5). As the CDM
progresses through each CDE level, the number of weaponeering restrictions also increases,
thereby elevating the potential risk to friendly forces and mission accomplishment based on
weapon, platform availability, and threats in the target area. See Figure 9-1.
Figure 9-1. Collateral risk and damage estimation

Two essential components to CDE levels are the collateral effects radius (CER) and the
collateral hazard area (CHA). The CER represents the largest collateral hazard distance for
a given warhead, weapon or weapon class considering predetermined, acceptable collateral
damage thresholds that are established for each CDE level. For cluster or improved conventional
munitions (ICMs), the CER includes the pattern radius of the submunitions.
The CHA is formed by measuring a CER from either the edge of a target facility boundary,
the aimpoint for a point target, or the edge of an engagement zone or artillery sheaf for an area
target. The assessment conducted at each CDE level is based on the existence of collateral
concerns (objects or persons) within the corresponding CHA. A CHA that contains an
unacceptable probability for collateral damage will elevate to the next higher CDE level unless
properly mitigated. Further, each succeeding CDE level employs mitigation techniques and
weaponeering restrictions (such as the requirement to use precision-guided munitions) designed
to reduce the area of collateral effects to an acceptable level. Examples from Figure 9-2 (Figure
D-A-2 from CJCSI 3160.01) illustrate the relationship.19
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Figure 9-2. CHA measurements (from Figure D-A-2 from CJCSI 3160.01)
Before engaging any target, commanders must answer five threshold questions:
Can I positively identify the object I want to affect?20
Are there protected or collateral objects, civilian or noncombatant personnel,
involuntary human shields, or significant environmental concerns within the effects
range of the weapon I would like to use to attack the target?
Can I mitigate damage to those collateral concerns by attacking the target with a
different weapon or with a different method of engagement, yet still accomplish the
mission?
If not, how many civilian and noncombatants do I think will be injured or killed by the
attack?
Are the collateral effects of my attack excessive in relation to the expected military
advantage gained and do I need to elevate this decision to the next level of command to
attack the target based on the ROE in effect?21
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Collateral Damage Estimation Levels

CDE Level 1
The initial assessment for CDE Level 1 resolves the first two threshold matters of any target
PID and the existence of protected or collateral objects within the weapons effect radius. CDE
Level 1 evaluates the targets functionality for dual-use concerns, identifies potential CBR plume
hazards, environmental hazards, and all collateral concerns within the Level 1 area.
During a Level 1 analysis, judge advocates must pay particular attention to the means
used to positively identify a target. Most collateral damage incidents result from target
misidentification.22 While the threshold remains a reasonable certainty, JAGs are cautioned
to not assume that PID has been established. For example, if the claim is that an A10 aircraft
circling overhead has established PID on the target, the JAG should ascertain whether the aircraft
is above or below the cloud line and can actually see the target with available optics. JAGs must
also be cognizant that the current ROE may not authorize the particular target for engagement
even though a legitimate military target or may restrict engagement authority to a superior
commander.
If the target serves a dual combatant and a civilian/noncombatant analysis (dual-use), JAGs
should advise commanders to estimate the population density of the facility. All dual-use targets
require a CDE Level 5 assessment.23
U.S. policy regarding human shields delineates between voluntary and involuntary. Voluntary
human shields are direct participants in hostilities and have shed their protected status. Voluntary
human shields are not considered collateral objects in the CDM. Only involuntary human shields
are considered collateral objects. Use of involuntary human shields requires a CDE Level 5
assessment. Where the status of human shields is unknown, the more restrictive rule applies. 24
CDE Level 1 also assesses the potential for producing a chemical, biological, or radiological
(CBR) plume hazard or environmental damage from either the target facility or surrounding
collateral objects. Examples include CBR production/storage facilities, fertilizer/pharmaceutical/
pesticide or herbicide production/storage facilities, medical equipment manufacturing and
storage facilities, petroleum refineries and paper manufacturing facilities. Widespread, long-term
and/or severe damage to the environment could result from flooding, uncontrollable fire, and
spillage of hazardous waste. In almost all cases, these situations will elevate to CDE Level 5
High due to significant casualties or risk of expanding the effects of the conflict.25
In summary, the CDE Level 1 final assessment is:
If the target is not positively identified, do not engage it.
If the target is positively identified, is not characterized as a dual-use facility, does not
present either a CBR plume or environmental hazard, and there are no collateral objects
and/or involuntary human shields within the CDE Level 1 CHA, the target is Level 1
Low and may be engaged with any conventional weapon in the U.S. inventory.26
If the target has been positively identified, but any of the other conditions are not
satisfied, proceed to CDE Level 2.
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CDE Level 2
CDE Level 2 addresses the third threshold question for commanders and identifies basic
weaponeering options to achieve the desired effect and mitigate the collateral damage. CDE
Level 2 uses two different methods minimum target size (MTS) or precision guided munition
(PGM) general.
MTS compares the targets size to the weapons systems or delivery platforms delivery error.
It provides a simple means to determine the feasibility of engaging a target with unguided or
ballistic weapons. Air-to-surface unguided munitions (ASUGMs) are often used for large-area
targets, but incur a significantly greater delivery error and higher risk for collateral damage.
However, ASUGMs are often more readily available than PGMs. If used, ASUGMs require a
CDE Level 3 assessment.
PGM general assesses target engagement with PGMs on individual aimpoints while minimizing
the weaponeering restriction to unitary or cluster PGMs.27 The preferred PGM general
assessment method is the aimpoint method, which assesses the risk of collateral damage at each
individual aimpoint. The target type will dictate whether a unitary or cluster weapon is most
effective to use. If no collateral objects are located within the CHA for the selected weapon, it
may be engaged using any of the PGMs on the respective reference table. If collateral objects are
identified, a CDE Level 3 assessment must occur.28
During a CDE Level 2 analysis, judge advocates should pay particular attention to the
methodology used and desired weapon. Unless the unit intends to utilize PGMs, the judge
advocate should advise elevation to a CDE Level 3. If PGMs are used, the judge advocate
should check for the existence of collateral objects within the CHA, which would elevate to a
CDE Level 3. Moreover, even with PGMs, the judge advocate should consider whether slightly
shifting the aimpoint could effectively destroy the target while removing collateral objects from
the CHA, thereby keeping the matter at CDE Level 2.
CDE Level 3
CDE Level 3 refines the weaponeering options by expanding possible delivery systems,
warheads, and fuse combinations that mitigate the risk of collateral damage while still achieving
the desired effect. By comparing the more narrow collateral effects radius (CER) of the desired
PGM to the nearest collateral object, the commander will know whether or not the PGM must be
mitigated. As long as the CER for the desired Level 3 PGM is less than or equal to the distance
to the nearest collateral concern, the target is assessed as either CDE Level 3 Low and may be
engaged with an unmitigated PGM (no delay fuse) or a mitigated PGM ( delay fuse). However, if
the CER is greater than the distance to the nearest collateral concern, the target requires a higher
CDE level assessment.29
As with CDE Level 2, the JAG should pay attention to the weapon system used, means to
mitigate, and consider whether slightly shifting the aimpoint could effectively destroy the target
while removing collateral objects from the CER. They should also ensure the CER and not the
greater CHA is used in the analysis.
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CDE Level 4
CDE Level 4 addresses the final weaponeering options (beyond fusing) available to achieve the
final effect and mitigate for collateral damage. These include: delay fuse/warhead burial, variable
time/proximity fuse, delivery heading restrictions, shielding and aimpoint offset.30 While it is
possible to employ some of the weaponeering options listed above at other CDE levels (such
as aimpoint offset), the ability to do so is conditional on the targets location in the physical
environment. Therefore, it is often considered at CDE Level 4.31
CDE Level 4 is calculated for less than 1-percent probability of fractional structural damage
from blast based on the assumption that noncombatant personnel will be located in noncombatant
collateral structures that afford some protection from fragmentation.32 This assumption accounts
for the fact that the location and number of transient noncombatant or civilian personnel cannot
be accurately predicted in space or time and limits the ability to mitigate collateral effects
to those objects that can be seen, sensed or known with collection assets. However, it does
not negate the responsibility to account for noncombatants or civilian in the open that can be
predicted based on available intelligence or pattern of life analysis such as rush hour traffic or
anticipated internally displaced persons movements.33
The CDM does not support the use of cluster weapons and ICMs at Level 4.34 Nor does it support
rocket assisted projectiles or extended/enhanced range munitions at Level 4.35
As with CDE Level 3, CDE Level 4 compares the number of collateral objects within the
particular CER (not the CHA) for the selected weaponeering decision. If the CER value is less
than or equal to the distance to the nearest collateral object, it is engaged as a CDE Level 4.36
In most cases within the DATE, this means that the brigade commander will be the approval
authority for these targets. Those weapons that have a CER greater than the distance to the
nearest collateral object will require elevation to CDE Level 5, and often require division
or higher approval to engage.37 Here, judge advocates must coordinate with other WfF staff
elements to help the commander determine whether he can weaponeer the particular PGM in
such a way as to retain engagement authority at his level (i.e., CDE Level 4).
CDE Level 5
CDE Level 5 addresses the 4th and 5th questions of the CDM: number of civilians and/or
noncombatants that may be killed/injured and the need to elevate engagement authority based
on the current ROE. CDE Level 5 occurs when all reasonable and known mitigation techniques
have been exhausted and some level of collateral damages is unavoidable. It is also used when
a CDE Level 1 assessment identifies CBR plume hazards, environmental hazards, known or
potential involuntary human shields, and/or dual-use targets.38
Once assessed as a CDE Level 5 target, the target remains classified as a Level 5 and may never
be mitigated to a lower level.39 This will require the division commander or higher approval
authority to engage.
CDE level 5 is the only level within the CDM that a final assessment of High may occur.40 If
CDE Level 5-High occurs, the matter must be elevated to the next higher commander (under
the sensitive target approval and review process) unless approval authority has previously been
delegated by appropriate orders/instructions.41 Targets at CDE Level 5-High are commonly
withheld to joint task force or combatant commanders to prosecute.
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When conducting the casualty assessment, judge advocates must be aware that the Level 5
assessment is only an estimate and should never be portrayed as an expected casualty count.
No precise means exists to predict noncombatant demographics. Commanders are limited to
the knowledge of the unique characteristics and cultural behaviors of the region and country,
population distributions, customs, cultural practices, and habits. Nor does it account for transient
individuals unless refined by current intelligence analysis, such as pattern of life.42
With every CDE Level 5 target (whether Low or High), the formal CDE will occur at the
division or higher command. Though the CDE does not occur at the brigade or regimental
level, judge advocates at these lower echelons should be prepared to assist the other warfighting
functions in ascertaining the relevant information to provide to their higher headquarters. This
also enables the staff to arm their commander with all necessary facts when he contacts division
to advocate for the target.
Here, judge advocates should pay particular attention to eliciting facts that refine the statistical
data used by the higher headquarters to conduct the casualty assessment or determine if the
suspected human shields are voluntary or involuntarily involved. This includes, for example,
patterns of life and the most current information on known internal displaced persons locations
or movement routes. It also requires assessing the reliability of the information. Is the pattern of
life analysis from a week ago or two months ago? Who reported the use of human shields? How
has it been corroborated?
In all such cases, judge advocates work together with the collective staff to provide the most
current and accurate information to empower the decision maker. They also have the ability to
leverage their technical chain and advocate to the division staff judge advocate on behalf of their
commander. Though the matter is beyond their level to action, it is not beyond their influence.
Summary
By preparing early for common legal challenges in the DATE, JAGs can proactively advise their
commanders and staffs. This enables them to participate effectively in the MDMP and tailor predeployment training to address common LOW and ROE issues. Overall, it will better enable their
units to address issues of which only a handful in the unit may have any practical knowledge
DHF, surrendering forces, and when and how to employ the collateral damage methodology.
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Endnotes:
1. CJCSI 3121.01E.
2. Id.
3. CJCSI 3160.01, No-Strike and CDE Methodology.
4. Operational Law (OPLAW) Handbook, pg. 26.
5. Id.
6. GPW, art 4(a)(4).
7. OPLAW Handbook.
8. The Joint Collateral Damage Estimation (CDE) Training and Certification Program is a 40 hour course of
instruction accredited by the Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munitions Effectiveness (JTCG/ME) and
endorsed by the Military Targeting Committee (MTC), leading to individual certification as a CDE Basic Analyst
or CDE Analyst Instructor. The POI consists of ten training modules addressing the Joint Targeting Cycle, CDE in
the Target Development Process, the Law of War (LOW), Legal Requirements of CDE, Operational Realities of
CDE, Basics of Weapon Effects and Dominant Hazards of Concern for CDE, Conventional Warhead Weaponeering
Principles for Precision Guided Munitions (PGM), Air-to-Surface Unguided Munitions (ASUGM), and Surface-toSurface Ballistic Munitions (SSBM), the CDE Assessment Process, Casualty Estimation, Mitigation Techniques, and
CDE Automation Tools. The course consists of four days of instruction, practical exercises, and reviews, preparing
the student for the end of course comprehensive examination, day five.
9. Encl A, para 1j.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. SROE, Enclosure A, 3a.
13. Id.
14. SROE, Enclosure A, 4a(3).
15. Rotation 13-01 ROE defined restricted fire areas to include all populated areas (any established city, town,
village, or settlement inhabited by civilians; any temporary settlement, camp, or column of displaced civilians,
migrants, or refugees; or any other concentration of civilians). Designated no strike areas included all hospitals,
religious sites, cultural sites, historical sites, and Atropian infrastructure.
16. SROE, Enclosure A, 4a(3) (The concept of proportionality in self-defense should not be confused with attempts
to minimize collateral damage during offensive operations.).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. CJCSI 3160.01, Figure D-A-2, p D-A-4.
20. PID is defined as the reasonable certainty that a functionally and geospatially defined object of attack is a
legitimate military target in accordance with the LOW and applicable ROE. CJCSI 3160.01, App A, Encl. D, 2a(1).
21. CJCSI 3160.01, App A, Encl. D, 2.
22. CJCSI 3160.01, App A, Encl. D, 2a(1).
23. CJCSI 3160.01, App A, Encl. D, 2b(3).
24. CJCSI 3160.01, App A, Encl. D, 2b(4)(a).
25. CJCSI 3160.01, App A, Encl. D, 2b(5-6).
26. Unless otherwise excepted in the CDE Level 1Reference Table.
27. CJCSI 3160.01, App A, Encl. D, 2c(1).
28. CJCSI 3160.01, App A, Encl. D, 2c(2).
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29. CJCSI 3160.01, App A, Encl. D, 2d.
30. CJCSI 3160.01, App A, Encl. D, 2e(4).
31. CJCSI 3160.01, App A, Encl. D, 2e(4)(e).
32. CJCSI 3160.01, App A, Encl. D, 2e.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. CJCSI 3160.01, App A, Encl. D, 2f.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. CJCSI 3160.01, App A, Encl. D, 2f(3).
42. CJCSI 3160.01, App A, Encl. D, 2f(1).
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Chapter 10
Military Intelligence Company Collection Teams:
Creating a Combat Multiplier
SSG Mark Baldry, SFC Xavier Ortiz, SFC Maria S. Kernan, SFC William J.
Carnes, and CPT Derek J. Kocher, Joint Multinational Readiness Center
The military intelligence company (MICO) has a uniquely flexible structure within the brigade
combat team. Organic collection and analysis elements work directly with leadership across
the brigade to provide early warning indication, situational awareness, tracking and disposition
of enemy units, and a common operating picture of the operational environment (OE).
Effective management and training of collection teams improves the capabilities of the unit in
tactical control of them, while providing the all-source collection element (ACE) with multisource intelligence. These collection teams have proven themselves highly effective during
counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. However, adapting their use for broader unified land
operations requires additional training for MI leaders and renewed focus on tactical support of
these teams.
Designed to prepare MICO leaders and their collection teams for success during training and
deployment, this article focuses on three areas: lateral coordination versus unit integration,
self-sufficiency and survivability, and active collectors versus passive collectors. In addition,
the article provides recommendations for home station training and improvement based on
observations of collection teams made at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center. These
observations were collected from the recent decisive action training environment rotation
conducted by the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team, as well as cumulatively from other
units over the past three years.
Lateral Coordination Versus Unit Integration

One of the most difficult tasks for low-level voice intercept (LLVI), Prophet signals intelligence
(SIGINT) system, and human intelligence (HUMINT) collection team (HCT) leaders and to
some extent unmanned aircraft system (UAS) operators is interfacing with the leadership of
the maneuver unit. The term integration is commonly used to describe this process. Integration
has shown varying levels of success and relies heavily on the ability of maneuver unit leaders to
understand the value of these enablers.
A time-intensive process, integration aims to unify personnel under a single command structure.
MI personnel attending rotational training understand that collection teams should become a
part of the maneuver unit they are tasked to support. This assumption often leads to friction
when collection teams link up with maneuver units that were not expecting their arrival. This
unexpected arrival is difficult to mitigate because it is often determined at different echelons and
on short notice.
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A way for collection team leaders to streamline this process is to favor an approach emphasizing
lateral coordination rather than complete integration. Lateral coordination focuses on parallel
effort with the maneuver unit, instead of joining in subordination through task organization. By
providing a valuable product, minimizing the operational footprint of the team, and retaining as
much operational control as possible, the collection team has an improved opportunity to present
itself as an added benefit, rather than just another attachment.
To be effective, initial lateral coordination with leadership must be concise and to the point. A
five to ten minute introduction should be the goal. Battalion-level assignments and companylevel assignments have different points of contact, and team leaders must be familiar with whom
to interface. These leaders are good starting points for the initial linkup at the battalion and
company level.
Battalion Level:
S-2 officer in charge (OIC) and noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC).
S-3 OIC/operations sergeant major.
Initial coordination at the battalion-level should focus on near-term reconnaissance and
surveillance taskings, who the team will be assigned to support, the common operating picture
of the battalions OE, and a discussion ensuring the best possible opportunities for collection
(capabilities brief). Other priorities should include: establishing early warning reporting
procedures who to relay time-sensitive information to, how to contact them, and contingency
procedures in case of communications failure; obtaining a copy of the commanders critical
information requirements (CCIRs) and the current priority information requirements (PIRs);
coordinating with the S-2 or S-3 for secured communications with the brigade ACE for a data
drop.
Company Level:
Commander.
First sergeant.
Executive officer.
Company intelligence support team (CoIST).
Initial coordination at the company level becomes more task oriented. Team leaders should
in-brief maneuver leaders on how the teams can support upcoming missions and what factors
ensure successful collection. The discussion should include current CCIRs and PIRs and how to
report collected information to the appropriate leader or the CoIST. Link up with the CoIST to
discuss any additional information requests, obtain details on communications and radio fills, and
determine a secured way to pass information to both the ACE and the MICO. Before departing
the company command post, team leaders should propose suggestions for taskings, if not already
assigned one. Successful lateral coordination maximizes collection time and minimizes logistical
requirements.
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Self-Sufficiency and Survivability

Too often, maneuver units have the impression that combat support personnel are burdens on
resources and unnecessary security risks. Collection team leaders can mitigate this perception
by demonstrating proactive work ethics and capabilities for independent operation. Training and
active support from the MICO are paramount to this goal.
The goal of self-sufficiency is to rely on the assigned unit for logistical support as little as
possible. If the MICO provides a majority of logistical support for their personnel, it provides
a two-fold benefit the flow of information from collectors back to their organic leadership
becomes a part of the battle rhythm, and the perceived burden of additional personnel being
placed on the maneuver unit is lifted. Daily coordination with MICO leadership should include a
logistics status report for resupply of classes I, II, III, V, VI, and IX along with intelligence
gathered. Supplies needed for upcoming patrols and missions away from the base of operations
must be anticipated.
Collection teams often find themselves assigned to maneuver units unable to provide housing
within the base of operations. A solution should be added to the collection teams standard kit
anticipating the need for shelter. Setup should be co-located with the best collection site on the
base, preferably a quiet and out of the way area. Shelters should be easy and fast to set up and
tear down, and easily stowed away when teams leave the base of operations. Creating hide-sites,
hasty fighting positions, natural shelters, etc., should be used in tactical situations and should be
similar to those created by Soldiers in the assigned unit.
Active Collectors versus Passive Collectors

Trends from the past three years have shown that MICO collection teams have developed a
mindset of passive collection, heavily influenced by the posture created by a long-term focus
on COIN. Operating from heavily fortified bases and outposts has created a need for robust
force protection, employing MICO assets to supplement this mission. While a valid concern,
training centered on force protection has lessened the ability for collection teams to operate
as independent reconnaissance elements. Unprepared for the risks of operating in a decisive
action training environment, teams have demonstrated during rotational training that they are
unprepared to engage a trained and organized force prior to deployment.
Recognizing that COIN is only part of a decisive action operation, preparing to employ
collection teams for use during offensive, defensive, and stability operations requires a paradigm
shift for MICO leaders. Creating a culture of active collectors MI collectors pushing forward
from bases of operations as reconnaissance elements is the most effective way to employ
these teams. Active collectors are motivated and take pride in their mission and skill set. They
seek to push their capabilities to the limit and embrace challenges. Physically fit, technically
and tactically proficient, active collectors are more likely to engage maneuver personnel and
proactively seek mission assignments.
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Recommendations for Training and Improvement

Past observation of collection teams has shown that they often prove to have a high level of
technical training and are proficient when operating their systems or engaging key leaders of
a local populace. MICO training programs should aim to bring the tactical knowledge of their
SIGINT, HUMINT, and UAS collection teams up to this level. What follows are areas that
MICO leaders need to emphasize and track during home-station training events.
Signal Intelligence
In the last decade, Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) collectors have received a greatly reduced
amount of tactical and common core training. Focus areas include the following:
Troop leading procedures.
Creating a group of pertinent battle drills for training. Contingency procedures should
be a focus area, e.g., avoiding contact with enemies, survival and evasion, maintaining
control of sensitive equipment.
Drafting and employing standard operating procedures.
Performing precombat checks and inspections based on standardized checklists.
Developing priorities of work once emplaced.
Specifically, SIGINT teams greatly benefit from training on long-range surveillance operations
(Field Manual 3-55.93, Long Range Surveillance Unit Operations, June 2009).
Wear and tear on equipment has proven an issue during rotation training. Specific to SIGINT
teams, movement over varied terrain takes a toll on fragile components such as antennae. The
addition of an intelligence systems maintainer (military occupational specialty 35T) to SIGINT
teams can greatly improve self-sufficiency. Technical experts, these Soldiers are able to not only
operate the systems, but also provide field expedient repair solutions and ensure that their team is
maximizing its system capabilities. If a scarce resource, 35Ts can provide valuable cross training
for LLVI and Prophet operators prior to deployment.
Human Intelligence
HCTs share many of the challenges that SIGINT teams face, yet they have some unique
concerns, such as the following:
Team simultaneously attends KLEs and engages local populace, coordinates every
Soldier a sensor (ES2) efforts.
Using intelligence contingency funds to develop sources and provide the appearance of
justified contact with local sources.
Coordination with security team leader and security planning.
Urban operations, breaching and room clearing.
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HCT members should remember that while they are not part of the maneuver unit, they must be
prepared to assist that unit while on patrol. Reasonable requests for assistance, that do not hinder
the HCTs collection ability, should not be refused. This willing cooperation with the maneuver
unit ensures a good level of trust and builds rapport. Training on urban operations and patrolling
gives HCT team leaders the tools for success.
Unmanned Aircraft System

Common issues for UAS platoons include deconflicting tactical ownership/tasking of UAS
assets, developing task and purpose of missions, and creating training that supports these tasks
and purposes.
Observations have shown that UAS platoons would greatly benefit from MICO leaders working
with higher headquarters to create single sources of tasking. Too often, UAS leaders receive
taskings from multiple sources, creating confusion within the brigade and confusion with
UAS operators. A single source of tasking allows for better intelligence collection tracking
and planning, and allows UAS leaders to determine the best use of available resources. The
recommended point of contact is the S-3 reconnaissance and surveillance team collection
manager. In control of intelligence collection taskings, the collection manager is best prepared
for predictive planning and mission assignment.
UAS mission planning should use a similar structure to planning for manned flights. Manned
aircraft require justification for flight beyond supporting a unit. Deconflicting airspace, justifying
the risk of valuable equipment and personnel, and allocating appropriate resources for flights
are common factors for manned and unmanned missions. A clearly defined task and purpose
for UAS missions gives operators and maintainers more effective control over their equipment
and resources, and a better understanding of the operation. UAS operators who understand their
mission need less oversight. Training can be tailored to prepare operators and maintainers for
common mission types.
Conclusion
Laterally coordinating with maneuver unit leaders streamlines the link-up process and enables
teams to maximize their collection time. Training and supporting self-sufficient teams increases
capabilities and creates new opportunities to support their brigade. A culture of active collectors
encourages proactive team leadership, esprit de corps, and movtivation with collection teams and
prepares them for challenging tasks.
The key to success for each of these collector teams is creating a custome set of battle drills for
them to train on. A written standard operating procedure book should be developed to provide
instructions for contingency palns and create continuity, such as a training plan for new team
members. MICO roles as training managers at home station cannot be emphasized enough.
Preparing these teams to operate with little oversight during the Army force generation process
ensures their success during deployment.
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Chapter 11
Personnel Recovery in Decisive Action and Other Operating Environments
CW3 John E. Clark, Joint Multinational Readiness Center
I will never leave a fallen comrade. I will never accept defeat. I will never
quit.
U.S. Soldiers Creed
Overview
Personnel recovery (PR) encompasses the task of bringing our warriors home. It is part of the
warrior ethos and should be profoundly embedded into the fabric of how the Army operates.
Units in decisive action training environments (DATEs) face the probability of experiencing
multiple incidents of isolated, missing, detained, and captured (IMDC) personnel. Each IMDC
event is unique and brings to bear separate courses of action and battle drills necessary for
completing the following five PR tasks:
Reporting.
Locating.
Recovering.
Supporting.
Reintegrating.
According to the Center for Army Lessons Learned 09-25, Army Personnel Recovery Handbook,
Army PR focuses on recovering isolated persons prior to detention. Therefore, commanders
should always attempt to accomplish recovery at the lowest level of command due to the critical
factor of time.
In preparation for mobilization prior to a DATE exercise or other deployment, units should have
assigned a trained and certified personnel recovery officer (PRO). A fully trained and certified
PRO is the lead advisor and planner of any PR event that may occur, enabling the commander
to employ a decentralized execution approach or retain strict control of a PR mission at higher
levels. To expand unit expertise and capabilities in this area, the PRO can designate additional
PROs down to the company level and provide the appropriate training to enhance PR operations
throughout the Army. By doing so, commanders can delegate PR decision-making authority to
subordinate commanders. Such delegation facilitates decentralized execution and maximizes
available time for planning and executing PR missions.
PR rehearsals are the most important preparation activities. Practicing PR actions prior to an
actual IMDC event is critical to successful PR operations. Every leader is responsible to plan
and prepare their unit and personnel for isolating events and support of recovery activities. Battle
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drills must include key information to enable the staff to identify the five PR tasks. During a
DATE rotation, the commanders intent may be to defeat the enemy at all cost, which may lead
to the inability to complete the five tasks of PR. Reporting may be conducted, but the other four
tasks will more than likely be set aside until the enemy is defeated. By having battle drills in
place and flow charts available to indicate the appropriate actions that must be accomplished,
units will be better able to continue the current operation as well as conduct the five PR tasks.
Battle drill rehearsals enable a common understanding of procedures between higher, adjacent,
and subordinate commanders and staffs.
Doctrine
In accordance with All Army Activities (ALARACT) message 122/2005: PR events will be
incorporated in all mission rehearsal/readiness exercises, combat training center rotations, and
Mission Command Training Programs. All unit leaders will include PR actions into every order
under paragraph III (Execution) and ensure plans utilizing all PR capabilities are put into place
and rehearsed as part of mission preparation as described in Field Manual (FM) 3-50.1, Army
Personnel Recovery, 21 November 2011. This is especially critical for small unit leaders to
ensure PR is reinforced as a warriors ethos and part of Army core values.
Education
Currently, there is no one course of study to establish and certify unit PROs. There are several
individual courses that are primarily computer-based training (CBT) along with some relevant
resident courses. By combining the courses into one PRO course to create staff PROs for
battalion level and above, the Army would greatly benefit by infusing fully-trained and qualified
PRO management cells into all units. This would also remove the historically typical burden
from intelligence sections and place responsibility on new PROs.
Training
Units should establish PR programs for staffs that provide brigade, regimental, and battalion
level PROs by combining CBT as well as resident PR courses through the Personnel Recovery
Education and Training Center (PRETC). This combined training enables units to have the
flexibility to maintain operational focus while conducting the five PR tasks to accomplish
recovery at the lowest level of command in accordance with Joint Publication (JP) 3-50, Joint
Personnel Recovery, and FM 3-50.1.
Units should incorporate PR tasks and training objectives into Theater Specific Individual
Requirements Training (TSIRT); such tasks may include completion or review of Isolated
Personnel Reports (ISOPREP), Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape (SERE) 100.1 code of
conduct training, recovery drills, moderate and high risk of isolation (MRI/HRI) briefs, and the
use of personnel recovery support equipment (PRSE) to include blood chits and personal locating
beacons. By incorporating the PR tasks and training objectives into TSIRT, the PRO will be
enabled to focus on advising the commander and mentoring the staff on all PR actions.
Preparation
A unit level PR program can be established by creating and maintaining PROs at the brigade/
regimental levels and the battalion/squadron levels. Establish guidelines in unit standing
operating procedures (SOPs) to identify PROs and require a minimum level of training. Utilize
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FM 3-50.1 to establish pre-mobilization PR preparation activities to integrate all warfighting

function capabilities and personnel.
Training and requirements should include, but not be limited to the following:
Familiarization with Joint Publication (JP) 3-50 and FM 3-50.1 as well as with all
PR-related web sites on Nonsecure/Secure Internet Protocol Routing (NIPR/SIPR)
Networks.
Selection of noncommissioned officers (rank of E-6 or above) to facilitate training and
tracking on the NIPR Pre-Outside the Contiguous United States Travel File system
used to create and track ISOPREPs.
Establishment of Personnel Recovery Mission Software (PRMS) accounts on SIPR to
manage ISOPREPs.
Course completions of the following to prepare and enable competent PROs:
Army Personnel Recovery ARPR 202 (CBT). Command and Staff Personnel
Recovery Roles and Responsibilities. The digital video disk (DVD) may be
ordered through the defense imagery website: http://www.defenseimagery.mil/
index.html. Interactive Multimedia Instruction (IMI) Products. Order - DVD
878-07.
Introduction to JP 3-50. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/docnet/courses/operations/
csar.htm.
SERE 100.1 Code of Conduct, Joint Knowledge Online (JKO) Direct Course;
J3TA-US022. http://jko.jfcom.mil.
Army PR 101A: Introduction to Personnel Recovery.

Fundamentals of Personnel Recovery PR 102; JKO Direct Course; J30
P-US018. http://jko.jfcom.mil.
PRMS CBT. The compact disk (CD) may be ordered through the PRMS
program or conducted online through SIPR. PRMSMail@jricp.dia.smil.mil for

PRMS training CD ordering info.
Joint Personnel Recovery Agency courses to include: PR 106, 290, 295, 296,
297, 300 and 301, PRETC.
Implications
Training Combine current PRETC courses to create one course that will produce PROs with
knowledge on managing a unit level PR program. Incorporate PR tasks and training objectives
into TSIRT programs.
Materiel Provide PRSE and instructors for TSIRT to include MRI/HRI briefs.
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Leadership Require a fully qualified PRO to be assigned at all times at brigade level and below.
Require identified PROs to attend PRETC and complete PR 300 and 301.
Doctrinal references such as joint publications, Army FMs, CALL handbooks, and other
publications, Army Regulations, and ALARACTs are necessary tools to establish guidelines to
create unit SOPs, PR training programs, and battle drills. These resources provide PROs with
sufficient knowledge to advise commanders and staffs to plan for any PR operation. However,
doctrinal references do not provide PROs with peer interaction, personal experiences, nor the
institutional knowledge PROs would gain from attending resident courses.
Providing our PROs with a resident single source program of study would unite the PR
knowledge database from joint communities while instilling peer interaction, personal
experiences, and institutional knowledge. A resident single-source program of study would
enable our units with brigade level PROs that would be capable of training, educating, and
qualifying lower-level PROs on multifaceted systems and processes throughout the full breadth
of PR to better provide PR pre-deployment preparation, planning, and mission execution. The
ultimate goal is always to bring our warriors home and deny the enemy a source of intelligence
information, while also contributing to the morale and mission motivation of the combat forces.
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Chapter 12
Planning, Preparing, and Executing Stryker Battalion Sustainment:
Logistics for Non-Logisticians
CPT Michael W. Kummerer, Joint Multinational Readiness Center
CPT George L. Cass, 2nd Cavalry Regiment
Sustainment determines the depth and duration of Army operations. It is
essential to retaining and exploiting the initiative and it provides the support
necessary to maintain operations until mission accomplishment.
Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 4-0, Sustainment, July 2012
For most maneuver, fires, and effects (MFE) officers, the last thing they want to be told is that
they have been chosen as the next battalion S-4. The average MFE captain knows only as much
about sustainment that wasnt erased from his memory following the career course. For those
lieutenants and captains that become S-4s prior to attending the career course, their knowledge of
sustainment is even less. For most of them, the only thing they know is: a) Logistics isnt sexy,
and b) Logistics causes headaches. Luckily, for most MFE S-4s, there is a saving grace: brigade
combat teams have forward support company commanders in every maneuver battalion, unless,
of course, you find yourself in a Stryker brigade in that case, guess what S-4, youre on your
own; figure it out!
Well, logistics may not be sexy, but it is essential. This article addresses some basic concepts for
non-logisticians to consider when planning, preparing, and executing sustainment in a decisive
action training environment (DATE). Just like the continuous operations cycle described in
ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process, May 2012, to properly execute sustainment, S-4s must
develop a continuous cycle of understanding capabilities, developing requirements, identifying
shortfalls and mitigating friction points (See Figure 12-1). The lessons learned that are discussed
in this article come from the field artillery squadron of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment (2CR). The
focus of the examples and lessons learned pertain to 155 mm M777 howitzer ammunition, but
can be applied to any critical class of supply used by any type of unit.
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Figure 12-1. The sustainment cycle
Understanding Capabilities
Before planning sustainment operations, it is essential to understand the capabilities of your
battalion. This includes logistical capabilities (haul capacity and fuel capacity), as well as
operational capabilities (supplies on hand). When calculating haul capacity, it is important to
look at all of the transportation assets used to move supplies on the battlefield. These vehicular
assets may include palletized load systems, load handling systems (LHS), the family of medium
tactical vehicles, (FMTV), and trailers. Understanding haul capacity is more than knowing the
cubic space and weight capabilities of a piece of equipment; it is about understanding how much
of a certain class of supply can be carried and what effect that has on operations.
The 2CRs field artillery (FA) squadron used an effective method of calculating haul capacity
by illustrating it in a tactical standing operating procedure (TACSOP), which also standardized
mission-configured loads (MCLs) (See Figure 2). This technique allowed the unit to put their
haul capacity capabilities into terms that were easy for commanders at all levels to understand.
Likewise, when calculating fuel capacity, it is important to understand not only the fuel capacity
of each vehicle type, but how those vehicles are distributed among subordinate units. By doing
this, Soldiers have a better understanding of fuel requirements for a troop/battery when they
report that they are 50 percent on fuel status.
Operationally, understanding capabilities means knowing what supplies are available in both
space and time. The single most important factor that will lead to operational understanding of
supplies on hand is accurate and timely reporting from subordinate units. Inaccurate reporting of
supplies has the potential to be a singular point of failure for any operation. For the FA squadron,
the most critical class of supply that required the greatest attention to detail was 155mm
howitzer ammunition. When the administrative and logistics operations center was not receiving
reports from the firing batteries and did not share a common operational picture (COP) with the
squadron, they could not accurately report, predict, or forecast how much 155 mm ammunition
was positioned at the gun lines. This lack of communication led to a very real risk of running out
of bullets. Once the batteries got into a routine, and the communication structures improved, this
risk was marginalized, and they never again risked going black on ammunition status.
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Developing Requirements
Sustainment must be synchronized and planned in conjunction with
operational planning. Through this collaborative planning effort,
operational and sustainment commanders and staffs build a mutual bond,
trust, and understanding of each others capabilities and requirements.
Building trust and confidence in sustainment to support decisive action is
essential.
ADRP 4-0
Figure 12-2. Example of MCL diagrams from the FA squadron TACSOP

A battalion S-4 cannot develop the sustainment requirements for his battalion by himself. It
takes input from all the staff sections, subordinate units, and the command team to develop a
successful plan. However, of all the sources that should be providing input to the S-4 to develop
requirements, the single most important source is the operations officer and the operational staff.
A sustainment plan that is not tied to and synchronized with an operational plan is destined to
fail; likewise, a sustainment plan that does not remain synchronized throughout the execution
of an operational plan runs a high risk of failure. This is why ADRP 4-0 lists integration as the
most critical of the 8 principles of sustainment. The reference goes on to say that integration
is combining all of the sustainment elements within operations to assure unity of command and
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effort. It requires deliberate coordination and synchronization of sustainment with operations

across all levels. For a battalion S-4, this means that it is absolutely critical to not only play a
significant role in the military decisionmaking process (MDMP), but also maintain a COP with
the S-3 as operations unfold. This can prove to be extremely difficult, especially in a DATE
rotation when sustainment planners and executers often separate themselves from battalion
command posts (CPs) by adhering to doctrine that requires that they operate from field trains and
combat trains CPs. If operations and sustainment planners are not trained to plan, synchronize,
and update each other while conducting split operations, they will likely experience degraded
execution on the battle field during a DATE exercise.
The 2CR FA squadron learned this the hard way during the regiments initial entry and offensive
operations, but learned from their mistakes and executed sustainment much more efficiently as
the rotation progressed. The two biggest mistakes that the FA squadron made early on were not
getting feedback from key staff members regarding the initial 155 mm ammunition draw and not
maintaining a COP with the all of the CPs during mission execution. This led to an inadequate
amount of 155mm dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) to contend with the
enemy armor threat, and skewed their consumption predictions because they were forced to fire
less effective ammunition at a higher volume than originally anticipated.
After learning from these mistakes, the squadron implemented several staff functions that
would improve synchronization between operations and sustainment for future operations. The
most effective of these staff functions was integrating the development of requirements into
the MDMP process and getting buy-in from all the key staff members when developing these
requirements. An example of this was the process for identifying the ammunition requirements
prior to the regimental defensive operations. The squadron S-2, S-3, fire direction officer (FDO)
and S-4 were all involved in the process, and this staff synchronization resulted in the squadron
having the right amount of ammunition to support the regiments operations. An example of a
product that was used during this synchronization was the enemy event template (Figure 12-3).
This template was produced by the S-2, used by the FDO to develop ammunition requirements
needed to defeat expected enemy formations, used by the S-3 to establish resupply triggers and
timelines, and finally used by the S-4 to develop ammunition requisition requirements based on
feedback from the FDO and S-3.
Identify Shortfalls
After achieving a thorough understanding of capabilities and diligently working with other key
staff members in developing requirements, it is time to conduct some basic sustainment algebra
to identify sustainment shortfalls.
Requirements Capabilities = Shortfalls
It seems easy, and as long as the first two steps have been completed and are as accurate as
possible, it really is. Sustainment shortfalls can be anything from lack of supplies, to inadequate
haul capacity, to a restriction placed on a unit by a higher headquarters. For 2CRs FA squadron,
the two biggest shortfalls were the 155 mm controlled supply rate (CSR) emplaced by 70th
Infantry Division (ID), 2CRs higher headquarters, and the squadrons lack of haul capacity to
support the 155 mm ammunition requirements.
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Figure 12-3. Enemy event template

During the MDMP process for defensive operations, the squadron identified that it would
require over 800 rounds of DPICM to support the three day defense and disrupt enemy armor
formations; unfortunately, the daily CSR of DPICM for the FA squadron was only 42 rounds
a major shortfall was identified. In regard to haul capacity, the squadron had two LHS trucks
assigned to the squadron support platoon. Each LHS can haul approximately 240 rounds of
155 mm with all of the required fuses, propellants, and primers. A full battery unit basic load of
155 mm rounds is 474 rounds; that meant that the squadron only had enough haul capacity to
provide a second load of ammunition for one battery, and if all three batteries were in different
locations, the squadron could only resupply two batteries at a time another major shortfall was
identified.
Mitigating Friction Points

Once the shortfalls have been identified, its time to do a little more sustainment algebra.
Computing this equation requires additional insight from and synchronization with the
operational staff.
Operational Plan Sustainment Shortfalls = Effects on Operations
Once you can clearly articulate the effects on operations caused by your sustainment shortfalls,
you are ready to move onto the next step: mitigating friction points. There are a number of key
players that can assist in mitigating friction points, but unless you can clearly explain why your
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sustainment shortfalls will have a negative effect on operations, you will not get the assistance
you desire. Generally, the first key player that should be approached is either the brigade/
regimental S-4, or the support operations officer (SPO) in the brigade support battalion (BSB)
or regimental support squadron (RSS). When seeking assistance from either of these entities in
mitigating friction points, its important to note that in addition to articulating negative effects of
operations, you should also be prepared to discuss steps you have already taken or are prepared
to take to assist the regiment or the RSS in overcoming your sustainment shortfalls.
As discussed earlier, the two biggest shortfalls that the FA squadron encountered were the
CSR from 70th ID and the lack of haul capacity for 155mm ammunition. The unit was able
to successfully mitigate both of these shortfalls by following a plan similar to that laid out
in this article. By clearly articulating the detrimental effects of the 155mm CSR in a letter of
justification to 70th ID, the CSR was lifted for the regiments defensive operations. This allowed
the FA squadron to request enough DPICM to counter the enemy armor threat. By working
directly with the regimental SPO, the FA squadron and the RSS developed a plan in which RSS
LHS trucks were task organized to support the massive 155mm ammunition requirement. (See
Figure 12-4.)
This type of relationship between the RSS/BSB and squadron/battalion S-4 is crucial to the
success of any sustainment plan. Never underestimate the lengths of which the logistics planners
and executers of the support battalion will go to support your mission, but also understand that
like any relationship, it takes time to develop. S-4s that provide timely reports, participate in
required meetings, seek regular guidance from the SPO and expend all resources before seeking
assistance from the RSS/BSB will have a much easier time coordinating for and receiving
support when it is needed. When this type of solid working relationship has been built, chances
are the logisticians have already developed ways to support the requirement before the request is
even sent forward!
A successful sustainment plan will extend operational reach, prevent
culmination or loss of the initiative, manage transitions, exploit possible
opportunities, and mitigate risk.
Army Doctrine Publication 4-0, Sustainment, July 2012
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Figure 12-4. Distribution plan for 155 mm ammunition

Logistics during decisive action operations is difficult, even for logisticians. For non-logisticians,
it can not only be difficult, but overwhelming at times. The ideas discussed in this article are not
going to make sustainment operations easy, but they will certainly help make them slightly more
manageable during planning, preparation, and execution. By adhering to the sustainment cycle
of understanding capabilities, developing requirements, identifying shortfalls, and mitigating
friction points, you will be well on your way to earning your undergraduate degree in logistics.
Leave the graduate level stuff to the logisticians!
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Chapter 13
The Sustainers Foxhole and Preparing for Unified Land Operations
CPT Eric M. Stangle, Joint Multinational Readiness Center
(Previously published in Sustainment magazine.)
The challenging construct of the decisive action training environment is designed to refocus
and reorient the Army for unified land operations in austere locations through the simultaneous
combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations. For tactical sustainment units, this
means supporting on the move and employing certain skill sets and field craft, many of which
have been largely undertrained or greatly diminished over the past decade.
Training in the field is the only way to become proficient at field operations. Regaining and
honing the skills needed to operate in the field poses a challenge for sustainment units because
they must balance the daily support requirements of their customer units and the training needs
of their Soldiers.
The need for decisive action training extends beyond enlisted Soldiers; many noncommissioned
officers (NCOs), company grade officers, and even some field grade officers have not had the
opportunity to participate in this type of training for a long time.
Forward Operating Base Versus Brigade Support Area

Supporting from an established forward operating base (FOB) differs greatly from supporting
from a brigade support area (BSA): the ways that we train for the two types of operations also
differ. Over the past decade during mission rehearsal exercises at combat training centers,
sustainment units almost exclusively operated out of fixed facilities that replicated any given
FOB in Afghanistan or Iraq. During these exercises, life support, entrance control points,
maintenance areas, motor pools, bunkers, and perimeter defenses are already established
and usually transferred over to the incoming unit as they would be during the relief-in-place
process. Units typically do not have to establish these necessities from scratch, and the training
environment has reflected that fact.
On the other hand, during decisive action rotations and unified land operations, it would be
very unlikely that suitable hard-stand facilities would exist to establish support areas; therefore
support units would have to operate in the field, particularly during offensive operations when
maintaining momentum is key to success.
The two modes of operational sustainment in decisive action bring into the planning and
execution processes different skill sets and procedures, such as site reconnaissance and
quartering party operations, tactical march techniques, site establishment, security, and
incorporating additional entities such as field trains command posts, and joint and multinational
partners.
As an Army, we have vast wartime experience. Indeed, most of our leaders and Soldiers have
several deployments under their belts. However, a FOB mentality is prevalent and a significant
shortfall exists in the knowledge base of leaders and Soldiers when it comes to conducting field
operations.
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Basic Field Craft

The enemy gets a vote, and for the tactical-level sustainer, managing logistics data, providing
distribution, providing medical treatment, or conducting maintenance can only be accomplished
after first securing yourself or you may not live long enough for logistics to matter. Establishing
a secure perimeter is a top priority in establishing a BSA, and so is clearly establishing priorities
of work in order to quickly do so.
Leaders may be unfamiliar with the resources and time it takes to accomplish the multiple tasks
required to establish and secure new field sites. Soldiers and NCOs may be unfamiliar with
common tasks that support mission essential tasks, so simultaneously establishing security, life
support, and conducting logistical tasks can be difficult. The consequences of which results in
unsynchronized and inefficient operations, and inadequate rest plans that hinder operations as
time progresses.
Many Soldiers just do not know what their individual responsibilities are in a field environment
and are uncertain as to why these tasks are important. Many company-level leaders are
equally inexperienced and therefore are not able to adequately identify training requirements
or effectively manage myriad tasks during field operations. Senior trainers have observed the
following trends:
Unfamiliarity with properly constructing and emplacing fighting positions and
concertina obstacles.
Difficulty transitioning from cell phones to tactical communications.
Unfamiliarity with drafting and understanding range cards and sector sketches.
Not using camouflage nets.
Lacking trained field sanitation teams.
Relative unfamiliarity with guard mount duties, responsibilities, and procedures.
Not employing challenge and password procedures.
Not adhering to noise and light discipline standards.
Not comprehending the rules of engagement.
Not positively identifying conventional and unconventional threats.
Unfamiliarity with chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield
explosives tasks.
Lacking standing operating procedures for field operations.
How is it we find ourselves in this situation? Many of our senior leaders have experienced
multiple field training exercises of this nature in their careers. Certainly, most of our sergeants
major have dug their share of fighting positions as they came up through the ranks.
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The answer is simple; we have been focused on the wars at hand. Counterinsurgency, counterimprovised explosive device training, and managing the Army Force Generation process, along
with other key tasks, was our focus as we prepared for each deployment. But more than that,
perhaps it has been taken for granted that these basic, seemingly simple skills are as ingrained in
our Soldiers today as they were into our senior leaders many years ago.
Training Management and Mission Support

Providing sustainment in unified land operations is not about going old school. It is about
sustaining the skills we have in our wartime deployments and building upon them to operate in
the most austere of environments. In other words, do what we know how to do without doing it
from a FOB.
As logisticians, our daily duties require us to be technical experts; we are great in a motor pool,
warehouse, or troop clinic. As a consequence, we tend to be less tactically proficient than our
combat arms counterparts even though we have a decades worth of experience securing tactical
convoys, reacting to enemy contact, and operating in a counterinsurgency environment. These
are all skills we need to sustain and incorporate into future training.
So, how do we tap into the knowledge and experience we have and build upon it? How do we
get our NCOs, platoon leaders, and company commanders the knowledge they need to train their
Soldiers in these areas and be efficient and effective managers of logistics in the field? We begin
with research. The Army has set the conditions for this transition and is providing resources for
commanders and leaders to access.
Some doctrine and training methodologies have changed, but some have not. For example, Field
Manual (FM) 22-6, Guard Duty, hasnt changed since 1975 and is still the current doctrine for
guard duty. On the other hand, FM 7-0, Training the Force, 2002, recently evolved into Army
Doctrine Publication and Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 7-0, Training Units
and Developing Leaders, 2012. It does not matter how old or how new the doctrine is if it goes
unused.
Doctrine and other training resources are easily accessible online through the Army Publishing
Directorate http://www.apd.army.mil and the Army Training Network (ATN) https://atn.army.
mil. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) has newsletters and bulletins from pre-2001
combat training center rotations that cover many good tactics, techniques, and procedures for
field operations that would still be effective today.
Training Focuses
Developing and updating unit tactical standing operating procedures to include field operations
would be extremely beneficial to any unit. The basic skills of field craft have not changed much
over the years and can be taught almost anywhere if time is dedicated. Commanders should not
take it for granted that their subordinate commanders and company leaders are knowledgeable in
these areas.
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Leader training programs are important to incorporate into a training cycle; even an hour or
two per week can have a big impact on the ability of junior leaders to conduct and lead training
events. Sustainment and maneuver commanders should look for opportunities to integrate
training for maneuver and sustainment personnel whenever possible as a means to share tactical
expertise and experience.
Supply lines and distribution networks are always enemy targets and sustainers must be tactically
proficient or they will risk not being technically capable. Training starts at the individual level;
ensuring that our junior leaders are receiving the necessary institutional and professional
education is important because it provides a solid foundation and prepares them for increased
duties and responsibilities.
Many changes are already occurring, most recently with the updates to the Warrior Leaders
Course and inclusion of the structured self-development modules in the Noncommissioned
Officer Education System (NCOES). But individual training at the unit level is perhaps the most
critical component to any training program because it is continuous and Soldiers must reach a
certain level of proficiency in order to get the most out of collective training events. Individual
training is also the most time consuming and personnel-intensive, and because of this, it creates
the most friction in a sustainment commanders training calendar.
Sending Soldiers to NCOES, new equipment training, and other troop schools, such as the
Battle Staff NCO and the Equal Opportunity Leaders Courses, among many others, will
always be a necessary fact of Army life. But it also means that when coupled with daily support
requirements, troop-to-task and manning requirements can quickly become a concern. When
conducting training conflicts with providing support to the customer, the training event is often
sacrificed.
To avoid this dilemma, commanders must clearly define their mission-essential tasks and desired
end states with the intent to ruthlessly enforce training calendars. Only then can subordinate
commanders conduct backwards planning, conduct battalion and company crosswalks, resource
training, and manage their support requirements effectively.
Sergeants Time Training

Only by ensuring that our NCOs have the necessary resources and time to train the individual can
we expect them to execute effective training events. Commanders can further reduce uncertainty
by being creative in their approach to training. For example, leaders can conduct maintenance
at a field site for a few days instead of in the motor pool, even if it is just a platoon at a time,
and incorporate and reinforce individual-level field skills. Commanders should encourage
junior leaders to conduct opportunity training and use any available time to train individual and
collective tasks while still conducting daily support activities.
Its all about training as you fight. Its all about leader development. Its all about conducting the
military decisionmaking process. Its all about efficiency and adaptability. Training individuals,
teams, leaders, and units is all about a lot of things and it can be overwhelming, especially when
confronted with tasks that are unfamiliar.
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Training Methodology
So where should we start? ADRP 7-0 tells us to train fundamentals first a logical axiom that
assumes the trainers are themselves proficient in the individual and collective tasks they are
expected to teach their Soldiers. And if they are not, what is the next best step after reviewing the
doctrine?
Officer and NCO professional development sessions present good opportunities for those
most experienced to review and teach in a forum that is conducive to leader and trainer
development. Start with the skill level1 tasks and work into the skill levels 2, 3, and 4 along with
other mission-essential task list (METL) supporting tasks. This should go beyond classroom
instruction and incorporate practical exercises in a field environment. Take your sergeants,
lieutenants, and company commanders out to a field site and give them shovels, sandbags,
lumber, a .50-caliber machinegun with tripod, and blank range cards and instruct them to build
a crew-served fighting position to standard. Not only will this allow them to gain appreciation
for amount of work that goes into these types of tasks in the field, but it also will give them
the experience they need to expand their units training plan and quality of instruction to their
Soldiers.
Individual training is continuous and constantly builds and reinforces individual task proficiency
through repetition with a series of desired outcomes that support the desired end state. A
METL task of deploy/establish support area for example, encompasses multiple subtasks for
subordinate units, such as occupy a new operating site, which involves multiple collective
tasks and individual tasks. The individual task of camouflaging equipment can be partially
trained in the motor pool or company area. Sewing the nets together, calculating how many and
what configurations are required for assigned equipment, and the fundamentals that explain
survivability can be taught within a few hours. Build upon this to create crew drills and time
standards that reinforce individual responsibilities.
Next, incorporate such training into a field environment and use the natural terrain patterns,
dispersion techniques, and proper set-up procedures. Several individual tasks can be trained in
the same way and in conjunction with other mutually supporting tasks. In this way, we are not
just checking the block on tasks, conditions, and standards; we are creating the basis for the
desired outcome, which is to support the mission-essential task of establishing a support area.
As the Army transitions over the next few years, its not a question of if we will be prepared for
unified land operations and future conflicts; it is a question of how well we will be prepared.
Strong command influence on dedicating training time and resources will help ensure the basics
of field craft are incorporated into unit training.
We as sustainers and leaders must safeguard to the best of our ability the limited time we have in
our schedules to conduct sergeants time, individual, collective, and job specific training. Officers
must participate in training just as they must assign the training tasks to subordinate leaders and
hold them accountable. Building efficiency in the basics of field craft will result in adaptability in
any environment and allow sustainers to better support customer units.
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Chapter 14
Accelerating the Flow of Human Intelligence Reporting:
The Latest Time Information is of Value
CW4 David Slyman, Joint Multinational Readiness Center
In the world of journalism, there is a time-honored adage: There is nothing older than
yesterdays newspaper. What happened yesterday is already old news and this applies equally
to human intelligence (HUMINT) reports that are published 24 hours after the information is
collected. It is old news to that maneuver commander who is on the offense in the fluid, dynamic
decisive action training environment (DATE).
In the second DATE rotation that the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels,
Germany, has hosted in the past year, some common intelligence themes have emerged during
HUMINT operations. These themes include the following:
Command/support relationships for the HUMINT collection teams (HCTs) direct
support or general support (reinforcing).
The role of intelligence contingency funds (ICF).
Screening, debriefing, and liaison operations.
Source contact operations and field detention site-type interrogations.
Order of battle interrogations.
Determining how to expedite the flow of reports from the HCT to its operational
management team (OMT).
In a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment, leaders may have the luxury to wait 24 hours for a
draft intelligence information report (IIR) to become published. In a DATE, 24 hours is too long
to wait, so what is the latest time that information is of value to that commander? And since that
timeframe is narrow, how can an HCT accelerate the flow of reporting to its customer?
Who is the Human Intelligence Customer?

The biggest problem within these themes was determining the fastest way to get an HCT report
back to the OMT for eventual dissemination via the S-2X section (the primary HUMINT
advisory staff element subordinate to the S-2). However, what the HCT, OMT, and S-2X
overlooked was the fastest way to get that report to the HCTs customer: the troop or company
commander first, the squadron or battalion commander second, and the OMT/S-2X third for
eventual dissemination to that regimental or brigade commander, and then to division and
eventually the intelligence community.
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An Unorthodox PACE Plan

JMRC recommends the following unorthodox primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency
(PACE) plan to ensure that the HCT information makes it to its customers who cannot wait:
PRIMARY: Face-to-face. Chances are that the HCT will accompany a troop or
company on its mission. The HUMINT operator should find the commander or first
sergeant to immediately share what was learned during the HCTs endeavors.
ALTERNATE: Frequency modulated (FM) radio or Blue Force Tracker (BFT). How do
the elements of that unit communicate with its leadership when it is on the move? The
HCT should use the same channels of communication to share its information with that
maneuver leadership.
CONTINGENCY: Cellular telephones. Virtually every country on this planet now has
some sort of cellular service, and many large mobile telephone companies provide
global roaming. An HCT must not withhold spot-reportable or other time-sensitive
information simply because there are no secure communications.
EMERGENCY: Satellite telephones. These should be last on the PACE plan because
they can be sometimes problematic (i.e., they cannot be used indoors, or the HCT may
have difficulty locating a satellite).
When Does the HCT Transmit a Report to the OMT?

In the DATE, the HCT transmits a report to its OMT after it has informed that maneuver
commander. If the HCT is able to type a formal report, it may not be able to send that report for
days unless it has the means to transmit data via the Global Rapid Response Intelligence Package
(GRRIP) system. By the time a draft IIR reaches the OMT, it is no longer actionable, but may
still be relevant to the analysts of the S-2Xs HUMINT analytical cell, the analysts of the allsource collection element (ACE)/brigade intelligence support element, or division/national level
analysts. And by the time that draft IIR becomes an IIR it may be another day or two before
it is published and can be found in searchable databases such as Query Tree, Pathfinder,
M3, HUMINT Online Tasking and Reporting (HOT-R), Combined Information Data Network
Exchange (CIDNE), etc.
When an HCT is sent into a DATE without its own independent communications equipment, and
depends instead upon the supported unit for communications support, the HCT must wait until
the airwaves are quiet before they are provided air time. Giving an HCT team leader a Secure
Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) laptop is not enough to make that team effective, as
the HCT must compete with other hyper-busy squadron Soldiers for a SIPR drop. Worse, using
a web-based reporting database (in this case it was CIDNE) only delayed the preparation and
dissemination of draft IIRs, as none of the remote HCTs were able to log on to the database to
draft their reports. By the time the HCTs developed a way to transmit the information back to the
OMT without using the web-based reporting database, the information was not only a day old,
but days old.
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So, if an HCT did not use the web-based reporting database, how did they transmit the reports to
the OMT? SIPR e-mail, BFT, and FM radio became the reporting media. Using these channels
meant that the OMT had to manually type the data into CIDNE to push the report to the
S-2X for publishing. Again, these alternate channels still resulted in delays to information
dissemination and thus, the information was of little value to the regimental commander.
However, these alternate communications channels did not impede the flow of information from
the HCT to the supported squadron. If the HCT was in a remote location with an on-the-move
troop, the HCT could verbally pass information first to that troop commander, second to that
squadron S-2 using BFT or FM radio, and thirdly to the OMT.
What this ultimately resulted in was a low formal IIR production count approximately
15 reports from five HCTs in a three-week exercise. However, the leaders who needed the
information at the tactical level received it immediately either in person, via BFT or FM radio.
Figure 14-1. Expedited reporting and dissemination diagram

The illustration in Figure 14-1 shows one way to expedite the flow of information to those
commanders who cannot wait for a formal report. The HCT conducts a meeting and passes what
they learn first to the maneuver commander whom they are supporting. The flow of information
flows successively higher and reaches the brigade two hours after the meeting. While this is
happening, the HCT passes the draft IIR to its OMT. Four hours after the meeting the S-2X
not division headquarters publishes the report.
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The important thing to note is that five hours after the meeting, the published report is available
to national-level agencies. In a COIN environment, these publishing times could be anywhere
from 24 to 48 hours after the source meeting.
Ensuring More Effective Human Intelligence Collection Team Communications

How can S-2X and OMT leaders better ensure their HUMINT operators are more
communications-effective? Some recommendations include:
Counter Intelligence-HUMINT Automated Tool Set (CHATS)/CI-HUMINT Automated
Reporting Collection System (CHARCS). CHATS/CHARCS has been fielded to
virtually all tactical units, but most HUMINT operators use only the laptop that comes
with the system. CHATS/CHARCS enables the HUMINT operator to draft an IIR,
account for ICF, and manage source information all offline, so when they have access
to a SIPR drop, transmission to an OMT is relatively quick.
HCT Toolkits. An HCT Toolkit typically has, among other items, an Iridium satellite
telephone, and often a device called a secure sleeve for secure voice communication.
GRRIP. The GRRIP system combines the best of CHATS and the HCT toolkit by
enabling the HCT to securely transmit data or voice. Moreover, a GRRIP can access
SIPR-based web reporting databases such as the HOT-R or CIDNE portals.
Mobile Phones. There are few countries in the world which do not have cellphone
service. The astute S-2X and OMT leadership will have already conducted a study of
all those countries in their potential area of operations and will have already purchased
cellphones through a service provider which provides roaming coverage in that
country.
Establishing a standing operating procedure (SOP) which directs the HCTs to provide
reporting first and foremost to that maneuver commander in whatever format that
expedites the flow of information. Once that supported commander has received the
information, the HCT will endeavor to pass it to the OMT as soon as possible. The
OMT will disseminate the information to the S-2 operations, S-2X, ACE chief, etc., per
the SOP.
Keeping the Maneuver Commander Informed is Job One

In a COIN environment where an HCT works from a fixed site with established communications
architecture, an HCT strives to send a report as soon as possible to the OMT that will ensure it is
reviewed, edited, and processed for publication and dissemination. This works well because the
turn-around time to move an IIR from a draft to publication is quick (often less than 24 hours),
and a spot report can be disseminated in an hour or less. In the relatively stable world of COIN,
these timeframes are acceptable. In a DATE, a report received 24 hours later is just that: late.
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An HCT does not need the latest electronic device to pass information to the unit it supports.
Sometimes the most effective way is the simplest and most fail-safe: in this case talking faceto-face with the commander. Ensuring that the HCT knows that its primary mission is to keep
that maneuver commander informed first, rather than the OMT, guarantees that a maneuver
commander will view that HCT as a value-added enabler. Besides, the life that HCT saves may
be its own.
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Chapter 15
Utilizing the Goat as a Nonlethal Effect in the Decisive Action
Training Environment
MAJ (Chaplain) Timothy L. Rietkerk, Joint Multinational Readiness Center
Unit ministry teams (UMTs) conduct religious area analysis (RAA) in order to advise the
commander and staff on the role of religion in the operational area. In the decisive action training
environment (DATE), with the focus of conducting simultaneous offense, defense, and stability
operations, the UMT must participate in the targeting process to best advise the commander and
staff. When directed by the commander, the UMT can perform religious leader liaison (RLL)
within the framework of Field Manual (FM) 1-05, Religious Support, October 2012, and the
Chief of Chaplains Policy No. 3 on RLL.
This article offers several tactics, techniques, and procedures describing how the UMT
participates in the targeting process and how RLL can be conducted in support of the stability
working group.
Figure 15-1. A goat served as a nonlethal effect
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Rotational Training
In preparation for the Joint Multinational Readiness Centers DATE rotation, the 2nd Cavalry
Regiments UMT, working through the RAA, identified the Islamic holiday, Eid al-Adha, as
having significant importance for the local population and potential implications for operations.
Eid al-Adha, also known as the Feast of the Sacrifice, is a four-day holiday to commemorate the
willingness of the prophet Abraham to sacrifice his son Ishmael when commanded by God. God
intervened and provided a ram for the sacrifice. Eid al-Adha involves the community coming
together and sacrificing domestic animals. The meat is then split three ways between family,
friends and neighbors, and the poor.
The chaplain brought this holiday to the attention of the S-9 and coordinated a RLL with the
local imam. The chaplain discussed the holiday with the imam and ascertained a need within the
community for potential assistance without making any direct promises for assistance. The imam
expressed concern for the number of displaced persons who were in the process of relocating to
an internally displaced-persons camp on the edge of the city and their ability to participate in Eid
al-Adha.
The chaplain returned with this information and asked the S-9 and the judge advocate general
(JAG) officer about the possibility of supplying goats to the imam in support of Eid al-Adha.
The JAG researched the request and was able to locate authorized funding for the purchase of
the goats. The chaplain also recommended that the provincial governor would be the best avenue
to supply the goats to the local imam. By having the governor supply the goats, the regiment
reinforced support for the local government, a key stability task. Purchasing goats through the
local economy also provided economic development. In this way, the goat served as a non-lethal
effect in support of key stability tasks in the DATE rotation.
Doctrine
By integrating with the staff and conducting the RLL in accordance with Chief of Chaplains
Policy No. 3, the UMT upheld the intent of FM 1-05:
Chaplain sections and UMTs can work within boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working
groups to integrate their respective expertise and knowledge with the collective expertise
of the staff in order to focus on specific problem sets to provide to the commander.
In order to integrate their respective expertise and knowledge, the UMTs must understand the
targeting process. The UMTs must staff their requests for information from the RAA through the
proper staff processes and then follow up with updating their running estimates when answers
are obtained.
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Figure 15-2. Soldiers must understand and work with the populace
The S-2 can assist with requests for information for protected religious sites and local religious
leaders. The S-9 provides another source for religious leader information. FM 3-57, Civil
Affairs Operations, October 2011, under the social information category on page 4-8, looks at
the role of religion in society and the various religious and fraternal groups. Also included in
the analysis are key events that can affect the commanders mission, such as elections, school
events, fiscal schedules, and holidays (religious periods and traditional vacation time). The
UMT should work with the S-9 who will be coordinating with the civil affairs teams to gather
information on the local population. The UMT must integrate and synchronize the RLL activity
with the S-9 when the commander decides to utilize the chaplain in this capacity. The RLL
activity must also be conducted within the Chief of Chaplains policy in order not to violate the
non-combatant status of the chaplain. The chaplain cannot serve as the sole or lead negotiator.
Reporting requirements for the chaplain cannot be part of a directed human intelligence
collection. The debriefing process for the chaplain should include these restrictions in the unit
procedure for conducting leader engagements and the staff briefed on the Chief of Chaplains
policy.
By being involved in the stability working group, the UMT synchronizes its advice and efforts
with the rest of the staff during the targeting cycle. The UMT should incorporate unit knowledge
management into their staff integration and utilize existing overlays and running estimates to
display the impact of religion on operations. A way is to show how religious holidays shape
population movements. The Islamic holiday Eid al-Adha involves the host nation community
potentially gathering together in large groups. Stability operations should take into account
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security and support for the population during the holiday. The chaplain, along with the staff,
provides recommendations to the commander on how to shape operations in this timeframe to
meet his key tasks. The S-3 and the future operations cell incorporate the stability working group
recommendations into operational planning and the overall targeting process.
In this way, the UMT can provide timely and effective advice on the role of religion in operations
through the targeting process while fully maintaining the chaplains non-combatant status and
staying within the Chief of Chaplains policy of RLL.
In utilizing the goat as a non-lethal effect, the unit supports the stability task in that the local
government is viewed as taking care of the needs of the local populace. In this instance, the local
government supports the population in celebrating an important religious holiday in a difficult
situation involving displaced persons. This provides hope to the population and achieves the
commanders goal of the local government being viewed as legitimate and able to take care
of the population. This also counters a key claim in the enemys campaign to undermine the
legitimacy of the host nation government.
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Appendix A
Collection Reports, JMRC Rotation 13-01
Lessons Learned, October 2012
Mission Command Focus Observations
Observation 1
Title: Improving command post (CP) security and survivability.
Description: CP security measures should be a high priority for the operations element and the
headquarters company command team as a CP is established to assume the mission command
role for subordinate units.
Discussion: Often security is an afterthought without receiving the required emphasis. Prerotational rehearsals focus on setting up structures and the mission command architecture but
not on the CP securing itself against direct or indirect attacks. As the CP occupies a position,
Soldiers must continuously improve not only its mission command capabilities but also its
security posture. Leaders and Soldiers must understand basic defensive operations as applied to
defending a strong point or battle position. These are skills that have eroded and not practiced
in a long time. Building fighting positions, preparing range cards and sector sketches, planning
distribution of fires, preparing alert plans, evacuating and treating casualties, and establishing
battlefield communications must be relearned and rehearsed at all levels, both during daylight
and periods of limited visibility. If every Soldier does not understand or cannot execute these
tasks to standard, the CP and all Soldiers associated with it are at great risk from enemy attack.
Insights/Lessons: Security is always the most important component of any mission. CPs are
high priority targets for the enemy. Detailed plans must be published, trained, and rehearsed
down to the lowest level both during daylight hours and during times of limited visibility.
Leaders must know how to employ organic weapons systems and to control distribution of
fire. Leaders must assign Soldiers/sections battle positions and sectors of fire and ensure they
are understood. Sector sketches and range cards must be completed. Survivability positions
must be dug to standard to protect weapons systems and Soldiers from enemy fire. An effective
communication plan, using squad radios or similar systems, must be implemented so that the
headquarters company commander and/or first sergeant can control available assets in the event
of an attack on the CP. A quick reaction force/reserve element should be identified in case of a
breach in the perimeter. Patrols and listening/observation posts must be established outside the
wire providing the CP with adequate warning of ground attacks. Alert procedures and challenge
and password procedures must be known by all and implemented in accordance with unit
standing operating procedures. Continual improvements must be accomplished for as long as the
CP occupies a position. In the event of a ground attack, all available assets that are not directly
related to manning or running the CP should be used to protect the CP. Field Manual 3-21.8,
The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, chapter 8, outlines comprehensive details in the planning,
execution, and maintenance of area and strongpoint defensive operations.
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Observation 2
Title: Integrating inform and influence activities (IIA) enablers.
Description: Unit leaders should use doctrinal resources to improve understanding and assist
proper integration of IIA enabler forces. One good tool is Army Doctrine Reference Publication
(ADRP) 5-0, The Operations Process, May 2012. Additionally, units should review chapter 5
of Field Manual 3-13, Inform and Influence Activities, January 2013, for guidance on how to
effectively integrate IIA enablers into the military decisionmaking process (MDMP).
Discussion: It is important for units to effectively integrate new forces, and through careful
planning, apportion and synchronize these forces to meet the requirements of the mission.
ADRP 5-0 provides good guidance on how units should approach the initial integration of new
forces and also provides a good checklist of tasks units should accomplish when integrating
enabler forces. The publication states Commanders, command sergeants major, and staffs help
assimilate new Soldiers into their units and new units into the force. They also prepare Soldiers
and new units in performing their duties properly and integrating into an upcoming operation
smoothly. Integration for new Soldiers includes training on unit standing operating procedures
(SOPs) and mission essential tasks for the operation. It also means orienting new Soldiers on
their places and roles in the force and during the operation. This integration for units includes,
but is not limited to: Receiving and introducing new units to the force and the area of operation,
exchanging SOPs, conducting briefings and rehearsals, establishing communications links, and
exchanging liaison teams (if required).
Contained in FM 3-13, Chapter 5, which is titled Inform and Influence Activities Integration, is
a good reference for units to utilize during the MDMP to ensure IIA enabler forces are properly
apportioned and synchronized to meet the requirements of the mission. In particular, units should
refer to the FMs guidance on course of action (COA) development which states During COA
development, the G-7 (S-7) provides advice on the potential impact of friendly and enemy
information activities, related actions, or activities of the relative combat power of the two sides.
This officer focuses IIA planning efforts on achieving an operational advantage at the decision
point of each course of action. Lastly, the G-7 (S-7) develops schemes of support and objectives
for IIA and input to a high-payoff target list for each course of action. Units should also utilize
the manuals guidance on COA analysis which states During COA analysis, the G-7 (S-7) helps
the G-2 (S-2) with enemy information activities and assessments, provides input on high-value
targets, and develops an IIA concept. This concept supports each friendly COA, addresses critical
event actions and messages, and reviews and refines task organization of information-related
capabilities to support IIA.
Insights/Lessons: Incorporate guidance from ADRP 5-0 and FM 3-13 into unit SOPs for
integrating IIA enabler forces and conducting IIA related aspects of MDMP.
Observation 3
Title: Understanding roles to enhance battalion-level command post operations.
Description: A battalion-level command post (CP) is manned with a battle captain and battle
noncommissioned officer (NCO) and three to four radio operators (ROs) per day and night shift.
During a training rotation, it is sometimes difficult to observe who is in charge or running the
CP. The lack of ownership and understanding is evident in the critical processes of how data is
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received by the ROs and/or battle captains/ battle NCOs and disseminated to the commander and
staff.
Discussion: A lack of ownership and understanding in CPs is partially due to undefined tasks and
purposes of each duty position within the CPs. Developing a common understanding of duties
and responsibilities demonstrates how each position supports the others enabling the battle
captains/battle NCOs to analyze information and inform the commander. What is sometimes
observed in a battalion CP is that an RO receives a radio transmission from a unit that meets a
commanders critical information requirement or friendly forces information requirement, but
the data received from the RO stays within the CP and is not pushed to the commander until
sometime after the event has happened. The figure below demonstrates how data transition to
understanding. (Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-0, Mission Command, May 2012)
Figure A-1. Data transition to understanding

Insights/Lessons: Prior to decisive action training rotations, battalion-level CPs should develop
and implement CP standing operating procedures (SOPs). The SOPs should include clearly
defined tasks and purposes per each role within the CP and how each role builds upon the others.
The CP should also conduct rehearsals on battle drills, focusing on how data is received and the
step action drill to get the data processed and sent to the commander and staff. Ownership will
come once each CP function understands its role.
Observation 4
Title: Conducting mission specific rules of engagement (ROE)/law of war (LOW) training.
Description: Soldiers and units in the decisive action training environment (DATE) face many
new and unfamiliar situations involving the ROE and LOW. To be successful in the DATE and
mitigate against ROE/LOW violations, units must advance beyond the baseline annual ROE/
LOW training mandated by Army Regulation (AR) 350-1, by developing and implementing
training scenarios tailored address the more common ROE/LOW issues in the DATE.
Discussion: AR 350-1 mandates annual ROE/LOW training (Level B training) for every Soldier
in the Army. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3121.01B, Standing Rules of
Engagement/ Standing Rules for the Use of Force for U.S. Forces (13 Jun 2005), further tasks
commanders with the primary responsibility for ensuring that their Soldiers are trained on the
ROE. The judge advocate assists in the training of Soldiers, staff, and leaders.
ROE training is not a one-time event it is a series of individual and collective training
exercises. Upon receipt of mission specific ROE, units should develop a training program and
leverage judge advocates to provide individual training for unit leaders. Leaders should then
incorporate ROE training into the units collective training events like situational training
exercises. See also Commanders Legal Guide, The Judge Advocate General Legal Center and
School, U.S. Army, 15 June 2012.
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The DATE presents units and individual Soldiers with many of the same issues faced in prior
counterinsurgency deployments in support of Operations Iraqi freedom/New Dawn and Enduring
Freedom, as well as a host of new issues. Specifically, the DATE may require Soldiers and units
to perform the following:
Positively identify irregular or paramilitary forces (such as the South Atropian Peoples
Army) as a declared hostile force and thereby distinguish them from the civilian
populace.
Understand and correctly distinguish the inherent right of self-defense from the
collateral damage methodology applied to offensive fires.
Execute fires approved by the proper authority against targets within restricted fire
areas, no fire areas or across international boundaries.
Understand ROE applicability/limitations of operational control (OPCON), tactical
control (TACON), or direct support multinational forces.
Understand detention authority, applicable LOW rules and processing requirements for
enemy prisoners of war and Atropian civilians.
Comply with reporting requirements for suspected LOW violations.
Upon receipt of mission specific ROE for the DATE, the brigade staff must incorporate the ROE
into their planning process, identify/seek appropriate revisions based on the unit mission, and
pass the ROE (with applicable training aids) to subordinate units in the operation order.
During mission analysis, the brigade judge advocate (BJA) should identify those ROE/LOW
issues that are likely to arise. The BJA should then tailor ROE training packages specific for the
mission to enable subordinate units to train these issues. The BJA should work with the brigade
planners to implement and track this training, as feasible. The unit must not merely rely upon
baseline AR 350-1 Level B training to ensure that Soldiers were sufficiently trained on the ROE.
Insights/Lessons: During unit leader training programs, recommend emphasis on predeployment ROE training particular to the DATE. To enforce the emphasis, units could be
required to backbrief their higher headquarters on the completion of such training during their
deployment phase. Further, ensure that multinational and coalition partners who are TACON or
OPCON to U.S. forces are properly trained on applicable ROE. Training is most effective when
conducted in a small group forum (rather than battalion-sized briefings), or incorporated into
other unit training events (such as situational training exercise lanes or during the command post
exercise phase). Training is also more effective when led by the company and platoon officers
and noncommissioned officers, assisted by on-site legal personnel.
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Observation 5
Title: Providing timely and accurate Title 10 reporting.
Description: The decisive action training environment (DATE) creates unique challenges to a
units ability to accurately report and/or investigate designated serious incidents (hostile deaths,
fratricide incidents, duty status whereabouts unknown (DUSTWUN) events, and law of war
violations) within the strict timelines set forth by law or regulation.
Discussion: Title 10 of the United States Code, as well as various Department of Defense (DoD)
directives and Army regulations, mandates that Army units will report and investigate designated
serious incidents within strict timelines. These incidents include, but are not limited to: the
death of any Soldier due to either enemy actions or operational accidents, suicides, law of war
violations, any DUSTWUN Soldier, any suspected fratricide incident, etc. In a DATE rotation,
the rotational training unit will be provided with an operation order (OPORD) from its higher
headquarters with a detailed matrix outlining reporting and investigation requirements. The RTU
will then need to incorporate those requirements into its OPORD, the associated legal annex, and
its battle drills.
While not a new requirement, units may find reporting compliance within the DATE to be more
challenging than past experiences had within mature theaters due to the lack of established
reporting chains and developed communication capabilities. Units that are most successful at
reporting during the DATE have spent time beforehand to plan and issue
Clear guidance of what items require reporting.
A defined reporting chain.
A detailed primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) plan that accounts
for the likely communication breakdowns that can occur during operations that are
highly mobile.
All this information should be disseminated in the units OPORD and within its battle drills.
Further, these battle drills must be practiced beforehand and then adhered to within the DATE
to truly be effective. In defining the reporting chain and PACE plan, the unit should account for
the realities of multiple command nodes that are often geographically dispersed and frequently
relocate due to operational necessity. Proper contingency planning is essential for smooth and
accurate reporting.
Units at every level must clearly assign the responsibility for Title 10 reporting so that some
named individual is made responsible for ensuring that reportable information goes up within
its prescribed timeline. This technique also allows for the unit to better focus training towards
these people, which should ensure clarity at each level in regard to what type of events require
reporting.
Insights/Lessons: The brigade judge advocate (BJA) should review the command post battle
drills to ensure that all incidents requiring a report to higher headquarters/investigation have
been designated someone responsible to report (chief of operations), what information must be
reported, and the required timeline. They must also designate who is the proponent for follow-on
reporting as the information becomes more available.
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The brigade and all subordinate units must routinely use the same command post battle drills
to ensure consistency and accuracy. Units must regularly rehearse these. The brigade must also
train subordinate units, staffs and liaison officers (LNOs) (including coalition partners who are
not familiar with U.S. Title 10, DoD or Department of the Army reporting requirements and
procedures) on the types of incidents that require reporting and timeframes associated therewith.
Particular focus should be on the unit LNOs and the battle captains.
The BJA should attend all wargaming sessions and combined arms rehearsals to identify specific
issues/battle drills that may be utilized during the upcoming mission. He/she should then
coordinate with the LNOs and other potential individuals in the current operations cell to ensure
all review and understand the battle drills. Rather than playing the action officer role for each
reporting task, JAs should serve an oversight role wherein they track multiple reports to ensure
their accuracy and timeliness.
Observation 6
Title: Defining the roles and responsibilities of the headquarters and headquarters battery (HHB)
command team.
Description: An open flow of communication must be established between the HHB command
team and the other headquarters command posts to stay abreast on the status of their Soldiers,
equipment, and requirements across the operating environment.
Discussion: The HHB command team plays a vital role in battalion/squadron operations.
The HHB is responsible for the administrative, life support, and security requirements of the
battalion/squadron staff members, sustainment Soldiers (medics, mechanics, fuel handlers),
and numerous field artillery enablers such as radar, meteorological, and survey. This is perhaps
the most widely spread organization within the regiment with the tactical command post (CP),
main, main CP, company/battery CPs, field trains, combat trains, and field artillery enablers all
located in different locations. Because the battery is spread out in such a manner, communication
systems and procedures are paramount. Accounting for all the personnel and equipment across
the battlefield will fail if the battery does not establish the mechanisms needed to meet battalion/
squadron demands. Coordinating with sister units within the brigade is also a responsibility that
should be fulfilled by the command team. This coordination includes sending the survey section
out to the other units in preparation of a defense, ensuring that the lines of communication are
open for the meteorological section to push the data to all the mortar sections, and ensuring that
the radar sections are receiving the support and security that they need.
Insights/Lessons: Communication procedures within the HHB should be developed and
practiced prior to DATE rotations. Establishing these procedures as well as reporting battle
rhythms prevents the many elements of the HHB from going without required support or
security. Additionally, individual sections should train on basic defense techniques with
assistance from the battery first sergeant (1SG). According to Field Manual 6-50, Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Cannon Battery, December 1996, the 1SG
is the principal enlisted advisor to the battery commander on reconnaissance and site selection
of the battery position, as well as the execution of the overall battery defense plan. Finally, the
HHB commander must decide where he and his command team should be positioned to facilitate
effective mission command.
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Observation 7
Title: Enabling knowledge management to enhance effective staff collaboration.
Description: Field Manual 6-01.1 Knowledge Management Operations, July 2012, defines
KM as the process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning,
and decisionmaking. The S-6 can enable staff collaboration through KM by understanding
information requirements, the operational environments, andthe communication equipment
available. To achieve this, the S-6 must define and develop an architecture that supports the units
KM requirements during the military decisionmaking process (MDMP).
Discussion: Each staff warfighting function (WfF) has unique information requirements that
remain fairly consistent no matter the operating environment. Each WfF must be prepared to
define their requirements during the MDMP. The S-6 must understand both the capabilities and
the limitations of each of the WfF communication systems and the impact these will have on
information delivery. Each WfF must be assessed individually when the network architecture is
defined.
Each WfF has unique systems to share their information requirements. The units capability
set includes interoperable communication systems and applications fielded together to
strengthen brigade combat team mission command networks and improve effectiveness in
todays operational environment. The S-6 must understand the capability set requirements for
interoperability as well as understand which equipment can be operated on the move and which
requires a fixed location. Communication systems considerations include Warfighter Information
Network-Tactical suites, frequency-modulation and Harris radios, the Enhanced Position
Location Reporting System, cell/satellite phones, and local established networks. Until the Army
delivers the network of the future, staffs must utilize the current communications systems that are
available.
The operating environments must be considered across each echelon and operational mission.
This requirement is the most challenging since it can change from mission to mission. Providing
command communications is critical, but the control communications are what enable the
staff collaboration. As part of the operating environment, the S-6 must also understand the
command center(s) and the commanders preferences in the roles and responsibilities of each
node in the structure. Is there a main command post, a tactical command post, or a mobile
command group? Who has the forward command, the rear command and what are the defined
roles of the commands? Mobile versus stationary attributes will impact the units ability to
move information. Understanding the information requirements and the capability set are major
considerations and will determine the primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE)
plan for each WfF. A validation exercise helps refine each WfF PACE plan and ensure optimal
information flow for each operating environment.
Insights/Lessons: The S-6 must plan each operation to meet the unique needs of the operational
environment and tactical formations inherent to the mission at hand. Staffs must define their
deliverables during the MDMP and train as they expect to fight in each operational environment.
The S-6 must understand both the capabilities and the limitations of each WfF communication
system and the impact these will have on information delivery.
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Appendix B
Intelligence Focus Observations
Observation 1
Title: Integrating human intelligence (HUMINT) collection teams (HCTs).
Description: Battalion and company staffs are unfamiliar with the capabilities of their HCT
assets. HCTs appear to be often thought of merely as interrogators, but interrogations are only
one of six disciplines which fall under a HUMINT collectors skill set. This lack of knowledge
regarding the HUMINT skill set makes it difficult for units to use all aspects of their information
collection assets.
Discussion: Units are accustomed to integrating support elements such as supply or medical on
a daily basis which makes their integration into the units planning process a natural occurrence.
The late integration of an HCT causes most units to think they need to adjust their plans for
accomplishing a mission. This misunderstanding is in line with the knowledge gap regarding the
use of HUMINT assets.
In most cases, units usually do not receive their HCT until they take part in a field training
exercise together. These exercises are productive for learning individual skill sets pertaining to
regular duties, but it leaves little time for units to learn how to integrate their HUMINT assets.
This limited interactive training makes it difficult for unit commanders to learn and practice
implementing the inherent capabilities of HCTs.
Insights/Lessons: The primary purpose for HUMINT collection assets is to satisfy the
commanders intelligence requirements. The knowledge gap regarding the operational use of
HUMINT assets degrades the maneuver units overall force protection posture. Units must
integrate their enablers during the initial stages of the planning process, allowing the HCTs to
thoroughly brief commanders on their capabilities. This gives commanders an opportunity to
improve knowledge regarding how to implement HUMINT assets to unit advantage during
future training exercises.
Field Manual (FM) 2-0, Intelligence, explains that HUMINT collectors efforts include the
following:
Debriefing (U.S. and non-U.S. civilians).
Screening (detained personnel, friendly forces, as well as locally employed persons).
Conducting liaisons with coalition forces.
Conducting source contact operations.
Conducting interrogations.
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These efforts are conducted in order to spot and assess near and long-term threats the unit may
encounter.
Observation 2
Title: Brigade combat teams should conduct information collection rehearsals as part of their
military decisionmaking process.
Description: Brigade combat teams operating in wide area security or combined arms maneuver
environments are supported by collection assets available from their organic organizations,
their combined joint task force level headquarters, their theater headquarters, as well as
national intelligence agencies. Brigades must manage more collection support than a division
headquarters was expected to manage prior to 2003. A common technique used at the division
level to synchronize information collection prior to 2003 was the reconnaissance and surveillance
rehearsal.
Discussion: The information collection rehearsal should be conducted by event or phase, in
line with the wargame or combined arms rehearsal. For each event covered, the actors should
brief each asset assigned or task organized, what named areas of interest they are observing,
what indicators they are looking for, and what essential element of information and priority
information requirements (PIR) they are attempting to answer. After briefing each asset using this
method, the actors must then brief what reporting methods they are going to use, and on what
communication systems.
Every information collector briefs how they are sharing the information they are collecting. Is
the information being input into a digital system? If yes, who is inputting the information? How
will battalions receive information if they are jumping their tactical operations center during
this event/phase? Is the information required to be broadcasted over the brigade operations and
intelligence or the command frequency modulation radio networks?
Following the completion of the events or phases, the rehearsal should include vignettes which
test redundancy in collection and the use of primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency
(PACE) communications plans. Collectors and users should understand from the rehearsal what
the commanders priorities are, and that as a result of these priorities, collection assets may
be moved or reallocated in order to answer PIR. Collectors and users should also have a clear
understanding of the information dissemination PACE plan.
Insights/Lessons: The intelligence warfighting function rehearsal should include the regiment/
brigade S-2, S-3, collection manager, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance liaison
officer (LNO), targeting officer, signals intelligence technician, S-2X human intelligence/
operational management team, unmanned aircraft systems platoon leader or technician, the
reconnaissance squadron S-3 or LNO, the artillery battalion S-2 and radar technician, and
battalion/squadron S-2s and S-3s or LNOs, as available.
The goal of the intelligence warfighting function rehearsal is an understanding of how
information will be collected, processed, analyzed, and disseminated for each phase/event of the
planned operation.
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Observation 3
Title: Maximizing the capabilities of the electronic intelligence (ELINT) section in the military
intelligence troop.
Description: The addition of an ELINT analyst section to the analysis and control element
(ACE) in the decisive action environment can better facilitate communication between the
signals intelligence (SIGINT) platoon and the targeting cell. Additionally, an ELINT section is
able to provide additional insight into the common operating picture through its ability to track
enemy weapon systems and their associated units from the order of battle.
Discussion: Adding ELINT capability to a brigade/regimental echelon may initially present a
challenge, as these echelons typically do not have organic collection capabilities or procedures
and equipment to receive ELINT reporting from higher echelons. Making effective use of tasking
requests for division and national level intelligence collection assets allows analysts to receive a
limited information feed, simulating reported information from the SIGINT production chain.
In one instance that was observed, the ACE officer in charge and SIGINT platoon agreed that
creating a section directly within the ACE would improve communication between the ELINT
analysts, the targeting cell, and ACE leadership. Analysts were limited to SECRET-level
reporting within the ACE, and were able to effectively desensitize information for reporting
purposes. All internal reporting was formatted as a tipper message, included weapon systems
and locations, and sent via PSi-chat instant messaging platform. No formal intelligence
reports were created. Close physical proximity to targeting allowed for the creation of timely
fire missions against enemy anti-air defense and ground targets, ensuring air superiority for
friendly air assets. ELINT was able to track movements of enemy units throughout the exercise,
providing fusion cell analysts with accurate, timely locations of enemy forces. Near the end
of the exercise, new techniques were developed for ELINT analysts to directly update the
regimental common operating picture in near real-time.
Insights/Lessons: ELINT is a valuable tool for units in the decisive action training environment,
particularly against conventional forces where the enemy incorporates complex weapon
systems, anti-air defense, air assets, and specialized communications equipment. Units can
effectively use information received to aid the regimental mission. However, at the exercise
level, there is not a clear picture of what ELINT is and how its capabilities and limitations can
be effectively leveraged. Units may receive information beyond the abilities of collection assets.
Tactical ELINT analysis is a valuable tool, but intelligence warfighting function operators must
reincorporate it in an accurate and appropriate manner to provide the best training.
Observation 4
Title: Enhancing understanding of the operational environment using the Geospatial Intelligence
(GEOINT) section.
Description: GEOINT is a crucial component of a staff integrated intelligence preparation of the
battlefield. The analysis and control elements GEOINT section helps task and direct available
intelligence collection assets to answer the commanders critical information requirements. The
role of the GEOINT section noncommissioned officer in charge is important for quality control
and accomplishment of the mission.
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Discussion: The senior or lead imagery analysts duty is to be prepared and have the section and
equipment ready to deploy. It is also a responsibility to keep the staff informed of capabilities
that the section can provide as well as communicate significant events going on before, during,
and after a deployment. Prior to deployment, GEOINT sections should download raw imagery
data needed for the operational environment on hard drives and provide capability briefs
to commanders and staff. GEOINT section supervisors should fully incorporate the use of
the Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) and Full Motion Video (FMV) technology for
conducting surveillance and reconnaissance. GEOINT sections are able to track movements of
friendly and enemy units and vehicles throughout the area of operation using both GMTI and
FMV providing situational development, accurate intelligence, and locations for fire missions.
This significantly enhances the overall success of the mission and provides an accurate picture of
the battlefield.
Insights/Lessons: Pre-deployment preparation is a must to improve a units ability to execute
an operation. Having all the imagery data of the operational area and briefing the commander
and staff of all GEOINT capabilities prior to movement greatly enhances overall success of the
mission. GEOINT sections should be integrated with their supported units prior to any training
exercise or deployment. This enables the commander to fully identify how the GEOINT skill set
can best be used to support the mission.
Observation 5
Title: Understanding the role of counterintelligence (CI) in tactical training environments.
Description: Tactical CI training is critical in providing experienced CI personnel that
understand how to support commanders operating in tactical environments. Without proper
training, CI Agents may not be able to articulate their roles to commanders, and may require
more time to accomplish tactical CI tasks.
Discussion: According to Field Manual (FM) 2-0, Intelligence, March 2010, Chapter 6, CIs
primary purpose at the tactical level is to assess vulnerabilities and advise commanders on force
protection issues. CI assets are instrumental in protecting bases of operations from infiltration,
collection, planning, and targeting by foreign intelligence and security services (FISS) and
international terrorist organizations (ITO) entities. FM 2-22.2, Counterintelligence, October
2009, provides guidelines of CI support to various types of military operations and identifies
tasks associated with particular types of operations.
The success of a CI team is measured by the operational emphasis, resourcing, and equipping
they receive from their supported commands. When operating at its full capacity, the role of
the CI Team is to deny, degrade, disrupt, or mitigate FISS and ITO ability and capability to
successfully execute intelligence collection targeting of U.S. or friendly force interests. CI
focuses on countering FISS and ITO intelligence collection activities targeting information or
material concerning U.S. or friendly force personnel, activities, operations, plans, equipment,
facilities, publications, technology, or documents. The CI team activities include providing
advice and assistance on security programs, education and awareness, threat vulnerability
assessments, CI screenings, CI investigations, and CI collections to assist commanders.
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Insights/Lessons: CI personnel must read and understand FM 2-0 and FM 2-22.2 prior to
deployment to a tactical training or combat environment. The S-2X cells must be fully integrated
in the staff processes prior to any deployment so they have input and oversight of how to best
utilize their personnel.
The CI Special Agent Course at Ft. Huachuca primarily focuses on strategic and field office
operations. Expanding and updating the program of instruction would help train and prepare
CI Agents for tactical operations to help agents articulate to commanders some aspects of their
duties, responsibilities, and how they are force enablers.
Observation 6
Description: Units must develop effective planning cycles for UAS intelligence collection,
specifically regarding the RQ-7B Shadow tactical UAS.
Discussion: The Shadow is a brigade level asset that should be integrated into the collection
process prior to the start of a training rotation. Depending on task organization, geographical
separation, and mission, it may take longer to integrate the Shadow into the intelligence planning
cycle. Getting the Shadow integrated is critical in order to effectively utilize the asset and
ultimately answer priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and determine enemy dispositions.
In cases of geographical separation, it may be better to place the Shadow in direct support
to a battalion-level unit or in direct support to the main effort. Having a detailed intelligence
collection plan, describing named areas of interest, PIRs, and the friendly/enemy situation can all
pay enormous dividends in the first hours of battle. Collection managers and UAS platoons must
have frank discussions on the capabilities and limitations of the system. The collection manager
should have an understanding of the impact that weather, maintenance, system characteristics,
and crew endurance will have on the UAS mission. Having a general understanding will
maximize effective use and reduce misallocation of resources.
Insights/Lessons: The S-2 and collection manager must integrate UAS into their planning cycles
and effectively communicate mission requirements. In decisive action operations, UAS assets
make the most impact in the days and hours prior to the battle by allowing commanders to see
the battlefield and prioritize targets. This is a change from the counterinsurgency environment
where UAS assets were often dynamically re-tasked to support ongoing operations. This change
requires prior planning and communication of requirements in order to manage operational and
logistic requirements.
Observation 7
Title: Equipping UAS units to enhance intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
Description: Shadow UAS platoons lack sufficient resources to operate with self-sufficiency
during decisive action operations.
Discussion: In decisive action operations, units are expected to have some measure of selfsufficiency and have organic means for basic life support and communication. The current
Shadow UAS modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) has no maintenance tent or
enhanced communications packages such as secure or nonsecure Internet protocol router network
access point terminals or Command Post of the Future systems. Shadow platoons are forced to
rely on existing structures to perform all of the maintenance operations. In the counterinsurgency
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(COIN) environment, Shadow utilized existing structures or locally purchased shelters. In the
dynamic decisive action environment, Shadow needs to have a dedicated maintenance tent in the
event that there is no suitable shelter at an airfield/landing strip. Additionally, the platoon needs
life support equipment such as sleep tents, heaters, lights, and generators. Lacking these items
is usually a problem at the unit level, but may indicate a prevalent problem that exists in many
formations as the Army prepares for the transition to decisive action. Lastly, Shadow platoons
must stay connected to the enterprise system. Mission information, weather reports, airspace
coordination, and many other functions are mainly done over email and the Internet. Without
these resources, Shadow platoons are forced to conduct all communications on frequency
modulated radio and Blue Force Tracker (BFT). Managing and disseminating intelligence
and aviation specific requirements via frequency modulation or Blue Force Tracker is nearly
impossible. At best, this situation causes delayed intelligence to the warfighters and at worst it
causes aviation accidents caused by a lack of situational awareness.
Insights/Lessons: The Shadow MTOE needs to be addressed at the Army level if there is truly
an expectation to deploy Shadow in austere conditions. Commanders must seriously consider
how to meet the logistic and communications requirements associated with the Shadow platoon
if they intend to use them effectively. In decisive action environments, units should be able
to operate with a reasonable level of self sufficiency, but with current equipping, the Shadow
platoon will need outside support. The Shadow and the UAS community have grown and
developed during the COIN conflict which featured forward operating bases and hardened
structures. The Army must determine how to support its newer low density and highlyspecialized logistic requirements.
As the Army embraces unified land operations and executes decisive action, it is imperative for
entire formations to relearn how to face a peer/near-peer threat in any operational environment
and succeed. Battles can be won and lost by the intelligence gathered in the moments preceding
a conflict. Planning and synchronizing intelligence requirements for UAS assets is critical
to achieving success in the beginning of the battle. UAS is a new asset to the decisive action
environment, so there is no historical precedent addressing the employment of tactical (Shadow)
UAS. As the Army continues to train in this new environment it must consider what equipment
increases are needed for units that may be geographically separated due to limitations or system
requirements.
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Appendix C
Fires Focus Observations
Observation 1
Title: Defining target acquisition (TA) platoon leader (PL) duties and responsibilities.
Description: Duties and responsibilities of TA PLs and platoon sergeants (PSGs) in direct
support field artillery battalions must be clearly identified.
Discussion: A challenge for TA PLs during decisive action training environment (DATE)
rotations is to identify and understand their roles and responsibilities as sensor managers. The TA
PL position is relatively new and has not been well defined in doctrinal references.
The TA PL integrated and supported operations by being assigned to the regimental/squadron
tactical command post, which was combined to better facilitate security, increase situational
awareness, and provide better timeliness and responsiveness of fires. With the TA PL serving as
the counterfire officer, some critical responsibilities/tasks were not accomplished due to physical
separation and competing demands related to high operational tempo. Some of the critical
friction points that arose were related to the survivability of the radar sections and the support
requirements (Class I, III, IX) being properly forecasted and scheduled. This led to the radar
sections having to conduct survivability moves at an unsustainable rate and resupply operations
not being scheduled. What followed were large gaps in radar coverage due to the radar sections
conducting their own resupply operations. Due to limited manning and key personnel (TA PL
and PSG) performing other duties, the radar sections were forced to move as entire sections to
conduct resupply operations at the combat trains command post.
Insights/Lessons: Challenges observed during the DATE rotation indicated a need for flexibility
for TA leaders to conduct reconnaissance of potential radar sites, check radar site locations,
check security, and check positioning for all sensors to include the Q36/Q37/Q48s to validate
positioning and operations. Army doctrine should address the duties and responsibilities of
the TA PL and PSG to allow these key individuals to develop as they negotiate the DATE.
Recommended duties and responsibilities for the TA leaders in direct support field artillery
battalions should include the following:
Ensuring the TA platoon is deployed and functioning in accordance with the field
artillery support plan.
Ensuring the platoon elements receive proper administrative, logistical, and
maintenance support.
Coordinating higher-level maintenance support to facilitate mission requirements.
Monitoring deployment of radar sections, survey teams, and meteorological sections;
recommending general position areas, search areas, and cueing guidance to the S-2/S-3.
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Facilitating maintenance support for TA radars, meteorological sections, and survey

equipment.
Monitoring the operations, status, and current and proposed locations of field artillery
radars in zone.
Managing implementation of radar zones in TA assets as directed by the radar
deployment order published by the counterfire operations cell.
Monitoring the terrain management plans for the positions of each section.
Maintaining crosstalk between the section and the battalion.
Establishing positions to best manage assets within the area of operations.
Performing necessary tactical coordination for weapons-locating radars in the area of
operations.
Coordinating communications, security, air defense artillery, positioning (engineers and
land clearance), logistics, and administration for assigned radars, survey teams, and
meteorological sections, as required.
Inspecting maintenance conducted by the platoon.
Monitoring staff channels for related activities between the counterfire operations cell
and target acquisition personnel.
Performing other duties as directed by the headquarters and headquarters battery
commander.
Observation 2
Title: Employing fire support at the company/troop level.
Description: Throughout the decisive action rotation, the rotational unit did an exceptional
job employing their organic 120 mm mortar section. From the initial order, the unit integrated
fire planning into their mission analysis and successfully executed all offensive and defensive
missions/tasks. When properly employed, mortar sections are extremely effective in maintaining
survivability against armored forces.
Discussion: During the offensive phase of the operation, the unit planned and executed targets
that supported their surprise and tempo while they conducted a penetration out of their tactical
assembly area. The result was the suppression or destruction of enemy forces while allowing
them to continue with their mission without loss of combat power or tempo. During the
defense, targets were planned in conjunction with emplaced obstacles to defeat enemy forces
attempting to breach, as well as targets that allowed their forces to displace to alternate and
subsequent battle positions. This resulted in the preservation of combat power throughout the
fight, until adjacent unit positions were breached. The mortar section was extremely effective at
displacing their mortar firing points after a set number of rounds had been fired, also maintaining
survivability for their indirect fire assets. While the 120 mm mortars did not destroy many enemy
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vehicles, they did provide the unit the adequate time and space to reconsolidate and continue the
fight.
Insights/Lessons: Units should continue to train on call-for-fire procedures and ensure they are
conducted at the lowest levels. The ability of Soldiers to effectively adjust mortar fires proves to
be a valuable skill during indirect fire engagements. This is especially important when operating
with a limited number of forward observers to move with dismounted teams.
Observation 3
Title: Conducting fires battalion planning using artillerized intelligence preparation of the
battlefield (IPB).
Description: The United States Army Field Artillery Schools Fires Battalion Planning White
Paper from January 2010 serves as a great tool in assisting fires battalions in conducting IPB
during the military decisionmaking process (MDMP).
Discussion: The publications Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP) 5-0.1,
Commander and Staff Officer Guide, September 2011, and Field Manual (FM) 2-01.3,
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, December 2010 including Change 2, do an excellent
job at outlining the key inputs, the processes, and the key outputs during the IPB process for
maneuver units. However, the Fires Battalion Planning White Paper goes a step further and
refines some of the IPB considerations to field artillery (FA) specific focus points and provides
some useful techniques that have proven successful for many artillery units.
IPB during the mission analysis portion of MDMP drives a majority of remaining operational
planning for the FA battalion. FM 2-01.3 states that the IPB process involves four steps: define
the operational environment, describe the environmental effects on operations, evaluate the
threat, and determine threat courses of action. The development of the modified combined
obstacle overlay (MCOO) assists in answering the first two of the four requirements in the IPB
process and is arguably one of the most important tools the FA battalion requires to continue
their planning effectively. FM 2-01.3 states It is important that the MCOO be tailored to
operational METT-TC [mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available,
time available, and civil considerations] factors, which are inherently different for an FA
battalion than a maneuver battalion. Some of the considerations that must be addressed in the
artillerized MCOO are: site to crest, intervening crests, cant issues, avenues of approach, and
soil composition. Integrated IPB and MCOO development are essential to assist the FA battalion
in its planning process.
Insights/Lessons: Continue to use the Fires Battalion Planning White Paper at the battalion
level during MDMP. The techniques outlined in the White Paper are effective in helping the fires
commander and staff conduct an integrated and thorough IPB. The techniques listed in the White
Paper are proven and tested methods that can be put into Army techniques publications as part of
the Doctrine 2015 transition.
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Observation 4
Title: Conducting Firefinder radar planning and zone management.
Description: Planning and execution of radar zones to facilitate the maneuver commanders
force protection priorities is critical in the decisive action training environment (DATE).
Discussion: Firefinder radars are one of the primary means of locating enemy indirect fire
systems. In order to effectively employ FA radars, the fire support officer (FSO) or counterfire
officer must understand the technical characteristics of radars, how the radars acquire targets, and
the technical requirements for radar employment.
FA target acquisition personnel on the brigade combat team staff must provide the technical
expertise required to support radar employment planning by the controlling FA headquarters.
They play an integral role in the MDMP, thus ensuring that radars are integrated into the
operational plan. For the direct support FA battalion to provide responsive counterfire that
supports the maneuver commanders priorities for force protection, radar planning must be
conducted within the MDMP.
Insights/Lessons: Units must review the newly released Army Techniques Publication 3-09.24,
Techniques for the Fires Brigade, November 2012, and also Field Manual 3-09.12, Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Field Artillery Target Acquisition, June 2002, prior to conducting
DATE or field training exercises to refresh or educate themselves on the proper planning,
integration, and employment of Firefinder radars.
Properly planned, rehearsed, refined, verified and digitally executed radar zones can initiate
prioritized counterfire during key times or events in the battle. During the intelligence
preparation of the battlefield process, the FSO or counterfire officer must identify the key areas
for coverage and identify likely enemy firing locations. The fires cell must make it a priority
to integrate zone management for planning, allocation, approval, dissemination, and rehearsals
into the overall planning process. Once zones are consolidated and approved, the FSO must
incorporate them into the maneuver and fire support execution matrices or any other products
used by the unit.
The fires cell, direct support battalion S-3/S-2, the task force fire support elements (FSEs), and
the counterfire officer must all understand their roles in triggering, refinement, and verification
of zones to match the scheme of maneuver. Verification of the unit or event location covered
by the planned zones is critical to the success of the plan. Accordingly, the zones planned for
the maneuver elements must be planned, verified, and triggered by the supported FSE. Radar
employment, movement, triggers, and cueing schedules, must all be included in the fire support
rehearsal, the FA technical rehearsal, the FA rehearsal (rock drill), and the combined arms
rehearsal.
Observation 5
Title: Training the fires and effects coordination cell (FECC) on employment of fires.
Description: The headquarters of the Department of the Army Mission Essential Task List
(HQDA METL) No. 06-6-5066 Employ Fires, provides a guideline for the commander to use
to train the FECC on employing fires. Units that train their FECCs on this METL task prior to
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decisive action training environment rotations can significantly improve their ability to deliver
fires.
Discussion: Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, August 2011, does a great job at
defining employment of fires. However, HQDA METL No. 06-6-5066 Employ Fires lists out
the key performance steps and measures the FECC needs to be proficient at before going into a
collective training environment.
JP 3-0 defines employ fires as follows: to use available weapons and other systems to
create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target. Joint fires are those delivered during the
employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action to produce desired
results in support of a common objective. Fires typically produce destructive effects, but various
nonlethal ways and means (such as electronic attack) can be employed with little or no associated
physical destruction.
Training the employment of joint fires is a challenge because it requires two or more components
to work together prior to a collective training event. There are performance steps and measures
in the HQDA METL that the commander can use to determine whether the FECC is employing
fires properly. Some of the key performance steps and measures listed in the HQDA METL No.
06-6-5066, Employ Fires, includes the following:
FECC executing planned fire missions.
FECC adjusting fires based on the commanders guidance.
FECC anticipating when the fire support coordinator will make recommendations,
actions, or decisions.
Processing target assessment.
Insights/Lessons: Units should review and continue to use the HQDA METL because it
effectively outlines the performance steps and measures and allows the commander to determine
and increase proficiency of the FECCs ability to employ fires.
Observation 6
Title: Integrating brigade targeting and fires planning using synchronization meetings.
Description: Fire support can become desynchronized when units focus too heavily on
dynamic targets and execute hasty instead of deliberate operations during their decisive action
training environment (DATE) rotation. To mitigate this rotational trend in a dynamic training
environment, staffs must consider and implement the discussion points and insights/lessons
learned from previous rotational units.
Discussion: During a DATE rotation, the brigade staff should integrate lethal and non-lethal
targeting with fire support planning into their operations processes by conducting daily target
synchronization meetings to develop and refine their targeting efforts for the next 24 to 48 hours.
This meeting synchronizes collection assets to support deep, close, and rear area operations and
identifies targets that require additional non-organic assets to engage to shape the close fight for
squadrons/battalions.
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Once formal planning begins for a transition to defense or counter-attack, the meeting provides
the mechanism for the staff to develop targeting products that support combined arms maneuver.
The staff conducts analysis and recommends to the commander the fire support plan with
prioritized collection assets, field artillery, close air support, and close combat attack aircraft
in support of the scheme of maneuver. Squadrons/battalions provide bottom up refinement for
named areas of interest, observers, priority targets, and fire support control measures (FSCMs).
Fire support and frequency modulated radio rehearsals are conducted before and after the
combined arms rehearsal to exercise sensor-to-shooter linkages, FSCMs, and scheme of fires
to ensure accomplishment of fire support tasks. During execution, the regiment/brigade level
command post (CP) that has control of the fight must be able to communicate and coordinate fire
support with maneuver elements, control movement and employment of organic and joint fires in
accordance with an approved fire support plan, clear fires for both ground and air assets, receive
and provide battle-damage assessments (BDA), and coordinate for higher level non-organic fires
and collection assets.
Insights/Lessons: Adhere to battle rhythm meetings and avoid becoming overwhelmed by the
current operations (CUOPs) fight. Targeting is both a CUOPs and future operations process; the
staff will miss critical synchronization meetings and lose targeting momentum if these meetings
are postponed or not conducted due to situations such as having units in contact. Avoid placing
assets under the control of multiple regiment/brigade level CPs; this will de-synchronize the
combined arms fight. Two or more CPs will have difficulty coordinating with each other to
synchronize fires and collection assets in support of maneuver operations. When conducting
centralized control of fires, organic cannon calls for fire and counterfire missions are coordinated
through the CP that has the ability to clear fires for both ground and air assets, otherwise units
run the risk of fratricide. This CP must also have visibility on movement of gun platoons and
available cannon fire to support maneuver, which is battle tracked by the fires cell.
Utilize and follow fire support products such as the target synchronization matrix in order to
avoid re-directed joint fires and collection platforms based on enemy contact that do not meet
high-priority target (HPT) criteria. Engage enemy forces at the squadron/battalion level and
below before re-tasking higher organic and joint fires assets. Ensure the CP in charge of the fight,
receives BDA reports to assess effectiveness of fires on enemy HPTs. This information is critical
to staff targeting analysis and planning for the next 24-48 hours.
Observation 7
Title: Developing and using tactical and technical triggers.
Description: Tactical and technical trigger development is vital in delivering timely and accurate
fires in preplanned groups and series.
Discussion: Units are more successful when basing triggers on maneuver events or enemy
actions rather than on time. It is also important to synchronize triggers during the wargaming
process and during rehearsals. These actions help to avoid late fires or those placed on the wrong
formations and that are not adjusted to support the desired effects as stated in the fire support
tasks (FSTs).
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Triggers identified early in the planning process must be properly disseminated to observers,
tied to primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency plans, and adequately rehearsed
to successfully execute planned, massed, and synchronized fires instead of just targets of
opportunity.
Insights/Lessons: Fire support officers (FSOs) must rehearse triggers in detail to accurately
display the amount of time required for the event to occur. Also, FSOs must ensure that observers
are in position to provide battle damage assessment and understand the attack guidance matrix to
refine the target locations or repeat missions in order to achieve the desired effects. This ensures
the conditions have been met to allow commanders to continue to maneuver. Defensive triggers
must be physically emplaced for redundancy and the commanders must understand what actions
will trigger fires to be executed. Offensive triggers must be based on friendly movement in
relation to the targets and execution of the FSTs.
Observation 8
Title: Developing effective observation plans.
Description: Fire support officers (FSOs) must develop and execute effective observation plans
to support fire support tasks (FSTs), the scheme of fires, and the scheme of maneuver.
Discussion: During the wargaming process, FSOs are challenged to synchronize observation
plans with the scheme of maneuver. Three trends observed during DATE rotations include the
following:
Observation planning is seldom top-down driven, often resulting in plans that do not
include trained observers with direct observations of the units targets in support of
FSTs.
During the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process, terrain management tools
are not used to identify observation post (OP) locations with line-of-sight to the target
area.
Fire support teams/combat observation and lasing teams (COLTs) are not getting into
position to acquire the enemy before becoming decisively engaged.
Insights/Lessons: During the wargaming process, FSOs must synchronize observation plans
with the scheme of maneuver. To do this, staffs must conduct thorough terrain analyses and have
an understanding of the enemys capabilities. FSOs must then provide top-down plans that are
refined by subordinate units in conjunction with their commanders.
Field Manual 3-09.31, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined
Arms Commander, October 2002, states the major responsibility of the FSO includes
coordinating with the S-2 and S-3 to assist in the development of the battalion observation plan,
and plan for and supervise the execution of assigned and developed FSTs.
FSOs must plan to have observers in position to support the maneuvers commanders
decision points and each FST.
Consider using scouts, COLTs, or maneuver shooters as observers.
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FSOs should identify requirements for OPs and include their locations in the fire
support annex and also in the tasks to maneuver units of the base operation order.
Use terrain management tools to provide line-of-sight diagrams to observers relative to the
targets they are responsible for. FSOs must synchronize the occupation of OPs with the scheme
of maneuver during the wargaming process and rehearse the movement in detail to ensure the
observers can occupy OPs prior to being decisively engaged.
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Appendix D
Movement and Maneuver Focus Observations
Observation 1
Title: Achieving fire superiority while allowing for reacting to contact, breaking contact, and
continuing reconnaissance.
Description: According to Field Manual (FM) 3-21.94, The Stryker Brigade Combat Team
Infantry Battalion Reconnaissance Platoon, April 2003, a dismounted reconnaissance team has
the option to take one of four M240B 7.62 mm machineguns assigned to the platoon with them
on a patrol/mission. The FM also outlines essential equipment for establishing observation posts
(OPs). Crew served weapons or M249 5.56 mm light machineguns are among the listed items
essential for establishing OPs; however, M249s are not actually provided to the recon platoon
as part of their standard modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE). The platoon
is manned to send out three separate four-man dismounted elements to observe three separate
named areas of interest. Without sufficient numbers of M249s, the three dismounted teams must
carry three of the platoons four heavier M240Bs, which slows movement and degrades the
platoons mounted element some of its casualty-producing firepower.
Discussion: The scout platoon, whether conducting scout or alternative operations, does not
have the ability to react to contact like an infantry or standard combat unit because of its lack
of firepower. An infantry platoon has the ability to react to contact by laying down enough
suppressive fire to achieve fire superiority, thus allowing the unit to choose whether or not to
push the attack or break contact. A scout unit conducting reconnaissance operations is supposed
to stay hidden, but maintain contact with enemy elements in order to give commanders realtime positions and movements of enemy forces on the battlefield. If a four-man scout team is
compromised during a reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) patrol or while occupying an
OP, its main goal is to break contact because it does not have the ability to sustain a prolonged
engagement.
A dismounted scout team will move in two- to four-man elements depending upon the mission.
Those missions include R&S patrols as well as establishing OPs. They can also be tasked
to conduct additional missions that are not related to scout operations, which may include
establishing traffic control points, providing personnel security detachments, or conducting
presence patrols inside of towns. Scout leaders want their elements to travel light to allow their
teams to be able to move more quickly and break contact more easily if compromised. To that
end, the scouts only carry M4 carbines and one M203 grenade launcher per team.
Insights/Lessons: Dismounted scout teams lack the firepower to effectively suppress enemy
elements to allow for breaking contact and continuing reconnaissance. Scout leaders should
integrate M249 light machineguns into their dismounted scout teams; squadron MTOEs should
be adjusted to include three M249 light machine guns for each battalion recon platoon.
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Observation 2
Title: Supporting a Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) with tanks.
Description: An organic Stryker company requires additional friendly armor to defend itself
against a significant armored enemy force for any substantial period of time and retain combat
power during a prolonged decisive action training environment.
Discussion: When confronted with enemy forces far superior to their organic anti-armor
capabilities, SBCTs are challenged during both the offense and defense to significantly slow the
forward momentum of replicated T-72, T-80, and BMP armored vehicles. The M2 .50 caliber
machinegun and Mk19 grenade launcher mounted on M1126 infantry carrier vehicles (ICVs) are
most effective against dismounted infantry or lightly skinned vehicles or structures and cannot
be expected to cause any significant damage to enemy tanks. Though there are variants of the
standard ball ammunition (i.e., saboted light armor penetrator, armor piercing incendiary, or
armor piercing explosive rounds to name a few), enemy tanks are too heavily armored to expect
the M2 to have any significant effect. Concurrently, the 40mm high explosive round from a
Mk19 may destroy external optics and weapon systems on a tank, but the tank will still be able to
return relatively accurate fire from its main gun using auxiliary sites a significant problem for
the lightly-skinned ICV.
As the most prevalent variant in an SBCT, ICVs must rely heavily upon the dismounted Javelin
missile systems and to an extent, the M1128 Mobile Gun System (MGS) Stryker to repel
armored threats. Though effective, Javelin teams are limited by the considerations addressed in
Field Manual 3-21.11, The SBCT Rifle Company, January 2003, Appendix A: visibility and timespace factors. Visibility is often diminished by heavily wooded terrain that offers Javelin gunners
limited time to identify targets and allow the proper lock-on by the missile system.
According to FM 3-21.11, Appendix B, although the MGS has a limited armor killing
capability, it should never be considered a tank. The intended purpose of the MGS is primarily to
close with and destroy enemy infantry. The MGS is capable of carrying 105mm high-explosive
anti-tank and sabot rounds in order to defend itself against armored infantry vehicles. However,
it is not designed to sustain a prolonged volley between T-72s or T-80s. The primary function of
the MGS is to serve as an element to assist in the breaching of an obstacle or as a support by fire
for mounted or dismounted infantrymen as they approach an objective or enemy obstacle. Once
its position is compromised to a vehicle with greater armor and main gun caliber, an MGS must
displace or risk destruction. The MGS is unable to survive even one main gun round strike from
an enemy main battle tank (MBT).
Insights/Lessons: Each Stryker variant has its own specific purpose and capability. When forced
through either planning or necessity to stray from that intended purpose, a Stryker unit may
expect to endure heavier casualties. An SBCT must have a significant attachment of heavily
armored friendly elements to ensure success against an enemy with tanks, regardless of type or
main gun capability. One company/troop of armor should be attached to each squadron/battalion
to provide the needed firepower to reduce enemy threats and retain significant combat power.
Squadrons/battalions would then be able to integrate armor into the defense or offense, saving
the Strykers and infantry for ground fights against enemy infantry.
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Observation 3
Title: Controlling troop-level direct fires while conducting aggressive reconnaissance.
Description: While conducting zone reconnaissance, a fratricide incident occurred between the
headquarters section and an attached infantry platoon.
Discussion: While transitioning from zone reconnaissance to a screen in depth, the attached
infantry platoon had displaced from its most recently reported position, but informed neither the
commander nor its adjacent platoons of its new location. Upon 3rd Platoons visual contact with
an enemy BRDM and the platoon leaders subsequent description of the BRDMs activity and
location, the headquarters element engaged one of the attached friendly infantry carrier vehicles,
mistaking it for the BRDM. Contributing to the cause was a lack of consistent reporting with
the newly attached infantry platoon. The primary cause, however, was the lack of direct fire
control measures being established and enforced during the troops aggressive reconnaissance.
At platoon-level, direct fire control measures must be established to prevent friendly direct fire
oriented on dismounted observation posts and vehicle hide positions. Also, troop commanders
must establish direct fire control measures between the platoons and establish very clear named
areas of interest and platoon boundaries.
Insights/Lessons: While direct fire planning and emplacement of direct fire control measures is
more difficult while conducting movement than while stationary, the ever more likely occasion
for confusion on the battlefield is all the more reason to establish effective and easily identified
fire control measures. While easily identified target reference points are not always feasible given
movement through complex terrain, Army doctrine provides various threat- and terrain-based fire
control measures to prevent fratricide. Sometimes, the only reasonable direct fire control measure
is an azimuth-based sector of fire, directed from the troop commander to the platoon leaders
who then divide sectors amongst platoon weapon and observation platforms. Development of
the situation requires refinement of these sectors of fire based on the present fields of fire. Often,
to set the proper conditions for direct fire control, simple maneuver-focused graphic control
measures keep friendly personnel, vehicle, and weapons platforms in the right place at the right
time and provide situational awareness to friendly unit leaders. If executing aggressive zone
reconnaissance (on the move), establishing directed weapon systems orientation and keeping
friendly units relatively on line is a very basic method of direct fire control. Commanders and
subordinate leaders should establish methods within their tactical standing operating procedures
to better control direct fires and to better mass the effects of friendly fire on enemy forces.
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Appendix E
Protection Focus Observations
Observation 1
Title: Integrating short range air defense (SHORAD) artillery assets with the scheme of
maneuver.
Description: As the Army shifts focus back to the decisive action training environment at the
Army combat training centers, it is imperative that air defense officers regain proficiency at
employing maneuver air defense assets to enhance the overall brigade scheme of maneuver
and provide force protection. Common mistakes are made during all phases of the military
decisionmaking process (MDMP) cycle which subsequently result in executing air defense
operations that fail to fully utilize the capabilities of the assets available, leave high value assets
unprotected, or fail to protect maneuver formations from enemy air threats.
Discussion: During mission analysis, the Air Defense Airspace Management (ADAM) cell must
fully understand the SHORAD assets available, especially if the supporting air defense artillery
(ADA) unit is a multi-national unit. This provides a complete understanding of capabilities and
limitations. In addition, the ADAM cell will often not receive specified air defense tasks in the
operation order (OPORD) from higher headquarters but will have many implied tasks that have
to be identified, analyzed, and matched up to the assets available to conduct those missions.
Mission analysis for air defense includes not just the maneuver forces but also radars, data link
architecture, and early warning systems. The ADAM cell also has to spend time with the brigade
S-2 identifying enemy air avenues of approach and the enemy air order of battle to determine
what the most likely enemy air courses of action are. Without the proper intelligence preparation
of the battlefield (IPB) products, the ADAM cell will move into course of action (COA)
development without a clear understanding of how the enemy intends to utilize his aerial assets
to achieve desired results.
After identifying how and where the enemy will likely use air assets, the ADAM cell can then
begin to create a scheme of maneuver that synchronizes with the brigades ground scheme of
maneuver. A key to employing SHORAD assets is to provide them the same level of detail and
clear task and purpose as any other maneuver force. Simply giving a task to provide air defense
will cause significant challenges during execution. Included among the numerous items to plan
for are battle positions (primary, alternate, subsequent), sectors of fire, and displacement criteria.
Additionally, if SHORAD assets are going to be task organized to subordinate units, then a clear
command support relationship is required. If not, units will have confusion on logistical resupply,
engagement request channels, and security.
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During wargaming, the ADAM cell can bring the air defense plan and have it tested against the
red cell. It is paramount that the red cell fights with their aerial assets as realistically as possible.
This should identify any potential shortfalls in the air defense plan and highlight any friction
points that will cause the brigade to either request additional assets or point out any areas where
the commander may have to assume risk.
Lastly, the ADAM cell must spell out everything they planned in the Annex E (Protection)
portion of the brigade OPORD. This should include not just the active air defense measures but
the passive ones as well.
Insights/Lessons:
The brigade commander has to provide his priorities for air defense coverage.
The ADA planner, in conjunction with the brigade S-2, has to do a thorough enemy
aerial IPB during mission analysis.
Mission analysis should encompass maneuver forces, radars, data link architecture, and
early warning procedures.
COA development has to provide clear task and purpose to subordinate units.
Proper command support relationships should alleviate issues with communication,
logistics, and tasking authority.
The red cell or opposing forces should utilize aerial assets during wargaming to test the
air defense plan.
OPORD, Annex E (Protection), spells out both the active air defense and the passive
air defense measures.
Observation 2
Title: Tying reinforcing obstacles into existing obstacles in support of engagement areas.
Description: During the defense, the observed squadron conducted an area defense to block
enemy mechanized forces from using a specific direction of attack. After conducting intelligence
preparation of the battlefield and determining the enemys most probable courses of action,
engagement areas were established where the enemy would be destroyed. To support these
engagement areas, the squadron and its attached engineer support dug tank ditches and emplaced
several hundred meters of mine and wire obstacles with the intent of turning attacking forces into
established engagement areas.
Discussion: The maneuver unit had a clear understanding of desired engagement area and
obstacle effect to turn the enemy mechanized forces to provide flank shots for anti-tank (AT)
systems. However, the reinforcing mine and wire obstacles and anti-tank ditches were not tied
in to impassable or severely restricted terrain. This allowed enemy forces to bypass the obstacles
and avoid the engagement areas by utilizing logging trails and forested areas with more than
three meters between trees. Utilizing these covered and concealed routes, enemy forces were able
to mass on friendly battle positions and achieve penetration of the squadron defense.
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Insights/Lessons: After issuing operations orders, units must conduct reconnaissance to

confirm or deny the applicability of their plans, to include proposed engagement areas. During
preparation and priorities of work, commanders and key staff should physically inspect
preparations to include siting of obstacles. If it is not possible to tie reinforcing obstacles into
natural obstacles or severely restricted terrain, the obstacle or maneuver plan must incorporate
other methods to force the enemy into the desired engagement areas. Against mechanized threats,
this can include dismounted AT ambushes against smaller maneuver corridors, emplacing hoax
minefields, or other deception methods.
Observation 3
Title: Providing training and external augmentation to bolster aviation expertise at the brigade
level.
Description: Additional training is available to increase resident aviation expertise particularly
if brigade aviation elements (BAEs) are not fully manned. Additionally, aviation liaison officer
(LNO) teams can assist in providing the necessary aviation specific knowledge for planning and
coordination.
Discussion: According to Training Circular (TC) 1-400, The Brigade Aviation Element
Handbook, April 2006, the BAE is a planning and coordination cell whose major function is
to incorporate aviation into the ground commanders scheme of maneuver. The BAE focuses
on providing employment advice and initial planning for aviation missions, unmanned aircraft
systems, airspace planning and coordination, and synchronization with the air liaison officer
and the effects coordinator. The BAE also coordinates directly with the aviation brigade or
the supporting aviation task force (TF) for detailed mission planning. The BAE accomplishes
these core responsibilities through close coordination with the S-3, commander and staff.
While the members of the BAE are permanent members of the staff, aviation LNO teams, who
represent the supporting aviation TF at a designated maneuver headquarters, can perform the
necessary critical tasks required for proper integration of aviation in order to maximize their
effects in support of the ground scheme of maneuver.
Insights/Lessons: Every effort should be made to train the available personnel on BAE-specific
duties and responsibilities through the myriad of courses available. Resourcing the available
courses becomes more critical with any shortages to authorized aviation personnel within
the BAE and/or in anticipation of increased operational tempo. If non-aviation personnel are
assuming the role(s) of the BAE, it is imperative that they receive the respective courses as
resources are available. Aviation LNO teams should be requested and appropriately staffed, even
if only for specific operations, particularly if the authorized BAE is not fully manned and/or
the appropriate personnel are not adequately trained. Effective employment of properly trained
aviation personnel and/or LNOs is imperative for coordination and synchronization between the
brigade and the supporting aviation TF. Other implications include the following:
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Training: BAE personnel, or those filling the role, should attend the Air Defense
Airspace Management/BAE Course at the Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill,
Oklahoma; the Joint Firepower Course at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada; the Joint
Targeting School; the Joint Aerospace Command and Control Course; the Joint
Personnel and Recovery Agency (JPRA) personnel recovery courses 101 and 301; or
the Joint Air Tasking Order Process Course (JATOPC) at Hurlburt Field, Florida.
Personnel: Maintain BAE personnel as a priority aviation fill due to branch-specific
subject-matter expertise requirements not otherwise present in brigade-level staffs. If
resident aviation subject-matter experts are unavailable, the staff should request LNO
augmentation from the supporting aviation TF.
Observation 4
Title: Manning and equipping brigade aviation elements (BAE) for the decisive action training
environment (DATE).
Description: Brigade combat teams (BCTs) that are preparing for DATE rotations must resource
the BAEs with the proper equipment and trained personnel.
Discussion: In accordance with TC 1-400, The Brigade Aviation Element Handbook, April
2006, the BAE will be task organized and resourced to enable the BCT to maintain 24 hour
synchronized aviation operations and conduct airspace command and control while operating
with multiple command posts such as tactical command posts (TAC), tactical operations centers
(TOCs), and mobile command groups. Unit BAEs must be task organized and resourced with
staffs to include the following personnel:
One aviation branch major.
One aviation branch captain.
One aviation branch chief warrant officer three (CW3), tactical operations (TACOPS).
One aviation operations (15P) sergeant first class.
One (15P) staff sergeant.
One (15P) specialist.
The current modified table of organization and equipment includes the additional manning of
one unmanned aircraft system(UAS) warrant officer (150), and one air traffic control operator
staff sergeant (15Q). With an integrated and resourced BAE, units would greatly improve their
overall capability to function as a synchronized aviation operation during planning and targeting
working groups. The aviation major and captain are both key personnel required to sustain
24-hour operations while operating two command posts to provide valuable insight to the BCT
commander on aviation operations and planning. In the event of a shortage of the aviation
branch major or captain, the TACOPS or UAS warrant officer can provide valuable input and
synchronization to the aviation, targeting, and collection working groups. A qualified personnel
recovery officer or TACOPS warrant greatly enhances the BCT in the pre-mobilization and
deployment training and will prepare the BCT for any personnel recovery mission
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The TOC and the TAC must be resourced with the essential equipment to include two Air
and Missile Defense Workstations (AMDWS) and two Tactical Airspace Integration Systems
(TAISs). Both systems are essential for proper clearing of air space for fire missions and other air
traffic. Units that are not properly resourced with two TAIS and two AMDWS systems can use
other systems such as a secure Internet protocol router network (SIPRNET) laptop and a Raven
UAS laptop with the FALCON View program to identify restricted operating zones and air
corridors. This is generally insufficient to maintain a constant air picture and maintain situational
awareness, but the 15P aviation operator can clear air and talk to aircraft with frequencymodulated radio communication while monitoring the stale picture on the FALCON View
system. This is commendable when the battle is in a lull. However, when operations require
multitasking with the use of multiple aircraft and fire missions, having adequate resources
utilizing the Army Battle Command System (ABCS) such as TAIS and AMDWS will greatly
enhance the aviation synchronization operations at the TOC and the TAC.
Insights/Lessons: BCTs should exhaust all efforts to increase the BAE staff to full operating
capability well before a deployment or any large exercise such as a DATE rotation. BAE
personnel would greatly benefit from the specialized training offered to BAE elements, such as
the Air Defense Airspace Management (ADAM)/BAE course at the Fires Center of Excellence
at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The course offers a robust training atmosphere that studies the ADAM/
BAE roles and responsibilities and the many systems the ADAM/BAE uses to enable BCTs in
operational synchronization and integration. Resourcing the ADAM/BAE with two TAIS and
two AMDWS systems greatly enhances the split operations of the ADAM/BAE affording the
brigade aviation officer (BAO) the opportunity to properly advise the BCT commander, have
a constant air picture, maintain situational awareness, remain connected, and attain a fully
functional system with the TOC. Other implications include the following:
Training: Units should send personnel to attend the ADAM/BAE course at the Fires
Center of Excellence at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Require at least one of each key training
slot to be filled at all times (i.e., BAO, ADAM officer in charge, TACOPS/Personnel
Recovery Officer, Aviation and ADAM noncommissioned officer-in-charge).
Materiel: Units should add redundant TAIS and AMDWS in the ADAM/BAE cells.
Leadership: Require that prior to assignment to BAE positions, all personnel attend the
ADAM/BAE course.
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Appendix F
Sustainment Focus Observations
Observation 1
Title: Task organizing to effectively execute sustainment operations in Stryker units.
Description: After 12 years of continued conflict and multiple deployments to counterinsurgency
environments, units have begun to lose their institutional knowledge on conducting logistics
operations in decisive action training environments (DATE). Stryker organizations, which were
designed to have an austere combat service support (CSS) footprint, require even more thought
and planning for their sustainment operations. Units must train to conduct logistics operations
with the task organization they will have when operating at a combat training center (CTC) if
they anticipate executing logistics successfully.
Discussion: Field Manual 3-21.21, The Stryker Brigade Combat Team Infantry Battalion, April
2003, states, due to the nature of the battalions capabilities, the CSS structure is purposefully
austere to increase force mobility. The Stryker squadron is manned to field a combat trains
command post (CTCP), which consists of the units S-4, S-1, combat repair team attached
from the regimental support squadron (RSS) and squadron aid station (SAS). The organization
of a traditional field trains command post (FTCP) does not exist in the doctrine. Instead, the
headquarters and headquarters troop commander and his headquarters element provide the
squadron with direct interface with the RSS by locating inside the regimental support area. The
FTCP is rounded out with the addition of the troop supply sections.
Recent rotational units have task organized a logistics element that consisted of three fuelers,
two heavy expanded mobility tactical truck (HEMTT) wreckers and four HEMTT load handling
systems from the RSS to the squadron to serve as the logistical support team (LST) for the
squadron during their CTC rotation. The squadron then dedicated three Stryker infantry carrier
vehicles to serve as a security element for the LST. That element proved to be inadequate to
execute logistics packages for the entire squadron as well as execute additional emergency
Class IV and V resupplies and recovery operations. If LSTs are task organized down to the
squadron level, they will require enough assets to adequately move and support the squadron
with Class III, IV, V, and IX as well as recovery assets over a large, complex area of operations.
The LST should be able to maneuver as two separate elements in order to execute multiple tasks
simultaneously.
Units must also consider an elements ability to secure itself when considering task organization
for executing logistics operations. When operating in a DATE with a hybrid threat, units must
ensure that every element within their formation can secure itself. In some cases, that may mean
task organizing a combat platoon to secure the CTCP, which generally doesnt have any combat
arms Soldiers but contains most of the squadrons support assets and SAS.
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Insights/Lessons: As units prepare to execute a CTC rotation, they must evaluate the
environment they are entering and task organize their elements to effectively execute logistics
in that environment. Units must ensure that their logistics elements are capable of executing all
the tasks they will receive as well as secure themselves and move independently. Units should
exercise their task organized logistics elements during training exercises prior to training at a
CTC. The CTC should be used to validate their previous training.
Observation 2
Title: Standardizing battle damage assessment and repair (BDAR) and recovery operations.
Description: Mechanics and recovery operators must have the proper information to conduct
timely and efficient battle damage assessment and repair (BDAR) and recovery operations. Units
must utilize standardized recovery reports.
Discussion: Recovery operations should be coordinated with the squadron/battalion maintenance
managers and should be conducted in accordance with the commanders priorities. There should
be a specified timeline that enforces recovery decisions based on the amount of time operators
spend attempting self-recovery or BDAR. If the timeline or the capabilities are exceeded, the site
that requires recovery must send a recovery request containing the proper information through
the administrative/logistics operations center and finally to the mechanics and wrecker operators.
The maintenance team needs accurate information regarding the type of equipment, description
of damage, and action required to improve response times, reduce excess time spent on the site,
or provide the ability to successfully execute additional missions.
Insights/lessons: Battalions must develop standardized recovery request formats to give
maintenance teams and commanders clearer pictures of situations and what is required
to perform recoveries. The recovery reports should, at a minimum, provide the following
information:
Equipment identification.
Location (grid coordinates).
Detailed equipment fault/level of immobility (mire factor).
Evaluation of on-site repair capability.
Tactical situation.
Security measures/recommended route of approach.
The use of standardized formats developed by the maintenance personnel, S-4, and commander
helps expedite recovery operations and allows more flexibility during tactical operations.
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Observation 3
Title: Accounting for fuel issue and receipt of petroleum products.
Description: During decisive action training environment rotations, squadrons/battalions must
properly account for fuel issued or received during tactical refueling operations.
Discussion: With the ever increasing budget constraints on the U.S. Army, the Command Supply
Discipline Program (CDSP) should be a high priority for leaders at all levels. CDSP applies to all
classes of supply, and is not optional during training events regardless of the importance of the
training or the units operational tempo. During field exercises, units must utilize the Department
of the Army (DA) Form 3643, Daily Issue of Petroleum Products, to account for daily issues
and receipts of JP8 fuel. The DA 3643 was developed so a unit can accurately account for fuel,
forecast requirements, and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse. Lack of proper accounting can result
in inaccurate usage reports to higher echelons of support. Without utilizing a DA 3643, there
is no way to accurately prepare the DA Form 3644, Monthly Abstract of Issues of Petroleum
Products and Operating Supplies, which report a units monthly fuel consumption rate. In
addition to fiscal responsibility, proper fuel accountability is vital to accurately forecasting
requirements for future combat operations.
Insights/Lessons: Field Manual 10-67-1, Concepts and Equipment of Petroleum Operations,
April 1998, defines how fuel is accounted for on the battlefield. The information collected feeds
the S-4s running estimates and ensures enough fuel is on hand for contingency operations and
planning. Using this doctrinal method to account for petroleum products ensures compliance
with Army standards and prevents mishandling of government supplies.
Observation 4
Title: Maintaining a logistics common operating picture (LOGCOP) through accurate
sustainment reporting.
Description: The importance of overcoming the challenges associated with obtaining and
maintaining a current LOGCOP has a major impact on future mission planning.
Discussion: Inaccurate and late logistics status reporting from subordinate units can cause
mission planners at the brigade/regimental level to speculate on their logistics posture during the
military decisionmaking process. The end result is commanders making uninformed decisions
based on incomplete information available at the time of course of action approval. In order for a
unit in combat to retain and exploit the initiative, it is vital for sustainment planners at all levels
to accurately determine what their units current LOGCOP is, and what their future logistics
requirements will be.
Insights/Lessons: The best platform for maintaining a current LOGCOP is the Battle Command
Sustainment Support System (BCS3). The BCS3 is best used on the Nonsecure Internet Protocol
Router Network (NIPRNET) while executing fast-moving operations in an expeditionary
environment. Communications between the regimental support operations officer, regimental
S-4, and the regimental logistics planner must be maintained at all times. All three must have a
good understanding of their current LOGCOP.
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Sustainers should conduct daily face-to-face logistics synchronization meetings. These meetings
produce the best up-to-date unit-level LOGCOP information possible. In turn, this information
enables the planners in the regimental staff to have a clear situational understanding of their
logistics posture to use for future mission planning purposes.
Suggestions for success during future decisive action rotations includes the following:
Validate unit reporting standing operating procedures, reporting battle rhythms, and
primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency plans before the beginning of training
rotations.
Use BCS3 as the primary method for logistics reporting.
When rapid movement on the battlefield is anticipated, look at co-locating the
BCS3 with very small aperture terminals (VSATs) as a short-term method for BCS3
communication until NIPRNET connectivity is established.
Incorporate face to face logistics synchronization meetings into the daily battle rhythm.
Observation 5
Title: Processes for casualty reporting and personnel accountability.
Description: Accurate and timely casualty reporting has an important impact on future mission
planning.
Discussion: The accuracy and timeliness of the casualty packet submission from subordinate
units to the regimental or brigade-level S-1 is a critical component of casualty management.
Leaders at all levels must know and understand their roles, duties, and responsibilities, and
how they impact the units personnel accountability and replacement process. Commanders
and staffs make decisions based on unit-level strengths and capabilities. Casualty reporting
timeliness and accuracy is extremely important, and must be managed efficiently and thoroughly.
Most importantly, poor casualty reporting can have a negative effect on the next-of-kin (NOK)
notification process. The recorded information facilitates NOK notification, casualty assistance,
casualty tracking and status updates, and provides the basis for historical and statistical reports.
Insights/Lessons: One major lesson learned during the decisive action training environment
(DATE) rotation was the importance of timely and accurate reporting from the subordinate
company/troop level, all the way up to the regimental S-1. Units engaged in combat operations
in an expeditionary environment must have a full understanding of the casualty management
process. Strength reporting has a direct impact on the brigade or regimental staffs ability to have
a clear situational understanding of their operational capabilities. Unit-level casualty operations
standing operating procedures (SOP) should cover the management of collecting, recording,
reporting, verifying, and processing of casualty information from the unit-level to Headquarters,
Department of the Army. Communication and dissemination of unit strength reports is essential
in keeping planners and commanders informed on their current manning posture.
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Suggestions for success at future DATE rotations include the following:

Validate casualty reporting SOPs, reporting requirements, and primary, alternate,
contingency, and emergency plans before beginning a training rotation.
Conduct training on the casualty reporting process at every level before deployment to
a combat training center exercise.
Have battle drills designed and rehearsed for executing and reporting on mass casualty
situations.
Observation 6
Title: Planning, organizing, and rehearsing medical operations.
Description: Brigade or regimental medical planning to facilitate the movement of the wounded
from the point of injury to the nearest medical treatment facility is vital for the success of
any unit engaged in combat operations. This includes the execution of ground or air medical
evacutions (MEDEVACs)/casualty evacuations (CASEVACs). The purpose of a units medical
common operating picture (MEDCOP) is to track the location, capability, and medical assets of
all treatment facilities across the units area of operation.
Discussion: A critical function of a units surgeon cell is to obtain and maintain an updated
MEDCOP. This gives the units medical planners situational awareness required for planning
and course of action development. One method to ensure information is being received and
understood throughout the entire unit is through the conduct of routine medical synchronization
meetings. Additionally, the brigade or regimental surgeon cell must ensure that rehearsals of the
medical evacuation plan are conducted and are to standard. These rehearsals should start from
the lowest level of medical care to a medical treatment facility with the required definitive care.
The ultimate goal is to keep all medical planning on the same operating picture.
Insights/Lessons: To ensure mission success, a brigade or regimental surgeon cell must
make it a priority to keep the MEDCOP updated. Equally as important, they should make this
information easily accessible to its subordinate squadron or battalion medical planners. In turn,
subordinate units must use the same MEDCOP for their planning and rehearsals purposes.
Properly planned, resourced, and executed, medical evacuation rehearsals, focusing from the
point of injury through the entire evacuation process will allow all medical planners and leaders
to identify conflicts, constraints, or limitations in their plans.
Routinely conducted medical synchronization meetings allow the brigade or regimental surgeon
cell, medical support operations officer, and the medical planners at the squadron- or battalionlevel to be involved in the planning process.
Conducting medical evacuation battle drills on the current operations floor creates a continuity of
proficiency that ensures that all vital steps in the evacuation process are completed.
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Observation 7
Title: Planning air MEDEVAC and CASEVAC.
Description: In decisive action environments, air MEDEVAC and CASEVAC operations must
be thoroughly planned and communicated down to the lowest unit levels.
Discussion: MEDEVAC is the timely, efficient movement and en route care by medical
personnel of the wounded, injured, or ill persons from the battlefield and/or other locations to
medical treatment facilities. The provision of en route care on medically equipped vehicles
or aircraft enhances the patients potential for recovery and may reduce long-term disability
by maintaining the patients medical condition in a more stable manner. CASEVAC is a term
used by nonmedical units to refer to the movement of casualties aboard nonmedical vehicles or
aircraft. Patients do not receive medical care.
During decisive action operations, casualties may mount and lines of communications become
extended, necessitating increased use of aviation assets to conduct CASEVAC. When responding
to such requests, tasked aircrews must understand comprehensive CASEVAC plans to transport
casualties to higher levels of care. Aircrews must be aware of any existing casualty collection
points and locations of ambulance exchange points and battalion aid stations. Ground units must
communicate situations where landing locations may not be secure or within enemy direct fire
range and they must ensure that pick-up zones are large enough to land the various helicopter
CASEVAC/MEDEVAC platforms.
Insights/Lessons: CASEVAC and MEDEVAC planning is a brigade/regimental level task as
described in Field Manual (FM) 4-02.2, Medical Evacuation, July 2009 including change 2,
paragraph 4-43. The regiment must ensure that the plan is disseminated to supporting units.
If air CASEVAC or MEDEVAC is required, casualties must be moved to locations suitable
for aircraft. The air ambulance evacuates Priority I, URGENT patients from as far forward
as possible (FM 4-02.2, paragraph 4-39). When using aviation, some considerations include
proximity to the enemy and size of the landing area. In contrast to counterinsurgency operations,
when conducting decisive action during unified land operations, the least preferred method
of air CASEVAC/MEDEVAC is directly responding to the point of injury. This puts aircrews
and aircraft at extremely high vulnerability to shoot-down risks. See also FM 8-10-6, Medical
Evacuation in a Theater of Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, April 2000.
142
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Decisive Action Training Environment

DIGITAL VERSION AVAILABLE

DECISIVE ACTION TRAINING ENVIRONMENT AT THE JMRC, VOL. II

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

DECISIVE ACTION TRAINING ENVIRONMENT AT THE JMRC, VOL. II

DECISIVE ACTION TRAINING ENVIRONMENT AT THE JMRC

Chapter 1. Fighting a Complex Threat: Ten Observations from the

Chapter 2. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Maneuvering

Chapter 3. The Brigade Combat Team Information Collection Rehearsal

Chapter 4. Integrating Brigade-Level Targeting into the Operations

Chapter 5. Fire Support Planning in the Decisive Action Training

Chapter 6. Brigade Tactics and Techniques for Inform and Influence

Chapter 7. Integrating Air Defense in the Brigades Military

Chapter 8. Tackling Communications Challenges During a Decisive

Chapter 9. Legal Challenges in the Decisive Action Training

Chapter 10. Military Intelligence Company Collection Teams: Creating a

Chapter 11. Personnel Recovery in Decisive Action and Other Operating

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Chapter 12. Planning, Preparing, and Executing Stryker Battalion

Chapter 14. Accelerating the Flow of Human Intelligence Reporting: The

Chapter 15. Utilizing the Goat as a Nonlethal Effect in the Decisive

Appendix A. Collection Reports, JMRC Rotation 13-01, Lessons

Appendix B. Collection Reports, JMRC Rotation 13-01, Lessons

Appendix C. Collection Reports, JMRC Rotation 13-01, Lessons

Appendix D. Collection Reports, JMRC Rotation 13-01, Lessons

Appendix E. Collection Reports, JMRC Rotation 13-01, Lessons

Appendix F. Collection Reports, JMRC Rotation 13-01, Lessons Learned,

DECISIVE ACTION TRAINING ENVIRONMENT AT THE JMRC, VOL. II

Center for Army Lessons Learned

COL Thomas H. Roe

LTC Curt Taylor

DECISIVE ACTION TRAINING ENVIRONMENT AT THE JMRC, VOL. II

Figure 1-1. Soldiers secure a critical road intersection in a German town.

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

DECISIVE ACTION TRAINING ENVIRONMENT AT THE JMRC, VOL. II

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

DECISIVE ACTION TRAINING ENVIRONMENT AT THE JMRC, VOL. II

Figure 1-3: Engineers construct counter-mobility positions in preparation for the

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

DECISIVE ACTION TRAINING ENVIRONMENT AT THE JMRC, VOL. II

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

DECISIVE ACTION TRAINING ENVIRONMENT AT THE JMRC, VOL. II

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Observation 9: Fighting to Communicate. True knowledge management (KM) is much more

DECISIVE ACTION TRAINING ENVIRONMENT AT THE JMRC, VOL. II

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

DECISIVE ACTION TRAINING ENVIRONMENT AT THE JMRC, VOL. II

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Planning Starts with the Doctrinal Foundation

DECISIVE ACTION TRAINING ENVIRONMENT AT THE JMRC, VOL. II

Figure 2-1. Airborne BCT early entry (assault) CP

Figure 2-2. Stryker BCT main CP

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Figure 2-3. Stryker BCT TAC CP

DECISIVE ACTION TRAINING ENVIRONMENT AT THE JMRC, VOL. II

Figure 2-4. Airborne BCT TAC CP

Changing the Paradigm: Developing CP1 and CP2

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Figure 2-5. Airborne BCT main CP

DECISIVE ACTION TRAINING ENVIRONMENT AT THE JMRC, VOL. II

Figure 2-6. Brigade headquarters modular build