Unconventional

Warfare
Are US Special Forces engaged in an ‘offensive war’ in the Philippines?
 Focus on the Philippines
SPECIAL REPORTS
No. 1
January 2007

Focus on the Philippines Special Reports are in-depth

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contemporary issues.

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First published January 2007.

Author
Herbert Docena (herbert@focusweb.org)

Editor
Nicola Bullard (n.bullard@focusweb.org)

Pictures
VJ Villafranca/ M4 Collective
Rem Zamora
Luis Liwanag

Graphics
Melissa Rivera

Acknowledgment
Mae Ann Saguano, Abduhum Jaujali, Irshad Amin, Pakanna
Al Sadat, Mukim Abdurajik, Namra Pakanna, Ariston Chiong,
Analiza Ugay, Rovie dela Cruz, Regina Estrada
COVER PHOTO BY VJ VILLAFRANCA/ M4 COLLECTIVE

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appreciate receiving a copy of the text in which the report is
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ISBN 978-971-92886-4-0
 Unconventional
Warfare
Are US Special Forces engaged in an ‘offensive war’ in the Philippines?

Focus on the Philippines

SPECIAL REPORTS

No. 1
January 2007
Unconventional Warfare

4 Focus on the Philippines

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VJ VILLAFRANCA/ M4 COLLECTIVE
Since January 2002, US Special Operations Forces
(SOFs) have been stationed in the southern
Philippines and have not left since then.
Initially the deployment sparked controversy
and stirred opposition given that a long-standing
campaign against US military presence in the
country had earlier resulted in the insertion into
the post-Marcos 1986 Constitution of provisions
limiting the presence of foreign troops and in the
eventual closure of US military bases in 1992. While
a subsequent treaty paved the way for the re-entry of
US troops to take part in so-called training exercises,
the deployment of the US SOFs was a big step
farther: For the first time, US troops were openly
going to a combat-zone with real enemies. In an
attempt to stop the deployment, a petition invoking
the constitutional provisions on foreign troops was
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SPECIAL REPORTS
Unconventional Warfare
lodged before the Philippine Supreme Court.1 It was
junked. While the Court agreed with the petitioners
that US troops are indeed constitutionally banned
from engaging in an “offensive war” in the country,
it held that whether they are actually doing so is “a
question of fact” that has to be proven.2
Five years after the initial deployment, this report
gathers the available information and evidence
regarding this “question of fact” with the intention
to show that there are grounds for revisiting the role
and actions of the US military in the Philippines,
both in terms of its constitutionality and in terms its
impact on regional peace and stability.
5
Unconventional Warfare

‘A Question of Fact’ Because of domestic historical

Though it is now known that US President George
W. Bush had from the beginning offered to send the
troops in a direct military role,3 US and Philippine
government officials have consistently maintained
that the SOFs are not engaged in “actual combat”
or in an “active military role” in the country.4 In
light of the Supreme Court ruling, this position is
evidently intended to justify the constitutionality of
the deployment and to counter the legal arguments
of the opposition. With few exceptions, the media
has tended to follow this line without probing
further, as though the “question of fact” has
become a fact that is no longer in question.5
But new and accumulated information on the actual
operations of the US troops in the country over
the years indicate that the question is still far from
being adequately answered. Though seemingly only
a legal and technical issue, much is at stake. The
deployment of US Special Forces troops in the
country has arguably had significant implications
for issues of peace and security in the southern
Philippines, on democracy in the country and its
sovereignty, on the geo-political balance in the
region, and on the US’ global military posture. But
– because of domestic historical factors and the
current balance of political forces – it is on the
claim that the US Special Forces are not engaged in
“actual combat” that their continuing presence in
the Philippines seem to stand.
This report revisits and explores this claim. At the
outset, it is worth clarifying that it is beyond the
scope and capacity of this report to exhaustively
and conclusively probe the subject owing to the
following limitations:
First is the deliberate secrecy with which the US
troops’ mission in the Philippines is being executed.
factors and the current balance
of political forces – it is on
the claim that the US Special
Forces are not engaged in
“actual combat” that their
continuing presence in the
Philippines seem to stand.
As will be discussed later, the unit in question
specializes precisely in covert and clandestine
operations. No journalist is known to have
accompanied US troops in action and most of the
information they report is limited to what is given to
them during press briefings and interviews.
Second is the apparent mismatch between how
the mission has been presented to the public and
how it is privately understood and carried out by
the US troops and by the governments.6 Such a
divergence broke out in the open at least once, in
February 2003, when the Pentagon announced
that the US troops were coming for actual combat
operations7 and accused Filipino officials of asking
them to mislead the public.8 As GlobalSecurity.org,
a reference for security-related issues, observed: “US
operations in the Philippines are particularly hard
to track as political realities make it difficult for the
United States to publicly identify counter-terrorism
operations and thus current operations are generally
identified or associated with other training exercises
or with humanitarian operations…”9 Moreover, the
SOFs in the country are known to have conducted
“psychological operations” or “psyops” for
“handling the Philippine media” because it was felt
that local journalists have a “decidedly anti-American
bias.”10 In the US military, “psyops” are defined as

“Yet a nagging question remains: are American troops actively engaged in combat alongside
Filipino soldiers under the guise of an alleged training and assistance exercise? Contrary to
what petitioners would have us do, we cannot take judicial notice of the events transpiring
down south, as reported from the saturation coverage of the media...The petitions invite us
to speculate on what is really happening in Mindanao, to issue, make factual findings on mat-
ters well beyond our immediate perception, and this we are understandably loath to do.
It is all too apparent that the determination thereof involves basically a question of fact.”
- Supreme Court decision on petition against deployment of US troops, April 2002

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VJ VILLAFRANCA/ M4 COLLECTIVE
US TROOPS with Filipino soldiers in Jolo, Sulu.
“planned operations to convey selected information
and indicators to foreign audiences to influence
their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and
ultimately the behavior of foreign government,
organizations, groups, and individuals.”11
Third is the reluctance of residents living in the
area of operations to publicly relate what they have
witnessed, for fear of reprisals from the military.
In a region where rampant accusations of abuses
and human rights violations allegedly committed by
the military have gone unresolved, these witnesses
refuse to talk knowing that their testimonies directly
contradict the public pronouncements of military
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Unconventional Warfare
officials stationed in their provinces.
Despite these limitations, this report at least hopes
to offer leads or raise questions that others in
government and in civil society – those who are
in the position to compel and protect witnesses or
demand explanations – may choose to probe further.
It relies on publicly available information provided
by US troops themselves who, in writing about their
missions for military publications, have gone on
record to describe their experiences in ways that cast
their operation in a different light. It is based on
first-hand interviews with witnesses who have dared
to come out and who claim to have seen US troops
7
Unconventional Warfare

Special operations: those “conducted in hostile, denied,

or politically sensitive environments” and that require
“covert, clandestine, or discreet capabilities.”
- US Special Operations Command, Special Opera-
tions Forces Posture Statement, July 2003

in action. It gathers various separate news articles,

reports, and papers offering little-known or little-
discussed information on the mission and puts them
together to provide a bigger and more coherent
picture. Finally, it studies and analyzes overall US
global military strategy in order to contextualize their
mission in the Philippines.

Based on the findings of this report, there is reason

to believe that the “question of fact” the Supreme
Court raised may be ready to be proven.

Special Operations
In trying to answer the question of whether US
troops are engaged in an “offensive war” in the
Philippines, it is first important to draw a distinction
between US soldiers who join the regular joint
combined training exercises in various parts of the
country12 (see table on pages 20-21 and 32-37) with
those who are part of the Joint Special Operations
Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P).13 What was
cancelled by the United States government in
December 2006, in response to the refusal of a
Philippine court to transfer custody of a US Marine
convicted of rape to the US, was only the annual
training exercises slated for February 2007, not
the deployment of the JSOTF-P in the southern
Philippines. Media coverage and public discussion
on the presence of US troops in the country have
tended to lump those who take part in the JSOTF-P
with those who take part in the exercises but there
are important differences.14

While participants of the regular training exercises

come from many different branches and services
of the US military, those under the JSOTF-P are
drawn specifically from the Special Operations
Forces (SOFs), or those units that specialize in
conducting “special operations.”15 According to
the SOF’s own definition, “special operations” are
those “conducted in hostile, denied, or politically
sensitive environments” and that require “covert,

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SPECIAL REPORTS
 Unconventional Warfare

clandestine, or discreet capabilities.”16 The US It is important to draw a

Army Field Manual, a guide for military missions
and procedures, notes that SOF’s are the “force of
choice” for “dynamic, ambiguous, and politically
volatile situations.”17
In the US military, a “Joint Task Force” is
established whenever there is a need to bring
together units from more than one service for
conducting specific missions.18 What is now known
as the JSOTF-P evolved in July 2002 from the earlier
Joint Task Force-510 (JTF-510) which was deployed
to Basilan island, in the Southern Philippines, in
January 2002. JTF-510 is described by the US Pacific
Command as its “crisis response, rapid deployment”
unit.19 According to an Army Major in a paper for
the US Army Command and General Staff College,
this task force has established a “forward operating
base” in Zamboanga City.20
While the number of participants in the training
exercises is publicly disclosed prior to each exercise,
this information has been withheld in the case of
the JSOTF-P since its creation.21 Based on various
media reports, the number of troops deployed to the
southern Philippines has ranged between 160 and
350 but it is not clear what the actual total number
is for a specific period. US embassy spokesman
Matthew Lussenhop at one point claimed it
“wouldn’t be above 100.”22 But US Lt. Col. Mark
Zimmer, JSOTF-P public affairs officer, said it varies
“depending on the season and the mission.”23
While many of the exercises are conducted
inside Philippine military training camps or other
designated training areas, the JSOTF-P has been
operating in an area in which actual hostilities with
forces seen as hostile to the Philippines government
distinction between US soldiers
who join the regular joint
combined training exercises in
various parts of the country
with those who are part of the
Joint Special Operations Task
Force-Philippines.
have ensued and are still ongoing. The exact
coverage of its area of operation remains unclear.
Moreover, the training exercises are conducted with
no specified target or enemy in mind; the JSOTF-
P, on the other hand, has been explicit in targeting
“terrorists,” in particular the Abu Sayyaf Group
(ASG), and lately, the Jemaah Islamaiah, both of
which are listed as “designated foreign terrorist
organizations” by the US Department of State.24
Indeed, from the very beginning, US and Philippine
government officials announced that the deployment
was part of the US-led “global war against terror.”
Unknown to many, the JTF’s deployment here was
labeled by the US military as “Operation Enduring
Freedom-Philippines” (OEF-P) to signify that that
the nature and the goal of the deployment was in
the same league as the original “Operation Enduring
Freedom” – the invasion of Afghanistan in October
2001.25 According to an article in the New York Times,
the deployment to the Philippines was probably “the
largest deployment of Special Forces into a combat
zone” since Afghanistan, where Special Forces were
also at the forefront.26 While US officials have since

“The deployment of U.S. troops was contentious in-country because the

local press asserted that U.S. forces could not legally participate in combat
operations. However, a correct reading of the Philippine Constitution re-
veals that it prohibits only the stationing of foreign forces in the Philippines
after the 1991 expiration of the Philippines-U.S. agreement on military
bases. The constitution does not prohibit combat operations and provides
an exception to this-if there is a treaty in force-and a treaty has been in
force between the two countries since 1951. A lack of understanding of
Philippine laws contributed to U.S. decisions to unduly restrict the employ-
ment of SF advisers.”
- Col. David Maxwell, Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philip-
pines commander, Military Review, May-June 2004

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SPECIAL REPORTS
Unconventional Warfare
“The mission on Basilan was to
conduct unconventional
warfare operations in the
Southern Philippines through,
by, and with the AFP to help
the Philippine government
separate the population from
and to destroy terrorist
organizations.”
- Col. David Maxwell, Joint
Special Operations Task
Force-Philippines commander
10
played down the Philippines’ being part of the
“global war on terror,” President Bush in a speech
as late as October 2004, continued to single out the
country as one front in this war --- alongside Iraq
and Afghanistan.27
Finally, the regular training exercises are close-ended
and usually last for no more than a week or two,
after which the participating units return to their
home bases; on the other hand, the JSOTF-P’s stay
has been indefinite. Contrary to former National
Security Adviser Roilo Golez’s assurance in 2002
that the US troops will “be gone” after six months,
the troops remain.28 Despite persistent queries
from reporters and civil society organizations, US
and Filipino officials have refused to give an exit-
date. Capt Eddie Paruchabutr, former JSOTF-P
information officer, could only say, “It’s continuous
as long as we are allowed to stay.”29
Special Warfare
While US and Filipino officials publicly emphasize
mostly the “humanitarian” and “civil-military
operations” (CMOs) of the JSOTF-P, members of
this unit have privately cast their experience while
in the country in a different light. Although written
principally for internal US military consumption and
little read outside of defense circles, their writings
shed light on how they actually understand the
nature of their mission in the Philippines.
For example, in an article for the US Army Combined
Arms Center’s Military Review journal, the first
commander of the JSOTF-P Col. David Maxwell states
that their mission was “to conduct unconventional
warfare in the southern Philippines through, by, and
with the AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] to
help the Philippine government separate the population
and destroy the terrorist organization.” Their key tasks
included “denying the ASG sanctuary,” “surveilling,
controlling, or denying ASG routes,” and “surveilling
supporting villages and key personnel.” In an apparent
rebuff to the Supreme Court, Maxwell pointed out
that – contrary to the Justices’ reading – the Philippine
constitution “does not prohibit combat operations.”
According to Maxwell, the “correct reading” of the
constitution would show that it proscribes only the
stationing of forces, not combat operations. Re-
appointed as JSOTF-P commander in October 2006,
Maxwell described the operations he led as being
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VJ VILLAFRANCA/ M4 COLLECTIVE
US TROOPS in Jolo, Sulu.
conducted “under the guise of an exercise.”30
Maxwell’s description is shared by members of
the 1st Special Forces group who wrote a 45-
year history of their unit’s engagements in the
Philippines for the publication Special Warfare, the
bulletin of the US Army John F. Kennedy Special
Warfare Center and School. According to their
own account, their unit took part in “the ongoing
unconventional warfare operations…”31 Dr. C.H.
Briscoe, the command historian of the US Army
Special Operations Command interviewed soldiers
“who participated at all levels of operations.”
He wrote how their mission “transformed from
unconventional warfare to foreign internal defense
and development.” According to him, the ensuing
ground campaign was best described by referring to
the “counterinsurgency model.”32
Eric Wendt, also writing for the same publication,
cited the Joint Task Force’s actions as “a superior
example of successful counterinsurgency.”33
Similarly, Cherilyn Walley, another US military
historian, noted how the Special Forces in
the country turned “from performing tactical
missions to implementing the counterinsurgency
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Unconventional Warfare
model that had been practiced by the American
military in Vietnam.”34 An analyst writing for the
National Bureau of Asian Research observed that,
“[A]lthough US training of Philippine forces in both
Luzon and Mindanao is labeled counter-terror, in
fact, the effort seems to be more counterinsurgency
against the paramilitary forces of the Abu Sayyaf
and the MILF [Moro Islamic Liberation Front].”35
Incidentally, the US soldiers who performed these
missions in Vietnam also claimed to be “advisers”
even when they were later known to have been
involved in combat.
The terms “unconventional warfare,” “foreign
internal defense,” and “counterinsurgency” are
rarely, if at all used, by US and Filipino officials
in publicly describing the JSOTF-P’s work. But
they are the words of choice of members of the
US military writing on their own mission in the
Philippines.36 In US military jargon, “unconventional
warfare” and “foreign internal defense” are among
the key missions of SOFs.37 Considered their raison
d’etre, “unconventional warfare” refers to all those
operations that SOFs conduct “through, with, or by
indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized,
11
Unconventional Warfare
unconventional warfare: refers to all those
operations conducted “through, with, or by indig-
enous or surrogate forces who are organized,
trained, equipped, supported, and directed in
varying degrees by an external source.”; covers
“guerilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intel-
ligence activities, and unconventional assisted
recovery.”
- Special Operations Forces Posture State-
ment, July 2003
foreign internal defense: refers to those
activities conducted “to organize, train, advise,
and assist host-nation military and paramilitary
forces” and ensure that operations “support US
national interests.”
- Special Operations Forces Posture State-
ment, July 2003
counter-insurgency covers all those “military,
paramilitary, political, economic, psychologi-
cal, and civic actions taken by a government to
defeat insurgency. It is an offensive approach
involving all elements of national power; it can
take place across the range of operations and
spectrum of conflict.”
- US Army Field Manual 3-07-22
12
trained, equipped, supported, and directed in
varying degrees by an external source.”38 This covers
“guerilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence
activities, and unconventional assisted recovery.”39
The operations under “foreign internal defense”
refer to those activities conducted “to organize,
train, advise, and assist host-nation military and
paramilitary forces.”40 According to a US Army Field
Manual, the goal of this mission is to ensure that
the kind of assistance that the US gives to its host’s
troops “support US national interests.”41 “Counter-
insurgency” covers all those “military, paramilitary,
political, economic, psychological, and civic actions”
performed by a government to defeat internal enemies.
‘In the thick of it’
Since the US Special Forces is a highly specialized
and small branch of the US military, they are
deployed only to those places and for those missions
where their specialization and capabilities are most
needed. A Field Manual points out that missions
to which Special Forces are to be deployed should
first be assessed and that they should be sent only to
those missions that require skills and capabilities that
only the unit can provide. As the manual stresses,
“Special Forces offers unique military options
unavailable from any other source.”42 Though
little is reported in the media about the details of
actual operations beyond the contents of press
releases from US information officers, eyewitness
testimonies of local residents who claim to have
seen them in action, as well as certain media reports,
indicate that the Special Forces’ exceptional skills
have indeed been applied in their operations.
US and Philippine officials portray the US troops
role as passive “advisers” indirectly engaged in the
operations from a distance. But reports indicate that
their role has been more active and direct. From the
beginning, the US troops were authorized under the
terms-of-reference between the US and Philippine
governments to fire back if shot at. Under this
arrangement, US Special Forces have “intentionally
ventured into known Abu Sayyaf territory in an
attempt to reassure locals while also dissuading the
rebels from operating openly, as well as possibly
tempting them to confront the Americans militarily,”
notes an analyst with the Washington DC-based
Center for Defense Information.43
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SPECIAL REPORTS
 “The US military helps to advise and assist the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Unconventional
We share infor- Warfare
mation and train. But we are not directly involved in the operation in Sulu. We have no combat or
frontline presence.”
- US embassy spokesperson Matthew Lussenhop, September 2006

In a little-reported incident in June

2002, US Marines exchanged gunfire
with alleged members of the Abu Sayyaf
group. In another incident, though not
during a patrol, at least one US soldier
was reported to have been “killed in
action.” In March 2006, a Huey helicopter
carrying US troops to Sulu was attacked
by unidentified assailants.

Even as “advisers,” Briscoe, the Army historian,
notes that the “guys were in thick of it” and were
anxious to “get in the fight.”44 According to Briscoe,
the US troops “expected to shoot or to be shot.”45
Such an expectation would not seem misplaced for,
as one writer for a war veterans’ publication pointed
out, “Though the Philippines [sic]1 constitution
prohibits foreign soldiers from fighting within the
island nation, US troops are exposed to the same
risks they would see in combat.”46 In fact, on at least
one known occasion, they have actually fired back.
In a little-reported incident in June 2002, as reported
by the Los Angeles Times and confirmed in the Army
magazine, US Marines exchanged gunfire with
alleged members of the ASG.47 In another incident,
though not during a patrol, at least one soldier was
reported to have been “killed in action.”48 In March
2006, a Huey helicopter carrying US troops to Sulu
was attacked by unidentified assailants.49
US officials describe Special Forces’ role as “training,
advising, and assisting” Filipino troops, without
elaborating on what exactly “assisting” means.
During the on-the-job training against hostile forces,
giving advice, helping, and actually being part of the
action may well have overlapped. As Walley explains,
“Security-assistance missions preclude the trainers
from being combatants or from performing duties
in which they are likely to become combatants. But
the trainers’ credibility and effectiveness as teachers
mandated that they accompany the AFP troops on
their graduation exercise, of which combat was an
integral part.”50 While their primary role was to train,
Briscoe points out that the “unspoken” mission later
changed to include “facilitating the rescue” of ASG
hostages. As Briscoe details in his account of the
rescue effort, this entailed assuming a more assertive
and central role in the planning, decision-making,
and execution of the operations.51
At first, the US troops were only allowed to operate
at the battalion-level. Such a set-up frustrated US
troops. At one point, former US Pacific Command
chief Admiral Dennis Blair reportedly “tried to get
too aggressive” while others in the military pressed
for a “longer and more intense mission.”52 The
JSOTF-P commander Maxwell argued that confining
the troops at the battalion was a “strategic error.”53
That error has since been apparently rectified and
US troops have since been authorized by former
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to operate at
the company-level and have joined patrols “as often

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Unconventional Warfare

as possible.”54 This set-up is similar to the US war on

Afghanistan where Special Forces troops joined and
commanded 120-man companies of the Northern
Alliance.55

It was apparently on one of these patrols that in

June 2005, residents claimed US forces allegedly
joined the Philippine military in their operations
against Abu Sayyaf members in Maguindanao
province in mainland Mindanao – even when no
training exercises or civil projects were announced
then.56 A P-3 Orion plane was sighted flying over the
area.57 In November of that year, the AFP launched
operations allegedly against the Abu Sayyaf, even
as those who were fighting back claimed to belong
to the Moro National Liberation Front, a group
whose peace agreement with the government has
frayed but which is not tagged a “terrorist group”
by either Manila or Washington. Eyewitnesses of
the encounters claimed to have seen US troops
actually join the Filipino soldiers in operations at
the immediate vicinity of the fighting.58 They were
seen aboard military trucks with their Filipino
counterparts and in rubber boats, mounting heavy
artillery, operating military equipment, removing
landmines, or evacuating casualties. Throughout the
clashes, a spy plane – which locals claim had been
flying over the skies for months – was seen hovering
above the area where fighting was ongoing.59

‘Special
Reconnaissance’
US officials dismissed these reports as “absolutely
not true.”60 According to the JSOTF-P public affairs
officer Lt. Col. Mark Zimmer, “We are not in any
way involved in military operations conducted by the
Philippine Armed Forces.”61 Another spokesperson
said they don’t comment on the details of their
operations.62 But even a Filipino general, Gen.
Nehemias Pajarito, while maintaining that the US
troops were not involved in combat, confirmed at
least one sighting.63 According to him, the US troops
were only repairing water pipes while the operations
were ongoing.64 Another Filipino colonel confirmed
to have requested the US troops’ help in clearing
landmines.65 The US troops’ role in evacuating
troop casualties had previously been reported and
confirmed by the US military itself.66 In an article in
a US Air Force magazine, US soldiers were reported
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VJ VILLAFRANCA/ M4 COLLECTIVE
US TROOPS with Filipino soldiers in Jolo, Sulu.
November 2001: US President George Bush
offers to send US troops to the Philippines for
a “direct military role” in combating the Abu
Sayyaf.
January 2002: The first batch of US Special
Operations Forces are deployed to Basilan.
April 2002: Philippine Supreme Court junks
petition questioning constitutionality of the
deployment of US troops, saying whether they
are involved in an “offensive war” first needs to
be proven.
June 2002: US troops who participated in the
operation describe their mission as “unconven-
tional warfare operations” in a military publica-
tion. In Basilan, US troops exchange gunfire
with alleged Abu Sayyaf members.
October 2002: One US soldier is “killed in ac-
tion” in a bombing incident in Zamboanga City.
February 2003: US Department of Defense
official announces that US troops to be
deployed to Sulu island will engage in actual
combat operations. Philippine government
denies this. Planned deployment is postponed
but the US’ characterization of the deployment
is not taken back.
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SPECIAL REPORTS
Unconventional Warfare
FIVE YEARS ON...
November 2003: signing of Mutual Logistics
Support Agreement which, according to Army
Magazine, made Philippines a “supply base” of
the US.
May 2004: In a military publication, US mili-
tary commander in Basilan Col. David Maxwell
writes that their mission in the Philippines was
to conduct “unconventional warfare” to “de-
stroy” the Abu Sayyaf Group “under the guise
of an exercise.”
June 2005: Witnesses claim US troops took
part in hostilities against the Abu Sayyaf in
Maguindanao.
October 2005: Australian media reports
that Australian troops are involved in “covert
operations” against terrorists in the Southern
Philippines.
November 2005: Witnesses claim US troops
took part in operations against the Moro Na-
tional Liberation Front in Sulu.
February 2006: Filipino general confirms
sighting of US troops at the vicinity of No-
vember 2005 fighting but denies they were
involved in combat.
October 2006: Australian troops reported by
Australian media to have joined US and Filipino
soldiers in pursuit of the Abu Sayyaf in Sulu.
15
Unconventional Warfare
to have “helped infiltrate and extract ground forces.”67
In subsequent operations in September 2006, a
Filipino military spokesperson also confirmed that US
troops assisted in evacuating soldiers.68
As for their role in spying, the Associated Press
confirmed that the operations were “backed at times
by US surveillance aircraft.”69 An unmanned aerial
vehicle later crashed and was recovered by local
citizens.70 Though a US military spokesperson then
claimed the spy planes were used for “humanitarian”
projects,71 other US officials, including a general,
have stated that they have been used to hunt down
targets.72 According to a report to the US Congress,
P-3 aircraft were used in the Philippines to provide
“intelligence and communications support” to the
AFP.73 In September 2006, Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita himself acknowledged that US
troops were using surveillance equipment to track
down the ASG.74 That the surveillance was meant for
combat was confirmed by former National Security
Council adviser Golez himself when he was quoted
as saying that American pilots on surveillance flights
could “call in air strikes” if they spot ASG fighters.75
From the beginning, according to a local journalist,
US troops had used “unmanned planes, electronic
tracking devices, eavesdropping mechanisms,
experimental laser beacons, and a full range of
16
US intelligence gadgets.”76 Their use attests to
the “special reconnaissance” mission that is one
of the specializations of Special Forces troops.
According to the Army Field Manual, the objective
of this mission is “to confirm, refute, or obtain
– by visual observation or other collection methods
– information on the capabilities, intentions, and
activities of an actual or potential enemy.”77 One
of these methods is the tapping of cell phones – a
task which US soldiers reportedly found challenging
because of the mixing of local languages and the
volume of messages.78 In these operations, the
Special Forces were aided by the Central Intelligence
Agency. In their annual report, in notes under
“support to military operations,” the CIA claimed
to have supported the Joint Task Forces by using
“human intelligence” and through other technical
operations.79 The former Philippine Ambassador
to Washington, Albert Del Rosario, also confirmed
the establishment of an “intelligence fusion center”
manned by both US and Filipino troops and the
setting up of satellite equipment.80
US soldiers have also been deeply involved in
operations from their vantage point in the military
headquarters. During the rescue of Abu Sayyaf
hostages, it was reported that some US soldiers were
stationed in the command post of the Philippine
military.81 What exactly their role is in decision-
Focus on the Philippines
SPECIAL REPORTS

US TROOPS join rescue and relief operations after the landslide i in Guinsaugon, Leyte in February 2006.
making and how they relate with Filipino officials
they claim to be “advising” is not known since little
has come out of the room. Because US soldiers are
legally barred from being put under the command
of foreign officers, the question of who ultimately
calls the shots is unclear. In at least one incident,
however, Briscoe narrates how the US commanders
did “steer the AFP leadership” into supporting
a particular plan of action.82 “Unconventional
warfare” missions are defined as those in which
indigenous forces are “directed” by US troops.83
Apart from the US troops, Australian soldiers are also
said to have joined AFP troops in what Australian
media described as “covert operations” in the
country.84 Members of the elite Australian Special Air
Service (SAS) were reported to have engaged in what
one Australian newspaper as “the closest the SAS has
come to conventional combat operations in Southeast
Asia since the end of the Vietnam War in the
1970s.”85 Incidentally, the Philippine and Australian
governments are currently in the process of working
out a “Status of Forces Agreement” similar to the
one the Philippines has with the US in order to
establish the legal framework covering the presence
of Australian troops in the country.86
Focus on the Philippines
SPECIAL REPORTS
Unconventional Warfare
REM ZAMORA
‘The full range of
operations’
In denying that US troops are engaged in “actual
combat” in the Philippines, US and Philippine
officials have sought to reduce the coverage of the
definition of “actual combat” to only those actions
which involve the direct application of force. This
implies that US troops could only be considered as
engaging in combat when they themselves personally
pull the trigger and fire guns at their enemies.
As has been discussed earlier, they have actually
found themselves in this position. Still, US public
information officers stress that their actions are
confined to performing “non-combat” roles, such
as training or undertaking humanitarian missions or
engineering projects. Under their limited definition,
teaching Filipino troops what to do during
actual operations, tapping cell phones, flying spy
planes, mine-clearing, or psychological operations
are not considered part of an “offensive war.”
“Unconventional warfare” is not “warfare.”
But even as US and Filipino officials take pains
17
Unconventional Warfare
In denying that US troops are
engaged in “actual combat” in
the Philippines, US and
Philippine officials have sough
to reduce the coverage of the
definition of “actual combat” to
only those actions which involve
the direct application of force.
to publicly draw distinctions between US troops’
missions, the US military apparently does not. As the
Army Field Manual clearly states, “Military power is
not limited to acts of violence and overt hostilities to
achieve strategic objectives.” This view is particularly
valid for the Special Forces, the Manual notes. It
makes it clear that “The principles of war apply to
the full range of operations, specifically where the
use of force is more selective and where restraint and
nonlethal aspects of power are dominant.”87 David
Tucker, a professor of defense analysis at the Naval
Postgraduate School and Christopher J. Lamb, a
fellow at the National Defense University in the US,
explain that both direct and indirect use of force may
be “mutually supportive, producing a greater effect
together than separately.” They also point out that not
all Special Forces missions can be neatly categorized
as direct or indirect. They particularly cite as an
example “unconventional warfare” which, they say,
“might include direct engagement of enemy forces
by US personnel.”88 “Counter-insurgency” is likewise
defined by the US Army as an “offensive approach.”89
While it is true that the US Special Forces are also
engaged in humanitarian missions, in development
projects, and in the training of local troops, these
activities are still seen by the US military as part
of the waging of war. That these activities are
being emphasized over direct and more aggressive
activities serve to reinforce the notion that the US
troops are not engaged in combat – even when both
their combat and non-combat missions have one
objective: to fight and defeat their enemies.
The JSOTF-P actively promotes their “civil-military
operations” or CMOs in the local press. This include
school-building projects, construction of deep wells,
roads, bridges and other infrastructure, medical and
dental missions, and the like. But the military’s own
18
“Military power is not limited to acts of
violence and overt hostilities to achieve
strategic objectives.”
- US Army Field Manual No.3-05.20
conception of what these projects are for is clear in
their definition of CMOs as a “group of planned
activities in support of military operations that
enhance the relationship between the military forces
and civilian authorities and population and which
promote the development of favorable emotions,
attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile
grounds.”90 Testifying about their CMOs in Basilan,
former US Pacific Command chief Admiral Thomas
Fargo noted that their projects “acted as force
multipliers for US and AFP operations because the
programs separated the citizens of Basilan from
supporting the terrorist threat.”91
The goal is not just to earn the sympathy of the
locals, but to extract information necessary for
combat. As a military writer wrote, the underlying
aim of the humanitarian projects is “not simply
to provide feel-good projects that achieve positive
perceptions among the local populace.” According
to him, “the purpose is to utilize the correct…
carrots… that will yield actionable intelligence that
can be used to target and destroy the insurgent
infrastructure…” After the carrots come the sticks.
According to Wendt, “After the infrastructure has
been identified and exposed by the local population,
its members can be killed or captured.” This strategy
to gain detailed local knowledge takes a long time
and requires that the troops are “embedded” in the
community in order to become more familiar with
both the terrain and the local culture. 92
Even the infrastructure projects – the extension of
airport runways, construction of piers and jetties,
the paving of roads, and so on which have won
over many local authorities – have larger military
goals. Pointing out how they enabled troops to
move around more quickly, Walley notes that the
projects “benefited US trainers and advisers and
contributed to force protection.”93 They were also
useful for meeting the troops supply and logistics
needs.94 Likewise, the training of AFP troops serves
combat-related goals. In the terminology of the US
military, indigenous troops act as “force multipliers”
in projecting power and in achieving US military
objectives but – as the Army Field Manual puts it
– “with minimum visibility, risk, and cost.”95 In other
words, the members of the AFP are trained so that
they can be put out front and first in line when the
enemies start firing.
Focus on the Philippines
SPECIAL REPORTS

‘Long-term low-
visibility presence’
All these interrelated missions conform to the
overall military strategy of the US government, as
articulated in various official documents, including
the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the National
Security Strategy (NSS), the National Military Strategy
(NDS), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the
National Strategy to Combat Terrorism (NSCT), among
others.96 Rather than just lone-standing missions, the
US troops’ actions in the Philippines are part of a
comprehensive and wide-ranging transformation of
the US’ military organization and its global posture.
At one level, the deployment of troops in the
Philippines is in keeping with the US’ determination
to “focus decisive military power and specialized
intelligence resources to defeat terrorist networks
globally.”97 This is because, in the minds of US
military planners, the challenge to US interests no
longer comes just from state but also non-state
actors especially those taking shelter in states that are
incapable of controlling their territory. “America is
now threatened less by conquering states than we are
by failing ones,” notes the NSS.98 Incidentally, this
“failing state” label has been increasingly pinned on
the Philippines, with former US embassy officials
describing Mindanao as “a doormat for terrorism
in the region” or as the “next Afghanistan.”99 Faced
with these kinds of threats, the NSS asserts that
“The fight must be taken to the enemy, to keep
them on the run.”100 As US President George Bush
himself said, “The fight against terror is not just in
Afghanistan. We’re gonna fight terror wherever it
exists.”101 In this fight, the lines between a defensive
“[T]he missions... in the Philippines established an acceptable American
military presence in the Southeast Pacific and re-established professional
military relationships.”
- Dr C.H. Briscoe, US Army historian
Focus on the Philippines
SPECIAL REPORTS
Unconventional Warfare
Rather than just lone-stand-
ing missions, the US troops’
actions in the Philippines are
part of a comprehensive and
wide-ranging transformation
of the US’ military
organization and its
global poture.
war and what the Supreme Court terms “offensive
war” are blurred, if not indeterminate. For as the
NSCT points out, “[T]he best defense is a good
offense.”102
As a result, the QDR calls for a shift in emphasis
“from conducting war against nations – to
conducting war in countries we are not at war
with”103 – a category that fits the Philippines.
Seymour Hersh, the prominent investigative
journalist, has written about a presidential order
that allows the Pentagon “to operate unilaterally in a
number of countries where there is a perception of
a clear and evident terrorist threat.” Though the list
of countries was not revealed, the description again
covers the Philippines: “A number of the countries
are friendly to the US and are major trading
partners. Most have been cooperating in the war on
terrorism.”104
In these countries, the US will strive to work with
willing governments but it reserves the right to
act alone and preemptively if they so refuse.105
One analyst described the new strategy thus:
19
US Military Presence in the Philippines: Joint
see page 32-37 for de
Exercises and the JSOTF-P (1992 to present)
etailed information
 Unconventional Warfare
LUIS LIWANAG
US TROOPS n a medical mission in Zamboanga.
“countries that harbor terrorists, either by consent
or because they are unable to enforce their laws
within their territory, effectively forfeit their rights
of sovereignty.”106 This implies that regardless of
any constitutional prohibition against its forces
being involved in combat inside Philippine territory,
the US has the right to do what it takes. In fact,
according to a memorandum prepared by the
former chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen.
Richard Myers – who had earlier been reported
as pushing for deeper involvement in the country
-- the Philippines has been included in the list of
“emerging targets for preemptive war” of a new
US military unit authorized to conduct clandestine
operations abroad.107
The Special Forces’ mission and presence in the
Philippines fit the QDR’s vision for this global war,
indicating that in light of the US’ overall strategy,
they have goals far larger than publicly expressed
locally. The QDR states that the SOFs will “increase
their capacity to perform more demanding and
specialized tasks, especially long-duration, indirect
and clandestine operations in politically sensitive
environments and denied areas.”108 For what the
document describes as “direct action,” the SOFs
are envisioned to possess the abilities “to locate,
22
tag, and track dangerous individuals and other
high-value targets globally” – actions which they
have been performing in the southern Philippines.
In this, the prominent role played by surveillance
and intelligence-gathering reflects the US military’s
push towards establishing an “unblinking eye over
the battle-space” by using more spy planes and
mobilizing more local spies.109
Beyond pursuing “terrorists,” however, the SOF’s
stationing in the Philippines is an important
component of the US’ evolving global military
positioning. As the US embarks on the most radical
realignment of its worldwide presence since World
War II, the aim, according to the QDR, is “to develop
a basing system that provides greater flexibility for US
forces in critical areas of the world, placing emphasis
on additional bases and stations beyond Western
Europe and Northeast Asia.” This includes the need
to “provide temporary access to facilities in foreign
countries that enable US forces to conduct training
and exercises in the absence of permanent ranges
and bases.”110 It also entails a change in emphasis
from “from static defense, garrison forces” – such
as those the US had in Subic and Clark – “to mobile,
expeditionary operations”111 as exemplified by the
operations of the JSOTF-P in Sulu.
Focus on the Philippines
SPECIAL REPORTS

“From conducting war against nations --- to conducting war in countries we are not at war with”
- Quadrennial Defense Review 2006, list of areas to which US military will shift its emphasis
In fact, while discussing the current realignment of
US military presence, former US Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld has confirmed plans to establish
“nodes” for Special Operations Forces in Asia.112
Former US Pacific Command head Admiral Thomas
Fargo has announced their intention to expand SOF
presence in the region through the establishment
of more “cooperative security locations (CSLs),”
or military installations to which the US will
have access to, in the region.113 The Overseas
Basing Commission, an official body tasked to
review the US overseas military infrastructure,
has confirmed that the Philippines is one of the
countries in Asia where such “CSLs” are being
developed.114 In November 2002, the Philippine and
US governments signed the Mutual Logistics and
Servicing Agreement which, according to a military
publication, made the Philippines a “supply base” of
the United States.115
In these plans, Special Forces hold a special place.
More than other units, SOFs have usually been
the contingent to count on in order to “gain or
maintain US access to strategically important foreign
countries.”116 In fact, another military contingent
also composed mostly of Special Forces, the
Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa, has
Focus on the Philippines
SPECIAL REPORTS
Unconventional Warfare
also been established in Djibouti in West Africa in
2002. With its mission and objectives very similar
to the JSOTF-P, the Task Force has been described
as a “model for future military operations.”117 These
small and inconspicuous units fulfill the stated need
of “maintaining a long-term, low visibility presence
in many areas of the world where US forces do
not traditionally operate.”118 As the Army historian
puts it, the deployment in Sulu has “established
an acceptable American military presence in the
Southeast Pacific…”119 In other words, the JSOTF-
P may not only be conducting war within the
Philippines, it may have also entrenched a new form
of U.S. bases in the country.
Re-establishing its presence in the Philippines is
key to deepening US military presence in the region
and worldwide, a goal articulated clearly and openly
by US officials in the belief that the US’ “primary
line of defense remains well forward…”120
Regardless of the specific interventions against
Abu Sayyaf members or Iraqi fighters in another
part of the world or other enemies elsewhere,
the overarching objective of that global presence
is to enhance the United States’ war-waging and
interventionary capacity in pursuit of its interests
worldwide.
23
Unconventional Warfare
Summary
In light of the above, there is sufficient reason to
further probe the claim that US Special Operations
Forces are engaged in an “offensive war” in the
southern Philippines “under the guise of an
exercise,” as previously alleged by petitioners before
the Supreme Court.
To summarize, the following are some of the leads
that would seem to support this contention:
n The deployment is considered by the US
military as part of its “global war against
terror,” a war with actual enemies as targets.
US troops are authorized to fire at these
enemies. It has been reported that they
have engaged in a firefight against alleged
members of the Abu Sayyaf. At least one of
the US troops has been “killed in action.”
n The very nature of the participating US
military unit, the Special Operations Forces,
indicates that the mission is not confined
to training or conducting humanitarian
missions. The SOF is a special branch of
the US military specifically trained and
deployed for covert operations, including
guerilla warfare, sabotage, surveillance,
and other combat operations. While
their operations also include non-combat
humanitarian projects, training and other
civic actions, these are also seen by the US
military as integral to their combat missions.
n US soldiers themselves describe their
mission as being that of “unconventional
warfare,” “foreign internal defense,”
and “counter-insurgency” – missions in
which Special Forces specialize because
of their unique capabilities and which
include combat components. The current
commander of the US troops has even
gone on record to state his disagreement
with the Supreme Court’s ruling barring
foreign troops from engaging in combat
within Philippine territory. He describes
the mission as being conducted “under the
guise of an exercise.”
n Eyewitness testimonies by residents who
24
saw US troops in action confirm that the
Special Operations troops applied their
unique capabilities in their mission on
various occasions. These witnesses attest
to seeing US troops in the vicinity of
fighting during actual hostilities, operating
military equipment, defusing landmines,
and performing other war-related actions.
The sighting of spy planes, including the
recovery of one that crashed, confirms the
use of US military equipment by US troops
for war-fighting purposes.
n Official and public documents articulating US
military doctrine and strategy locate the US’
deployment to the Philippines in the context
of its larger global war effort. They also
confirm the US’ determination to wage war
even inside the territories of countries they
are not at war with and they explicitly assert
the US’ “right” to act unilaterally to defeat its
enemies, regardless of the domestic limitations
set on its troops by the government of the
territory in which they operate.
Opponents and critics of US military deployment to
the Philippines have raised serious larger questions
on their presence and actions.
First, there is the concern that, instead of resolving
the problems in Mindanao, the intervention of the
US may be exacerbating the conflict and deepening
divisions. By promoting military solutions to what
are believed to be deeper structural problems caused
by historical injustice, economic marginalization,
and cultural discrimination, the reliance of the
AFP on the US military enables the government to
evade the root causes of war in the region. These
military solutions are resulting in more human rights
violations and in the entrenchment of the structures
of injustice and dispossession that fuel conflict.
Secondly, there are concerns that the US is using
the Philippines as a launchpad for aggressive and
illegal military interventions against other targets in
the country, in the region, and beyond. US troops
who have been stationed in or who have been
deployed to the Philippines are known to have
participated in the invasion and occupation of Iraq
and Afghanistan. With the Philippines integrated
within the US’ global military structure and its
forward deployment strategy, the government also
Focus on the Philippines
SPECIAL REPORTS

VJ VILLAFRANCA/ M4 COLLECTIVE
becomes complicit with and party to US actions
elsewhere, thereby making the Philippines a target
of US enemies.
Thirdly, there are worries about the negative social
and environmental impacts caused by the deployment,
as with the reported rise in prostitution or the use
of dangerous substances during operations. Finally,
there are also concerns that the deployment of
US troops in the country has larger geo-political
ramifications that affect the balance of forces in
the region, especially as the US military presence
is perceived to be designed to project power
throughout Southeast Asia and encircle China.
Focus on the Philippines
SPECIAL REPORTS
Unconventional Warfare
Recommendations
It is beyond the aim and the scope of this report
to thoroughly explore these issues. But they are
directly related to the question of whether US
troops are engaged in an “offensive war” because
their continued presence in the country rests on
the “question of fact” posed by the Supreme
Court not being proven. As this report has aimed
to show, there are sufficient grounds to revisit and
contest this question. The following are some initial
recommendations with the aim of establishing the
answer:
25
Unconventional Warfare
n For the legislative department to exercise its mandate
to investigate the issue further
The appropriate committees (on foreign
relations, justice, peace and reconciliation,
or on national defense and security) of the
Senate and the House of Representatives
committee should conduct hearings and
investigations on the issue, compel and
protect otherwise hesitant witnesses who
are afraid of military reprisal, and demand
the appearance of AFP and US military
officials involved in the missions. AFP
officials should be asked about the actions
of US troops in their operations. US military
officials should be required to explain their
own characterization of their mission, as
published in US military publications. Col.
David Maxwell, in particular, should be
summoned to explain why he believes US
troops are not barred from participating in
combat missions, contrary to the ruling of
the Supreme Court. The US Ambassador to
the Philippines should likewise be asked to
categorically state whether the Philippines
is indeed considered as one of those cases
where the US is “conducting war in countries
we are not at war with,” as described in the
Quadrennial Defense Review.
n For civil society groups to re-consolidate and to bring
the issue back on the national agenda
The conviction of a US Marine in a
controversial rape case has put the
spotlight on the US military presence
in the Philippines. But while the regular
training exercises have been put on hold,
the Special Forces continue to be stationed
in the country. Increased public discussion
on the issue of US troops in the country
may be useful in drawing attention to those
troops still in the southern Philippines and
for raising larger questions about their aims
and their consequences.
n For civil society groups to consider filing legal
challenges before the courts
In light of new information that has
come out since the Supreme Court’s
2002 ruling, civil society groups and
social movements, especially lawyers’
26
and human rights organizations, should
consider investigating the allegations
further, build a fool-proof case, and,
upon assessing the possibilities, consider
filing another legal challenge against the
deployment.
n For the legislative department and civil society to push
for oversight and accountability mechanisms on the
US troops
Members of the Senate and the House
of Representatives should be pressed to
constitute an independent monitoring
body composed of credible and
respected members to continually and
systematically monitor and report on US
troops in action. They should be allowed
to witness actual operations, visit military
facilities, and interview soldiers, officials,
and residents. They should be empowered
and given sufficient resources to pursue
their investigation, a venue to air their
reports, and a mandate to act on their
recommendations.
n For civil society groups and local communities to more
systematically document and more effectively report
the actions of US troops in the country
Local communities who are directly
exposed to the actions of US troops
should be supported. Training and
resources for systematically and credibly
reporting their actions should be
extended. Mechanisms for disseminating
their reports should be strengthened.
Given all that is at stake with the continued deployment
of US troops to the southern Philippines, the initiative
to shed light on their actions in the country could
go a long way towards resolving larger questions of
peace and security, as well as issues of democracy and
sovereignty in the country and beyond.n
Focus on the Philippines
SPECIAL REPORTS

Notes
1
Delon Porcalla, “SC asked to stop ‘Balikatan’ games,”
Philippine Star, February 2, 2002. For more on the legal
objections to the deployment, see Roland Simbulan, “US
military intervention in the Philippines: A New Phase” UP
Forum, April 2002; Ma. Socorro Diokno, “Kalayaang Aguila
2002: the Death Knell of Philippine Society,” undated; Manny
Mogato, “The Yankees are Back,” Newsbreak, February 6, 2002;
Manny Mogato, “Beyond War Games,” Newsbreak, February
13, 2002; Chay Hofilena and Manny Mogato, “Signed, Sealed,
and Delivered,” Newsbreak, February 6, 2002.
2
Text of Philippine Supreme Court decision, April 11, 2002.
3
Larry Niksch, “Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-US Anti-
Terrorism Cooperation,” Congressional Research Service Report
for Congress, January 25, 2002.
4
As a former JSOTF-P commander Maj. Guy Lemire said,
“We’re trainers, not advisers… We do not engage the enemy.
We do not go into the field.” (Glen Martin, “Battling Rebels
in Philippines: US Playing Critical Role in Campaign against
Muslim Insurgents,” San Francisco Chronicle, July 6, 2003); US
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld also said US troops do not
assume an “active military role” in the Philippines (Bill Gertz
and Rowan Scarborough, “Philippine confusion,” Washington
Times, February 8, 2002). US embassy spokesperson Matthew
Lussenhop said, “The US military helps to advise and assist the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. We share information and
train. But we are not directly involved in the operation in Sulu.
We have no combat or frontline presence.” (Julie Alipala and
Jeoffrey Maitem, “US doubts info that Indon terror suspect slain
in Jolo clash,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 14, 2006)
5
For example, an Associated Press’ report states that the
US is providing “covert non-combat assistance” (Associated
Press, “More than 5,000 US troops to hold war exercises near
Philippine Muslim rebel lairs,” January 4, 2006). Referring to US
troops in the Southern Philippines, Agence France Press reports
that they are training Filipino troops, (Agence France Press,
“U.S., Philippines To Hold Two Weeks Of Joint War Games);
Reporting on the US troops’ mine-clearing operations, Reuters
describes them as being on a “humanitarian mission.” (Reuters,
“U.S. troops remove landmines in Philippine south,” December
1, 2005.
6
Initially, the deployment of US troops to the southern
Philippines was presented as an attempt to once-and-for all
neutralize the ASG – but with US’ role confined to only training
and advising their Filipino counterparts. That gained traction
with a public frustrated with the Philippine military’s decade-
long failure to defeat the group. As the years passed, however,
and as public outrage at the atrocities of the ASG dissipated,
there has also been a discernible shift in the US and Philippine
governments’ media strategy: the anti-terror component, while
still there, has been toned down; played up instead has been
the humanitarian missions, development projects, and other
“civil-military operations” that provide economic benefit to local
populations.
7
“US troops may fight in Philippines,” CNN.com, February 20,
Focus on the Philippines
SPECIAL REPORTS
Unconventional Warfare
2003.
8
This provoked uproar in the Philippines and Filipino officials
quickly contradicted the Pentagon. Implying that they were
referring to the same thing but were using different labels, then
Philippine Defense Secretary Angelo Reyes dismissed the clash
in wording by saying it was just a “question of semantics.”
(Ellen Nakashima and Bradley Graham, “Missed Signals Forced
Suspension of U.S. Philippine Mission, Washington Post,
March 3, 2003) Concerned that they might suffer casualties, US
officials claimed that certain Filipino officials told them, “We
could always cover it up.” ( John Hendren and Richard Paddock,
“US troops deployment to RP called off, dispute blamed,”
Los Angeles Times, March 2, 2003) While that particular
deployment was postponed, the US government never retracted
its description of the operations. (Ellen Nakashima and Bradley
Graham, “Missed Signals Forced Suspension of U.S. Philippine
Mission, Washington Post, March 3, 2003)
9
GlobalSecurity.org, “Operation Enduring Freedom-
Philippines”, www.globalsecurity.org.
10
C.H. Briscoe, “Wanted dead or alive: Psychological
Operations during Balikatan 02-1,” Special Warfare, September
2004); Dr Richard L. Kiper, “‘Of Vital Importance’: the 4th
PSYOP Group,” Special Warfare, September 2002.
United States Department of the Army, Field Manual No.3-
11
05.20: Special Forces Operations, (Washington D.C.: US
Government Printing Office, June 26, 2001), glossary-23.
12
In 2006, up to 37 different training exercises of various
durations, locations, and participation were scheduled
throughout the year. This was a jump from the previous
count of between 17 to 24 exercises for the previous years.
(Carolyn O. Arguillas, “Q and A with US Ambassador Francis
Ricciardone: ‘Ops-Intel-fusion is not spying,’” MindaNews,
February 28, 2005; Jojo Due, “Biggest RP-US military exercise
starts next week,” Philippine Business Daily Mirror, February
17, 2006). The exercises in the Philippines are just some of
over 125 exercises the United States conducts in Asia every
year. (GlobalSecurity.org, “Pacific Fleet Exercises,” www.
globalsecurity.org)
13
It may well be argued that those who come for training do so
for war. Indeed US troops who have trained in the Philippines
have been deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. Filipino officials
also admit that the training Filipino soldiers get from US troops
are to be used in the Philippine government’s war against local
communists. (Gil C. Cabacungan, “US to step up anti-terror
training of RP troops,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 18,
2006. But this is not within the scope of this report to explore.
For its purposes, it will limit the discussion on the actions of the
JSOTF-P in the southern Philippines.
14
It is possible that some JSOTF-P members take part in the
regular training exercises and those JSOTF-P missions include
training components.
15
It is also possible that troops from other units may have taken
part in the deployment but the bulk of the troops are reported
to have come from SOFs.
27
Unconventional Warfare
16
US Special Operations Command, “Special Operations Forces
Posture Statement,” July 2003; For more on Special Operations
Force organization within US military structures, see Special
Operations Forces Reference Manual at www.fas.org/irp/agency/
dod/socom/sof-ref-2-1/SOFREF_Ch2.htm.
17
Field Manual No.3-05.20, 1-4.
18
Field Manual No.3-05.20, 4-3.
Cherilyn Walley, “Special Forces training exercises continue
19
Balikatan mission,” Special Warfare, September 2004; US Pacific
Command Website, www.pacom.mil.
20
Maj. Kevin T. Henderson, US Army, “Army Special
Operations Forces and Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special
Operations Capable) Integration: Something a Joint Task Force
Commander should Consider,” monograph, United States Army
Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced
Military Studies, 19 May 2004; another writer talks about a
“Forward Operating Base 11”, Base in Southern Philippines
called “Forward Operating Base 11” (Cherilyn Walley, “Impact
of the semi-permissive environment on force protection in
Philippine engagements,” Special Warfare, September 2004)
21
At start of the deployment in January 2002, there were
supposed to be 160 to 250 who were joining. (Steve Vogel,
“Americans Arrive in Philippines U.S. Special Forces To Aid
Filipino Army In Threatened Areas,” Washington Post, January
16, 2002; Fe B. Zamora, “All US troops will leave on July 31,
says Wurster,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 1, 2002; Pat Roque,
“US Special Forces in Philippines,” Associated Press, February
18, 2002; Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, “Philippine
confusion,” Washington Times, February 8, 2002). In November
2002, the Army Magazine reported that there were 260
members of the task force were in the southern Philippines.
(Army Magazine, “News Call,” November 1, 2002). In February
2003, 350 Special Forces were reportedly scheduled to be sent
to Sulu but this was postponed. (Eric Schmitt, “US combat
force of 1700 is headed to the Philippines”, New York Times,
February 21, 2003; Bradley Graham, “US Bolsters Philippine
Force,” Washington Post, February 21, 2003) In October 2003,
300 Special Forces were reported to be in Basilan (US spy
aircraft deployed in Philippines,” October 13, 2003 The News
International (Pakistan). By February 2006, 250 more troops
were reported to be joining those who were already in Sulu but
it was not clear how many were still there at that time (“RP-US
to conduct war games amid ‘rape’ controversy, Philipine Daily
Inquirer, January 10, 2006; “No time frame of US troops’ stay
in Sulu, Mindanews, January 17, 2006). Shortly after, US military
spokesperson Capt Burrel Parmer announced that 400 US
troops will be Sulu for various projects. (Ding Cervantes, “5,500
US military personnel coming for Balikatan 2006,” Philippine
Star, February 17, 2006). In September 2006, 114 US troops
were reported to have arrived in Zamboanga City as part of
the “normal rotation” of soldiers under JSOTF-P, according
to the US embassy. (Julie Alipala, “100 GIs held at Zambo
immigration,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 28, 2006).
22
“US troops helping in pursuit of MNLF breakaway group,”
Inq7.net, November 24, 2005
23
“Civilians want probe on US military’s alleged supervision in
28
Sulu war,” Mindanews, November 24, 2005.
24
United States Department of State, “Patterns of Global
Terrorism,” www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/
25
Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, Commander US Pacific Command,
Statement before the House Armed Services Committee on
US Pacific Command Posture, March 12, 2003; GlobalSecurity.
org, “Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines,” www.
globalsecurity.org.
26
Raymond Bonner, “Special Forces Sweltering Paradise,” New
York Times, February 26, 2002; Eric Schmitt, “US-Philippine
Command may signal war’s next phase,” New York Times,
January 16, 2002
27
Juliet Labog-Javellana, “Bush gives RP special mention on
terror fight,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 2, 2004; It is
not clear whether “Operation Ultimatum,” launched in August
2006, is still the same as OEF-P but with another name or
another operation altogether but reports stated that the US has
been “actively involved” in the “US-backed” mission.
28
(Julie Alipala and Jeoffrey Maitem, “US doubts reports of
Umar Patek’s death,” Inquirer, September 13, 2006; “Troops
kill 6 Abus in Sulu Clash,” Manila Standard Today, August 25,
2006; Associated Press, “Two Philippine soldiers killed as troops
press offensive against Muslim militants,” International Herald
Tribune, October 11, 2006; Xinhua, “Philippine defense chiefs
say gov’t forces sure to win war against Abu Sayyaf,” October 2,
2006)
29
Golez said, “[W]e assure you after six months the Americans
are going to be gone. They’ll be going home.” (Joel San Juan
and John Anthony Concepcion, “Abu Sayyaf wiped out in one
year; US troops not permanent in RP – Golez,” Manila Times,
January 29, 2002.
30
Interview with Capt. Eddie Paruchabutr, Joint Special
Operations Task Force information officer, March 9, 2006,
Zamboanga City.
31
Col. David Maxwell, “Operation Enduring Freedom-
Philippines: What Would Sun-Tzu say?” Military Review, May-
June 2004
32
Members of the 1st Special Forces Group, “The history of the
1st SF Group in the Republic of the Philippines; 1957-2002,”
Special Warfare, June 2002.
C.H. Briscoe, “Why the Philippines: ARSOF’s expanded
33
mission in the war on terror,” Special Warfare, September 2004.
34
Eric P. Wendt, “Strategic counterinsurgency modeling,”
Special Warfare, September 2005.
35
Cherilyn Walley, Impact of the semi-permissive environment
on force protection in Philippine engagements,” Special Warfare,
September 2004.
Sheldon W. Simon, “Theater Security Cooperation in the
36
US Pacific Command,” National Bureau of Asian Research
Analysis, Volume 14, Number 2, August 2003.
Focus on the Philippines
SPECIAL REPORTS

37
Cherilyn Walley, “Impact of the semi-permissive environment
on force protection in Philippine engagements,” Special Warfare,
September 2004; Eric P. Wendt, “Strategic counterinsurgency
modeling,” Special Warfare, September 2005; Cherilyn Walley,
“Civil affairs: a weapon of peace on Basilan Island,” Special
Warfare, September 2004)
38
Field Manual No.3-05.20, 2-1.
39
Mike Skinner, “The renaissance of unconventional warfare
as an SF mission,” Special Warfare, Winter 2002; United States
Special Operations Command, Special Operations Forces
Posture Statement, July 2003.
40
Field Manual No.3-05.20, 2-1; Edward Bruner and Ronald
O’Rourke, “Special Operations Forces in Operation Enduring
Freedom: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional
Research Service Report for Congress, May 23, 2002.
41
Special Operations Forces Posture Statement, July 2003.
42
Field Manual No.3-05.20, 2-11.
43
Field Manual No.3-05.20, 1-9, 1-22.
44
Mark Burgess, “The US Deployment in the Philippines:
Expand the Mission,” Center for Defense Information, June 7,
2002
45
C.H. Briscoe, “Balikatan exercise spearheaded ARSOF
operations in the Philippines,” Special Warfare, September 2004
46
C.H. Briscoe, “Balikatan exercise spearheaded ARSOF
operations in the Philippines,” Special Warfare, September 2004
47
Tim Dyhouse, “Shoulder-to-shoulder: combating terrorists in
the Philippines: more than 600 US troops are training Filipinos
to eradicate Muslim extremists on Basilan island,” VFW
(Veterans of Foreign Wars) Magazine, May 2002
48
John Hendren, “Rebels shoot at US Troops in the
Philippines,” Los Angeles Times, June 18, 2002; Army Magazine
(published by the Association of the United States Army),
“News Call,” August 1, 2002
49
Cherilyn Walley, “Impact of the semi-permissive environment
on force protection in Philippine engagements,” Special Warfare,
September 2004; Roel Pareno and Pia Lee-Brago, “American
Troops in Zamboanga commemorate 9-11,” Philippine Star,
September 12, 2006.
50
Roel Pareno, “Gunfire hits Huey with US troops,” Philippine
Star, March 9, 2006
51
Walley mentions only the “security-assistance mission”
which is just one of the listed missions performed by SOFs.
As shown above, US troops themselves have attested that they
have performed other missions. Cherilyn Walley, “Special Forces
training exercises continue Balikatan mission,” Special Warfare,
September 2004). The Field Manual itself points out the SOF
can engage in “multiple missions.” (Field Manual No.3-05.20,
2-24)
Focus on the Philippines
SPECIAL REPORTS
Unconventional Warfare
C.H. Briscoe, “Rescuing the Burnhams: the unspoken
52
SOCPAC mission,” Special Warfare, September 2004
53
Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, “Philippine confusion,”
Washington Times, February 8, 2002; John Hendren and
Richard Paddock, “US troops deployment to RP called off,
dispute blamed,” Los Angeles Times, March 2, 2003.
54
Col. David Maxwell, “Operation Enduring Freedom-
Philippines: What Would Sun-Tzu say?” Military Review, May-
June 2004
55
C.H. Briscoe, “Balikatan exercise spearheaded ARSOF
operations in the Philippines,” Special Warfare, September 2004
56
Manny Mogato, “Beyond War Games,” Newsbreak, February
13, 2002
57
“Party-list group opposes holding of Balikatan drill in
Cotabato town,” Manila Bulletin, Jan 11, 2006; Interview with
witness, March 9, 2006.
58
Interview with Jon Rudy, March 7, 2006
59
Herbert Docena, “On-the-Job Training: Are US soldiers
engaged in actual combat in the Philippines?”, Focus on the
Global South, March 9, 2006, www.focusweb.org; Carolyn
O. Arguillas, “Civilians want probe on US military’s alleged
supervision in Sulu war, MindaNews, November 24, 2005; Maila
Ager and Veronica Uy, “US troops helping in pursuit of MNLF
breakaway group—solon,” Inquirer, November 24, 2005.
60
Interviews with various combatants and witnesses, January 28
to February 6, 2006, Sulu.
61
Julie Alipala, “4 US soldiers join anti-terror operation in
Jolo—official,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 25, 2006.
62
“Moro groups want US soldiers out of Sulu,” Inquirer News
Service, November 28, 2005.
Interview with Capt. Eddie Paruchabutr, Joint Special
63
Operations Task Force information officer, March 9, 2006,
Zamboanga City.
64
Interview with Gen. Nehemias Pajarito, commander of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines 104th Brigade, February 6,
2006.
65
Interviews with various combatants and witnesses, January 28
to February 6, 2006, Sulu.
“US Troops Remove Landmines in Philippine South,” Reuters,
66
December 2, 2005.
67
“US wants more troops here,” Philippine Daily Inquirer,
March 17, 2002; C.H. Briscoe, “Balikatan exercise spearheaded
ARSOF operations in the Philippines,” Special Warfare,
September 2004; Army Magazine (published by the Association
of the United States Army, “News Call,” May 1, 2002; Tim
Dyhouse, “Shoulder-to-shoulder: combating terrorists in the
Philippines: more than 600 US troops are training Filipinos to
29
Unconventional Warfare
eradicate Muslim extremists on Basilan island,” VFW (Veterans
of Foreign Wars) Magazine, May 2002.
68
Michael Farris, “Special ops a success in the Philippines,”
Airman, November 2002.
69
Joel Guinto, “2 soldiers slain, 3 hurt in new clashes with Abu
Sayyaf,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 7, 06.
70
“RP, US troops begin military exercises to strengthen anti-
terror drive,” SunStar, October 14, 2005.
71
“US military appeals for return of missing unmanned plane,”
Associated Press, February 10, 2006; Julie Alipala, “Sulu
residents recover unmanned ‘spy plane’,” Inquirer, February 17,
2006; Julie Alipala, “US Army exec rewards finder of spy plane,”
Inquirer, February 17, 2006
72
Carolyn O. Arguillas, “US troops moved around conflict zones
for ‘civic action’ and ‘ops-intel fusion’,” MindaNews, January 7,
2006
73
Roel Pareno, “US spy gear lead to Abus,” Philippine Star,
March 18, 2002; Roel Pareno, “Soldiers, backed by US planes,
clash with Abus,” Philippine Star, March 13, 2002; Kyodo News,
“U.S. spy planes deployed against Abu Sayyaf rebels,” February
25, 2002; Kenn Finlayson, “112th signal battalion opens the big
pipe’ during Balikatan 02-1,” Special Warfare, September 2004.
Thomas Lum and Larry A. Niksch, “The Republic of the
74
Philippines: Background and US Relations,” Congressional
Research Service Report for Congress, January 10, 2006.
75
Paolo Romero, “‘US now helping in Janjalani hunt,” Philippine
Star, August 8, 2006; Paolo Romero, “Troops closing in on JIs,
Janjalani,” Philippine Star, September 25, 2006.
76
Carlito Pablo, “’They can no longer hide’: Golez says US night
sensors will turn tide against Abus,” Philippine Daily Inquirer,
February 22, 2002.
Manny Mogato, “Americans gained more than Filipinos,”
77
Cyberdyaryo, July 26, 2002
78
Field Manual No.3-05.20, 2-15.
79
Cherilyn Walley, “Impact of the semi-permissive environment
on force protection in Philippine engagements,” Special Warfare,
September 2004.
80
Central Intelligence Agency, Annual Report 2002, www.cia.
gov/cia/reports/Ann_Rept_2002/smo.html.
Ambassador Albert Del Rosario, “A Progress Report on the
81
Philippines: The Balikatan Exercises, the Abu Sayyaf, and Al-
Qaeda,” The Heritage Foundation Heritage Lectures No 738,
March 19, 2002.
82
Carlos H. Conde, “Abu Sayyaf Hostage Crisis: Rangers, not
US-trained troops, figured in ‘rescue’ fight,” Bulatlat.com, June
9-15, 2002.
83
C.H. Briscoe, “Rescuing the Burnhams: the unspoken
30
SOCPAC mission,” Special Warfare, September 2004.
84
Mike Skinner, “The renaissance of unconventional warfare
as an SF mission,” Special Warfare, Winter 2002; United States
Special Operations Command, Special Operations Forces
Posture Statement, July 2003.
85
“Elite Australian troops to join hunt for JI terrorists in RP,”
Inquirer News Service, October 11, 2005
86
Greg Sheridan, “SAS in hunt for Asia’s terrorists,” October
18, 2006
87
Michaela P. del Callar, “RP, Australia ‘working’ on permanent
troops deployment in defense treaty,” The Daily Tribune,
October 5, 2006
88
Field Manual No.3-05.20, 1-15.
89
David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, “Restructuring Special
Operations Forces for Emerging Threats,” Strategic Forum
(Institite for National Strategic Studies, National Defense
University) No 219, January 2006.
90
US Army Field Manual 3-07-22
91
Field Manual No.3-05.20, glossary-5.
92
Statement of Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, U.S. Navy
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command Before the House Armed
Services Committee on U.S Pacific Command Posture, March
12, 2003.
93
Eric P. Wendt, “Strategic counterinsurgency modeling,”
Special Warfare, September 2005.
94
Cherilyn Walley, “Civil affairs: a weapon of peace on Basilan
Island, Special Warfare, September 2004
95
Jim Garamone, “Basilan: Before. After. After that?” American
Forces Press Service, June 3, 2002
96
Field Manual No.3-05.20, 1-21
97
Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Policy),
Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001 and 2006) in http://
www.defenselink.mil/qdr/; Office of the President, National
Security Strategy (2006), www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html;
Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy (2005),
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nds1.
pdf; Department of Defense, National Military Strategy (2004),
www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nms.pdf;
Office of the President, National Strategy to Combat Terrorism
(2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/
counter_terrorism/counter_terrorism_strategy.pdf.
98
National Strategy to Combat Terrorism, 17.
99
Quadrennial Defense Review 2001, 5.
Pia Lee-Brago, “U.S. Diplomat: Mindanao Could Be Next
100
Afghanistan” April 11, 2005; Nikko Dizon, “Ricciardone:
Cotabato doormat for terrorists,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, May
Focus on the Philippines
SPECIAL REPORTS
 Unconventional Warfare

12, 2005.

101
National Security Strategy, 8.

Office of the President, Transcript of Press Briefing with US

102

President George Bush, November 20, 2001.

103
National Strategy to Combat Terrorism,
24.

104
Quadrennial Defense Review 2006, vi.

Seymour Hersh, “The Coming Wars: What the Pentagon can

105

now do in secret,” The New Yorker, January 24-31, 2005

106
National Strategy to Combat Terrorism, 21.

quoted in G. John Ikenberry, “America’s Imperial Ambition,”

107

Foreign Affairs September/October 2002, Vol 81. No 5.

Barton Gellman, “Secret Unit Expands Rumsfeld’s Domain,”

108

Washington Post, January 23, 2005.

109
Quadrennial Defense Review 2006, 44.

110
Quadrennial Defense Review 2006, 55.

111
Quadrennial Defense Review 2001, 26.

112
Quadrennial Defense Review, vi.

113
Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, Testimony to
Senate Armed Service Committee, Washington D.C., September
23, 2004.

Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, “Regarding the Defense Global

114

Forces Posture Review,” Testimony before the Senate Armed

Services Committee, September 23, 2004.

Overseas Basing Commission, Report to the President and

115

Congress, August 15, 2005, H11.

Army Magazine, “News Call,” January 1, 2003; Manny

116

Mogato, “RP, US sign Mutual Logistics Support Agreement,”

Cyberdyaryo, November 22, 2002.

117
Field Manual No.3-05.20, 1-11.

118
Stanley A. Weiss, “After Iraq, a New US Military Model,”
International Herald Tribune, December 27, 2006.

119
Quadrennial Defense Review 2006, 23.

C.H. Briscoe, “Why the Philippines? ARSOF’s expanded

120

mission in the war on terror”, Special Warfare, September 2004.

121
National Military Strategy 2004, 10.

Focus on the Philippines 31

SPECIAL REPORTS
Training Days
JOINT EXERCISES BETWEEN US AND FILIPINO TROOPS
1992 to 2006
Despite the closure of US military bases in the Philippines in 1992, US troops have still been regularly deploying to the Philippines to take part in joint exercises with Filipino troops. The
frequency of these exercises increased significantly after the 1998 signing of the Visiting Forces Agreement. Since 2002, around 17 to 24 exercises were held annually.1 In 2006, the US and
Philippine governments announced that a total of 37 joint exercises will be held throughout the year.2 They last between a few days to as long as six months. The table below lists only those
known exercises based on available newspaper clippings and military websites. Where different information from various clippings on one exercise are found, the ones with the most details
are used. The number of troops involved is not constant throughout duration of each exercise.
CODENAME DURATION NUMBER OF US TROOPS INVOLVED LOCATION OF EXERCISES NOTES
BALIKATAN ‘92 19 to 30 October 1992 600 US soldiers Nueva Ecija, Cavite 3
BALIKATAN ‘93 18 October 1992 1,300 US soldiers Not stated 4
(end date not stated)
PALAH ‘95 – 02 18 or19 July 1995 2 US Navy Officers, 13 US Marines Palawan 5
(end date not stated)
CARAT ’98 5 August 1998 Not stated Zambales 6
(end date not stated)
CARAT ‘99 3 May to 1 June 1999 Not stated Not stated 7
PALAH ’99-01 3 to 21 May 1999 Unspecified number from the US Navy Not stated 8
MARSURVEX 1 June 1999 Not stated Not stated 9
(end date not stated)
CODENAME DURATION NUMBER OF US TROOPS INVOLVED LOCATION OF EXERCISES NOTES

10
BALIKATAN 2000 28 January to 3 March 2000 Around 2,500 US soldiers Zambales, Pampanga, Palawan,
Cavite, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija

11
CARAT 2000 13 to 27 June 2000 2,000 US soldiers Cavite, Zambales, Nueva Ecija,
Manila

12
MARSURVEX 25 to 29 September 2000 Not stated Not stated

13
FLASH PISTON 007 4 to 25 August, 2000 17 to 20 US Navy Seals Cebu

14
TEAK PISTON 6 November 2001 (for two 90 US soldiers Cebu
weeks)

15
BALIKATAN 02-01 (*) 31 January to 31 July 2002 Between 660 to 1,300 US troops, Basilan
including 160-250 from the Special
Forces, 340 US and Navy engineers
16
BALIKATAN 02-02 22 April to 6 May 2002 2,600 US soldiers Various parts of Luzon
(**)

17
BALIKATAN 03-01 Announced February 2003 1,700 to 3,000 US troops, including Sulu and Zamboanga City
(***) but was postponed; this was 350 Special Operations forces in Sulu
supposed to go on “until both
sides agree it is finished”
18
PIX 03 3 February 2003 (for three 700 US Marines Cavite
weeks)

19
BALIKATAN 2004 23 February to 7 March 2004 700 to 2,500 US troops Palawan, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija,
Cavite, Aurora, and Batanes
CODENAME DURATION NUMBER OF US TROOPS INVOLVED LOCATION OF EXERCISES NOTES
BALANCE PISTON 26 July to 13 August 2004 Unspecified number from US Marine North Cotabato 20
04-3 Battalion Landing Team 6 and US
Special Forces group
PALAH 04-01 5 August to December 31 2004 Unspecified number from US Navy No specified 21
Seals
MARSURVEX 04-04 “Lined up for fourth quarter” of Not specified Not specified 22
2004
BALANCE PISTON 31 January to 18 February 2005 7 US Special Forces Unit Nueva Ecija 23
05-01
BALIKATAN 2005 21 February 2005 (end date not 300 US troops Not specified 24
stated)
BALANCE PISTON 11 April to 5 May 2005 28 US troops Basilan 25
OS-6
BALIKATAN 21 April to 5 May 2005 Not specified Not specified 26
CARAT 16 to 23 August 2005 Around 1,200 US sailors Manila, Zambales, and Palawan 27
PHILBLEX 16 October 2005 (two weeks) 500 US Marines (will also participate in Pampanga, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija 28
Talon Vision) Cavite
TALON VISION 16 to 26 October 2005 4,500 US marines and sailors Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Zambales, 29
and AMPHIBIOUS including US Navy Task Force 76 and Cavite, Tarlac
LANDING EXERCISE Amphibuous Squadron 11)
PHILBLEX ‘06 22 to 26 October 2005 3,300 Marines from 31st Marine Zambales 30
Expeditionary Unit
 CODENAME DURATION NUMBER OF US TROOPS INVOLVED LOCATION OF EXERCISES NOTES

31
BALANCE PISTON 3 November to 2 December 2005 Not specified Zamboanga del Sur
06-01

32
BALANCE PISTON 17 January to 17 February 2006 30 US soldiers North Cotabato
06-02

33
BALIKATAN 2006 20 February to 5 March 2006 5,500 US soldiers Cavite, Pampanga Nueva Ecija,
Sulu

34
CARAT 2006 15 August 2006 (one week) 2,000 US soldiers from US Navy Zambales, La Union

35
PHILBLEX October 2006 (two weeks, exact “not less 2,000” from US Marines Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Tarlac
dates not specified)

36
TALON VISION 16 to 31 October 2006 5,700 US Marines from 3rd Marine Tarlac, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija,
and AMPHIBIOUS Expeditionary Unit, the Essex Cavite, Zambales, Palawan
LANDING EXERCISE Expeditionary Strike Group, Marines
37
KAPIT BISIG Mentioned September 2006 Not specified Not specified

38
Not stated September 2006 (not specified) US Special Forces Basilan, Tawi-Tawi

ACRONYMS: PALAH - “Exercise Pandagat, Lupa, at Himpapawid”; CARAT - Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training; MARSURVEX - Maritime Survey
Exercise; PIX – Philippine; Interoperability Exchange; PHILBLEX - “Philippine Bilateral Exercise
Unconventional Warfare
* It is not clear from press reports what the difference is
between Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines and
Balikatan 02-1 because different officials say different
things and use the names interchangeably. Those who
were deployed as part of Operation Enduring Freedom-
Philippines were originally reported to also be taking
part in Balikatan 02-01. According to a US Army
historian, planners at the US Pacific Command thought
of Balikatan 02-1 as a “joint combined exercise,” not
a separate campaign of Operation Enduring Freedom.
(C.H. Briscoe, “Reflections and observations on ARSOF
operations during Balikatan 02-1” Special Warfare,
September 2004). Also, the 250 Special Forces reported to
be going to Sulu in early 2006 were reported to be part of
Balikatan 2006
** According to journalist Manny Mogato, this is different
from Balikatan 02-01; Balikatan 02-01, according to
GlobalSecurity.org, was a “purely training exercise” as
compared to Balikatan 02-2.
*** Announced February 2003 but was postponed;
this was supposed to go on “until both sides agree it is
finished”
36
Notes for table
1
Carolyn O. Arguillas, “Q and A with US Ambassador Francis
Ricciardone: ‘Ops-Intel-fusion is not spying’,”
MindaNews, February 28, 2005
2
Jojo Due, “Biggest RP-US military exercise starts next week,”
Philippine Business Daily Mirror, February 17, 2006; Ding
Cervantes, “5,500 US military personnel coming for Balikatan
2006, Philippine Star, February 17, 2006.
3
“Annual RP-US war exercise launched,” Inquirer, October 20,
1992; Cesar B. Cesar, “RP-US Exercise Balikatan ’92,” Pilipino
Reporter Magasin, November 15, 1992.
4
Cynthia Balana, “RP-US military exercise reels off today,”
Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 18, 1993.
5
“Linked to Spratly Now? US Commandos Train RP Troops,”
Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 24, 1995; Stella O. Gonzales and
Jerry Esplanada “De Villa plays down US training RP troops,”
Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 25, 1995
6
“RP, US Troops Conduct War Games Sans VFA,” Philippine
Star, August 6, 1998
7
www.navy.mil.ph
8
www.navy.mil.ph
9
www.navy.mil.ph
10
Darra Guineden, “Balikatan War Exercises End,” Philippine
Graphic, March 13, 2000; Tonette Orejas, “Balikatan Program
Protests to Greet RP-US Military Exercises,” Philippine Daily
Inquirer, January 14, 2000; Armand Nocum, “320 American
soldiers arrive for Balikatan” Philippine Daily Inquirer, February
13, 2000; Cythia D. Balana, “All set for Balikatan Phase 2,”
Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 18, 2000; “522 US soldiers
now here for joint military exercises,” Manila Bulletin, February
15, 2000; Hector Soto, “War games unaffected by all-out war
vs MILF” Manila Times, July 28, 2000; Aris R. Ilagan, “RP, US
open joint military exercises,” Manila Bulletin, January 29, 2000;
Roy Sinfuego, “AFP security ready for Balikatan 2000,” Manila
Bulletin, February 18, 2000; Fernan Marasigan, “4,800 RP, US
troopsa in Balikatan,” Today, January 25, 2000.
11
Jojo Due, “RP-US joint military exercise starts Tuesday,”
Today.
12
www.many.mil.ph
13
www.many.mil.ph; Philippine Headline News online, http://
www.Newsflash.org; Sol Jose Vanzi “RP Jurisdiction over US
Sailors Disputed”, Task Force Detainees of the Philippines,
www.tfdp.org; Rico Nuñez “Two Killed, I wounded During
US-RP Exercise.” Suzzane B. Salon, “Raps vs VFA participants
junked” Cebu Daily News online.
14
Jethro C. Dionisio, “Joint US-RP military exercises to be held
in Mactan in November,” Cyberdyaryo.com, October 16, 2001
Focus on the Philippines
SPECIAL REPORTS
 Unconventional Warfare

15
Steve Vogel, “Americans Arrive in Philippines U.S. Special
Forces To Aid Filipino Army In Threatened Areas,” Washington
Post, January 16, 2002; Fe B. Zamora, “All US troops will leave
on July 31, says Wurster,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 1,
2002; Pat Roque, “US Special Forces in Philippines,” Associated
Press, February 18, 2002; Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough,
“Philippine confusion,” Washington Times, February 8, 2002;
Eric Schmitt, “US combat force of 1700 is headed to the
Philippines,” New York Times, February 21, 2003; Bradley
Graham, “US Bolsters Philippine Force,” Washington Post,
February 21, 2003; Banlaoi, Rommel C., The War on Terrorism
September 27, 2005
29
“RP, US troops begin military exercises to strengthen anti-
terror drive,” SunStar, October 14, 2005; “500 GIs coming for
new war games,” Philippine Star, September 27, 2005; “US, Phils
to hold Two weeks of joint war games,” Agence France Press,
October 15, 2005; “4,500 US troops in RP for war games,”
Philippine Star, October 17, 2005; “US, Philippines kick off
largest annual military exercises,” Xinhuanet, October 22, 2005
“US, Philippines kick off largest annual military exercise,”
30

in Southeast Asia, (Manila: Rex Book Store, Inc, 2004); Xinhuanet, October 22, 2005
Manny Mogato, “The Name of the Game: Team Challenge,”
Newsbreak, April 15, 2002 31
“US troops moved around conflict zones for ‘civic action’ and
‘ops-intel fusion’,” Mindanews, January 7, 2006
Manny Mogato, “The Name of the Game: Team Challenge,”
16

Newsbreak, April 15, 2002; GlobalSecurity.org, “Operation 32

Enduring Freedom-Philippines” www.globalsecurity.org
17
Eric Schmitt, “US combat force of 1700 is headed to the
Philippines”, New York Times, February 21, 2003; Bradley
Graham, :US Bolsters Philippine Force,” Washington Post,
February 21, 2003.
18
Press Release from Marine Air Ground Task Force, February
3, 2003
19
“Balikatan 2004 – Improving Combat Readiness Between
Philippine and US Forces”, Asia Pacific Defense Forum, Spring
2004; Jofelle Tesorio, “RP-US war games end quietly,” March
8, 2004; Bebot Sison, Jr, “700 US troops arrive for ‘Balikatan
2002’”, Philippine Star, February 16, 2004.
“No time frame of US troops’ stay in Sulu, Mindanews,
January 17, 2006; “RP-US troops begin military exercises,”
Associated Press, January 17, 2006
33
Jojo Due, “Biggest RP-US military exercise starts next week,”
Philippine Business Daily Mirror, February 17, 2006; Ding
Cervantes, “5,500 US military personnel coming for Balikatan
2006, Philippine Star, February 17, 2006;“RP-US to conduct
war games amid ‘rape’ controvery, Philippine Daily Inquirer,
January 10, 2006; “No time frame of US troops’ stay in Sulu,
Mindanews, January 17, 2006
34
Bebot Sison, “RP-US Carat 2006 opens at Subic,” Philippine
Star, August 16, 2006
James Mananghaya, “RP, US Marines to hold Philblex,”
35

Philippine Star, August 9, 2006

20
Aquiles Zonio, “Sarangani eyed as site of joint US-RP
exercises,” SunStar, September 27. 2004; TJ Burgonio, “Joint Veronica Uy, “US-RP troops start war drills,” Inq7.net,
36

RP-US military exercises to continue despite strained ties,”
Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 19, 2004; Keith Bacongco,
“Students protest stay of US troops in campus hostel,” Today,
August 3, 2004; Al Jacinto, “Protest Greets Joint Philippine-US
Military Training Exercise,” Arab News. July 26, 2004; Karl B.
Kaufman, “RP-US military exercise begins on Monday,” Manila
Times, July 25, 2004
21
J Burgonio, “Joint RP-US military exercises to continue
despite strained ties,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 19, 2004
October 16, 2006; “5,700 US troops coming for war exercises in
Luzon,” Philippine Star, October 4, 2006.
37
James Mananghaya, “AFP: 6,000 troops now pursuing Sayyaf
chief, JI bombers,” Philippine Star, September 13, 2006
38
James Mananghaya, “AFP: 6,000 troops now pursuing Sayyaf
chief, JI bombers,” Philippine Star, September 13, 2006

22
TJ Burgonio, “Joint RP-US military exercises to continue
despite strained ties,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 19, 2004

“Philippine, US troops kick off joint military exercises,”

23

Xinhuanet, January 31, 2005

Teresa Cerojano, “US, Filipino troops start big exercise,”

24

Associated Press, February 21, 2005

25
“’Balikatan’” starts in Basilan,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, April
11, 2005.

26
2005 National Security Calendar

27
Anthony de Leon and Allan Macatuno, “US-RP war games
start; 1,200 US troops arrive,” Inq7.net, August 16, 2005

28
“500 GIs coming for new war games,” Philippine Star,

Focus on the Philippines 37

SPECIAL REPORTS
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