1 Alejandro Sanchez

615 Townsite Drive

2 Vista, CA 92084
760-681-4109
3 Plaintiff
4

6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
8 Alejandro Sanchez )
)
9 Plaintiff. ) Case No. 10cv0218 BEN WVG
) Judge: Hon. Roger T. Benitez
10 v. )
)
11 Superior Court of The State of California )
County of San Diego North County Division ) PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN
12 Civil Filling Clerks CARLOS; TONY; and ) OPPOSITION TO NORTH COUNTY
MARIE individually as well as in their Official ) HEALTH SERVICES (North County
13
capacity; Clerk Lynn Arthur individually as well ) Health Project Inc.) MOTION TO
as in her Official capacity; Clerk Reporter ) DISMISS
14 )
Jennifer Stark individually as well as in her )
15 Official capacity; Sergeant Thomas Cleary ) Date: April 19, 2010
individually as well as in his Official capacity; ) Time: 10:30 a.m.
16 Deputy Doug Sanders individually as well as in ) Courtroom: 3 (4th Floor)
his Official capacity; Supervisor Nancy Wikoff )
17 individually as well as in her Official capacity. )
NCHS supervisor Tiffani Mauro; Irma Cota ) Complaint filed: January 28, 2010
18
President and CEO, Phil Lenowsky Chief
19 Financial Officer, Kevin Ellis Chief Medical
Officer of the North County Health Services a
20 Private Non Profit Corporation, Board of Directors
of North County Health Services George E. Lopez
21 Chair, Melissa Brown Board Vice-Chair, Diane
Seaberg Secretary, Rick Martinez Treasurer,
22 Adriana Andres-Paulson Immediate Past Chair,
Andres Martin Board of Director, Clyde H. Beck
23
Jr. Board of Director, Emigdio Lopez-Ramirez
24 Board of Director, Shohre Zaheri Board of
Director, Walt Steffen Board of Director. North
25 County Health Services (North County Health
Project Incorporated). and does 1-100
26 Defendants
27

28

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 1 I.
2 SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION RULE 12 (b) (6)
3 The United States Supreme Court has noted that a complaint cannot be dismissed for failure to
4 state a claim unless the Plaintiff cannot prove or set facts that would entire him to relief.
5 Jack Clemens V. Del Norte County Unified school District 843 F. Supp. 583, *; 1994 U.S.
6 Dist. Lexis 792, **; 64 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P43, 168; 94 daily Journal DAR 2124
7 “A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim must be denied unless it appears that the
8 plaintiff can prove no set of facts, which would entitle him or her to relief. [**9]” Conley v.
9 Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 2L. Ed. 2d 80, 78 S. Ct. 99 (1957); Fidelity fin. Corp. v. Fed. Home
10 Loan Bank of San Francisco, 792 F 2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir.1986) cert, denied. 479 U.S. 1064, 93
11 L. Ed. 2d 998 107 S. Ct. 949 (1987). All material allegations in the complaint will be taken as true
12 and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
13 is a challenge to the sufficiency of the pleadings set forth in the complaint. “When a federal [*5]
14 court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint, before the reception of any evidence either by
15 affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a limited one. The issue is not whether a plaintiff
16 will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.”
17 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1974); Gilligan v. Jamco
18 Development Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1997). NL Ind., Inc v. Kaplan, 792 F. 2d 896,
19 898,(9th Cir. 1986) “Although the court is generally confined to consideration of the allegations in
20 the pleadings, when the complaint is accompanied by attached documents, such documents are
21 deemed part of the complaint and may be considered in evaluating the merits of a Rule 12 (b) (6)
22 motion.” Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F2d 1265, 1267, (9th Cir.), Cert. Denied sub nom.
23 Wyo. Community Dev. Auth. V. Durning, 484 U.S. 944, 98 L. Ed. 2d 358, 108 S. Ct. 330 (1987).
24 Therefore Plaintiff Alejandro Sanchez will submit attached exhibits in support of the
25 allegations in this complaint. On any other motion to dismiss under rule 12 (b) (6), the court may
26 consider matters outside the pleadings, but must accept as true all material allegations of the
27 complaint and construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff. See Fed. [**10] R. Civ. P. 12;
28 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490. 501-02, 45 L. Ed. Ed 343, 95 S. Ct. 2197 (1975) 397 F. Supp. 200,

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 1 * ; 1975 U.S. Dist. Lexis 11611,** in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,78 S. Ct.99, 2L. Ed. 2d 80
2 (1975) in which the Supreme Court state; [**3] “[In] appraising the sufficiency of the complaint
3 we follow, of course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state
4 a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
5 claim which would entitle him to relief.”
6 Based on the complaint, this court at this stage of the proceedings cannot say that plaintiff
7 will not be able to prove any set of facts that would entitle him to relief. Defendants’ motion
8 should therefore be denied. Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, this court should accept as true the
9 facts as alleged in the complaint, views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and
10 recognizes that dismissal is inappropriate "unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would
11 be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of his claim.” see
12 Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (explaining that dismissal for failure to state a
13 claim is proper "only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could
14 be proved consistent with the allegations").
15 II.
16 DEFENDANTS TIFFANI MAURO'S AND KEVIN ELLIS COURSE
17 OF ACTIONS WERE CONTRARY TO THE LAW
18 Plaintiff has and will repeat the facts in this document; Plaintiff is a disabled individual
19 within the meaning of the American with Disabilities Act Public Law 101-336 (42 U.S.C. Sec.
20 12101 et seq ) and the California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act. The Unruh Civil Rights Act subjects
21 to liability “[w]hoever denies, aids or incites a denial, or makes any discrimination or distinction
22 contrary to [the Act].” (Civ. Code, § 52, subd. (a).) Thus, liability under the Act for denying a
23 person the “full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services” of a
24 business establishment (Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (b)) extends beyond the business establishment
25 itself to the business establishment’s employees responsible for the discriminatory conduct.
26 The Supreme Court of California affirmed in North Coast Women's Care Medical Group Inc. v.
27 San Diego Superior Court; Benitez S142892/ Ct.App. 4/1 D045438 Filed 8/18/08 stated once
28 again that a public/private agency cannot deny medical services within the jurisdiction of the State

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 1 of California regardless of their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, or
2 medical condition are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities,
3 privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” (Civ. Code, § 51,
4 former subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 2000, ch. 1049.)
5 Plaintiff Alejandro Sanchez his wife and five children were patients of the North County
6 Health Services, "NCHS" for on or about fourteen years. Plaintiff had not filed a written
7 complaint until these current events. After the painting, pharmacy and the HINI vaccine events
8 Plaintiff filed a written complaint with the North County Health Services complaining about: (a).
9 NCHS employees were painting in the waiting area while patients were sitting down waiting to be
10 called to the rooms. (b). Plaintiff complained that he called the pharmacy several times to get the
11 medication for his children and every time he called the computers were down. (c). Plaintiff
12 complained that asthmatic or elderly people were not given priority over the HINI immunization.
13 NCHS sent Plaintiff a letter acknowledging the receipt of his complaints.
14 Immediately after Plaintiff complained, NCHS Chief Medical Officer Kevin Ellis sent the
15 letter to Plaintiff in acknowledgement of him complaint. Soon after NCHS defendants retaliated
16 against Plaintiff and on January 15, 2010 NCHS sent Plaintiff a letter which stated:
17
Dear, Mr. Sanchez
18 It is necessary to inform you that North County Health Services can no longer
provide services to you. Over the past several weeks you have been rude and
19 threatening to several staff members and it now appears that you are inappropriately
interested in one or more female staff at NCHS. the staff is concerned for their safety,
20
as you have been noticed driving around the parking lot at closing time when staff are
21 leaving. NCHS has filed a restraining order regarding this activity. If you are seen on
NCHS property in the future the police will be called and you will be removed.
22
We suggest that you find another provider for future medical care and services.
23

24 Enclosed please find an authorized form so that your medical records may be released
to health care provider of your choice. Please sign this and designate the name and
25 address of your physician and send it back to NCHS medical records department.
Once received, a copy of your records will be mailed to your physician.
26

27 Sincerely,
Kevin Ellis, D.O.
28 Chief Medical Officer

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 1 This letter violated the ADA and the Unruh Act because Defendants could not legally deny
2 him medical services because he complained about the standard of care at the North County
3 Health Services facilities (Exhibit 1). The statements made in this letter are slanderous
4 inflammatory lies, crafted with malice and with the intent to destroy Plaintiff Sanchez character,
5 integrity and reputation in the community. Plaintiff Sanchez had been a patient with good
6 standing for on or about (14) fourteen years. He had not filed any complaints against the NCHS
7 and as soon as he filed the written complaint about the three issues mentioned above NCHS
8 resorted to retaliatory, harmful and criminal acts against Plaintiff.
9 On January 15, 2010 Defendant Tiffani Mauro further violated Plaintiff's civil and statutory
10 rights by going into the Superior Court for the State of California North County Division and
11 filing an application for restraining order [WV-1 and WV-120]. The application was filed by
12 Tiffani Mauro Vice President of Operations for North County Health Services [page 4 of 4 of
13 WV-100 9 Rv. January 1, 2005].
14 Defendant Tiffani Mauro Vice President of Operations for North County Health Services filed
15 the applications on behalf of North County Health Services representing all employees of North
16 County Health Services (See Exhibit No. 16). North County Health Services is a 501C3 for Profit
17 Corporation. Tiffani Mauro is not a licensed attorney in the state of California to practice law and
18 represent a “Corporation.” Tiffani Mauro is not a licensed attorney to practice law in the State of
19 California to represent, “employees” of a Corporation. The Clerk of the Court for the Superior
20 Court of California, County of San Diego North County Division acquiesced in the violation by
21 accepting both [WV-1 and WV-120] application. The documents were entered on January 15,
22 2010 at 3:12 P.M. On the same day the temporary order for a restraining order was signed and
23 dated January 15, 2010 by Judge Adrienne A. Orefield .
24 Judge Orefield ordered North County Health Services to serve the documents on Plaintiff
25 Sanchez on January 15, 2010. Tiffani Mauro failed to serve the documents as ordered by Judge
26 Orefield. Instead of serving the documents as order by Judge Orefield Tiffani Mauro states in her
27 declaration, "after I left the courtroom, I realized that I had attached the (4) four pages of internal
28 notes to my Application. These notes are confidential business records of NCHS, and I did not

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 1 intended to make them a part of the public record. I requested the sheriff's department not to serve
2 the documents until I could resolve the issue regarding the four (4) pages of internal notes. On
3 January 19, 2010 I returned to the Court and requested that the internal notes be returned and not
4 be made part of the public record. the clerk informed me that I would have to file a motion and
5 have the issue decided by judge. " (Exhibit 2)
6 To start, Defendant Mauro showed up to court and presented documents in support of her TRO
7 to the judge. At no time does the court clerks or the Court note that there is something
8 fundamentally wrong with the situation. First Defendant Tiffani Mauro shows up and files a TRO
9 on behalf of a, "CORPORATION, EMPLOYEES of the CORPORATION" along with her minor
10 son without a license to practice law. Second she submits documents in support of her TRO and
11 states that these documents are statements of Plaintiff, "conduct" by other employees. Defendant
12 Tiffani Mauro does not state the conduct which would require the Superior Court to grant her a
13 Restraining Order against Plaintiff except to claim that, "Mr. Sanchez has been calling the office
14 frequently and harassing the NCHS employees by reputedly asking for me.1" Yet Defendant
15 Tiffani Mauro fails to state the dates, time or months of the events. This is important because if
16 any of these statements were true, Defendant Tiffani Mauro as well as the NCHS would have filed
17 a police report and would have provided a copy of the video tape to the police and the Superior
18 Court attached with her declarations.2 Defendant Tiffani Mauro also states in her declaration, "I
19 saw him driving around in the parking lot outside the building as I was leaving work, and he made
20 'eye contact' with me. To began she does not state what day or time of this "eye contact" incident.
21 Then she changes her mind and asks for the records back. Defendant Tiffani Mauro makes no
22 specific allegations of what type of, "conduct" was threatening to her. Was Plaintiff filing of a
23 complaint against NCHS threatening to her?3 It appears that Defendant Tiffani Mauro is merely
24

25
1
26
See Declaration of Tiffani Mauro page 2 or 3.
2
27
The NCHS has video cameras throughout the facility . As a supervisor she had access to make a
copy of the video tapes. Further the NCHS could have made the tape available to the Superior
28 court.
3
California Code of Civil Procedure Section 527.8

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 1 reciting a booklet on how to get a restraining order but makes no mention of any actual acts or
2 conduct she alleges were threatening to her. Further Defendant Tiffani Mauro submits no facts to
3 support her allegations of threatening conduct, no video tapes from NCHS office or police reports.
4 Defendant Mauro states in her declarations, "the clerk informed me that I would have to file a
5 motion and have the issue decided by a judge." Why would the "clerk" not ask Defendant if she
6 was an attorney to practice law in the state of California or why she was filing on behalf of the
7 Corporation, employees or her minor son? Why would the Superior Court Clerk not let Defendant
8 Tiffani Mauro know that she could not give her legal advice and she should consult an attorney?
9 After this fiasco NCHS Attorney Sandoval makes an appearance and files an ex parte to retrieve
10 the documents which the Court states are damaging to the, "Corporation" (Exhibit 3).
11 Attorney Sandoval's Memorandum and declaration which were never sent to Plaintiff Sanchez
12 nor were they made available to him, the many times he went to the Superior Court to view the
13 file against him.4 the Memorandum submitted to the Superior Court states that the (4) four
14 documents were, "memorialize discussions between various staff members about how to address
15 concerns regarding Defendant." Attorney Sandoval further states, "documents should be returned
16 because it harbors serious concerns for the safety of its employees should the signed temporary
17 restraining order and notice of the upcoming notice to show cause....such notes are irrelevant to a
18 termination on the merits of a request for a temporary restraining order or subsequent injunction."
19

20
(2) "Credible threat of violence" is a knowing and willful statement or course of conduct that
21 would place a reasonable person in fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate
family, and that serves no legitimate purpose.
22
(3) "Course of conduct" is a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of
23 time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose, including following or stalking an
employee to or from the place of work; entering the workplace; following an employee during
24 hours of employment; making telephone calls to an employee; or sending correspondence to an
25
employee by any means, including, but not limited to, the use of the public or private
mails, interoffice mail, fax, or computer e-mail.
26 (c) This section does not permit a court to issue a temporary restraining order or injunction
prohibiting speech or other activities that are constitutionally protected, or otherwise protected
27 by Section 527.3 or any other provision of law.
28 4
Plaintiff Sanchez finally received a copy of the ex parte memorandum and declarations of
Defendant Tiffani Mauro and NCHS attorney Cynthia Sandoval on or about March 25, 2010.

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 1 Notes and declarations are certainly, "relevant" in determining a cause for a restraining order
2 (Exhibit 4). 5 All documents in this case should have never been sealed, (Exhibit 6) Plaintiff never
3 had a opportunity to view the records or any moving papers filed against him in Superior Court.
4 NCHS defendants have made many libelous and egregious defamatory allegations against Plaintiff
5 and sought to file them under seal. Never affording the Plaintiff an opportunity to defend himself
6 against these allegations which are unknown to him. Defendants have made statements like,
7 "loitering, hounding, disturbing behavior, inappropriate, rude, threatening...." Yet never
8 providing a shred of evidence to any of these egregious libelous and unfounded accusations.
9 NCHS could have provided a copy of the video tape to prove any and all of their allegation,
10 yet have failed to even provide a copy of a video tape6. In her Declaration NCHS attorney
11 Sandoval further states that, "it is believed that these employees could be placed in danger should
12 their identities be disclosed, and they could very well be subjected to the same type of behavior
13 which resulted in the granting of the present temporary restraining order.....further NCHS will be
14 prejudiced is the confidential records are disclosed .....The embarrassment resulting from this
15 episode could prove damaging to its operations."
16 III.
17 ALL DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE UNDER SUPEVISOR LIABILITY
18 Defendants, Irma Cota, Phil Lenowsky, Kevin Ellis George E. Lopez, Melissa Brown, Diane
19 Seaberg, Rick Martinez, Adriana Andres-Paulson, Andres Martin, Clyde H. Beck Jr., Emigdio
20 Lopez-Ramirez, Shohre Zaheri, Walt Steffen, are personally liable for all the violations committed
21 in the establishment in which they all hold a supervisor capacity and liability positions.
22 Therefore under the American with Disabilities Act Public Law 101-336 (42 U.S.C. Sec.
23 12101 et seq ) and the California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, the Health Insurance Portability and
24 Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 (P.L.104-191) [HIPAA], Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
25

26

27
5
Memorandum was submitted without a cover sheet, accepted by the Superior Court Clerks.
28
6
NCHS has cameras inside the facility and outside.

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 1 Defendants are all liable. 7 Hansen 885 F.2d 642, 646, (9th Cir. 1989) U.S. App. Lexus 13906
2 [*646] Clearly states, “On any theory of vicarious liability, See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475
3 U.S. 469, 479, 89 L. Ed. 2d 452, 106, S. Ct. 1292 (1986). A supervisor may be liable if there exists
4 either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation. Or (2) a sufficient
5 casual connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.
6 Thompkins v. Belt 828 F. 2d 298, 303,-04 (5th Cir. 1987) Supervisory liability exists even without
7 overt personal participation in the offensive act if supervisory officials implement a policy so
8 deficient that the policy “itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights” and is “the moving force of
9 the constitutional violations.”
10 Defendants Kevin Ellis, and Tiffani Mauro were personally involved and they both hold
11 supervisory capacity positions of employment at the NCHS offices. Irma Cota, Phil Lenowsky,
12 George E. Lopez, Melissa Brown, Diane Seaberg, Rick Martinez, Adriana Andres-Paulson,
13 Andres Martin, Clyde H. Beck Jr., Emigdio Lopez-Ramirez, Shohre Zaheri, Walt Steffen, are
14 equally responsible for not creating policies, practices and procedures that would protect the rights
15 of patients, established the policies aliened with state and federal equal protection laws, establish
16 policies that would protect patients privacy under HIPAA establish policies to protect the health
17 and safety of patients. Instead all above named Defendants resorted to egregious and retaliatory
18 actions which have caused Plaintiff irreparable harm.
19 Plaintiff Sanchez is very involved in the Community of Townsite Barrio, community members
20 have a lot of respect for Plaintiff. Community members look up to Plaintiff and seek his advise in
21 matters of civil rights, education, housing, immigration and other advocacy matters. Plaintiff
22 Sanchez is very involved in his church and teachers the bible classes to children in the barrio.
23 Plaintiff Sanchez is a member of DLAC a school district Language Acquisition Committee at the
24
7
25 The Unruh Civil Rights Act subjects to liability “[w]hoever denies, aids or incites a denial, or
makes any discrimination or distinction contrary to [the Act].” (Civ. Code, § 52, subd. (a).) Thus,
26 liability under the Act for denying a person the “full and equal accommodations, advantages,
27
facilities, privileges, or services” of a business establishment (Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (b)) extends
beyond the business establishment itself to the business establishment’s employees responsible for
28 the discriminatory conduct.

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 1 Vista Unified School District, he attends and is very active in school board meetings, city of Vista
2 meetings, he is very involved with his five children's separate schools and is a very respectable
3 member and fine example for other men in the Townsite Barrio. Plaintiff Sanchez attends various
4 civic or school meetings almost every night of the week in the afternoon, during the day he meets
5 with people and is a current daily visitor at the Vista Courthouse and law library. Plaintiff can
6 account for every day of his where about and what meetings he attended on which day of the
7 week. Plaintiff Sanchez has always been accompanied by his wife when he visited the NCHS and
8 most of the time by his daughter Ivonne an adult residing with Plaintiff, his wife and his four
9 children. E.g. Schwartz v. Snhomish County, Case No. C05-7538P, Slip op. 2006 WL 692024
10 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 17,2006) in support of Hansen 885 F.2d 642, 646 heightens pleading but E.g.
11 Schwartz [*11] “the Ninth Circuit Court has noted that “[s]upervisory liability exists even without
12 overt personal participation in the offensive act if supervisory officials implement a policy so
13 deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiations of constitutional rights’ and the moving force is a
14 constitutional violation.”’ Hansen 885 F.2d 646.
15 IV.
16 NORTH COUNTY HEALTH SERVICES AND THEIR AGENTS ARE LIABLE
17 UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT BECAUSE THEIR
18 REVENUES ARE GOVENMENT FUNDS.
19 (Third Cause of action)
20 A. As explained above under the laws and statutes of the American with Disabilities Act
21 Public Law 101-336 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 12101 et seq), the California’s Unruh Civil Rights
22 Act, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 (P.L.104-
23 191) [HIPAA], and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act Defendants are all liable.
24 B. NCHS is not a government entity but they are recipients of public funds, 50% come from
25 Medical, 22% from programs and grants, 14% from health outreach programs, 8% self
26 pay, 4% private insurance and 2% miscellaneous.
27 When a recipient of state and federal funds accepts funds they sign a contractual agreement with
28 state and federal agencies (charter). One of the conditions of acceptance of state and federal

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 1 grants is the nondiscriminatory provisions, fiduciary duties in the contractual agreement. Even
2 without the agreement Defendants of NCHS are doing business in the state of California. As the
3 California Supreme Court clarified in North Coast Women's Care Medical Group Inc. v. San
4 Diego Superior Court; Benitez S142892/ Ct.App. 4/1 D045438 Filed 8/18/08.8
5 "public/private agency cannot deny medical services within the jurisdiction of the State of
6 California regardless of their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, or
7 medical condition are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities,
8 privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” (Civ. Code, § 51,
9 former subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 2000, ch. 1049.)"
10 The Statutes mean just what they say Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948,
11 at 464-66.
12 V.
13 CRIMINAL CONDUCT IS NOT PROTECTED UNDER CALIFORNIA LITIGATION
14 (Fourth Cause of Action)
15 Anti-SLAPP Motion "ASM" is not available to a defendant who claims that the plaintiff's cause
16 of action arises from defendant's protected activity when that activity is illegal as a matter of law
17 and thus not protected by constitutional government entities and not viewed as free speech and
18 petition. Flatery v. Mauro (2006) 39 c 4th 299, 320, 46 Cr 3d 606. Communication that that
19 constituted criminal extortion as a matter of law was not protected activity under Anti-SLAPP
20 law; whether defendant's conduct was illegal as a matter of law is primary part inquiry in ASM
21 analysis. Paul for council v. hanyecz (2001) 85 CA 4th 1356, 102 CR2d 864 disapproved on other
22 grounds Equilan Enters v. Consumer Cause. Inc. 124 CR 2d 507.
23

24 8
Relevant in this case, the statutes require business establishments to provide “full and equal
25 accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services” to all persons. “For purposes of
the free speech clause, simple obedience to a law that does not require one to convey a verbal or
26 symbolic message cannot reasonably be seen as a statement of support for the law or its
27
purpose. Such a rule would, in effect, permit each individual to choose which laws he would obey
merely by declaring his agreement or opposition.” (Catholic Charities, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp.
28 558-559.)

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 1 Certainly not even Defendants can believe their actions were within the boundaries of the law.
2 After Plaintiff sent a letter to NCHS and complained about (a). NCHS staff painting the waiting
3 area while his asthmatic children and other patients were sitting waiting to be called.
4 (b). Pharmacy's computer always down and medications not being dispensed. (c). That asthmatic
5 and elderly were not given priority for the HINI vaccine.
6 Kevin Ellis, D.O. Chief Medical Officer retaliated against Plaintiff First Amendment Right to
7 complain (free speech) by sending him a letter informing Plaintiff that NCHS, "can no longer
8 provide services to you..." Further accusing Plaintiff of being rude and threatening and having
9 inappropriate conduct and interest in female NCHS staff..."
10 In Gadant v. City of Carson (2005) 128 C4th 705, 27 CR 3d 318. The Court found that a
11 Plaintiff who alleged that she was defamed by false statements in connection with wrongful
12 termination established through declarations probability of success on a defamation claim.
13 NCHS, Kevin Ellis, D.O. Chief Medical Officer further actions became more egregious when
14 Defendant Tiffani Mauro took the libel accusations against Plaintiff to Superior Court and filed
15 for a TRO on behalf of the Corporation, on behalf of the employees of the Corporation and on
16 Behalf of her son without a license to practice law in the state of California in furtherance of their
17 illegal acts against plaintiff and violations of his rights under American with Disabilities Act
18 Public Law 101-336 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 12101 et seq), the California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, the
19 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 (P.L.104- 191) [HIPAA]9,
20 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. Plaintiff Sanchez has shown probability of success on the
21 claims brought against the NCHS and its named Defendants because his allegations are true and
22 can be proven by the declarations and exhibits in submission to this Court. Wilbanks v. Wolk
23 (2004) 121 C 4TH 883, 17 CR 3 497. "Sufficient evidence presented to establish prima facie
24 claim for statutory damages under pen C §632.7 based on news broadcast using improper secret
25 recordings." Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 C4th 82, 92, 124, CR 2d 530) the focus of Anti-
26 SLAPP " is not the form of the Plaintiff's cause of action but, rather, the defendant's activity that
27 gives rise to his or her asserted liability-and whether that activity constitutes protected speech of
28

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 1 petitioning" (see Leegin Creative Leather Prods. Inc. v. Diaz (2005) 131 CA 4th 1517, 33 CR 3d.
2 139 (fraudulent workers compensation claim). Therefore, this Court must find that NCHS
3 defendants activities and conduct were illegal and not within the protection of free speech or
4 litigation privilege.
5 VI.
6 PLAINTIFF HARRASMENT AND RETALIATION CLAIMS ARE VADID CLAIMS
7 (Fifth Cause of Action)
8 Defendants reliance on Scripps Clinic v. Superior Court, 108 Ca. App. 4th 917 (2003) is
9 misguided for these reasons:
10 First: Scripps clinic as a private clinic has a contractual agreement with Health Net PPG.
11 Health Net PPG Operations Manual, which governs the contractual relationship between Scripps
12 and Health Net, stated that a patient may be terminated for one instance of the following behavior:
13 fraud, disruptive or abusive behavior, dangerous behavior, and receipt of a notice of intent to sue.
14 Patient Thompson sued Scripps and Scripps terminated her. To start with NCHS is a private, non-
15 profit organization that provides primary health care services to the underserved in North County
16 San Diego County10 even by Defendants own accounts (see Tiffani Mauro Declaration).
17 NCHS is a recipients of public funds, 50% come from Medical, 22% from programs and
18 grants, 14% from health outreach programs, 8% self pay, 4% private insurance and 2%
19 miscellaneous. On 4% of NCHS revenues come from private insurance. Since over 86% of
20 NCHS revenues come from federal funds (Exhibit 6 ) NCHS has a contractual agreement with
21 the United States Department of Human Services, The Joint Commission on Accreditation of
22 Healthcare Organizations, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), Tri City Medical
23 Center, Scripps Hospital, Palomar Hospital and other agencies. All of these regulatory agencies
24 require NCHS to adhere to state and federal anti-discrimination, anti-retaliation, anti-harassment
25

26

27 9
Defendant Tiffani Mauro used Plaintiff medical records in the application for TRO without
28 Plaintiff's consent knowledge or authorization.
10
See Tiffani Mauro's Declaration

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 1 and a strong prohibition against patient dumping11. NCHS is viewed as a clinic of last resort to
2 many Medical, Medicare, self pay, and uninsured. NCHS is not a private lucrative clinic and it
3 does not have contractual agreements with private insurance like Scripps but rather public
4 contracts.
5 Second: North Coast Women's Care Medical Group Inc. v. San Diego Superior Court;
6 Benitez S142892/ Ct.App. 4/1 D045438 Filed 8/18/08 supersedes Scripps v. Superior Court 108
7 Ca. App. 4th 917 (2003). In North Coast Women's Care Medical Group Inc the California
8 Supreme Court clarified that patient dumping even in a private clinic under private insurance
9 contracts was unacceptable and illegal in violation of the California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act.
10 NCHS retaliated by drummed up charges of disruptive and inappropriate behavior against Plaintiff
11 Sanchez for complaining about the paint, pharmacy, and HINI immunizations. Harassing and
12 defaming Plaintiff even to go as far as going into Superior Court and made those charges public
13 and with the intent to cause Plaintiff Sanchez irreparable harm.
14 VII.
15 PLAINTIFF HAS A RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER THE ADA
16 Title II Of The American With Disability Act 42 U.S.C. § 1213, 12132, 12132 :
17 (Sixth Cause of Action)
18 42 U.S.C. § 12131. Definitions (2) Qualified individual with a disability
19
The term “qualified individual with a disability” means an individual with a disability who,
20
with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of
21
architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and
22

23

24 11
North Coast Women's Care Medical Group Inc. v. San Diego Superior Court; Benitez S142892/
25
Ct.App. 4/1 D045438 Filed 8/18/08 stated once again that a public/private agency cannot deny
medical services within the jurisdiction of the State of California regardless of their sex, race,
26 color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, or medical condition are entitled to the full and
equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments
27 of every kind whatsoever.” (Civ. Code, § 51, former subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 2000, ch.
28
1049.) American with Disabilities Act Public Law 101-336 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 12101 et seq), the
California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) of 1996 (P.L.104- 191) [HIPAA]

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 1 services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation
2 in programs or activities provided by a public entity.
3 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Discrimination
4
Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by

5
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the

6
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such

7
entity.
42 U.S.C. § 12133. Enforcement
8
The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in section 794a of title 29 shall be the remedies,
9
procedures, and rights this subchapter provides to any person alleging discrimination on the basis
10
of disability in violation of section 12132 of this title.
11
One again since, NCHS is a recipients of public funds, 50% come from Medical, 22% from
12
programs and grants, 14% from health outreach programs, 8% self pay, 4% private insurance
13
and 2% miscellaneous. On 4% of NCHS revenues come from private insurance. Since over 86%
14
of NCHS revenues come from federal funds. NCHS has a contractual agreement with the United
15
States Department of Human Services, The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
16
Organizations, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), Tri City Medical Center,
17
Scripps Hospital, Palomar Hospital and other agencies. All of these regulatory agencies require
18
NCHS to adhere to state and federal anti-discrimination, anti-retaliation, anti-harassment and a
19
strong prohibition against patient dumping. NCHS dumped, discriminated, retaliated and defamed
20
Plaintiff with egregious accusations of inappropriate conduct, stocking NCHS employees because
21
Plaintiff complained about the (a). Paint (b). pharmacy and (c). HINI vaccine. In violation of
22
American with Disabilities Act Public Law 101-336 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 12101 et seq), the
23
California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
24
(HIPAA) of 1996 (P.L.104- 191) [HIPAA].
25
///
26
///
27
///
28
//

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 1 VIII.
2 ALL NCHS DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE FOR VIOLATING
3 PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
4 (Seventh Cause of Action)
5 NCHS is a recipients of public funds, 50% come from Medical, 22% from programs and
6 grants, 14% from health outreach programs, 8% self pay, 4% private insurance and 2%
7 miscellaneous. On 4% of NCHS revenues come from private insurance. Since over 86% of
8 NCHS revenues come from federal funds. NCHS has a contractual agreement with the United
9 States Department of Human Services, The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
10 Organizations, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), Tri City Medical Center,
11 Scripps Hospital, Palomar Hospital and other agencies. Plaintiff Sanchez complained about the
12 (a). Paint (b). Pharmacy (c). HINI immunizations.
13 Plaintiff had a first amendment constitutionally protected right to complain and express his
14 dissatisfaction about the low standard of care his children were receiving without the fear of
15 retaliation, harassment, defamation of his character and to be dumped as a patient of the NCHS.
16 Plaintiff was damaged and defamed by NCHS slanderous and libel accusations and NCHS
17 egregious acts caused irreparable harm because Plaintiff is well known and respected in his
18 Townsite community.
19 All of the regulatory agencies the NCHS has contractual agreements with require NCHS to
20 adhere to state and federal anti-discrimination, anti-retaliation, anti-harassment a strong
21 prohibition against patient dumping, and the protection of Patients first amendment speech to
22 complain and file complaints against their health care providers.
23 IX.
24 NCHS NEEDS A PERMANENT INJUNCTION AGAINST PATIENT
25 DUMPING AND MUZZLING PATIENTS FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS.
26 (Eighth Cause of Action)
27 Defendants egregious actions and conduct of slandering, defaming and placing Plaintiff in a
28 negative light in his community. In addition by placing these egregious inflammatory actions in

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 1 court documents for public publication and view has caused Plaintiff irreparable harm to his
2 character and has caused grievous stress, loss of sleep, and embarrassment. Plaintiff had a fight to
3 complain and file a written complaint to NCHS administration.
4 X.
5 CONCLUSION
6 Plaintiff Sanchez hereby requests that this court deny NCHS motion to dismiss in its entirety.
7 Further that the punitive damages are necessary because NCHS Defendants knew and should have
8 known of that when they signed to contractual agreement to receive 86% of their revenues in
9 federal funds they also signed a contractual agreement with the federal government to create
10 strong anti-discrimination, anti-retaliation, anti-harassment policies, practices and procedures.
11 Further, a complaint procedure policy, with instructions and forms as required by federal law.
12 NCHS arrogance in claiming that they are a private agency and they don't have to comply with
13 state and federal regulations is silly at best and dangerous for patient care and safety.
14 North Coast Women's Care Medical Group Inc. v. San Diego Superior Court; Benitez S142892/
15 Ct.App. 4/1 D045438 Filed 8/18/08 stated once again that a public/private agency cannot deny
16 medical services within the jurisdiction of the State of California regardless of their sex, race,
17 color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, or medical condition are entitled to the full and
18 equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments
19 of every kind whatsoever.” (Civ. Code, § 51, former subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 2000, ch.
20 1049.) American with Disabilities Act Public Law 101-336 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 12101 et seq), the
21 California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
22 (HIPAA) of 1996 (P.L.104- 191) [HIPAA].
23 Dated: March 31, 2010
24 __________________
25 Alejandro Sanchez
26

27

28

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