SPE 89775

Analysis of an Annular Pressure Buildup Failure during Drill Ahead

P. D. Pattillo, SPE, BP America; B. W. Cocales, SPE, BP America; S. C. Morey, SPE, BP America

Copyright 2004, Society of Petroleum Engineers Inc.

This paper was prepared for presentation at the SPE Annual Technical Conference and
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Abstract
While drilling ahead in salt on the Pompano A-31 (Gulf of
Mexico) wellbore below the 16 in. shoe, the rotary stalled
abruptly and the drill pipe simultaneously became stuck.
Subsequent calipers indicated the 16 in. casing to be deformed
onto the drill pipe at approximately 250 ft.
To the authors' knowledge, this represents the first instance
of an annular pressure buildup (APB) failure during drilling.
APB is typically associated with extremes of temperature
change resulting from production operations. In the current
instance, the temperature change was solely from circulating
drilling fluid.
The manuscript provides a detailed post-analysis of the 16
in. casing failure:
An overview of the conventional casing design for
this well, indicating that normal operating conditions
should not have resulted in a failure;
A review of the failure event, substantiated by field
measurement and photographs;
An investigation of APB associated with
inadvertently closing the 16 in. casing annulus at the
surface, demonstrating the magnitude of thermally
induced pressure load that can result;
Consideration of an alternate failure mode, column
buckling, to demonstrate that this failure mode was
not active in this wellbore;
A finite element model of the drill pipe/16 in.
casing/20 in. casing trio indicating that, in addition to
collapse of the 16 in. casing and subsequent sticking
of the drill string, the outer 20 in. casing was also
damaged by the event.
The latter item is particularly important in that damage to
outer strings can be easily overlooked as one concentrates on
the collapsed casing and drill pipe fish. Damage to the outer
20 in. string is confirmed by a mechanical caliper.

Conclusions in the paper center on confirmation of the

postulated failure mode by field measurement and
recommendations for avoiding such an event.
Introduction
While drilling ahead at 9132 ft. on the Pompano A-31
wellbore (Vioska Knoll 989 A-31, OCS-G-6898) below the 16
in. shoe (Fig. 1), the rotary stalled abruptly and the drill pipe
simultaneously became stuck. An increase of mud flow out of
the flow line surged over the gumbo buster.
Approximately 500 psi pressure was bled off the 16 in. x
20 in. annulus. The fluid initially recovered from the 16 in. x
20 in. annulus was a clear 10 ppg brine, but later changed to a
10.5 ppg synthetic based mud composition tantamount to the
fluid placed above the cement top in the 16 in. annulus.
Casing

MD/TVD

TOC

Schematic

1233

26 in.

1486/1486

20 in.

4052/4050

16 in.

6212/6210

9132/8877
Fig. 1 - Schematic of Pompano A-31 at Time of Failure, All Depths
in Ft RKB

Tripping the drill string out of the hole required 60-100

kips at each 8-3/8 in. HWDP tool joint and 150 kips at the
uppermost 14-1/2 in. stabilizer. Recovery of subsequent
stabilizers and the remaining seven joints of HWDP was aided
with drilling jars.
A caliper logging tool set for a maximum diameter of 113/4 in. tagged an obstruction at 253 ft. Logging upward, the
caliper showed damage from 242-253 ft. The wellbore was
temporarily abandoned with four cement plugs. Subsequent to
plugging the well, pressure testing indicated communication
between the 16 in. and 20 in. casing strings.
The 16 in. casing was cut at 1399 ft. and pulled. The
remaining 16 in. riser stub, along with the Dril-Quip hanger
running tool, were recovered to 1485 ft. A caliper was then
run in the 20 in. casing indicating damaged casing from 253280 ft. (maximum inside diameter 20.387 in. at 272 ft. see
Fig. 10).
Figs. 2 and 3 illustrate the condition of the 16 in. casing
recovered from the vicinity of the obstruction. The ovalized
cross section appears adjacent to a window (presumably) worn
by milling prior to recovery.

SPE 89775

Pertinent evidence gathered during the initial investigation

and recovery of the ovalized 16 in. casing includes:
The drill string stalled abruptly, indicating an
instantaneous event;
There is no evidence from pre-failure drilling
parameters of an out-of-the-ordinary occurrence;
The recorded circulating temperatures 180F
bottom hole and 168F at the flow line are high
(particularly the latter);
The 16 in. annulus valve was closed while drilling
the 14-1/2 x 17-1/2 in. hole section;
The depth of the failure is shallow. Given 10.5 ppg
drilling fluid outside the 16 in. casing, an evacuated
collapse differential is 0.052 psi/ppg-ft x 250 ft x
10.5 ppg = 136 psi, as compared to the API collapse
rating for this casing of 1480 psi.
For future reference, the Pompano A-31 casing run prior to the
failure is listed in Table 1.
Table 1. Summary of Pompano A-31 Casing
OD
(in.)
20

Weight
(lb/ft)
133
169
84
97

16

Grade

Thread

X-56
X-56
P-110
N-80

BOSS
BOSS
BOSS
BOSS

Top
(ft.)
0
3000
0
1486

Bottom
(ft.)
3000
4053
1486
6209

Conventional Casing Design

The term conventional casing design in this context refers to
design whereby a single tubular string's integrity is
investigated without consideration of that string's interaction
with other tubulars. Loads associated, for example, with
trapped pressures in an annulus between the target string and
its neighbors are not considered.
Safety Factor
0

0
Fig. 2 - Photograph of Recovered, Collapsed 16 in. Casing

Measured Depth, ft

1000
2000
3000
4000

Lost Circulation
Evacuation

5000
6000
7000

Fig. 4 Conventional Collapse Design Factors, 16 in. Casing

Fig. 3 - Photograph of Recovered, Collapsed 16 in. Casing

Fig. 4 summarizes the pertinent external pressure design

factors for loads typical to an intermediate casing string. The
current string was designed for the lost circulation load case,
where the mud used to drill the next hole section is allowed to

SPE 89775

Table 2. Collapse Results from 16 in. Companion

Samples
Sample
1
2
3

Average
Diameter:Thickness
Ratio
32.04
31.67
30.97
Average

Collapse
(psi)
2247
2315
2454
2339

alternative the surface circulating temperature (inlet to drill

pipe) was adjusted until such point as the observed circulating
temperature of 168F was predicted by the software. Input
data for the model are summarized in Table 3.
Fig. 5 presents the results of the thermal prediction,
indicating, not only the profile outside the drill string, but also,
for later reference, the temperature in the 16 in. x 20 in.
annulus.
Temperature, Deg F
0

Table 3 . Input Data for Drill Ahead Thermal Analysis

Variable
Days to Drill
Rotating/Circulating
Hours
Average Circulation Rate
Number of Trips
Depth Interval
Circulate on Bottom
before POOH
Fluid
Bit
Motor/MWD/LWD/Collars
(All modeled as collars)
HWDP
Drill Pipe

Value
7.13
75
1200 gal/min
1
6209-9132 ft. MD
1.5 hrs
13.1 lb/gal OBM
DPI 17.5 MC43
18/18/18/18/18/18/20/16
TFA 1.994 sq. in.
8 x 3-1/4
165 ft.
6-5/8, 70.8 lb/ft, E, FH
927 ft.
6-5/8, 27.7 lb/ft, S, FH
Remainder

Temperature Modeling
Of the evidence outlined in the previous section, one
outstanding feature is the high surface circulating temperature
during drill ahead. An attempt was made to match the
circulating temperatures with a commercial thermal simulator.
Unfortunately, the capabilities of the software were
insufficient to model the drilling rigs fluid system. As an

100

150

200

250

1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000

The implication of the above is that, barring unexpectedly

low collapse resistance of the subject casing, conventional
collapse loads should not have failed this string at 253-280 ft.
To investigate the possibility that the casing opposite this
interval might have lower than expected collapse performance,
companion joints to the failed casing were collapse tested,
with the results displayed in Table 2. As indicated in the
table, the collapse resistance of the companion joints is well
above the API minimum collapse rating of 1480 psi upon
which the safety factors in Fig. 4 are based.

50

Measured Depth, ft

drop until it reaches a hydrostatic balance with pore pressure

in the open hole. The depth and corresponding pore pressure
used are those which result in the most severe collapse load
case. The evacuation load case is also shown for information,
as this load scenario is used by some operators. Pertinent
depths in the figure are 1486 ft., the section crossover in the
16 in. string (see Table 1) and 2549 ft., the depth to which the
mud column falls in the lost circulation load case.
Although the lower portion of the 16 in. casing, the 97 lb/ft
N-80 run below 1486 ft., will have a safety factor less than
unity under the evacuation load case, the failure in this string
was in the shallower, 84 lb/ft P-110 casing. Collapse safety
factors for this shallower segment of the 16 in. casing are
consistently above 1.5.

Undisturbed
DS Annulus
16 In. Annulus

9000
10000
Fig. 5 - Temperature Prediction from Drill Ahead Thermal
Simulation

Annular Pressure Buildup

In well design, annular pressure buildup (ABP) refers to the
pressure change in a fluid in a closed annulus. The
phenomenon is particularly relevant to offshore wells where
annuli may be trapped by terminating a casing string(s) at the
mud line. The ABP phenomenon, however, can occur in any
annulus that is not vented1,2.
Consider a liquid completely filling a closed container. As
the temperature of the fluid is increased, it will attempt to
expand in accordance with its coefficient of thermal
expansion. This volume change will be countered by the
rigidity of the container. Resistance to the free expansion of
the fluid induces a pressure increase. According to the rigidity
of the enclosing walls, this pressure increase induces a
corresponding change in the dimensions of the container.
Equilibrium ensues involving changes in both the fluid and the
container. The incremental annular pressure accompanying a
change in temperature is, therefore, a function of:
The mechanical and thermal properties of the annular
fluid;
The flexibility of the confining boundary; and
The temperature increase.
The Present Case. The 16 in. x 20 in. annulus in the current
well constitutes a possibly closed container. First, as
mentioned in the introductory comments, the 16 in. annulus
valve was closed while drilling the 14-1/2 in. x 17-1/2 in. hole
section. Secondly, the targeted top of cement for the 16 in.
casing is close to the 20 in. casing shoe. Error in cement
calculations or application, barite settling in the drilling fluid

SPE 89775

above the cement top or failure to maintain stability of any

open hole above the cement could individually, or in concert,
contribute to closure of the 16 in. x 20 in. annulus.
Of further importance to the ABP issue is the fact that a
synthetic, rather than water-based mud was used to drill the
17-1/2 in. hole section. This switch in mud composition
distinguishes the current 17-1/2 in. hole section from all but
one of its counterparts on the Pompano platform. The 17-1/2
in. hole section of one earlier well was also drilled with
synthetic mud. This earlier operation, however, ran 13-3/8 in.
72 lb/ft N-80 casing (2670 psi collapse resistance), rather than
16 in., in the 17-1/2 in. hole.

Value
See Fig. 5 thermal modeling results
13.1 lb/gal OBM
11.6 lb/gal OBM
4000 ft.(Used to close annulus)

The synthetic fluid present in the 16 in. x 20 in. annulus was

modeled as an oil-based mud due to limitations in the
modeling software.
With the above inputs, the predicted incremental pressure
due to annular pressure buildup is 3423 psi (9.6 bbl potential
expansion volume). Compared to the collapse rating of the 16
in. 84 lb/ft P-110 casing (1480 psi) this value is more than
sufficient to initiate collapse (assuming a roughly equal
density gradient from inside and outside fluids.)
As mentioned above, one distinguishing fact in the current
scenario is the decision to switch from water-based to
synthetic mud. If the above calculation is repeated with 11.6
lb/gal water-based mud in the 16 in. x 20 in. annulus, the
ensuing pressure due to APB is 2395 psi (6.1 bbl potential
expansion volume) which still exceeds the API collapse rating
of the inner string. The following points are important:
The API collapse rating is conservative, but even
using a more modern prediction3 and targeting
average rather than minimum collapse, the rating of
the 16 in. is 2080 psi, still less than the predicted
incremental APB pressure.
Both the oil-based and water-based calculations
assume a completely fluid filled annulus. If any
portion of the 16 in. x 20 in. annulus were void, that
is, gas filled, then that void could serve as an
accumulator for its volume equivalent of fluid
expansion. This would reduce the corresponding
expansion pressure. The effect of a void/gas cap in
the 16 in. x 20 in. annulus is illustrated in Fig. 6.
With an oil-based mud, a gas cap of 4 bbls reduces
the ABP pressure from 3423 psi to 1995 psi. A void
of approximately 5.5 bbl would reduce the
incremental ABP pressure below the API collapse
rating and suggest no failure. The volume capacity
of the upper portion of the 16 in. x 20 in. annulus is
0.0921 bbl/ft. Thus, 5.5 bbl corresponds to 60 ft.

4000
3500
Oil-Based Mud
Water-Based Mud

3000
2500

Tamano Average Collapse

2000
API Minimum Collapse

1500
1000
500
0
0

10

Volume of Gas Cap, bbl

Fig. 6 - Variation of Annular Pressure Buildup with Void in 16 in. x
20 in. Annulus

Symmetry

Table 4. Input Data for ABP Model

Variable
Temperature Profile
Internal Fluid
Annular Fluid
Top of Cement

Annular Fluid Expansion Pressure, psi

Modeling Results. A drill ahead scenario using data

described in Table 4 was used to calculate annular pressure
buildup effects on the 16 in. x 20 in. annulus.

There is a significant difference between the oilbased and water-based results, allowing ample room
(for example, in the presence of a partial gas cap as
mentioned above) for failure with the synthetic fluid,
but not with a water-based fluid. Returning to Fig. 6,
and using the Tamano et al.3 equation to define
collapse, a gas cap with volume less than 0.81 bbls
(8.8 ft.) would produce a collapse with either WBM
or OBM, a gas cap with volume between 0.81 bbls
and 3.76 bbls (40.8 ft.) would produce a collapse
with OBM, but not with WBM, and a gas cap of
greater than 3.76 bbls would be sufficient to avoid a
collapse with either annular fluid. The extent of any
possible gas cap in the 16 in. x 20 in. annulus is
unknown.

A
Symmetry
Fig. 7 - Undeformed Mesh for Casing Collapse Finite Element
Model

SPE 89775

a. At 16 in. Collapse Load

Modeling the Collapse Damage

To fully understand the observed damage to the tubulars
recovered from Well A-31, a two-dimensional plane strain
finite element model of the failure point was constructed. The
model (Fig. 7) consists of concentric cross sections, starting
with the inner string, of 6-5/8 in. 27.7 lb/ft (ID = 5.901 in.) S135 drill pipe x 16 in. 84.0 lb/ft (ID = 15.010 in.) P-110 casing
x 20 in. 133 lb/ft (ID = 18.730 in.) X-56 casing.
The mesh is symmetric along the boundaries of the first
quadrant. In fact, the inner and outer tube meshes are axisymmetric. The middle tube, however, representing the 16 in.
casing is assigned a slight ovality in order to induce collapse
when the 16 in. tube is subjected to external pressure. All
casing elements are four node, reduced integration plane strain
elements. In addition, the mesh contains contact elements to
model possible interaction between the strings.
Typical results from the analysis are summarized in Figs. 8
and 9. Fig. 8 displays successive deformation of the 16 in.
casing. In Fig. 8.a the initial (e.g. manufactured) ovality of the
16 in. casing has been magnified by external pressure in the 16
in. x 20 in. annulus to the point that the tube has reached the
maximum load it can tolerate and is in the process of
collapsing.
Fig. 8.b illustrates the fact that the post-buckled
deformation of the 16 in. casing actually contacts the 20 in.
casing first. This contact (see discussion of Fig. 9) will
momentarily reinforce the 16 in. cross section. The driving
pressure, however, is sufficient to cause further deformation of
the middle tube, leading to its eventual contact with the inner
string of drill pipe.
The model reproduces both the
deformation of the 20 in. casing and the contact and seizing of
the drill pipe by the 16 in. casing.
Fig. 9 lends additional detail to the deformed plots in Fig.
8. Here, displacements at the points of initial contact with the
20 in. casing (Point A, Fig. 7) and the drill pipe (Point B, Fig.
7) are plotted versus the external pressure applied to the 16 in.
casing.

b. First Contact with 20 in. Casing

External Pressure, psi

2500
Point A
Point B

2000
1500
1000
500
0

-6

-4

-2

Displacement, in.
c. First Contact with Drill Pipe

Fig. 9 - Displacements of Key Locations on 16 in. Casing (See Fig.

7 for Definition of Points A and B)

Fig. 8 - Successive Deformation of 16 in. Casing from Collapse

through Contact of Outer and Inner Tubes. Contours are von
Mises Intensity.

Initially, the slight ovality assigned the 16 in. cross section

results in both horizontal (Point A) and vertical (Point B)

SPE 89775

displacements. At a critical value of external pressure, the

maximum response of the 16 in. cross section is reached, and
collapse occurs. The post-buckled response of the tube is to
suffer additional ovalization under decreasing pressure.
As deformation of the 16 in. casing continues, it eventually
contacts the outer, 20 in. tube. Briefly, the 16 in. is reinforced
as displacements at Point A become more difficult due to the
stiffness of the 20 in. cross section. Eventually, however, and
at a pressure much less than the initial collapse pressure of the
16 in. tube, there is sufficient vertical displacement for the
tube to contact the inner drill pipe.
Evidence in support of the above model is provided by a
caliper run in the 20 in. casing following recovery of the inner
16 in. string. Fig. 10 summarizes the damage to the 20 in.
casing due to collapse of the 16 in. casing as caliper log
measurements of maximum and minimum internal diameter.
For reference, the figure also contains (dashed lines) predicted
maximum and minimum diameters of the 20 in. casing at the
time the post-buckling 16 in. casing just touches the drill pipe
(see Fig. 8.c). The exact displacements of the 20 in. should
differ from these benchmarks due to the following:
Following initial contact, the 16 in. will further
deform the 20 in. casing as it deforms around the drill
pipe (see the tails of the 16 in. displacements reported
in Fig. 9).
Once the 16 in. casing is recovered, there will be a
small elastic recovery of the 20 in. casing.
Recovery of the 16 in casing may have further
deformed the 20 in. string.

buckling, a drill ahead load case identical to the one used in

the ABP analysis was constructed, the only difference being
that for the buckling analysis the 16 in. x 20 in. annulus was
assumed open. Buckling of a vertical tubular is governed by
the so-called effective force,
Fe = Fz ( p i Ai p o Ao ) , ............................................. (1)

where a negative value of Fe indicates buckling. Thus

lowering p o (e.g. removing the potential for ABP by
prohibiting generation of thermally induced pressure in this
annulus) reduces Fe , thus increasing the likelihood of excess
buckling.
Fig. 11 summarizes the results. Only the upper section of
the 16 in. casing (e.g. the 84 lb/ft P-110 section) is analyzed,
as the upper and lower sections of the string are separated in
terms of axial load by a landing ring at their cross over. A
worst case, assuming all the weight of the upper section is
landed on the landing ring, was used in the analysis. The
entire 16 in. casing string is buckled, as evidenced by the
negative effective stress (= Fe / ( Ao Ai ) ).
However,
nowhere is the von Mises equivalent stress (maximum in cross
section is displayed), which includes the effect of bending due
to buckling, in excess of the yield stress (110,000 psi) of the
casing at the failure point.

Measured Depth, ft.

200
200

240
260
280
300

Max ID at DP Contact

Min ID at DP Contact

Measured Depth, ft.

220

320

400
600
800
von Mises Equivalent, psi
Effective Stress, psi

1000
1200
1400

Minimum ID
Maximum ID

340

-50000

50000

100000

Maximum Effective Stress, psi

Fig. 11 - Stress State in 16 in. Casing due to Column Buckling

17

18

19

20

21

Inside Diameter, in.

Fig. 10 - Log Measured Displacements of 20 in. Casing

The intended message of Fig. 10 is that observed damage

of the 20 in. casing is consistent with the scenario of 16 in.
casing collapsing due to annular pressure buildup effects.
A Note on Column Buckling
Early in the failure investigation, the possibility of damage in
the 16 in. casing being the result of column buckling was
investigated. To examine the consequences of column

Finally, and as further evidence that column buckling is

not the failure mechanism in this well, buckling and its
associated deformations should be more severe in the lower
sections of the uncemented length of 16 in. casing (see Fig.
11). The failure in this well occurred near the surface.

SPE 89775

Conclusions
1. Damage to the 16 in. casing in the subject well is due
to collapse associated with annular pressure buildup
during drill ahead.
2. The 16 in. x 20 in. annulus was closed by (a) closing
the annulus valve at the upper end and (b) either
cement, formation (e.g. wellbore stability) or barite
settling at the lower end.
3. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first known
instance of an ABP related collapse due to drilling,
rather than production, thermal loads. The primary
source of pressure is the relatively high surface
circulating temperature.
4. The variation in thermal behavior between an oilbased and water-based fluid, possibly coupled with
the presence of a gas cap in the 16 in. x 20 in.
annulus, can explain why this problem was not
encountered on previous wellbores.
5. Collapse of the 16 in. casing not only seizes the inner
drill pipe, but also ovalizes the outer 20 in. casing.
The latter effect has been confirmed by a mechanical
caliper.
6. Excess bending stress due to column buckling during
drill ahead is not the failure mechanism in this well.
Nomenclature
Ai = tube internal cross-sectional area, [L2], in2
Ao = tube external cross-sectional area, [L2], in2
Fe = effective force, [ML/T2], lb.
Fz = axial force, [ML/T2], lb.
pi = internal pressure, [M/(LT2)], psi
p o = external pressure, [M/(LT2)], psi
References
1.

2.

3.

Halal, A. S. and Mitchell, R. F., Casing Design for

Trapped Annulus Pressure Buildup, SPE Drilling &
Completion, June, 1994.
Ellis, R. C.,Fritchie, D. G. Jr., Gibson, D. H., Gosch, S. W.,
and Pattillo, P. D., Marlin Failure Analysis and Redesign;
Part 2, Redesign, SPE 74529 presented at the 2002
IADC/SPE Drilling Conference, Dallas, Texas, February
2628, 2002.
Tamano, T., Mimake, T., and Yanagimoto, S., A New
Empirical Formula for Collapse Resistance of Commercial
Casing, Journal of Energy Resources Technology, ASME,
1983.