Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1Z64589FNW95123039
Via email: james_gerstenlauer@ca11.uscourts.gov
Neil J Gillespie
https://wwwapps.ups.com/WebTracking/processPOD?Requester=&tracknum=1Z64589FNW95123039&refNumbers=&loc=en_US
Proof of Delivery
Close Window
Dear Customer,
This notice serves as proof of delivery for the shipment listed below.
Tracking Number:
Service:
Weight:
Shipped/Billed On:
Delivered On:
Delivered To:
Signed By:
1Z64589FNW95123039
UPS Next Day Air Saver
5.00 lbs
12/18/2015
12/21/2015 9:43 A.M.
56 FORSYTH ST NW
ATLANTA, GA, US 30303
GREENE
Left At:
Mail Room
Close Window
https://www.ups.com/uis/create?ActionOriginPair=default___PrintWindowPage&key=labelWindow&type=html&loc=en_US&instr=A&doc=shipment...
FOLD HERE
CUSTOt1ER:
Not Provided
ID Type: Not Provided
TRACKING NUMBER
1Z64589FNW95123039
DROP-OFF DATE/TIME:
Fri 18 Dec 2015 6:54 PM
ESTIMATED PICKUP DATE:
UPS (Air)
Fri 18 Dec 2015
1pkg
TOTAL PACKAGES:
1pkg
WEIGHT
2.30 Ibs
TH IS AECE IPT LISTS EACH PACKAGE AECE IUED BY UPS CC OCALA FL AHD IHD ICATES
THAT THE IHFOAMATIOH FOA EACH PACKAGE HAS BEEH TAAHSI1IT TED TO EACH CAAA lEA' S
DATA SYSTEI1. TH IS AECE IPT IS HOT COHF IAI1AT 10H THAT THE CAAA lEA HAS PICKED UP
THE PACKAGES. TO UEAIFY IolHEH AHD IF A PACKAGE HAS BEEH PICKED UP. GO TO
ISH IP. COM/TAACK IT /TAACK. ASP AHD EHTEA THE TAACK IHG HLiMBEAS LISTED ABOUE.
YOU ACKHOIolLEDGE THAT THE SH IPMEHT SEAU ICES PAOU IDED BY UPS CC OCALA FL FOA
THE LISTED PACKAGES AAE SUBJECT TO AHD GOUEAHED BY EACH CAAAIEA AGAEEMEHT.
IF APPL ICABLE. THE AATES AHD SEAU ICE GU IDE FOA EACH CAAA lEA. AHD THE TAA IFF
IH EFFECT AT THE TIME OF SHIPMEHT.
F'owere,jb ,! ISh:p1r;
IifiiI sa NOTICE ON REVERSE regarding UPS Terms, and nobce of Irmltallon of IrabiUty Where allowed by law, shipper authonzes UPS to act as fOfWaldlngagent for export conltOl and
customs purposes. Ife.pocted from the US, shipper cl!ftifieslhat thecornmodibes. technology or software were uported from the US In accordance WIth the &port Administtabon
ReguIItions. DlvefslonClllllralylllllaw Is pIahIbftecl.
RRDRf \014
Page 1 of 6
Neil Gillespie
From:
To:
Sent:
Subject:
12/18/2015
Page 2 of 6
Tampa, FL 33602
(813) 228-2715
donna_elm@fd.org
Dear Ms. Elm:
My letter to Chief Judge Merryday concerned, inter alia, the case of
Antonio J. Ortiz-Carballo v. David R. Ellspermann, Clerk and Comptroller of
Marion County, US District Court, Middle District of Florida, Ocala
Division, Case No. 5:08-cv-00165, and counsel appoitment under Poindexter
v. FBI, Addendum Five, and Florida Statutes, section 29.007,
Court-appointed counsel.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/293332610/Hon-Steven-Merryday-Chief-US-District-Judge-Civil-CounselAppointment
My letter to Chief Judge Merryday concerns, inter alia, a systemic problem
in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, and
violation of laws requiring civil counsel appointment. The public record
version of Philip R. Lammens Application for US District Judge shows on
page 2 he was Assistant US Attorney in Ocala,
"Assistant United States Attorney, United States Attorney's Office,
Middle District of Florida,
Ocala Division (April 2008-July 2012)"
The government (DOJ/US Attorney) failed to bring a civil rights case
against David R. Ellspermann, Clerk and Comptroller of Marion County, and
that failure occurred during the time Assistant US Attorney Philip R.
Lammens had the duty and opportunity to bring a civil rights case against
Ellspermann, in my personal opinion.
Eric Holder's parting shot: It's too hard to bring civil rights cases,
reported by politico.com
http://www.politico.com/story/2015/02/eric-holder-civil-rights-interview-mike-allen-115575
sounds absurd on its face because he was the Attorney General of the United
States. But when considered with the fact that many or most criminal civil
rights violations are perpetrated under color of law, Eric Holder's parting
shot begins to make sense, as in the failure of the government to bring a
civil rights case against David R. Ellspermann, Clerk and Comptroller of
Marion County. Its too hard to bring civil rights cases because the
government is so corrupt. Color of law cases are obstructed in many ways by
corrupt federal judges, corrupt federal magistrates, corrupt AUSAs and
corrupt law enforcement. Also, the criminal justice system lacks a safe
12/18/2015
Page 3 of 6
12/18/2015
Page 4 of 6
You wrote "Oh good. I am not involved in that at this time. I don't need
further information re your case then unless we are appointed. Thank you."
Ms. Elm, this is not about my case. My letter to Chief Judge Merryday did
not mention my case. And I understand your motivation to defend, or look
away, from a corrupt federal court system in the Middle District of
Florida. Your livelihood is tied to that corrupt system. You like getting
the big federal salary that goes along with being the Federal Defender. I
get that. Unfortunately, no matter how well intentioned, the US magistrate
judge scheme, and the federal defender scheme, have become bootlicks to
injustice.
I am sharing the forgoing in the interest of justice. Thank you.
Neil J. Gillespie
8092 SW 115th Loop
Ocala, Florida 34481
----- Original Message ----From: "Donna Elm" <Donna_Elm@fd.org>
12/18/2015
Page 5 of 6
12/18/2015
Page 6 of 6
>
>> Neil this is an interesting thing. I never requested this. Or any
>> judicial application for that matter. Perhaps someone else did? Or
>> someone did from my office using my letterhead? If there's anything
>> nefarious going on though, I would want to know.
>>
>>
>> Donna Lee Elm, FPD
>> Federal Defender's Office
>> 400 North Tampa Street, Suite 2700
>> Tampa, FL 33602
>> (813) 228-2715
>> donna_elm@fd.org
>>
>>
>>
>> This e-mail contains PRIVILEGED and CONFIDENTIAL information intended
> only
>> for the use of the addressee(s) named above. If you are not the intended
>> recipient of this e-mail, or an authorized employee or agent responsible
>> for delivering it to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified
that
>> any dissemination or copying of this e-mail is strictly prohibited. If
> you
>> have received this e-mail in error, please notify us by reply e-mail and
>> delete this e-mail. Thank you for your cooperation.
>>
>>
>>
>> From: "Neil Gillespie" <neilgillespie@mfi.net>
>> To: <Undisclosed-Recipient:;>
>> Date: 12/16/2015 07:19 PM
>> Subject: Philip R. Lammens Application for US District Judge
>>
Jul-23-2015.
>>
>>
>>
>> [attachment "Philip R. Lammens Application for US District Judge
>> Jul-23-2015..pdf" deleted by Donna Elm/FLMF/11/FDO]
>>
>>
>>
>
>
>
>
>
>[attachment "Judge Hodges honored at reception.pdf" deleted by Donna
Elm/FLMF/11/FDO] [attachment "aba-ldf_statement.pdf" deleted by Donna
Elm/FLMF/11/FDO]
12/18/2015
One would have to have been outside of the United States and cut off from media to
be unaware of the recent spate of killings of unarmed African American men and women at
the hands of white law enforcement officers. Several of these killings, like those of Walter
Scott in South Carolina, 12-year-old Tamir Rice in Ohio and Eric Garner in New York, have
been captured by citizen video and viewed nationwide. More recently, the in-custody
death of Freddie Gray sparked days of unrest in Baltimore, which ended only when the
officers (who were of multiple races) were charged by the local prosecutor.
Given the history of implicit and explicit racial bias and discrimination in this
country, there has long been a strained relationship between the African-American
community and law enforcement. But with video cameras and extensive news coverage
bringing images and stories of violent encounters between (mostly white) law enforcement
officers and (almost exclusively African-American and Latino) unarmed individuals into
American homes, it is not surprising that the absence of criminal charges in many of these
cases has caused so many people to doubt the ability of the criminal justice system to treat
individuals fairly, impartially and without regard to their race.
That impression is reinforced by the statistics on race in our criminal justice system.
With approximately 5 percent of the worlds population, the United States has
approximately 25 percent of the worlds jail and prison population. Some two-thirds of
those incarcerated are persons of color. While crime rates may vary by neighborhood and
class, it is difficult to believe that racial disparities in arrest, prosecution, conviction and
incarceration rates are unaffected by attitudes and biases regarding race.
And, to the extent that doubts remain, the U.S. Department of Justices recent
investigation of law enforcement practices in Ferguson, Missouri, should put them to rest.
In Ferguson, the Justice Department found that the dramatically different rates at which
African-American and white individuals in Ferguson were stopped, searched, cited,
arrested and subjected to the use of force could not be explained by chance or differences
in the rates at which African-American and white individuals violated the law. These
disparities can be explained at least in part by taking into account racial bias.
Given these realities, it is not only time for a careful look at what caused the current
crisis, but also time to initiate an affirmative effort to eradicate implied or perceived racial
bias in all of its forms from the criminal justice system.
As lawyers, we have a very special role to play. As the Preamble to the American
Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct states,
As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, access
to the legal system, the administration of justice and the quality of service
rendered by the legal profession. . . . In addition, a lawyer should further
the publics understanding of and confidence in the rule of law and the
justice system because legal institutions in a constitutional democracy
depend on popular participation and support to maintain their authority.
What must we do? The answer lies in making both macro and micro changes in our
criminal justice system.
At the macro level, Congress and state legislatures must look at the vast array of
laws that criminalize behaviors that pose little, if any, danger to society. We have overcriminalized conduct throughout the United States and have come inappropriately to rely
on the criminal justice system to address problems of mental health and poverty. We have
adopted unnecessary zero-tolerance policies in schools that inappropriately require police
officers to take the place of teachers and principals and become behavioral judges. We
need fewer criminal laws, and fewer circumstances in which police, prosecutors and judges
are called upon to deal with social, as opposed to criminal, issues.
July 2015
We must therefore take immediate action at the micro level to begin the process of
rebuilding trust and confidence in the criminal justice system and fulfilling the promise of
equal justice.
Prosecutors play an important and vital role within the criminal justice system and
should be leaders in this effort. We have begun what we anticipate will be a series of
conversations focused on identifying ways in which prosecutors can play a more powerful
role in addressing the problem of racial bias our justice system. Our organizations arranged
an off-the-record discussion that included prosecutors and other participants in the
criminal justice system committed to equal justice. We emerged from our discussion with a
commitment to advancing the reforms listed below. We regard these reforms as necessary
investments that are essential to strengthening public confidence in the rule of law and the
legitimacy of our justice system.
1.
We need better data on the variety of interactions between law enforcement
and citizens. Earlier this year FBI Director James Comey himself a former federal
prosecutor acknowledged that gathering better and more reliable data about encounters
between the police and citizens is the first step to understanding what is really going on in
our communities and our country. Data related to violent encounters is particularly
important. As Director Comey remarked, Its ridiculous that I cant know how many
people were shot by police. Police departments should be encouraged to make and keep
reports on the racial identities of individuals stopped and frisked, arrested, ticketed or
warned for automobile and other infractions. Police departments should report incidents
in which serious or deadly force is used by officers and include the race of the officer(s) and
that of the civilian(s). This will certainly require investment of funds, but that investment
is key to a better future. We cannot understand what we cannot measure, and we cannot
change what we cannot understand.
2. Prosecutors should collect and publicly disclose more data about their work that
can enable the public to obtain a better understanding of the extent to which racial
disparities arise from the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. While this data collection
will also require investment of funds, it is essential to achieving the goal of eliminating
racial bias in the criminal justice system.
3. Prosecutors and police should seek assistance from organizations with expertise
in conducting objective analyses to identify and localize unexplained racial disparities.
These and similar organizations can provide evidence-based analyses and propose
protocols to address any identified racial disparities.
3
July 2015
4. Prosecutors offices, defense counsel and judges should seek expert assistance to
implement training on implicit bias for their employees. An understanding of the science of
implicit bias will pave the way for law enforcement officers, prosecutors and judges to
address it in their individual work. There should also be post-training evaluations to
determine the effectiveness of the training.
5. Prosecutors offices must move quickly, aggressively, unequivocally and yet
deliberately to address misconduct that reflects explicit racial bias. We must make clear
that such conduct is fundamentally incompatible with our shared values and that it has an
outsized impact on the publics perception of the fairness of the system.
6. Prosecutors offices and law enforcement agencies should make efforts to hire and
retain lawyers and officers who live in and reflect the communities they serve. Prosecutors
and police should be encouraged to engage with the community by participating in
community forums, civic group meetings and neighborhood events. Prosecutors offices
should build relationships with African-American and minority communities to improve
their understanding about how and why these communities may view events differently
from prosecutors.
7. There should be a dialogue among all the stakeholders in each jurisdiction about
race and how it affects criminal justice decision-making. In 2004, the ABA Justice Kennedy
Commission recommended the formation of Racial Justice Task Forces which would
consist of representatives of the judiciary, law enforcement and prosecutors, defenders and
defense counsel, probation and parole officers and community organizations to examine
the racial impact that policing priorities and prosecutorial and judicial decisions might
produce and whether alternative approaches that do not produce racial disparities might
be implemented without compromising public safety. There is little cost associated with
the assembly of such task forces, and they can develop solutions that could be applicable to
a variety of jurisdictions provided that the various stakeholders are willing to do the hard
work of talking honestly and candidly about race.
8. As surprising as it might seem, many people do not understand what prosecutors
do. Hence, prosecutors offices, with the help of local and state bar associations, should
seek out opportunities to explain their function and the kinds of decisions they are
routinely called upon to make. Local and state bar associations and other community
organizations should help to educate the public that the decision not to prosecute is often
as important as the decision to prosecute; that prosecutors today should not to be judged
solely by conviction rates but, instead, by the fairness and judgment reflected in their
decisions and by their success in making communities safer for all their members; and that
some of the most innovative alternatives to traditional prosecution and punishment like
diversion and re-entry programs, drug and veteran courts and drug treatment have been
instigated, developed and supported by prosecutors.
9. To ensure accountability, the public should have access to evidence explaining
why grand juries issued no true bills and why prosecutors declined to prosecute police
4
July 2015
officers involved in fatal shootings of unarmed civilians. The release of grand jury
evidence, as in Ferguson, is one way to promote the needed accountability.
10. Accountability can also be promoted by greater use of body and vehicle cameras
to create an actual record of police-citizen encounters. With the proliferation of powerful
firearms in our communities, law enforcement departments reasonably seek equipment
that enable them to protect themselves and their communities when called upon to
confront armed and dangerous individuals seeking to engage in criminal or terrorist acts.
However, while it is appropriate to arm our police and train them in the use of ever-more
powerful weapons, it is equally important to train our law enforcement officers in
techniques designed to de-escalate tense situations, make accurate judgments about when
use of force is essential and properly determine the appropriate amount of force required
in each situation.
11. We must recognize that not every lawyer has the judgment and personal
qualities to be a successful prosecutor, administer justice and be willing to acknowledge
the possibility of implicit bias. Prosecutors who routinely engage in conduct or make
decisions that call into question the fairness or integrity of their offices should be removed
from office if they cannot be trained to meet the high standards expected of public officers.
At the same time, the terms prosecutorial misconduct and police misconduct should be
used with greater care. Even the best prosecutors will make mistakes, much like the best
defense lawyers and judges do. There is good reason to limit the characterization of
misconduct to intentional acts that violate legal or ethical rules.
12. Prosecutors, judges and defense counsel must pay more attention to the
collateral consequences of convictions. In many jurisdictions, after an individual is
convicted of an offense and completes his or her sentence (by serving time, paying a fine or
completing probation or parole), the individual nevertheless faces a life sentence of
disqualification and deprivation of educational, employment, housing and other
opportunities. This runs counter to the interests we all share in rehabilitation of the
offender and positive re-integration into and engagement with the communities in which
they live. In many cases, prosecutions can be structured to limit some of the most
pernicious of these consequences, provided that the lawyers and the courts take the time
and care to examine alternative disposition options. Prosecutors, judges and defense
counsel should join together to urge legislatures and administrative agencies to reconsider
the laws and regulations that impose these collateral consequences and determine whether
they can be modified to provide more opportunities for former offenders without
compromising public safety.
The American criminal justice is unquestionably at a moment of crisis. But there
are many steps we, as members of the bar, can and should take quickly to begin to turn the
ship of justice around and ensure that the system delivers the blind justice that it promises.
If we commit ourselves to confronting and eliminating the racial biases that now exist, we
can restore the much-needed public confidence in our criminal justice system. As Supreme
Court Justice Thurgood Marshall once exhorted in accepting the Liberty Medal Award in
5
July 2015
1992, America can do better. Indeed, America has no choice but to do better.
Both the American Bar Association and the Legal Defense Fund will continue to
convene meetings with prosecutors and other law enforcement groups to support the
reforms we have identified. We also will work to support and advance a robust dialogue
among prosecutors and leaders in the profession about how best to eliminate racial bias
from our justice system.
William C. Hubbard,
President, American Bar Association
Sherrilyn Ifill
President and Director-Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
The following individuals participated in the discussion that led to this joint statement:
Sidney Butcher
Assistant States Attorney, Baltimore City State's Attorney's Office
John Chisholm
District Attorney, Milwaukee County
Kay Chopard Cohen
Executive Director, National District Attorneys Association
Angela Davis
Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law
Mathias H. Heck
Prosecuting Attorney, Montgomery County, OH
Belinda Hill
First Assistant District Attorney, Harris County, TX
David F. Levi
Dean, Duke University School of Law
Myles Lynk
Professor of Law, Arizona State University College of Law
Wayne McKenzie
General Counsel, New York City Department of Probation
John Pfaff
Professor of Law, Fordham University
6
July 2015
July 2015
http://www.law.ufl.edu/flalaw/2012/11/judge-hodges-honored-at-reception/
University
of
Florida
Levin
College
of
Law
By Richard Goldstein
When U.S. District Judge William Terrell Hodges (JD 58) was nominated to the federal bench in
1971, he assumed his robes in the middle district of Florida before the age of 40, and 41 years later
he holds the same job, now as a federal judge on senior status in Ocala.
A remarkably stable career one might conclude.
But it was clear during a Nov. 2 reception at the Thomas Center in Gainesville sponsored by the
North Central Chapter of the Federal Bar Association that Hodges did not stand still during his long
tenure.
(http://www.law.ufl.edu/flalaw/wp-content/uploads
/2012/11/IMG_5403_low_res.jpg)
Judge William Terrell Hodges (JD 58) was honored Nov. 2 at the
Thomas Center in Gainesville. (Photos by Haley Stracher)
As protg of former Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Hodges rose to lead policymaking body for the
administration of justice in the federal courts, becoming chair of the Judicial Conference of the United
States. Hodges and District Judge Anthony Alaimo lodged the complaint that would result in the
impeachment and removal from office of U.S. District Judge Alcee Hastings, who had been acquitted
by a jury of soliciting a bribe in a mob case. And he mentored decades worth of law clerks.
Those clerks were present in force at the Thomas Center to praise their former boss.
Scott L. Whitaker (JD 76), who clerked for Hodges from 1976 to 1978, said Hodges took seriously his duty to dispense justice and to guard against abuse of
power.
I watched him struggle every time he had to pass sentence, Whitaker said. His humility in all things is beyond anything Ive ever seen. He always used to
say, every time you use a little power, you lose a little power. Ive never seen him abuse it once.
Still, one story of the way Hodges exercised power elicited knowing laughter from the audience that
included UF Law students.
Judge Gerald Bard Tjoflat of the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals explained that Tampa maintained
a bus stop immediately in front of the courthouse steps while Hodges was chief judge of the middle
district during the 1980s.
The city of Tampa had a bus system and they had a monstrous bus stop at the base of the old
federal courthouse in Tampa. All the buses came there and the jurors would have trouble getting up
there to the courthouse, Tjoflat said.
Hodges sent a letter to the mayor demanding that the bus stop be moved. When no action ensued,
Tjoflat said, federal marshals dismantled the offending public transportation facility with blow torches.
Sitting on a dais with Tjoflat, Hodges accepted laconically the stories and praise offered during the
Toast to Judge Hodges event.
(http://www.law.ufl.edu/flalaw/wp-content/uploads
/2012/11/IMG_5293_low_res.jpg)
Judge William Terrell Hodges (JD 58) was honored Nov. 2 at the
Thomas Center in Gainesville. (Photos by Haley Stracher)
That was the result of deputies who volunteered; no order was given so it was unappealable,
Hodges deadpanned.
Last year Hodges served as the Peter T. Fay Jurist-in-Residence at UF Law speaking with students and faculty about judicial clerkships, trial advocacy and
legal careers.
Hodges was appointed by President Richard Nixon in 1971. He served as chief judge from 1982 to 1989 and has maintained senior status since 1999.
Tagged as: William Terrell Hodges (http://www.law.ufl.edu/flalaw/tag/william-terrell-hodges/), judge hodges (http://www.law.ufl.edu/flalaw/tag/judge-hodges/)
http://www.law.ufl.edu/flalaw/2012/11/judge-hodges-honored-at-reception/
Faculty Scholarship & Activities: Nov. 13, 2012 (http://www.law.ufl.edu/flalaw/2012/11/faculty-scholarship-activities-nov-13-2012/)
Federal Trade Commissions Bureau of Economics director to discuss antitrust law (http://www.law.ufl.edu/flalaw/2012/11/federal-trade-commissionsbureau-of-economics-director-to-discuss-antitrust-law/)
http://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/09/09/438581667/report-judges-have-too-much-control-in-public-defense-system
1:58
Embed
Transcript
11/30/2015 5:33 PM
http://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/09/09/438581667/report-judges-have-too-much-control-in-public-defense-system
A new report finds serious concerns about the federal defense system's ability to "ensure constitutionally required
representation for litigants while preserving the independence essential to the defense function."
Patrick Semansky/AP
A tough new report has concluded that the federal government's system for
defending poor people needs to change. The nearly two-year study by the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers said judges who are supposed to be neutral
arbiters too often put their fingers on the scales.
The report said defense lawyers for the poor who work in the federal court system
need more resources to do their jobs. That means money, not just for themselves,
but to pay for experts and investigators.
"Having good, fully resourced defense counsel with access to ancillary services is an
absolute must in a society that is arresting 14 million people a year," said Norman
Reimer, executive director of the NACDL.
In an adversary system, lawyers for poor defendants say, they need to operate on
equal footing with prosecutors. But the study, the first of its kind in more than 20
years, found the source of most concern rests with judges who exercise too much
control over the process.
Bonnie Hoffman, a deputy public defender in Virginia, led the task force.
"There's some significant ways we feel the federal system is not measuring up most
importantly, in the area of independence," Hoffman said.
That's because judges are in charge. They have a role in selecting the defense lawyers
for the poor clients who appear in court. They act as umpires during a plea hearing
or a trial. And then those same judges approve or reject the defense lawyers' fee
requests.
"It's a shame to think that somebody agrees to do this work, they do the work that
they're asked to do ... to be a zealous advocate for somebody who's accused of a
crime," Hoffman said, "and then when they finish that somebody can come back and
11/30/2015 5:33 PM
http://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/09/09/438581667/report-judges-have-too-much-control-in-public-defense-system
say, 'I know you did good work ... but we don't feel like we should pay you for all the
work that you did.' "
That concern extended to dozens of people who spoke to Hoffman and others only on
the condition of anonymity, for fear that their livelihoods would be hurt if they
shared their experiences too openly.
One unnamed lawyer said he can drive five or six hours to visit a prisoner to help
prepare a defense, but judges in his area are "reluctant" to pay for those hours on the
road. In another case, a lawyer reported a magistrate, or lower-level judge, had called
him and asked him to slash 10 percent from his fees. The payment paperwork had
been "misplaced" for over a year, the report said.
In many cases, judges cut fees without explanation. And there's no way to appeal.
"It's just not a good situation to have the judge that you're appearing before have that
much control over your practice, over ultimately how you represent your client," said
Gerry Morris, a longtime defense attorney in Texas and the president of NACDL.
The new report doesn't offer a clear solution to the independence problem. But
Morris pointed out that the chief administrative body of the U.S. courts has launched
its own study of the system for representing poor defendants.
Morris said he hopes that panel will take defense lawyers into account. The report
said the committee includes three defense lawyers and six judges.
OLDE R
N E WE R
11/30/2015 5:33 PM
http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=438581667
11/30/2015 5:34 PM
http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=438581667
JOHNSON: That's because judges are in charge. They have a role in selecting the
defense lawyers for the poor clients who appear in court. They act as umpires during
a plea hearing or trial, and then those same judges approve or reject the defense
lawyers' fee requests. In many cases, the report says, judges cut fees without
explanation, and there's no way to appeal. Gerry Morris is a longtime defense
attorney in Texas.
GERRY MORRIS: It's just not a good situation to have the judge that you're
appearing before have that much control over, ultimately, how you represent your
client.
JOHNSON: The report says there's no clear solution to that independence problem,
but Morris says the courts have launched their own study of the system for
representing poor defendants, and he says he hopes judges will take defense lawyers
into account. Carrie Johnson, NPR News, Washington.
Copyright 2015 NPR. All rights reserved. Visit our website terms of use and permissions pages at www.npr.org for
further information.
NPR transcripts are created on a rush deadline by a contractor for NPR, and accuracy and availability may vary. This text
may not be in its final form and may be updated or revised in the future. Please be aware that the authoritative record of
NPRs programming is the audio.
2015 npr
11/30/2015 5:34 PM
http://www.nacdl.org/federalindigentdefense2015/
NACDL
Reports
United States Courts, Criminal Justice Act: At 50 Years, A Landmark in the Right to Counsel (CJA at 50) [n.4]
Report of the Committee to Review the Criminal Justice Act (1993) (Prado Report) [n.9]
Report of the Judicial Conference of the United States on the Federal Defender Program (Judicial Conference Report of 1993) [n.14]
Subcommittee on Long-Range Planning and Budgeting, Should the Structure of the Defender Services Program be Changed? Report to the
Committee on Defender Services of the Judicial Conference of the United States (2005) (Gleeson Report) [n.19]
Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts, 2012 Annual Report [n.24]
Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts, 2014 Annual Report [n.24]
AOs 2013 Annual Report [n.25]
Judicial Conference of the United States, Jurisdiction of Committees (2009) [n.28]
US Courts, Judiciarys Cost-Containment EffortsAnnual Report 2013 [n.50]
Fiscal Year 2014: No Budget and a Government Shutdown Annual Report 2013 [n.56]
Vera Institute of Justice, Improving Public Defense Systems: Good Practices for Federal Panel Attorney Programs (2003) [n.76]
New York County Lawyers Association, Courts in Crisis (Jan. 2014) [n.102]
The CJA Supervising Attorney: A Possible Tool in Criminal Justice Act Administration (Report to the Judicial Conference Committees on
Defender Services, Judicial Resources, and Court Administration and Case Management) [n.138]
Communications: Memoranda, Letters, and Emails
Email from Pamela Hamrin to Joel Schumm, Oct. 17, 2014 [n.28]
Email from Cait Clarke to Bonnie Hoffman (Nov. 12, 2014) (attachment) [n.29]
Letter from Chief Judge Loretta A. Preska et al. to Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (Aug. 13, 2013) [n.40]
Memorandum to chief judges from Leonidas Ralph Mecham, July 1, 2004 [n.48]
Memo to Judge John D. Bates, director, from Robert K. Loesche, general counsel, July 30, 2014 [n.58]
Letter from Sen. Christopher A. Coons, chairman, and Sen. Jeff Sessions, ranking member, of the Senate Judiciary Committee on Bankruptcy
and the Courts, to the Honorable William B. Traxler, Jr. (Aug. 5, 2013) [n.69]
Email from Judge Julia Gibbons, chair of the Budget Committee, to members of the Judicial Conference (Sept. 8, 2014) [n.92]
Email from Andy Archuleta, Defender Services Office (Feb. 2, 2015) [n.99]
Letter to Members of the Southern District of Georgia Bar from Chief Judge Lisa Godbey Wood, Apr. 21, 2011 [n.106]
Press Release: Criminal Justice Act Mentoring Program Approved for the Southern District of New York (Oct. 23, 2008) [n.111]
Email from Bob Burke to Schumm (Jan. 5, 2015)(attachment) [n.113]
Jan. 6, 2015, response from DSO to Task Force inquiries [n.118]
Memo from AO Director Judge Bates and DSC Chair Judge Blake, to all judges, Dec. 23, 2014 [n.127]
11/30/2015 5:34 PM
http://www.nacdl.org/federalindigentdefense2015/
Letter from Yolanda Barrera et al. to Hon. Dale Fischer et al. (March 28, 2014) [n.135]
NACDL Materials
Rationing Justice: The Underfunding of Assigned Counsel Systems (2013) [n.41]
Problem-Solving Courts: The Criminal Costs of Treatment and the Case for Reform [n.41]
Minor Crimes, Massive Waste: The Terrible Toll of Americas Broken Misdemeanor Courts [n.41]
Resolution of the Board of Directors of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Mar. 7, 1992 [n.88]
Resolution of the Board of Directors of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers Urging Congress to Fully Fund the Criminal Justice
Act, April 25, 1998 [n.95]
Resolution of the Board of Directors of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Jan. 7, 2009 [n.101]
Other
Compilation of Background History and Information, U.S. Defender Program [n.16]
ABA Ten Principles of A Public Defense Delivery System [n.26]
1660 L St. NW 12th Floor Washington, DC 20036 Phone: (202) 872-8600 / Fax: (202) 872-8690
2015, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL), All Rights Reserved.
11/30/2015 5:34 PM
Case: 13-11585
Page: 1 of 1
Case: 13-11585
Page: 1 of 1
Sincerely,
JOHN LEY, Clerk of Court
Reply to: Melanie Gaddis, B
Phone #: (404) 335-6187
Enclosure(s)
PRO-3 Letter Returning Papers Unfiled
Case: 13-11585
Page: 1 of 1
Case: 13-11585
Page: 1 of 1
https://ecf.ca11.uscourts.gov/cmecf/servlet/TransportRoom
General Docket
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals Docket #: 13-11585
Nature of Suit: 3290 Other Real Property Actions
Reverse Mortgage Solutions, In v. Neil Gillespie, et al
Appeal From: Middle District of Florida
Fee Status: Fee Not Paid
Docketed: 04/15/2013
Termed: 06/12/2013
Case Handler: Gaddis, Melanie, B
(404) 335-6187
Curtis Wilson
Direct: 407-674-1850
[COR LD NTC Retained]
McCalla Raymer, LLC
225 E ROBINSON ST STE 660
ORLANDO, FL 32801
Danielle N. Parsons
Direct: 954-319-7121
[NTC Retained]
McCalla Raymer, LLC
225 E ROBINSON ST STE 660
ORLANDO, FL 32801
versus
Neil J. Gillespie
NEIL J. GILLESPIE, as Co-Trustees of the Gillespie Family Living Trust
Direct: 352-854-7807
Agreement Dated February 10, 1997
Defendant - Appellant [NTC Pro Se]
8092 SW 115TH LOOP
OCALA, FL 34481
NEIL J. GILLESPIE
Defendant - Appellant
https://ecf.ca11.uscourts.gov/cmecf/servlet/TransportRoom
https://ecf.ca11.uscourts.gov/cmecf/servlet/TransportRoom
04/15/2013
14 pg, 810 KB
04/15/2013
CIVIL APPEAL DOCKETED. Notice of appeal filed by Appellant Neil J. Gillespie on 04/10/2013. Fee
Status: Fee Not Paid. No hearings to be transcribed.
USDC order denying IFP as to Appellant Neil J. Gillespie was filed on 03/07/2013. Docket Entry 19.
7 pg, 43.4 KB
8 pg, 323.51 KB
Appellant's Certificate of Interested Persons and Corporate Disclosure Statement filed by Appellant Neil J.
Gillespie.
1 pg, 52.95 KB
APPEARANCE of Counsel Form filed by Danielle N. Parsons for Reverse Mortgage Solutions, Inc.. (ECF:
Curtis Wilson)
05/02/2013
05/09/2013
05/09/2013
E-filed Appearance of Counsel processed for Attorney Curtis Wilson for Appellee Reverse Mortgage
Solutions, Inc. in 13-11585.
05/17/2013
USDC order denying IFP as to Appellant Neil J. Gillespie was filed on 05/09/2013. Docket Entry 28.
3 pg, 47.22 KB
ORDER: On its own motion, the court DISMISSES the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. (RB/SM/AJ).
06/12/2013
3 pg, 52.2 KB
62 pg, 4.97 MB
MOTION for reconsideration of a panel order entered on 06/12/2013 filed by Appellants Neil J. Gillespie
and Neil J. Gillespie. Opposition to Motion is Unknown [6911968-1]
21 pg, 1.09 MB
Public Communication: Letter from Pro Se Appellant to update and correct previous letter dted 07/01/2013
- no action requested..
10 pg, 608.7 KB
Public Communication: Letter from Pro Se Appellant Additional documents for reconsideration of denial of
recon motion - returned with SPCT-5 information.
2 pg, 202.02 KB
ORDER: Motion for reconsideration of panel order filed by Appellants Neil J. Gillespie and Neil J. Gillespie
is DENIED. [6911968-2] FMH, CRW and AJ
5 pg, 306.04 KB
Public Communication: Letter from Pro Se Appellant with UPS voucher to return his filed
documents/records..
07/02/2013
07/19/2013
07/22/2013
07/25/2013
08/07/2013
10/30/2013
Public Communication: Letter from Pro Se Appellant Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court - returned.
2 pg, 294.11 KB
Notice of Writ of Certiorari filed as to Appellants Neil J. Gillespie and Neil J. Gillespie. SC# 13-7280.
11/08/2013
1 pg, 41.63 KB
ADDENDUM FIVE
NON-CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT COUNSEL APPOINTMENTS
The court adopts these provisions for furnishing representation for persons financially unable
to obtain adequate representation in cases and situations which do not fall within the scope of 18
U.S.C. 3006A, as amended but in which the court believes that the interests of justice will be
served by the presence of counsel.
(a) Determination of Need.
In determining need for appointment of counsel, the court shall generally be governed by the
guidelines outlined in 18 U.S.C. 3006A.
(b) Appointment of Counsel.
(1) Counsel shall be selected from the same panels of attorneys designated or approved by
the district courts of the Eleventh Circuit as described in Addendum Four, which are hereby
approved by this court, or from a bar association, legal aid agency, or other approved organization.
In addition, any judge of this court may appoint competent counsel not otherwise included in the
preceding categories.
(2) Any person seeking relief under 29 U.S.C. 621, 42 U.S.C. 1981, 42 U.S.C. 1982,
42 U.S.C. 1983, 42 U.S.C. 1985, 42 U.S.C. 1986, 42 U.S.C. 2000a, 42 U.S.C. 2000d, and
42 U.S.C. 2000e or in such other cases as the court shall determine to be appropriate may be
eligible for representation. The court may approve such representation on a determination that the
interests of justice so require and that the person is financially unable to obtain representation.
(3) The court may at its discretion and in the interest of justice substitute one appointed
counsel for another at any stage of the proceedings on appeal.
(4) The court may at its discretion and where circumstances warrant make appointments of
counsel retroactive so as to include representation furnished prior to appointment.
(c) Withdrawal or Release of Appointed Counsel.
Counsel appointed under this rule to represent a party shall continue such representation until
relieved by order of the court of appeals.
(d) Duties of Appointed Counsel.
(1) Appointed counsel shall furnish the party represented, upon written request, with a copy
of motion papers and briefs filed for the party on the appeal, and shall send the party a copy of the
Rev.: 8/07
Addendum Five
court's decision when issued; the clerk will send appointed counsel an extra copy of the decision for
this purpose.
(2) Appointed counsel shall appear for oral argument only when directed by the court.
(3) In the event of affirmance or other decision adverse to the party represented appointed
counsel shall promptly advise the party in writing of the right to seek further review by the filing of
a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court.
(4) Appointed counsel shall advise the party represented in each case that, if the party wishes
to file a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court, the party may have the right to do
so without prepayment of fees and costs or giving security therefor.
(5) No appointed representative under this rule shall accept a payment from or on behalf of
the person represented in this court without prior authorization by a United States circuit judge.
(e)
(1) In all appeals covered by this rule, the court of appeals may authorize reimbursement of
necessary expenses reasonably incurred in representing a party on appeal, consistent with the
limitations contained in the Criminal Justice Act, by any private attorney, bar association, legal aid
agency, or other approved organization appointed by the court for the purpose of representing a party
on appeal pursuant to this addendum. Compensation for attorney services as a fee for either in-court
or out-of-court time is not authorized.
(2) Travel expenses and other expenses reasonably incurred and necessary for adequate
representation on appeal may be claimed by an appointed attorney or other legal representative. The
clerk of court shall furnish each attorney or other representative at the time of appointment with
information as to expenses currently allowable and in accordance with rules, regulations and
guidelines promulgated by the Judicial Conference of the United States. Per diem may not be
claimed in lieu of actual travel and subsistence expenses. Meal and lodging expenses incurred
incident to representation on appeal, necessary long distance telephone calls or telegrams, and the
cost of photocopying (but not printing), are reimbursable expenses within the guidelines established
by the court. Expenses of general office overhead, personal items, filing fees and expenses of
printing of briefs are not reimbursable. Expenses of travel by private automobile may be claimed
on a straight mileage basis at the authorized rate. See (6) of the guidelines, below. Parking fees
and toll expenses are allowable. Transportation other than by private automobile may be claimed
on an actual cost basis, but first class fare is not permitted unless absolutely necessary and
documentation is provided that tourist or economy fares were not available.
(3) Unless otherwise ordered by the court for good cause shown, travel expenses other than
those incurred in connection with attending oral argument will not be reimbursed without a prior ex
parte application to and approval by the court.
Rev.: 8/07
Addendum Five
(4) All claims for reimbursement of expenses for representation on appeal shall be itemized
in detail and filed with the clerk of court on officially approved forms that the clerk's office will
provide. Claims should be filed as promptly as possible and in no event later than 60 days after
issuance of the mandate.
(5) After approval of allowable reimbursable expenses by the court, the claim form will be
forwarded to the circuit executive for payment.
(6) Reimbursable Expenses.
(a) Travel and transportation expenses. Travel and transportation must be accomplished by
the most economical means available. Only actual expenses may be claimed.
(i) Air transportation. Tourist or economy accommodations must be used except
where unavailable. A copy of the ticket must be attached to the claim form. If travel
by first class air transportation is claimed a detailed explanation of the reasons
therefor must be provided with the ticket copy.
(ii) Automobile transportation. The total mileage cost shall not exceed the fare
authorized for travel by tourist or economy air transport except in an emergency or
for other compelling reasons. Travel by privately owned automobile shall not exceed
the current government authorized rate for official travel per mile on a straight
mileage basis, plus parking fees, ferry, bridge, road, and tunnel fares.
(iii) Local transportation. Local travel will be accomplished by the most economical
means available and only actual expenses may be claimed. Transportation to and
from an airport should be by airport shuttle, if available.
(iv) Meals and lodging. Reasonable compensation for hotel or motel
accommodations and meals will be allowed on an actual expense basis subject to the
limitations governing compensation for federal employees traveling to the same
destination. Counsel will be notified by the clerk prior to the scheduled oral
argument session of the current limitations. A copy of the hotel or motel bill shall
be attached to the claim form.
(b) Photocopying. Actual costs not to exceed 25 cents per page will be paid if copy bill is
submitted. For in-house copying, actual costs not to exceed 15 cents per page will be paid.
(c) Express mail and other special arrangements. For delivery of items that could have been
mailed via U.S. Postal Service first class mail, additional expenses will be reimbursed only
if a satisfactory explanation is given why first class mail service was not utilized. In
non-emergency cases routine documents such as briefs and motions should be prepared early
enough to permit use of first class mail.
Rev.: 8/07
Addendum Five
Rev.: 8/07
Addendum Five
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/initiatives/civil_right_to_counsel.html
Home > ABA Groups > Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants > Initiatives > Civil
Right to Counsel
Additional Resources
ABA Toolkit for a Right to Counsel in Civil
Proceedings
Neil J. Gillespie
Birth Date: 3/19/1956
Accu-Chek Compass
One Page Summary Report
12/29/2014 - 1/11/2015
Trend Graph
600
550
500
450
bG (mg/dL)
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
12/29
2014
12/30
12/31
1/1
2015
1/2
1/3
1/4
1/5
1/6
1/7
1/8
1/9
1/10
1/11
Average Day
600
550
500
450
bG (mg/dL)
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Night
Before
Breakfast
After
Breakfast
Before
Lunch
After
Lunch
Before
Dinner
After
Dinner
Evening
Target Range
Overall
After Meals
Range
Above Target
Within Target
Below Target
Hypo
Printed: 1/11/2015
Tests Percent
11 100.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
356
Highest bG (mg/dL):
213
Lowest bG (mg/dL):
Average bG (mg/dL): 270.5
Number of HIs:
0
Number of LOs:
0
Page 1 of 1
11
Total # of Tests:
Avg. # Tests per Day: 0.8
Standard Deviation: 48.3
Roche Diagnostics
October 6, 2015
Neil J. Gillespie
8092 SW 115th Loop
Ocala, FL 34481
Tel. 352-854-7807
Email: neilgillespie@mfi.net
Enclosure: Addendum Five to the local rules for the U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
https://wwwapps.ups.com/WebTracking/processPOD?Requester=&tracknum=1Z64589FNW92003432&refNumbers=&loc=en_US
Proof of Delivery
Close Window
Dear Customer,
This notice serves as proof of delivery for the shipment listed below.
Tracking Number:
Service:
Weight:
Shipped/Billed On:
Delivered On:
Delivered To:
Signed By:
1Z64589FNW92003432
UPS Next Day Air Saver
.40 lb
10/06/2015
10/07/2015 10:29 A.M.
56 FORSYTH ST NW
ATLANTA, GA, US 30303
GREENE
Left At:
Mail Room
Close Window
https://www.ups.com/uis/create?ActionOriginPair=default___PrintWindowPage&key=labelWindow&type=html&loc=en_US&instr=A&doc=shipment...
FOLD HERE
ADDENDUM FIVE
NON-CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT COUNSEL APPOINTMENTS
The court adopts these provisions for furnishing representation for persons financially unable
to obtain adequate representation in cases and situations which do not fall within the scope of 18
U.S.C. 3006A, as amended but in which the court believes that the interests of justice will be
served by the presence of counsel.
(a) Determination of Need.
In determining need for appointment of counsel, the court shall generally be governed by the
guidelines outlined in 18 U.S.C. 3006A.
(b) Appointment of Counsel.
(1) Counsel shall be selected from the same panels of attorneys designated or approved by
the district courts of the Eleventh Circuit as described in Addendum Four, which are hereby
approved by this court, or from a bar association, legal aid agency, or other approved organization.
In addition, any judge of this court may appoint competent counsel not otherwise included in the
preceding categories.
(2) Any person seeking relief under 29 U.S.C. 621, 42 U.S.C. 1981, 42 U.S.C. 1982,
42 U.S.C. 1983, 42 U.S.C. 1985, 42 U.S.C. 1986, 42 U.S.C. 2000a, 42 U.S.C. 2000d, and
42 U.S.C. 2000e or in such other cases as the court shall determine to be appropriate may be
eligible for representation. The court may approve such representation on a determination that the
interests of justice so require and that the person is financially unable to obtain representation.
(3) The court may at its discretion and in the interest of justice substitute one appointed
counsel for another at any stage of the proceedings on appeal.
(4) The court may at its discretion and where circumstances warrant make appointments of
counsel retroactive so as to include representation furnished prior to appointment.
(c) Withdrawal or Release of Appointed Counsel.
Counsel appointed under this rule to represent a party shall continue such representation until
relieved by order of the court of appeals.
(d) Duties of Appointed Counsel.
(1) Appointed counsel shall furnish the party represented, upon written request, with a copy
of motion papers and briefs filed for the party on the appeal, and shall send the party a copy of the
Rev.: 8/07
Addendum Five
court's decision when issued; the clerk will send appointed counsel an extra copy of the decision for
this purpose.
(2) Appointed counsel shall appear for oral argument only when directed by the court.
(3) In the event of affirmance or other decision adverse to the party represented appointed
counsel shall promptly advise the party in writing of the right to seek further review by the filing of
a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court.
(4) Appointed counsel shall advise the party represented in each case that, if the party wishes
to file a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court, the party may have the right to do
so without prepayment of fees and costs or giving security therefor.
(5) No appointed representative under this rule shall accept a payment from or on behalf of
the person represented in this court without prior authorization by a United States circuit judge.
(e)
(1) In all appeals covered by this rule, the court of appeals may authorize reimbursement of
necessary expenses reasonably incurred in representing a party on appeal, consistent with the
limitations contained in the Criminal Justice Act, by any private attorney, bar association, legal aid
agency, or other approved organization appointed by the court for the purpose of representing a party
on appeal pursuant to this addendum. Compensation for attorney services as a fee for either in-court
or out-of-court time is not authorized.
(2) Travel expenses and other expenses reasonably incurred and necessary for adequate
representation on appeal may be claimed by an appointed attorney or other legal representative. The
clerk of court shall furnish each attorney or other representative at the time of appointment with
information as to expenses currently allowable and in accordance with rules, regulations and
guidelines promulgated by the Judicial Conference of the United States. Per diem may not be
claimed in lieu of actual travel and subsistence expenses. Meal and lodging expenses incurred
incident to representation on appeal, necessary long distance telephone calls or telegrams, and the
cost of photocopying (but not printing), are reimbursable expenses within the guidelines established
by the court. Expenses of general office overhead, personal items, filing fees and expenses of
printing of briefs are not reimbursable. Expenses of travel by private automobile may be claimed
on a straight mileage basis at the authorized rate. See (6) of the guidelines, below. Parking fees
and toll expenses are allowable. Transportation other than by private automobile may be claimed
on an actual cost basis, but first class fare is not permitted unless absolutely necessary and
documentation is provided that tourist or economy fares were not available.
(3) Unless otherwise ordered by the court for good cause shown, travel expenses other than
those incurred in connection with attending oral argument will not be reimbursed without a prior ex
parte application to and approval by the court.
Rev.: 8/07
Addendum Five
(4) All claims for reimbursement of expenses for representation on appeal shall be itemized
in detail and filed with the clerk of court on officially approved forms that the clerk's office will
provide. Claims should be filed as promptly as possible and in no event later than 60 days after
issuance of the mandate.
(5) After approval of allowable reimbursable expenses by the court, the claim form will be
forwarded to the circuit executive for payment.
(6) Reimbursable Expenses.
(a) Travel and transportation expenses. Travel and transportation must be accomplished by
the most economical means available. Only actual expenses may be claimed.
(i) Air transportation. Tourist or economy accommodations must be used except
where unavailable. A copy of the ticket must be attached to the claim form. If travel
by first class air transportation is claimed a detailed explanation of the reasons
therefor must be provided with the ticket copy.
(ii) Automobile transportation. The total mileage cost shall not exceed the fare
authorized for travel by tourist or economy air transport except in an emergency or
for other compelling reasons. Travel by privately owned automobile shall not exceed
the current government authorized rate for official travel per mile on a straight
mileage basis, plus parking fees, ferry, bridge, road, and tunnel fares.
(iii) Local transportation. Local travel will be accomplished by the most economical
means available and only actual expenses may be claimed. Transportation to and
from an airport should be by airport shuttle, if available.
(iv) Meals and lodging. Reasonable compensation for hotel or motel
accommodations and meals will be allowed on an actual expense basis subject to the
limitations governing compensation for federal employees traveling to the same
destination. Counsel will be notified by the clerk prior to the scheduled oral
argument session of the current limitations. A copy of the hotel or motel bill shall
be attached to the claim form.
(b) Photocopying. Actual costs not to exceed 25 cents per page will be paid if copy bill is
submitted. For in-house copying, actual costs not to exceed 15 cents per page will be paid.
(c) Express mail and other special arrangements. For delivery of items that could have been
mailed via U.S. Postal Service first class mail, additional expenses will be reimbursed only
if a satisfactory explanation is given why first class mail service was not utilized. In
non-emergency cases routine documents such as briefs and motions should be prepared early
enough to permit use of first class mail.
Rev.: 8/07
Addendum Five
Rev.: 8/07
Addendum Five
Page 1 of 3
Neil Gillespie
From:
To:
Cc:
Sent:
Attach:
Subject:
10/10/2015
Page 2 of 3
Cc: Ita M. Neymotin ; Mark Brewer ; Alton L. "Rip" Colvin ; Jeffrey Lewis ; JOHN TENEWITZ ; Neil Gillespie
Sent: Saturday, September 12, 2015 6:16 AM
Subject: Fw: How does a qualified civil litigant obtain a federal civil counsel appointment?
Mr. Carey, when can I expect a response from you to my email below?
Thank you. Neil J Gillespie
----- Original Message ----From: Neil Gillespie
To: Rick Carey
Cc: Neil Gillespie
Sent: Friday, September 11, 2015 2:05 AM
Subject: How does a qualified civil litigant obtain a federal civil counsel appointment?
Rick Carey
Assistant Federal Public Defender
Office of the Federal Public Defender
201 SW 2nd St Ste 102
Ocala, FL 34474-4119
Office: 352-351-9157
Fax: 352-351-9162
Dear Mr. Carey:
This is a request for information only.
How does a qualified civil litigant obtain a federal civil counsel appointment? A law-abiding civil litigant who is indigent,
disabled, and a vulnerable adult, (Fla. Stat. ch 415). Cases like a section 1983 civil rights lawsuit, or defense of a wrongful
foreclosure of a federal HECM reverse home mortgage.
Attached you will find Addendum Five to the local rules, U.S. Eleventh Circuit (set out in part below) that shows non-criminal
justice act counsel appointments are available.
http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/courtdocs/clk/RulesAddendum05AUG07.pdf
How does a qualified litigant apply for a federal civil counsel appointment?
The U.S. District Court, Middle District of Florida CJA page does not show information for a non-criminal justice act civil
counsel appointment. https://www.flmd.uscourts.gov/AttyResources/cja_e-voucher.htm
Do the federal courts have a plan equivalent to the Florida Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel, the five
Regional Counsel offices created by the legislature (Statute 27.511)? http://flrc2.org/History.html If so, How does a qualified
litigant apply for a federal civil counsel appointment?
Also, the American Bar Association (ABA) has a "Civil Right to Counsel" page, "Law Governing Appointment of Counsel in
State Civil Proceedings", with 50 research reports, one for each state detailing existing authority for appointment of counsel in
various types of civil proceedings. The Florida report is attached.
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/initiatives/resource_center_for_access_to_justice/resources--information-on-key-atj-issues/civil_right_to_counsel1.html
If I missed anything leading to a federal civil counsel appointment, please advise me. Thank you.
Sincerely,
Neil J. Gillespie
8092 SW 115th Loop
Ocala, FL 34481
Tel. 352-854-7807
Email: neilgillespie@mfi.net
ADDENDUM FIVE - U.S. Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
NON-CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT COUNSEL APPOINTMENTS
http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/courtdocs/clk/RulesAddendum05AUG07.pdf
10/10/2015
Page 3 of 3
The court adopts these provisions for furnishing representation for persons financially unable to obtain adequate representation
in cases and situations which do not fall within the scope of 18 U.S.C. 3006A, as amended but in which the court believes
that the interests of justice will be served by the presence of counsel.
(a) Determination of Need...
(b) Appointment of Counsel...
(2) Any person seeking relief under 29 U.S.C. 621, 42 U.S.C. 1981, 42 U.S.C. 1982, 42 U.S.C. 1983, 42 U.S.C. 1985,
42 U.S.C. 1986, 42 U.S.C. 2000a, 42 U.S.C. 2000d, and 42 U.S.C. 2000e or in such other cases as the court shall
determine to be appropriate may be eligible for representation. The court may approve such representation on a determination
that the interests of justice so require and that the person is financially unable to obtain representation
10/10/2015
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/initiatives/resource_center_for_access_to_justice/resources---information-on-key-at...
Home > ABA Groups > Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent
Defendants > Initiatives > Resource Center for Access to Justice Initiatives > Resources & Information
on Key ATJ Issues > Civil Right to Counsel
Additional Resources
ABA Toolkit for a Right to Counsel in Civil
Proceedings
FLORIDA
Copyright 2014 American Bar Associaton
All rights reserved.
American Bar Associaton
Standing Commitee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants
321 N. Clark Street
Chicago, IL 60610
Phone: 312-988-5765; FAX: 312-988-5483
htp://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_aid_indigent_defendants.html
The materials herein may be reproduced, in whole or in part, provided that such use is for informatonal, noncommercial purposes only and any copy of the materials or porton thereof acknowledges original publicaton by
the American Bar Associaton and includes the ttle of the publicaton, the name of the author, and the legend
Copyright 2014 American Bar Associaton. Reprinted by permission. Requests to reproduce materials in any
other manner should be addressed to: Copyrights and Contracts Department, American Bar Associaton,
321 N. Clark Street, Chicago, IL 60610; Phone: 312-988-6102; FAX: 312-988-6030;
E-mail: copyright@abanet.org.
ABA DIRECTORY OF LAW GOVERNING APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN STATE CIVIL PROCEEDINGS FLORIDA 2012
FLORIDA
Table of Contents
Preface.........................................................................................................................................................1
Law Addressing Authorizaton or Requirement to Appoint Counsel in Specifc Types of Civil Proceedings.2
1. SHELTER..............................................................................................................................................2
Federal Statutes and Court Decisions Interpretng Statutes...........................................................2
2. SUSTENANCE......................................................................................................................................2
Federal Statutes and Court Decisions Interpretng Statutes...........................................................2
3. SAFETY AND/OR HEALTH....................................................................................................................3
A. Domestc Violence Protecton Order Proceedings.........................................................................3
B. Conservatorship, Adult Guardianship, or Adult Protectve Proceedings........................................3
State Statutes and Court Decisions Interpretng Statutes...............................................................3
State Court Rules and Court Decisions Interpretng Court Rules....................................................4
C. Civil Commitment or Involuntary Mental Health Treatment Proceedings.....................................4
State Statutes and Court Decisions Interpretng Statutes...............................................................4
State Court Rules and Court Decisions Interpretng Court Rules....................................................5
State Court Decisions Addressing Consttutonal Due Process or Equal Protecton .....................5
D. Sex Ofender Proceedings..............................................................................................................5
E. Involuntary Quarantne, Inoculaton, or Sterilizaton Proceedings.................................................5
State Statutes and Court Decisions Interpretng Statutes...............................................................5
4. CHILD CUSTODY..................................................................................................................................5
A. Appointment of Counsel for ParentState-Initated Proceedings................................................5
State Statutes and Court Decisions Interpretng Statutes ..............................................................5
Federal Statutes and Court Decisions Interpretng Statutes...........................................................6
State Court Rules and Court Decisions Interpretng Court Rules....................................................7
State Court Decisions Addressing Consttutonal Due Process or Equal Protecton ....................7
State Court Decisions Addressing Courts Inherent Authority........................................................9
B. Appointment of Counsel for ParentPrivately Initated Proceedings...........................................9
State Court Decisions Addressing Consttutonal Due Process or Equal Protecton .....................9
C. Appointment of Counsel for ChildState-Initated Proceedings.................................................10
Federal Statutes and Court Decisions Interpretng Statutes.........................................................10
State Court Rules and Court Decisions Interpretng Court Rules..................................................11
State Court Decisions Addressing Consttutonal Due Process or Equal Protecton ..................11
D. Appointment of Counsel for ChildPrivately Initated Proceedings...........................................11
5. MISCELLANEOUS..............................................................................................................................11
A. Civil Contempt Proceedings.........................................................................................................11
State Court Decisions Addressing Consttutonal Due Process or Equal Protecton ..................11
B. Paternity Proceedings..................................................................................................................12
C. Proceedings for Judicial Bypass of Parental Consent for Minor to Obtain an Aborton...............12
State Statutes and Court Decisions Interpretng Statutes.............................................................12
State Court Decisions Addressing Consttutonal Due Process or Equal Protecton ..................12
D. Unaccompanied Minors in Immigraton Proceedings..................................................................13
ABA DIRECTORY OF LAW GOVERNING APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN STATE CIVIL PROCEEDINGS FLORIDA 2012
ii
ABA DIRECTORY OF LAW GOVERNING APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN STATE CIVIL PROCEEDINGS FLORIDA 2012
iii
Preface
Important Informaton to Read Before Using This Directory
The ABA Directory of Law Governing Appointment of Counsel in State Civil Proceedings
(Directory) is a compilaton of existng statutory provisions, case law, and court rules requiring
or permitng judges to appoint counsel for civil litgants. The Directory consists of 51 detailed
research reportsone for each state plus D.C.that present informaton organized by types of
civil proceedings. Prior to using the Directory, please read the Introducton, at the Directorys
home page, for the reasons behind the development of the Directory, the various sources of
authority from which judicial powers to appoint counsel in civil proceedings may derive, and
the structure used to organize informaton within each of the research reports.
Terms of Use/Disclaimers
This Directory should not be construed as providing legal advice and the ABA makes no
warrantes concerning the informaton contained therein, which has been updated to refect
the law through early 2012. The Directory does not seek to address all conceivable subsidiary
issues in each jurisdicton, but some such issues were researched and addressed, including:
notfcaton of right to counsel; standards for waiver of right to counsel; standard of review on
appeal for improper denial of counsel at trial; whether counsel for a child means a clientdirected atorney or a best interests atorney/atorney ad litem; and federal court decisions
fnding a right to counsel. Similarly, the research did not exhaustvely identfy all law regarding
the issue of compensaton of appointed counsel in each jurisdicton, though discussion of such
law does appear within some of the reports.
The Directory atempts to identfy as unpublished any court decisions not published
within an ofcial or unofcial case reporter. Discussion of unpublished cases appears only for
those jurisdictons where court rules currently permit their citaton in briefs or opinions.
Limitatons on the use of unpublished opinions vary by jurisdicton (e.g., whether unpublished
cases have value as precedent), and such limits were not exhaustvely researched. Users should
conduct independent, jurisdicton-specifc research both to confrm whether a case is published
and to familiarize themselves with all rules relatng to the citaton and use of unpublished or
unreported cases.
Acknowledgments
This Directory was a mult-year project of the ABAs Standing Commitee on Legal Aid
and Indigent Defendants (SCLAID). We are indebted to our partner in this project, the Natonal
Coaliton for a Civil Right to Counsel (NCCRC), for sharing the body of research that was adapted
to form the Directorys reports. The Acknowledgments, at the Directorys home page, details
additonal specifc contributons of the many individuals involved in this project.
ABA DIRECTORY OF LAW GOVERNING APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN STATE CIVIL PROCEEDINGS FLORIDA 2012
A protectve service interventon is a hearing in which the court determines whether, as a result of abuse,
neglect, or exploitaton, an adult is in need of protectve services by the state, such as placement in adult familycare homes, assisted living facilites, nursing homes, or other appropriate facilites. Fla. Stat.. 415.1051(3). See
also id. 415.1051(1) (describing nonemergency protectve services interventons).
2
In re Fey, 624 So.2d 770, 772 n.1 (Fla. App. 1993) (Florida Probate Rule 5.550(b)(1)(B) provides that the requisite
notce of fling the petton to determine incapacity shall state that an atorney has been appointed to represent
such person; thus, the appointment of counsel must be accomplished at the very onset of guardianship
proceedings, as opposed to any tme before fnal hearing.)
ABA DIRECTORY OF LAW GOVERNING APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN STATE CIVIL PROCEEDINGS FLORIDA 2012
(c) Any atorney representng an alleged incapacitated person may not serve as guardian
of the alleged incapacitated person or as counsel for the guardian of the alleged
incapacitated person or the pettoner.
(d) Efectve January 1, 2007, an atorney seeking to be appointed by a court for
incapacity and guardianship proceedings must have completed a minimum of 8 hours of
educaton in guardianship. A court may waive the inital training requirement for an
atorney who has served as a court-appointed atorney in incapacity proceedings or as
an atorney of record for guardians for not less than 3 years. The educaton requirement
of this paragraph does not apply to the ofce of criminal confict and civil regional
counsel untl July 1, 2008.
One of the Florida Court of Appeals has said that the failure to appoint counsel in such
proceedings is reversible error. Martnez v. Cramer, --- So.3d ----, 2013 WL 4006526 (Fla. App.
2013) (citng In re Fey, 624 So.2d 770, 772 (Fla. App. 1993). Counsel is also provided for review
of the guardianship. Fla. Stat. 744.464(2)(e). Additonally, Fla. Stat. 744.3031 provides that
counsel must be appointed for emergency guardianship proceedings.
State Court Rules and Court Decisions Interpretng Court Rules
Fla. Prob. R. 5.649(c) provides that [w]ithin 3 days afer a petton has been fled, the
court shall appoint an atorney to represent a person with a developmental disability who is the
subject of a petton to appoint a guardian advocate. The person with a developmental disability
may substtute his or her own atorney for the atorney appointed by the court.
C. Civil Commitment or Involuntary Mental Health Treatment Proceedings
State Statutes and Court Decisions Interpretng Statutes
When an indigent person is mentally disabled and requires involuntary admission to
residental services, he or she is enttled to appointed counsel at both the capacity
determinaton, Fla. Stat. 393.12, and the hearing to determine involuntary admission, id.
393.11(6). Counsel must also be appointed for indigent people subject to pettons for
involuntary outpatent placement, see id. 394.4655(4), or inpatent placement, see id.
394.467(4).3
In Auxier v. Jerome Golden Center for Behavioral Health, 85 So.3d 1164 (Fla. App. 2012), a wards GAL commited
the ward and then opposed appointment of counsel for the ward, arguing that the GALs own atorney could
represent the ward. The Court of Appeals held that the atorney appointed pursuant to 394.467(4) represents
the ward, not any GAL that the ward might have.
ABA DIRECTORY OF LAW GOVERNING APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN STATE CIVIL PROCEEDINGS FLORIDA 2012
Indigent partes also have the right to court-appointed counsel in proceedings regarding
involuntary substance abuse treatment. See id. 397.681(2).
State Court Rules and Court Decisions Interpretng Court Rules
Fla. R. Juv. P. Rule 8.350(a)(6)( 2011) provides that, where the state seeks to place a
dependent child in mental health facility, [i]f the department's moton, the guardian ad litem's
report, or another party based on communicaton with the child indicates that the child does
not agree with the department's moton, then the court shall appoint an atorney to represent
the child, if one has not already been appointed.
State Court Decisions Addressing Consttutonal Due Process or Equal Protecton
The Florida Supreme Court has found a right to counsel for civil commitment. Pullen v.
State, 802 So.2d 1113, 1119 (Fla. 2001) (While the right to appointed counsel in Baker Act
involuntary civil commitment proceedings is provided by Florida statute, the consttutonal
guarantee of due process would require no less.). Though the court did not specify which
consttuton it was relying on, its citaton to federal cases would suggest it was a holding under
the federal consttuton.
D. Sex Ofender Proceedings
Fla. Stat. 394.916(3) specifes that in proceedings for involuntary civil commitment of
sexually violent predators, [a]t all adversarial proceedings under this act, the person subject to
this act is enttled to the assistance of counsel, and, if the person is indigent, the court shall
appoint the public defender or, if a confict exists, other counsel to assist the person.
E. Involuntary Quarantne, Inoculaton, or Sterilizaton Proceedings
State Statutes and Court Decisions Interpretng Statutes
If an indigent person is to be hospitalized or placed in isolaton due to tuberculosis, she
or he has the right to appointed counsel at the hearing. See id. 392.56(3)(c).
4. CHILD CUSTODY
A. Appointment of Counsel for ParentState-Initated Proceedings
State Statutes and Court Decisions Interpretng Statutes
ABA DIRECTORY OF LAW GOVERNING APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN STATE CIVIL PROCEEDINGS FLORIDA 2012
Florida statutes provide indigent parents with a right to counsel in all dependency
proceedings. Fla. Stat. 39.013(1) (Parents must be informed by the court of their right to
counsel in dependency proceedings at each stage of the dependency proceedings. Parents who
are unable to aford counsel must be appointed counsel.); see also id. 39.013(9) (describing
courts responsibilites under this provision). There is, however, a split of authority as to
whether the term parent in 39.013(1) includes the non-ofending parent. See In re A.G., 40
So.3d 908 (Fla. App. 2010) (fnding non-ofending parent is enttled to appointed counsel, and
disagreeing with C.L.R. v. Department of Children & Families, 913 So.2d 764 (Fla. App. 2005)).
Dependency proceedings ofen determine whether children will be placed in shelters
temporarily or whether parental rights will be terminated permanently, and statutes expressly
mandate appointment of counsel in each of these partcular circumstances. See id.
39.013(10) (Court-appointed counsel representng indigent parents at shelter hearings shall be
paid from state funds appropriated by general law.); id. 39.402(5)(b)(2) (during hearings to
determine the placement of children in shelters, if indigent, the parents have the right to be
represented by appointed counsel). Id. 39.807(1)(a) (The court shall appoint counsel for
indigent parents for all stages of terminaton of parental rights proceedings).
If a parent voluntarily surrenders rights to a child, Florida statutory law does not provide
a right to counsel in dependency proceedings. See Fla. Stat. 39.807 (2011)(d) (right to counsel
not applicable to any parent who has voluntarily executed a writen surrender of the child and
consent to the entry of a court order therefor.) See also Justce Admin. Comm'n v. Goetel, 32
So. 3d 786, 787 (Fla. App. 2010) (Because the mother executed a writen surrender, she had
no right to appointed counsel for her terminaton proceeding.). Also, grandparents do not
have a statutory right to court-appointed counsel in dependency proceedings. Justce
Administratve Com'n v. Grover, 12 So. 3d 1256 (Fla. App. 2009). A legal guardian who is not a
parent similarly lacks a statutory right for appointment of counsel. B.M. v. Dep't of Children &
Families, 842 So. 2d 936, 937 (Fla. App. 2003) (As B.D. is not a parent of these children, there is
no fundamental liberty interest of a parent involved in these proceedings.).
Federal Statutes and Court Decisions Interpretng Statutes
The federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), which governs child welfare proceedings in
state court,4 provides:
In any case in which the court determines indigency, the parent or Indian custodian shall
4
While the ICWA does not appear to have a defnitve statement about jurisdicton, 25 U.S.C. 1912(b) refers to
state law not providing for appointment of counsel. Additonally, 25 U.S.C. 1912(b) states: In any involuntary
proceeding in a State court, where the court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the
party seeking the foster care placement of, or terminaton of parental rights to, an Indian child shall notfy the
parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child's tribe, by registered mail with return receipt requested, of the
pending proceedings and of their right of interventon. These provisions, plus the fact that child welfare
proceedings typically occur in state court, suggest that ICWA applies in state law proceedings.
ABA DIRECTORY OF LAW GOVERNING APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN STATE CIVIL PROCEEDINGS FLORIDA 2012
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981) (fnding no absolute Fourteenth Amendment right
to counsel in terminaton of parental rights proceedings).
6
Potvin in turn drew its test largely from Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1974). As noted earlier, the right
to appointed counsel has since been statutorily extended to all dependency proceedings by Fla. Stat. 39.013 and
in S.B. v. Dept. of Children & Families, 851 So. 2d 689, 692 (Fla. 2003), the court noted that Fla. Stat. 39.013(1)
supersedes the Potvin factors by providing an absolute right to counsel in all dependency proceedings.
ABA DIRECTORY OF LAW GOVERNING APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN STATE CIVIL PROCEEDINGS FLORIDA 2012
because there is a consttutonally protected interest in preserving the family unit and raising
ones children, In re D.B., 385 So. 2d at 90, the Potvin calculus always mandates appointment
of counsel for the parent when terminaton of parental rights is at stake: [A] consttutonal
right to counsel necessarily arises where the proceedings can result in permanent loss of
parental custody. In all other circumstances the consttutonal right to counsel is not
conclusive; rather, the right to counsel will depend upon a case-by-case applicaton of the test
adopted in Potvin . . . . Id. at 87.
The D.B. court concluded by notng that it was not departng from federal precedent:
The right to counsel in juvenile dependency proceedings has not been addressed by the United
States Supreme Court. Further, only one federal appellate court, the Ninth Circuit in Cleaver v.
Wilcox, has writen on the issue, and we have adhered to their view. Id. at 94. But since
Lassiter, the Florida Supreme Court has, without expressly notng the confict, 7 reafrmed its
view that, when terminaton of parental rights are at stake, state due process always mandates
appointment of counsel for the parent. See J.B. v. Florida Dept. of Children and Family Services,
768 So. 2d 1060, 1067-68 (Fla. 2000); In re E.H., 609 So. 2d 1289, 1290 (Fla. 1992).
Applying the Potvin factors, an intermediate appellate court found that due process
required counsel to be provided in a dependency proceeding even when terminaton of
parental rights was not at stake when the indigent parent was mentally ill and thus lacked the
ability to represent herself efectvely. See L.W. v. Dep't. of Health and Rehabilitatve Services,
695 So. 2d 724 (Fla. App. 1996). And in White v. Department of Health and Rehabilitatve
Services, 483 So. 2d 861 (Fla. App. 1986), the court found that the parents at issue were enttled
to appointed counsel at every stage of the dependency proceedings where their admissions
during the dependency proceeding resulted in an adjudicaton of their abuse and neglect
(which are two grounds for permanent commitment) and resulted in placement of the twins in
a foster home where lack of parental visitaton resulted in a charge of abandonment (a third
ground for permanent commitment) and resulted in a performance agreement (the failure to
perform being a fourth ground for permanent commitment). See also In re R.W., 429 So. 2d
711, 712 (Fla. App. 1983) (in dependency case, [m]erely informing an indigent parent of the
right to assistance of counsel, and referring that parent to a legal aid ofce, while withholding
court appointment and failing to establish a knowing waiver of record, does not pass
consttutonal muster.) But see In Interest of J.L.C., 501 So. 2d 92, 93 (Fla. App. 1987) (per
curiam) (rejectng mothers argument that failure to provide counsel untl terminaton
proceeding violated due process; court cites to D.B. and notes that it does not appear that the
trial court's determinaton was based on evidence previously adduced at a dependency hearing
at which the mother was not represented by counsel).
One intermediate appellate court did note the confict shortly afer Lassiter was decided. See In re D.D.W., 400
So. 2d 1310, 1311 (Fla. App. 1981).
ABA DIRECTORY OF LAW GOVERNING APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN STATE CIVIL PROCEEDINGS FLORIDA 2012
In S.B. v. Dept of Children and Families, 851 So. 2d 689, 694 (Fla. 2003), in which counsel
was appointed pursuant to statute in a child dependency proceeding, the Florida Supreme
Court held that [b]ecause there is no consttutonal right to counsel under the circumstances
of this case, we likewise fnd that there is no right to collaterally challenge the efectveness of
counsel. However, there might be a right to efectve assistance in cases where the right to
counsel is consttutonally based. In In re E.K., 33 So. 3d 125, 127 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010), the
Second District Court of Florida took up this issue and called a right to efectve counsel one
without a means by which to enforce that right. The court noted that while the state
supreme court had not held that an individual has a right to efectve counsel, it appears that a
parent who is consttutonally enttled to appointed counsel in a terminaton proceeding is
implicitly enttled to efectve assistance of counsel. Id. at 127. The court outlined the history
of the problem in Florida courts and sought certfcaton on the issue. Id. It appears that none
of the partes in E.K. requested that the Supreme Court accept jurisdicton on certfcaton, and
no acton was taken on the issue. See Deborah A. Schroth, Role of the Lawyer in Dependency
Cases, JUVL FL-CLE 10-1 (2011).
State Court Decisions Addressing Courts Inherent Authority
In Makemson v. Martn County, 491 So. 2d 1109, 1112 (Fla. 1986), the Florida Supreme
Court held that the court has the authority to exceed legislatvely mandated statutory fee caps
in order to ensure reasonable compensaton for atorneys who had been appointed to
represent indigent clients in criminal cases. In Board of County Com'rs of Hillsborough County
v. Curry, 545 So.2d 930 (Fla. App. 1989), a Florida Court of Appeals extended the reasoning of
Makemson to non-capital cases, notng that the basis for the Makemson decision was the
judiciary's inherent power to ensure adequate representaton for indigent criminal defendants
by competent counsel, regardless of whether the defendant has been charged with a capital
crime. Further, the Scruggs court extended Makemson to terminaton of parental rights cases
due to the fundamental rights at stake and suggested that it would reach a similar holding in
any type of case where counsel was consttutonally required. See Id.
B. Appointment of Counsel for ParentPrivately Initated Proceedings
State Court Decisions Addressing Consttutonal Due Process or Equal Protecton
In a decision that involved the terminaton of a fathers parental rights pursuant to a
contested adopton proceeding, the court of appeals in the Second District found that an
indigent legal parent is enttled to appointed counsel in an adopton proceeding that involves
the involuntary terminaton of his or her parental rights . . . . O.A.H. v. R.L.A., 712 So. 2d 4 (Fla.
App. 1998). In O.A.H., the court found that although the applicable statute pursuant to which
the fathers parental rights were to be terminated (Fla. Stat. 63.072) (repealed in 2001) did
ABA DIRECTORY OF LAW GOVERNING APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN STATE CIVIL PROCEEDINGS FLORIDA 2012
not contain an express statutory right to counsel, under Floridas Due Process Clause, the father
was nonetheless enttled to counsel, when the proceedings can result in a permanent loss of
parental rights. Id. at 10. In reaching its decision, the court in O.A.H. also found that an
adopton proceeding, and the resultng terminaton of parental rights, is not purely a private
dispute and that the State has exclusive authority to terminate legal relatonship of a parent
and child, and that this authority is a state acton sufcient to invoke due process concerns.
Id. at 8. Regarding state acton, the court relied upon U.S. Supreme Court precedent in M.L.B.
v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 117 n.8 (1996). See also M.E.K. v. R.L.K., 921 So. 2d 787 (Fla. App. 2006)
(in adopton case, Fifh District holds that trial court in adopton case erred in following Lassiter
instead of O.A.H.); In the Interest of M.C., 899 So. 2d 486 (Fla. App. 2005) (reafrming O.A.H);
G.C. v. W.J., 917 So.2d 998, 999 (Fla. App. 2005) (First District case where court followed O.A.H).
C. Appointment of Counsel for ChildState-Initated Proceedings
Federal Statutes and Court Decisions Interpretng Statutes
The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), which governs child welfare proceedings in state
court,8 provides the following with regard to any removal, placement, or terminaton of
parental rights proceeding:
The court may, in its discreton, appoint counsel for the child upon a fnding that such
appointment is in the best interest of the child. Where State law makes no provision for
appointment of counsel in such proceedings, the court shall promptly notfy the
Secretary upon appointment of counsel, and the Secretary, upon certfcaton of the
presiding judge, shall pay reasonable fees and expenses out of funds which may be
appropriated pursuant to secton 13 of this ttle.
25 U.S.C. 1912(b).
The federal Child Abuse Preventon and Treatment Act (CAPTA) provides:
A State plan submited under paragraph (1) shall contain a descripton of the actvites
that the State will carry out using amounts received under the grant to achieve the
objectves of this subchapter, including (B) an assurance in the form of a certfcaton
by the Governor of the State that the State has in efect and is enforcing a State law, or
8
While the ICWA does not appear to have a defnitve statement about jurisdicton, 25 U.S.C. 1912(b) refers to
state law not providing for appointment of counsel. Additonally, 25 U.S.C. 1912(b) states: In any involuntary
proceeding in a State court, where the court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the
party seeking the foster care placement of, or terminaton of parental rights to, an Indian child shall notfy the
parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child's tribe, by registered mail with return receipt requested, of the
pending proceedings and of their right of interventon. These provisions, plus the fact that child welfare
proceedings typically occur in state court, suggest that ICWA applies in state law proceedings.
ABA DIRECTORY OF LAW GOVERNING APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN STATE CIVIL PROCEEDINGS FLORIDA 2012
10
has in efect and is operatng a statewide program, relatng to child abuse and neglect
that includes-- (xiii) provisions and procedures requiring that in every case involving a
victm of child abuse or neglect which results in a judicial proceeding, a guardian ad
litem, who has received training appropriate to the role, including training in early
childhood, child, and adolescent development, and who may be an atorney or a court
appointed special advocate who has received training appropriate to that role (or both),
shall be appointed to represent the child in such proceedings.
42 U.S.C. 5106a(b)(2).
State Court Rules and Court Decisions Interpretng Court Rules
Although Fla. Stat. 39.807(2)(a) only provides that [t]he court shall appoint a guardian
ad litem to represent the best interest of the child in any terminaton of parental rights
proceedings, Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.217(a) provides: At any stage of the proceedings, any party may
request or the court may consider whether an atorney ad litem is necessary to represent any
child alleged to be dependent, if one has not already been appointed. Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.217(b)
adds that [t[he court may appoint an atorney ad litem to represent the child in any
proceeding as allowed by law.
State Court Decisions Addressing Consttutonal Due Process or Equal Protecton
In the pre-Lassiter9 case of In the Interest of D.B. and D.S., 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980), the
Florida Supreme Court summarily found that there is no consttutonal right to counsel for the
subject child in a juvenile dependency proceeding. Id. at 91.
D. Appointment of Counsel for ChildPrivately Initated Proceedings
No law could be located regarding the appointment of counsel for children in privately
initated child custody proceedings.
5. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Civil Contempt Proceedings
State Court Decisions Addressing Consttutonal Due Process or Equal Protecton
The Florida Supreme Court rejected a Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel in civil
contempt proceedings due to a failure to pay child support. Andrews v. Walton, 428 So. 2d 663
9
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981) (fnding no absolute Fourteenth Amendment right
to counsel in terminaton of parental rights proceedings).
ABA DIRECTORY OF LAW GOVERNING APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN STATE CIVIL PROCEEDINGS FLORIDA 2012
11
(Fla. 1983). The high court reasoned that since civil contempt required ability to pay (and
willful failure to do so), those facing this sancton would never be sufciently indigent to merit
appointment of counsel. Id. at 666. However, one appellate court subsequently held that
where a contemnor willfully or unintentonally divests himself/herself of the ability to pay, then
counsel is required because the contemnor essentally no longer holds the keys to his/her own
prison. Bowen v. Bowen, 454 So. 2d 565 (Fla. App. 1984).
B. Paternity Proceedings
No law could be located regarding the appointment of counsel for indigent litgants in
paternity proceedings.
C. Proceedings for Judicial Bypass of Parental Consent for Minor to Obtain an
Aborton
State Statutes and Court Decisions Interpretng Statutes
The Florida Parental Notce of Aborton Act, Fla. Stat. 390.01114, provides that a minor
may petton a Florida circuit court for a waiver of the notfcaton requirements under the
aforementoned Act. Upon such a petton, the court shall advise the minor that she has a
right to court-appointed counsel and shall provide her with counsel upon her request at no cost
to the minor. Id. 390.01114(4)(a).10
State Court Decisions Addressing Consttutonal Due Process or Equal Protecton
The state supreme court has found appointed counsel necessary in hearings
determining the need for parental consent to aborton. See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1196
(Fla. 1989). The court stated: In [parental consent hearings] wherein a minor can be wholly
deprived of authority to exercise her fundamental right to privacy [by obtaining an aborton],
counsel is required under our state consttuton. Id. The court noted that the provision of
counsel in In re D.B. was based on the fact that an individuals interest in preserving the family
unit and raising children is fundamental, In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1196, and thus since a
womans right to decide whether or not to contnue her pregnancy consttutes a fundamental
consttutonal right, counsel is similarly required whenever one can be deprived of the
authority to exercise that right. Id. The court cited Indiana Planned Parenthood Afliates Assn
v. Pearson, 716 F.2d 1127, 1138 (7th Cir. 1983), for that courts analogous reasoning under
10
In North Florida Women's Health and Counseling Services, Inc. v. State, 866 So.2d 612 (Fla. 2003), the Florida
Supreme Court found that the notfcaton requirement violated the privacy provisions of the Florida Consttuton,
but in response, the state amended the consttuton to say that the legislature may require parental notfcaton
without violatng a young woman's state consttutonal right of privacy, as long as the parental-notfcaton law
provides for certain exceptons and a judicial bypass.
ABA DIRECTORY OF LAW GOVERNING APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN STATE CIVIL PROCEEDINGS FLORIDA 2012
12
federal law. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1196. In Pearson, the court held that the statute
impermissibly fails to provide for the appointment of counsel to minors. 716 F.2d at 1138.
Despite this citaton to supportve federal precedent, the In re T.W. court maintained that it was
expressly decid[ing] this case on state law grounds. 551 So. 2d at 1196. 11
Also at stake in T.W. was the fact that the trial court had appointed counsel to act as
guardian ad litem for a fetus in a judicial bypass case. The trial court had appointed counsel
due to the trial courts concerns that the bypass statute was unconsttutonally vague and that
minors should be required to obtain parental consent in all cases. The guardian therefore
artculated these arguments essentally on behalf of the court. The Florida Supreme Court held
that the appointment was clearly improper and that it was the Atorney Generals job to
make such challenges to the statute, not the courts.12 The Florida Supreme Court passed on
the queston of whether appointment of counsel for a fetus would be proper absent motve by
a judge to challenge the consttutonality of the statute. 13
D. Unaccompanied Minors in Immigraton Proceedings
State Statutes and Court Decisions Interpretng Statutes
In cases where a child (i) has been adjudicated dependent, (ii) found not to be a citzen
of the United States, (iii) is found by the court to be eligible for special immigrant juvenile
status, and (iv) such status is in the best interest of the child, Fla. Stat. 39.5075 requires that
the [Florida] department [of child services], or community-based care provider shall, directly
or through voluntary or contractual legal services, fle a petton for special immigrant juvenile
status and the applicaton for adjustment of status to the appropriate federal authorites on
behalf of the child. Fla. Stat. 39.5075(5) (emphasis added).
E. Proceedings Involving Claims by and Against Prisoners
11
Note that this decision efectvely overruled a prior one from a Florida federal court ruling on federal grounds.
Jacksonville Clergy Consultaton Service, Inc. v. Martnez, 707 F.Supp. 1301 (M.D. Fla. 1989).
12
We are compelled to comment on the trial judge's fnding that the court, as the only entty otherwise involved
[i]n the proceeding which could possibly protect the state's interest, could have standing to challenge the
consttutonality of the statute. Under no circumstances is a trial judge permited to argue one side of a case as
though he were a litgant in the proceedings. The survival of our system of justce depends on the maintenance of
the judge as an independent and impartal decisionmaker. A judge who becomes an advocate cannot claim even
the pretense of impartality. T.W., 551 So.2d at 1190 n.3.
13
See also In re Guardianship of J.D.S., 864 So.2d 534 (Fla. App. 2004) (GAL for fetus not appropriate because GALs
can only be appointed for persons and fetus not a person under law).
ABA DIRECTORY OF LAW GOVERNING APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN STATE CIVIL PROCEEDINGS FLORIDA 2012
13
14
ABA DIRECTORY OF LAW GOVERNING APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN STATE CIVIL PROCEEDINGS FLORIDA 2012
15
50 App. U.S.C.A. 512(a) states, This Act [sectons 501 to 515 and 516 to 597b of this Appendix] applies to--
(2) each of the States, including the politcal subdivisions thereof
15
50 App. U.S.C. 521(a) states, This secton applies to any civil acton or proceeding, including any child custody
proceeding, in which the defendant does not make an appearance.
ABA DIRECTORY OF LAW GOVERNING APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN STATE CIVIL PROCEEDINGS FLORIDA 2012
16
the court may not enter a judgment untl afer the court appoints an atorney to
represent the defendant. If an atorney appointed under this secton to represent a
servicemember cannot locate the servicemember, actons by the atorney in the case
shall not waive any defense of the servicemember or otherwise bind the
servicemember.
50 App. U.S.C. 521(b)(2).
Additonally, 50 App. U.S.C. 522(d)(1), which also applies to all civil proceedings
(including custody),16 specifes that a service member previously granted a stay may apply for
an additonal stay based on a contnuing inability to appear, while 522(d)(2) states: If the
court refuses to grant an additonal stay of proceedings under paragraph (1), the court shall
appoint counsel to represent the servicemember in the acton or proceeding.
State Court Decisions Addressing Courts Inherent Authority
In Makemson v. Martn County, 491 So. 2d 1109, 1112 (Fla. 1986), discussed supra Part
4.A, the Florida Supreme Court held that the court has the authority to exceed legislatvely
mandated statutory fee caps in order to ensure reasonable compensaton for atorneys who
had been appointed to represent indigent clients in criminal cases. In Board of County Com'rs
of Hillsborough County v. Curry, 545 So.2d 930 (Fla. App. 1989), a Florida Court of Appeals
extended Makemson to terminaton of parental rights cases due to the fundamental rights at
stake and suggested that it would reach a similar holding in any type of case where counsel was
consttutonally required.
16
50 App. U.S.C. 522(a) applies to any civil acton or proceeding, including any child custody proceeding, in
which the plaintf or defendant at the tme of fling an applicaton under this secton-- (1) is in military service or is
within 90 days afer terminaton of or release from military service; and (2) has received notce of the acton or
proceeding.
ABA DIRECTORY OF LAW GOVERNING APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN STATE CIVIL PROCEEDINGS FLORIDA 2012
17
not provided the records I requested from him November 30, 2015. Mr. Fitzgibbons has claimed
several excuses, which in my view is a deliberate delay or refusal to provide the records.
2.
I do not understand why Mr. Ortiz-Carballo had to pay a lawyer on any basis other than a
contingent fee agreement in a successful employment civil rights case. See Poindexter v. FBI.
3.
US Magistrate Judge Gary R. Jones failed to follow the Report and Recommendation
law, 28 U.S. Code 636 (b), and Chapter 6, Untied States Magistrate Judges, in this case.
4.
I believe Magistrate Judge Gary Jones was wrong to grant, without a hearing, a motion
by Cynthia Sass to withdrawal as counsel for Mr. Ortiz-Carballo, without replacement counsel to
represent him. A lawyer is bound by the rules of professional conduct to see a case to the end.
See Rule 4-1.3 Diligence, https://www.floridabar.org/divexe/rrtfb.nsf/FV/7CAA33D4D0F911B585257170006DC334
Motion for Leave to Withdrawal as Counsel for Plaintiff by Cynthia N. Sass et al.
Case 5:08-cv-00165-WTH-DAB Document 22 Filed 02/23/09 Page 1 of 4 PageID 385
Order by US Magistrate Jones, GRANTED without a hearing, a motion to withdrawal as
counsel, filed by Cynthia N. Sass et al., thereby leaving the Plaintiff unrepresented
Case 5:08-cv-00165-WTH-DAB Document 23 Filed 02/24/09 Page 1 of 2 PageID 389
5.
I believe Magistrate Judge Gary Jones was wrong to deny Mr. Ortiz-Carballos pro se
Motion For A Federal Public Defender. I believe he was entitled to counsel appointment in an
employment civil rights case if he could not obtain adequate counsel.
Plaintiffs PRO SE Motion For A Federal Public Defender, Doc. 24, March 20, 2009
Case 5:08-cv-00165-WTH-DAB Document 24 Filed 03/20/09 Page 1 of 1 PageID 391
Order, DENIED counsel appointment, by US Magistrate Gary R. Jones
Case 5:08-cv-00165-WTH-DAB Document 25 Filed 03/23/09 Page 1 of 2 PageID 392
Rick Carey is the Assistant Federal Public Defender in Ocala. Donna Lee Elm is the Federal
Defender, appointed by the US Eleventh Circuit COA for a term of 4 years. If the Federal
Defender is not appropriate for a civil counsel appointment, the Chief Judge of the Middle
District has a duty to provide an alternative way to provide a civil counsel appointment.
Florida Statutes, section 29.007, Court-appointed counsel, applies in any situation in which the
court appoints counsel to protect a litigants due process rights.
Addendum Five, US Eleventh Circuit, Non-Criminal Justice Act Counsel Appointment:
The court adopts these provisions for furnishing representation for persons financially
unable to obtain adequate representation in cases and situations which do not fall within
the scope of 18 U.S.C. 3006A, as amended but in which the court believes that the
Please advise the undersigned if, and when, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Florida will comply with laws requiring civil counsel appointment.
Also advise the undersigned if, and when, certain US Magistrate Judges will comply with the
Report and Recommendation law, 28 U.S. Code 636 (b), and/or Middle District local rule
Chapter 6, Untied States Magistrate Judges. Thank you.
Sincerely,
Neil J. Gillespie
8092 SW 115th Loop
Ocala, Florida 34481
Tel. 352-854-7807
Email: neilgillespie@mfi.net
Scribd: https://www.scribd.com/user/32458790/Neil-Gillespie
Website: http://www.nosue.org/
Blog: http://nosueorg.blogspot.com/
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/pages/The-Justice-Network/150432974991704
Cc: Mr. Antonio J. Ortiz-Carballo, 1748 NE 60th Street, Ocala, FL 34479
Cc: James Gerstenlauer, Circuit Executive, james_gerstenlauer@ca11.uscourts.gov
U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
http://www.scribd.com/doc/284367285/Letter-to-James-Gerstenlauer-Circuit-Executive-US-Eleventh-Circuit-COA
NPR: Report: Judges Have Too Much Control In Public Defense System
http://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/09/09/438581667/report-judges-have-too-much-control-in-public-defense-system
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Report: Federal Indigent Defense 2015
http://www.nacdl.org/federalindigentdefense2015/
28 U.S. Code Chapter 23 - CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLANS
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/part-I/chapter-23
28 U.S. Code 471 - Requirement for a district court civil justice expense and delay reduction plan
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/471
There shall be implemented by each United States district court, in accordance with this chapter, a
civil justice expense and delay reduction plan. The plan may be a plan developed by such district
court or a model plan developed by the Judicial Conference of the United States. The purposes of
each plan are to facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil cases on the merits, monitor discovery,
improve litigation management, and ensure just, speedy, and inexpensive resolutions of civil disputes.
Ortiz-Carballo v Ellspermann, $125,000 Settlement Case No. 5.08-cv-00165 Marion Co. FL
http://www.scribd.com/doc/271966970/Ortiz-Carballo-v-Ellspermann-125-000-SETTLEMENT-Marion-Co-Florida
ABA, Florida Directory of Law Governing Appointment of Counsel in State Civil Proceedings
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_judges_manu
al_fl.authcheckdam.pdf
https://www.ups.com/uis/create?ActionOriginPair=default___PrintWindowPage&key=labelWindow&type=html&loc=en_US&instr=A&doc=shipment...
FOLD HERE
12/11/2015 2:42 PM
Antonio J. Ortiz-Carballo
1748 NE 60th Street
Ocala, FL 34479
Dear Mr. Ortiz-Carballo,
Congratulations on your lawsuit against David R. Ellspermann, Clerk and Comptroller of Marion
County, and $125,000 settlement against Clerk Ellspermann for employment discrimination.
My name is Neil Gillespie. I am a volunteer civil rights advocate. I am not a lawyer. But I know
it is not illegal to speak Spanish. Under Fla. Stat. sec. 90.606 Interpreters and translators.
(1)(a) When a judge determines that a witness cannot hear or understand the English
language, or cannot express himself or herself in English sufficiently to be understood, an
interpreter who is duly qualified to interpret for the witness shall be sworn to do so.
Also see enclosed a news story in the Orlando Weekly, by Monivette Cordeiro, July 22, 2015,
How Floridas judicial system violates the federal Civil Rights Act and leaves non-English
speakers out in the cold. http://www.orlandoweekly.com/orlando/how-floridas-judicial-system-violates-the-federal-civil-rights-actand-leaves-non-english-speakers-out-in-the-cold/Content?oid=2415259
The court records in your case show, in my personal opinion, denial of your civil rights under
color of law. You established a cause of action against Clerk Ellspermann for employment
discrimination. The settlement amount of $125,000 shows the violation of your employment
civil rights was substantial. On that basis, several things look wrong:
1.
I believe the U.S. Attorney had a duty to bring a civil rights case against Clerk David
Ellspermann. I believe the Assistant U.S. Attorney in Ocala then was Philip R. Lammens.
2.
I do not understand why you had to pay a lawyer in a successful employment civil rights
case on any basis other than a contingent fee agreement. See Poindexter v. FBI discussed below.
3.
US Magistrate Judge Gary R. Jones is not an Article III federal judge, he is a magistrate
judge, a lawyer hired by the court for a term of eight years. A magistrate judge is supposed to
issue a report and recommendation, which is ruled on by an Article III judge, William Terrell
Hodges in your case. There is a 14 day period before the Article III judge rules where you get to
file a response to the report and recommendation. But Magistrate Judge Jones ruled directly on
matters that required an Article III federal judge, who is appointed by President for life, and
confirmed by the U.S. Senate. Report and Recommendation (R&R) rules are complicated, and I
do not fully understand them. Here is a link to a R&R in the Tampa Division.
http://www.justice.gov/archive/tax/Prater_Magistrate_sRptandRecMSJ.pdf
Page - 2
Also see the local rules for the Middle District of Florida, Chapter 6 US Magistrate Judges,
https://www.flmd.uscourts.gov/LocalRules.htm
Enclosed you will find local Rule 6.01 Duties of United States Magistrate Judges, 9 pages.
Also see 28 U.S. Code Chapter 43 - UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGES
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/part-III/chapter-43
4.
I believe Magistrate Judge Gary Jones was wrong to grant, without a hearing, a motion
by Cynthia Sass to withdrawal as your counsel, without replacement counsel to represent you. A
lawyer is bound by the rules of professional conduct to see a case to the end. See Rule 4-1.3
Diligence, https://www.floridabar.org/divexe/rrtfb.nsf/FV/7CAA33D4D0F911B585257170006DC334
Motion for Leave to Withdrawal as Counsel for Plaintiff by Cynthia N. Sass et al.
Case 5:08-cv-00165-WTH-DAB Document 22 Filed 02/23/09 Page 1 of 4 PageID 385
Order by US Magistrate Jones, GRANTED without a hearing, a motion to withdrawal as
counsel, filed by Cynthia N. Sass et al., thereby leaving the Plaintiff unrepresented
Case 5:08-cv-00165-WTH-DAB Document 23 Filed 02/24/09 Page 1 of 2 PageID 389
5.
I believe Magistrate Judge Gary Jones was wrong to deny your pro se Motion For A
Federal Public Defender. I believe you were entitled to counsel appointment in an employment
civil rights case if you could not obtain adequate counsel.
Plaintiffs PRO SE Motion For A Federal Public Defender, Doc. 24, March 20, 2009
Case 5:08-cv-00165-WTH-DAB Document 24 Filed 03/20/09 Page 1 of 1 PageID 391
Order, DENIED counsel appointment, by US Magistrate Gary R. Jones
Case 5:08-cv-00165-WTH-DAB Document 25 Filed 03/23/09 Page 1 of 2 PageID 392
Rick Carey is the Assistant Federal Public Defender in Ocala. Donna Lee Elm is the Federal
Defender, appointed by the US Eleventh Circuit COA for a term of 4 years. Ms. Elms term
expires September 8, 2016, see enclosed. The public can comment through December 21, 2015.
Florida Statutes, section 29.007, Court-appointed counsel, applies in any situation in which the
court appoints counsel to protect a litigants due process rights.
The Ocala Division, Middle District of Florida, is under the US Eleventh Circuit COA.
Addendum Five, US Eleventh Circuit, Non-Criminal Justice Act Counsel Appointment:
The court adopts these provisions for furnishing representation for persons financially
unable to obtain adequate representation in cases and situations which do not fall within
the scope of 18 U.S.C. 3006A, as amended but in which the court believes that the
interests of justice will be served by the presence of counsel.
Page - 3
(b)(2) Any person seeking relief under 29 U.S.C. 621, 42 U.S.C. 1981, 42 U.S.C.
1982, 42 U.S.C. 1983, 42 U.S.C. 1985, 42 U.S.C. 1986, 42 U.S.C. 2000a, 42
U.S.C. 2000d, and 42 U.S.C. 2000e or in such other cases as the court shall determine
to be appropriate may be eligible for representation. The court may approve such
representation on a determination that the interests of justice so require and that the
person is financially unable to obtain representation.
Enclosed is my letter to James Gerstenlauer, Circuit Executive, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh
Circuit, asking about Addendum Five. Mr. Gerstenlauer has not responded.
The American Bar Association (ABA), in its Florida Directory of Law Governing Appointment
of Counsel in State Civil Proceedings, 2. Sustenance, states,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination. While
nearly all Title VII claims are brought in federal court, the U.S. Supreme Court has
specified that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts for Title VII
claims. Yellow Freight System Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 826 (1990).
Title VII provides that [u]pon application by the complainant and in such circumstances
as the court may deem just, the court may appoint an attorney for such complainant.
42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1). In Poindexter v. FBI, the D.C. Court of Appeals observed:
Title VII's provision for attorney appointment was not included simply as an
aforethought; it is an important part of Title VII's remedial scheme, and therefore courts
have an obligation to consider requests for appointment with care. In acting on such
requests, courts must remain mindful that appointment of an attorney may be essential
for a plaintiff to fulfill the role of a private attorney general, vindicating a policy of
the highest priority. Once the plaintiff has triggered the attorney appointment
provision, courts must give serious consideration to the plaintiffs request such
discretionary choices are not left to a court's inclination, but to its judgment; and its
judgment is to be guided by sound legal principles. Furthermore, in exercising this
discretion, the court should clearly indicate its disposition of the request for appointment
and its basis for that disposition. 737 F.2d 1173, 1183-85 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Magistrate Judge Gary Jones should have followed Poindexter v. FBI, Addendum Five, and the
Report and Recommendation rules. Article III Judge William Terrell Hodges had a duty to
follow Poindexter v. FBI, Addendum Five, and Report and Recommendation. See Judicial
Conduct & Disability http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/judicial-conduct-disability
Conclusion
You are a remarkable individual for bringing a successful case against David R. Ellspermann,
Clerk and Comptroller of Marion County, for employment discrimination violating your civil
rights. Unfortunately Clerk Ellspermann was protected from the full consequences of the law by
the corrupt federal court system, and corrupt cronies in the U.S. Department of Justice.
Page - 4
Neil J. Gillespie
8092 SW 115th Loop
Ocala, Florida 34481
Tel. 352-854-7807
Email: neilgillespie@mfi.net
Scribd: https://www.scribd.com/user/32458790/Neil-Gillespie
Website: http://www.nosue.org/
Blog: http://nosueorg.blogspot.com/
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/pages/The-Justice-Network/150432974991704
Page - 5
NPR: Report: Judges Have Too Much Control In Public Defense System
http://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/09/09/438581667/report-judges-have-too-much-control-in-public-defense-system
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Report: Federal Indigent Defense 2015
http://www.nacdl.org/federalindigentdefense2015/
28 U.S. Code Chapter 23 - CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLANS
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/part-I/chapter-23
28 U.S. Code 471 - Requirement for a district court civil justice expense and delay reduction plan
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/471
There shall be implemented by each United States district court, in accordance with this chapter, a
civil justice expense and delay reduction plan. The plan may be a plan developed by such district
court or a model plan developed by the Judicial Conference of the United States. The purposes of
each plan are to facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil cases on the merits, monitor discovery,
improve litigation management, and ensure just, speedy, and inexpensive resolutions of civil disputes.
Ortiz-Carballo v Ellspermann, $125,000 Settlement Case No. 5.08-cv-00165 Marion Co. FL
http://www.scribd.com/doc/271966970/Ortiz-Carballo-v-Ellspermann-125-000-SETTLEMENT-Marion-Co-Florida
Page - 6
ABA, Florida Directory of Law Governing Appointment of Counsel in State Civil Proceedings
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_judges_manu
al_fl.authcheckdam.pdf
http://www.orlandoweekly.com/orlando/how-floridas-judicial-system-violates-the-federal-civil-rights-act-and-leaves-non-english-speakers-out-in-the...
By Monivette Cordeiro
Maria Machin had a test for the Duval County Courthouse when she walked in
on the morning of June 29. She would walk to every single floor of the
courthouse and ask for directions to the domestic-violence office. She wouldn't
ask for help in English only in Spanish.
As Machin ambled from floor to floor, she went to each help desk asking for
employees to show her the way, but instead of assisting her, she says they
looked at her like she was "an alien." Finally, she found her way to the office,
where again she asked for help, this time about filing domestic-violence forms.
After some more strange looks, the employees finally rustled up from the back
a woman who spoke Spanish.
"She told me that there are no forms or anything to give someone that speaks
Spanish," says Machin, president of the League of United Latin American
Citizens in Jacksonville. "The clerk of the court has told his people that anyone
coming in that doesn't speak English has to bring their own translator ... it's
like Mayberry on acid here. We are invisible to them."
The experience Machin had last month is the reality many people who are
limited English proficient, also known as LEP, experience as they go through
Florida's judicial system. And it isn't limited to asking for directions at a help
desk. In most Florida courts, interpreters are not provided by the state in civil
cases, only in criminal proceedings, Machin says, and in some courts, LEP
individuals are asked to bring and pay for their own interpreters, unless they
are indigent. LEP services also vary by location and the population of speakers
of other languages, she says.
12/11/2015 10:54 AM
http://www.orlandoweekly.com/orlando/how-floridas-judicial-system-violates-the-federal-civil-rights-act-and-leaves-non-english-speakers-out-in-the...
Machin is a member of the Florida Language Access Coalition. Last week the
organization filed an administrative complaint to the Department of Justice
Civil Rights Division that alleges that Florida courts are routinely violating the
federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 by failing to provide free, qualified
interpretation services in all programs and activities of the courts.
Under the Civil Rights Act, state courts that receive indirect or direct federal
funding must comply with Title VI, which prohibits discrimination on the basis
of race, color and national origin in programs that receive federal financial
assistance, according to the federal LEP website. In a 2010 letter from Thomas
Perez, then the Assistant Attorney General of the DOJ's Civil Rights Division,
to state court administrators and chief justices across the country, Perez wrote,
"The Supreme Court has held that failing to take reasonable steps to ensure
meaningful access for LEP persons is a form of national origin discrimination.
... Despite efforts to bring courts into compliance, some state court system
policies and practices significantly and unreasonably impede, hinder or restrict
participation in court proceedings and access to court operations based upon a
person's English language ability."
Perez also reiterated in his letter that state courts must provide interpreters in
all court proceedings, cannot charge interpreter costs to one or more parties,
cannot restrict language services to only courtrooms and must ensure
communication with court appointed or supervised personnel.
In a memorandum of understanding between the State of Maine Judicial
Branch and the federal government, the DOJ makes it clear that in an extreme
case of noncompliance from a state, the department is authorized to terminate
its financial assistance or file a civil suit.
Florida State Statutes 90.606 and 90.6063 address interpreters and
translators, but don't specifically provide instructions for people who are not
deaf. Florida Supreme Court public information officer Craig Waters said in a
statement on July 15 that "The Florida Supreme Court and the state courts
have a policy of not commenting publicly about pending complaints against
us."
In the Ninth Judicial Circuit, which covers Orange and Osceola counties,
interpreters are provided in any situation where you could lose due process
rights, which includes the criminal division and juvenile courts, as well as
domestic violence and mental health hearings, says chief deputy court
administrator Karen Levey. The circuit court employs seven Spanish-speaking
interpreters and one Spanish/Haitian Creole interpreter, who provide services
for almost 25,000 court hearings.
"It's quite a few events for just eight people," she said. "We would like to hire
more, but we can't until we have funding sources from the state."
Kathy Card, state coordinator for the Florida Language Access Coalition and
one of the complainants, says she was the chair of the National LEP Advocacy
Task Force when it filed a successful complaint against Maine's judicial system
over a decade ago for not complying with the federal law. After the DOJ's
ruling, Card says information was sent to all state judicial systems about LEP
rules, including Florida's program manager for the Court Interpreter
Certification and Regulation Program..
Later, she retired and moved to Florida, where she says she found Florida was
about 20 years behind when it came to interpretation services in courts,
12/11/2015 10:54 AM
http://www.orlandoweekly.com/orlando/how-floridas-judicial-system-violates-the-federal-civil-rights-act-and-leaves-non-english-speakers-out-in-the...
hospitals, schools, housing, voter polls and social services. In June, she called
Florida's program manager to see what the situation was a decade later.
"She just told me they look toward Florida State Statutes, and when I asked
about the federal law, she said, 'I'm not going to comment on that, you will
have to ask general counsel,'" Card says. "It's frustrating because if you're not
monitoring the states' compliance, they stop. ... There is a huge amount of
work ahead of us, and this state is the most challenging in the entire country."
12/11/2015 10:54 AM
CHAPTER SIX
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGES
RULE 6.01
(a)
In addition to the powers and duties set forth in 28 U.S.C. Section 636(a), the United
States Magistrate Judges are hereby authorized, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b), to perform
any and all additional duties, as may be assigned to them from time to time by any judge of this
Court, which are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.
(b)
The assignment of duties to United States Magistrate Judges by the judges of the
Court may be made by standing order entered jointly by the resident judges in any Division of the
Court; or by any individual judge, in any case or cases assigned to him, through written order or oral
directive made or given with respect to such case or cases.
(c)
The duties authorized to be performed by United States Magistrate Judges, when
assigned to them pursuant to subsection (b) of this rule, shall include, but are not limited to:
12/1/09
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
6-1
12/1/09
(7)
(8)
Setting of bail for material witnesses and holding others to security of the
peace and for good behavior. (18 U.S.C. Section 3149 and 18 U.S.C.
Section 3043)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
6-2
12/1/09
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
Conduct or preside over the voir dire examination and empanelment of trial
juries in civil and criminal cases.
(21)
Processing and review of all suits instituted under any law of the United
States providing for judicial review of final decisions of administrative officers
or agencies on the basis of the record of administrative proceedings, and the
preparation of a report and recommendation to the Court concerning the
disposition of the case.
(22)
Serving as a master for the taking of testimony and evidence and the
preparation of a report and recommendation for the assessment of damages
in admiralty cases, non-jury proceedings under Rule 55(b)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P.,
or in any other case in which a special reference is made pursuant to Rule
53, Fed.R.Civ.P.
6-3
12/1/09
(23)
(24)
(25)
(26)
Conduct of proceedings and imposition of civil fines and penalties under the
Federal Boat Safety Act. (46 U.S.C. Section 1484(d)).
6-4
RULE 6.02
(a)
In any case in which the magistrate judge is not authorized to enter an operative
order pursuant to Rule 6.01, 28 U.S.C. Section 636 or any standing or special order of the Court
entered thereunder, but is authorized or directed to file a report or recommendation to the District
Judge to whom the case has been assigned, a copy of such report and recommendation shall be
furnished, upon filing, to the District Judge and to all parties. Within fourteen (14) days after such
service, any party may file and serve written objections thereto; and any party desiring to oppose
such objections shall have fourteen (14) days thereafter within which to file and serve a written
response. The District Judge may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, the report and
recommendation of the magistrate judge or may receive further evidence or recommit the matter
to the magistrate judge with instructions.
12/1/09
6-5
RULE 6.03
(a)
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 3401, any full time United States Magistrate Judge of
this District, sitting with or without a jury, shall have jurisdiction to try persons accused of, and
sentence persons convicted of, petty offenses. With consent of the parties, any full time United
States Magistrate Judge of this District, sitting with or without a jury, shall have jurisdiction to try
persons accused of, and sentence persons convicted of a Class A misdemeanor committed within
the District whether originating under an applicable Federal statute or regulation or a state statute
or regulation made applicable by 18 U.S.C. Section 13. Cases of misdemeanors may, upon transfer
into this District under Rule 20, Fed.R.Cr.P., be referred to a full time United States Magistrate
Judge of this District for plea and sentence, upon defendant's consent. In a petty offense case
involving a juvenile, any full time United States Magistrate Judge of this District may exercise all
powers granted to the District Court under Chapter 403 of Title 18 of the United States Code. In
cases of any misdemeanor, other than a petty offense involving a juvenile, in which consent to trial
before a Magistrate Judge has been filed, a Magistrate Judge may exercise all powers granted to
the District Court under Chapter 403 of Title 18 of the United States Code.
(b)
Any person charged with a petty offense as defined in 18 U.S.C. Section 19 may, in
lieu of appearance post collateral in the amount indicated for the offense, waive appearance before
a magistrate judge, and consent to forfeiture of the collateral. The offenses for which collateral may
be posted and forfeited in lieu of appearance by the person charged, together with the amounts of
collateral to be posted, shall be specified in standing orders of the Court, in each Division of the
Court, copies of which shall be maintained in the offices of the Clerk and the magistrate judges,
respectively. For all petty offenses not specified in such standing orders, the person charged must
appear before a magistrate judge; and further, nothing contained in this rule shall prohibit a law
enforcement officer from arresting a person for the commission of any offense, including those for
which collateral may be posted and forfeited, and requiring the person charged to appear before a
magistrate judge or, upon arrest, taking him immediately before a magistrate judge.
(c)
In the trial of all cases pursuant to this rule, Rule 58, Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, governs practice and procedure.
12/1/09
6-6
RULE 6.04
12/1/09
RESERVED
6-7
RULE 6.05
(a)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(c)(1), and subject to the provisions of this rule,
all full time United States Magistrate Judges in the District are hereby specially designated to
conduct any or all proceedings in any jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in
the case.
(b)
Upon the filing of any civil case the Clerk shall deliver to the Plaintiff(s) written notice
of the right of the parties to consent to disposition of the case by a United States Magistrate Judge
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(c) and the provisions of this rule. The Clerk shall also issue or
supply at that time, for each Defendant in the case, copies of such notice which shall be attached
to the summons and thereafter served upon the Defendant(s) in the manner provided by Rule 4,
Fed.R.Civ.P.; provided, however, that a failure to serve a copy of such notice upon any Defendant
shall not affect the validity of the service of process or the jurisdiction of the Court to proceed. If,
after the initial filing of a civil case, new or additional parties enter or join in the action pursuant to
the operation of any statute, rule or order of the Court, the Clerk shall immediately mail or otherwise
deliver a copy of such notice to each such party.
(c)
The written notice contemplated by subsection (b) of this rule shall be in such form
as the judges of the Court from time to time direct. In addition, the Clerk shall maintain on hand,
in a form or forms to be approved by the judges of the Court, written consent agreements for the
use of the parties in communicating to the Clerk their unanimous and voluntary consent, upon entry
of an order of reference by the presiding district judge, to have all further proceedings in the case,
including trial with or without a jury, and the entry of judgment, conducted by a United States
Magistrate Judge. One form of such consent agreements shall provide for appeal to the United
States Court of Appeals (28 U.S.C. Section 636(c)(3)), and another shall provide for appeal to the
presiding district judge (28 U.S.C. Section 636(c)(4)).
(d)
If the parties in any civil case unanimously consent to disposition of the case by a
United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(c) and this rule, such consent
must be communicated to the Clerk on an appropriate form (provided by the Clerk in accordance
with subsection (c) of this rule). The Clerk shall not accept or file any consent except in the form
and manner, and within the time, prescribed by this rule.
(e)
In the event the parties file a unanimous consent pursuant to subsection (d) of this
rule, the Clerk shall immediately notify the presiding district judge who will promptly (1) enter an
order of reference to a United States magistrate judge, or (2) enter an order declining to do so;
provided, however, the judges of the Court shall not decline to make an order or orders of reference
for the purpose of limiting the types of cases to be tried by the United States magistrate judges
pursuant to this rule. In making or in declining to make an order of reference the presiding judge
may consider, among other things, the current allocation of pending judicial business between the
judges of the Court and the magistrate judges; the judicial economy, if any, to be gained by the
reference as measured in part by the extent of prior judicial labor expended and familiarity
accumulated in the case by the judge or the magistrate judge, as the case might be; the extent to
which the magistrate judge(s) may have time available to devote to the case giving due regard to
the necessity of diligent performance of other judicial duties regularly assigned to the magistrate
judges; and any other features peculiar to the individual case which suggest, in the interest of justice
or judicial economy, that a reference should or should not be made.
12/1/09
6-8
(f)
In any case in which an order of reference has been made, the presiding judge may,
for cause shown on his own motion, or under extraordinary circumstances shown by any party,
vacate the order of reference and restore the case to the calendar of the presiding judge.
(g)
In all cases in which an order of reference has been made on the basis of a consent
agreement providing for appeal to the presiding judge of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
Section 636(c)(4), any such appeal shall be governed by the applicable Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure relating to appeals in civil cases from the District Court to the Court of Appeals, except
that Rules 30, 31(b), and 32, Fed.R.App.P., shall not apply.
(h)
Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit or affect the right of any judge or
judges of the Court to assign judicial duties or responsibilities to a United States magistrate judge
or magistrate judges pursuant to Rule 6.01, or any standing order entered under that rule, with or
without the consent of the parties.
12/1/09
6-9
https://www.floridabar.org/divexe/rrtfb.nsf/FV/7CAA33D4D0F911B585257170006DC334
MEMBER SERVICES
LOG IN
FIND A LAWYER
www.floridabar.org
12/11/2015 10:30 AM
JAMES P. GERSTENLAUER
Circuit Executive
DATE
6 November 2015
To
FROM
su BJECT:
James P. Gerstenlauer
~~~
Attached for your information is the public notice concerning the reappointment
of the Federal Public Defender in the Middle District of Florida at Tampa. Although
the incumbent Federal Public Defender, Donna Lee Elm, does seek reappointment,
there is no presumptive right to reappointment. Therefore, the position will be
advertised to the bar and general public.
We are forwarding the notice of this position throughout the federal judiciary,
and to federal, state, and local bar organizations. We ask your assistance in
circulating this announcement.
Thank you.
Attachment
56 Forsyth Street, NW
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
404/335-6535
PUBLIC NOTICE
REAPPOINTMENT OF INCUMBENT FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER
Middle District of Florida
The current four-year term of Donna Lee Elm, Federal Public Defender for
the Middle District of Florida at Tampa, expires 8 September 2016. The Federal
Public Defender, under authority of 18 U.S.C. 3006A(g)(2)(A), provides criminal
defense services to individuals unable to afford counsel and supervises a full-time
staff of attorneys and administrative and clerical personnel. In accordance with
regulations of the Judicial Conference of the United States and the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit governing the appointment and reappointment of Federal
Public Defenders, a review committee has been established to evaluate Ms. Elm's
performance in consideration of her request to be reappointed to a new four-year
term. The Committee is soliciting written comments from members of the bar and
concerned citizens about the performance of Ms. Elm and her office staff. .If
requested, the identity of a respondent to this solicitation will not be divulged
without prior consent. However, Ms. Elm will be provided with a general
description of the source and nature of any comments. Comments should be
submitted to James P. Gerstenlauer, Circuit Executive, United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 56 Forsyth Street, NW, Atlanta, GA 30303,
and must be received in the Circuit Executive's Office no later than
21 December 2015.
Although the incumbent Federal Public Defender, Donna Elm, does seek
reappointment, there is no presumptive right to reappointment. Therefore, the
position will be advertised to the bar and general public. Accordingly, the Court is
soliciting applications for this position from qualified persons. The Court
encourages applications from all qualified persons, including women, members of
minority groups, and individuals with disabilities. All applications, including the
application of the incumbent Federal Public Defender, will be subjected to the same
standard of review. The approximate salary range is $142,740 to $158,600,
depending on experience and qualifications. Federal public defenders may not
engage in the private practice of law and are subject to judiciary financial disclosure
requirements.
b.
have been eng~ged in the active practice of criminal law for a period of at
least five years, preferably with significant federal criminal trial and appellate
.
expenence;
c.
d.
e.
f.
http://www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0000-0099/0029/Sections/0029.007.html
Select Year:
Chapter 29
COURT SYSTEM FUNDING
29.007
Court-appointed counsel. For purposes of implementing s. 14, Art. V of the State Constitution,
the elements of court-appointed counsel to be provided from state revenues appropriated by general law are
as follows:
(1) Private attorneys appointed by the court to handle cases where the defendant is indigent and cannot
be represented by the public defender or the office of criminal conflict and civil regional counsel.
(2) When the office of criminal conflict and civil regional counsel has a conflict of interest, private
attorneys appointed by the court to represent indigents or other classes of litigants in civil proceedings
requiring court-appointed counsel in accordance with state and federal constitutional guarantees and federal
and state statutes.
(3) Reasonable court reporting and transcription services necessary to meet constitutional or statutory
requirements, including the cost of transcribing and copying depositions of witnesses and the cost of foreign
language and sign-language interpreters and translators.
(4) Witnesses, including expert witnesses, summoned to appear for an investigation, preliminary hearing,
or trial in a case when the witnesses are summoned on behalf of an indigent, and any other expert witnesses
approved by the court.
(5) Mental health professionals appointed pursuant to s. 394.473 and required in a court hearing involving
an indigent, mental health professionals appointed pursuant to s. 916.115(2) and required in a court hearing
involving an indigent, and any other mental health professionals required by law for the full adjudication of
any civil case involving an indigent person.
(6) Reasonable pretrial consultation fees and costs.
(7) Travel expenses reimbursable under s. 112.061 reasonably necessary in the performance of
constitutional and statutory responsibilities.
Subsections (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) apply when court-appointed counsel is appointed; when the court
determines that the litigant is indigent for costs; or when the litigant is acting pro se and the court determines
that the litigant is indigent for costs at the trial or appellate level. This section applies in any situation in
which the court appoints counsel to protect a litigants due process rights. The Justice Administrative
Commission shall approve uniform contract forms for use in processing payments for due process services
under this section. In each case in which a private attorney represents a person determined by the court to be
indigent for costs, the attorney shall execute the commissions contract for private attorneys representing
persons determined to be indigent for costs.
History.s. 7, ch. 2000-237; s. 43, ch. 2003-402; s. 16, ch. 2005-236; s. 18, ch. 2007-62.
12/11/2015 12:10 PM
http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/jnnews01.nsf/8c9f13012b96736985256aa900624829/959ac272ec61276385257ef50054bc88!OpenDocument
MEMBER SERVICES
LOG IN
FIND A LAWYER
www.floridabar.org
Search:
News HOME
The current four-year term of Donna Lee Elm, federal public defender for the Middle District of Florida at Tampa, expires September 8,
2016.
A review committee has been established to evaluate Elms performance in consideration of her request to be reappointed to a new
four-year term. The committee is soliciting written comments from members of the bar and concerned citizens about the performance
of Elm and her staff. If requested, the identity of a respondent to this solicitation will not be divulged without prior consent. However,
Elm will be provided with a general description of the source and nature of any comments.
Comments should be submitted to James P. Gerstenlauer, Circuit Executive, United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, 56
Forsyth Street, NW, Atlanta, GA 30303, and must be received no later than December 21.
Although Elm does seek reappointment, there is no presumptive right to reappointment. Accordingly, the court is soliciting
applications for this position from qualified persons. All applications, including the application of the incumbent, will be subjected to
the same standard of review. The approximate salary range is $142,740 to $158,600, depending on experience and qualifications.
Federal public defenders may not engage in the private practice of law and are subject to judiciary financial disclosure requirements.
To qualify applicants must: Be members in good standing of at least one state bar or the District of Columbia or the Virgin Islands bar,
and members in good standing of every other bar of which they are members; Have been engaged in the active practice of criminal
law for a period of at least five years, preferably with significant federal criminal trial and appellate experience; not be related by
blood or marriage to a judge of the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals or to a judge of the district court to be served, within the degrees
specified in Title 28, United States Code, Section 458 at the time of the initial appointment.
Applications are available at www.ca11.uscourts.gov; from any federal clerk of court in the states of Alabama, Florida, and Georgia;
and from the circuit executive, James P. Gerstenlauer, 56 Forsyth Street, NW, Atlanta, GA 30303.
Applications must be received in the Circuit Executives Office no later than December 21. Email and fax copies of applications will not
be accepted.
[Revised: 11-06-2015]
News HOME
JAMES P. GERSTENLAUER
Circuit Executive
DATE
6 November 2015
To
FROM
su BJECT:
James P. Gerstenlauer
~~~
Attached for your information is the public notice concerning the reappointment
of the Federal Public Defender in the Middle District of Florida at Tampa. Although
the incumbent Federal Public Defender, Donna Lee Elm, does seek reappointment,
there is no presumptive right to reappointment. Therefore, the position will be
advertised to the bar and general public.
We are forwarding the notice of this position throughout the federal judiciary,
and to federal, state, and local bar organizations. We ask your assistance in
circulating this announcement.
Thank you.
Attachment
56 Forsyth Street, NW
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
404/335-6535
PUBLIC NOTICE
REAPPOINTMENT OF INCUMBENT FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER
Middle District of Florida
The current four-year term of Donna Lee Elm, Federal Public Defender for
the Middle District of Florida at Tampa, expires 8 September 2016. The Federal
Public Defender, under authority of 18 U.S.C. 3006A(g)(2)(A), provides criminal
defense services to individuals unable to afford counsel and supervises a full-time
staff of attorneys and administrative and clerical personnel. In accordance with
regulations of the Judicial Conference of the United States and the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit governing the appointment and reappointment of Federal
Public Defenders, a review committee has been established to evaluate Ms. Elm's
performance in consideration of her request to be reappointed to a new four-year
term. The Committee is soliciting written comments from members of the bar and
concerned citizens about the performance of Ms. Elm and her office staff. .If
requested, the identity of a respondent to this solicitation will not be divulged
without prior consent. However, Ms. Elm will be provided with a general
description of the source and nature of any comments. Comments should be
submitted to James P. Gerstenlauer, Circuit Executive, United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 56 Forsyth Street, NW, Atlanta, GA 30303,
and must be received in the Circuit Executive's Office no later than
21 December 2015.
Although the incumbent Federal Public Defender, Donna Elm, does seek
reappointment, there is no presumptive right to reappointment. Therefore, the
position will be advertised to the bar and general public. Accordingly, the Court is
soliciting applications for this position from qualified persons. The Court
encourages applications from all qualified persons, including women, members of
minority groups, and individuals with disabilities. All applications, including the
application of the incumbent Federal Public Defender, will be subjected to the same
standard of review. The approximate salary range is $142,740 to $158,600,
depending on experience and qualifications. Federal public defenders may not
engage in the private practice of law and are subject to judiciary financial disclosure
requirements.
b.
have been eng~ged in the active practice of criminal law for a period of at
least five years, preferably with significant federal criminal trial and appellate
.
expenence;
c.
d.
e.
f.
David R. Ellspermann
Plaintiff alleged violations of his rights protected by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the Florida Civil Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983; and
PLAINTIFF specifically waives, releases, acquits, and forever discharges any claims, actions,
right of action whatsoever he may have against the DEFENDANT, its insurers and PGIT, under
the United States Constitution, the Florida Constitution, Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of
1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985, 1988, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), the Florida Human Rights Act, the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992
( 760.01-760.11 and 509.092, Fla. Stat.), the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C.
12132 et. seq) the Florida Whistle Blower Act( 112.3187 et. seq Fla. Statutes), the Florida
Workers' Compensation Act, 119.07, Fla. Stat., including attorneys' fees or costs, or any other
state, federal or administrative rule, statute; ordinance or law of any nature relating to
employment....read more in the attached Settlement Agreement and General Release.
Table of Contents
United States District Court - Middle District of Florida - Ocala Division
Antonio J. Ortiz-Carballo v. David R. Ellspermann, Case No. 5:08-cv-00165
Exhibit 1
Order of Dismissal, The Court has been notified that the above-styled cause has been settled
Case 5:08-cv-00165-WTH-DAB Document 87 Filed 02/01/11 Page 1 of 1 PageID 1407
Exhibit 2
Exhibit 3
Letter February 8, 2011 Cindy A. Townsend to Ms. Jaime Acker, Claims Analyst,
Growth Enterprises, Insured: Marion County, Claimant: Anthony Ortiz-Carballo
Exhibit 4
Letter February 18, 2011 Cindy A. Townsend to Ms. Jaime Acker, Claims Analyst,
Growth Enterprises, Insured: Marion County, Claimant: Anthony Ortiz-Carballo
Exhibit 5
Exhibit 6
Exhibit 7
Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, by Cynthia N. Sass for the Plaintiff
Case 5:08-cv-00165-WTH-DAB Document 9 Filed 06/11/08 Page 1 of 21 PageID 110
Exhibit 8
Motion for Leave to Withdrawal as Counsel for Plaintiff by Cynthia N. Sass et al.
Case 5:08-cv-00165-WTH-DAB Document 22 Filed 02/23/09 Page 1 of 4 PageID 385
Exhibit 9
Exhibit 10
Plaintiffs PRO SE Motion For A Federal Public Defender, Doc. 24, March 20, 2009
Case 5:08-cv-00165-WTH-DAB Document 24 Filed 03/20/09 Page 1 of 1 PageID 391
Exhibit 11
Exhibit 12
US 11th Circuit, Addendum Five, Non-Criminal Act Counsel Appointments (August 2007)
http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/courtdocs/clk/RulesAddendum05AUG07.pdf
Exhibit 13
Exhibit 14
Exhibit 15
Exhibit 16
Exhibit 17
ANTONIO J. ORTIZ-CARBALLO,
Plaintiff,
-vs-
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
The Court has been notified that the above-styled cause has been settled, it is
ORDERED that this cause be and the same is hereby DISMISSED, subject to the
right of any party to move within 60 days of the date of entry of this Order, to reopen the
action, upon good cause shown, or to submit a stipulated form of final order or judgment.
BY ORDER OF THE COURT, this 1st day of February, 2011.
ANTONIO J. ORTIZ-CARBALLO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ANTONIO
ORTIZ-CARBALLO,
and
Defendant,
DAVID
ELLSPERMANN, in his individual capacity and in his official capacity as the Clerk
of the Circuit Court, Fifth Judicial Circuit, Marion County, Florida, by and through
their undersigned counsel and pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), hereby
stipulate to the dismissal of this cause with prejudice as to Defendant, DAVID
ELLSPERMANN, in his individual capacity and in his official capacity as the Clerk
of the Circuit Court, Fifth Judicial Circuit, Marion County, Florida, with each party
to bear its own attorneys fees and costs.
'
BELL
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
MICHAEl M. BEll
MICHAEl H. BOWliNG
HAEJ KIM
MICHAEl]. ROPER
JOSEPH D. TESSITORE
DAVID B. BlESSING
GAll C. BRADFORD
ANNA E. ENGELMAN
CHRISTOPHER R. FAY
KATHRYN A. JOHNSON
ESTEBAN F. SCORNIK
DAlE A. SCOTT
CINDY A. TOWNSEND
MARY j. WAlTER
February 8, 2011
Insured:
Claimant:
Claim No.:
Marion County
Anthony Ortiz-Carballo
EV138237
Date ofLoss:
Our File No.:
~,~::~,~~
CAT/em
Enclosure
cc:
David Ellspermann
Katherine Glynn, Esq.
Yari Benitez
Henry Peavy
Sara Rothermel
Cindy A. Townsend
P.A.
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
MICHAEl M. BEll
MICHAEl H. BOWliNG
HAEJ. KIM
MICHAEl). ROPER
JOSEPH D. TESSITORE
DAVID B. BlESSING
GAll C. BRADFORD
ANNA E. ENGELMAN
CHRISTOPHER R. FAY
KATHRYN A. JOHNSON
ESTEBAN F. SCORNIK
DALE A. SCOTT
CINDY A. TOWNSEND
MARY j. WALTER
E-mail: office@bellroperlow.com
www.bellroperlow.com
Ms Jaime Ack
Claims Analyst, owth Enterprises
Chartis Financial Lines-E;Isj'~i-------
Post Office Box 25947
Shawnee Mission, KS 66225
RE:
Insured:
Claimant:
Claim No.:
Date of Loss:
Our FileNo.:
Marion County
Anthony Ortiz-Carballo
EV138237
June 11, 2007
026-296
Dear Ms Acker:
Please find enclosed the original, fully executed, Settlement Agreement and
General Release in the above matter. As I am sure you are aware, the settlement
funds are due to Plaintiff on or before February 28, 2011. Please be sure to have
the settlement check in my possession prior to February 28th so I can ensure timely
delivery to Plaintiff's counsel.
Thank you for your attention to this matter and if there are any questions or
concerns, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Very truly yours,
CAT:em
Cindy A. Townsend
Jaime Acker
February 18, 2011
Page 2
cc:
Yari Benitez
David Ellspermann
Katie Glynn, Esq.
Henry Peavy
Sara Rothermel
"'
RECITALS
Whereas PLAINTIFF, who was employed as a Clerk for the DEFENDANT,
contends that he was the subject of discrimination, hostile work environment
retaliation, and other personal injury, and subsequently filed a civil suit captioned:
11
capacity and in his official capacity as the Clerk of the Circuit Court, Fifth Judicial
Circuit, Marion County, Florida, Defendant; United States District Court, Middle
District of Florida, Orlando Division, Case No.: 5:08-CV-00165-0R-lOGRJ"
(hereinafter 11suit"), wherein he alleged violations of his rights protected by Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Florida Civil Rights Act and 42 U.S.C.
1981 and 1983; and
WHEREAS, DEFENDANT has denied and continues to deny that he
violated any of PLAINTIFF's rights protected by either federal or state law and
denies the claims and allegations which were set forth in the above referenced
11
Suit" and any other cause of action that has or could arise out of PLAINTIFF's
Page2 of13
1.
Agreement
A.
In consideration for the payments and other good and valuable consideration
set forth in Paragraph (2) below, PLAINTIFF agrees, upon receipt of the
consideration due hereunder to file and serve a Notice of Dismissal with Prejudice
of the above referenced 11 Suit", and does further hereby agree to release, acquit, and
forever discharge DEFENDANT, its insurers and Preferred Governmental
Insurance Trust (PGIT) of and from any and all manner of action and actions,
cause and causes of action, suits, debts, dues, sums of money, accounts,
reckonings,
bonds,
bills,
specialties,
covenants,
contracts,
controversies,
PLAINTIFF
specifically waives, releases, acquits, and forever discharges any claims, actions,
right of action whatsoever he may have against the DEFENDANT, its insurers and
PGIT, under the United States Constitution, the Florida Constitution, Title VII of
the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. 1983,
1985, 1988, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the Florida
Human Rights Act, the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 ( 760.01-760.11 and
509.092, Fla. Stat.), the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. 12132 et.
seq) the Florida Whistle Blower Act( 112.3187 et. seq Fla. Statutes), the Florida
Workers' Compensation Act, 119.07, Fla. Stat., including attorneys' fees or costs,
or any other state, federal or administrative rule, statute; ordinance or law of any
nature relating to employment.
B.
set forth above is a General Release of all claims. PLAINTIFF expressly waives
Page 5 of13
and assumes the risk of any and all claims, in law or in equity, which exist as of
this date, but of which PLAINTIFF does not know or suspect to exist, whether
through ignorance, oversight, error, negligence, or otherwise and, which, if known,
would materially affect PLAINTIFF's decision to enter this Settlement Agreement.
PLAINTIFF further agrees that he has agreed to accept payment of the sum
specified herein as a complete compromise of matters involving disputed issues of
law and fact. PLAINTIFF assumes the risks that the facts or law may be other than
he currently believes or understands.
C.
compromise of a litigated and disputed claim and neither this Agreement, nor any
consideration to be paid hereunder shall be construed as an admission by the
DEFENDANT, its insurers or PGIT of any unlawful, tortious or wrongful acts
whatsoever towards PLAINTIFF, and DEFENDANT, its insurers and PGIT
specifically disclaim any liability to PLAINTIFF or the propriety of any and all
factual or legal averments made by PLAINTIFF in the above referenced "suit".
D.
constitute a nullity.
E.
In response to inquiries,
DEFENDANT will provide only his dates of employment, position which he held
at the time he left DEFENDANT's employ and the salary he was earning at that
time. Notwithstanding, DEFENDANT will respond to any and all public records
requests made with respect to PLAINTIFF's employment records in accordance
with the guidelines established in Chapter 119, Florida Statutes.
F.
DEFENDANT, its insurers and PGIT from all judgments and any and all liens,
costs and expenses whatsoever arising from the above described incident, and
agrees that PLAINTIFF will satisfY those claims or liens and will hold the
DEFENDANT, its insurers and PGIT harmless from such claims or liens,
including but not limited to any hospital liens, medical liens, liens held by
Medicaid and/or Medicare and any other governmental agency, insurance liens, tax
liens or attorneys charging liens.
Page 7 of13
2.
Consideration
A.
through its insurers, agrees to pay to the individual named below, the sum outlined
below.
B.
all
claims
which PLAINTIFF
may
have
against the
ii.
Fraxedas, Esq.
iii.
Fraxedas, Esq.
C.
have for wages or salary, the parties acknowledge and agree that the payments set
Page 8 ofl3
forth in subsection (A) above do not constitute wages or salary to PLAINTIFF, and
accordingly DEFENDANT will not take payroll deductions, withholding,
employee pension, contributions or other deductions from said payments; will not
make payment of appropriate payroll taxes, and will not report said income to the
Internal Revenue Service as reimbursement for wages of salary. Instead the parties
stipulate and agree that said amount represents reimbursement for compensatory
damages for personal physical injuries.
future tax liabilities, if any, including penalties and interest, which may be incurred
by PLAINTIFF or DEFENDANT in association with said payments will be the
sole responsibility and liability of PLAINTIFF, and PLAINTIFF agrees to
indemnify and hold harmless DEFENDANT, its insurers and PGIT for any
additional tax liability which may arise from said payment. Said tax liability shall
not be a ground for avoiding or setting aside this Settlement Agreement.
3.
Page9 ofl3
PLAINTIFF understands that with respect to an ADEA claim only, that after
his execution of this Agreement he has seven days within which to revoke his
agreement to resolve such ADEA claim only by delivering written notice of said
revocation to counsel for the DEFENDANT at 2707 E. Jefferson Street, Orlando,
Florida 32803.
4.
Severability
If any clause or provision of this Agreement is found to be void, invalid, or
unenforceable, it shall be severed from the remaining provisions and clauses which
shall remain in full force and effect.
5.
Governing Law
The parties hereto agree that the law of the State of Florida shall govern this
Agreement and all respects in the event any action must be instituted for breach of
this Agreement, the parties agree that the sole venue shall be Marion County,
Florida.
6.
Miscellaneous
A.
has read carefully and fully understands all provisions of this Agreement and that
he is entering into this Agreement of his own free will and with the advice of his
attorneys.
Agreement with the intent to be bound thereby and he has not been coerced or
induced by anyone to enter into this Agreement. PLAINTIFF acknowledge that he
has read and fully understands the Agreement's terms, conditions, meaning and
intent, including but not limited to the fmal binding effect of the General Release.
B.
and no other promises or agreements shall be binding unless signed by all parties.
All prior representations regarding the Agreement are hereby expressly disclaimed
by all parties unless incorporated herein.
C.
All parties shall take such further action and shall execute and deliver
such further documents as may be reasonably requested by the other party in order
to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Agreement.
D.
PLAINTIFF agrees that the terms, amount and fact of settlement and
any facts concerning his claims shall be kept confidential by him. PLAINTIFF
further agrees that he will not actively seek out media attention or publicity
regarding the terms, the amount or conditions of this Settlement Agreement and
General Release and will further not discuss this matter with anyone including
past, present or future employees of the DEFENDANT. If contacted, PLAINTIFF
agrees simply to indicate that the matter has been resolved and decline from any
further discussion concerning the details of his claim or the nature of the
Page 11 of13
settlement.
E.
The parties to this Agreement hereby confirm and agree that each of
them will refrain from making derogatory statements about any other party hereto
or about the policies and practices of any other party hereto, and that they will
make every effort to avoid denigrating each other in any manner. While it is
recognized that any party hereto may be required to testifY or provide information
in response to valid legal process, the parties agree that they will not voluntarily
provide information about the other that is derogatory.
F.
In the event one of the parties breaches the terms and conditions of the
Settlement Agreement and General Release, the prevailing party shall recover
attorney's fees.
G.
Page 12 ofl3
STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF MARION
::dw.
oath.---~~----------~
~~~'.L;;ili.J
s No~~
~
STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF MARION
The foregoing was acknowledged before me this ll\ day of ~ ~ ,
2011, by DAVID ELLSPERMANN, who i(j}ersonally kno\Yiiho me~as
produced
as identification and who did/did not take an oath.
-R
My Commission Expires:
~otary Public
!;,.!
,,
,,
())_on~~
Page 13 ofl3
http://www.ocala.com/article/20110202/ARTICLES/110209928?template=printpicart
This copy is for your personal, noncommercial use only. You can order presentation-ready copies for
distribution to your colleagues, clients or customers here or use the "Reprints" tool that appears above
any article. Order a reprint of this article now.
A federal lawsuit brought against Marion County Clerk of Court David Ellspermann
by a former employee who alleges he was discriminated against because of his race
has tentatively settled, according to an attorney involved in the case.
The resolution comes several weeks before a nine-count complaint that had been
whittled down to just one claim by a federal magistrate in December was set to go to
trial.
Antonio Ortiz-Carballo filed suit against Ellspermann in April 2008 claiming he was
fired from his position as a deputy clerk in June 2007 in retaliation for speaking out
against what he felt was unfair treatment by a supervisor.
Cindy Ann Townsend, of Bell & Roper PA, the Orlando law firm representing
Ellspermann, confirmed there was a monetary amount agreed upon by both parties,
but could not disclose the terms until the settlement was finalized.
Until we get the final order, were still in litigation, Townsend said Wednesday.
The plaintiff has to execute the settlement agreement, then we have to advise the
court it is ready for dismissal.
Ortiz-Carballo, an Ocala resident hired by the Clerks Office in November 2005,
referred to a series of incidents in his complaint, including a remark in which
Ellspermann allegedly once told him, There is to be no Spanish spoken in my
office.
Later, in a deposition, Ellspermann clarified that the policy of the Clerks Office is
for all official business to be conducted in English, and that no Spanish should be
spoken in the work environment regardless of whether or not anyone else could
hear it.
The clerk, who is responsible for all hiring and firing of staff, denied he terminated
Ortiz-Carballo for any reason other than his professional conduct. He claimed the
firing resulted from his being disrespectful and disruptive to the operations of the
office and the relationships within the office after the employee directly
approached him about his belief that he felt a direct supervisor was sabotaging his
career.
It was to this supervisor that Ortiz-Carballo had previously complained concerning
insensitive and inappropriate remarks made by two co-workers towards another
Hispanic employee in the Domestic Violence division. He also allegedly refused to
comply with a request to turn the volume up on his phone ringer, a conflict that
required a conference with managers in the Clerks Office and led to that discussion
a month later in which Ellspermann advised the employee of the no-Spanish rule.
Whether any or all of these previous exchanges had any bearing on Ortiz-Carballos
termination is a matter the federal court took into consideration in December.
Orlando-based Magistrate David A. Baker granted Ellpermanns motion for
summary judgment on all counts except the one relating to disparate treatment
http://www.ocala.com/article/20110202/ARTICLES/110209928?template=printpicart
discrimination. Had there been a trial, the plaintiff would have used three avenues
to pursue it: the Florida Civil Rights Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
Section 1983.
Although not addressed by the parties, it is plain that the alleged statements in this
case are not direct evidence of racial or national origin discrimination, the judge
wrote. He added, however, that the Clerk failed to articulate any legitimate reason
for terminating Plaintiff without using the progressive discipline policy.
Immediately after Ortiz-Carballo told Ellspermann he believed his direct supervisor
was sabotaging him, he was given just two options: resign or be fired. OrtizCarballo did not submit a resignation letter; therefore, he was fired.
The Ocala resident, who had received at least one promotion while employed by the
Clerk, had never been the subject of any disciplinary action during his two-year
employment.
Baker, a magistrate on the federal bench since December 1991, made clear in his
25-page order he felt no evidence demonstrated any historic ill-effect of the
no-Spanish policy in the Clerks Office: There is no evidence that Plaintiff had
previously been told to stop speaking Spanish; that he (or any other employee) was
ever disciplined for speaking Spanish in the workplace; or that the policy created a
hostile atmosphere for Hispanics, he wrote.
Federal court records show that a successful mediation hearing was held this past
Monday.
When reached by phone, Ortiz-Carballo denied comment, deferring to his attorneys.
Ellspermann, via a staff attorney in his office, also declined to comment.
Contact Suevon Lee at 867-4065 or suevon.lee@starbanner.com.
Copyright 2015 Ocala.com All rights reserved. Restricted use only.
further pleadings, motions and notices shall be served on Plaintiff at: 1748 NE 60th
Street, Ocala, Florida 34479-1741.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Ocala, Florida, on February 24, 2009.
Copies to:
All Counsel
Plaintiff
1748 NE 60th Street,
Ocala, Florida 34479-1741
10
Id.
11
Copies to:
All Counsel
Pro Se Plaintiff
Id.
Even in cases where exceptional circumstances are present for appointment of counsel the
Court only has the authority to request an attorney to represent an indigent civil litigant and not the
authority to require an attorney to represent an indigent litigant. See Mallard v. United States District Court
for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 109 S.Ct. 1814, 104 L.Ed.2d 318 (1989).
ADDENDUM FIVE
NON-CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT COUNSEL APPOINTMENTS
The court adopts these provisions for furnishing representation for persons financially unable
to obtain adequate representation in cases and situations which do not fall within the scope of 18
U.S.C. 3006A, as amended but in which the court believes that the interests of justice will be
served by the presence of counsel.
(a) Determination of Need.
In determining need for appointment of counsel, the court shall generally be governed by the
guidelines outlined in 18 U.S.C. 3006A.
(b) Appointment of Counsel.
(1) Counsel shall be selected from the same panels of attorneys designated or approved by
the district courts of the Eleventh Circuit as described in Addendum Four, which are hereby
approved by this court, or from a bar association, legal aid agency, or other approved organization.
In addition, any judge of this court may appoint competent counsel not otherwise included in the
preceding categories.
(2) Any person seeking relief under 29 U.S.C. 621, 42 U.S.C. 1981, 42 U.S.C. 1982,
42 U.S.C. 1983, 42 U.S.C. 1985, 42 U.S.C. 1986, 42 U.S.C. 2000a, 42 U.S.C. 2000d, and
42 U.S.C. 2000e or in such other cases as the court shall determine to be appropriate may be
eligible for representation. The court may approve such representation on a determination that the
interests of justice so require and that the person is financially unable to obtain representation.
(3) The court may at its discretion and in the interest of justice substitute one appointed
counsel for another at any stage of the proceedings on appeal.
(4) The court may at its discretion and where circumstances warrant make appointments of
counsel retroactive so as to include representation furnished prior to appointment.
(c) Withdrawal or Release of Appointed Counsel.
Counsel appointed under this rule to represent a party shall continue such representation until
relieved by order of the court of appeals.
(d) Duties of Appointed Counsel.
(1) Appointed counsel shall furnish the party represented, upon written request, with a copy
of motion papers and briefs filed for the party on the appeal, and shall send the party a copy of the
Rev.: 8/07
Addendum Five
12
court's decision when issued; the clerk will send appointed counsel an extra copy of the decision for
this purpose.
(2) Appointed counsel shall appear for oral argument only when directed by the court.
(3) In the event of affirmance or other decision adverse to the party represented appointed
counsel shall promptly advise the party in writing of the right to seek further review by the filing of
a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court.
(4) Appointed counsel shall advise the party represented in each case that, if the party wishes
to file a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court, the party may have the right to do
so without prepayment of fees and costs or giving security therefor.
(5) No appointed representative under this rule shall accept a payment from or on behalf of
the person represented in this court without prior authorization by a United States circuit judge.
(e)
(1) In all appeals covered by this rule, the court of appeals may authorize reimbursement of
necessary expenses reasonably incurred in representing a party on appeal, consistent with the
limitations contained in the Criminal Justice Act, by any private attorney, bar association, legal aid
agency, or other approved organization appointed by the court for the purpose of representing a party
on appeal pursuant to this addendum. Compensation for attorney services as a fee for either in-court
or out-of-court time is not authorized.
(2) Travel expenses and other expenses reasonably incurred and necessary for adequate
representation on appeal may be claimed by an appointed attorney or other legal representative. The
clerk of court shall furnish each attorney or other representative at the time of appointment with
information as to expenses currently allowable and in accordance with rules, regulations and
guidelines promulgated by the Judicial Conference of the United States. Per diem may not be
claimed in lieu of actual travel and subsistence expenses. Meal and lodging expenses incurred
incident to representation on appeal, necessary long distance telephone calls or telegrams, and the
cost of photocopying (but not printing), are reimbursable expenses within the guidelines established
by the court. Expenses of general office overhead, personal items, filing fees and expenses of
printing of briefs are not reimbursable. Expenses of travel by private automobile may be claimed
on a straight mileage basis at the authorized rate. See (6) of the guidelines, below. Parking fees
and toll expenses are allowable. Transportation other than by private automobile may be claimed
on an actual cost basis, but first class fare is not permitted unless absolutely necessary and
documentation is provided that tourist or economy fares were not available.
(3) Unless otherwise ordered by the court for good cause shown, travel expenses other than
those incurred in connection with attending oral argument will not be reimbursed without a prior ex
parte application to and approval by the court.
Rev.: 8/07
Addendum Five
(4) All claims for reimbursement of expenses for representation on appeal shall be itemized
in detail and filed with the clerk of court on officially approved forms that the clerk's office will
provide. Claims should be filed as promptly as possible and in no event later than 60 days after
issuance of the mandate.
(5) After approval of allowable reimbursable expenses by the court, the claim form will be
forwarded to the circuit executive for payment.
(6) Reimbursable Expenses.
(a) Travel and transportation expenses. Travel and transportation must be accomplished by
the most economical means available. Only actual expenses may be claimed.
(i) Air transportation. Tourist or economy accommodations must be used except
where unavailable. A copy of the ticket must be attached to the claim form. If travel
by first class air transportation is claimed a detailed explanation of the reasons
therefor must be provided with the ticket copy.
(ii) Automobile transportation. The total mileage cost shall not exceed the fare
authorized for travel by tourist or economy air transport except in an emergency or
for other compelling reasons. Travel by privately owned automobile shall not exceed
the current government authorized rate for official travel per mile on a straight
mileage basis, plus parking fees, ferry, bridge, road, and tunnel fares.
(iii) Local transportation. Local travel will be accomplished by the most economical
means available and only actual expenses may be claimed. Transportation to and
from an airport should be by airport shuttle, if available.
(iv) Meals and lodging. Reasonable compensation for hotel or motel
accommodations and meals will be allowed on an actual expense basis subject to the
limitations governing compensation for federal employees traveling to the same
destination. Counsel will be notified by the clerk prior to the scheduled oral
argument session of the current limitations. A copy of the hotel or motel bill shall
be attached to the claim form.
(b) Photocopying. Actual costs not to exceed 25 cents per page will be paid if copy bill is
submitted. For in-house copying, actual costs not to exceed 15 cents per page will be paid.
(c) Express mail and other special arrangements. For delivery of items that could have been
mailed via U.S. Postal Service first class mail, additional expenses will be reimbursed only
if a satisfactory explanation is given why first class mail service was not utilized. In
non-emergency cases routine documents such as briefs and motions should be prepared early
enough to permit use of first class mail.
Rev.: 8/07
Addendum Five
Rev.: 8/07
Addendum Five
13
14
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on October 16, 2009, I presented the foregoing to the Clerk of
the Court for filing and uploading to the CM/ECF system which will send a notice of electronic
filing to the following: Michael J. Roper, Esq., Bell, Roper & Kohlmyer, P.A., 2707 East Jefferson
Street, Orlando, FL 32803. I further certify that I mailed the foregoing document and the notice of
electronic filing by first-class mail and to the following non-CM/ECF participants: None.
https://ecf.flmd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?102024748365511-L_1_0-1
CLOSED
Ortiz-Carballo v. Ellspermann
Assigned to: Senior Judge Wm. Terrell Hodges
Referred to: Magistrate Judge David A. Baker
Case in other court: State Court - 3/6/08, 08-1109-CAB
Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)
Plaintiff
Antonio J. Ortiz-Carballo
V.
Defendant
15
https://ecf.flmd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?102024748365511-L_1_0-1
David R. Ellspermann
Clerk of Circuit Court, Fifth Judicial
Circuit in and for Marion County, Florida
Date Filed
Docket Text
04/30/2008
1 NOTICE OF REMOVAL from 5th Judicial Circuit, Marion County, Florida, case
number 08-1109-CAB and filed in State Court on 3/6/08. Filing fee $ 350.00, receipt
number C-6638 filed by David R. Ellspermann. (Attachments: # 1 State Record, # 2
Civil Cover Sheet)(LMF) (Entered: 04/30/2008)
04/30/2008
04/30/2008
05/02/2008
05/05/2008
05/13/2008
05/30/2008
06/09/2008
06/11/2008
9 AMENDED COMPLAINT and Demand for Jury Trial against David R. Ellspermann
with Jury Demand filed by Antonio J. Ortiz-Carballo.(Sass, Cynthia) (Entered:
06/11/2008)
https://ecf.flmd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?102024748365511-L_1_0-1
06/20/2008
06/27/2008
07/18/2008
12 MOTION for protective order from Deposition Scheduled for August 5, 2008 and
Memorandum of Law in Support by Antonio J. Ortiz-Carballo. (Attachments: # 1
Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7
Exhibit G)(Sass, Cynthia) Motions referred to Magistrate Judge Gary R. Jones.
(Entered: 07/18/2008)
07/20/2008
07/25/2008
07/31/2008
15 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 12 Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order
From Deposition For August 5, 2008. Signed by Magistrate Judge Gary R. Jones on
7/31/2008. (grj) (Entered: 07/31/2008)
09/22/2008
10/01/2008
01/07/2009
01/13/2009
01/14/2009
02/02/2009
02/23/2009
02/24/2009
23 ORDER granting 22 Motion For Leave To Withdraw As Counsel for Plaintiff. Signed by
Magistrate Judge Gary R. Jones on 2/24/2009. (grj) (Entered: 02/24/2009)
https://ecf.flmd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?102024748365511-L_1_0-1
03/20/2009
03/23/2009
03/25/2009
04/07/2009
27 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 20 Defendant's Second Amended Motion
To Compel Production of Documents From Non-Parties; granting 26 Defendant's
Motion To Compel Plaintiff To Respond To Defendant's Third Request To Produce.
Signed by Magistrate Judge Gary R. Jones on 4/7/2009. (grj) (Entered: 04/07/2009)
04/20/2009
06/09/2009
06/19/2009
30 MOTION for leave to file Motion for summary judgment in Excess of Twenty-Five (25)
Pages by David R. Ellspermann. (Townsend, Cindy) Modified on 6/22/2009 (LMF).
(Entered: 06/19/2009)
06/23/2009
07/31/2009
07/31/2009
08/03/2009
08/14/2009
https://ecf.flmd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?102024748365511-L_1_0-1
10/02/2009
10/02/2009
10/02/2009
10/13/2009
10/14/2009
10/14/2009
10/14/2009
42 MOTION for leave to file Amended Final Pretrial Statement by David R. Ellspermann.
(Townsend, Cindy) (Entered: 10/14/2009)
10/15/2009
10/15/2009
10/16/2009
10/16/2009
10/16/2009
47 MOTION for extension of time to complete discovery /Reopen Discovery and Stay
Ruling on Pending Summary Judgment Motions by Antonio J. Ortiz-Carballo. (Sacks,
David) Motions referred to Magistrate Judge Gary R. Jones. (Entered: 10/16/2009)
10/16/2009
10/16/2009
10/16/2009
10/18/2009
10/19/2009
52 Minute Entry. Proceedings held before Senior Judge Wm. Terrell Hodges: PRETRIAL
CONFERENCE held on 10/19/2009. Court Reporter: Dennis Miracle (MAM) (Entered:
10/19/2009)
10/19/2009
https://ecf.flmd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?102024748365511-L_1_0-1
commencing 2/1/2010 in Ocala Courtroom 1 before Senior Judge Wm. Terrell Hodges.
(MAM) (Entered: 10/19/2009)
10/19/2009
54 NOTICE canceling pretrial conference scheduled for 1/20/10 and jury trial hearing
scheduled for trial term commencing 2/1/10. (MAM) (Entered: 10/19/2009)
10/19/2009
55 ORDER granting 46 Motion for extension of time to file joint pretrial statement;
granting 47 Motion for extension of time to complete discovery and to stay ruling on
pending summary judgment motions; granting 48 Motion to continue trial. The Clerk is
directed to remove this case from the trial term commencing November 2, 2009, and to
reschedule this case for final pretrial conference and trial as set forth in this Order.
Signed by Senior Judge Wm. Terrell Hodges on 10/19/2009. (LRH) (Entered:
10/19/2009)
10/20/2009
10/29/2009
11/06/2009
58 RESPONSE re 57 Notice of Itemization of Fees and Costs filed by Antonio J. OrtizCarballo. (Sacks, David) (Entered: 11/06/2009)
11/19/2009
11/30/2009
12/30/2009
12/30/2009
12/31/2009
01/19/2010
01/19/2010
https://ecf.flmd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?102024748365511-L_1_0-1
66 MOTION to strike Defendants' Reply memorandum (Doc. #'s 32 and 33) and
incorporated Memorandum in Support by Antonio J. Ortiz-Carballo. (Sacks, David)
Motions referred to Magistrate Judge Gary R. Jones. Attorney notified re blank pages,
will refile. Modified on 1/27/2010 (LMF). (Entered: 01/26/2010)
01/27/2010
67 MOTION to strike Defendants' Reply Memorandum (DKT NO.'s 32 and 33) and
Incorporated Memorandum in Support by Antonio J. Ortiz-Carballo. (Sacks, David)
Motions referred to Magistrate Judge Gary R. Jones. (Entered: 01/27/2010)
01/27/2010
01/28/2010
02/02/2010
70 Joint MOTION for miscellaneous relief, specifically Joint Motion to Remove Case from
March 1, 2010 Trial Docket by David R. Ellspermann, Antonio J. Ortiz-Carballo.
(Townsend, Cindy) (Entered: 02/02/2010)
02/04/2010
71 ORDER granting 70 Joint Motion to Remove Case from March 1, 2010 Trial Docket.
Signed by Senior Judge Wm. Terrell Hodges on 2/3/2010. (LRH) (Entered: 02/04/2010)
06/16/2010
09/24/2010
73 Case reassigned to Magistrate Judge David A. Baker. New case number: 5:08-cv165-Oc-10DAB. Magistrate Judge Gary R. Jones no longer assigned to the case. (LMF)
Modified on 9/27/2010 (DFD). (Entered: 09/24/2010)
09/27/2010
10/06/2010
75 ORDER referring motion for report and recommendation: 32 MOTION for summary
judgment and Incorporated Memorandum of Law filed on behalf of David
Ellspermann in his official capacity as Clerk of Court filed by David R. Ellspermann,
33 MOTION for summary judgment and Incorporated Memorandum of Law filed on
behalf of David Ellspermann, in his individual capacity, filed by David R. Ellspermann
Signed by Senior Judge Wm. Terrell Hodges on 10/6/2010. (LRH) Motions referred to
Magistrate Judge David A. Baker. (Entered: 10/06/2010)
11/01/2010
76 ORDER granting 72 Motion to schedule a status conference. The Court will conduct a
status conference and hear oral argument on the Motions for Summary Judgment on
11/16/10 at 10:30 a.m. at Orlando Courthouse, Courtroom # 6D. Signed by Magistrate
Judge David A. Baker on 11/1/2010. (LMF) (Entered: 11/01/2010)
11/16/2010
77 Minute Entry. Proceedings held before Magistrate Judge David A. Baker: Status
Conference and Oral Argument on Motion for Summary Judgment held on 11/16/2010.
(digital) (HSL) (Entered: 11/16/2010)
https://ecf.flmd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?102024748365511-L_1_0-1
11/22/2010
78 ORDER that this case should be put back on the trial calendar. This matter is set for the
trial term commencing 2/28/11 with a final pretrial conference on 2/16/11, time to be set
by Clerk by separate notice. Signed by Magistrate Judge David A. Baker on 11/22/2010.
(LMF) (Entered: 11/22/2010)
11/23/2010
12/14/2010
12/28/2010
12/28/2010
01/10/2011
83 RESPONSE to objections to 80 Report and Recommendations by Antonio J. OrtizCarballo. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix, # 2 Exhibit 1: Employee-Supervisor Conference
form, dated April 3, 2007, # 3 Exhibit Personnel File of Tamela McIntyre, # 4 Exhibit
Termination Memo of Sandra Pruitt, Dated January 30, 2007, # 5 Exhibit Carballo
Termination Memo dated June 13, 2007, # 6 Exhibit Excerpts from Deposition of David
Ellspermann)(Sacks, David) (Entered: 01/10/2011)
01/11/2011
01/14/2011
85 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 32 Motion for summary judgment; granting
in part and denying in part 33 Motion for summary judgment; adopting 80 Report and
Recommendations. Signed by Senior Judge Wm. Terrell Hodges on 1/14/2011. (LRH)
(Entered: 01/14/2011)
01/31/2011
02/01/2011
https://ecf.flmd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?102024748365511-L_1_0-1
03/01/2011
03/02/2011
89 ORDER dismissing this case with prejudice re 88 Stipulation of Dismissal filed by David
R. Ellspermann. Signed by Senior Judge Wm. Terrell Hodges on 3/2/2011. (LRH)
(Entered: 03/02/2011)
03/03/2011
Client Code:
Description:
Docket Report
Search
Criteria:
5:08-cv-00165WTH-DAB
Billable
Pages:
Cost:
0.70
ORTIZ-CARBALLO v. ELLSPERMANN, Case No. 5:08-cv-165-Oc-10GRJ. (M.D. Fla. Apr 07, 2009)
ORTIZ-CARBALLO v. ELLSPERMANN
Case No. 5:08-cv-165-Oc-10GRJ. (M.D. Fla. Apr 07, 2009)
ANTONIO
J.
ORTIZ-CARBALLO,
Plaintiff, v. DAVID R. ELLSPERMANN,
IN HIS INDIVIDUAL AND IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CLERK OF
THE
CIRCUIT
COURT,
FIFTH
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR
MARION
COUNTY,
FLORIDA,
Defendant.
Case No. 5:08-cv-165-Oc-10GRJ.
United States District Court, M.D. Florida,
Ocala Division.
April 7, 2009
ORDER
GARY JONES, Magistrate Judge
Pending before the Court is Defendant, David R.
Ellspermann, Clerk Of The Circuit Court, Fifth Judicial Circuit In And For Marion County, Florida's,
Second Amended Motion To Compel Production Of
Documents From Non-Parties (Doc. 20) to which
Plaintiff filed a response in opposition (Doc. 21) and
Defendant, David Ellspermann, Clerk Of The Circuit
Court, Fifth Judicial Circuit In And For Marion
County, Florida's Motion To Compel Plaintiff To Respond To Defendant's Third Request To Produce
(Doc. 26) to which Plaintiff has not filed a response.
casetext.com/case/ortiz-carballo-v-ellspermann
1 of 5
16
ORTIZ-CARBALLO v. ELLSPERMANN, Case No. 5:08-cv-165-Oc-10GRJ. (M.D. Fla. Apr 07, 2009)
here, the Court's jurisdiction is premised upon a federal question, the federal law of privilege governs the
Court's determination of whether the requested med5
ical records are privileged. *3
2. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1).
3. Id.
4. "Paragraph (c)(3) explicitly authorizes the
quashing of a subpoena as a means of protecting a witness from misuse of the subpoena
power." Fed.R.Civ.P. 45 advisory committee
notes, 1991 amendment.
5. See Hancock v. Hobbs, 967 F.2d 462,
th
466-47 (11 Cir. 1992.)
patients in the course of diagnosis or treatment are protected from compelled disclosure
under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.").
7. Defendant incorrectly refers to the "doctor/
patient privilege" throughout his Motion.
However, Plaintiff acknowledges that there is
no doctor-patient privilege and that he only
seeks application of the psychotherapist-patient privilege to those records related to
counseling he received from Dr. Poetter. See
Doc. 21 at page 3, n. 2.
casetext.com/case/ortiz-carballo-v-ellspermann
2 of 5
ORTIZ-CARBALLO v. ELLSPERMANN, Case No. 5:08-cv-165-Oc-10GRJ. (M.D. Fla. Apr 07, 2009)
infliction of emotional distress; (2) an allegation of a specific mental or psychiatric injury
or disorder; (3) a claim of unusually severe
emotional distress; (4) plaintiff's offer of expert testimony to support a claim of emotional
distress; and/or (5) plaintiff's concession that
his or her mental condition is "in controversy"
within the meaning of the rule).
casetext.com/case/ortiz-carballo-v-ellspermann
3 of 5
ORTIZ-CARBALLO v. ELLSPERMANN, Case No. 5:08-cv-165-Oc-10GRJ. (M.D. Fla. Apr 07, 2009)
As discussed above, because federal law does not recognize a doctor-patient privilege, the requested
records are subject to discovery under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure if the records are "relevant
to a claim or defense of any party." Here, Dr. Gomez'
records reflect treatment more than 10 years ago for a
six-month bout of depression. These records are not
relevant or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant evidence in this action. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion To Compel the records of Dr.
Gomez (Doc. 21) is due to be DENIED.
casetext.com/case/ortiz-carballo-v-ellspermann
4 of 5
ORTIZ-CARBALLO v. ELLSPERMANN, Case No. 5:08-cv-165-Oc-10GRJ. (M.D. Fla. Apr 07, 2009)
duce (Doc. 26) is GRANTED. Plaintiff shall serve re-
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DONE AND ORDERED.
casetext.com/case/ortiz-carballo-v-ellspermann
5 of 5
BELL
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
MICHAEL M. BEll
MICHAEL H. BOWLING
HAEJ. KIM
MICHAELJ. ROPER
JOSEPH D. TESSITORE
DAVID B. BLESSING
GAIL C. BRADFORD
ANNA E. ENGELMAN
CHRISTOPHER R. FAY
KATHRYN A JOHNSON
ESTEBAN F. SCORNIK
DALE A SCOTI
CINDY A TOWNSEND
MARY]. WALTER
February 7, 2011
ATTORNEY CLIENT COMMUNICATION
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
PRIVILEGED - CONFIDENTIAL
Insured:
Claimant:
Claim No.:
Marion County
Anthony Ortiz-Carballo
EV138237
CAT:em
cc:
Katherine Glynn, Esq.
David Ellspermann
Cindy A. Townsend
17
Bill To
Mediation Invoice
Date
Invoice#
1/31/2011
11JJF25B
Description
Amount
937.50
Mediation services rendered by J. Joaquin Fraxedas, including review of mediation summaries and
materials; conduct mediation conference; and any travel. THE AMOUNT SHOWN BELOW IS YOUR
SHARE OF THE FEES AND COSTS (1/2 ). 5 hrs. x $375/hr.
***PLEASE DO NOT DIVIDE THE AMOUNT SHOWN***.
~ ~~O~~n
FEB - 2 2011
~------'~
Total
$937.50
Payments/Credits
***PLEASE RETURN A COPY OF THIS INVOICE WITH YOUR PAYMENT
AND INDICATE THE INVOICE NUMBER ON YOUR CHECK***
Balance Due
Phone#
Fax#
Web Site
407-661-5757
407-661-9006
rfraxedas@ fraxedas.com
www.fraxedas.com
$0.00
$937.50
ANTONIO J. ORTIZ-CARBALLO
Plaintiff,
v.
DAVID R. ELLSPERMANN,
CLERK OF THE CIRClJIT COURT,
FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND
FOR MARION COUNTY, FLORIDA
Defendant.
--------------------------~/
NOTICE OF MEDIATION
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, upon agreement of the parties, the
Mediation Conference has been scheduled and will now take place on Monday,
January 31, 2011 at 10:00 a.m. The Mediator will be Jay Fraxedas, Esquire and
the Mediation Conference will be held at the Offices of Fraxedas Mediation,
2450 Maitland Center Parkway, Suite 202, Maitland, Florida 32751.
Ortiz-Caballo v. Ellspermann
Case No. 05:08-CV-QOlGS-WTH-GRJ
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the within and
foregoing has been sent by U. S. Mail on January~~ , 2011, to David Sacks,
Esquire, 1017 LaSalle Street, Jacksonville, Florida 32201.
~~~~~
BELL
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
MICHAEL M. BELL
MICHAEL H. BOWLING
HAEJ. KIM
MICHAEL j. ROPER
JOSEPH D. TESSITORE
DAVID B. BLESSING
GAll C. BRADFORD
ANNA E. ENGELMAN
CHRISTOPHER R. FAY
KATHRYN A. JOHNSON
ESTEBAN F. SCORNIK
DALE A. SCOTT
CINDY A. TOWNSEND
MARY J. WALTER
RE:
Insured:
Claimant:
Claim No.:
Date of Loss:
Our File No.:
Marion County
Anthony Ortiz-Carballo
EV138237
June 11, 2007
026-296
Again, no issue of
On May 1, 2007, another meeting was held between Plaintiff, Suess and
Kudary during which Plaintiff was presented with various options to deal with the
issue regarding the ring volume on his telephone. Plaintiff elected to keep the
ringer lowered while he was present at his desk, but agreed to increase the ring
volume on the telephone every time he stepped away from his desk.
As a result of the continuing administrative issues between Plaintiff and
Kingsley related to his work assignments and desk location, on June 11, 2007, the
Clerk met with Plaintiff, Kingsley, Kudary and Landers. During the meeting
Plaintiff, without any justification, accused Kingsley of trying to sabotage him and
set him up for termination.
The Clerk concluded this unsubstantiated,
disrespectful, and insubordinate accusation against Plaintiffs direct supervisor, in
the Clerk's presence, evidenced an irretrievable breakdown of the employeesupervisor relationship and Plaintiffs employment with the Clerk's Office.
The Clerk ended the conference and afforded Plaintiff the opportunity to
resign in lieu of termination, which Plaintiff accepted. At no point during this
meeting did Plaintiff complain about discrimination or retaliation based on a prior
complaint of discrimination. However, on June 12, 2007, Plaintiff called the
Clerk's Office to verbally rescind his resignation and was thereafter terminated.
On June 13, 2007, the Clerk sent a memorandum to Plaintiff confirming the
retraction of his resignation and summarizing the June 11, 2007 meeting. On June
25, 2007, Plaintiff responded to that memorandum and disputed he had been
disrespectful and disruptive to the operations of the office and the relationships
within the office. Yet again, Plaintiff never mentioned any complaint about
discrimination, harassment, or disparate treatment.
In support of his disparate treatment claim, Plaintiff has identified Sandra
Pruitt and Tammy Mcintyre, both Caucasians, as comparators. Like, Plaintiff,
Pruitt and Mcintyre were terminated for insubordination. Plaintiff asserts that
although Pruitt and Mcintyre engaged in similar behavior they were disciplined
less harshly, in that, they were afforded multiple opportunities to correct and
improve their behavior while he was not and which he contends violates the
Clerk's progressive discipline policy. In support of his argument that Ellspermann
DISPARATE TREATMENT:
SANDRA PRUITT:
Plaintiff claims that Pruitt is a proper comparator because she engaged in the
same misconduct but was treated more favorably than he was. This is simply not
true.
Pruitt was employed as a Clerk I in the Traffic Department. Her immediate
supervisor was Karen Rodgers. Prior to her termination, Ellspermann met with
Pruitt to discuss her profane language and aggressive behavior towards her Q:
workers. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 21) During that meeting, Pruitt acknowledged her
behavior and agreed to improve her attitude. Insubordination was never the subject
of any prior warnings to Pruitt.
On January 30, 2007, Ellspermann was advised that Pruitt had engaged in
two incidents of inappropriate behavior towards her supervisor. The first incident
involved Pruitt giving her supervisor, Rodgers, the finger and mouthing an
expletive behind Rodgers' back. The second incident involved Pruitt telling a coworker that she "hated her f---ing job." Ellspermann determined that Pruitt's
actions towards her supervisor were both disrespectful and unacceptable and
immediately terminated her employment.
Based on the above, it is clear that Pruitt and Plaintiff did not engage in
"nearly identical" misconduct. While Ellspermann did give Pruitt a warning
before her termination, that warning was based on Pruitt's behavior towards her
co-workers and not an act of insubordination. Conversely, the purpose of
Ellspermann's meeting with Plaintiff was to discuss his two prior incidents of
insubordination towards his supervisor which began when he refused to follow her
specific instructions regarding the volume of his telephone. Moreover, during
Plaintiffs meeting with Ellspermann, Plaintiff challenged and opposed his
supervisor's authority in Ellspermann's presence by accusing his supervisor of
sabotaging his career and trying to get him fired. Pruitt never engaged in any such
behavior during her meeting with Ellspermann, but instead admitted that she
needed to improve her behavior and committed to doing so. Contrary to Plaintiffs
B.
TAMMY MCINTYRE:
WANDA CRYER:
Plaintiff alleges that Cryer, a Hispanic female, was also treated less
favorably by Ellspermann when he terminated her at the end of her probationary
period. However, Cryer, did not engage in similar or nearly identical misconduct
as either Pruitt or Mcintyre. Cryer was not terminated for insubordination; instead,
she was terminated due to excessive absenteeism, tardiness and poor work
performance. Moreover, Cryer was a probationary employee while Pruitt and
Mcintyre were full time employees. See Bricknell v. City of St. Petersburg,
F.Supp.2d *10 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (finding that probationary officer was not
similarly situated to officers who had completed their probationary period).
Further, Cryer's supervisor recommended her termination whereas Pruitt and
Mcintyre's supervisors did not. Clearly, Cryer is not similarly situated to either
Pruitt and Mcintyre and any evidence relating to her termination would not is
insufficient to rebut the legitimate non-discriminatory reasons proffered for
Plaintiffs termination.
D.
While it is true that Pruitt, Mcintyre and Plaintiff were all terminated for
insubordination, neither Pruitt nor Mcintyre made any accusations against or
engaged in insubordinate behavior towards their supervisors in the presence of
Ellspermann. Additionally, it is abundantly clear that the warnings given to Pruitt
and Mcintyre prior to their terminations were not for insubordination. Instead it
was for impatient, rude or angry behavior primarily towards their co-workers and
not for refusing to obey a directive from their supervisor on more than one
occasion. Like Pruitt and Mcintyre, it was Ellspermann's intention to utilize the
progressive discipline policy with Plaintiff. Thus, at the time Ellspermann held the
June 11, 2007 meeting there was no intent to terminate Plaintiffs employment.
Instead the meeting was held to try and resolve Plaintiffs complaints and issues
with his supervisor. This is supported by the termination memorandum sent to
Plaintiff on June 13, 2007 which clearly states that Ellspermann's decision to
terminate Plaintiff was based on the two previous incidents of insubordination as
well as Plaintiffs conduct during the June 11, 2007 meeting wherein he confronted
and accused his supervisor of sabotaging his career and trying to get him fired.
TERMINATING
PLAINTIFF
WITHOUT
USING
THE
PROGRESSIVE DISCIPLINE POLICY IS NOT EVIDENCE OF
PRETEXT.
C.
..
This case will likely be moderately expensive to defend through trial. The
depositions of Plaintiff, the Clerk and several of his employees have already been
taken. We have currently scheduled meetings to prepare the Clerk and his staff for
the trial and continue to prepare for trial in the event this matter is not resolved at
mediation.
If you have any questions regarding the above, please do not hesitate to
contact me.
~~~~
Cindy A. Townsend
CAT/em
cc:
David Ellspermann
Katherine Glynn, Esq.
Yari Benitez