Professional Documents
Culture Documents
UNIFORMITY OF TAXATION
G.R. No. 81311 June 30, 1988
KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAGLILINGKOD SA PAMAHALAAN NG PILIPINAS, INC., HERMINIGILDO
C. DUMLAO, GERONIMO Q. QUADRA, and MARIO C. VILLANUEVA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO TAN, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, respondent.
G.R. No. 81820 June 30, 1988
KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER (KMU), its officers and affiliated labor federations and
alliances,petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, and SECRETARY OF BUDGET, respondents.
G.R. No. 81921 June 30, 1988
INTEGRATED CUSTOMS BROKERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES and JESUS B.
BANAL, petitioners,
vs.
The HON. COMMISSIONER, BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
G.R. No. 82152 June 30, 1988
RICARDO C. VALMONTE, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF FINANCE, COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE and SECRETARY OF BUDGET, respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
These four (4) petitions, which have been consolidated because of the similarity of the main issues involved therein,
seek to nullify Executive Order No. 273 (EO 273, for short), issued by the President of the Philippines on 25 July
1987, to take effect on 1 January 1988, and which amended certain sections of the National Internal Revenue Code
and adopted the value-added tax (VAT, for short), for being unconstitutional in that its enactment is not alledgedly
within the powers of the President; that the VAT is oppressive, discriminatory, regressive, and violates the due
process and equal protection clauses and other provisions of the 1987 Constitution.
The Solicitor General prays for the dismissal of the petitions on the ground that the petitioners have failed to show
justification for the exercise of its judicial powers, viz. (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest,
personal and substantial, of the party raising the constitutional questions; (3) the constitutional question should be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the question of constitutionality is directly and necessarily involved in a
justiciable controversy and its resolution is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties. According to the
Solicitor General, only the third requisite that the constitutional question should be raised at the earliest
opportunity has been complied with. He also questions the legal standing of the petitioners who, he contends, are
merely asking for an advisory opinion from the Court, there being no justiciable controversy for resolution.
Objections to taxpayers' suit for lack of sufficient personality standing, or interest are, however, in the main
procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of the cases at bar, and in keeping with the Court's
duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine wether or not the other branches of government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to
them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of these petitions.
But, before resolving the issues raised, a brief look into the tax law in question is in order.
The VAT is a tax levied on a wide range of goods and services. It is a tax on the value, added by every seller, with
aggregate gross annual sales of articles and/or services, exceeding P200,00.00, to his purchase of goods and
services, unless exempt. VAT is computed at the rate of 0% or 10% of the gross selling price of goods or gross
receipts realized from the sale of services.
The VAT is said to have eliminated privilege taxes, multiple rated sales tax on manufacturers and producers, advance
sales tax, and compensating tax on importations. The framers of EO 273 that it is principally aimed to rationalize the
system of taxing goods and services; simplify tax administration; and make the tax system more equitable, to enable
the country to attain economic recovery.
The VAT is not entirely new. It was already in force, in a modified form, before EO 273 was issued. As pointed out
by the Solicitor General, the Philippine sales tax system, prior to the issuance of EO 273, was essentially a single
stage value added tax system computed under the "cost subtraction method" or "cost deduction method" and was
imposed only on original sale, barter or exchange of articles by manufacturers, producers, or importers. Subsequent
sales of such articles were not subject to sales tax. However, with the issuance of PD 1991 on 31 October 1985, a
3% tax was imposed on a second sale, which was reduced to 1.5% upon the issuance of PD 2006 on 31 December
1985, to take effect 1 January 1986. Reduced sales taxes were imposed not only on the second sale, but
on every subsequent sale, as well. EO 273 merely increased the VAT on every sale to 10%, unless zero-rated or
exempt.
Petitioners first contend that EO 273 is unconstitutional on the Ground that the President had no authority to issue
EO 273 on 25 July 1987.
The contention is without merit.
It should be recalled that under Proclamation No. 3, which decreed a Provisional Constitution, sole legislative
authority was vested upon the President. Art. II, sec. 1 of the Provisional Constitution states:
Sec. 1. Until a legislature is elected and convened under a new Constitution, the President shall
continue to exercise legislative powers.
On 15 October 1986, the Constitutional Commission of 1986 adopted a new Constitution for the Republic of the
Philippines which was ratified in a plebiscite conducted on 2 February 1987. Article XVIII, sec. 6 of said
Constitution, hereafter referred to as the 1987 Constitution, provides:
Sec. 6. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first
Congress is convened.
It should be noted that, under both the Provisional and the 1987 Constitutions, the President is vested with
legislative powers until a legislature under a new Constitution is convened. The first Congress, created and elected
under the 1987 Constitution, was convened on 27 July 1987. Hence, the enactment of EO 273 on 25 July 1987, two
(2) days before Congress convened on 27 July 1987, was within the President's constitutional power and authority to
legislate.
Petitioner Valmonte claims, additionally, that Congress was really convened on 30 June 1987 (not 27 July 1987). He
contends that the word "convene" is synonymous with "the date when the elected members of Congress assumed
office."
The contention is without merit. The word "convene" which has been interpreted to mean "to call together, cause to
assemble, or convoke," 1 is clearly different from assumption of office by the individual members of Congress or
their taking the oath of office. As an example, we call to mind the interim National Assembly created under the 1973
Constitution, which had not been "convened" but some members of the body, more particularly the delegates to the
1971 Constitutional Convention who had opted to serve therein by voting affirmatively for the approval of said
Constitution, had taken their oath of office.
To uphold the submission of petitioner Valmonte would stretch the definition of the word "convene" a bit too far. It
would also defeat the purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitutional and render meaningless some other
provisions of said Constitution. For example, the provisions of Art. VI, sec. 15, requiring Congress to conveneonce
every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session would be a contrariety, since Congress would already
be deemed to be in session after the individual members have taken their oath of office. A portion of the provisions
of Art. VII, sec. 10, requiring Congress to convene for the purpose of enacting a law calling for a special election to
elect a President and Vice-President in case a vacancy occurs in said offices, would also be a surplusage. The portion
of Art. VII, sec. 11, third paragraph, requiring Congress to convene, if not in session, to decide a conflict between the
President and the Cabinet as to whether or not the President and the Cabinet as to whether or not the President can
re-assume the powers and duties of his office, would also be redundant. The same is true with the portion of Art. VII,
sec. 18, which requires Congress to convene within twenty-four (24) hours following the declaration of martial law
or the suspension of the privilage of the writ of habeas corpus.
The 1987 Constitution mentions a specific date when the President loses her power to legislate. If the framers of said
Constitution had intended to terminate the exercise of legislative powers by the President at the beginning of the
term of office of the members of Congress, they should have so stated (but did not) in clear and unequivocal terms.
The Court has not power to re-write the Constitution and give it a meaning different from that intended.
The Court also finds no merit in the petitioners' claim that EO 273 was issued by the President in grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. "Grave abuse of discretion" has been defined, as follows:
Grave abuse of discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction (Abad Santos vs. Province of Tarlac, 38 Off. Gaz. 834), or, in
other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. (TaveraLuna, Inc. vs. Nable, 38 Off. Gaz. 62). 2
Petitioners have failed to show that EO 273 was issued capriciously and whimsically or in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It appears that a comprehensive study of the VAT had been
extensively discussed by this framers and other government agencies involved in its implementation, even under the
past administration. As the Solicitor General correctly sated. "The signing of E.O. 273 was merely the last stage in
the exercise of her legislative powers. The legislative process started long before the signing when the data were
gathered, proposals were weighed and the final wordings of the measure were drafted, revised and finalized.
Certainly, it cannot be said that the President made a jump, so to speak, on the Congress, two days before it
convened." 3
Next, the petitioners claim that EO 273 is oppressive, discriminatory, unjust and regressive, in violation of the
provisions of Art. VI, sec. 28(1) of the 1987 Constitution, which states:
Sec. 28 (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation.
The petitioners" assertions in this regard are not supported by facts and circumstances to warrant their conclusions.
They have failed to adequately show that the VAT is oppressive, discriminatory or unjust. Petitioners merely rely
upon newspaper articles which are actually hearsay and have evidentiary value. To justify the nullification of a law.
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication. 4
As the Court sees it, EO 273 satisfies all the requirements of a valid tax. It is uniform. The court, in City of Baguio
vs. De Leon, 5 said:
... In Philippine Trust Company v. Yatco (69 Phil. 420), Justice Laurel, speaking for the Court,
stated: "A tax is considered uniform when it operates with the same force and effect in every place
where the subject may be found."
There was no occasion in that case to consider the possible effect on such a constitutional
requirement where there is a classification. The opportunity came in Eastern Theatrical Co. v.
Alfonso (83 Phil. 852, 862). Thus: "Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable
articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has
the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation; . . ." About
two years later, Justice Tuason, speaking for this Court in Manila Race Horses Trainers Assn. v. de
la Fuente (88 Phil. 60, 65) incorporated the above excerpt in his opinion and continued; "Taking
everything into account, the differentiation against which the plaintiffs complain conforms to the
practical dictates of justice and equity and is not discriminatory within the meaning of the
Constitution."
To satisfy this requirement then, all that is needed as held in another case decided two years later,
(Uy Matias v. City of Cebu, 93 Phil. 300) is that the statute or ordinance in question "applies
equally to all persons, firms and corporations placed in similar situation." This Court is on record
as accepting the view in a leading American case (Carmichael v. Southern Coal and Coke Co., 301
US 495) that "inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or
exemption infringe no constitutional limitation." (Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148, 153).
The sales tax adopted in EO 273 is applied similarly on all goods and services sold to the public, which are not
exempt, at the constant rate of 0% or 10%.
The disputed sales tax is also equitable. It is imposed only on sales of goods or services by persons engage in
business with an aggregate gross annual sales exceeding P200,000.00. Small corner sari-sari stores are consequently
exempt from its application. Likewise exempt from the tax are sales of farm and marine products, spared as they are
from the incidence of the VAT, are expected to be relatively lower and within the reach of the general public. 6
The Court likewise finds no merit in the contention of the petitioner Integrated Customs Brokers Association of the
Philippines that EO 273, more particularly the new Sec. 103 (r) of the National Internal Revenue Code, unduly
discriminates against customs brokers. The contested provision states:
Sec. 103. Exempt transactions. The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:
xxx xxx xxx
(r) Service performed in the exercise of profession or calling (except customs brokers) subject to
the occupation tax under the Local Tax Code, and professional services performed by registered
general professional partnerships;
The phrase "except customs brokers" is not meant to discriminate against customs brokers. It was inserted in Sec.
103(r) to complement the provisions of Sec. 102 of the Code, which makes the services of customs brokers subject
to the payment of the VAT and to distinguish customs brokers from other professionals who are subject to the
payment of an occupation tax under the Local Tax Code. Pertinent provisions of Sec. 102 read:
Sec. 102. Value-added tax on sale of services. There shall be levied, assessed and collected, a
value-added tax equivalent to 10% percent of gross receipts derived by any person engaged in the
sale of services. The phrase sale of services" means the performance of all kinds of services for
others for a fee, remuneration or consideration, including those performed or rendered by
construction and service contractors; stock, real estate, commercial, customs and immigration
brokers; lessors of personal property; lessors or distributors of cinematographic films; persons
engaged in milling, processing, manufacturing or repacking goods for others; and similar services
regardless of whether or not the performance thereof call for the exercise or use of the physical or
mental faculties: ...
With the insertion of the clarificatory phrase "except customs brokers" in Sec. 103(r), a potential conflict between
the two sections, (Secs. 102 and 103), insofar as customs brokers are concerned, is averted.
At any rate, the distinction of the customs brokers from the other professionals who are subject to occupation tax
under the Local Tax Code is based upon material differences, in that the activities of customs brokers (like those of
stock, real estate and immigration brokers) partake more of a business, rather than a profession and were thus
subjected to the percentage tax under Sec. 174 of the National Internal Revenue Code prior to its amendment by EO
273. EO 273 abolished the percentage tax and replaced it with the VAT. If the petitioner Association did not protest
the classification of customs brokers then, the Court sees no reason why it should protest now.
The Court takes note that EO 273 has been in effect for more than five (5) months now, so that the fears expressed
by the petitioners that the adoption of the VAT will trigger skyrocketing of prices of basic commodities and services,
as well as mass actions and demonstrations against the VAT should by now be evident. The fact that nothing of the
sort has happened shows that the fears and apprehensions of the petitioners appear to be more imagined than real. It
would seem that the VAT is not as bad as we are made to believe.
In any event, if petitioners seriously believe that the adoption and continued application of the VAT are prejudicial to
the general welfare or the interests of the majority of the people, they should seek recourse and relief from the
political branches of the government. The Court, following the time-honored doctrine of separation of powers,
cannot substitute its judgment for that of the President as to the wisdom, justice and advisability of the adoption of
the VAT. The Court can only look into and determine whether or not EO 273 was enacted and made effective as law,
in the manner required by, and consistent with, the Constitution, and to make sure that it was not issued in grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and, in this regard, the Court finds no reason to
impede its application or continued implementation.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
D. NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE
(1) G.R. No. 3473
J. CASANOVAS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JNO. S. HORD, defendant-appellee.
WILLARD, J.:
The plaintiff brought this action against the defendant, the Collector of Internal Revenue, to recover the sum of
P9,600, paid by him under protest as taxes on certain mining claims owned by him in the Province of Ambos
Camarines. Judgment was rendered in the court below in favor of the defendant, and from that judgment the plaintiff
appealed.
There is no dispute about the facts.
In January, 1897, the Spanish Government, in accordance with the provisions of the royal decree of the 14th of May,
1867, granted to the plaintiff certain mines in the said Province of Ambos Camarines, of which mines the plaintiff is
now the owner.
That there were valid perfected mining concessions granted prior to the 11th of April, 1899, is conceded. They were
so considered by the Collector of Internal Revenue and were by him said to fall within the provisions of section 134
of Act No. 1189, known as the Internal Revenue Act. That section is as follows:
SEC. 134. On all valid perfected mining concessions granted prior to April eleventh, eighteen hundred and
ninety-nine, there shall be levied and collected on the after January first, nineteen hundred and five, the
following taxes:
2. (a) On each claim containing an area of sixty thousand square meters, an annual tax of one hundred
pesos; (b) and at the same rate proportionately on each claim containing an area in excess of, or less than,
sixty thousand square meters.
3. On the gross output of each an ad valorem tax equal to three per centum of the actual market value of
such output.
The defendant accordingly imposed upon these properties the tax mentioned in section 134, which tax, as has before
been stated, plaintiff paid under protest.
The only question in the case is whether this section 134 is void or valid.
I. It is claimed by the plaintiff that it is void because it comes within the provision of section 5 of the act of Congress
of July 1, 19021 (32 U.S. Stat. L., 691), which provides "that no law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be
enacted." The royal decree of the 14th of May, 1867, provided, among other things, as follows:
ART. 76. On each pertenencia minera (mining claim) of the area prescribed in the first paragraph of article
13 (sixty thousand square meters) there shall be paid annually a fixed tax of forty escudos (about P20.00).
The pertenencia referred to in the second paragraph of the same article, though of greater area than the
others (one hundred and fifty thousand square meters), shall pay only twenty escudos (about P10.00).
ART. 78. Pertenencia of iron mines and mines of combustible minerals shall be exempt from the annual tax
for a period of thirty years from the date of publication of this decree.
ART. 80. A further tax of three per centum on the gross earnings shall be paid without deduction of costs of
any kind whatsoever. All substances enumerated in section one shall be exempt from said tax of three per
centum for a period of thirty years.
ART. 81. No other taxes than those herein mentioned shall be imposed upon mining and metallurgical
industries.
The royal decree and regulation for its enforcement provided that the deeds granted by the Government should be in
a particular form, which form was inserted in the regulations. It must be presumed that the deeds granted to the
plaintiff were made as provided by law, and, in fact, one of such concessions was exhibited during the argument in
this court, and was found to be in exact conformity with the form prescribed by law. The deed is as follows:
Don Camilo Garcia de Polavieja, Marquez de Polavieja, Teniente General de los Ejercitos Nacionales,
Caballero Gran Cruz de la Real y Militar Orden de San Hermenegildo, de la Real y distinguida de Isabel la
Catolica, de la del Merito Militar Roja, de la de la Corona de Italia, Comendador de Carlos Tercero,
Bennemerito de la Patria en grado eminente, condecorado con varias cruses de distincion por meritos de
guerra, Capitan General y Gobernador General de Filipinas.
Whereas I have granted to Don Joaquin Casanovas y Llovet and to Don Martin Buck the concession of a
gold mine entitled "Nueva California Segunda" in the jurisdiction of Paracale, Province of Ambos
Camarines: Now, therefore, in the name of His Majesty the King (whom God preserve), and pursuant to the
provisions of article 37 of the royal decree of May 14, 1867, regulating mining in these Islands, I issue, this
fifth day of November, eighteen hundred and ninety-six, this title deed to four pertenencias, comprising an
area of two hundred and forty thousand square meters, as shown in the attached sketch map drafted by the
engineer Don Enrique Abella y Casariego, and dated at Manila December sixteenth of the said year, subject
to the following general terms and conditions:
1. That the mine shall be worked in conformity with the rules in mining, the grantee and his laborers to be
governed by the police rules established by existing regulations.
2. That the grantee shall be liable for all damages to third parties that may be caused by his operations.
3. That the grantee shall likewise indemnify his neighbors for any damage they may suffer by reason of
water accumulated on his works, if, upon being requested, he fail to drain the same within the time
indicated.
4. That he shall contribute for the drainage of the adjacent mines and for the general galleries for drainage
or haulage in proportion to the benefit he derives therefrom, whenever, by authority of the GovernorGeneral, such works shall be opened for a group of pertenencias or for the entire mining locality in which
the mine is situated.
5. That he shall commence work on the mine immediately upon receipt of this concession unless prevented
by force majeure.
6. That he shall keep the mine in active operation by employing at the rate of at least four laborers for
eachpertenencia for at least six months of each year.
7. That he shall strengthen the walls of the mine within the time indicated whenever, by reason of
mismanagement of the work, it threatens to cave in, unless he be prevented by force majeure.
8. That he shall not render further profitable development of the mine difficult or impossible by avaricious
operation.
9. That he shall not suspend the operation of the mine with the intention of abandoning the same without
first informing the Governor of his intention, in which case he must leave the mine in a good state of
timbering.
10. That he shall pay taxes on the mine and its output as prescribed in the royal decree.
11. Finally, that he shall comply with all the requirements contained in the royal decree and in the
regulations for concessions of the same nature as the present.
Without special conditions.
Now, therefore, by virtue of this title deed, I grant to Don Joaquin Casanovas y Llovet and to Don Martin
Buck the ownership of the said mine for an unlimited period of time so long as they shall comply with the
foregoing terms and conditions, to the end that they may develop the same and make free use and
disposition of the output thereof, with the right to alienate the said mine subject to the provisions of existing
laws, and to enjoy all the rights and benefits conceded to such grantees by the royal decree and by the
mining regulations. And for the prompt fulfillment and observance of the said conditions, both on the part
of the said grantees and by all authorities, courts, corporations, and private persons whom it may concern, I
have ordered this title deed to be issued given under my hand and the proper seal and countersigned by
the undersigned Director-General of Civil Administration.
It seems very clear to us that this deed constituted a contract between the Spanish Government and the plaintiff, the
obligation of which contract was impaired by the enactment of section 134 of the Internal Revenue Law above cited,
thereby infringing the provisions above quoted from section 5 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902. This
conclusion seems necessarily to result from the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in similar cases.
In the case of McGee vs. Mathis (4 Wallace, 143), it appeared that the State of Arkansas, by an act of the legislature
of 1851, provided for the sale of certain swamp lands granted to it by the United States; for the issue of transferable
scrip receivable for any lands not already taken up at the time of selection by the holder; for contracts for the making
of levees and drains, and for the payment of contractors in scrip and otherwise. In the fourteenth section of this act it
was provided that
To encourage by all just means the progress and completion of the reclaiming of such lands by offering
inducements to purchasers and contractors to take up said lands, all said swamp and overflowed lands shall
be exempt from taxation for the term of ten years or until they shall be reclaimed.
In 1855 this section was repealed and provision was made by law for the taxation of swamp and overflowed lands,
sold or to be sold, precisely as other lands. McGee, before this appeal, had become the owner by transfer from
contractors of a large amount of scrip issued under the Act of 1851, and with this scrip, after the repeal, took up and
paid for many sections and parts of sections of the granted lands. Taxes were levied by the State on the lands so
taken up by McGee. The Supreme Court held that these taxes could not be collected. The Court said at page 156:
It seems quite clear that the Act of 1851 authorizing the issue of land scrip constituted a contract between
the State and the holders of the land scrip issued under the act.
In the case of the Home of the Friendless vs. Rouse (8 Wallace, 430), it appeared that on the 3d day of February,
1853, the legislature of Missouri passed on act to incorporate the Home of the Friendless in the city of St. Louis.
Section 1 of the act provided that
All property of said corporation shall be exempt from taxation.
The court held that the State had no power afterwards to pass laws providing for the levying of taxes upon this
institution. The Court said among other things at page 438:
The validity of this contract is questioned at the bar on the ground that the legislature had no authority to
grant away the power of taxation. The answer to this position is, that the question is no longer open for
argument here, for it is settled by the repeated adjudications of this court, that a State may be contract based
on a consideration exempt the property of an individual or corporation from taxation, either for a specified
period or permanently. And it is equally well settled that the exemption is presumed to be on sufficient
consideration, and binds the State if the charter containing it is accepted.
In the case of The Asylum vs. The City of New Orleans (105 U.S., 362), it appears that St. Ariva's Asylum was
incorporated by an act of the legislature of Louisiana, approved April 29, 1853. The law incorporating it provided
that it should enjoy the same exemption from taxation which was enjoyed by the Orphan Boys' Asylum of New
Orleans. The law relating to the last named institution provided (page 364):
That, from and after the passage of this act, all the property, real and personal, belonging to the Orphan
Boys' Asylum of New Orleans be, and the same is hereby exempted from all taxation, either by the State,
parish, or city in which it is situated, any law to the contrary notwithstanding.
It was held that the State had no power by subsequent legislation to impose taxes upon the property of this
institution.
That the doctrine announced in these cases is still maintained in that court is apparent from the case of
Powersvs. The Detroit, Grand Haven and Milwaukee Railway which was decided on the 16th of April, 1906, and
reported in 201 U. S., 543. Section 9 of the act of the legislature of Michigan, incorporating the railway company,
provided:
Said company shall, on or before the 1st day of July, pay to the State treasurer, an annual tax of one per cent
on the capital stock of said company, pain in, which tax shall be in lieu of all other taxation.
The court said at page 556:
It has often been decided by this court, so often that a citation on authorities in unnecessary, that the
legislature of a State may, in the absence of special restrictions in its constitution, make a valid contract
with a corporation in respect to taxation, and that such contract can be enforced against the State at the
instance of the corporation.
The case at bar falls within the cases hereinbefore cited. It is to be distinguished from the case of the Metropolitan
Street Railway Company vs. The New York State Board of Tax Commissioners (199 U.S., 1). In that case it was
provided by various acts of the legislature, that the companies therein referred to, should pay annually to the city of
New York, a fixed amount or percentage, varying from 2 to 8 per cent of their gross earnings additional taxes was
sustained by the court. It was sustained on the ground that the prior legislation did not expressly say that the taxes
thus provided for should be in lieu of all other taxes. The court said at page 37:
Applying these well-established rules to the several contracts, it will be perceived that there was no express
relinquishment of the right of taxation. The plaintiff in error must rely upon some implication, and not upon
any direct stipulation. In each contract there was a grant of privileges, but the grant was specifically or
privileges in respect to the construction, operation and maintenance of the street railroad. These were all
that in terms were granted. As consideration for this grant, the grantees were to pay something, and such
payment is nowhere said to be in lieu of, or as an equivalent or substitute of taxes. All that can be extracted
from the language used, was a grant of privileges and a payment therefor. Other words must be written into
the contract before there can be found any relinquishment of the power of taxation.
But in the case at bar, there is found not only the provisions for the payment of certain taxes annually, but there is
also found the provision contained in article 81, above quoted, which expressly declares that no other taxes shall be
imposed upon these mines.
The present case is to be distinguished also from that class of cases of which Grands Lodge vs. The City of New
Orleans (166 U.S., 143) is a type, and which includes Salt Company vs. East Saginaw (13 Wall., 373) and
Welchvs. Cook (97 U.S., 541). In these cases the exemption was a mere bounty and did not form a part of any
contract.
The fact that this concession was made by the Government of Spain, and not by the Government of the United
States, is not important. (Trustees of Dartmouth College vs. Woodward, 4 Wheaton, 518.)
Our conclusion is that the concessions granted by the Government of Spain to the plaintiff, constitute contracts
between the parties; that section 134 of the Internal Revenue Law impairs the obligation of these contracts, and is
therefore void as to them.
II. We think that this section is also void because in conflict with section 60 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902.
This section is as follows:
That nothing in this Act shall be construed to effect the rights of any person, partnership, or corporation,
having a valid, perfected mining concession granted prior to April eleventh, eighteen hundred and ninetynine, but all such concessions shall be conducted under the provisions of the law in force at the time they
were granted, subject at all times to cancellation by reason of illegality in the procedure by which they were
obtained, or for failure to comply with the conditions prescribed as requisite to their retention in the laws
under which they were granted: Provided, That the owner or owners of every such concession shall cause
the corners made by its boundaries to be distinctly marked with permanent monuments within six months
after this act has been promulgated in the Philippine Islands, and that any concessions, the boundaries of
which are not so marked within this period shall be free and open to explorations and purchase under the
provisions of this act.2
This section seems to indicate that concessions, like those in question, can be canceled only by reason of illegality in
the procedure by which they were obtained, or for failure to comply with the conditions prescribed as requisite for
their retention in the laws under which they were granted. There is nothing in the section which indicates that they
can be canceled for failure to comply with the conditions prescribed by subsequent legislation. In fact, the real
intention of the act seems to be that such concession should be subject to the former legislation and not to any
subsequent legislation. There is no claim in this case that there was any illegality in the procedure by which these
concessions were obtained, nor is there any claim that the plaintiff has not complied with the conditions prescribed
in the said royal decree of 1867.
III. In view of the result at which we have arrived, it is not necessary to consider the further claim made by the
plaintiff that the taxes imposed by article 134 above quoted, are in violation of the part of section 5 of the act of July
1, 1902, which declares "that the rule of taxation in said Islands shall be uniform."
The judgment of the court below is reversed, and judgment is ordered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant for P9,600, with interest thereon, at 6 per cent, from the 21st day of February, 1906, and the costs of the
Court of First Instance. No costs will be allowed to either party in this court.
After the expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith and ten days thereafter let the
case be remanded to the court from whence it came for proper action. So ordered.
(2) Read Case No. 13 in Constitutional Limitations, Equal Protection of the Law
(3) G.R. No. L-60126 September 25, 1985
CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER & LIGHT CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
This is about the liability of petitioner Cagayan Electric Power & Light Co., Inc. for income tax amounting to
P75,149.73 for the more than seven-month period of the year 1969 in addition to franchise tax.
The petitioner is the holder of a legislative franchise, Republic Act No. 3247, under which its payment of 3% tax on
its gross earnings from the sale of electric current is "in lieu of all taxes and assessments of whatever authority upon
privileges, earnings, income, franchise, and poles, wires, transformers, and insulators of the grantee, from which
taxes and assessments the grantee is hereby expressly exempted" (Sec. 3).
On June 27, 1968, Republic Act No. 5431 amended section 24 of the Tax Code by making liable for income tax all
corporate taxpayers not specifically exempt under paragraph (c) (1) of said section and section 27 of the Tax Code
notwithstanding the "provisions of existing special or general laws to the contrary". Thus, franchise companies were
subjected to income tax in addition to franchise tax.
However, in petitioner's case, its franchise was amended by Republic Act No. 6020, effective August 4, 1969, by
authorizing the petitioner to furnish electricity to the municipalities of Villanueva and Jasaan, Misamis Oriental in
addition to Cagayan de Oro City and the municipalities of Tagoloan and Opol. The amendment reenacted the tax
exemption in its original charter or neutralized the modification made by Republic Act No. 5431 more than a year
before.
By reason of the amendment to section 24 of the Tax Code, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in a demand
letter dated February 15, 1973 required the petitioner to pay deficiency income taxes for 1968-to 1971. The
petitioner contested the assessments. The Commissioner cancelled the assessments for 1970 and 1971 but insisted
on those for 1968 and 1969.
The petitioner filed a petition for review with the Tax Court, which on February 26, 1982 held the petitioner liable
only for the income tax for the period from January 1 to August 3, 1969 or before the passage of Republic Act No.
6020 which reiterated its tax exemption. The petitioner appealed to this Court.
It contends that the Tax Court erred (1) in not holding that the franchise tax paid by the petitioner is a commutative
tax which already includes the income tax; (2) in holding that Republic Act No. 5431 as amended, altered or
repealed petitioner's franchise; (3) in holding that petitioner's franchise is a contract which can be impaired by an
implied repeal and (4) in not holding that section 24(d) of the Tax Code should be construed strictly against the
Government.
We hold that Congress could impair petitioner's legislative franchise by making it liable for income tax from which
heretofore it was exempted by virtue of the exemption provided for in section 3 of its franchise.
The Constitution provides that a franchise is subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the
public interest so requires (Sec. 8, Art. XIV, 1935 Constitution; Sec. 5, Art. XIV, 1973 Constitution),
Section 1 of petitioner's franchise, Republic Act No. 3247, provides that it is subject to the provisions of the
Constitution and to the terms and conditions established in Act No. 3636 whose section 12 provides that the
franchise is subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress.
Republic Act No. 5431, in amending section 24 of the Tax Code by subjecting to income tax all corporate taxpayers
not expressly exempted therein and in section 27 of the Code, had the effect of withdrawing petitioner's exemption
from income tax.
The Tax Court acted correctly in holding that the exemption was restored by the subsequent enactment on August 4,
1969 of Republic Act No. 6020 which reenacted the said tax exemption. Hence, the petitioner is liable only for the
income tax for the period from January 1 to August 3, 1969 when its tax exemption was modified by Republic Act
No. 5431.
It is relevant to note that franchise companies, like the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, have been
paying income tax in addition to the franchise tax.
However, it cannot be denied that the said 1969 assessment appears to be highly controversial. The Commissioner at
the outset was not certain as to petitioner's income tax liability. It had reason not to pay income tax because of the
tax exemption in its franchise.
For this reason, it should be liable only for tax proper and should not be held liable for the surcharge and interest.
(Advertising Associates, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Court of Tax Appeals, G. R. No. 59758,
December 26, 1984,133 SCRA 765; Imus Electric Co., Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 125 Phil. 1024;
C.M. Hoskins & Co., Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-28383, June 22, 1976, 71 SCRA 511.)
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Tax Court is affirmed with the modification that the petitioner is liable only for
the tax proper and that it should not pay the delinquency penalties. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
(4) Phil Power and Devt Co v. CIR, CTA Case No. 1152, October 31, 1965. Read the PDF Ill upload with this
Doc. Wara kasi ak nahanap nga iba nga file, PDF la talaga.
That the amount deposited by the plaintaff him the sum of P60,000.00 before the trial, be
confiscated to apply for the payment of the back taxes and for the redemption of the property in
question, if the amount is less than P6,000.00, the remainder must be returned to the Director of
Pedro Borgonia, who represents the plaintiff herein;
That the deposit of the Municipal Treasurer in the amount of P6,000.00 also before the trial must
be returned to said Municipal Treasurer of Bangued, Abra;
And finally the case is hereby ordered dismissed with costs against the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 22-23)
Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly incorporated with the Securities and
Exchange Commission in 1948, filed a complaint (Annex "1" of Answer by the respondents Heirs of Paterno
Millare; Rollo, pp. 95-97) on July 10, 1972 in the court a quo to annul and declare void the "Notice of Seizure' and
the "Notice of Sale" of its lot and building located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes and
penalties amounting to P5,140.31. Said "Notice of Seizure" of the college lot and building covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. Q-83 duly registered in the name of petitioner, plaintiff below, on July 6, 1972, by
respondents Municipal Treasurer and Provincial Treasurer, defendants below, was issued for the satisfaction of the
said taxes thereon. The "Notice of Sale" was caused to be served upon the petitioner by the respondent treasurers on
July 8, 1972 for the sale at public auction of said college lot and building, which sale was held on the same date. Dr.
Paterno Millare, then Municipal Mayor of Bangued, Abra, offered the highest bid of P6,000.00 which was duly
accepted. The certificate of sale was correspondingly issued to him.
On August 10, 1972, the respondent Paterno Millare (now deceased) filed through counstel a motion to dismiss the
complaint.
On August 23, 1972, the respondent Provincial Treasurer and Municipal Treasurer, through then Provincial Fiscal
Loreto C. Roldan, filed their answer (Annex "2" of Answer by the respondents Heirs of Patemo Millare; Rollo, pp.
98-100) to the complaint. This was followed by an amended answer (Annex "3," ibid, Rollo, pp. 101-103) on August
31, 1972.
On September 1, 1972 the respondent Paterno Millare filed his answer (Annex "5," ibid; Rollo, pp. 106-108).
On October 12, 1972, with the aforesaid sale of the school premises at public auction, the respondent Judge, Hon.
Juan P. Aquino of the Court of First Instance of Abra, Branch I, ordered (Annex "6," ibid; Rollo, pp. 109-110) the
respondents provincial and municipal treasurers to deliver to the Clerk of Court the proceeds of the auction sale.
Hence, on December 14, 1972, petitioner, through Director Borgonia, deposited with the trial court the sum of
P6,000.00 evidenced by PNB Check No. 904369.
On April 12, 1973, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted and embodied by the trial court in its
questioned decision. Said Stipulations reads:
STIPULATION OF FACTS
COME NOW the parties, assisted by counsels, and to this Honorable Court respectfully enter into
the following agreed stipulation of facts:
1. That the personal circumstances of the parties as stated in paragraph 1 of the complaint is
admitted; but the particular person of Mr. Armin M. Cariaga is to be substituted, however, by
anyone who is actually holding the position of Provincial Treasurer of the Province of Abra;
2. That the plaintiff Abra Valley Junior College, Inc. is the owner of the lot and buildings thereon
located in Bangued, Abra under Original Certificate of Title No. 0-83;
3. That the defendant Gaspar V. Bosque, as Municipal treasurer of Bangued, Abra caused to be
served upon the Abra Valley Junior College, Inc. a Notice of Seizure on the property of said school
under Original Certificate of Title No. 0-83 for the satisfaction of real property taxes thereon,
amounting to P5,140.31; the Notice of Seizure being the one attached to the complaint as Exhibit
A;
4. That on June 8, 1972 the above properties of the Abra Valley Junior College, Inc. was sold at
public auction for the satisfaction of the unpaid real property taxes thereon and the same was sold
to defendant Paterno Millare who offered the highest bid of P6,000.00 and a Certificate of Sale in
his favor was issued by the defendant Municipal Treasurer.
5. That all other matters not particularly and specially covered by this stipulation of facts will be
the subject of evidence by the parties.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court to consider and admit this
stipulation of facts on the point agreed upon by the parties.
Bangued, Abra, April 12, 1973.
Sgd. Agripino Brillantes
Typ AGRIPINO BRILLANTES
Attorney for Plaintiff
Sgd. Loreto Roldan
Typ LORETO ROLDAN
Provincial Fiscal
Counsel for Defendants
Provincial Treasurer of
Abra and the Municipal
Treasurer of Bangued, Abra
Sgd. Demetrio V. Pre
Typ. DEMETRIO V. PRE
Attorney for Defendant
Paterno Millare (Rollo, pp. 17-18)
Aside from the Stipulation of Facts, the trial court among others, found the following: (a) that the school is
recognized by the government and is offering Primary, High School and College Courses, and has a school
population of more than one thousand students all in all; (b) that it is located right in the heart of the town of
Bangued, a few meters from the plaza and about 120 meters from the Court of First Instance building; (c) that the
elementary pupils are housed in a two-storey building across the street; (d) that the high school and college students
are housed in the main building; (e) that the Director with his family is in the second floor of the main building; and
(f) that the annual gross income of the school reaches more than one hundred thousand pesos.
From all the foregoing, the only issue left for the Court to determine and as agreed by the parties, is whether or not
the lot and building in question are used exclusively for educational purposes. (Rollo, p. 20)
The succeeding Provincial Fiscal, Hon. Jose A. Solomon and his Assistant, Hon. Eustaquio Z. Montero, filed a
Memorandum for the Government on March 25, 1974, and a Supplemental Memorandum on May 7, 1974, wherein
they opined "that based on the evidence, the laws applicable, court decisions and jurisprudence, the school building
and school lot used for educational purposes of the Abra Valley College, Inc., are exempted from the payment of
taxes." (Annexes "B," "B-1" of Petition; Rollo, pp. 24-49; 44 and 49).
Nonetheless, the trial court disagreed because of the use of the second floor by the Director of petitioner school for
residential purposes. He thus ruled for the government and rendered the assailed decision.
After having been granted by the trial court ten (10) days from August 6, 1974 within which to perfect its appeal
(Per Order dated August 6, 1974; Annex "G" of Petition; Rollo, p. 57) petitioner instead availed of the instant
petition for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction before this Court, which petition was filed on
August 17, 1974 (Rollo, p.2).
In the resolution dated August 16, 1974, this Court resolved to give DUE COURSE to the petition (Rollo, p. 58).
Respondents were required to answer said petition (Rollo, p. 74).
Petitioner raised the following assignments of error:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SUSTAINING AS VALID THE SEIZURE AND SALE OF THE COLLEGE
LOT AND BUILDING USED FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES OF THE PETITIONER.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE COLLEGE LOT AND BUILDING OF THE
PETITIONER ARE NOT USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES MERELY BECAUSE THE
COLLEGE PRESIDENT RESIDES IN ONE ROOM OF THE COLLEGE BUILDING.
III
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE COLLEGE LOT AND BUILDING OF THE
PETITIONER ARE NOT EXEMPT FROM PROPERTY TAXES AND IN ORDERING PETITIONER TO PAY
P5,140.31 AS REALTY TAXES.
IV
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ORDERING THE CONFISCATION OF THE P6,000.00 DEPOSIT MADE IN
THE COURT BY PETITIONER AS PAYMENT OF THE P5,140.31 REALTY TAXES. (See Brief for the Petitioner,
pp. 1-2)
The main issue in this case is the proper interpretation of the phrase "used exclusively for educational purposes."
Petitioner contends that the primary use of the lot and building for educational purposes, and not the incidental use
thereof, determines and exemption from property taxes under Section 22 (3), Article VI of the 1935 Constitution.
Hence, the seizure and sale of subject college lot and building, which are contrary thereto as well as to the provision
of Commonwealth Act No. 470, otherwise known as the Assessment Law, are without legal basis and therefore void.
On the other hand, private respondents maintain that the college lot and building in question which were subjected to
seizure and sale to answer for the unpaid tax are used: (1) for the educational purposes of the college; (2) as the
permanent residence of the President and Director thereof, Mr. Pedro V. Borgonia, and his family including the inlaws and grandchildren; and (3) for commercial purposes because the ground floor of the college building is being
used and rented by a commercial establishment, the Northern Marketing Corporation (See photograph attached as
Annex "8" (Comment; Rollo, p. 90]).
Due to its time frame, the constitutional provision which finds application in the case at bar is Section 22, paragraph
3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine Constitution, which expressly grants exemption from realty taxes for
"Cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes ...
Relative thereto, Section 54, paragraph c, Commonwealth Act No. 470 as amended by Republic Act No. 409,
otherwise known as the Assessment Law, provides:
The following are exempted from real property tax under the Assessment Law:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific or educational purposes.
xxx xxx xxx
In this regard petitioner argues that the primary use of the school lot and building is the basic and controlling guide,
norm and standard to determine tax exemption, and not the mere incidental use thereof.
As early as 1916 in YMCA of Manila vs. Collector of lnternal Revenue, 33 Phil. 217 [1916], this Court ruled that
while it may be true that the YMCA keeps a lodging and a boarding house and maintains a restaurant for its
members, still these do not constitute business in the ordinary acceptance of the word, but an institution used
exclusively for religious, charitable and educational purposes, and as such, it is entitled to be exempted from
taxation.
In the case of Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. Provincial Board of Ilocos Norte, 51 Phil. 352 [1972], this Court included
in the exemption a vegetable garden in an adjacent lot and another lot formerly used as a cemetery. It was clarified
that the term "used exclusively" considers incidental use also. Thus, the exemption from payment of land tax in
favor of the convent includes, not only the land actually occupied by the building but also the adjacent garden
devoted to the incidental use of the parish priest. The lot which is not used for commercial purposes but serves
solely as a sort of lodging place, also qualifies for exemption because this constitutes incidental use in religious
functions.
The phrase "exclusively used for educational purposes" was further clarified by this Court in the cases of Herrera
vs. Quezon City Board of assessment Appeals, 3 SCRA 186 [1961] and Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs.
Bishop of the Missionary District, 14 SCRA 991 [1965], thus
Moreover, the exemption in favor of property used exclusively for charitable or educational
purposes is 'not limited to property actually indispensable' therefor (Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 2, p.
1430), but extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of said purposes, such as in the case of hospitals, "a school for training nurses, a
nurses' home, property use to provide housing facilities for interns, resident doctors,
superintendents, and other members of the hospital staff, and recreational facilities for student
nurses, interns, and residents' (84 CJS 6621), such as "Athletic fields" including "a firm used for
the inmates of the institution. (Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 2, p. 1430).
The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the Constitution (Apostolic
Prefect v. City Treasurer of Baguio, 71 Phil, 547 [1941]).
It must be stressed however, that while this Court allows a more liberal and non-restrictive interpretation of the
phrase "exclusively used for educational purposes" as provided for in Article VI, Section 22, paragraph 3 of the 1935
Philippine Constitution, reasonable emphasis has always been made that exemption extends to facilities which are
incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes. Otherwise stated, the use of the
school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. Thus, while the
use of the second floor of the main building in the case at bar for residential purposes of the Director and his family,
may find justification under the concept of incidental use, which is complimentary to the main or primary purpose
educational, the lease of the first floor thereof to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the
imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of education.
It will be noted however that the aforementioned lease appears to have been raised for the first time in this Court.
That the matter was not taken up in the to court is really apparent in the decision of respondent Judge. No mention
thereof was made in the stipulation of facts, not even in the description of the school building by the trial judge, both
embodied in the decision nor as one of the issues to resolve in order to determine whether or not said properly may
be exempted from payment of real estate taxes (Rollo, pp. 17-23). On the other hand, it is noteworthy that such fact
was not disputed even after it was raised in this Court.
Indeed, it is axiomatic that facts not raised in the lower court cannot be taken up for the first time on appeal.
Nonetheless, as an exception to the rule, this Court has held that although a factual issue is not squarely raised
below, still in the interest of substantial justice, this Court is not prevented from considering a pivotal factual matter.
"The Supreme Court is clothed with ample authority to review palpable errors not assigned as such if it finds that
their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision." (Perez vs. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 645 [1984]).
Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court correctly arrived at the conclusion that the school building as well as the
lot where it is built, should be taxed, not because the second floor of the same is being used by the Director and his
family for residential purposes, but because the first floor thereof is being used for commercial purposes. However,
since only a portion is used for purposes of commerce, it is only fair that half of the assessed tax be returned to the
school involved.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Abra, Branch I, is hereby AFFIRMED
subject to the modification that half of the assessed tax be returned to the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate, Inc., filed the donor's gift tax return. Under date of April 29, 1960, the
respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment for donee's gift tax against the Catholic Parish
of Victorias, Negros Occidental, of which petitioner was the priest. The tax amounted to P1,370.00 including
surcharges, interests of 1% monthly from May 15, 1958 to June 15, 1960, and the compromise for the late filing of
the return.
Petitioner lodged a protest to the assessment and requested the withdrawal thereof. The protest and the motion for
reconsideration presented to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue were denied. The petitioner appealed to the
Court of Tax Appeals on November 2, 1960. In the petition for review, the Rev. Fr. Casimiro Lladoc claimed, among
others, that at the time of the donation, he was not the parish priest in Victorias; that there is no legal entity or
juridical person known as the "Catholic Parish Priest of Victorias," and, therefore, he should not be liable for the
donee's gift tax. It was also asserted that the assessment of the gift tax, even against the Roman Catholic Church,
would not be valid, for such would be a clear violation of the provisions of the Constitution.
After hearing, the CTA rendered judgment, the pertinent portions of which are quoted below:
... . Parish priests of the Roman Catholic Church under canon laws are similarly situated as its Archbishops
and Bishops with respect to the properties of the church within their parish. They are the guardians,
superintendents or administrators of these properties, with the right of succession and may sue and be sued.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The petitioner impugns the, fairness of the assessment with the argument that he should not be held liable
for gift taxes on donation which he did not receive personally since he was not yet the parish priest of
Victorias in the year 1957 when said donation was given. It is intimated that if someone has to pay at all, it
should be petitioner's predecessor, the Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz, who received the donation in behalf of the
Catholic parish of Victorias or the Roman Catholic Church. Following petitioner's line of thinking, we
should be equally unfair to hold that the assessment now in question should have been addressed to, and
collected from, the Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz to be paid from income derived from his present parish where ever
it may be. It does not seem right to indirectly burden the present parishioners of Rev. Fr. Ruiz for donee's
gift tax on a donation to which they were not benefited.
xxx
xxx
xxx
We saw no legal basis then as we see none now, to include within the Constitutional exemption, taxes
which partake of the nature of an excise upon the use made of the properties or upon the exercise of the
privilege of receiving the properties. (Phipps vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 91 F [2d] 627; 1938,
302 U.S. 742.)
It is a cardinal rule in taxation that exemptions from payment thereof are highly disfavored by law, and the
party claiming exemption must justify his claim by a clear, positive, or express grant of such privilege by
law. (Collector vs. Manila Jockey Club, G.R. No. L-8755, March 23, 1956; 53 O.G. 3762.)
The phrase "exempt from taxation" as employed in Section 22(3), Article VI of the Constitution of the
Philippines, should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. Statutes exempting
charitable and religious property from taxation should be construed fairly though strictly and in such
manner as to give effect to the main intent of the lawmakers. (Roman Catholic Church vs. Hastrings 5 Phil.
701.)
xxx
xxx
xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the decision of the respondent Commissioner of
Internal Revenue appealed from, is hereby affirmed except with regard to the imposition of the compromise
penalty in the amount of P20.00 (Collector of Internal Revenue v. U.S.T., G.R. No. L-11274, Nov. 28,
1958); ..., and the petitioner, the Rev. Fr. Casimiro Lladoc is hereby ordered to pay to the respondent the
amount of P900.00 as donee's gift tax, plus the surcharge of five per centum (5%) as ad valorem penalty
under Section 119 (c) of the Tax Code, and one per centum (1%) monthly interest from May 15, 1958 to the
date of actual payment. The surcharge of 25% provided in Section 120 for failure to file a return may not be
imposed as the failure to file a return was not due to willful neglect.( ... ) No costs.
The above judgment is now before us on appeal, petitioner assigning two (2) errors allegedly committed by the Tax
Court, all of which converge on the singular issue of whether or not petitioner should be liable for the assessed
donee's gift tax on the P10,000.00 donated for the construction of the Victorias Parish Church.
Section 22 (3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines, exempts from taxation cemeteries, churches and
parsonages or convents, appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for
religious purposes. The exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed on such properties enumerated, as
property taxes, as contra distinguished from excise taxes. In the present case, what the Collector assessed was a
donee's gift tax; the assessment was not on the properties themselves. It did not rest upon general ownership; it was
an excise upon the use made of the properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of receiving the properties (Phipps
vs. Com. of Int. Rec. 91 F 2d 627). Manifestly, gift tax is not within the exempting provisions of the section just
mentioned. A gift tax is not a property tax, but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter
vivos, the imposition of which on property used exclusively for religious purposes, does not constitute an
impairment of the Constitution. As well observed by the learned respondent Court, the phrase "exempt from
taxation," as employed in the Constitution (supra) should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of
taxes. And there being no clear, positive or express grant of such privilege by law, in favor of petitioner, the
exemption herein must be denied.
The next issue which readily presents itself, in view of petitioner's thesis, and Our finding that a tax liability exists,
is, who should be called upon to pay the gift tax? Petitioner postulates that he should not be liable, because at the
time of the donation he was not the priest of Victorias. We note the merit of the above claim, and in order to put
things in their proper light, this Court, in its Resolution of March 15, 1965, ordered the parties to show cause why
the Head of the Diocese to which the parish of Victorias pertains, should not be substituted in lieu of petitioner Rev.
Fr. Casimiro Lladoc it appearing that the Head of such Diocese is the real party in interest. The Solicitor General, in
representation of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, interposed no objection to such a substitution. Counsel for
the petitioner did not also offer objection thereto.
On April 30, 1965, in a resolution, We ordered the Head of the Diocese to present whatever legal issues and/or
defenses he might wish to raise, to which resolution counsel for petitioner, who also appeared as counsel for the
Head of the Diocese, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bacolod, manifested that it was submitting itself to the
jurisdiction and orders of this Court and that it was presenting, by reference, the brief of petitioner Rev. Fr. Casimiro
Lladoc as its own and for all purposes.
In view here of and considering that as heretofore stated, the assessment at bar had been properly made and the
imposition of the tax is not a violation of the constitutional provision exempting churches, parsonages or convents,
etc. (Art VI, sec. 22 [3], Constitution), the Head of the Diocese, to which the parish Victorias Pertains, is liable for
the payment thereof.
The decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed insofar as tax liability is concerned; it is modified, in
the sense that petitioner herein is not personally liable for the said gift tax, and that the Head of the Diocese, herein
substitute petitioner, should pay, as he is presently ordered to pay, the said gift tax, without special, pronouncement
as to costs.
about the same size as those on the right of the reception hall, the first being the billiard room and the other the
restaurant. The athletic building is entered from the rear veranda. It is a two story wing 68 by 85 feet. Passing from
the veranda into the athletic hall one finds first, on the left, the toilet room, and beyond this, to the rear, the shower
baths and locker rooms. The swimming pool is in the center of the athletic wing and is 60 by 19 feet in size, lined
with cement. To the right of the swimming pool are the bowling alleys. A wide stairways leads to the second floor.
Above the swimming-pool and bowling alley is a large room 50 by 85 feet which is the gymnasium and also the
auditorium when occasion requires. About one-third of the roof converting the athletic wing is used as a roof garden.
The second and third floors of the main building are given over almost wholly to rooming apartments and baths. On
the second floor over the entrance hall is a members' parlor, from which a small balcony projects over the main
entrance. The remainder of the second floor and all to the third are composed of the living rooms. These apartments,
of which there are 14 on the second and 20 on the third floor are approximately 18 by 14 feet each. They provide
accommodations for 64 men.
The purposes of the association, as set forth in its charter and constitution, are:
To develop the Christian character and usefulness of its members, to improve the spiritual, intellectual,
social and physical condition of young men, and to acquire, hold, mortgage, and dispose of the necessary
lands, buildings and personal property for the use of said corporation exclusively for religious, charitable
and educational purposes, and not for investment or profit.
The purposes of this association shall be exclusively religious, charitable and educational, in developing the
Christian character and usefulness of its members and in improving the spiritual, mental, social and
physical condition of young men.
Speaking generally, the association claims exemption from taxation on the ground that it is a religious, charitable
and educational institution combined. That it has an educational department is not denied. It is undisputed that the
aim of this department is to furnish, at much less than cost, instruction in subjects that will greatly increase the
mental efficiency and wage-earning capacity of young men, prepare them in special lines of business and offer them
special lines of study. Attention is given to subjects included in civil service and consular examinations both here
and in the United States. The courses offer commercial subjects, as well as many others, and include stenography
and typewriting, bookkeeping, arithmetic, English composition, foreign languages, including elementary and
advanced Spanish and Tagalog, special courses in Philippine history, public speaking, surveying, horticulture,
tropical dependencies, and the group of subjects required for entrance into the consular services, such as political
economy, American and modern history. Courses are also offered in law, social, ethics, political economy and other
subjects.
The institution has also its religious department. In that department there are, generally speaking, three main lines of
work Bible study, religious meetings and special classes. Course are offered in the Life of Christ and the Old
Testament and in the larger social significance of the teachings of Jesus. Meetings are held on Sunday afternoons
and several times during the week and courses are offered in the study of missions, in the method of teaching the
Bible and kindred subjects.
The atmosphere of the Young Men's Christian Association is distinctly religious and there is constant effort on the
part of the officials to create a religious spirit; and to that end there is continuous pressure to induce members to
attend not only the religious services of the association but also those of one or another of the churches of Manila.
While the association is nonsectarian, it is preeminently religious; and the fundamental basis and groundwork is the
Christian religion. All of the officials of the association are devoted Christians, members of a church, and have
dedicated their lives to the spread of the Christian principles and building of Christian character.
The institution also has charitable features. It makes no profit on any of its activities. The professors and instructors
in all departments serve without pay and freely give of their time and ability to further the purposes of the
institution. The chief secretary and his assistant receive no salary from the institution. Whatever they are paid comes
from the United States. In estimating the cost of instruction in the various departments, or of the other things for
which pay is received, no account is taken of the interest on the money invested in the grounds and building, of
deterioration in value resulting from the lapse of time, or of the fact that the professors and instructors and certain
officials receive no pay. We have, then, a building and grounds, professors and instructors, and certain institution
officials, furnished free of charge, and which makes no profit even on that basis. This, it would seem, would lend
some color to the claim that the association takes on some of the aspect of a charitable institution. While it appears
that the association is not exclusively religious or charitable or educational, it is demonstrated that it is a happy
combination of all three, giving to its membership the religious opportunities of the church, the educational
opportunities of the school and the blessings of charity where needed without the recipient feeling or even knowing
that he is the object of charity.
It is claimed, however, that the institution is run as a business in that it keeps a lodging and boarding house. It may
be admitted that there are 64 persons occupying rooms in the main building as lodgers or roomers and that they take
their meals at the restaurant below. These facts, however, are far from constituting a business in ordinary acceptation
of the word. In the first place, no profit is realized by the association in any sense. In the second place, it is
undoubted, as it is undisputed, that the purpose of the association is not, primarily, to obtain the money which comes
from the lodgers and boarders. The real purpose is to keep the membership continually within the sphere of
influence of the institution; and thereby to prevent, as far as possible, the opportunities which vice president to
young men in foreign countries who lack home or other similar influences. We regard this feature of the institution
not as a business or means of making money, but, rather, as a very efficient means of maintaining the influence of
the institution over its membership. As we held in the case of the Columbia Club, religious and moral teachings do
not always stop with the spoken word; but to be effective in the highest degree they must follow the young man
through as many moments of his life as possible. To this end the feature of the Young Men's Christian Association to
which objection is made lends itself with great effect; and we are, accordingly, forced to regards this activity of the
institution not as a business but as a method by which the institution maintains its influence and conserves the
benefits which its organization was designed to confer.
As we have seen in the description already given of the association building and grounds, no part is occupied for any
but institutional purposes. From end to end the building and grounds are devoted exclusively to the purposes stated
in the constitution of the association. The library and reading rooms, the game and lounging halls, the lecture rooms,
the auditorium, the baths, pools, devices for physical development, and the grounds, are all dedicated exclusively to
the objects and purpose of the association the building of Christian character and the creation of moral sentiment
and fiber in men. It is the belief of the Young Men's Christian Association that a Christian man, a man of moral
sentiment and firm moral fiber, is yet a better man for being also all-round man one who is sound not only
according to Christian principles and the highest moral conceptions, but physically and mentally; whose body and
mind act in harmony and within the limits which the rights of others set; who are gentleman in physical and mental
struggles, as well as in religious service; who have self-respect and self-restraint; who can hit hard and still kindly;
who can lose without envy; who can congratulate his conqueror with sincerity; who can vie without temper, contend
without malice, concede without regret; who can win and still be generous, in short, one who fights hard but
square. To the production of such men the association lends all its efforts, husbands all its resources.
We are aware that there are many decisions holding that institutions of this character are not exempt from taxation; but, on
investigation, we find that the majority of them are based on statutes much narrower than the one under consider and that in all
probability the decisions would have been otherwise if the court had been passing on a statute similar to ours. On the other hand,
there are many decisions of the courts in the United States founded on statutes like the Philippine statute which hold that
associations of this class are exempt from taxation. We have examined all of the decisions, both for and against, with care and
deliberation, and we are convinced that the weight of authority sustains the positions we take in this case.
There is no doubt about the correctness of the contention that an institution must devote itself exclusively to one or the other of
the purpose mentioned in the statute before it can be exempt from taxation; but the statute does not say that it must be
devoted exclusively to any one of the purposes therein mentioned. It may be a combination of two or three or more of those
purposes and still be entitled to exempt. The Young Men's Christian Association of Manila cannot be said to be an institution
used exclusively for religious purposes, or an institution used exclusively for charitable purposes, or an institution devoted
exclusively to educational purposes; but we believe it can be truthfully said that it is an institution used exclusively for all three
purposes, and that, as such, it is entitled to be exempted from taxation.
The judgment appealed from is reversed and the cause remanded with instructions to enter a judgment against the city of Manila
and in favor of the Young Men's Christian Association of Manila in the sum of P6,221.35. Without costs in this instance. So
ordered.
In regard to the lot which formerly was the cemetery, while it is no longer used as such, neither is it used for
commercial purposes and, according to the evidence, is now being used as a lodging house by the people who
participate in religious festivities, which constitutes an incidental use in religious functions, which also comes within
the exemption.
The judgment appealed from is reversed in all it parts and it is held that both lots are exempt from land tax and the
defendants are ordered to refund to plaintiff whatever was paid as such tax, without any special pronouncement as to
costs. So ordered.
The building involved in this case is principally used as a hospital. It is mainly a surgical and orthopedic
hospital with emphasis on obstetrical cases, the latter constituting 90% of the total number of cases
registered therein. The hospital has thirty-two (32) beds, of which twenty (20) are for charity-patients and
twelve (12) for pay-patients. From the evidence presented by petitioners, it is made to appear that there are
two kinds of charity patients (a) those who come for consultation only ("out-charity patients"); and (b)
those who remain in the hospital for treatment ("lying-in-patients"). The out-charity patients are given free
consultation and prescription, although sometimes they are furnished with free medicines which are not
costly like aspirin, sulfatiazole, etc. The charity lying-in-patients are given free medical service and
medicine although the food served to the pay-patients is very much better than that given to the former.
Although no condition is imposed by the hospital on the admission of charity lying-in-patients, they
however, usually give donations to the hospital. On the other hand, the pay-patients are required to pay for
hospital services ranging from the minimum charge of P5.00 to the maximum of P40.00 for each day of
stay in the hospital. The income realized from pay-patients is spent for the improvement of the charity
wards. The hospital personnel is composed of three nurses, two graduate midwives, a resident physician
receiving a salary of P170.00 a month and the petitioner, Dr. Ester Ochangco Herrera, as directress. As such
directress, the latter does not receive any salary.
Petitioners also operate within the premises of the hospital the "St. Catherine's School of Midwifery" which
was granted government recognition by the Secretary of Education on February 1, 1955 (Exhibit "F-3", p.
10, BIR rec.) This school has an enrollment of about two hundred students. The students are charged a
matriculation fee of P300.00 for 1- years, plus P50.00 a month for board and lodging, which includes
transportation to the St. Mary's Hospital. The students practice in the St. Catherine's Hospital, as well as in
the St. Mary's Hospital, which is also owned by the petitioners. A separate set of accounting books is
maintained by the school for midwifery distinct from that kept by the hospital. The petitioners alleged that
the accounts of the school are not included in Exhibits "A", "A-1", "A-2", "B", "B-1", "B-2", "C", "C-1"
and "C-2" which relate to the hospital only. However, the petitioners have refused to submit a separate
statement of accounts of the school. A brief tabulation indicating the amount of income of the hospital for
the years 1954, 1955 and 1956, and its operational expenses, is as follows:
1954
Income
Charity
Pay Ward
Ward
P14,779.50
Expenses
Deficit
P
5,280.04 P1,303.80
P10,803.26
P16,083.30
Ward
P17,433.30
Expenses
P
6,859.32
14,038.92
Deficit
P3,464.94
P20,898.24
(Exhibits "B", "B-1" and "B-2")
1956
Income
Expenses
Deficit
Charity
Pay Ward
Ward
P21,467.40
P
5,559.89 P 341.53
16,249.04
P21,809.93
the stock dividends of the corporation, in view of a gain of P200,000.00 in property, besides good-will, which was
not carried out, does not justify the inference that the corporation has become one for business and profit, none of its
profits having inured to the benefit of any stockholder or individual (Collector of Internal Revenue vs. University of
Visayas, L-13554, February 28, 1961).
Moreover, the exemption in favor of property used exclusively for charitable or educational purposes is "not limited
to property actually indispensable" therefor (Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 2, p. 1430), but extends to facilities which are
"incidental to and reasonably necessary for" the accomplishment of said purposes, such as, in the case of hospitals,
"a school for training nurses, a nurses' home, property use to provide housing facilities for interns, resident doctors,
superintendents, and other members of the hospital staff, and recreational facilities for student nurses, interns and
residents" (84 C.J.S., 621), such as "athletic fields," including "a farm used for the inmates of the institution"
(Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 2, p. 1430).
Within the purview of the Constitutional exemption from taxation, the St. Catherine's Hospital is, therefore, a
charitable institution, and the fact that it admits pay-patients does not bar it from claiming that it is devoted
exclusively to benevolent purposes, it being admitted that the income derived from pay-patients is devoted to the
improvement of the charity wards, which represent almost two-thirds (2/3) of the bed capacity of the hospital, aside
from "out-charity patients" who come only for consultation.
Again, the existence of "St. Catherine's School of Midwifery", with an enrollment of about 200 students, who
practice partly in St. Catherine's Hospital and partly in St. Mary's Hospital, which, likewise, belongs to petitioners
herein, does not, and cannot, affect the exemption to which St. Catherine's Hospital is entitled under our
fundamental law. On the contrary, it furnishes another ground for exemption. Seemingly, the Court of Tax Appeals
was impressed by the fact that the size of said enrollment and the matriculation fee charged from the students of
midwifery, aside from the amount they paid for board and lodging, including transportation to St. Mary's Hospital,
warrants the belief that petitioners derive a substantial profit from the operation of the school aforementioned. Such
factor is, however, immaterial to the issue in the case at bar, for "all lands, building and improvements used
exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation," pursuant to the
Constitution, regardless of whether or not material profits are derived from the operation of the institutions in
question. In other words, Congress may, if it deems fit to do so, impose taxes upon such "profits", but said "lands,
buildings and improvements" are beyond its taxing power.
Similarly, the garage in the building above referred to which was obviously essential to the operation of the
school of midwifery, for the students therein enrolled practiced, not only in St. Catherine's Hospital, but, also, in St.
Mary's Hospital, and were entitled to transportation thereto for Mrs. Herrera received no compensation as
directress of St. Catherine's Hospital were incidental to the operation of the latter and of said school, and,
accordingly, did not affect the charitable character of said hospital and the educational nature of said school.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, as well as that of the Assessment Board of Appeals of
Quezon City, are hereby reversed and set aside, and another one entered declaring that the lot, building and
improvements constituting the St. Catherine's Hospital are exempt from taxation under the provisions of the
Constitution, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
On these shipments, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue levied and collected the total amount of P118,847 as
compensating tax.
The Bishop of the Missionary District filed claims for refund of the amount he had paid on the ground that under
Republic Act No. 1916, the materials and articles received by him were exempt from the payment of compensating
tax. As the two-year period for recovery of tax was about to expire, the Bishop of the Missionary District filed a
petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeals, without awaiting action on his claim for refund. Subsequently, he
also filed two supplemental petitions for review covering other shipments received by him and on which he had paid
compensating taxes.
On August 21, 1959, the petitioner, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue denied respondent's claim for refund on
the ground that St. Luke's Hospital was not a charitable institution and, therefore, was not exempt under the law.
This is also the position he maintained in his answer to the first supplemental petition for review in the Tax Court.
After trial, the Tax Court rendered a decision holding the shipments exempt from taxation ordering the petitioner to
refund to the respondent the amount of P118,847. It denied a motion for reconsideration of its decision, prompting
petitioner to interpose this appeal.
Petitioner makes the following assignment of errors:
1. The shipments cannot be considered donations because the Missionary District is merely a branch of the
Missionary Society. The two hold identical interests.
2. The Tax Court's holding that the real donors are the people who contributed money to the Missionary Society in
America is based on the uncorroborated testimony of Robert Meyer, Treasurer of the Missionary District in the
Philippines, who did not have personal knowledge of the alleged contribution. The alleged contributors were not
even identified.
3. The St. Luke's Hospital is not a charitable institution and, therefore, is not exempt from taxation because its
admits pay patients. The Secretary of Finance states in his Dept. Order No. 18 that hospitals admitting pay patients
and charity patients are not charitable institutions.
This order was issued pursuant to the power given him by the last proviso of Republic Act No. 1916 which provides:
SECTION 1. The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, all donations in any form and
all articles imported into the Philippines, consigned to a duly incorporated or established international civic
organization, religious or charitable society or institution for civic, religious or charitable purposes shall be
exempt from the payment of all taxes and duties upon proof satisfactory to the Commissioner of Customs
and/or Collector of Internal Revenue that such donations in any form and articles so imported are donations
for its use or for free distribution and not for barter, sale or hire: Provided, however, That in case such are
subsequently conveyed or transferred to other parties for a consideration, taxes and duties shall be collected
thereon at double the rate provided under existing laws payable by the transferor: Provided, further, That
rules and regulation, shall be promulgated by the Department of Finance for the implementation of this Act.
This Court has already held that the following requisites must concur in order that a taxpayer may claim exemption
under the law (1) the imported articles must have been donated; (2) the donee must be a duly incorporated or
established international civic organization, religious or charitable society, or institution for civic religious or
charitable purposes; and (3) the articles so imported must have been donated for the use of the organization, society
or institution or for free distribution and not for barter, sale or hire. (Commissioner v. Church of Jesus Christ "New
Jerusalem," G.R. No. L-15772, Oct. 31, 1961)
In this appeal, the petitioner contends that the importations in question cannot be considered "donations" because the
Missionary Society, which made the shipments, and the Missionary District in the Philippines are not different
persons but rather are one and the same, the latter being a mere branch of the former.
It should be enough to point out that by stipulation of the parties, the respondent Bishop is admitted to be a corporation sole duly registered with
the Securities and Exchange Commission and that the Missionary District is a "duly incorporated and established religious society." They are,
therefore, entities separate and distinct from the Missionary Society whose address is at 281 Fourth South, New York 10, N.Y., U.S.A. The fact
that the Missionary District, of which respondent is the Bishop, is a branch of the Missionary Society is of no moment. For that matter, so is the
Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines a branch of the Universal Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, but it is a branch only in religious
matters, in matters of faith and dogma. In other respects, it is independent. (Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator v. Land Registration
Commissioner, G.R. No. L-8451, December 20, 1957)
The Tax Court's finding that the materials and supplies were purchased by the Missionary Society with money obtained from contributions from
other people who should be considered the real donors is also assailed as being based on the uncorroborated testimony of Robert Meyer,
Treasurer of the Missionary District, who it is said, did not have personal knowledge of the matter testified to by him. This is not so. As
respondent points out, the various deeds of donation state in paragraph 3 that the "Missionary Society is a non-profit organization and derives its
support from voluntary contributions."
Petitioner's other point is that St. Luke's Hospital is not a charitable institution considering that it admits paying patients. Indeed, it was on this
ground that petitioner denied respondent's claim for refund. It is argued that pursuant to the last proviso of Republic Act No. 1916, the Secretary
of Finance issued Department Order No. 18 on October 20, 1958, stating that
Hospitals that admit pay patients and charity patients ... are not charitable institutions for purposes of Republic Act No 1916.
Again, it should be enough to point out that the admission of pay patients does not detract from the charitable character of a hospital, if, as in the
case of St. Luke's Hospital, its funds are devoted exclusively to the Maintenance of the institution (Cf., e.g., Herrera v. Quezon City Board of
Assessment Appeals, G.R. No. 15270, September 30, 1961). The Secretary of Finance cannot limit or otherwise qualify the enjoyment of this
exemption granted under Republic Act No. 1916 in implementing the law.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs.
any hearing, adjudged the case; all in total disregard of basic laws of procedure and basic provisions of due process
in the constitution, thereby indicating a failure to grasp and understand the law, which goes into the competence of
the Honorable Presiding Judge." 4
It was the submission of counsel that an action for declaratory relief would be proper only before a breach or
violation of any statute, executive order or regulation. 5 Moreover, there being a tax assessment made by the
Provincial Assessor on the properties of respondent Roman Catholic Bishop, petitioner failed to exhaust the
administrative remedies available under Presidential Decree No. 464 before filing such court action. Further, it was
pointed out to respondent Judge that he failed to abide by the pertinent provision of such Presidential Decree which
provides as follows: "No court shall entertain any suit assailing the validity of a tax assessed under this Code until
the taxpayer, shall have paid, under protest, the tax assessed against him nor shall any court declare any tax invalid
by reason of irregularities or informalities in the proceedings of the officers charged with the assessment or
collection of taxes, or of failure to perform their duties within this time herein specified for their performance unless
such irregularities, informalities or failure shall have impaired the substantial rights of the taxpayer; nor shall any
court declare any portion of the tax assessed under the provisions of this Code invalid except upon condition that the
taxpayer shall pay the just amount of the tax, as determined by the court in the pending proceeding." 6
When asked to comment, respondent Judge began with the allegation that there "is no question that the real
properties sought to be taxed by the Province of Abra are properties of the respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of
Bangued, Inc." 7 The very next sentence assumed the very point it asked when he categorically stated: "Likewise,
there is no dispute that the properties including their procedure are actually, directly and exclusively used by the
Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. for religious or charitable purposes." 8 For him then: "The proper remedy
of the petitioner is appeal and not this special civil action." 9 A more exhaustive comment was submitted by private
respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. It was, however, unable to lessen the force of the objection
raised by petitioner Province of Abra, especially the due process aspect. it is to be admitted that his opposition to the
petition, pressed with vigor, ostensibly finds a semblance of support from the authorities cited. It is thus impressed
with a scholarly aspect. It suffers, however, from the grave infirmity of stating that only a pure question of law is
presented when a claim for exemption is made.
The petition must be granted.
1. Respondent Judge would not have erred so grievously had he merely compared the provisions of the present
Constitution with that appearing in the 1935 Charter on the tax exemption of "lands, buildings, and improvements."
There is a marked difference. Under the 1935 Constitution: "Cemeteries, churches, and parsonages or convents
appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable, or
educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation." 10 The present Constitution added "charitable institutions,
mosques, and non-profit cemeteries" and required that for the exemption of ":lands, buildings, and improvements,"
they should not only be "exclusively" but also "actually and "directly" used for religious or charitable
purposes. 11 The Constitution is worded differently. The change should not be ignored. It must be duly taken into
consideration. Reliance on past decisions would have sufficed were the words "actually" as well as "directly" not
added. There must be proof therefore of the actual and direct use of the lands, buildings, and improvements for
religious or charitable purposes to be exempt from taxation. According to Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Guerrero: 12 "From 1906, in Catholic Church v. Hastings to 1966, in Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. v. Acting
Commissioner of Customs, it has been the constant and uniform holding that exemption from taxation is not favored
and is never presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. Affirmatively put, the law
frowns on exemption from taxation, hence, an exempting provision should be construed strictissimi juris." 13 In
Manila Electric Company v. Vera, 14 a 1975 decision, such principle was reiterated, reference being made
to Republic Flour Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue; 15Commissioner of Customs v. Philippine
Acetylene Co. & CTA; 16 and Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs. 17
2. Petitioner Province of Abra is therefore fully justified in invoking the protection of procedural due process. If
there is any case where proof is necessary to demonstrate that there is compliance with the constitutional provision
that allows an exemption, this is it. Instead, respondent Judge accepted at its face the allegation of private
respondent. All that was alleged in the petition for declaratory relief filed by private respondents, after mentioning
certain parcels of land owned by it, are that they are used "actually, directly and exclusively" as sources of support
of the parish priest and his helpers and also of private respondent Bishop. 18 In the motion to dismiss filed on behalf
of petitioner Province of Abra, the objection was based primarily on the lack of jurisdiction, as the validity of a tax
assessment may be questioned before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals and not with a court. There was also
mention of a lack of a cause of action, but only because, in its view, declaratory relief is not proper, as there had
been breach or violation of the right of government to assess and collect taxes on such property. It clearly appears,
therefore, that in failing to accord a hearing to petitioner Province of Abra and deciding the case immediately in
favor of private respondent, respondent Judge failed to abide by the constitutional command of procedural due
process.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the resolution of June 19, 1978 is set aside. Respondent Judge, or who
ever is acting on his behalf, is ordered to hear the case on the merit. No costs.