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459

Science and the World: Philosophical Approaches

Jeffrey Foss, ed.
Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2014; pbk, xv + 536 pp., $42.95; ISBN 9781-5511-1624-2

TIMOTHY CHAMBERS
Even a cursory review of the literature brings to light scores of articles treating
the topic of student relativism, including several essays appearing in this
journal.1 Not surprisingly, several commentators sense that student relativism finds a partial source in a thesis we might dub student positivism: the
view, roughly, that scientific knowledge ... is the only valid knowledge.
(524) Stephen Satris, for instance, describes encountering a typical student
reaction ... that while scientific facts (which can be proven) might be an
exception, everything elseopinions, views, feelings, values, lifestyle, ideals, activities, religion, tasteis after all relative; Richard Momeyer notes
a similar student distinction between those quantitative, scientific areas
of inquiry in which real knowledge is attainable (facts), and those fields of
inquiry not yet blessed by scientific method, such as philosophy, where all
is a matter of (subjective) non-confirmable opinion.2
If, as these authors suggest, a reflexive student relativism partially results
from a simplistic view of the natural sciences, then this provides one strong
motivation for texts which aim to provide, as does this anthology, a philosophical introduction to science ... ready-to-read by the average freshman
straight out of high school. (xiii)
Foss has gone to great lengths in his effort to make this text so-readyto-read by newcomers to academic philosophy. He heads each of the anthologys twenty-five readings with introductory remarks. He appends three
sets of study-questions to each reading: one type (Explication Questions)
ensures the student has read the selection carefully; another type (Evaluation
Questions) prompts students to gauge the readings plausibility; the third
type (The Bigger Picture) invites students to consider broader philosophical
concerns occasioned by the reading, and compare it with others in the volume.
Add in the texts general introductions and an extensive twenty-five-page
Philosophical Dictionary (keyed to the texts technical terms3), and Fosss
contributions comprise nearly 250 pages of the text. Foss has set the bar high
for first-time college students, but its obvious that he has endeavored to be
an ever-present and helpful coach.
Foss divides his anthology into two main sections, each corresponding to
a central philosophical imperative. Section 1 answers to the commandment
to Know thyself! and is devoted to scientific method and logic (ix, xiii).
Section 2 contains articles that invite students to see the Big Picture, and
investigate ... science from the point of view of ethics, political theory,
and the theory of human nature. (ix, xiiixiv) Topics treated in these two
Teaching Philosophy, 2015. All rights reserved. 0145-5788
DOI: 10.5840/teachphil201538458

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sections interweave, of course, since at least part of the project of Knowing

Oneself involves articulating the role one plays in the proverbial Big Picture.
(A) While Foss titles his anthologys first part, Since and Method: From
Proof to Models (1), a survey of the sections dozen articles reveals that it
casts a wider net than advertised, yet omits considerations one might have
expected in an introductory treatment of scientific method and logic. Foss
offers no explicit subdivision of this section; nonetheless, its readings fall
into three main clusters:
1) The Problem of Induction/The Hypothetico-Deductive Method/Falsifiability (Newton, Hume, Hempel, Popper, Haack). The pedagogical merit of
Fosss selections here is obvious: Insofar as newcomers to philosophy (including student positivists) hold a picture of sciences workings at all, its
probably derived from a typical science textbooks brief, broadly-sketched
treatment of The Scientific Method.4 These textbooks, in turn, often reflect
the influence of Poppers falsifiability criterion for distinguishing science
from non-science, and Hempels classic invention-and-test description of
scientific justification.
At the same time, I have a reservation or two. The text omits discussing the
more concrete flaws in Hempel and Poppers accounts (e.g., their neglect of
the significance of auxiliary hypotheses in deriving an observation-statement
from a target-hypothesis). And as much as the experienced philosophy student will find Haacks discussion insightful and helpful,5 I fear it is a bridge
too far for first-time students: her essay presupposes a fluency with authors
(Lakatos, Feyerabend) and concepts (first-order logic, underdetermination)
which inexperienced students are unlikely to have.
2) Socio-Historical Views of Science (Kuhn/Paul Churchland/Harding/
Giere). Again, the pedagogical motivation here is laudable: Insofar as student
positivism thrives, it partially does so on a false picture of The Scientist as
an amalgam between the flawlessly logical Dr. Spock and Sgt. Joe all we
know are the facts, maam Friday.6 The true picture of scientific practice,
as Kuhn famously urged, is a far more fascinating epistemological story.
And yet, I fear the readings contained in this anthology lie beyond
introductory students grasp. While Paul Churchlands illustrations of
paradigm-cases in basic physics are helpful (22731), further focus upon
Kuhns historical illustrations (Copernicus; the discovery of oxygen and xrays) would have been welcomeperhaps in the form of Case Studies, as
often appear in other philosophy of science introductions and anthologies.7
Similarly, the topic of scientific bias in general, and sexist bias in particular,
certainly warrant attention. But I fear the substance of Harding and Gieres
abstract treatments will be lost on students who have yet to encounter more
practical examples of bias as they arise (and are managed) in actual scientific
practice: confirmation bias, statistical biases, etc.
3) Models and Realism (Foss/van Fraasen/Peacock). I have no doubt
that these readings8 would spur some thought-provoking discussion in a

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graduate-level seminar. The view that scientific theories contents should

be conceptualized, most broadly, as models, rather than as sentences or
sets-of-sentences (a vexing vestige of Carnaps logical positivist approach
to the natural sciences) is a worthy contemporary topic. But it takes no small
amount of philosophical background and subtlety to motivate such a projectand certainly more than can reasonably be expected of students in their
early acquaintance with philosophy. In a similar spirit, I wonder whether a
first-time treatment of realism ought to focus upon contemporary physics
(quantum mechanics), rather than, say, the issue of instrumentalism as it
arises in Osianders famous preface to Copernicus.
(B) Foss intends Section 2 to offer students a view of the Big Picture by
providing an introduction to the main ethical dimensions of science. (280)
The sections preface thus offers, first, a barnstorming tour of a dozen main
ethical theories, from Theologically-based ethics to Noncognitivism.
(27077) Foss then maps out three phases of scientific activity which can
engender ethical scrutiny: the acquisition of information (research), the
dissemination of information (communicating science), and the application of information (technology) (27780).
However, as early as the first reading (Galileos Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina (28194)), it becomes clear that the sections selections dont
instantiate the proffered program. Instead, the overarching issue concerns the
extent to which biological explanations can conflict with explanations traditionally offered by theologians and social scientists. Against this backdrop,
Fosss readings cluster around three main controversies.
(1') Evolution (Genesis 13/Morris/Ruse/Dennett). The topic of young
earth creationism is somewhat dated; traditionalists have, more recently, targeted evolutionary biology under the banners of irreducible complexity and
Intelligent Design. Nonetheless, Fosss selections highlight an important
question: How should we navigate the tensions which arise between (certain
interpretations of) divinely-revealed Word and the scientifically-revealed
World? Our answer to this question, in the case of Darwin and biology, cant
help but have far-reaching consequences, as Daniel Dennett points out in his
helpful historical and philosophical contextualization of Darwins dangerous
idea. The idea of natural selection, like universal acid, threatens to leak
out, offering answerswelcome or notto questions in cosmology (going
in one direction) and psychology (going in the other direction). (400)
(2') Sociobiology (Wilson & Ruse/Pinker). This latter direction, of Darwinian explanations suggesting answers in domains traditionally claimed
by the social sciences and ethics, finds one incarnation in Edward Wilson
and Michael Ruses sociobiological program (40926). Not surprisingly, as
Steven Pinker points out, many social scientists object to the prospect of their
domains being poached by reductionist evolutionary biologists; they also
worry that sociobiology might carry bad-old-fashioned Social Darwinism in
its traina worry Pinker aims to assuage (42739).

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These readings are some of the most spirited in Fosss volume. My only
concern, pedagogically, is the lack of balance: students would be well-served
to know that reservations about sociobiology are not limited to social scientists concerns about academic turf or social-justice advocates concerns
about legitimating inequality and oppression. The Wilson/Ruse program has
also drawn withering methodological critique from such Darwinian stalwarts
as Dennett (who dismisses Wilsons sociobiology as simplistic), biologist
Jerry Coyne (who describes it as speculation ... unaccompanied by hard
evidence), and philosopher of science Philip Kitcher (In the case of pop
sociobiology, commonly accepted standards [of evidence] are ignored).9
(3') Cloning (Dawkins/Tracy/Kitcher). As Foss advertises, these readings
indeed consider some of the ethical dimensions of cloning. Kitcher briefly
cites Mill and Kant (47778). Dawkins offers some pedestrian ethical considerations (44448). The readings also raise the broader question of the place
of religiously inspired reasons in a pluralistic society that requires its social
policies to be guided by publicly-arguable rationales. Dawkins argues that,
lacking scientific expertise, and lacking the skill to marshal secular moral and
logical arguments articulately, representatives of religious traditions often
have no rightful (earned) authority in public discussions of ethical issues
surrounding cloning (44255). Against this line of thought, David Tracys
contribution (45770) is subtle but suggestive. He worries that public reason threatens to become merely technical instrumental reasoning; what
is lost in such a reduction is attention to human ends, themselves, guided by
deep intuitions and visions of the [G]ood, which are precisely the kinds of
limit-questions upon which religious traditions are founded (465). Your
scientists were so preoccupied with whether or not they could, scolds Dr. Ian
Malcolm before disaster befalls Jurassic Park, that they didnt stop to think
if they should; Fosss selections could certainly inspire illuminating studentdiscussion of avoiding ethical oversights in the rush of scientific researches.
Foss describes his volume as a complete ... self-contained text for a
well-rounded first course in the philosophy of science (xv). My own reading
leaves me with an uncomfortable dilemma. A number of the readings seem
overly ambitious for first-time students of philosophy. A number of Fosss
omissions (Goodmans New Riddle? Quines Two Dogmas?) puzzle me.
For these reasons, I personally would probably opt for a text that is more
introductory in tone and/or comprehensive in scope than the present volume.

Notes
1. Richard W. Momeyer, Teaching Ethics to Student Relativists, Teaching Philosophy 18:4 (December 1995): 30111; Stephen A. Satris, Student Relativism, Teaching
Philosophy 9:3 (September 1986): 193205. For a more recent review, see Gerald J. Erion,
Engaging Student Relativism, Discourse: Teaching and Learning in Philosophical and
Religious Studies 5:1 (Autumn 2005): 12033.

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2. Respectively: Satris, Student Relativism, 194 and Monmeyer, Teaching Ethics

to Student Relativists, 311n1.
3. I worry whether the volume might be somewhat jargon-heavy for beginning students: The Dictionary contains thirty-two -ism-terms, from altruism through naturalism,
to verificationism. (Nine additional ethical -isms are briefly defined in the Introduction
to Section 2 [27077].)
4. For a helpful survey, see James Blachowicz, How Science Textbooks Treat
Scientific Method: A Philosophers Perspective, British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science 60 (2009): 30344.
5. Susan Haack, Nail Soup: A Brief, Opinionated History of the Old Deferentialism, in Defending ScienceWithin Reason: Between Scientism and Cynicism (Amherst,
NY: Prometheus Books, 2003): 3156.
6. More generally, Kerry S. Walters worries that the typical emphasis in Critical
Reasoning courses might re-inforce a narrow view of rational thinking as merely obeying a formulaic calculus of justification, at the expense of rational patterns of creative
thinking including imagination, insight and intuition. See Critical Thinking, Rationality,
and the Vulcanization of Students, Journal of Higher Education 61.4 (July/August 1990):
44867.
7. E.g., Steven Gimbel, ed., Exploring the Scientific Method: Cases and Questions
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011).
8. Jeffrey Foss, Science, Maps and Models, in Science and the Riddle of Consciousness: A Solution (New York, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000): 4055; Bas van
Fraasen, Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism, in The Scientific Image (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1980): 619; Kent A. Peacock, Realism in a Quantum World,
previously unpublished.
9. Respectively: Daniel Dennett, Darwins Dangerous Idea: Ethics and the Meanings
of Life (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1996), 469; Jerry A. Coyne, Why Evolution is True
(New York: Viking Books, 2009), 230; Philip Kitcher, Vaulting Ambition: Sociobiology
and the Quest for Human Nature (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985), 435.
Timothy Chambers, 126 Lawler Road, West Hartford CT 06117; tcham71@gmail.com

Philosophy of Language: The Classics Explained

Colin McGinn
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2015; hc, x + 225 pp., $35.00; ISBN 978-0-26202845-5

JASON DECKER
Colin McGinns latest monograph, Philosophy of Language: The Classics
Explained, is an attempt to explain as clearly and accessibly as possible
ten classic texts from the philosophy of language. There are no surprises;
we get Frege on astronomy, Kripke on Gdel and Schmidt, Russell on the
present King of France, Donnellan on men holding martinis, Kaplan on the
importance of having character, Evans on ... just about everything, Putnam
on what aint in the head, Tarski on T-sentences, Davidson on Tarski, and
Teaching Philosophy, 2015. All rights reserved. 0145-5788
DOI: 10.5840/teachphil201538459

pp. 463469