Serving the Public Interest

Is The TFWP Good For Canada?

December 18, 2015
Professor John Wilkins and Ian Macdonald

Max Zhu
212140000
0

Executive Summary
In the globalized world, the flow of capital, communication and population is the new
norm. The demolition of political boundaries have enabled people to migrate in search for better
employment opportunities abroad. Unfortunately, the influx of foreign workers have fuelled
intense competition in the domestic labour market, squeezing out the middle class and leaving jobs
only at the ends of skills spectrum. As domestic workers are reluctant to accept low-paying,
dangerous and precarious employment, G8 countries must look abroad for cheap surplus labour to
fill the low-skilled positions. In Canada, these workers arrive through the Government of Canadas
Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP), a federal employment initiative that brings foreign
nationals, up to eight months in a year, across the country to fill short-term labour shortages for
local businesses. Originally intended to respond to labour shortages on Canadian farms, the
TFWP has since been abused by employers as a means to replace domestic employees as foreign
migrants work better and are cheaper to pay. Employers have been caught illegally retaining
their passports upon their arrival in Canada and can freely repatriate sick, injured or undesired
workers back to their home nations without justification. In light of these human rights abuses,
violations to Canadian law and the harmful implications to the regional development of Canadas
economy, this paper contends that the TFWP does not serve the public interest defined as a
program that is fairly executed and meets the common good of society and its shared values (Pal
and Maxwell). Following an introduction to the issue, the paper will develop three key business,
legal and moral arguments against the program, including the moral responsibility ought to be
exercised by the various levels of government involved. It provides three key recommendations
on addressing the main concerns and concludes with an outlook on how the TFWP will be
expanded under the looming Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement.

Introduction
History and Management of the TFWP
The Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP) started in 1966 as a partnership between
Canada and Jamaica. The Canadian government, in response to concerns from farmers who were
finding it increasingly difficult to hire workers from Canada to harvest crops, established a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to allow workers to legally enter Canada for periods of
six weeks to eight months to alleviate Canadian labour shortages within the agricultural sector
(Flecker). This branch of the program is known the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program
(SAWP) and brought 264 workers in its first year (Flecker). In the next 10 years, partnerships with
nine other Caribbean nations were established and brought a total of 4,000 workers each year by
1976 (Flecker). The TFWP has grown significantly in the last 40 years. Two new branches have
since been established the Live-In Caregiver Program (LICP) and the Pilot Project for
Occupations Requiring Lower Levels of Formal Training (PP) inflating the overall program size
by 63 times to 251,253 workers annually (Citizenship and Immigration Canada). The top three
source countries are the Philippines, the United States and Mexico.

Originally, the TFWP was managed by the Canadian government through Human
Resources and Skills Development Canada (HRSDC); however, in 1987, the administration of the
program was privatized in 1987 to Foreign Agricultural Resource Management Services
(FARMS), a non-profit organization controlled and funded by Canadian growers (Flecker). Quotas
were initially established to limit the number of migrant workers admitted to Canada and the type
of skilled work they may be employed to do. This was eliminated by FARMS in exchange for a
supply-demand system that matched labour needs to labour supply in the source countries

(Flecker). In 2002, a pilot project for low-skilled workers was initiated (PP), opening the doors
for all types of employers to hire migrants for any job with no to low skill requirement. It remains
a pilot project today and has faced the heaviest backlash in the court of public opinion. In one
incident, McDonalds franchises in Lethbridge, AB and Parksville, BC were barred from hiring
foreign workers by former Employment Minister Jason Kenney in 2014 as local employees were
being denied much-needed overtime shifts to accommodate the full-time working hours
guaranteed under the migrants contracts (Tomlinson). Many locals didnt get enough work to
pay their rent and often felt marginalized or exiled by the Filipino migrants who were
promoted to managerial roles (Tomlinson). The TFWP has evolved into a form of reverse
discrimination against unemployed and hard-working Canadians.

Both Sides of the Dilemma

Benefits of the program do exist. Policymakers contend that the gap in supply for lowpaying, manual and precarious work leaves employers with no domestic alternatives to fill the
positions. The agricultural sector faces the challenge of having to fill relatively large number of
roles in a short period of time to prepare for growing or harvesting seasons and processing times
for economic immigration programs take too long. In contrast, 80 percent of low-skilled worker
applications were rendered within 16 weeks in 2009 (HRSDC et al.). Without the SAWP, 53
percent of employers would have no other alternatives and 20 percent would have closed or sold
their businesses (HRSDC et al.). The less-expensive cost of employing migrant farmers keeps the
cost of food low for Canadians and secures the competitive position of Canadian agriculture in
global exports.

The social cost of the program, however, is far greater for all stakeholders involved.
Because foreign workers are paid at the same prevailing rate as Canadians i.e. minimum wage,
the cost advantage seems relatively small on the surface. This is on top of the private health
insurance, work permits and housing accommodations that employers are legally obligated, as
established by the annual MOUs, to provide for workers. Between the fine lines, however, rests
the deductions that employers are entitled to take from workers paycheques including EI, CPP
and pension plan premiums; cost of basic living supplies; and transportation costs, in the event of
medical or workplace emergencies. In effect, each worker is responsible for more costs than the
average Canadian worker and pays for the employers contribution to social assistance programs,
in addition to their own. Even worse, Canadians are being passed over by employers for these
savings. Only 22 percent of farm employers would increase efforts to recruit Canadian and
permanent residents to meet their labour shortages, opting to not fill them at all (HRSDC et al.).

Despite their contributions to the social welfare system, very few are able to tap into them
for assistance. They do not receive language training to learn English or French when they are
here. With their basic personal needs met on farms distant from urban centres, they do not have
access to vehicles and only receive a single day off in the week to purchase groceries or send
money back home. On the farm, they engage in unsafe and dangerous working conditions,
handling chemicals without adequate training and strain provincial health care systems when they
become sick or injured. In addition, human trafficking systems have emerged in some provinces.
As workers realize their non-existent legal status in Canada, they escape to the underground
economy as an undocumented person (Flecker). This jeopardizes the safety of local communities
and the risk for greater criminal activity, particularly as no level of government owns an effective

tracking system of who or where exactly migrant workers are employed. These details are left
completely between FARMS and their employers.

The matter is about to get worse. Under the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) signed by the
Conservative government in October 2015, employers in regulated skilled trades such as
plumbing or construction work will no longer need to obtain a Labour Market Opinion (LMO)
from the HRSDC prior to applying for foreign workers (Curry). Positive LMOs must be obtained
by employers today to confirm that they have met the minimum advertising period for jobs (six
weeks) and there are insufficient Canadians to fill the open roles. By eliminating these
requirements, employers can bypass government oversight and hire as many foreign workers as
desired and, consequently, laying off the many good-paying, unionized jobs in these fields. Canada
is bound to see more foreign workers in the coming years that will aggravate the current social
cost of the program on themselves and other Canadians.

Scope and Literature Review

This paper will first identify the key stakeholders in the issue. Then, after defining what
public interest means in Canada, it applies the lenses of economics, law and morality to make
the argument that the TFWP is not good for Canada. All of the information is obtained from
secondary sources. Arguments in favour of the program are often drawn from government
documents while opposing viewpoints are presented from academics, media sources and labour
unions, including a 2011 report from the Canadian Labour Congress titled Model Program or
Mistake?. Similar guest worker programs in the United States (H-2A and H-2B visas) will be
discussed in recommendation for the Canadian program.

Figure 1: Key Stakeholder Analysis

Stakeholder

Employers

What their interest is

Sustain business and
profitability
Fill labour shortages

Under the status quo

Benefits
Limitations
Efficient system for meeting labour needs; 70% of Must obtain a Labour Market Opinion (LMO)
SAWP employers unable to find Canadian
from the HRSDC prior to applying for foreign
workers to fill position
labour
Can bring labour to distant regions or challenging
jobs not taken on by most Canadians
Workers are paid at prevailing wages of the
market for their jobs, often minimum wage due to
the skills required

Foreign
Workers

Federal
Government

Canadian
Public

Earn a decent level of

income and remit funds
back to families back home;
Living accommodations, airfare to/from Canada
pay for childs education
and private health care insurance is paid for by
employers
Some are promised the right
to PR and citizenship
Caregivers can obtain PR after 24 months or
3,900 hours of work, with employers consent
Meet labour demands of
Some oversight achieved through annual
economy; address OECD
negotiations of MOUs with Caribbean countries
goals of integrating labour for the SAWP
markets globally
Agriculture is sold at competitive prices in
Serve the best interest of all domestic and foreign markets
Canadians
TFWs contribute to social welfare systems of all

Food and child care is affordable

Maintain a good standard of
living in Canada
Spur economic growth in distant communities in
Canada (i.e. groceries purchased)
6

Must obtain work permit from Citizenship and

Immigration Canada (CIC) and meet eligibility
requirements
Unpaid overtime due to proximity to place of
work, either living in-home or near the farm
Payment of significant employment placement
fees over $1,000 for SAWP and $3,000 9,000
for LICs
Substandard living and working conditions but
only 20% take corrective action no access to
legal channels
No effective system to track the whereabouts of
foreign workers
Bureaucratic backlog due to extensive partnership
required with diff. levels of government
(limitations of power under Section 91, 92 of
Constitution)
Inability to land jobs in low-skilled position due to
employer preferences for hardworking, better
foreigners
Burden on regional health care systems due to
preventable workplace hazards

Findings Analysis and Discussion

Defining the Public Interest
The term public interest is vaguely defined and susceptible to many different
interpretations and approaches in the public sphere. This paper will use the framework presented
by Leslie A. Pal and Judith Maxwell in the paper Assess the Public Interest in the 21st Century: A
Framework prepared for the External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation in January 2004.
Public interest is the balance of process, public opinion, specific interests, common interest and
shared values:
Figure 2: 5 Components of the Public Interest
Key elements
Process
Public Opinion
Specific Interests
Common Interests
Shared Values

Evidenced by
Existence of transparency, reasonable access by all stakeholders,
neutrality
Addressing majority and strong majority views
Fair distribution of costs and benefits among all groups under the option
selected
Managing the trade-offs of some options over others
Considering legal rights and conflicts among shared values in society

In other words, the TFWP will meet the public interest if it balances the interests of
individuals, enterprises and the collective values of society (17). The program would be designed
with transparency in mind, engaging the relevant stakeholders identified in the previous
stakeholder map. It will consider how the majority of Canadians feel about importing foreign
workers but would only select the option that does not conflict with the law, such as the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms. Above all, it would not unfairly burden any particular group involved
whether it be the employers or foreign workers and, if it does, there should be evidence of work
done to shift costs and allocate benefits across all groups.

The Case for Regional Development

A key argument raised by proponents of the TFWP is its impact in spreading economic
development across all regions of Canada. As identified in a joint report commissioned by the CIC,
HRSDC and the Canada Border Services Agency, seasonal jobs are not sufficiently attractive to
encourage migration across or within provinces yet these positions need to be met or farms may
otherwise cut production (HRSDC et al.) Fluctuations in annual production make it impossible to
predict the need for labour. As hiring workers through the Federal Skilled Worker or Provincial
Nominee Programs can take between 8 to 34 months, the SAWP provides a quick, 16-week
turnaround time to provide farms with enough labour by the annual harvest (HRSDC et al.). The
demand is real; one survey of SAWP employers noted that 70 percent were unable to find workers
in Canada to fill their positions and had little choice but to apply for foreign help. Efficiency is a
key objective of the federal governments oversight as it ensures that Canadian businesses remain
globally competitive in the commodities market. Without the hands to do the job, labour-intensive
agriculture such as vegetables would be forced to cut supplier contracts or raise their prices to
cover the lost production (Read et al.). Compared to immigrants, TFWs are assigned to one
employer each year and have mobility restrictions to where they can supply their labour. They can
be easily shed when labour market conditions change by not hiring them next year and thus
do not impact the job prospects of Canadians and permanent residents in poor economic times.
This was demonstrated in 2009 as increased national unemployment of 8.3 percent led to a 17
percent decrease in TFWs accepted (HRSDC et al.). Above all, the limitations on where they work
indirectly affects where they spend their discretionary income. On some farms in Manitoba, for
instance, workers are transported to nearby cities of Winnipeg or Portage La Prairie on Friday
night excursions to do their shopping or access medical services (Read et al.). The migrants valued

the rare opportunity to speak to other migrants and would spend much time within the local
commercial establishments that hosted them. Having workers confined to certain areas ensures
some regional development as they support the local bars, grocery stores and other businesses that
profit from their weekly visits.

Opponents of the TFWP decry this narrow scope of regional development raised by the
government. The same impact would be felt by hiring Canadians for those farm positions, albeit
in different towns and cities, as they would likely live on or near the farm as well. By failing to
enforce regulations, most employers only advertise for seven days, rather than the mandatory six
weeks, prior to applying for a LMO and receiving permission to hire abroad (OFL). Canadians
job-seekers are not given a fair period of time to apply to these job postings. Moreover, most of
these shortages are self-created as employers demand highly-qualified candidates for belowaverage wages to dissuade local applications (OFL). There is no follow-up process to determine if
the same qualifications are upheld once temporary workers arrive in Canada. Only a small amount
of regional development arises from the TFWP. Most workers are housed and socially isolated on
the farm and do not have the opportunity to contribute to the local community. They are often
selected for their low levels of education and are unlikely to understand English, nor have the
opportunity to take English classes with their lone day of rest (Read et al.).

One of the strategic outcomes of the TFWP listed by the HRSDC is migration that
significantly benefits Canadas economic, social and cultural development. With their inability
to converse in English, these workers cannot add, or take, important pieces of culture to their
communities. Furthermore, they lead their lives in fear of violating the rules of their contract. In

an interview with the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, farm worker Manuel ascribes his
decision to not play soccer to his fear of being injured. He would be sent back to Mexico and not
receive any insurance payouts for his injuries, as it didnt happen at work (Read et al.). Another
point of resistance is the meagre amount of income they earn. On average, TFWs are paid
prevailing wages but not all workers are paid the same. High-skilled workers earn $33 an hour
while low-skilled workers in general labour earn $15 per hour; however, seasonal agricultural
workers only make an average of $10 per hour, below the minimum wage in all provinces across
Canada (HRSDC et al.). This creates a program marred by income inequality as the above-market
pay of skilled workers is used to offset the income inequality of the marginalized migrants at the
bottom. All workers must pay placement deposits to FARMS and the International Organization
for Migration (IOM) to validate their contract. For Guatemalan migrant workers, the $400 fee is
equivalent to 17 percent of their average annual income and many borrow from loan sharks to keep
up with the debt payments (Flecker). Coupled with other deductions, these workers are left with
little money to invest in the local economy nor make significant contributions to the social or
cultural spheres of their nearby towns.

In sum, TFWs do not play a large role in regional development of the Canadian economy.
While their assistance is necessary to the profitability of farm enterprises, they make a small
imprint on Canadas social fabric and retain little connection to their work geography. Only 5.5
percent of economic immigrants between 2005 and 2009 were TFWs and, with no ties to local
communities, few return to live in those communities and add to regional development in the long
run (HRSDC et al.).

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Violation of the Law

As part of the governments duty to consider shared values, no policy or program shall
violate the legal rights of all parties involved (see Figure 2). Yet by placing the administration of
the TFWP into the hands of Canadian growers and farmers, migrant workers are denied the right
to receive basic protections under the law. For example, the Alberta Ministry of Employment and
Immigration conducted inspections on all 407 workplaces that employed migrant workers and
discovered that 74 percent of the employers had violated the Employment Standards Act regarding
overtime pay and record keeping (Flecker). Not all workers were aware of the rules of wage
legislation and, even if they did, most did not undertake corrective action for fear of not being
recalled in the next year. This was the case for worker complaints against the exorbitant fees
charged by labour brokers to bring them to Canada. Every province has provincial legislation on
regulating employment agencies but most function on a complaints-based system that requires the
worker to file the complaint. In Alberta, only 277 investigations were undertaken by the
government into broker activities in 2007 (AFL). Yet, when the Alberta Federation of Labour
contracted a lawyer to extend free legal support to workers, over 1,400 complaints were logged
within the first six months of the Special Advocate Project (AFL). This demonstrates that foreign
workers are aware of their subjection to poor working conditions but lack the means to access
justice and equality.

Many provincial labour laws continue to exclude farm workers from the legislation that
protects permanent residents and Canadian citizens. Some arise from the nature of their work;
agricultural workers in Ontario, for example, are denied the freedom of association as collective
bargaining laws does not extend to their jobs. Minimum wages do not have to be paid for non-

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mechanized farm jobs, such as picking raspberries or strawberries (Carpentier and Fiset). In British
Columbia, the Employment Standards Act considers LICs as contractors rather than employees,
making it more difficult to unionize the profession. Most provinces do not recognize the domestic
arena as a workplace, denying the foreign workers the legal protection from workplace violations
(Flecker). Other exclusions arise from the unilateral way the system is designed. Recognizing the
power imbalance they wield over low-skilled workers, the Canadian government has a clause in
every MOU that denies individuals whose spouses or children do not reside in their home country
(Flecker). This would be a form of discrimination under provincial labour laws as it restricts ones
employment opportunities on factors irrelevant to their job description. The federal government
claims that it helps reinforce the temporary nature of the program as it encourages individuals to
return home (Flecker). Had the program been developed in consultation with human rights groups
or migrant workers, the clause would not likely exist as it legally separates families apart. This is
a direct violation of due process in the five-part formula to public interest as foreign workers could
not reasonably affect the regulations that apply to them.

The most damaging element of the TFWP is the systemic discrimination that migrant
workers must endure on a daily basis. The Qubec Court of Appeal defines it as a set of facts,
institutional policies, decision-making procedures, behaviours and attitudes thatmaintain
disproportionately exclusionary effects on members of groups (Gaz Mtropolitain). As the federal
government maintains oversight of the program, the TFWP is considered government action and
is required to abide by the rights protected under the Charter. In practice, however, migrant
workers rarely obtain this level of protection. Given the geographical situation of farms and their
living quarters, they are perpetually linked to their workspaces on a daily basis. They do not have

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the reasonable means to meet with other migrants and take collective action against workplace
abuse, for instance, and this violates their fundamental freedom of association under Section 2. It
jeopardizes their right to fair and reasonable conditions of employment, as well as their being, and
can affect their right to life and liberty under Section 7. In addition to the Charter, the TFWP also
violates provincial human rights legislation, such as the Ontario Human Rights Code or the Quebec
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Carpentier and Fiset). The non-legal status complicates their
determination of primary residence as well as eligibility for social services. In Quebec, this
prevents them from receiving legal aid, social assistance and may deny them the right to education
as discretion is left with individual school boards (Carpentier and Fiset). Even if they wished to
leave their employers quarters, they would be unable to access low rental housing as applicants
must be a permanent resident which they can never be who has resided in the province for
more than 12 months (Carpentier and Fiset). Their contracts are limited to a maximum of eight
months per year. Altogether, the program places them under conditions that would violate their
right to mobility, free public education as well as measures of financial assistance that the Quebec
Charter guarantees all people in the province (Carpentier and Fiset). The system is set to fail the
foreign workers by indirectly shifting them just outside the scope of federal or provincial
legislation.

Overall, TFWP is a vehicle that excludes migrant workers from the basic protection of the
law. By not providing the channels for them to access the law and imposing unlawful restrictions
on their employment, the program affects many of the human rights they deserve as persons in
Canada. Demanding that they work with a permit at all times limits their ability to shift employers
and, in turn, harms their freedom to resign or alleviate their own social conditions. This freedom

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is not codified in any level of law but, as described by Claude Fabien, it marks the difference
between slavery and the contemporary conception of work (Fabien). To truly serve the public
interest, the TFWP ought to respect the legal rights owed to all people, including migrants, as part
of its commitment to shared values and integrate their opinions in the process of sustaining the
program in the future.

Responsible Action
When it comes to the TFWP, the so-called elephant in the room is how inherently racist
it is. In 2006, 63 percent of temporary migrant workers in Canada were from low-income countries,
and 62 percent were racialized workers from non-European, global South nations (Thomas). The
program is administered in a way that encourages employers to import workers from certain racial
groups, out of characteristics that they may be more compliant, better or more hardworking than
others (Tomlinson). LICs and domestic workers, for instance, disproportionately come from the
Philippines while SAWs are mostly hired out of Mexico. Once the workers arrive, they are subject
to racist insults and, in the case of TFWs in Southwestern Ontario, communities in nearby farm
towns deliberately raised prices in response to their anger of losing key agricultural jobs (Valiani).
It exemplifies that the values of the Canadian majority, in terms of maintaining a good standard of
living, are being ignored to service the profit-driven motives of the agricultural sector.

In the first half of the twentieth century, European women who entered as domestic workers
were granted permanent residency status upon arrival and were not required to meet any
expectations. Today, some domestic workers from the Caribbean and the Philippines have yet to
be granted permanent status, despite having worked as a nanny since the 1970s (Valiani). While

14

LICs qualify for PR after 24 months or 3,900 hours on the job, their application will only be
processed with the authorization of their employers. Immigration decisions are, then, being shifted
into the hands of Canadian employers, shaping the nations policy for business interests and not
necessarily the ideal interests for Canadas future. This has begun already; in 2008, for instance,
252,235 TFWs arrived in Canada while only 242,343 individuals were granted permanent
residency status (Flecker).

Mexicos abundant supply of temporary workers arose as a result of intensive agricultural

economic liberalization under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The Mexican
government decreased its subsidization of farms and, as world prices for wheat, beans and corn
plummeted, most Mexican farms went out of business (Read et al.). Mass unemployment ensued
and, today, feeds the majority of the migrant labour supply that comes to Canada each year (Read
et al.). As a country that benefitted from NAFTA, Canada has failed to respect its partnership with
Mexican people. Even if the influx of workers is an unintended consequence of the deal, not
enough is being done to mitigate the social cost imposed on the workers. They are employed in
labour-intensive, low-paying jobs that nobody wants. To keep them from staying in Canada, they
are barred from bringing in their wives and children and are forced to accept a 48-month absence
from Canada after four years of continuous service (Immigration and Refugee Protection Act).
They contribute the same amount of EI, CPP and income tax as permanent residents or Canadians
citizens yet they will never be accepted as part of Canadas social fabric, despite their input into
the countrys economic health. Under these circumstances, the migrants absorb the costs of the
program while Canadians, and Canadian employers, reap the benefits of cheap, disposable labour.

15

The federal government has failed to balance the specific interests of key stakeholders, as
prescribed by the third element of the public interest formula.

Conclusion
Canadas Temporary Foreign Worker Program and its subdivisions only service the ends
of a small minority of labour-intensive businesses in Canada. By privatizing the administration of
the program from the federal government, employers have turned the program for their best
interests rather than the best interests of the Canadian public. The TFWP, in the current form, does
not adequately meet any of the five elements in ensuring the program acts in the public interest. In
designing this program, very little consultation was made with unions, public interest groups and
foreign workers to identify how the program could balance the needs of businesses and the rights
of individuals. The program is not neutral anymore instead pro-business as it wilfully ignores
the consequences it has imposed on the migrants. The strong majority view of Canadians is that
the program should never replace the domestic labour market. Yet, as exposed by the CBC in 2013,
large corporations are shortchanging hardworking Canadians in favour of employing lower-cost
answers to their problems. Most importantly, the TFWP takes away the basic protections that
workers deserve in Canada. It disrupts the image of Canada as a beacon of light in the human rights
on the global stage as migrants continue to be racially abused, mistreated or denied access to their
rights as a result of the rules and regulations imposed by the program. They bear the greatest burden
of this program as insufficient oversight and responsibility is exercised on, and by, the employers.
Canada must do a better job in protecting them to protect the national interest.

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The full-text release of the Trans-Pacific Partnership on 5 November 2015 contained

numerous changes for the TFWP going forward. As aforementioned, the Canadian government is
prohibited from imposing or maintaining any numerical restriction related to temporary entry of
skilled tradespeople. This harms the public interest; as Gill McGowan, president of the Alberta
Federation of Labour said, it will allow an unlimited number of temporary foreign workers in
certain broad occupational categorieswhile bypassing all measures to protect Canadian jobs
(Curry). The definition of skilled trades is not exactly clear; however, it does include electrical
trades and other construction trades which may encompass any number of possible professions.
It may end up, yet again, as another case where the onus is on the individual employer to
demonstrate that their foreign hires do work or craft that requires skill. Another section of the
trade pact eliminates the requirement of labour certification for Professionals and Technicians.
Currently, regulatory bodies such as the Ontario College of Trades must assess or train foreign or
out-of-province tradesmen that wish to work in the province, cumulating in an examination
(Curry). Without this standard, a greater risk of public safety emerges as tomorrows technicians
may not have the necessary degree of skill required to do their jobs properly for Canadians,
resulting in bad work or shoddy installations of equipment. The combined impact of these changes
will make it easier for foreign workers to enter the domestic labour market and, with lower
qualifications, intensify wage pressures on domestic jobs. Above all, it will magnify the current
loopholes in the program as more people will experience the challenge of being a second-tier
person in a first-world country.

Recommendations
This paper proposes three recommendations to shape the program to better meet the public interest:

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1. Oversee the program through one government agency. This is similar to the creation of
a Bureau of Immigration and Market Research proposed under the Border Security,
Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act of 2013 being debated in the
United States currently. One level of government ideally at the federal level will
monitor all foreign workers and establish uniform standards for the program across Canada.
Part of the current problem in the TFWP is the distribution of responsibilities across all
three levels of government. Each level takes on their part as prescribed by Section 91 and
92 (Division of Powers) of the Constitution, but none take responsibility for the systemic
problems of the program. For instance, the federal government ensures that workers
residences meet certain building and health codes when negotiating MOUs with other
governments; however, building inspections are done by municipal authorities and the
standards upheld vary greatly from one region to the next (Stastna). Workers are then left
with poor living quarters that aggravate their pre-existing frustrations with their employers.
Another instance happens at the crossroads of provincial-federal jurisdiction. In terms of
workplace safety, migrant workers in Ontario are covered by the Occupational Health and
Safety Act but are not protected in provinces such as Alberta (Stastna). The right to
unionization, furthermore, is guaranteed for workers in British Columbia and Quebec but
prohibited in Ontario (Stastna). The variation of conditions across the program can be
eliminated if all responsibilities are centralized by one federal agency. This agency can
take over all monitoring and standards to ensure that Canadas promises in international
agreements can, and are, upheld in practice.

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2. Issue sector-based work permits. This idea was proposed by Marie Carpentier and Carole
Fiset as part of the Human Rights and Youth Commission of Quebecs investigation on
systemic discrimination in the provinces foreign worker program. Under the current
program, workers stand to lose their housing, insurance and right to work in Canada as
their work permits extend to one employer in one location. Inevitably, it succumbs them to
dirty and deplorable working conditions as they have no other places to go. Creating work
permits that enable them to migrate across the province gives them mobility rights as they
can explore the market for other employers, and prompt the government to scrutinize
employers with high turnover rates.
3. Guide the Interprovincial Standards Red Seal Program. To address (a) the concerns of
Canadians that they are losing their jobs to foreigners; and (b) the threat of foreign workers
in skilled trades under the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, the federal government
should take a stronger role in promoting the Red Seal program. Since 1959, an apprentice
approved by the Red Seal is able and qualified to work in all of Canadas 13 provinces and
territories without further examination. It facilitates movement of skilled trades between
regions of uneven development as tradespeople can easily move between provinces to
appease demand for their skills. In recent years, however, the federal government has
gradually shifted the task of labour force development downwards to the provinces,
weakening the Program over time (Valiani). Taking the leadership role in this initiative
once more would make it more difficult for employers to look abroad by making the
domestic workforce more competitive for open positions. This would also address the
public opinion that foreigners are stealing Canadian jobs from the hands of Canadians, and
helping the TFWP claim a stronger position as a program of public interest.

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Works Cited
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