Quick Decisive Victory:

The Search For The Holy Grail

A Monograph

by

Major Marc I. Alderman

Infantry

School of Advanced Military Studies

United States A~~ Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

C\

Second Term AY 92-93

Approved for Publlc Release; Dhtrtbullon Is Unllmlled

file:///R|/12CARL1M/sams93_mp/alderman/citation.txt

AD Number: ADA274047
Subject Categories: MILITARY OPERATIONS, STRATEGY AND TACTICS
Corporate Author: ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS
SCHOOL
OF ADVANCED MIL ITARY STUDIES
Title: Quick Decisive Victory: The Search for the Holy Grail.
Descriptive Note: Monograph,
Personal Authors: Alderman, Marc I.
Report Date: 15 MAY 93
Pages: 56 PAGES
Monitor Acronym: XA
Monitor Series: USACGSC/SAMS
Descriptors: *MILITARY DOCTRINE, *MILITARY STRATEGY, *DECISION MAKING,
ANALYSTS,
BENEFITS, COLD WAR, DOCUMENTS, ENVIRONMENTS, FRANCE, GLOBAL, MODEMS,
POWER,
RISK, VIABILITY, MILITARY FORCE LEVELS, COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS, SHORT RANGE
(TIME).
Identifiers: Decisive victory, Decisive force, *Quick decisive victory.
Abstract: The monograph evaluates the viability of quick decisive victory as a
principle of U.S. military strategy. Modern concepts of quick decisive victory
form the cornerstone of present U.S. military strategy. These concepts
originated from the Weinberger Doctrine, but the principle of decisive force in
the 1992 National Military Strategy Document, now establishes the framework for
quick decisive victory. Today the U.S. military is using quick decisive victory
to provide a clear focus while moving from a grand strategy based on a Cold War
global context to a grand strategy based on a Post-Cold War regional context.
Although the idea of quick decisive victory has strong support within the
military services some political-military analysts claim ;it too narrowly
defines-the limits of U.S. military power in a monopolar strategic environment.
Therefore, this monograph examines the suitability of quick decisive victory as
a defining element of U.S. military strategy. To accomplish this examination,
the monograph first conducts a historical analysis of two decisive victories:
the Ulm-Austerlitz campaign of 1805; and the 1940 campaign for France. This
analysis identifies the strategic and operational conditions supporting quick
decisive victory. Secondly, the monograph assesses the present strategic
environment and compares present conditions with the historical analysis.
file:///R|/12CARL1M/sams93_mp/alderman/citation.txt (1 of 2)6/28/2004 8:44:45 AM

file:///R|/12CARL1M/sams93_mp/alderman/citation.txt

Finally, the monograph evaluates the comparative assessment to determine

possible benefits and risks for codifying quick decisive victory in U.S.
military strategy.
Limitation Code: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
Source Code: 416090

file:///R|/12CARL1M/sams93_mp/alderman/citation.txt (2 of 2)6/28/2004 8:44:45 AM

ABSTRACT

The monograph evaluates the viability of quick decisive victory as a

principie of U.S. military strategy. Modem concepts of quick decisive
victory form the cornerstone of present U.S. military strategy. These
concepts originated from the 'Weinberger Doctrine, but the principle of
decisive force in the 1992 National Miliiry Strategy Document, now
establishes the framework for quick decisive victory. Today the U.S.
military is using quick decisive victory to provide a clear focus while
moving from a grand strategy based on a Cold War global context to a
grand strategy based on a Post-Cold War regional context. Although the
idea of quick decisive victory has strong support withir: the military services
some political-military analvsrs claim it too narrowly definesthe limits of
U S . military power in a mono-polar strategic environment. Therefore. :his
t~lonographexamines the suitability of quick decisive victory as a defining
element of US. military strategy.
To accomplish this examination, the monograph first conducts a
historical analysis of two decisive victories: the Ulm-Austerlitz campaign of
1805: and the 1940 camoaian for France. This analvsis identifies Me
strategic and operatiOnai conditions supporting quick decisive victory.
Secondly, the monograph assesses the oresent strategic environment ana
compares present conditions with the historical analysis. Finally. the
monograph evaluates the comparative assessment to determine possible
benefits and risks for codifying quick decisive victory in U.S. military
strategy.
The monograph concludes that the concepts of quick decisive
victory should remain part of U.S. military strategy. However. U.S. military
strategy must also integrate ideas for employment of limited military force
in operations other than war. and for employment of military force during
protracted conflicts. Incorporatingthese concepts will produce a balanced
and viable military strategy.

1.

Page
introduction ................................... 1

II.

Strategy Process

Ill.

Historical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

iV.

Present Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

V.

Comparative Anaiysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40

VI .

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Endnotes

..............................

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51

iNTRODUCTlQN

After defeating the rogue barons and uniting all of Britain, King Arthur and
his Knights of the Round Table faced an uncertain future. Peace was at hand.
but it was an uneasy peace. The direct conflict against the rebellious barons had
given way to a subtle struggle for power within King Atthuf's court. The
chivalrous Knights of Cametot were ill prepared to confront this indirect
subterfuge. As a result, King Arthur searched for a means to provide direction
and continurty for his military organization. Arthur decided that a great quest
would insure that his Knights kept their fighting spirit and commitment to their
code of chivalry. He decided his knights would seek the Holy Grail. The search
for the Holy Grail was undeniably a great and noble quest. Although noble in
intent, the quest for the Grail became an obsession. It took Arthur's Knights on a
perilous journey away from their King and leaving Camelot undefended.
Originally intended to give the knights of Camelot a clear purpose during a time of
peace. the quest for the unattainable ideal led instead to their destruction.
Today, the U.S. military is also in a period of transition. The United States

witnessed the destruction of the "evil Soviet Empire" and so the U.S. military
searches for a new purpose. Now. the clarion call for the U.S. military is quick
decisive victory. Like Arthuts quest for the Holy Grail, the U.S. military seems
grasping at quick decisive victory as a means to provide clear direction during a
period of transition. Quick decisive victory like the quest for the Grail is
undeniably a noble endeavor. Soldiers from the beginning of recorded history
have sought quick decisive victories but. like the search for the Holy Grail, it has

been an illusive goal.

Modem concepts of quick decisive victory originated from the Weinberger
Doctrine. During the Reagan Administration, this doctrine became the
cornerstone of U.S. military strategy. The four major tenets of the doctrine
articulated by Casper Weinberger ( Secretaty of Defense from 1980 until 1987)
are:
snly use military force to secure vital national interests
-establish clear and obtainable military objectives
-use ovewnelming force
-ensure the operation has public support
Although the 'Neinberger Doctrine helped to shape the intervention ~f U.S.
military in Grenaaa. Panama, and South West Asia, the strategic environment

,,

. .~.
I.

has since radically changed. The end of the cold war reduced the threat of super

k:
j.:

1..

power confrontation, giving the U.S. greater strategic latitude and allows the U.S.

i,..-,
L.;

.
:,:,.
~

to use military force more freely. This was reflected by President George Bush's

,,, -.. :~
,.:I

comments during a speech at the U.S. Military Academy where he stated that

,'

military power could be used to secure "important" rather than only vital interests.
There IS also a perception within the military that the extremely low casualty rates
experienced dunng the most recent operations have influenced the expectations
of the American people. The changes n the strategic environment forced the
idea of quick decisive victory to evolve, yet it remains a fowl point of US. military
1

strategy.:
The 1992 National Military Strategy Document mantfests rhese chanqes to
quick decisive victory within the principle of decisive force. This key document

descnbes the principle of decisive force in the following manner:

Once a decision for military action has been made, half measures
and confused objectives extract a severe price in the form of
protracted conflict which causes needless waste of human lives
material resources. a divided nation at home and defeat.
Therefore, one of the essential elements of our national military
strategy is the ability to rapidly assemble the forces we need to
win-the concept of applying decisive force to overwhelm our
adversaries and thereby terminate conflicts swiftly with minimum
loss of life.2
The principle of decisive force, therefore, redefines quick decisive victory with the
following conditions:
Glear and attainable m~litaryobjectives
-overwhelming force (achieved through rapid power projection)
-swift conflict termination
-minimum loss of life
Although the idea of quick decisive victory has strong support within the
military services, some political analysts are extremely critical. Edward Luttwak
claims mat the model too narrowly defines the limit of military power in a
monopolar strategic environment. Other critics. such as retired Admiral B.R.
Inman, question the ability of a post-industrial U.S. to maintain the technoiogical
edge to ensure quick. decisive, vict0ry.j The purpose o i this monograph is to
explore this question: Should quick decisive victory be a principle of U.S. military
strategy? Or is the U.S. military on a quest for the Holy Grail?
This monograph explores this question by conducting a historical analvsis
of several quick decisive victories. The purpose of the analysis is to identii the
conditions that allow these victories to be quick and'decisive. Secondly. the
monograph assesses the present conditions and compares them with the results
from the historical analysis.
To conduct the analvsis, a definition of quick decisive victory is also

necessary.

Developmg a clear and concise definition of quick decisive vctory is

diicult Neither the National Security Strategy Document, the National Military
Strategy Document. nor any military service doctrines attempt to specifically
define the terms "quicknand "decisive." For the purposes of this monograph.
Operation Desert Stom ( the Offensive Campaign of the Gulf War) provides the
model for such victory.
Operation Desert Storm began in October 1990 when U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) initiated the offensive operational campaign planning4.
This planning process produced Operat~onOesert Storm. Desert Storm
concluded six months later after achieving all operational objectives and suffering
less than 700 allied casualties( compared to over 100,000 Iraqi casualtiesf.
Therefore, the model for quick decisive victory is:
a. quick: a campaign executed within six months
b. decisive: the campaign achieved the operational objectives
c. minimum causalities ( when compared to enemy loses)
This model establishes the template for selecting the historical examples and the

strategy process will provide the method for analyzing each example.

To conduct a consistent historical analysis, a standard analytical

framework is necessary. In this monograph, the strategy process forms the basis
of the historical analysis. This process is the foundation of national security and
has rive sequential elements: identifying national objectives, formulating grand
strategy, developing military strategy, orchestrating operational strategy, and

executina battlefield strategy (or tactics). a

IdenMying national objectives is the first and crucial step in the strategy
process.

National objectives drive the strategy process. They form the hub

around which the remaining elements revolve. There are two types of national
objectives: internal and external. External objectives come from a nation's global
posture. Internal objectives come from a nation's political and economic
Level or intensity of interest establishes a priority among the national
objectives. Donald Nuechtertein, in his book, -Over

'**

explains

these different levels of interest. Nuechterlein states a nation's willingness to

expend resources to secure an objective comes from the intensity of interest
associated with the objective. Nuechterlein identifies four levels of intensity of
interest: survival, vital, major, and peripheral.ll
Objectives with the highest levels of intensity are those involving national
survival. A national objective, such as U.S. strategic nuclear deterrence.
guarantees the physical existence of the nation. As a matter of survival, the US.
was willing to expend virtually unlimited quantities of resources to secure
strategic nuclear deterrence. The immense national resources expended to
develop the nuclear Mad (land based missiles, submarine launched missiles, and
bombers) reflect the intensity of interest the U.S. has in securing this objective.
With the end of the Cold War, the threat of nuclear destruction has diminished
yet deterring nuclear attack remains the U.S. most important national objective.
Not directly related to national survival, vital interests are critical national
objectives. Vital interests are national objectives involving the risk of serious

harm.

TWOdistinctive traits identify vital national interests: (1) the

unwillingness to compromise, whatever the circumstance, and (2) the willingness

to use military force if necessary to protect or secure the objective.13 President
Jimmy Carter identified the unrestricted flow of oil from the Persian Gulf as a v~tal
interest of the U.S.14. An interruption of the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf would
seriously disrupt the U.S. economy and the economies of its major trading
pamers. The effort expended by the U.S. during the Persian Gulf War proved
the intensity of U.S. interest in this region. Major interests are less intense but
effect political, social, or economic well betng for the nation. Peripheral interests
are least important because they do not affect the nation as a whole.15 The
remainder of the strategy process orchestrates the ways and means to protect
and secure national objectives.
National objectives are the points of focus or targets for all subsequent
elements of the pmcess.16 The clearer the target, the easier it is to hit. Likewise.
the more clearly defined the national objectives, the more coherent the strategy
because it will be easier to relate the means to the ends. This is the purpose of
grand strategy to relate the ends (national objectives) to the ways(methods) and
means(resources) at the national level.
Grand strategy creates the ways and means for attaining or maintaining
national objectives. To accomplish this. grand strategy must develop and
integrate the elements of national power. It also must balance the nations
commitments with the nation's power and resources. Generally, state policies
and doctrines articulate this element of strategy. These policies reflect the level

of national interest and establish the parameters for the application of national
power (political. economic, mPtary. and geographic) with respect to national
objectives. Grand strategy integrates me efforts of the highest levels of
government (diplomatic, economic and military institutions). In relation to these
institutions. it also describes the forms and use of military power. As a result.
grand strategy outlines the context and conditions for using military forces which
in turn establishes the basis for the development of military strategy."
Military strategy coordinates the development, deployment, and
employment of military forces to secure national objectives. The force
development aspects of military strategy focus on force structure, weapon
systems. training, and sustainment. Ideas of force deployment define the
national requirements and capabilities to project military power. The probable
region.andthreat define the methods of employment. However, the critical task
for military strategy. is to coordinate and integrate each subordinate element.18
Establishing broad ideas of force development, deployment, and employment. for
the roles and missions assigned within the grand strategy balances military ends,
ways. and means. This is the essence of military strategy.
Operational strategy provides a narrower focus for the employment of
military forces. It is the art and science of designing, organizing, and conducting
campaigns and major operations to secure strategic objectives.lWperationai
Strategy is the critical link between national objectives and the military forces in
battle. The concepts of operational design forge this link by creating the structure
far conducting campaigns. The essential elements of operational design are:

centers of gravity, lines of operation. decisive points, and culminati~n.~

These
concepts form the threads of continuity belween the military ways and means,
and the appmpriate political ends. They establish the threads of continuity by
tying the abstract political ends to physical military objectives. Tracing the
operational concepts will therefore, identify operational conditions leading to
quick, decisive victories; however, further explanation is necessary to use them
as a standard for analysis.
Clausewit2 defined center of gravity as "the hub of all power." The source
where the enemy and friendly force draws its respective physical strength.
flexibility, or will to fight. Theoretically. centers of gravity exist at each level of war
(strategic, operational, and tactical). At the operational level, centers of gravity
have a physical nature. A national capitol, command and control systems, the
army, an alliance system, or lines of communication are some examples of
opposing centers of gravity. 2' An effective operational strategy will integrate and
,focus all campaign activities against the enemy's center of gravity while
simultaneously protecting ones own. Therefore, the relative effectiveness of an
operational strategy may largely depend on proper identification of both friendly
and enemy centers of gravity. Lines of operation are the paths that eventually
lead to centers of gravity.
Lines of operation are another important idea of operational design. Lines

of operation ". . define the directional orientation of the force.

"The directional

orientation has three dimensions: in time. space, and in relation to the enemy."
They emanate from the baseof operations thmugh the force to its objectives.

There are two basic schemes for lines of operation. interior and exrerior lines.
Operational strategy employs interior lines when the lines of operation radiate
from a single base of operation but are often divergent. Interior lines facilitate
moving forces laterally within a theater of operation faster than the enemy. This
method supports the rapid shifting of effort and therefore, is advantageous for
smaller or weaker forces. Exterior lines emanate from multiple bases of
operation and converge on the enemy or a single objective. Although exterior
lines require larger forces, they generally promote battles of annihilation. Lines of
operation are the conduits through which operational strategy transmits and
directs the destructive power of tactical elements and supporting operations.
Lines of operation often focus toward decisive points.
Decisive points are physical objectives that provide significant leverage
against the enemy and define the course of a campaign. "They are usually
geographic in nature, such as a hill, a town, or a base of operations but could
also include other physical elements such as command posts, a critical boundary,
airspace, or a communication node."= Decisive points are the pressure points
exposing the enemy center of gravlty to.attack by increasing friendly operational
flexibility. Like a catapult, decisive points enhance and accelerate the projection
of combat power against the enemy.
Combat is a destructive process which erodes the physical and moral
strength of an army. The process of erosion drives an army to the point where it
can no longer attack or defend. Therefore, relative combat power between an
attacker and defender creates the basis for the concept of culmination. An

attacking force has culminated when its combat power no longer exceeds the
defending force. At this point the attacking force is vulnerable to counterattack
and risks destruction if it presses the attack. A defending force has culminated if,
it can no longer counterattack or continue to conduct a credible defense.24

Controlling and adjusting the operational tempo to balance logistical demands

with the conduct of combat opeations is essential to prevent culmination. An
effective operational strategy must consider the finite resources available for the
campaign and the rate of supply. This is necessary for proper resource allocation
which helps drive the enemy force to culmination while preventing one's own.
These operational concepts establish the framework for conducting the
campaign and give substance to the operational strategy. They (within the
strucnim of the campaign) define where and when to fight and set conditions for
battle. Battles create the conditions for the next level of the strategy process.
battlefield strategy. Bafflefield strategy or tactics is the art and science of winning
battles. "Battles consist of a series of related engagements." Engagements are
short fights between small forces (division or smaller). Battles are larger in
scope; they are of longer duration and en&mpass larger forces. The outcomes
decide the course of campaigns and ultimately decide the success or failure of
the operational strategy. Effective tactics integrate and synchronize maneuver
firepower, protection. and leadership to secure v i ~ t o r y .Tactics
~
direct the
employment of forces on the battlefield. while grand. military, and operational
strategies have chosen the battlefield and allocated forces for the fight.
The strategy process establishes an outline for analyzing the historikl

and contemporary strategic environments and assessing the conditions at each

ievel supporting quick decisive victory. The outline is as follows:
A. Identify and evaluate national objectives.
B. Define the grand strategy and evaluate its effectiveness in providing
the appropriate ways, and means to achieve the national objectives.
C. Determine if the NMS developed, deployed, and employed an
appmpriate military force structure.
D. Assess the effectiveness of the Operational Strategy through campaign
design.
E. Evaluatetactics employed based on allocated resources and force
structure.
This standard method of assessment provides a consistent comparison of the
historical examples and the contemporary strategic environment.

This section of the monograph examines two historical examples of quick

decisive victory and uses the strategy process to identify conditions which made
this form of warfare possible. The two historical examples selected for analyses
are: Napoleon's victory at Ulm-Austeriitz; and Germany's victory in France in
1940. They are amoung the great military victories of modem history. Each of

these examples fits the monograph's definition of quick decisive victory. They
were quick

- a single campaign completed within six months.

Each was decisive

- the campaign achieved all operational objectives. All were cheap in terms of
human lives - the victors took significantly fewer casualties, then their opponents.
Therefore, these are appmpriate examples of quickdecisive victory and suitable
for analysis.
Ulm-Austenitz is a definitive example of quick decisive victory. In one
hundred days. Napoleon's Grand Armee' marched from the English Channel to

heart of eastern Europe. In its wake. the Grande Arrnee' left the fragments of the
Austrian-Russian armies and the desiccated corpse of the Third Coalition. The
events mat resulted in the battles of Ulm-Austerlitz began in the summer of
180!Las
During that Summer, the Grande Ann.&

camped along the English

Channel preparing to invade England. Napoleon Bonaparte became Emperor of

France. He also and pronounced himself King of ltaly and assimilated Genoa
into the French Empire.27These actions regarding ltaly were contrary to the
terms of the Treaty of Luneville and threatened the Ausman Emperor's
aspirations to reestablish dominion over ltaly and southern Bavaria." As a result.
Great Britain seized this opportunity to forge a coalition between Great Britain.
Austria-Hungry, and Russia. This was the third coalition formed to oppose
Napoleon. England, was unable to compete on the continent at this time with
ground forces. but guaranteed financial support to Russia and Austria-Hungry.2g
The conflict began when the Austrian Army split into two major commanas.
One under Arch Duke Charles composed of approximately 96,000troops and
another under Arch Duke Ferdinand composed of approximately 44.000troops."
In early September. Charles' army moved south across the Alps to seize Milan
and restore the prestige of Austria; Ferdinand's army moved into Bavaria.
Alexander. the Tsar of Russia mobilized an army of approximately 75.000and
marched to linkup with Fenlinand in Ba~aria.~'The Austrians and Russians
expected Napoleon to reinforce ltaly (as he did in previous campaign) exposing
the flanks of his army to the combined Austrian and Russian armies.

In August 1805. Napoleon began to deploy the Grande &m&e from the
Channel coast to the Rhine River. Karl Mack was Ferdinand's chief of staff and
the *de facto* commander of the Austrian army in Bavaria. Mack was energetic
and experienced but failed to comprehend the power and speed of the French
army. Mack did not believe Napoleon could cross the Rhine with more than
70,000 men. As a result, Mack moved into Bavaria on 2 September.P

On 17 September Napoleon issued orders to his marshals to move the

Grande Anne'e across the Rhine and march to the Danube. Napoleon

outlined his concept of operat~onin his initial directive to his corps commanders.
The Grande Armdein September I805

Marshal Jean-Baptist Bernadette

Marshal A.F.L.V. Marmont
Marshal L.N. Davout
Marshal Nicolas J. Soult
v
Marshal Jean Lannes
VI
Marshal Michel Ney
VII
Marshal P.F.C.Augereau
CAV Marshal Joachim Murat
Guard Marshal J.B. Bessieres
Reserve Artillery General E.A.C. Dommartin
Reserve Corps
Wurttemberaers.
. (Bavarians.
.
.
BTotal
I
I1
111
IV

17,737
20,758
17,452
41.358
17,788
24,409
14.850
23,415
6,278
5.000
76 QQQ

225,045

He framed his intent for his commanders by providing corps mutes of march and
objectives. Davout. Soult, Ney. and Lannes were to marcn through Baden.
Wurtemburg, and Bavaria. Davout was to move his corps to Nora Lingen by 10
October. Soult to Aalen by 9 Octooer, Lannes to Ulm by 9 October, and Ney to
the high ground overlooking Ulm by 7 October. Bernadette and Marimont to
depart Wurzberg and get within a days march of Donauaworth by 9 October.

Mutat was to move acmss the Rhine and conduct a series of demonstrations in
the Black Forest to focus me attention of the Austrians to the east. 33
By the 19 September, lead elements of the Austrian army enter Ulm (on
the Danube) and Minmengen along the Mu. This placed the Austrian army in
excellent positions to defend against an aftack from the east through the Black
Forest but exposed the army's northernflank Yet Mack ignored this threat
fixating on Murat's demonstration and ordered fortifications built to defend against
an attack from the east.
The G r a n d e Arme'e cmssed the Rhine North of Ulm with 200.000
soldiers on 26 September. Beween 30 September and 9 October the French
vice continued to tighten around the Austrian army: but. Mack could not tear his
attention from the wily Murat and by 9 October 150,000 French soldiers were
astride the Austrian lines of communication. The Austrians made several
attempts to breakout and avoid capture but on 19 October Mack surrendered his
army to the inevitable. Napoleon wmte to Josephine. "I have achieved my
objective; I have destroyed the Austrian Army by sheer marching." "4
For the next five days. Napoleon worked feverishly to refit the G r a n d e
Armge. He Was preparing to fight the Russian Army that had been marching to

link up with the Austrians at Ulm. The G r a n d e Annee moved against the
Russian army on 26 October 1805. Tsar Alexander nominally commanded the
Russian army, but Kutusov. Alexander's Chief of Staff. was truly in charge.
Kutusov was more cunning then Mack and refused decisive engagement. He
instead fought a series of delaying actions west acmss the tributaries of the

Danube. Through a combination of Kutusov's skillful maneuvers and good

fortune the Russran army slipped from Napoleon's grasp east of Vienna.

35

By the

end of November, the weather was bad, the French soldiers were growing weary,
and the Prussian and southern Austrian army was threatening the flanks of
G r a n d e Armde. Napoleon needed to destroy the Russian army quickly

before sending the French Amy to winter quarters.

To accomplish this, Napoleon developed a brilliant deception to draw the
Russians into a decisive battle. The battlefield he chose was the Praetzen plain
between Brunn and Austerlilz. Through an elaborate deception, Napoleon
convinced the Tsar Alexander that the G r a n d e A r m d e Was ripe for conquest.

As a result, Alexander, against the strong protests of Kutusov. ordered the

Russians to attack the French on the Praetzen plain.where Napoleon laid in wait.
In the resulting battle, Napoleon annihilated the Russian army. 37
Using the strategy process to analyze this conflict, the conditions that
su~portedquick decisive victory at Ulm-Austerlitz become apparent. Napoleon's
(and hence France's) national objectives were clear and vital, accelerating the
military response. The Emperofs grand strategy established policies which
provided for the coordination of political, economic. and military power. France's
national military strategy provided the means. the best army in all Europe.
Through an unsurpassed ability for integrating and applying military ways and
means to achieve national oojectives. Napoleon's operational strategy formea the
foundation for victory. Finaily, the G r a n d e Arm&e possessed the tactical
skills to take advantage of the opportunities provided by Napoleon's operational

strategy and won on the bafflefield.

When the Third Coalition moved armies into Italy and Bavaria, it
threatened the tenitory and soveregnty of France. The threat to France's
physical existence (at least as an Empire).was a clear and present danger to
Napoleon and defined his national strategic objective: the destruction of the Third
Coalition.

So. it was easy for Napoleon to temporarily abandon his plans to

invade England and focus his military and political power to destroy the alliance
between Austria and Russia. Destroying the Third Coalition also supported
Napoleon's ultimate objective of French domination of Continental Europe. z
Napoleon's grand strategy balanced on two pillars of French policy. The

first was Po secure a defensible eastern border for the French Empire and the
second was to eliminate ail threats to French Continental hegemony. The
Ulrn-Austerlitz campaign supported both these objectives. In accordance with his
grand strategy, Napoleon strove to politically isolate the Third Coalition from the
other Continental powers (specifically Prussia and Bavaria) and then destroy it.
He moved rapidly in both directions. Napoleon sent emissaries to secure
Prussian neutrality by providing assurances of Napoleon's respect for Prussian
sovereignty and offering the state Hanover to sweeten the bargain.

These

political actions successfully neutralized Prussia and negated Prussian previous

commitments to support Austria by blocking French troop movements through
Prussia. Simultaneously. Napoieon secured the support of the Prince of Bavana
which resulted in the Bavarian and French armies linking-up in Wuaberg. 4' He
then began the deployment of the Grande Arme'e from the English Channel to

the Rhme River.

The G r a n d e A r m d e was the fullest expression of France's nat~onal
mllitary strategy. Initially organized to fulfill and protect the dream of the French
Revolution, the G r a n d e a g e became the means to achieve continental
hegemony. Inspired by unbridled nationalism France instituted national
conscription allowing the development of an army of over 400.000 by 1805.42
Napoleon's army inherited a corps organuational structure which became
the standard for European m~litarysystems. The corps organizational structure
gave the G r a n d e A r m d e unmatched flexib~lityand reacn. The corps structure
simplified the rapid deployment of 200,000 French soldiers from the Atlantic coast
across the Rhine prqecting an overwhelming force agamst the Austrians. 43 It
also provided an effective means of employment Corps organizations allowed
the Napoleon and his Marshals greater flexibility n shaptng the battlefield
because French corps could move and fight independently. Although Napoleon
attempted to create a French navy to contest British dominion of the seas, the
G r a n d e A m d e Was the definitive element of Napoleon's national m~litary

strategy.
The political isolation of the Third Coalition from Prussia and Bavaria and
the deployment of the G r a n d e Anae'e prov~dedthe resources for Napoleon to
fashion his operational strategy. Destroy~ng
the Third Coalition was the nat~onai
objective. To eliminate this alliance. Napoleon aecided to destroy Ferdinand's
and Alexander's armies. The destruction of these armies would expose Vienna
to French occupation and force Austria to make a separate peace and thus break

Me C ~ a l i t i o n .As
~ a result. Ferd~nand
and Alexanaefs armtes were the
operational objectives and operational centers of grav~ty.Napoleon designed his
campaign with the operational objective destroying the northem Austnan and
Russian armies. 45
Initially operating on exterior lines. the Grande Amge converged on
the decisive point- Ulm. Fixing the Austrians in place through Murat's
demonstrations. Napoleon executed an operational envelopment of the Austrian
army cutting its lines of communication. 46 This simultaneously gave Napoleon
central position with respect to the Austrian and approaching Russtan army and
therefore setting the in~tialconditions for the next battle wtth the Russtans.
Totally cut off. Mack surrendered the Austrian army at Ulm. The quick vtctory
over the Austrians resulted in few casualties and gave the Grande Arm&e an
opportunity to refit and rearm. This operational pause staved off culmination.
Napoleon then turned on the Russians, but they slipped away north of Vienna.
Bad weather reduced available supplies and increased the difficulty of
conducting offensive operations. Napoleon had to quickly fight a decisive oattle
with the Russian army. He tdentfied the next decis~vepoint, the Praetzen Plain
and lured the Russian army there to destroy it. 47
A brilliant deception drew the Russian army to the Praetzen badlefieid east
of Austeriitz. Napoleon chose this terrain because it was shaped like a funnel,

with the Olmutr Road (in the north) at the top of the funnel, a flat plateau necked
down from north to south by the Goldbach Brook on the west, and a senes of
large ponds on the south east. The town of Praetzen was almost dead center in

the funnel. Napoieon's initial dispositions exposed his southern flank (the spout
of the funnel) to the Russians. Kutusov identified this vulnerability and took the
bait. At 0630 on 2 December Kutusov moved almost half his army against the
French southern flank. down the spout of the funnel. The Russians (with 34,000
troops) marched right into Napoleon's trap. Before the Russians could exploit the
exposed flank. Napoleon moved Davours Corps (12,000 troops) into strong
defensive positions along Goldbach Brook, effectively putting a stopper in the
spout of the funnel. For several hours the Russians hurled themselves against
Davout's Corps. The Russians inflicted heavy losses on Davout's corps but. the
French held their positions. At approximately 0900, Napoleon launched his
counterattack with Soult's Corps augmented with another division. Soult (with
19.000 troops) attacked through the town of Praetzen (middle of the funnel)

hitting most of the Russian army ( over 50,000 troops) in the flank and rear. The
Russian army shattered and attempted to retreat across the frozen Satschan
Pond. French artillery fired on the ice causing the ice to break under the feet of
the fleeing Russian soldiers. Effective tactical employment of the Grande
Armeie at Austerlb destroyed the Russian army and sealed the fate of the

Third Coalition.
Austeriitz was an excellent example of the use of tactical envelopment.
Tactical envelopment Was the hallmark of the G r a n d e A n n d e . The G r a n d e
A r m d e was adept at attaining a positional advantage through maneuver.

Usually. the French would use a corps to fix the enemy, then maneuver one or
two other corps against the enemy's flanks and rear. These tactics facilitated

battles of destruction but required good reconnaissance to find the enemy flanks
and greater mobility to exploit the advantage. At Austerliiz. however. Napoleon
demonstrated the ability to create an exposed enemy flank through tactical
deception.

After analyzing Napoleon's strategy process. the conditions that shaped

Napoleon's success become visible. The Third Coalition threatened the physical
existence of the French Empire making priorifization of effort and allocation of
resources easy. The centralization of politicai and military power in the Emperor
eased the redirection and integration of France's grand strategy. As a resuit.
Napoleon quickly identified a clear strategic objective. the destruction of the Third
Coalition. He then integrated the application of diplomacy and military power to
isolate and crush the Coalition. Napoleon was fortunate to inherit the national
military strategy that produced the G r a n d e A m d e . Universal conscription
and the carps structure allowed the development, deployment, and employment
of the best army in Europe. The G r a n d e A r m d e let Napoleon strategically
project military power throughout central Europe and concurrently provided
superior operational and tactiil flexibility.
Napoleon's operational and tactical strategies at Ulm-Austerliiz were near
flawless. He ~ t h l e s ~focused
ly
on the destruction of the Austrian and Russian
armies and used both operational and tactical deceptions to achieve surprise.
The Emperor created an operational design that was strong yet flexible. He used
exterior lines to concentrate combat power near Ulm to destroy the Austrian
army. This concentration simuitaneouslv provided the the G r a n d e A m 4 e a

central position with respect to the Russian Army. This gave Napoleon the
flexibility of interior lines with respect to the approaching Russian army. When
the Russians were denying Napoleon a climatic battle, he created a decisive poinr
and lured the Russian army there through an operational deception. Once the
battle began. Napoleon used a tactical deception to position the Russian army for
annihilation.
One hundred and thirty-five years later, in the spring of 1940, the German
Army forged a quick decisive victory of monumental proportions. In just six
weeks, the German Army destroyed the combined Allied armies and with them
the French-British Alliance. At 0535 on 10 May. the German Army again crossed
the borders of Belgium and Holland to conquer France. Within ten days German
tanks reached the Channel Coast at Noyelles (at the mouth of the Sornme). The
German army's "sichelschnitt" (or sickle cut) enveloped the best of the Allied
ground forces. the entire British Expeditionary Force and two French Armies (1st
and 9th). This forced the evacuation of over 450,000 British and French troops
from the beaches at Dunkirk and left France alone to face the German
juggernaut. By 22 June. with his armies fleeing the unrelenting German advance.
Marshal Petain (France's hero of World War I! surrendered France to German
occupation and subjugation.
The seeds of the German invasion of France sprouted in Poland in
September 1939. Germany's invasion of Poland was the rirnit of Allied tolerance
of German aggression. On 3 September, the Allies declared war on Germany.
After the rapid destruction of Polish resistance Hitlets attention immediately

turned toward the west. havlng "secured" Germany's eastern flank w~tha
"Nonaggression Treaty" wtth the Soviet Union. While the Allied armies on the
French border fought a phony war, Hitler and the German General Staff planned
the invasion of France for 12 Novemoer 1939. Bad weather and a reluctant
German General Staff repeatedly delayed the offensive. j' However. by May
1940, Hitter's Generals and his army were ready and poised to attack France.

The key to German preparations was the campaign plan that evolved between
Hitler. and his Generals. The result of the evolutionary process was a bold
campaign plan that integrated operational deception, surprise. and a deep
concentrated armored thrust to penetrate and then envelop Allied Forces. J2
Examining the 1940 Campaign in France through the strategy process will
idenMy the situational circumstances that produced a quick decisive victory for
the German Army. By 1940, Hitler controlled the destiny of Germany and
therefore his objectives became German national obj-ves.

Hitter outlined his

objectives for Germany in Mein Kampf, which he wrote while in prison. In his
book, Hitter described his idea of German domination over Europe and eventually
the world. His ultimate goal was to unite all Germanic peoples under the Third
Reich and to carve out sufficient Lebensraum (living space) to ensure economic
and physical security. 53
Four national objectives framed Hitlefs strategic vision. He wanted to ( 1)
regain German territory lost after World War 1, (2) assimilate all German~c
peoples. and (31 seize living space in eastern Europe. These objectives were
heavily contingent on Hitler's fourth and most important objective. military

rearmament. To accomplish these objectives. Hitler mobilized the economic.

political and military power of Germany. Economically, Hitler's policies forced the
nationalization of key industries. j4 Diplomatically, he furthered his expansionist
objectives whenever possible through false promises and commitments. As
Napoleon (with a Nonaggression Treaty) neutralized Prussia before attacking the
Austrians. Hitler neutralized Me Soviet Union before attacking France .

The key

element of Hitler's grand strategy, however, was restoring Germany's military

power, because Hitler intended to carve out Germany's Lebensraum through
rnilitaty conquest.
The national military strategy supported the German conquest of Europe.
by developing. deploying, and employing air and land forces to fight ground
campaigns on the Continent. Because of Germany's limited strategic reserves,
the campaigns had to be quick and decisive. This forced the German military to
develop a form of warfare known ever since as Blitzkrieg." Blitzkrieg combined
armor, aircraft, and infantry ~ntoan integrated military instfument which could
sustain a rapid operational tempo. The German national military strategy
accomplished this through the orchestration of technology with force structure,
weapon systems, doctrine, and training. 57
The German Luftwaffe (Air Force) developed prmanly to support ground
forces through interdiction and close air support. As a result, the Luftwaffe
employed territorially based commands composed of bombers, dive oombers.
fighters. rransports, and reconnaissance aircraft. This manner of employment
provided flexible and responsive support to German Army Groups.

59

The cornerstone of German national military strategy was tne German

Army. The heart of the German Army was the Panzer corps. These were large
combined arms mechanized formations capable of independent operations.
Panrer divisions were the building blocks for the Panzer corps. It too was a
combined arms armored formation. Each Panzer corps also had a squadron of

Stuka dive bombers in d i i t support. Stukas supported deep armored thrusts

beyond artillery range. It was this force structure that gave the German Army its
decisive edge during the French Campaign of 1940. 59
The strategic objective of this campaign was to destroy the alliance
between France and Britain and conquer and subjugate France. a These were
ambitious objectives

considering relative force ratios. Both the Allied (including

Belgium and Dutch forces) and German armies had roughly the same numbers of
divisions (136). The French, however, learned the wrong lessons from World
War I. Convinced that the linear defense was the strongest form of war, the
Allies neglected the development of armored forces. In 1940 the Allies had only
three armored divisions and one independent armored brigade and these units
lacked proper communications equipment. To further reinforce the defense. the
Allies distributed many of their tanks to their infantry divisions. Even though the
Allies had better tanks (bigger guns and thicker armor). they could not employ
coherent armored organizations. Air power was the only distinct German
advantage. In terms of aircraft, the Germans had a ten to one numerical
superiority in bombers and a six to one numerical superiority in close air support
aircraft (dive bombers).M Accordingly, in terms of relative combat power, the

German army did not nave overwhelming force at the strategic level. This forcea
the German General Staff to create it through operational design.
The campaign plan's intent was to destroy the finest Allied armies
deployed along the Belgium border, then turn south and eliminate remaining
French resistance. An operational penetration followed by an operational
envelopment was the German Army's means of accomplishing the intent. Sedan
was the "schwerpunkt" of the German thrust into France.

Three Panzer corps

formed the spearhead for the penetration. They punched a hole in the French
defenses at Sedan. then drove west to the Channel Coast. The Panzers then
turned north along the coast to complete the envelopment of sixty-four Allied
divisions. After eliminating Allied resistance in the north, the German army
paused to refit. then attacked south across the Seine and completed the
destruction of the Allied armies.
Like the Ulm-Austerlitz campaign, deception and surpnse were key
elements of the German operational design. The Allies believed the German
maln effort would come through Belgium. Holland. and Luxembourg, as it had in

1914. The original Operation Plan Yellow (developed in November 1939) placed

the main effort through the low countries with a limited objective to seize territory
in Holland, Belgium. and Northern France. However, a German aircraft carrying
the plan made an emergency landing in France, compromising this campaign
design. This forced the German General Staff to aiter the operational concept.
With Hitlefs encouragement, the General Staff adopted a new campaign
design developed by General Erich von Manstein. Manstein's plan was far more

aspiring. It sought to ". . . force a decision by land," through the destruction of

the Allied armles in France. To accomplish this, Manstein developed a bold
scheme of maneuver. ife placed the main effort in the center through the rugged
Ardennes Forest French Marshal Petain declared the Ardennes impassable and

so. the French left me area lightly defended. Additionally, an effective deception
fixed the Allied forces along the Belgium frontier. German deep operations
(airborne assaults and air strikes) in the low countries convinced the Allied High
Command. the main attack was coming through Holland and Belgium. Through
this deception and the unexpected location of the main attack, the German's
achieved both strategic and operational surprise. "3
Unprepared for an armored assault, the French defenses in the Ardennes
quickly buckled and German Panzer columns catapulted across the Meuse at
Sedan. To execute the rapid penetration and envelopment, the German General
Staff fashioned an armored spear to thrust through Sedan to the coast. Seven of

the ten available Panzer divisions, organized into two Panzer Corps under a
Panzer Group headquarters formed the armored spear which drove to the heart
of France. Strategic and operational surprise combined with an operational
penetration and envelopment established the conditions for the destruction of the
Allied armies in nomtem France.
The operational concept directed an attack by three Army groups. Army
Group B with 29 divisions (including one Panzer Corps with three Panzer
Divisions) and Army Group C with 19 divisions conducted supporting attacks in
the north and south respectively. Army Group B attacked through Holland into

Belgium. Its mission was to press the attack vigorously and fix Allied forces
defending along the Belgium frontier and deceive the enemy of location of the
main effort Army Group C was to attack the Maginot tine and fix the French
Second and Third Armies. The Army Group A, with 45 divisions (including seven
armor divisions) was the main effort. Its mission was to attack in the center
through the Ardennes Forest cross the Meuse River. penetrate the French Ninth
Army defenses at Sedan, drive to the mouth of the Somme, and then envelop
the Allied armies from the south.
Guderian's Panzer Corps arrived on the Meuse and occupied Sedan on 12
May. By 16 May, Guderian's Corps broke through the French defenses and was
driving east. The surprise and speed of the attack created such psychological
trauma within the Allied command that it never recovered. When the situation
was fully explained to French Foreign Minister Ed'ouard Daladier. he exclaimed:

". . . it means the French Army is destroyed."

65

After the penetration. the Panzer

columns drove west to mouth of the Somme and then turned north to complete
the envelopment of the northern Allied armies.
The army groups operated on exterior lines which facilitated the
convergence of combat power on the Allied armies. There were three decisive
po~ntsin this campaign: Sedan, Noyelles-Aberville, and Dunkirk. Sedan was
decisive because it was the German Army's gateway to the intenor of France.
The seizing of Noyeiles and Abenrille was decisive because it div~aedthe Allied
forces and secured the flank of Army Group A on the English Channel. Dunkirk
was a lost opportunity for the German Army. If Hitler had not sto~pedthe

German Panzen on 22 May, the Allied Armies wouid have been cutoff from the
channel ports. This would have kept 300.000 British soldiers fmm escaping and
may have knocked Great Britain out of the war. But, the fear of culmination and
over extension sapped Hitter's will. 68
In this campaign that the Wermacht's higher operational tempos
paradoxically reduced the potential of culmination. The higher operational
tempos of the German Panzer units prevented the Allies from concentrating
against them. This reduced German attrition (casualties) and conserved combat
power.

The German's destruction of the nowern Allied forces did cause the

culmination of the Allied defense of France. After Dunkirk the French were
neither physically nor psychologically able to launch a major counteroffensive.
Physically, the French had no reserves to conduct a counteroffensive but, more
importantly even the French High Command succumbed to defeatism. By 24
May, even General Maxime Weygand. French Commander in Chief, believed the
war was lost.
German tactics focused on the ability to rapidly concentrate combat power
through the employment of combined arms formations. Guderian's attack on
Sedan was an excellent example of German tactical finesse. During this battle.
Guderian's motorized infantry and sapper (engineer) units made an assauit
crossing of the Meuse with supporting close air and anillery fires. The infantry
secured crossing sites and reduced the French initial defensive belts. Guderian
then threw several tank brigades across the river. The tanks attacked into the
depths of the French defense (with tactical air elements providing fire support).

Simultaneously, the infantry continued to expand the bridgeheaos while German

artillery defeated French counterattacks. These synchronized attacks quickly
ovewhelmed the French defenses and Guderian's Corps achieved an
operational penetration.

s9

Fmm the analysis of Hitler's strategy process, the elements that produced
the German victory in 1940 present themselves. Hitter's national objectives
demanded a grand strategy that closely integrated offensive political and military
policies. In retrospect. Hitter had difficulty matching his national objectives
(Germany's dominion over all of Europe) with Germany's strategic means.
Germany lacked large quantities of many strategic materials such as oil and
iron-ore limiting production. Germany was just emerging from the postwar
depression, which made Hitler reluctant to fully mobilize the population, economy,
and industry for another war (Germany economy and industries were not fully
mobilized until late 19421. Germany's tack of strategic depth forced Hitler to
develop a grand strategy that was very opportunistic. He initially attempted to
attain national objectives through diplomatic subterfuge and coerclon whenever
possible. If diplomacy failed, or when the opportunity occurred. Hitler called on
the German military to secure the objective quickly by force.

70

These integrated offensive political and military policies provided the

foundation for Germany's victory in 1940. The Allies declaration of war in
September 1939, posed an immediate and direct threat to Hitter and the Third
Reich. Anticipating this response to the invasion of Poland, Hitler politically
isolated the Allies and secured Germany's eastern flank by signing a

Nonaggression Pact with the Soviets in August. This allowed Hitler to focus all of
Germany's military might against France. Germany's strategic posture also
benefited from the Allies' defensive strategy and doctrine.

'! The Allied defensive

posture allowed Germany to turn and face this western threat unhindered.
Without interference from the Allies. Germany was able to refit and redeploy the
military forces in Poland and mobilize, equip, and train additional divisions. Most
importantly, however, it gave Hitler and his generals time to clearly identify the
strategic objective. the destruction of the "Alliance" and the occupation of France.
Hiller's opportunistic grand srrategy developed a very responsive and
offensively based military strategy. Germany's limited strategic depth demanded
quick decisive victories. The integration of these policy requirements produced
Blitzkrieg or "lightining war". As the vantage point of German national military
strategy. Blitzkrieg developed combined land and air forces to conduct sudden
military offensives. German Panzer corps were the physical fulfillment of this
concept. The German's military strategy orchestrated the development of force
structure, doctrine, and training with technology producing an effective combined
arms organization. the Panzer Corps. These organizations in tum gave the
German Army the ability to synchronize the effects of infantry, armor, artillery.
engineers, and close air support. This level of synchronization allowed the
Germans to quickly overwnelm numerically superior forces. Bliizkrieg proved
very successful in France, because France lacked the operational depth to
absorb the lightning thrusts of the German Panzer Corps.
The brilliance of the German operational and tacticai strategies of 1940

was how effectwely they focused the German military strengths agatnsr Allied
weaknesses. The Allies lacked operational depth both physically and
conceptually. Physical depth was lost when the Allies identified the wrong
location of the German main effort. It was further reduced when Holland and
Belgium attempted to remain neutral, forcing the Allies to remain on the Belgium
frontier until the invasion began. Conceptually. the Allies lacked operational
depth because of their strict adherence to a forward linear defense. The Allies
were so dedicated to the concepts of forward defense, they failed to constitute
any operational or strategic reserves. As a result, Germany's unexpected
armored penetration at Sedan burst the Allied defense like a pin through a

balloon.

Half a century later, on the Arabian Peninsula the evolution of combined

arms reached another level of synchronization, the conduct of joint warfare. Joint
warfare integrated the application of military power of separate military services:
army, air force, navy and marine. The key organization for executing this form of
warfare was a unified command. This command orchestrated the employment of
military force at the operational level throughout the dimensions conflict: land,
sea. air, and even space. The United States' quick decisive victory in the Gulf
iNar reflected this new level of synchronization for military power, joint
operations.

72

The roots of the conflict emerged from an imaalance of military and

economic power on the Arabian Pennsula. In 1989. Iraq's economy was

staggering under the burden of a large national debt incurred from the protracted
war with Iran and a subsequent military build-up. By 1990 lraq could no longer
even pay the intemst on its foreign loans. lraqi President Saddam Hussein's
solution was to invade and occupy Iraq's oil-rich neighbor. Kuwa~t.
On 17 July 1990 Hussein accused Kuwait of cheating lraq out of billions of
dollars of oil revenues and demands reparations. lraq began massing several
armored divisions on the Kuwaiti border. Kuwait agreed to negotiate with lraq
over the reparations. The negotiations began 1 August, but at 1 AM 2 August
(Kuwaiti time), lraq mvaded Kuwait. Within 18 hours, lraqi forces secured Kuwart
City and the Kuwaiti Government had fled to Saudi Arabia. On 6 August. 11 lraqi

divisions were in Kuwait consolidating along the Saudi border. Also on 6 August
the first U.S. military forces deployed to Saudi Arabia.

74

Although the U.S. was a member of a twenty-six-nation coalition organized

to fight lraqi aggression, the U.S. played the dominant role in forging the victory.
The U.S. established the strategic objectives, developed the coalition, provided
most of the military forces, and designed the operational strategy. President
George Bush moved quickly to isolate lraq politically. Through his leadership.
international consensus solidified against Hussein. The result was a 26 nation
coalition willing to directly confront lraq. President Bush also energized the
United Nations wnich passed several resolutions. The resolutions demanded the
withdrawal of lraqi forces from Kuwait and established a trade embargo.

75

These actions established the political conditions necessary for the U.S. to
,

employ military force. Military force was used against lraq in two major
campaigns: Desert Storm. and Desert Shield. The defensive campaign (Desert
Shield) lasted fmm 2 August 1990 until 17 January 1991. Its purpose was to
deter further lraqi aggression against Saudi Arabia, show the resolve of the
coalition. and set the conditions for an offensive campaign (if required). On 29
November, the U.N. authorized the use of force to compel Iraq's withdrawal, if
lraq did not leave Kuwait by 15 January 1991. By 17 January 1991, the U.S.
and other members of the coalition had exhausted all diplomatic efforts to prevent
a conflict. 76 The U.S., in conjunction with its coalition partners decided to
execute the offensive campaign to drive lraq out of Kuwait.
Again, as in the previous historical examples, surprise and deception were
key elements of the operational design. At 0250 on 17 January. the U.S. led
coalition initiated Desert Storm with a surprise air attack against lraqi air defense
assets and other critical targets. Surprise was achieved thmugh the use of
advanced stealth technology. The first waves of aircraft into lraq were F-117
stealth fighters which traveled to their targets undetected. These attacks were
also supported by Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles launched from U.S. Navy
ships in the Gulf. Continuous follow -on attacks against lraq were made by U.S.
and coalition fighters for the next 31 days. The combination of the sophisticated
U.S. aircraft and precision guided munitions quickly eliminated lraqi air defense
capabilities, and national command. command communications and control
structures. After securing air supremacy, and severing lines of communicarion,
the air operation concentrated on attriting lraqi forces in Kuwait. 77

On 23 February. ground operations began. Coaiition forces fixed enemy

units in Kuwait with an amphibious deception and a supporting attack aiong the
coast. Simultaneously, two U.S. Corps (XVlllth and Vllth) enveloped the lraqi
forces from the west and completed their desbuction. The focus of the
envelopment was the elite Republican Guard Divisions. the backbone of the lraqi

Amy. In just 100 hours, the U.S. military decimated the lraqi Army, fourth largest
.army in the world, and restored the legitimate government of Kuwait. For the
moment, U.S. interests in SWA were secure.

78

Although involved in the region since World War II. the U.S. never clearly
defined its policy in Persian Gulf until 1979. In 1979, President Jimmy Carter
identified the unrestricted flow of oil from the Penian Gulf as vital to the interests

of the U.S.. This became known as the "Carter Do~trine."~~

The economies of
the U.S. and the U.S.'s major trading partners are heavily dependent on otl as a
source of energy. The Persian Gulf contains roughly 75 percent of the world's oil
reserves. Western Europe and Japan receive 80 to 90 percent of their oil from
the Persian Gulf. Therefore, the economy of the US. would experience senous
harm if the flow of oil from the gulf regton was cutoff.

Although, many believed

the U.S. also had a moral obligation to turn back lraqi aggresston, the U.S. vital
national Interest was to Insure the untnterrupted flow of ad from Southwest Asia
(SWA). By seizing Kuwait. Saddam liussein controlled almost 50 percent of the
wond's known 011reserves. This was too much power to leave n the nands of
someone as unstable as Saddam Hussein. Pursuant to U.S. national interests.

Pres~dentGeorge Bush established these straregic objectives (on 5 August)

following the lraqi invasion of Kuwait: 80
- Immediate and complete withdrawal of lraqi forces from Kuwait
- Restoration of the legitimate Kuwaiti Government
Security and Stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf
Safety and protection of lives of American citizens abroad

The Persian Gulf, however, did not always inspire this level of U.S.
concern but. an increasing global dependency on oil imports and the end of the
Cold War pushed this region near the top of US. national interests. Previously,
U.S. grand strategy focused almost exclusively on the containment of
communism. Secretary of State Dean Acheson first fully articulated this grand
strategy in a paper for the National Security Council (NSC-68) in 1949. However.
the U.S. did not adopt this strategy until 1951. NSC-68 identified the spread of
communism as a threat to the survival of the U.S. and outlined economic, political
and military policies to prevent the Soviet Union from exporting Marxist-Leninism.
The diplomatic effom included the development of alliances modeled after the
North Atlantic Treaty organization. It also included an increase in foreign aide
and military sales to threatened nations. The keystone of the policy: however.
was the rearming of the US. to directly confront communist aggression. This
policy resulted in an unprecedented peacetime buildup of US. military power and
set the foundation of U.S. National Military Strategy for the next forty years. g1
During the cold war. U.S. military strategy had two major components: a
nuclear component. and a conventional component. The strategic nuclear
strategy balanced on an idea of mutual assured destruction (MAD). This strategy
developed. deployed, and employed the strategic nuclear triad. The triad was a

system based on: strategic bombers. land based intercontinental ballistic

missiles, and submarine launched ballistic missiles. The operational concept was
to deter a nuclear attack by insuring a massive retaliatory capability even in the
event of a "first or preemptive" nuclear strike from the Soviet Union. Any single
part of the triad could destroy the Soviet Union (hence MAD). MAD made
strategic nuclear conffict unthinkable.82
The second major part of the U.S. Cold War military strategy was the
conventional component. It developed and deployed conventional US. forces to
deter and if requtred fight a global conventional conflict w~ththe Soviets. To plan
and conduct integrated land, naval, and air operations rhroughout the world, the
National Security Act of 1947 created joint regional organizational structures.
These joint organizations were called Unified Combatant Commands. Un~fied
Commands synchronized the unique capabilities of each service creating a
synergistic effect at the tactical, operational. and strategic level of war. The
synergistic effects would overload the enemy's command and operational
functions; thereby, exposing enemy vulnerabilities and reducing enemy freedom
of action. As these Unified Command structures matured. they became the
conduits for projecting U.S. military power and the nucleus for the development of

military force structure. operational strategy. doctrine and train~ng.

Another key concept of U.S. military strategy was to have quality rather
than quantity. Although global in scope, the conventional strategy pnmarilv
focused on fighting the Warsaw Pact in Europe. Force structure. weapon
systems, training, and doctrine were also influenced by the Europe-first

philosophy of the cold war. U.S. military forces were never able to match the
Warsaw Pact forces one for one, so the U.S. military strategy attempted to
achieve superiority by combining technology with intelligent and motivated mtlitary
personnel. This philosophy produced a relatively small but very technically
advanced, highly trained. all volunteer military.
Revolution in Afghanistan and the fall of the Shah of Iran mitigated the
predilection with a Europe first strategy. In response to these events the U.S.
organized the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (in 1981) to handle a Soviet
incursion into SWA. but the RDJTF was inadequate. To meet ever increastng
regional security requirements, the Department of Defense established a unified
regional command: U.S. Central Command or CENTCOM in 1982.
"Geographically, the new command centered on the Arabian Peninsula and
crucial fingers of water along its side: The Arabian Gulf: the gulf of Aden: and the
Red Sea. But.

. . .[also included] Egypt, the Sudan, the Horn of Africa, . . .

Afghanistan and Pakistan."

This Unified Command structure encouraged

continuous regional planning. War planning initially focused on blocking a Soviet

incursion. but by 1989had correctly identified Iraq as the major regional threat.

As a result, CENTCOM planners had the framework for Desert Shield and Desert
Storm in June 1990.

ffi

Detailed development of the Desert Storm campaign plan began in

October. 1990. The key elements that established the strategic framework for
the offensive were the diplomatic efforts to build the coalition and the deployment
of an additional U.S. corps (Vllth Corps). This gave the U.S. and coalition military

forces significantly greater freedom of actionwhile reducing the Iraqis'. Vllth U S .

Corps closed in theater in January establishing the necessary conditions to
execute Desert Storm. The objective of the coalitions operational strategy was to
destroy the lraqi forces in Kuwait. To achieve this objective, the Desert Storm
campaign plan integrated simultaneous and sequential combined operations.
Desert Storm had three ma!or combined operations. There was the continued
naval blockade of lraqi ports. the independent air offensive. and then the ground
offensive. The intent was to continue Iraq's strategic isolation with the naval
blockade: isolate and attrit the lraqi Forces in Kuwait through air operations and
then complete their destruction with a ground offensive.
The naval blockade reduced Iraq's access to strategic materials,
munitions. and repair parts pushing lraqi forces in Kuwait toward culmination.
Independent air operations lasted 31 days. These air attacks initially focused on
attacking the designated strategic centers of gravity, the lraqi: national command
and control facilities, nuclear-chemical production facilities. and lines of
communication with the lraqi forces in Kuwait. Initially US. air forces conducted
joint offensive counterair strikes to destroy lraqi Air Defence (AD) systems.
Neutralizationof lraqi AD was a decisive point because it gave coalition forces
control of the air space over Iraq. Coalition control of lraqi air space totally
exposed the lraqi centers of gravity to air operations. The final portions of this
operation were the direct attacks against lraqi ground forces. lraqi RepuDiican
Guard Forces (Identifiedas the operational center of gravity by CENTCOM)
became the primary target, followed by attacks on forward defensive un~ts.The

combined naval and air campaigns prepared the lraqis for the decisive blow. On

27 February, the ground offensive began. Operating on exterior lines. the

coalition forces fixed, then enveloped Me lraqi army. 86
To establish the exterior lines of operation to envelop the lraqi forces, the
U.S. Third Army organized a series of logistic bases extending 300 miles west of
Dhahran. Extending the logistical support, facilitated the distribution of the bases
of operation which subsequently supported converging lines of operation. These
logistical bases also supported an accelerated operational tempo. With their
objective the elite lraqi Republican Guard Divisions (the operational center of
gravity) the enveloping U.S. corps attacked 300 miles in less than 5 days. The
combination of Me speed of the envelopment with the success of the fixing attack
and amphibious deception completely surprised the Iraqis. The U.S.
envelopment of the lraqi army caused a similar level of psychological paralysis as
did the German breakthrough at Sedan caused within the Allied army in 1940. At
0800. 28 February the cease went into effect. Four of the eight lraqi Republican
Guard Divisions were completely destroyed, as were 30 to 40 lraqi infantry and
mechanized divisions. Coalition casualties totaled less than a single battalion.
Remnants of remaining lraqi units fled north to Basra. In 100 hours of ground
combat. the US. led military coalition liberated Kuwait. 87
Throughout the campaign, the combined effects of advanced technology,
sound doctrine, rigorous training, and high quality personnel provided U.S. forces
a distinct tactical advantage. U.S. mililitary force structure, training, and
equipment resulted from U.S. military strategy. Therefore, U.S. tactical

supenority was directly attributable to the effectiveness of U.S. military strategy.

The Battte of Medina Ridge clearly demonstrated the level of US. tactical
superiority created by US. military strategy. Two major engagements occurred
during this battle which began when 2nd Brigade. 1st Armored Division (2AD)
encountered the 2nd Brigade of the lraqi Medina Division (Republican Guard).
Although it was foggy, US. M l A l tanks with thermal sights were able to identify
lraqi T-72 tanks at 4000 meters and engage them at 3600 meters. Effective
range of lraqi tanks was 1800 meters. Within in forty minutes, the 2nd Brigade,

2AD annthilated the 2nd Brigade of the Medina. 2AD quickly launchea a pursutt
wtth elements of its Attack Helicopter Battalion (AHB). A company of AH-61
Apache Helicopters cutoff and destmyed the remainder of the Medina Divbon.
Two hours after meeting 2AD, me Medina ceased to exist. This level of tactlcal
ability also prevailed within the other dimensions of conflict: air, sea, and space.

Iraq was unable to contest US. supremacy in space (for intelligence,

communication. and navigation) or on the sea. In the air, the lraqi Air Force fled
to Iran rather then face US. fighters. In the final assessment the US. victory in
the Gulf resulted from an effective military strategy that developed. deployed. and
employed consistently superior military organizations. 88

P
The conditions established for quick, decisive, victory in U.S. National
Military Strategy compare well with situational conditions in the preceding
historical examples. In all three cases there were clear military objectives. For

the Germans in 1940. however. this clarity came only after several months of
heated debate between Hitler and his generals. Clear objectives facilitate unity of
effort at every level war: strategic, operational, and tactical and are essential for
designing effective campaigns. The struggle between Hitler and his generals
highlights the responsibility of senior military leadership in assisting the civilian
political leadership in identifying and selecting appropriate military objectives.
Arh'culating the need for clear military objectives in U.S. military strategy codifies
this responsibility for U.S. senior military leaders.
The idea of attainability and overwhelming force get more abstract..
Attainability and overwhelming force are both functions of ways (methodology)
and means (resources). All the examples suggest. that both a superior means
and superior ways were necessary for quick decisive victory.
The historical analysis indicates achieving quick decisive victory was
dependent on the effectiveness of a nation's military strategy in developing an
asymmetrical military capability (means)-relativeto the threat. The superior
organizational sttuctures of the G r a n d e A17ne'e. the German Panzer corps,
and the U.S. Unified Commands allowed these respective military systems to
conduct new forms of warfare that were beyond the capability of their enemies.
In 1805 the unitary armies of the Austrians and Russians could not match the
speed and power generated by the corps of the G r a n d e Armge. Likewise the
French Army of 1940. steeped in static defensive doctrine could not cope with the
rapid mechanized warfare waged by the German Panzer corps. The U.S. victory
in the Gulf also reflects this pattern. The Iraqis military forces were extremely

vulnerable to U.S. CENTCOM's capability to plan and conduct sequential and

simultaneous joint operations. This vulnerability exposed Iraq to ever increasing
levels of destruction.
A superior methodology was also a critical element of the quick decisive
victories. To realize the full potential of the asymmetrical means, required a very
effective operational strategy. This was reflected in the execution of each
campaign plan. The encirclement of the Austrian army at Ulm. the German
penetration at the Ardennes, and the U.S. envelopment of the Iraqi Republican
Guard, all demonstrated the synergistic effects of combining superior capability
and superior methodology.
These campaigns also reflect a direct relationship between a high
operational tempo and swift conflict termination with minimum casualties. It
appears, when a high operational tempo combines with surprise (eased by
deception) the synergistic effect results in psychological paralysis of enemy
command and control elements. This condition degrades the enemy's ability to
concentrate combat power and accelerates moral collapse. These combined
effects produce quicker victories and fewer casualties.
The critical element of quick decisive victory, however, is a military
strategy that links grand strategy with an integrated and coherent force structure.
doctrine and training combined with an operational des~gnthat takes advantage
of the strengths of the forces provided. This concept is complex, but more

accurately describes the conditions for quick decisive victory then those now
described in U.S. military strategy.

CONCLUSlONS

The comparative analysis shows that the principle of decisive force'

effectively outlines the conditions for quick decisive victory. Quick decisive
victory is not an unattainable goal or Holy Grail. It should remain a fundamental
part of U.S. military strategy and doctrine to focus the development of force
structure and training on winning wars. Quick decisive victory provides the
impetus for maintaining superior military capability and continuing to develop
superior methodologies. Codifying this concept in U.S. Military Strategy and
doctrine, however, also incurs grave risks.
Quick, decisive, victories are the exception rather than the rule. The U.S.
military experience is better characterized by protracted bloody conflicts.
Therefore. quick decisive victory may create unrealistic expectations that will
cloud the judgement of senior military leaders.
The U.S. is in a general sense strategically defensive and historically will
not conduct preemptive military operations. This will normally result in the
strategic initiative being conceded to the enemy and subsequently causes the
U.S. military response to be reactive. This decreases the possibility of achieving
strategic surprise and increases the burden on the operational strategy to
develop speed and shock within the campaign. Overall, giving up the strategic
initiative reduces the potential for quick decisive victory.
The U.S. Military's "demand" for quick decisive victory conflicts with
Clausewitz's fundamental assertion that war is an extension of politics.
Advertising the U.S. military's reluctance to fight a prorracted war. hamstrings

political leaders and degrades the threat of U.S. military power. 2educing the
ambiguity in relation to when the US. will use military force allows other nations
to better predict the parameters of a U.S. response. This may give foreign
nations a distinct advantage and enables them to pursue a more effective
strategy with respect to the U.S..
Additionally, the preoccupation of U.S. national military strategy with quick,
decisive. victory and the corresponding policy of crisis response results in the
neglect of concepts for prevention. It appears the U.S. national military strategy
has two speeds

- deterrence or crisis response.

These concepts do not address

or incorporate the limited or restrained application of military force to prevent

conflict from occurring.
The concept of quick decisive victory should remain as part of U.S.
national military strategy. It must be balanced, however, by incorporating
concepts of employment in operations other than war, as well as concepts for
protracted warfare. Incorporatingthese concepts would help resolve a current
disconnect between U.S. military strategy and military doctrine. Both Joint and
Service doctrines discuss employment of U.S. military forces in strategic
environments other than war (formerly described as Low Intensity Conflicts). The
U.S. military participates in these operations on a daily basis: but the U.S. military
strategy does not include a principle for applying force under these conditions. A
possible solution is to develop a concept of preventive force. Preventive force
would conceptually focus on the indirect application of military power to stop
conflicts from occurring or growing.

ENDNOTES

' U.S. Army, FM 100-5

Joint Sa
t-,f

(May 1986). p. 1-4.

..

(October 1992), p. 10.

B.R. IflInan and Daniel F. Burton, Jr, "Technology and Competitiveness" Bxmgn

Affairs.(Spring 1990), pp. 116-1 34 and Edward Lumak. "On the Need to Reform
American Strategy,* Prannina (Washington, DC 1981), pp. 13-27.

'H. Norman Schwartzkopf, I

t
(New York,

1992), p.357-363.
Schwartzkopf described the initial briefing to the President and his request for an
the additional heavy corps(to do the job right) on 11 October.
'George J. Church, "The 100 Hours," Iime(11 March 1991). p.24. The total
allied casualty figures were 149 KIA and 513 wounded.
Schwartzkopf, !zkg.a pp. 386-387. 469-470. Schwartzkopf outlined the
campaign objectives as: destroy or force the withdrawal of Iraqi forces in Kuwait:
restore the legitimate Kuwaiti goverment; repatriate foreign nationals a POWs
held in Iraq; and pmmote the security and stability of the Persian Gulf region.
Schwartzkopf stated by 27 February " .. . we had won decisively."

'James Blackwell. Thunder ( New YoYork. 1991). p. xxviii. Predicted

casualty rates ranged from 5.000 to 30,000.
8 Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. S
now
-.
(Maxwell AFB. 1988). pp. 13-16.
lbid., p.i4.

Danid J. Kaufman. David S. Clark, and Kevin P. Sheehan.

Securitv (Maryland, 1991). p.3.
Donald Nuechterlein, 9
inthe(Lexington.1985). p. 174.
l1

l2

lbid.

I*Alexander Alexiev,
Monica. 1988). p.8.

7
(Santa

Nuechterlein, p.175. Nuechterlein dicusses relationship between survival. vital.

major, and peripheral interests.

IS

.* Drew. p. 14.
lbid., pp.14-16. Drew and Snow outline the purpose and framework of grand
strategy.
Ibid., pp 18-19. Ideas taken from Drew and Snows explanation of military
strategy.

2.3

, pp 7-9 to 7-12. The explanation of the concepts of

operational W i n and their relationship to campaign planning are from emerging
Army doctrine.
21

Ibid., p.7-9.
Ibid.. p.7-10.
Ibid.. pp. 7-10 to 7-11.

" Ibid., p.7-11

-(May
battle.

86). ppl0-11. Outlines the the relationship between tactics and

Albert Sidney Britt l l l , T h e (West Point, 1972)

57-79. 1 primarily use Sidney's historical account of the campaign.

PP

David Chandler, Theof Nawleon, (New York. 1966). pp 330-333.

Ibid.

Ibid., p.60. The Austrians fail to take into account a ten day difference in
calendars (with the Russians). As a result, the Russians are ten days behind the
Austrians giving Napoleon operational space and time.
32

lbid.

'j lbid.. p.62. This directive testifies to Napoleon's wholistic approach to the
campaign and to the grand design.

'*

Ibid., p.65.

Chandler., pp.402 -408.

35

37

Chandler., pp.409-412.

38

Britt., p.50.
Ibid.
Chandler.. p.331.
Britt, p.60.
Chandler.. p.403.

a Britt, pp.4448. The corps organization allowed Napoleon to distrrbute the

deployment of his army along multiple mutes. yet still concentrate the entire
force quickly for battle.
a Chandler.. p.327.

Philip J. Haythornwaite,
1988).pp.114-115.

45

..

(New York,

a Robert M. Epstein, "The Historical Practice of Operational Art." Gwrse

Camment* (SAMS, AY92-93). pp. 4-3-1 to 4-3-3.

Britt., pp.74-76. Britt outlines Napoleon's selection of the battlefield and the
deception to draw the Russians literally into a sack.

47

Ibid.
Haythomwaite., p.82. Haythomwaite describes the Grande Armee's tactical
doctrine of envelopment.

4Q

Alistar Home. Jo I nse a Rat& France 194Q. (New York, 1984, pp. 194 to 201
and Eric von M a n s t e i n . l o s t (Presidio, 1986), pp.94-126. The two
accounts diier slightly in the relative certainty of the coast and the northern
Allied forces were German objectives. Manstein's Map 4 (submitted to OKH and
eventually approved by Hitler). however; clearly shows the operational intent is to
penetrate in the center and envelop the northern Allied forces.
Home.. pp.173-194. Home states that Hadler plays a major role in resisting
Hitter's efforts to launch an attack from November to February.

" Manstein., p. 103. " The aim of the western offensive, I submitted . must be to

force an issue by land."

" Bany R Posen, IheSources of

..

. .

(London. 1984). pp.178181.

Ibid.
Home.. p.125.
Ibid.. pp.74 to 75.

" Len Oeighton, BUkchg. (New York, 1980). pp.155-169.

Mathew Cooper. T
h
e
Of FailUflL (Ft
Leavenworth. AY 89-90). pp.43-46.
SB

Horne.,7&84. Home outlines Guderian's efforts to develop the Panzer Corps

and the doctrine for the Blikrieg.

js

* Manstein, pp. 102-104.

lbid.. pp.217 to 221. Home compares the German and Allied armies. Home
argues mat the Germans were not significantly superior in men or material, but
were significantly superior in doctrine. training, and methods of employment.
Mellenthin supports this in Panzer (pp.12-30).
61

a Manstein., pp.94-126. The biggest difference between Manstein and Home's

assessment is that Home does not believe OKH ever identified the major
objectives of the operation. ~ a k t e i indicates
n
that these objectives were
understood by the senior commanders and Hitler and never addresses their
absence from the final order. 1 believe Manstein to be correct. Most of the senior
leaders would have resolved any questions during the war games conducted
throughout the plans developmentand giving general missmn orders was
consistent with the German's concept of Aufstragtaktic.
lbid.
a Home., pp. 246-309 and 430

Ibid
ffi

F.W. von Mellenthin, canter (New York. l98O), pp. 22-23.

Home.. pp.649650. The Allies suffered nearly ten times the casualties as the
Germans. The German casualty rates were well below the German's
expectations.

67

a Fuller.. pp. 398400 and Horne, p.610.

a Mellenthin.. pp. 15-21.

Posen.. pp179-181
Robert Allan Doughty, TheThe
(Princeton. 1985), pp. 178-190. Doughty attributes the
German victory not the Superiority of the German Army but, to France's failure to
adapt between wars. There is some truth in Doughty's argument, however, it
was not just a French defeat. The Germans also destroyed the armies of Britain,
Holland, and Belgium. Credit for developing and effectively employing large
integrated combined arms formations, must be given to the German Army.
7t

Department of Defense, 9
lhlaL (Washington, DC. April 1992). p.31
'2

74

Ibid.

75

Church, "100 Hours," p.32

76

Ibid.

77

Blackwell, Thunder.pp.79-81.

78 Church,

Alexiev.

pp 30-32.. Alexiev,

Afahanstan. p.8.

Afohanistan.. p.8.

m.

aa DOD,
pp. 3-8 and 20-21. A critical component of the maturation
process was the Goldwater-NicholsAct of 1986 which empowered the theater

ClNCs and gave them full authority for employment of all assigned forces.

a' Clay Blair. The Fornotten W a (New York. 1987), pp.25-27.

Fred Kaplan, The(Stanford University, 1991). pp.

31 7-319.

82

Armed Forces School Publication..Schwartzkopf., pp.271. 275.

85

lbid.

" Blackwell. Thunder.pp.79-81.

iNorfolk. 1994 ). p. 18-2.

* U.S. and News and Wand Report. Trrumoh(Random

House,1992). pp 340-360.
Ibid.

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