Understanding the Democratization of South Africa:

A Theoretical Case Study

POLS 4710: Topics in Comparative Politics
Professor Mohammad Yaghi

Dillon Smith (0797394)

December 11, 2015

Abstract

South Africa's transition to democracy was a necessary undertaking, as years of ethnic

tensions and minority rule slowly decayed. The complex assortment of actors that participated
in this transition, combined with the unique political and social landscape of South Africa, have
made this particular shift to democratization a peculiar and thus highly-studied subject in
comparative politics discourse. This paper has determined that the democratic transition in
South Africa was in part due to the willingness of the National Party and African National
Congress party to negotiate terms and compromise on their interests, as well as the highlymobilized civil society that was active in the country. In light of this thesis, both the transitional
theory and the civil society mobilization theory of democratization work to explain these factors
and help to provide insight on the remarkable transition to democracy that occurred in 1994.

Introduction

South Africa had a long and tumultuous history of Afrikaner minority rule during the Apartheid
era, defined by violence, oppression and ethnic tensions. In 1994, the vast majority of black South
Africans were enfranchised and the first true democratic election in the country took place on April 27th
of that year. Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) party was elected president of
the country, which was a big step towards reconciling the harms that had been committed in decades
past. The complexity that defines the democratic transition in South Africa, which went from a
minority authoritarian regime under Apartheid rule to a democratic state in a remarkably short period of
time, is due to the fact that it has no historical precedence; indeed, given that the white population had
been apart of the make up South Africa for centuries prior to 1994, the techniques used to end white
minority rule in other parts of Africa were not applicable here. As such, the democratization of South

Africa is a highly peculiar process that has been extensively studied in comparative political discourse,
with a variety of theories being applied to attempt to explain this transition. The original motivation of
this paper was to determine what the most prominent factors were that led to the democratization of
South Africa in 1994. After reviewing and analyzing a wide variety of literature, a conclusion has been
reached regarding this question: South Africa's transition and subsequent consolidation of democracy
was due both to a determined and highly-mobilized civil opposition movement, as well as the
willingness of the predominately-white National Party and the opposition African National Congress
party to negotiate a relatively peaceful and clear transitional process. The two main theories on
democratic transitions that apply to this process are pacted transitions applied in the broader
transition theory and civil society mobilization theory. To explore this position in depth this paper
will begin by presenting the aforementioned theoretical premises which explain democratization,
followed by an more specific application of these theories to the process that occurred in South Africa,
and concluding with a general analysis of the main factors that contributed to this transition.

Literature Review

As stated, an understanding of two crucial theories relating to democratic transitions are

necessary to appropriately analyze the democratization that took place in South Africa. The transition
theory, put forth by political scientists including Dr. Adam Przeworski, views democratic transitions
largely as the result of rational decisions on the part of political actors; namely their ability to moderate
their interests and their willingness to collaborate with opposition groups through pacts and
negotiations (Przeworski, 1991, pp. 85). The civil society mobilization theory, presented by Dr. Jan
Aart Scholte, explains civil activism and vigorous mobilization as extremely effective avenues to
promote democracy (Scholte, 2002, pp. 281).

The transition theory of democratization is one of the most prominent explanations amongst
scholars. Adam Przeworski (1991, pp. 84) claims that successful transitions from authoritarianism to
democratization can only occur as a result of negotiations and pacts between adversarial elites. He
argues that there are several crucial components that reinforce this concept, and they are as follows:
first, very few democracies are the result of a revolution which overthrows the state. Rather,
powerholders or in this case, the ruling regime retain much of their control over the levers of power,
and transition only begins when there is a mutually perceived sense of a stalemate between them and
the opposition forces (Przeworski, 1991, pp. 85). Second, contemporary prodemocracy movements
have come into existence at a time when alternative ideas of society have vanished; here, he is talking
about the collapse of Stalinist societies which have delegitmized radical notions of democracy and
social change. Granted, this explanation is rooted in the context of the 1990's, but its application to our
general subject is still appropriate. Ultimately, he argues that the chaos this large collapse of political
ideology has caused results in the need for alliance between the reformers inside the authoritarian
block and the moderates in the prodemocracy opposition (Przeworski, 1991, pp. 69). Both distance
themselves from the extremists views within their camps the hardliners in the authoritarian regime
and the radicals in the opposition so as to create an atmosphere conducive to negotiation. Thus,
democratic transition occurs when there is a stalemate between the actors with a stake in the political
process, and when those in power come to the conclusion that they will fail to gain more from
maintaining the status quo. Przeworski concludes by stating that successful negotiations require a pact
that is inevitably conservative, economically and socially, led by the elite of both sides and thus
balances all actors' interests into a workable framework (Przeworski, 1991, pp. 98).

Kerstin Hamann expands on this theory, giving considerable attention to the crucial role of pacts
and negotiations between competing actors. She views pacts as tools to set agreements between a set of
actors, and defines the rules governing the existence of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the

vital interests of those entering it (Hamann, 1997, pp. 111). The immediate function of pacts are to
define temporary solutions to pressing problems that satisfy the interests of major political actors as
much as possible. Hamman concludes that pacts are one of the most successful instruments for
introducing and stabilizing democratic rule, largely because of their capacity to decrease considerable
uncertainty during tense political scenarios (Hamann, 1997, pp. 112).

The civil society mobilization theory is a perspective that Jan Aart Scholte credits with
explaining the cause of many democratic transitions across the globe. He argues that civil society
activism and mobilization offer significant possibilities to reduce major democratic deficits, and thus
prove to be an extremely effective avenue for democratic promotion and sustainability (Scholte, 2002,
pp. 281). Scholte defines six key contributions that civil society mobilization makes to democratization,
using them as his justification for putting such consideration into the theory. Those six contributions are
as follows: civil activism gives political stakeholders a voice; enhances education opportunities;
promotes debate; increases political transparency; increases accountability of political actors; and
legitimizes the democratic process (Scholte, 2002, pp. 293-294). Most important out of these concepts
is that when there is a deep engagement between civil society and political mechanisms, the respect
that citizens accord to the democratic process is enhanced. This greatly legitimizes the democratic
process as people acknowledge that an authority has the right to govern and they have a duty to obey.
Perhaps most notable from Scholte's theory is his assertion that civil society mobilization contributions
should be viewed as one aspect of a multi-pronged strategy to democratization (Scholte, 2002, pp.
300). Indeed, he recognizes that it is not the only route to ensure successful democratization; it must be
accompanied by other methods of formal political processes. For this reason, civil society mobilization
theories significantly contribute to the complicated transition that took place in South Africa.

Pacted Transitions and South Africa's Democratization

Pacted transitions are a central concept of transition theory, and a crucial explanation of the
democratic transition in South Africa. Indeed, Adler & Webster see the process in South Africa as a
typical democratic transition, where the transition from authoritarianism to democracy is brought about
only as a result of negotiations and pacts between the reformers the African National Congress and
their allies and the ruling regime of the National Party (1995, pp. 76). When Frederick W. DeKlerk
became president in 1989, the opportunity for negotiation emerged between the two sides. His
government made significant moves to remove Apartheid rule from South Africa: the death penalty was
abolished, civil rights were restored to black citizens, free political activity was allowed and the state of
emergency that was in effect since 1986 was lifted (Muiu, 2008, pp. 135). It is important to note that a
crucial reason for these policy changes was the immense pressure that the white minority experienced
by the black majority however, these factors will be presented in detail when civil society
mobilization is discussed. For the purpose of this section, the lead-up to negotiations between the two
sides it what is of particular interest. De Klerk decided at the end of 1989 to open negotiations with the
African National Congress over the democratization of South Africa. As Przeworski asserts, the
decision to negotiate a transition is a rational decision made by the ruling regime once they come to the
understanding that there is a political stalemate and their interests can no longer be guaranteed within
the confines of the current political system (1991, pp. 85). Indeed, the National Party was under
significant pressure to open democratization talks due to an extensive number of factors, which will
now be discussed in detail.

De Klerk's decision to un-ban the African National Congress and negotiate an inclusive
democracy was the product of an Afrikaner group debate in the late 1980's in which political,
bureaucratic, cultural and economic white elites came to grips with the forces impacting the survival of

Afrikaner power and the larger white community (Giliomee, 1995, pp. 85). Hermann Giliomee points
to three crucial forces that led the Afrikaners to this perception: a weakening white demographic base,
economic stagnation, and a dramatically different international environment. For centuries, the
proportion of whites to blacks in the population was sufficient enough for the white minority to man all
the strategic positions in the political, economic and administrative systems of the country which
allowed them to keep the black population controlled. However, from 19601985, the white population
dropped by twenty-five percent and the National Party became aware that they no longer had the
capacity to run the country's most important posts on their own. De Klerk realised the white population
had a better chance of striking a more favorable bargain with the opposition if they did it soon, rather
than waiting until their population shrunk further (Giliomee, 1995, pp. 87-88). Economically, the
National Party began to realize that Apartheid rule was greatly harming their prosperity. Many external
actors who were vehemently opposed to Apartheid refused to trade with South Africa or fund any of
their aspirations. Combined with a significantly shrinking GDP, the government knew they needed to
negotiate a stable political framework conducive to investment and financial support as it was the only
way to address the country's economic problems (Giliomee, 1995, pp. 89). Additionally, as Apartheid
was largely condemned cross the globe, the white minority in South Africa never found true acceptance
on the international stage. The 1980's saw extreme international ostracization of the country and they
were excluded from sporting, scientific and academic circles (Giliomee, 1995, pp. 94). All of these
factors forced the National Party to acknowledge that their influence over the country was waning and,
combined with international condemnation, meant that they had no choice but to negotiate a legitimate
democratic transition with the African National Congress and other opposition groups.

As explained, the National Party reconsidered its Apartheid position after significant setbacks,
and while they felt that it was militarily possible for them to retain control of the country, this route
would be too costly and thus was avoided. Likewise, the African National Congress moderated their

ideology and both sides came to the conclusion the best way to move forward peacefully was through a
clear process of democratization (Smooha & Hanf, 1992, pp. 42). Formal negotiations began in 1990,
and took over a year to iron out all the details of the transition. The African National Congress' main
objective was to ultimately transform the regime from authoritarian to democratic, as this gave them
the best route to come out of the political wilderness. The National Party, while agreeing to
democratization, sought to control the process on their own grounds. They laid out their plan, which
would be introduced in broad terms with a long period of economic and social liberalization, followed
by democratization and eventually the total consolidation of the transition (Muiu, 2008, pp. 134).
Although hesitant to allow the National Party to stay in power during the transition, the African
National Congress compromised with them and allowed it to be so. The National Peace Accord was
signed by all parties in 1991 and from it the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) was
established. Through heavy negotiations, the Convention agreed on several core principles during the
transition: any form of discriminatory law would be repealed, political neutrality of free and fair access
to state-controlled media would be established, and security forces would be wholly placed under
control of an interim government (Muiu, 2008, pp. 138).

An extremely important part of these negotiations came when the African National Congress
introduced sunset clauses into the agreement. These clauses guaranteed job security, compensation
and retirement packages to the white Afrikaner civil service, who were justifiably concerned that
should the African National Congress win the elections their economic stability would vanish (Muiu,
2008, pp. 141). These clauses were not particularly supported by the opposition, but they recognized
that they would go a long way to ease the tensions of the National Party and would provide an
environment more conducive to negotiations. These clauses fit directly into the theory put forth by
Kerstin Hamman who, as previously explained, saw pacts as an explicit agreement between a set of
actors which seek to define mutual guarantees for the vital interests of those entering it (1997, pp. 111).

Przeworski's assertion of how actors handle extremist views within their camps in an attempt to
moderate is evident during the transitional process in South Africa. Throughout the negotiations, the
African National Congress was plagued by severe tensions between the main camps in the
organization: the moderates, who were led by Nelson Mandela, and the radicals, who sought to
substantially change the system in favor of the African majority (Muiu, 2008, pp. 141). The South
African Communist Party, which was a key ally of the African National Congress, were on the brink of
revolting but Mandela was able to silence their calls and ease the overall tension. Additionally, radicals
on both sides of the negotiations were silenced as both sets of moderates worked together towards a
peaceful political settlement. The radicals were essentially eliminated, either physically by the military
or diplomatically by an attack on their character (Muiu, 2008, pp. 148). This ensured that the
negotiations would not be hijacked by dissenters within each camp, and the moderates remained in
control over the process.

Civil Society Mobilization and South Africa's Democratization

Adler & Webster argue that a mobilized civil society and a powerful labor movement played
central roles in creating the conditions for democratization in South Africa. Extensive civil society
mobilization created the conditions leading to the transition, and used their intelligence and other
resources to form the transition in a way that heavily promoted the objectives of democracy and
equality (Adler & Webster, 1995, pp. 99). The oppression that the black population experienced for
decades in South Africa granted them the patience, tolerance and commitment to peace needed to
ensure the transition stayed on track. Ngomane & Flanagan argue that they used this oppression to
construct a collective political identity based on opposing Apartheid, demanding inclusion and
promoting both populations living side-by-side in harmony (2003, pp. 267-268). One of the hallmarks
of Apartheid rule was its ability to adapt to a changing political environment, including pressure from

an active civil society. In 1960, a peace protest turned violent when the South African police opened
fire and killed 69 black protesters. This event, known as the Sharpeville Massacre, led to a period of
intense repressive state action (Muiu, 2008, pp. 135). However, this repression was broken in 1976
when the Soweto Revolt took place. The revolts were a mass protest by black high school students over
the mandatory implementation of Afrikaner curriculum in all schools. These protests shocked the
Afrikaner ruling elite and paved the way for the political, economic and social changes which
culminated with the un-banning of the African National Congress and the release of political prisoners
in 1990 (Muiu, 2008, pp. 135).

An active labor movement had a defining impact on South Africa's democratization process.
Interestingly, the labor movement combined long-term radical goals of social transformation with
reformist strategies and tactics to achieve meaningful victories in the push for democracy without
provoking a hardliner reaction. The movement retained its civil society character which enabled it to
provoke the transition and contribute to the character of the transition itself (Adler & Webster, 1995,
pp. 90). Various labor and trade organizations were closely associated with the African National
Congress after its ban was lifted, and made crucial contributions to the democracy movement. The
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) made an extremely significant contribution to the
transition with its creation and formation of the Reconstruction and Development Programme which
was adopted by the African National Congress as its central policy program (Adler & Webster, 1995,
pp. 95). The African National Congress and Congress of South African Trade Unions launched the
programme in January 1994, and it attempted to build a broad social consensus through an extensive
accord. Central to the programme was that social movements such as the trade union movement, civics
movements, women's groups and youth organizations would be key parts of an organized pact to
reconstruct society along more democratic lines. The philosophy behind this was that these sectors
were the weakest, poorest and most marginalized groups in South African society, and thus had the

hardest time developing their capacities. Getting civic society mobilized in such a way would greatly
benefit the African National Congress' cause, and would ensure that democracy was not just confined
to periodic elections but would be an active process which enabled formations of civil society to
contribute to its reconstruction and development (Adler & Webster, 1995, pp. 98).

Another significant group that mobilized to greatly help the democratic cause was the black
youth. Rapid industrialization brought many black people to urban centres, and the needs of the
economy forced the Apartheid government to expand the number of slots available for black students in
secondary schools. These expanded educational opportunities allowed black youth to be exposed to
alternative perspectives; they met politically-conscious peers, had access to banned books and listened
to uncensored international media (Ngomane & Flanagan, 2003, pp. 268). In turn, this further exposed
them to the harshness of their subjugation and allowed them to foster a sense of unity aimed at ending
Apartheid rule. By the 1970s, black youth were vehemently breaking their silence and embarking on
strikes for justice and political equality; as mentioned, the Soweto Revolution in 1976 shocked the
Afrikaner elite and forced them to consider that a democratic transition may be the only avenue through
which they could at least partially protect their interests. Although they faced significant resistance, the
anti-Apartheid youth movement had lots of support which further helped them mobilize. Various black
organizational structures, families and communities helped their liberation struggle (Ngomane &
Flanagan, 2003, pp. 270). This new educated youth generation, known as the Young Lions,
established student movement organizations on campuses which was the crucial route to their entrance
into political activism. The Release Mandela campaign which provided immense pressure on the
Apartheid government to release Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners was spearheaded by this
youth generation. As Waldmeir concludes, an extensive range of civic associations, especially the youth
and labor movements, acted as the most important agents in the liberation struggle and thus led to the
pressure to democratize South Africa (1994, pp. 144). Civil society mobilization led both the liberation

and democratization movements which defined South African political culture in the 1980's and 1990's.

Analysis and Conclusions

Retrospectively assessing South Africa's democratization, it is interesting to examine Marina

Ottoway's 1991 analysis regarding the country's political landscape and why she believed it was not
conducive to a democratic transition. Central to her argument is that the African National Congress and
other opposition organizations were structured in such a way that they would be able to achieve a
successful transition from Apartheid, but not a successful transition to democracy (Ottaway, 1991, pp.
82). She rightly asserts that democratization would be determined by the African National Congress'
ability to transform from a liberation organization which required no defining political ideology to a
formal political party which did need one. However, as reflected in Przeworski's theory of democratic
transitions, the power and respect that Nelson Mandela commanded allowed him to set forth a specific
political agenda while simultaneously silencing radicals within the camp. Thus, the organization was
indeed able to transition to a formal political party and ensure the transition was maintained.

Adler & Webster present several criticisms to Przeworski's transition theory and suggest that the
civil society mobilization theory may be a more appropriate explanation for the democratization of
South Africa. First, they argue that his emphasis on the actions of political elites during democratic
transitions misunderstands the crucial role of popular movements in the origin, development and
outcome of transitions (1995, pp. 76). Indeed, both the labor movement and Young Lions youth
movement provided necessary pressure, which in many ways pushed the National Party towards
accepting democratization. Additionally, they assert that Przeworski views civil society mobilization as
merely a threat to the status quo, whereas it is more appropriate to view it as a central tool in the
development of transitions (Adler & Webster, 1995, pp. 90). Essentially, they use elements of social

movement theory to recast transition theory without its elite orientation and with a more prominent role
for civil society efforts. However, the negotiations and pacts that are undertaken by political elites are
essential to the development of democratic transitions and cannot be done without the core role of
formal political parties in the process. That is why this paper makes the argument that both pacted
transitions and civil society mobilization were crucial to ensure democratization in South Africa.

To further reinforce the position that both pacted transitions and civil society mobilization were
core factors in South Africa's democratic transition, this paper will conclude with an analysis of the
final steps that were taken to formalize the country's first democratic elections in 1994. In 1992, the
Conference for a Democratic South Africa stalemated, as the governing National Party refused to
budge in its demands for a veto over the adoption of a new constitution. In response, the African
National Congress and various civic organizations embarked on a campaign of rolling mass action,
including work strikes and mass protests (Adler & Webster, 2008, pp. 94). The National Party's security
forces and Afrikaner support organization reacted with vicious resistance, and the entire negotiation
process was threatening to collapse. Realizing that irrational mass mobilization was going to undermine
the entire process, both sides stepped back from their confrontational positions and negotiated ways to
keep the transition going. The National Party dropped their insistence on entrenched vetoes on the
constitution, and this is when the African National Congress put forth sunset clauses into the
deliberations (Adler & Webster, 2008, pp. 94). Formal negotiations resumed in early 1993, and an
election date was set for April 27, 1994. This final phase of democratization involved key contributions
from both civil society mobilization as well as formal negotiations and pacts, which is a prime example
of why neither theory can appropriately explain the successful democratic transition in South Africa.
Both significantly compliment each other, and created the conditions for which one of the more
complex and intense democratization processes in recent history was able to be consolidated.

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