The PRC-Taiwan Crisis; Assessing Alternative Outcomes

David Doolittle
INTL 401 - Critical Analysis
Professor Rebekah Moughon
October 18th
http://wpc.242f.edgecastcdn.net/00242F/academics/schools/SecurityAndGlobalStudies/INTL/I
NTL401/prc/message-traffic.html

Step 1-6: ACH Process

ACH Step One: Identify Possible Scenario Outcomes (Hypotheses)

Number

Hypothesis

China and Taiwan reach a diplomatic solution through

negotiations and all parties agree to diffuse tensions with or
without concessions

Hypothesis #1

China uses embargoes blockades and limited military action

to influence Taiwanese election results
China uses direct military actions invading Taiwan with the
intent of conquering and disposing the current leadership
TSU wins the election declares independence of Taiwan
declaring war on China and taking the first strike before
China reacts
KMT wins the election prompting TSU to challenge legitimacy
of election, civil war occurs the KMT being possibly supported
by Chinese military

Hypothesis #2
Hypothesis #3
Hypothesis #4

Hypothesis #5

Points
Possible
Points Earned

ACH Step Two: Evidence For and Evidence Against Each Hypothesis
ACH Steps Three and Four: Assess Evidence for Diagnosticity and Eliminate Evidence
ACH Steps Five and Six: (5) Eliminate Hypotheses and (6) Identify Linchpin Evidence
Hypothesis
Evidence

Delete

Evidence #1

Linchp
in

(H1a) List three pieces of evidence

indicating the crisis will be resolved
diplomatically.

(H1)
Political
Solution

(H2)
Limited.
Interventi
on

Open source reporting suggests Hu Jianto speaks with

Secretary of the UN General Ban Ki Moon to intervene (30
days prior to election)

According to the Washington Times Taiwan President Chen

Shui-bian agrees to send representatives to discuss the
situation (50 days prior to election)

In the historical overview two US carrier battle groups

diffused tensions during the 1996 Taiwanese election crisis
(1996)

(H1)
Political
Solution

(H2)
Limited.
Interventi
on

(H3)
Direct
Attack

Suggests Hu Jianto would rather diffuse tensions then see them escalate in any
situation resulting in H2a and or H3a
Evidence #2

Evidence #3

Made irrelevant by White House statement they cannot ensure support if escalation
(25 days prior)
Hypothesis
Evidence

Delete

Linchp
in

(H1b) List three pieces of evidence

indicating the crisis will not be resolved
diplomatically.

(H3)
Direct
Attack

Evidence #1

//

//

(H2a) List three pieces of evidence

indicating the crisis will be resolved
with limited intervention.

(H1)
Political
Solution

(H2)
Limited.
Interventi
on

US PACCOM reports Fighter regiment patrols (minimum 45

aircraft) in strait of Taiwan have increased 50% (20 days
prior to election)

(H2b) List three pieces of evidence

indicating the crisis will not be
resolved with limited intervention.

(H1)
Political
Solution

(H2)
Limited.
Interventi
on

According to an unknown source the PLA has issued

Mobilization orders for unknown number of PLAF fighter
regiments (minimum 45 fighter planes) to the PRC Nanjing
district sharing shore with Taiwan strait (30 days prior to
election)

Taiwan National Security Bureau (NSB) claims PRC is

orchestrating TSU victory to create tensions between them
according to an unconfirmed insider report (75 days prior to
election)

Would confirm PRC intended to increase tensions from the beginning leading to
disprove H1 in favor of H2a or more then likely H3a. This would make the
evidence 1 from H1a irrelevant. If information is not true then it becomes
irrelevant to disproving H1
Evidence #2

Taiwan news reports President Chen Shui-bian has increased

the alert level of Taiwanese defense forces to keep PRC from
interfering in election (65 days prior to election)

Whether Taiwan increases their defense forces or not can only be seen as
aggressive maneuvers from the PRC viewpoint, discouraging diplomacy. However
it does not applicably play into whether H1a H2a or H3a would be the PRCs COA
because it is independent of their actions and intentions as it was initiated by the
Taiwan defense force possibly as a result of previous incursions of intimidation by
the PRC into Taiwanese elections (c 1996)
The White House expressed US President Obama cannot
promise support of Taiwan if situation escalates (25 days
prior to election)

Evidence #3

Would Taiwan proceed with rhetoric if they knew the US would not come to their
aid at full escalation? This could depend on if the TSU positions are orchestrated
by the PRC as the NSB claims or by nationalist sentiments. The TSU rhetoric did
begin shortly after the NSB announcement and immediately following the PRC
began making military movements.
Hypothesis
Evidence

Delete

Linchp
in

Evidence #1

(H3)
Direct
Attack

Fighters could be used to enforce a no fly zone or in support of H3a to disable

Taiwanese air defenses for B-6 bomber runs
Xinhua state news announces the PLA will be conducting
CSS-6 missile tests in Taiwan strait in the coming days (20
days prior to election)

Evidence #2

Unknown target of missile tests is alarming. This intelligence gap needs to be

filled. Missiles could be Taiwan mainland, smaller Taiwanese islands, or into the
Taiwan strait to test capabilities. Too many unknowns in H2a E2 to make a
conclusive judgment.
X

Evidence #3

2 PLAN anti ship submarines left Ningbo and their location

is unknown. In addition an unknown number of Submarines
at Canton, Zhangzhou, and Whenzhou are ordered to prepare
for extended operations according to the NSA (40/45 days
prior to election)

According to scenario overview anti ship submarines would be necessary to

enforce a blockade of Taiwans water travel and actively engage in sabotage of
cargo ships leaving Taiwanese ports. Submarines could carry offensive missiles
and nuclear weapons so could also be used for a direct attack.. Submarines could
also be a diversion to redirect intel efforts towards determining their location.
Hypothesis
Evidence

Evidence #1

Delete

Linchp
in

(H3)
Direct
Attack
+

While this could be part of a build up to intimidate or coerce Taiwan, it is far more
likely, given the number of units being moved and the location these are being
moved into to support H3.

US STRATCOM reports 99/98th missile regiments in

Luciao and Lepning successfully test fired 2 missiles (700
maximum known missiles between 99/98/96th regiments)
into central China (40 days prior to election)

Evidence #2

Missile tests are done to ensure when they are needed they will be precise in hitting
their objective and are also used to signal adversaries of intention. These missiles
were fired in the opposite direction possibly to mislead intel efforts into believing
further claims of tests would also be on mainland China.
General Liang Guanglie announces through Xinhua state
media a series of unrelated naval exercises will occur near
Taiwan (65 days prior to election)

Evidence #3

Diagnostic value is limited due to what appears to be submarine and amphibious

squad already in preparations for exercises or attack disproving H2a in favor of the
exercise being solely an exercise or more elaborately part of H3a. Also whether
these are naval exercises or part of the PRCs COA is not known. Ongoing
exercises could hurt any diplomatic negotiations in process as well.
Hypothesis
Evidence

Delete

Evidence #1

Linchp
in

(H3a) List three pieces of evidence

indicating the crisis will be resolved
with a direct attack.

(H1)
Political
Solution

(H2)
Limited.
Interventi
on

Imagery from an unknown source reveals Zhangzhou and

Whenzhou naval ports have several amphibious assault
squadrons (plurality meaning 100 minimum landing craft
with potential to transport 30,000 minimum troops) in early
process of loading supplies (20 days prior to election)

(H3b) List three pieces of evidence

indicating the crisis will not be
resolved with a direct attack.

(H1)
Political
Solution

(H2)
Limited.
Interventi
on

The Peoples Liberation Army Daily reports PRC

Amphibious squadrons in Zhangzhou and Whenzhou (100
landing craft minimum with potential to transport 30,000
minimum infantry) are to participate in large scale exercise
in next 10 days (35 days prior to election)

(H3)
Direct
Attack

Several indicators around this evidence would drive this hypothesis with this
evidence to being a part of the most likely PRC COA. See indicators below for
additional information. Credibility of imagery source also needs to be considered
in final judgment of enemy COA.
USAF reconnaissance flights confirm 96th missile regiment
in Nanping is preparing systems (unknown number of SSM
CSS-6 missiles) to fire (20 days prior to election)

Evidence #2

Firing missiles into Taiwanese water is a known historical action of the PLA to
intimidate Taiwan. If PLA playing into the assumption analysts have that this
evidence would lead them to conclude Taiwan is likely to only choose H2 in the
scenario, then the PLA may be applying effective D/D to their true COA
X

Evidence #3

Unknown number of PLA B-6 bombers (capable of carrying

conventional chemical and or nuclear warheads) at Luqiao
airfield are seen in imagery from unknown imagery source
uploading unknown type of A2S munitions (20 days prior to
election)

Depending on various unknowns in this evidence (number of bombers, type of

munitions, source of imagery), and the fact H3bs E3 suggests a weak case for
intimidation being utilized, the assumption a fair amount of D/D is being applied to
keeping those unknowns hidden to mask intentions could be applicable. Three total
intelligence gaps in this evidence are either deliberate to make US and Taiwanese
intel pursue this false lead, or indicative of a bombing attack being incorporated in
the PRCs COA. In case of H3 bombers and fighters would be the first to soften up
opposition for a landing force, according to unit descriptions. Deception may also
indicate the bombers are uploading chemical or nuclear munitions. This could
create a strong international backlash against the PRCs COA which could prompt
them to keep munition types secret until a surprise attack.
Hypothesis
Evidence

Evidence #1

Delete

Linchp
in

(H3)
Direct
Attack
-

Made irrelevant by exercise already starting at 20 days prior to election. Could

have been used at time to initimidate Taiwanese politicians or motive to build up
military forces for additional implications in a PRC COA that is H2 or H3 but the

situation has appeared to develop further.

According to the historical overview missiles fired into
Taiwan strait during 1996 election crisis did not hit mainland
Taiwan (1996)

Evidence #2

//

Because in the past they have not fired missiles into Taiwan does not mean they
would now do so. China also did this during the election so if they were to engage
H2a as the COA it would likely happen soon after message traffic ceases.
Maintains relevance because China could be using this to their advantage to create
the assumption this will be their COA as an application of D/D
Chinese state media (Xinhua) shows video of unknown
number of bombers from an unknown date attacking foreign
renegade force with conventional or chemical munitions (45
days prior to election)

Evidence #3

Video could be used to intimidate Taiwanese politicians but also could be a reveal
of first strike options in event of H3a. Considering this intimidation, because while
there is a threat, it doesnt conclusively lead to H3a being the directed COA.
Points Possible

100

Points Earned

100

Step 7: Analysis of Findings

Section I - Introduction
In Taiwans presidential election tension has developed between the Taiwan government
and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). Two parties are running for President, the
Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). The TSU candidate is represented by
Shu Chin-Chiang. Shu has repeatedly used political speech involving independence sentiments.
These speeches challenge the PRCs 1996 Anti-Cessation Law, which allows the PRC to use
non-peaceful means against the Taiwan independence movement should Taiwan declare
independence. The PRC regards Taiwan as its sovereign territory. The election is now 20 days
away. The Communist Party of China (CPC) and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) activities
of the last 70 days show growing sensitivity to Chiangs political tactics. There are 3 hypotheses
(H1-H3) to a future course of action (COA) by the PRC:
H1. The CPC and Taiwan reach a diplomatic solution diffusing tensions
H2. The PRC uses intimidation tactics and limited military intervention influencing

election results
H3. The PLA engages in direct military actions to conquer Taiwan
Section II - Outcome assessed to be most likely to occur: Direct attack
Supporting evidence suggests a direct attack and limited intervention are equally
probable. However the presence of significant intelligence gaps, different PRC COAs from
historical precedents, and H3 having the most timely supporting evidence all contribute to its
likelihood.
Evidence 1a is a PRC activity consistent with a direct attack, specifically a land invasion.
Imagery of an unknown origin revealed 20 days prior to the election, Zhangzhou and Whenzhou
naval ports have several amphibious assault squadrons in the early process of loading supplies.
Evidence 1a is also a strong difference, from past PRC reactions to Taiwanese independence
sentiments. The PRC has previously used intimidation through limited missile strikes and
threatening further military action. Evidence 1b provides an argument where the supporting
evidence could be a training exercise in progress. The People's Liberation Army Daily reports
35 days prior to the election PLA Amphibious squadrons in Zhangzhou and Whenzhou are to
participate in large scale exercise in next 10 days The announcement of exercises has been
made irrelevant due to being introduced before the revelation of evidence 1b, making this more
supportive of a direct attack scenario, if the source is reliable.
Evidence 2a is consistent with H3 and constitutes another departure from historic
precedent by the PRC in response to Taiwans elections. 20 days prior to the election, an
unknown number of PLA B-6 bombers (capable of carrying conventional chemical and nuclear
warheads) at Luqiao airfield are seen in imagery from an unknown source uploading an
unknown type of air to surface munitions. In 2a the unknowns provide a significant amount of

intelligence gaps. 2a also comes from an unknown source, which makes the diagnostic value
contingent on the sources reliability. Evidence 2b attempts to devalue the evidence above. 45
days prior to the election, Chinese state media (Xinhua) shows video of an unknown number
of bombers from an unknown date attacking a foreign renegade force with unknown type of
munitions. 2a then could be dated imagery of the bombers being prepared to engage the
renegade force the 2b newscast refers to. The supporting evidence then would be false,
decreasing the probability assigned to H3. Show of force can also be indicative of capability and
intention. If the PRC is planning an attack with B-6 bombers, evidence 2b possibly revealed
capability and intention unintentionally.
Evidence 3a addresses 20 days prior to the election. USAF reconnaissance flights
confirm 96th missile regiment in Nanping are calibrating systems (unknown number of CSS-6
missiles) to fire. Firing the missiles could be to intimidate Taiwan, or as part of a direct attack.
However evidence 3b states, missiles fired into Taiwan territorial waters during the 1996
election crisis did not hit mainland Taiwan. Again, past actions of the PRC are not indicative of
present intentions. In this instance they can be interpreted as the PRC signaling Taiwan their
capabilities, which would be supportive of intimidation tactics or H2. Preparing missiles to fire
could also be to trap analysts in believing precedents are the intended COA.
H3 is mainly driven by acknowledging evidence 1a and 2a are from credible and timely
sources. There appears in this evidence an effort to hide the type of supplies PLA forces are
preparing. The unknowns in H3 could also be deliberate to hide the PRCs COA. Knowing the
B-6 munition type may show chemical or nuclear munitions being uploaded. This could provide
a necessity for the PRC to employ deception in order to avoid likely international pressure

against this COA. To shroud this signal the CPC and PLA may create noise promoting H2. H2s
evidence may confirm this suspicion, as evidence 3a in this hypothesis arguably has done.
Section III - Second Most likely to Occur: Limited intervention
H2 provides reliable non controlled information (RNCI) to the argument. RNCI is only
relevant if, the enemy is not aware of our access or is unlikely to realize that the information
can be used as an indicator of his future behavior (Kam 2004, 39). To imply H2 without
considering the entirety of the argument presented, because H3 and H2 share equal probabilities,
would be satisficing.
Evidence 1a is an example from RNCI sources, US PACCOM reports 20 days prior to
the election PRC Fighter regiment patrols in the strait of Taiwan have increased 50%. Fighters
could be used to enforce a no fly zone or to disable Taiwanese air defenses. Evidence 1b
comes from 30 days prior to the election, The PLA have issued Mobilization orders for an
unknown number of PLAF fighter regiments to the PRC Nanjing district bordering Taiwan
strait. An increase in fighter patrols may be related to the mobilization orders or signalling
intentions, then it would be suggestively supportive of H3.
Evidence 2a is from 20 days prior to the election, Xinhua state news announces the PLA
will be conducting CSS-6 missile tests of the Chinese coast in the coming days. State news is a
controlled information source. The announcement could be a form of intimidation consistent
with H2 without considering evidence 2b. 40 days prior to election US STRATCOM reports
99/98th missile regiments in Luciao and Lepning successfully test fired 2 missiles (700
maximum known missiles between 99/98/96th regiments) into central China. A spokesperson
for the PLA confirmed these were planned tests of reliability. This could indicate the CSS-6
missiles tests in 2a are a continuation of PLA reliability tests. Missiles also may act again as

signalling aspects of the PRC intentions.

2 PLA navy (PLAN) anti ship submarines left Ningbo Naval Base and their location is
unknown. Submarines at Canton, Zhangzhou, and Whenzhou are ordered to prepare for extended
operations according to the NSA. Both pieces of evidence 3a, originate from 40 and 45 days
prior to the election. The NSA is also another example of a RNCI source. Anti ship submarines
would be necessary to enforce a naval blockade of Taiwan. 65 days prior to the election
though, PLA General Liang Guanglie announces through Xinhua state media, a series of
unrelated naval exercises will occur near Taiwan. The submarines may be part of the exercise
also. This evidence however is highly dated and the situation has developed with ongoing
mobilizations and preparations appearing too strident for a strategy of mere intervention
All H2 supporting evidence comes from RNCI sources. The ability to confirm or deny H2
relies on whether the PRC has manipulated the RNCI sources to produce a strategic advantage.
This would manifest in tying up collection resources to fill intelligence gaps, mislead analytic
interpretation to believing precedents, or create a pseudo COA. In all evidence a strategy of
Limited Intervention is also consistent with a Direct Attack, equalizing probabilities. PLA
submarines can carry offensive missiles and nuclear weapons used in a direct attack. Finding the
unknown location of the first 2 submarines could also be a diversion, tying up collection
resources. Fighter planes would be necessary to soften landing zones for invading forces, thus,
their activity raises suspicion of a direct attack. If the intended COA was a bomber strike, then
focusing efforts on an invasion would be misguidance. Recent missile tests by the PLA would be
the likely COA for intimidation by the PRC, leading analysts to adopt H2 because of its
precedence. Consider also H2s supporting evidence in relation to timeliness. Around the last

acquired evidence, the H3 bomber imagery, is a host of noise supporting H2. These assumptions
and evidence combined, decrease the likelihood of H2.
Section IV - Least likely to Occur: Diplomatic diffusion
Some evidence supporting H1 appears to be consistent with H2 and H3. H1 is considered
possible to unlikely. It is an ideal COA where limited consequences appear to exist. The PRCs
benefit to a diplomatic solution is pondered after presenting the evidence.
Open source reporting attests in evidence 1a, 30 days prior to the election, CPC premier
Hu Jianto spoke with Secretary of the UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon to intervene. The
appeal appears sincere by the CPC, making 1a consistent with resolving the situation with
diplomacy. The PLA activities of H2 and H3 are direct contradictions to 1a though, and Jianto
may be stalling. Jianto told the PLA to consider all applicable plans 35 days prior to the
election. This means a diplomatic solution is not impossible, but evidence consistently points to a
different hypothesis. Consider also 75 days prior to the election Taiwan National Security
Bureau (NSB) claims the PRC is orchestrating a TSU victory to create tensions according to an
unconfirmed insider report. Depending on that evidences reliability, the PRC may never have
intended then to use diplomacy. This denies the supporting evidence its confirmatory ability and
decreasing probabilities of H1 occurring.
Evidence 2a from the historical overview stated, two US carrier battle groups diffused
tensions during the 1996 Taiwan election crisis. The carrier battle groups helped provide a
buffer between the PRC and Taiwan to foster more diplomatic discussion. The PRC could expect
this precedent to be repeated if current tensions continued to escalate. This expectation may
possibly be seen as the reason anti ship submarines were deployed. The unknown location of
those submarines may also explain why the White House expressed 25 days prior to the election

10

US President Obama cannot promise support of Taiwan if situation escalates. With the
locations unknown the carrier battle groups would be vulnerable, decreasing their value as a tool
for the diplomatic process. Conclusively then neither the PRC or Taiwan then can depend on the
US to contribute to a diplomatic solution. Again it does not mean one will not be attempted it just
lessens probabilities of H1 being the likely COA.
Resolving the situation diplomatically would benefit the PRC, increasing their standing
as a non confrontational world power with the UN and the international community. It may also
increase leverage in resolving future escalations of tension. A diplomatic solution would be a
political win for the PRC, as the situation needed to be resolved out of possible fear of PLA
capabilities.
V. Conclusion
The attempts at diplomacy continue despite the PLA activities, confirming the PRC is
truly reviewing all applicable plans. Which is why H1-H3 were all considered equally
probable until the introduction of evidence suggesting otherwise. After the NSB released
information that PRC planned to increase tensions between the two countries if Shu is elected,
PRC activities escalated to the present hostile environment. If a diplomatic solution is to be
considered probable again, it may depend on proving the NSB report false. Without this there is
overwhelming evidential support equally for H2 and H3.
Step 8: Indicators
1. East coastal PLA hospitals told to expect wounded and casualties in coming days
reserve medical personnel are told they will be working overtime at the request of the
state
2. Supporters on mainland China of an independent Taiwan (or those suspected of)
are increasingly detained in public in front of Xinhua camera crews

11

3. PLAF Fighter planes flights into Taiwan airspace are decreasing their distance to
Taiwanese mainland
4. Large quantities of fuel are moved to military build up sites
5. CPC warnings are suddenly redirected to different enemy, for instance Tibet or
western chinese Islamic extremists and overall direction of speeches moves away from
talking about Taiwan
6. Chinese port authorities begin to hold Taiwanese merchant vessels in mainland
port for extended period over trade infringement allegations
7. Hu Jianto makes several public appearances not mentioning Taiwan but acts
intended to boost the public opinion of himself

Works Cited:
Kam, Ephraim. Surprise Attack the Victim's Perspective. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 2004

12