2015 Digests

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January-March 2015 Case Digests
CIVIL
KALAW v FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 166357; 14 January 2015; Bersamin, J.
SUMMARY:
This is a resolution of the MR of the case for declaration of nullity of the marriage under Art
36, FC. SC, in its original decision, dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity because
of the following reasons:
i. Petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological
incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who
concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of
these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which
had not been sufficiently proven.
ii. Petitioners experts heavily relied on petitioners allegations of respondents
constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends,
adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioners experts opined that respondents
alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of
time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity
in the form of NPD.
But petitioners allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the
conclusions of his experts, were not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented
contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the petitioner.
SC: Granted MR. Granted the petition for declaration of nullity.
DOCTRINE:
(Note that this case explained the evolution of the standards adopted by the Courts in
deciding petitions for declaration of nullity)
1. Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even prior to the
celebration of the marriage that is permanent as to deprive the party of the awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was about to assume.
2. In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the
nullity of marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field
of psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform
themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and
judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent and
incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.
3. The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or non-existence of a
partys psychological incapacity should be final and binding for as long as such findings and
evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses and other evidence are not shown to be clearly
and manifestly erroneous
4. Courts must accord weight to expert testimony on the psychological and mental state of
the parties in cases for the declaration of the nullity of marriages, for by the very nature of
Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, despite having the primary task and burden of
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decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the
expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.
5. Lack of personal examination and interview of the person diagnosed with personality
disorder, like the respondent, did not per se invalidate the findings of the experts. Totality of
the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that
a certain condition could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed in the record,
the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in
interpreting such other evidence on the causation.
6. The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of her
theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that she can render to the courts in showing
the facts that serve as a basis for her criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of her
conclusion is founded. Hence, we should weigh and consider the probative value of the
findings of the expert witnesses vis--vis the other evidence available.
7. Molina doctrine is NOT ABANDONED in this case. However, the Court notes that there is
need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. SC reiterates the principle that each case
must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision
on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
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FORT BONIFACIO DEVT CORP v. VALENTIN FONG
G.R. No. 209370; March 25, 2015; Perlas-Bernabe, J.
SUMMARY:
Fort Bonifacio Devt Corporation (FBDC) entered into a Trade Contract with MS Maxco
Company for the execution of the structural and partial architectural works of one of its
condominium projects in Taguig, the Bonifacio Ridge Condominium. Under the Trade
Contract, FBDC had the option to hire other contractors to rectify any errors committed by
MS Maxco by reason of its negligence, act, omission, or default, as well as to deduct or setoff any amount from the contract price in such cases. When MS Maxco incurred delays and
failed to comply with the terms of the Trade Contract, FBDC took over and hired other
contractors to complete the unfinished construction. Sometime later, FBDC received a letter
from Fong, informing FBDC that MS Maxco had already assigned its receivables from FBDC to
him. FBDC refused to deliver to Fong the amount assigned by MS Maxco. They reiterated
that since MS Maxco incurred delays and rendered defective works, FBDC was constrained to
hire other contractors to repair the defects and complete the work therein, the cost of which
it deducted from MS Maxcos retention money, pursuant to the express stipulations in the
Trade Contract.
The RTC found FBDC liable, basing their decision on the concept of assignment of credit
under Art. 1624 of the Civil Code, which means that FBDCs consent as debtor was not
required for its validity and enforceability. Hence, the assignment to Fong was upheld. The
CA affirmed the RTC ruling.
The SC disagreed and held that FBDC is not bound by the Deed of Assignment between MS
Maxco and Fong. Fong, as mere assignee of MS Maxcos rights under the Trade Contract it
had previously entered with FBDC, i.e., the right to recover any credit owing to any
unutilized retention money, is equally bound by the foregoing provision and hence, cannot
validly enforce the same without FBDCs consent. Without any proof showing that FBDC had
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consented to the assignment, Fong cannot validly demand from FBDC the delivery of the
sum of P1,577,115.90 that was supposedly assigned to him by MS Maxco as a portion of its
retention money with FBDC. The practical efficacy of the assignment, although valid
between Fong and MS Maxco, remains contingent on FBDCs consent. Without the
happening of said condition, only MS Maxco, and not Fong, can collect on the credit.
DOCTRINE:
When a person assigns his credit to another person, the latter is deemed subrogated to the
rights as well as to the obligations of the former. By virtue of the Deed of Assignment, the
assignee is deemed subrogated to the rights and obligations of the assignor and is bound by
exactly the same conditions as those which bound the assignor. Accordingly, an assignee
cannot acquire greater rights than those pertaining to the assignor. The general rule is that
an assignee of a non-negotiable chose in action acquires no greater right than what was
possessed by his assignor and simply stands into the shoes of the latter.
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R TRANSPORT CORPORATION v. LUISITO G. YU
G.R. No. 174161, February 18, 2015, Peralta J.
SUMMARY:
At around 8:45 in the morning of December 12, 1993, Loreta J. Yu, after having alighted from
a passenger bus in front of Robinsons Galleria along the north-bound lane of Epifanio de los
Santos Avenue (EDSA), was hit and run over by a bus driven by Antonio P. Gimena, who was
then employed by petitioner R Transport Corporation. Loreta was immediately rushed to
Medical City Hospital where she was pronounced dead on arrival.
On February 3, 1994, the husband of the deceased, respondent Luisito G. Yu, filed a
Complaint for damages before the RTC of Makati City against petitioner R Transport, Antonio
Gimena, and Metro Manila Transport Corporation (MMTC) for the death of his wife. MMTC
denied its liability reasoning that it is merely the registered owner of the bus involved in the
incident, the actual owner, being petitioner R Transport.
Petitioner R Transport alleged that respondent had no cause of action against it for it had
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees and drivers and
that its buses are in good condition.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondent Yu ruling that petitioner R Transport
failed to prove that it exercised the diligence required of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its driver, who, by its negligence, ran over the deceased
resulting in her death. It also held that MMTC should be held solidarily liable with petitioner R
Transport because it would unduly prejudice a third person who is a victim of a tort to look
beyond the certificate of registration and prove who the actual owner is in order to enforce a
right of action. The CA affirmed the Decision.
SC affirmed. The bus driver, Gimena did not take the necessary precaution and instead,
drove on and bumped the deceased despite being aware that he was traversing a
commercial center where pedestrians were crossing the street. The registered owner as well
as the actual owner of the bus are solidarily liable with the driver, notwithstanding the fact
that it is not the registered owner.
DOCTRINE:
Negligence has been defined as "the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of
another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly
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demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Verily, foreseeability is the fundamental
test of negligence. It is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the
doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Both the trial and
appellate courts found driver Gimena negligent in hitting and running over the victim and
ruled that his negligence was the proximate cause of her death.
Indeed, this Court has consistently been of the view that it is for the better protection of the
public for both the owner of record and the actual operator to be adjudged jointly and
severally liable with the driver. As aptly stated by the appellate court, the principle of
holding the registered owner liable for damages notwithstanding that ownership of the
offending vehicle has already been transferred to another is designed to protect the public
and not as a shield on the part of unscrupulous transferees of the vehicle to take refuge in,
inorder to free itself from liability arising from its own negligent act.
The registered owner or operator has the right to be indemnified by the real or actual owner
of the amount that he may be required to pay as damage for the injury caused.
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SPOUSES RODOLFO AND MARCELINA GUEVARRA, v. THE COMMONER
LENDING CORPORATION, INC.,
G.R. No. 204672, February 18, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE,
SUMMARY:
On December 16, 1996, Sps. Guevarra obtained a P320,000.00 loan from TCLC, which was
secured by a real estate mortgage over land granted to the Sps through free patent.. The
Sps. Defaulted on the loan and the property was foreclosed. Sps. Guevarra challenged the
validity of the foreclosure proceedings due to the purported failure of TCLC to comply with
the notice, posting and publication requirements, and lack of authority, as a corporation,to
acquire the subject property. Sps. Guevarra also assailed the issuance by the Sheriff of Iloilo
of a Final Deed of Sale to be premature, as they were still entitled to redeem the subject
property within five (5) yearsfrom the expiration of the one-year period to repurchase. The
RTC ruled for the Sps. The CA affirmed. The SC affired, holding that the Sps. Still had the
right to redeem the property, having filed a case within the 5 year period.
DOCTRINE:
In an extra-judicial foreclosure of registered land acquired under a free patent, the
mortgagor may redeem the property within two (2) years from the date of foreclosure if the
land is mortgaged to a rural bank under Republic Act No. (RA) 720, as amended, otherwise
known as the Rural Banks Act, or within one (1) year from the registration of the certificate
of sale if the land is mortgaged to parties other thanrural banks pursuant to Act No. 3135. If
the mortgagor fails to exercise such right, he or his heirs may still repurchase the property
within five (5) years from the expiration of the aforementioned redemption period pursuant
to Section 119 of the Public Land Act.
Contrary to TCLCs claim, the tender of the repurchase price is not necessary for the
preservation of the right of repurchase, because the filing of a judicial action for such
purpose within the five-year period under Section 119 of the Public Land Actis already
equivalent to a formal offer to redeem. On this premise, consignation of the redemption
price is equally unnecessary.
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Nonetheless, the Court cannot subscribe to TCLCs contention that it is entitled to its total
claims under the promissory note and the mortgage contractin view of the settled rule
that an action to foreclose must be limited to the amount mentioned in the mortgage.
Moreover, the Court notes that the stipulated three percent (3%) monthly interest is
excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable, and exorbitant, hence, illegaland void for being
contrary to morals.
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NFF Industrial Corporation v G&L Associated Brokerage and/or Gerardo
Trinidad
GR No 178169; January 12, 2015; Peralta, J.
SUMMARY:
Petitioner was a manufacturer of bulk bags and respondent company is one of its customers
(Trinidad is the latters GM). Petitioner alleged that Respondent company ordered 2000 bulk
bags but failed to pay after delivery of the same despite demands. On the other hand, the
Respondent company alleged that they only ordered 1000 bulk bags and that petitioner
failed to deliver the same in accordance with the terms of the Purchase Order. As a result of
non-payment, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money against respondents. The RTC
granted the petition but was later reversed by the CA on appeal.
The SC reversed the CA, holding the Respondent company liable to pay for the bags. It
stated that although it isnt a trier of facts, this case falls under the exception that the
findings of the CA are contrary to those of the RTC. Specifically, the SC looked at the concept
of delivery in relation to the transfer of ownership in the context of the Law on Sales. By
examining the records, it found that the petitioner did indeed deliver the goods to the
designated site and that such deliveries were acknowleged by Trinidad despite the fact that
the same was not delivered to the person named in the Purchase Order. Acceptance of
delivery may be inferred from the conduct of respondents, and the buyer may be held liable
to pay for the price pursuant to Art. 1585 NCC. Here, the Respondent company accepted the
delivery of the bags and even used the same for hauling. Lastly, the SC held that Trinidad
cannot be held jointly and severally liable for the outstanding obligation of the Respondent
company since he was sued in his capacity as GM.
DOCTRINES:
1. In Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. v. Mayfair Theater, Inc., the concept of delivery
was elucidated, to wit: Delivery has been described as a composite act, a thing in which
both parties must join and the minds of both parties concur. It is an act by which one party
parts with the title to and the possession of the property, and the other acquires the right to
and the possession of the same. In its natural sense, delivery means something in addition
to the delivery of property or title; it means transfer of possession. In the Law on Sales,
delivery may be either actual or constructive, but both forms of delivery contemplate "the
absolute giving up of the control and custody of the property on the part of the vendor, and
the assumption of the same by the vendee.".
2. The vendees acceptance of the equipment and supplies and accessories, and the use it
made of them is an implied conformity to the terms of the invoices and he is bound thereby.
(Sy v Mina)
3. While a corporation may exist for any lawful purpose, the law will regard it as an
association of persons or, in case of two corporations, merge them into one, when its
corporate legal entity is used as a cloak for fraud or illegality. This is the doctrine of piercing
the veil of corporate fiction. The doctrine applies only when such corporate fiction is used to
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defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, or when it is made
as a shield to confuse the legitimate issues, or where a corporation is the mere alter ego or
business conduit of a person, or where the corporation is so organized and controlled and its
affairs are so conducted as to make it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct
of another corporation. To disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the
wrongdoing must be established clearly and convincingly. It cannot be presumed. (Rivera v
United Laboratories Inc)
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MANUEL JUSAYAN,ALFREDO JUSAYAN, AND MICHAEL JUSAYAN v. JORGE SOMBILLA
G.R. No. 163928; January 21, 2015; Bersamin, J.
SUMMARY:
Jorge Sombilla and Timoteo Jusayan verbally agreed that Jorge would retain possession of
the land and deliver 110 cavans of palay annually to Timoteo without need for accounting of
the
cultivation
expenses,
provided Jorge paid the irrigation fees. In 1975, the land was transferred to Timoteo's three
sons. Timoteo wrote Jorge terminating his administration and demanding return of the
possession
of
the
land
in 1984, which Jorge failed to do. Timoteo filed a complaint for recovery of possession
against Jorge, who argued that he enjoyed security of tenure as an agricultural lessee. The
RTC upheld the contractual relationship of agency and ordered Jorge to deliver possession to
the sons. the CA reversed and dismissed the case, holding that the relationshiop was of
agricultural tenancy, and that the demand of Timoteo for the delivery of his share in the
harvest and the payment of irrigation fees constituted an agrarian dispute that
was outside the RTC's jurisdiction and within the DAR's. The SC partially affirmed the
decision insofar as regarding the tenancy relationship, but since the action was instituted
before jurisdiction was granted to the DAR over agrarian reform matters, jurisdiction was
properly vested with the RTC.
DOCTRINE:
Although the purpose of the civil law lease and the agricultural lease may be agricultural
cultivation and production, the distinctive attribute that sets a civil law lease apart from an
agricultural lease is the personal cultivation by the lessee. An agricultural lessee cultivates
by himself and with the aid of those of his immediate farm household. Conversely, even
when the lessee is in possession of the leased agricultural land and paying a consideration
for it but is not personally cultivating the land, he or she is a civil law lessee. Cultivation is
not limited to the plowing and harrowing of the land, but includes the various phases of farm
labor such as the maintenance, repair and weeding of dikes, paddies and irrigation canals in
the landholding. Moreover, it covers attending to the care of the growing plants, and grown
plants
like
fruit
trees
that
require
watering, fertilizing, uprooting weeds, turning the soil, fumigating to eliminate plant pests
and all other activities designed to promote the growth and care of the plants or trees and
husbanding the earth, by general industry, so that it may bring forth more products or fruits.
A tenant is not required to be physically present in the land at all hours of the day and night
provided that he lives close enough to the land to be cultivated to make it physically
possible for him to cultivate it with some degree of constancy.
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WELLEX GROUP INC v U-LAND AIRLINES CO. LTD.
G.R. No. 167519; 14 January 2015; Leonen, J.
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SUMMARY: This is a case of rescission of a MOA between Wellex (domestic corporation) and
U-Land (foreign corporation registered to do business in Phil). It should be noted that Wellex
owns shares of stock in several corporations including Air Philippines International
Corporation (APIC), Philippine Estates Corporation (PEC), and Express Savings Bank (ESB).
Wellex and U-Land entered into a 1st MOA to expand their respective airline operations in
Asia. One of the provisions of which provided that in the event of the non-execution of an
SPA within the 40 day period, or within the extensions thereof, the payments made by
plaintiff shall be returned to it. Wellex and U-Land also agreed to enter into a joint
development agreement simultaneous with the execution of the share purchase agreement.
The joint development agreement shall cover housing and other real estate development
projects. Its execution was conditioned on the execution of a share purchase agreement. The
share purchase agreement was entered into under the understanding that operational
control of APIC and Air Philippines Corporation (APC) shall be lodged jointly to WELLEX and
U-LAND on the basis of mutual agreement and consultations. Thereafter, a 2 nd MOA
(between Wellex, APIC and Air Philippines Corporation or APC) was allegedly executed
forming part of the first MOA. However, it was not dated, and no place was indicated as the
place of signing. It was not notarized either, and no other witnesses signed the document.
The parties of the first MOA failed to execute a share purchase agreement. However, U-Land
remitted to Wellex a large sum of money in varying amounts and through the issuance of
post-dated checks. This amount was secured by several properties of Wellex. However,
despite these transactions, both parties still failed to execute the
share purchase
agreement. Thus, U-Land demanded the return of the amount advanced. U-Land filed a
Complaint praying for rescission of the First Memorandum of Agreement and damages
against Wellex and for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment.
RTC: Rescission is proper. It found that Wellex did not enter into the stipulated share
purchase agreement because it did not have the shares of APC transferred to APIC despite
its representations. Under the circumstances, it is clear that defendant fraudulently violated
the provisions of the MOA.
CA: Affirmed RTC. It stated that rescission referred to here is predicated on the breach of
faith by the appellant which breach is violative of the reciprocity between the parties. It is
noted that appellee has partly complied with its own obligation, while the appellant has not.
It is, therefore, the right of the injured party to ask for rescission because the guilty party
cannot ask for rescission.
SC: RTC and CA affirmed.
DOCTRINE:
1. This case was resolved based on the plain meaning rule of the provision of the 1 st MOA
pursuant to Art 1373, NCC.
2. Novation extinguishes an obligation between two parties when there is a substitution of
objects or debtors or when there is subrogation of the creditor. It occurs only when the new
contract declares so in unequivocal terms or that the old and the new obligations be on
every point incompatible with each other.
For novation to take place, the following requisites must concur:
1) There must be a previous valid obligation.
2) The parties concerned must agree to a new contract.
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3) The old contract must be extinguished.

4) There must be a valid new contract.
Novation may also be express or implied. It is express when the new obligation declares in
unequivocal terms that the old obligation is extinguished. It is implied when the new
obligation is incompatible with the old one on every point. The test of incompatibility is
whether the two obligations can stand together, each one with its own independent
existence. Because novation requires that it be clear and unequivocal, it is never presumed,
In the civil law setting, novatio is literally construed as to make new. So it is deeply rooted in
the Roman Law jurisprudence, the principle novatio non praesumitur that novation is
never presumed. At bottom, for novation to be a jural reality, its animus must be ever
present, debitum pro debito basically extinguishing the old obligation for the new one.
3. The test of incompatibility is whether or not the two obligations can stand together, each
one having its independent existence. If they cannot, they are incompatible and the latter
obligation novates the first. Corollarily, changes that breed incompatibility must be essential
in nature and not merely accidental. The incompatibility must take place in any of the
essential elements of the obligation, such as its object, cause or principal conditions thereof;
otherwise, the change would be merely modificatory in nature and insufficient to extinguish
the original obligation
4. Applying Article 1185, NCC, the parties are obligated to return to each other all they have
received, since the share purchase agreement was never executed. Rescission (under 1191)
does not merely terminate the contract and release the parties from further obligations to
each other, but abrogates the contract from its inception and restores the parties to their
original positions as if no contract has been made. Consequently, mutual restitution (under
1385), which entails the return of the benefits that each party may have received as a result
of the contract, is thus required. To be sure, it has been settled that the effects of rescission
as provided for in Article 1385 of the Code are equally applicable to cases under Article
1191.
For Article 1191 to be applicable, however, there must be reciprocal prestations as
distinguished from mutual obligations between or among the parties. A prestation is the
object of an obligation, and it is the conduct required by the parties to do or not to do, or to
give. Parties may be mutually obligated to each other, but the prestations of these
obligations are not necessarily reciprocal. The reciprocal prestations must necessarily
emanate from the same cause that gave rise to the existence of the contract.
This is different from Article 1381 and Article 1383, which pertain to rescission where
creditors or even third persons not privy to the contract can file an action due to lesion or
damage as a result of the contract. When a party seeks the relief of rescission as provided in
Article 1381, there is no need for reciprocal prestations to exist between or among the
parties. All that is required is that the contract should be among those enumerated in Article
1381 for the contract to be considered rescissible. Unlike Article 1191, rescission under
Article 1381 must be a subsidiary action because of Article 1383. Further, fraud is not
necessary in an action for rescission or resolution under Article 1191. The existence of fraud
must be established if the rescission prayed for is the rescission under Article 1381.
The rescission on account of breach of stipulations is not predicated on injury to economic
interests of the party plaintiff but on the breach of faith by the defendant, that violates the
reciprocity between the parties. It is not a subsidiary action, and Article 1191 may be
scanned without disclosing anywhere that the action for rescission thereunder is
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subordinated to anything other than the culpable breach of his obligations by the defendant.
This rescission is a principal action retaliatory in character, it being unjust that a party be
held bound to fulfill his promises when the other violates his. As expressed in the old Latin
aphorism: Non servanti fidem, non est fides servanda. Hence, the reparation of damages
for the breach is purely secondary.
On the contrary, in the rescission by reason of lesion or economic prejudice, the cause of
action is subordinated to the existence of that prejudice, because it is the raison detre as
well as the measure of the right to rescind. Hence, where the defendant makes good the
damages caused, the action cannot be maintained or continued, as expressly provided in
Articles 1383 and 1384. But the operation of these two articles is limited to the cases of
rescission for lesin enumerated in Article 1381 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, and does
not apply to cases under Article 1191.
5. The degree of evidence needed to prove the existence of fraud under 1338:
[T]he standard of proof required is clear and convincing evidence. This standard of proof is
derived from American common law. It is less than proof beyond reasonable doubt (for
criminal cases) but greater than preponderance of evidence (for civil cases). The degree of
believability is higher than that of an ordinary civil case. Civil cases only require a
preponderance of evidence to meet the required burden of proof. However, when fraud is
alleged in an ordinary civil case involving contractual relations, an entirely different standard
of proof needs to be satisfied. The imputation of fraud in a civil case requires the
presentation of clear and convincing evidence. Mere allegations will not suffice to sustain the
existence of fraud. The burden of evidence rests on the part of the plaintiff or the party
alleging fraud. The quantum of evidence is such that fraud must be clearly and convincingly
shown.
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BPI (formerly, Prudential Bank) v Sps. Castro
GR no 195272; 14 January 2015; Perez, J.
SUMMARY:
There are two loans contracted by Sps Castro from Prudential Bank in the amounts of P
100,000 and 55,000.00. The P100,000.00 loan was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage (REM)
over petitioners' property located in Quezon City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 364277 while the P55,000.00 loan was secured by another REM over two parcels
of land located in Alaminos, Laguna covered by TCT Nos. T-2225 and T-2226, registered in
the name of Davids mother, Guellerma Malabanan. The loans remain unpaid, thus,
Prudential filed two separate petitions for foreclosure.
The controversy arose because, as Prudential Bank admitted in their first petition, through
inadvertence, the photocopies of the first two pages of the REM covering the properties in
Laguna were mixed and attached to the photocopies of the last two pages of the REM
covering the Quezon City property. Now in the Notice of Sheriffs Sale, the name Guellerma
Malabanan rep. by her AIF David M. Castro appeared as mortgagor while the amount of
mortgaged indebtedness is P96,870.20 (55,000 loan plus interest). The real property
described therein however is the Quezon City property. The QC property was sold at a public
auction in favour of Prudential whose winning bid was P 396,000.
Sps Castro filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Sheriffs Certificate of Sale and
Damages against Prudential Bank alleging that the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of the
Quezon City property is null and void for lack of notice and publication of the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale. Spouses Castro proffered that the property foreclosed is not one of the
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properties covered by the REM executed by Guellerma Malabanan which was the basis of the
Notice of Sheriffs Sale which was posted and published.
RTC: Complaint dismissed. It found that there is no substantial defect on the notice,
objective of notice was attained since there was sufficient publicity of the sale through
newspaper publication and that there was no showing that the property was sold for a price
far below its value, an intimation of collusion between the sheriff who conducted the sale
and the bank
CA: Reversed RTC. Erroneous designation of Guellerma Malabanan as mortgagor, instead
of David, did not affect the validity of the notice. However, with respect to the amount of
the mortgaged indebtedness, the discrepancy vis-a-vis the actual amount owed by Spouses
Castro is significant.
Declaring a small amount of indebtedness in the petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure and in the notice of sheriffs sale would effectively depreciate the
value of the property. Slight deviation from the statutory requirements invalidate the
notices.
SC: Affirmed RTC.
DOCTRINE:
1. Foreclosure proceedings have in their favor the presumption of regularity and the party
who seeks to challenge the proceedings has the burden of evidence to rebut the same. In
this case, respondent failed to prove that Prudential Bank has not complied with the notice
requirement of the law.
2. Most important requirements of Act No. 3135 is that the notice of the time and place of
sale shall be given. If the sheriff acts without notice, or at a time and place other than that
designated in the notice, the sheriff acts without warrant of law. Both time and place were
given in this case.
3. Object of a notice of sale is to inform the public of the nature and condition of the
property to be sold, and of the time, place and terms of the sale. Notices are given for the
purpose of securing bidders and to prevent a sacrifice of the property. If these objects are
attained, immaterial errors and mistakes will not affect the sufficiency of the notice; but if
mistakes or omissions occur in the notices of sale, which are calculated to deter or mislead
bidders, to depreciate the value of the property, or to prevent it from bringing a fair price,
such mistakes or omissions will be fatal to the validity of the notice, and also to the sale
made pursuant thereto. The mistakes and omissions referred to in the above-cited ruling
which would invalidate notice pertain to those which: 1) are calculated to deter or mislead
bidders, 2) to depreciate the value of the property, or 3) to prevent it from bringing a fair
price. IN THIS CASE, there was no intention to mislead, as the errors in fact did not mislead
the bidders as shown by the fact that the winning registered bid of P396,000.00 is over and
above the real amount of indebtedness of P209,205.05. The amount mentioned in the
notice did not indicate a collusion between the sheriff who conducted the sale and the
respondent bank. Further, as mentioned in the notice, amount excludes penalties, charges,
attorneys fees and all legal fees and expenses for the foreclosure and sale.
4. Erroneous designation of an entity as the mortgagor does not invalidate the notice of sale.
The notice rule was complied with when the Notice of Sheriffs Sale was published in
Philippine Recorder, a national newspaper of general circulation once a week for three
consecutive weeks. Further, foreclosure procedure is supported by Affidavit of Publication,
Notice of Sheriffs Sale, Sheriffs Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Posting, and Minutes of the
Auction Sale. Indubitably, these documents evidenced the regular and lawful conduct of the
foreclosure proceedings.
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_________________________________________________________________________________
RICARDO HONRADO v GMA NETWORK FILMS, INC
GR no 204702; 14 January 2015; Carpio, J.
SUMMARY:
GMA entered into a TV Rights Agreement with Honrado under which Honrado, as licensor of
36 films, granted to GMA Films, for a fee (three instalments), the exclusive right to telecast
the the films for a period of three years. Under Paragraph 3 of the Agreement, the parties
agreed that all betacam copies of the [films] should pass through broadcast quality test
conducted by GMA-7. The parties also agreed to subject the films for approval by MTRCB,
and in the event of disapproval, LICENSOR [Petitioner] will either replace the censored
PROGRAMME TITLES with another title which is mutually acceptable to both parties or,
failure to do such, a proportionate reduction from the total price shall either be deducted or
refunded whichever is the case by the LICENSOR OR LICENSEE [GMA Films]
Two of the films covered by the Agreement were Evangeline Katorse and Bubot for which
GMA Films paid P1.5 million each. In 2003, GMA sued for breach of contract and breach of
trust praying for a sum of money representing the fee it paid for Evangeline Katorse (P1.5
million) and a portion of the fee it paid for Bubot (P350,000) that was not remitted by
Honrado to the filmowners of Bubot.
As regards Katorse, GMA rejected the film because its running time was too short for
telecast. Honrado replaced it with Winasak na Pangarap, to which GMA issued a
certification attesting that such film is of good broadcast quality. Now, GMA was alleging
that it rejected Winasak despite the certification because of its substantial content as being
bold.
As regards Bubot, GMA paid 1.5M, but Honrado remitted only 900,000 to the owners. GMA
alleges that since an implied trust arose between the parties as petitioner fraudulently kept
the unremitted amount for himself.
RTC: Complaint dismissed. RTC gave credence that Winasak validly replaced Katorse,
and that, as regards Bubot, no implied trust was formed since there is no proof that
petitioner pocketed any portion of the fee in question.
CA: Granted appeal of GMA. Winasak is not a valid replacement since it was boldand
GMA has authority to reject under Par4 of agreement. As regards Bubot, there is an impled
trust since nowhere in the TV Rights Agreement does it provide that the licensor is entitled
to any commission x x x [hence] x x x [petitioner] Honrado cannot claim any portion of the
purchase price paid for by x x x GMA Films.
SC: Affirmed RTC.
DOCTRINE:
1. There is no breach of contract/trust since the stipulated basis of film replacement is
MTRCBs disapproval. regardless of the import of the Film Certification, GMA Films rejection
of Winasak na Pangarap finds no basis in the Agreement. In terms devoid of any ambiguity,
Paragraph 4 of the Agreement requires the intervention of MTRCB, the state censor, before
GMA Films can reject a film and require its replacement. Specifically, Paragraph 4 requires
that MTRCB, after reviewing a film listed in the Agreement, disapprove or X-rate it for
telecasting. GMA Films does not allege, and we find no proof on record indicating, that
MTRCB reviewed Winasak na Pangarap and X-rated it. In doing so, GMA Network went
beyond its assigned role under the Agreement of screening films to test their broadcast
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quality and assumed the function of MTRCB to evaluate the films for the propriety of their
content. This runs counter to the clear terms of Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Agreement.
2. There is no breach of trust since Disposal of the Fees Paid to Petitioner is Outside of the
Terms of the Agreement. Further, SC decided not to rule on the existence of an implied trust
since GMA is not a party to the agreements made by Honrado and the film owners. The
Agreement is a licensing contract, the essence of which is the transfer by the licensor
(petitioner) to the licensee (GMA Films), for a fee, of the exclusive right to telecast the films
listed in the Agreement. Stipulations for payment of commission to the licensor is
incongruous to the nature of such contracts unless the licensor merely acted as agent of the
film owners. Nowhere in the Agreement, however, did the parties stipulate that petitioner
signed the contract in such capacity. On the contrary, the Agreement repeatedly refers to
petitioner as licensor and GMA Films as licensee. Nor did the parties stipulate that the
fees paid by GMA Films for the films listed in the Agreement will be turned over by petitioner
to the film owners. Instead, the Agreement merely provided that the total fees will be paid in
three instalments.
_________________________________________________________________________________
NPC v. MARUHOM ET AL
G.R. No. 175863; Feb. 18, 2015; Perez, J.
SUMMARY:
NPC took possession of a land in Marawi City for the purpose of building a hydroelectric
power plant. The land was in truth registered under a TCT in the name of respondent
Mangondato, but the NPC thought it was part of public land reserved for the use of govt.
When respondent discovered NPCs occupation of the land, he demanded compensation
from NPC. NPC initially rejected such claim of ownership, but eventually acknowledged
Mangondatos right to receive compensation therefor. However, they failed to yield a
consensus as to the FMV of the land. Thus, Mangondato filed a complaint for reconveyance
against NPC, while the NPC filed an expropriation complaint both with the RTC. The RTC
upheld NPCs right to expropriate and denied respondents claim for reconveyance, but still
requiring NPC to pay rentals for the occupation of the land. NPC appeal to the CA because it
disagreed with the amount of just compensation adjudged. During the pendency of the
appeal, the respondents Ibrahims and Maruhoms filed a complaint against Mangondato and
NPC, claiming that they are the real owners of the land. The CA denied the appeal, which
was upheld by the SC. The RTC then ruled in the second case that the Ibrahims and the
Maruhoms are the real owners of the land, however reconveyance cannot happen since the
land had already been expropriated. It declared the Ibrahims and Maruhoms as the rightful
recipients of the rental fees and indemnity for the expropriation, holding Mangondato and
NPC solidarily liable to the former for such amount. CA denied NPCs appeal. The SC held
that NPC cant be held solidarily liable with Mangondato. NPC was not in bad faith when it
paid Mangondato, since such was required by the finaly and executor decision in the prior
civil case. Even if the Ibrahims and the Maruhoms are the real owners, such payment by NPC
to Mangondato extinguished NPCs obligation since Mangondato can be considered a
possessor of credit pursuant to Art. 1242 CC.
DOCTRINE:
A finding of bad faith, thus, usually assumes the presence of 2 elements: first, that the actor
knew or should have known that a particular course of action is wrong or illegal, and second,
that despite such actual or imputable knowledge, the actor, voluntarily, consciously and out
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of his own free will, proceeds with such course of action. Only with the concurrence of these
two elements can we begin to consider that the wrong committed had been done
deliberately and, thus, in bad faith.
Article 1242 of the Civil Code is an exception to the rule that a valid payment of an
obligation can only be made to the person to whom such obligation is rightfully owed. It
contemplates a situation where a debtor pays a possessor of credit i.e., someone who is
not the real creditor but appears, under the circumstances, to be the real creditor. In such
scenario, the law considers the payment to the possessor of credit as valid even as
against the real creditor taking into account the good faith of the debtor.
_________________________________________________________________________________
IMELDA ET. AL v BONIFACIO and VSD REALTY & DEVT CORP.
G.R. Nos. 148748; 14 January 2015; Leonardo-de Castro, J.
SUMMARY:
Petitioners are registered co-owners of the subject land under a TCT. They have been in
open, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the subject land, by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest, since 1926. Further, they are paying the real
property taxes over the subject land since 1949. Among the annotations on the TCT are two
encumbrances:
(1) a lease agreement dated September 24, 1963, in favor of
Manufacturers Bank and Trust Company (Manufacturers Bank), over a portion of the subject
land, with the condition that the buildings which the lessee had constructed thereon shall
become the property of the lessor/s after the expiration of the lease agreement; and (2)
another lease agreement dated December 20, 1971, in favor of a certain Chan Heng, over
the remaining portion of the subject land.
The problem arose when the petitioners found out that the land was being sold to a certain
Louis Ong. The purported owner, respondent Bonifacio, was the sub-lessee of Kalayaan
Development Corporation, which, in turn, was the sub-lessee of Manufacturers Bank, which
was the direct lessee of petitioners. Petitioners also learned that respondent Bonifacio was
able to register the subject land in her name under another TCT (it must be noted that the
technical description in this TCT is different from that of the TCT of petitioner and it was
issued pursuant to another RTCs Order.) Thus, petitioners filed declaration of nullity and
cancellation of respondent Bonifacios TCT which was taken by the RTC as a petition for
quieting of title. Subsequently, petitioners discovered that respondent Bonifacio sold the
subject land in favor of respondent VSD Realty & Development Corporation (VSD Realty),
RTC: Dismissed the petition. It noted the bare differences in the land areas and lot
numbers contained therein, and concluded that said technical descriptions were not one and
the same, appreciating the testimony of several engineers of DENR and Land Management
Services. It also upheld Bonifacios TCT.
CA: Dismissed the appeal. It ruled that since respondent Bonifacio is the owner of the
subject land, validly registered in her name, she is within her rights in selling said property
to respondent VSD Realty, making the latters TCT No. 285313 also valid. Petitioners cannot
attact Bonifacios TCT collaterally. It further stated that where two TCTs purport to include
the same land, the earlier in date prevails. Hence, in point of priority in issuance, the title of
Bonifacio prevails over that of the [petitioners].
SC: Reversed RTC and CA. Declared Bonifacios TCT null and void.
DOCTRINE:
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When is an action an attack on a title? It is when the object of the action or

proceeding is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the
title was decreed. The attack is direct when the object of an action or proceeding is to
annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the
attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on
the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. This case is a direct attack on
title.
As a general rule, action to quiet title prescribes after one year from and after the date
of the entry of such decree of registration. (Section 32, PD 1529). However, the filing of
an action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the disputed real property is in the possession
of the plaintiff. One who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be owner
thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking
steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being that his undisturbed possession
gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and
determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title,
which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession. The rule on the
incontrovertibility or indefeasibility of title has no application when contending parties
claim ownership over the subject land based on their respective certificates of title
thereon which originated from different sources. A TCT is not conclusive evidence of title if
it is shown that the same land had already been registered and that an earlier certificate
for the same land is in existence.
Those titles derived from any title that traces its source to an OCT declared by
the SC as null and void (pursuant to previous rulings) is void, for such mother
title is inexistent.
_________________________________________________________________________________
HORTIZUELA v. TAGUFA
G.R. No. 205867; Feb. 23, 2015; Mendoza, J.
SUMMARY:
Petitioner filed a complaint for reconveyance and recovery of possession with damages
against respondents with the MCTC in Isabela. Petitioner alleged that the landwas originally
owned by her parents, though it was mortgaged with the DBP. For failure to redeem the
property, DBP foreclosed and sold it to Atty. Marquez, who in turn sold it to the husband of
one of the defendants, using the fund sent by petitioner who was in America and with the
agreement that the husband will reconvey the property.
MTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, ruling that plaintiffs resorted to a wrong
cause of action. RTC reversed. CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision, ruling that the
complaint was also questioning the validity of the Torrens title over the land, which is in
violation of Sec. 48 of PD 1529 which provides that a certificate is not subject to collateral
attack. SC ruled that the complaint for reconveyance was not a collateral attack on the title,
and was the proper remedy for Petitioner.
DOCTRINE:
A Torrens title cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law. When the Court says direct attack, it means that the object of an action
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is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the
attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the
judgment or proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.
An action for reconveyance is a recognized remedy, an action in personam, available to a
person whose property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in anothers
name. In an action for reconveyance, the decree is not sought to be set aside. It does not
seek to set aside the decree but, respecting it as incontrovertible and no longer open to
review, seeks to transfer or reconvey the land from the registered owner to the rightful
owner. Reconveyance is always available as long as the property has not passed to an
innocent third person for value.
A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property
described therein. It cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner; nor can it be
used as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich himself at
the expense of others. Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose the
possibility that the real property may be co-owned with persons not named in the certificate,
or that it may be held in trust for another person by the registered owner.
The indefeasibility of a title over land previously public is not a bar to an investigation by the
Director of Lands as to how such title has been acquired, if the purpose of such investigation
is to determine whether or not fraud had been committed in securing such title in order that
the appropriate action for reversion may be filed by the Government.
A private individual may bring an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land even if the title
thereof was issued through a free patent since such action does not aim or purport to reopen the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration, but only to show
that the person who secured the registration of the questioned property is not the real
owner thereof.
_________________________________________________________________________________
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPS. JOSE CASTUERA AND PERLA
CASTUERA
G.R. No. 203384; January 14, 2015; Carpio, J.
SUMMARY:
Spouses Castuera filed an application for original registration of title over the property. The
RP filed an opposition thereto. RTC and CA granted the application. The SC reversed the CA.
The advance plan and the CENRO certification are insufficient proofs of the alienable and
disposable character of the property. They must present a certified true copy of the DENR
Sec.s declaration or classification of the land as alienable and disposable
DOCTRINE:
It is not enough for the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) or
CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration
must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the
land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by
the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant must present a copy of the original
classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary,
or as proclaimed by the President. Such copy of the DENR Secretarys declaration or the
Presidents proclamation must be certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of such
official record. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.
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_________________________________________________________________________________
UNGAY MALOBAGO MINES, INC. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 187892; January 14, 2015; Peralta, J.
SUMMARY:
Ungay Malobago Mines, Inc. filed with the RTC a petition for reconstitution of an OCT
pursuant to RA 26 and PD 1529. RTC, CA and SC denied the petition. Ungay admitted that it
was not the owner of the land on which the mining patent was issued as the same was
owned and registered in the name of Rapu Rapu Minerals Inc. Hence, it is not possessed of a
legal personality to institute a petition for judicial reconstitution of the alleged lost of the
OCT. The reconstitution in this case does not only refer to a registered interest which was
noted on an additional sheet of a certificate of title but the reconstitution of a lost certificate.
Therefore, its reliance on Section 11 to support its claim that it can file for the reconstitution
of the OCT is misplaced.
DOCTRINE:
The persons who can file the petition for reconstitution of a lost certificate are the registered
owner, his assigns or persons in interest in the property.
A petition for judicial reconstitution of a registered interest, lien or encumbrance, may be
filed only when the certificate of title affected has not been totally destroyed, that is, when
said certificate of title is composed of more than one sheet and only the portion of the
additional sheet, on which such interest, lien or encumbrance was noted is missing.
_________________________________________________________________________________
STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. v. SPOUSES RUNE AND LEA
STROEM
G.R. No. 204689; January 21, 2015; Leonen, J.
SUMMARY:
Spouses Stroem entered into an owners contractor agreement with Asis-Leif and Co., Inc. for
the construction of a house. Pursuant to the agreement, Asis-Leif secured a performance
bond from Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. Due to Asis-Leifs failure to finish the project on
time despite the repeated demands, the spouses filed a complaint for breach of contract and
sum of money against Asis-Leif, Ms. Asis Leif and Stronghold. The RTC and CA ruled in favor
of the spouses. The case involves the proper invocation of the Construction Industry
Arbitration Committees jurisdiction through an arbitration clause in a construction contract.
The court ruled that not being a party to a construction agreement, petitioner Stronghold
cannot invoke the arbitration clause. It cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the CIAC.
DOCTRINE:
Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns, and heirs.
_________________________________________________________________________________
GE BANK v. SPOUSES DIZON
G.R. No. 184301; March 23, 2015; J. Peralta
SUMMARY: Spouses Dizon obtained a loan from petitioner bank secured by way of REM
over the subject property. Spouses defaulted on their payments and despite demand were
unable to pay. This prompted the bank to institute extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings
over the subject property. The Bank was the highest bidder for the sum of P180k. Within the
1 year redemption period, the Spouses tendered and gave only P90k which was less than
the redemption rpice. Nonetheless, the bank accepted said price.
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The Bank then consolidated its title over the subject property. The Spouses Dizon manifested
their desire to re-acquire the subject property, but the Bank declined to entertain the same
as they still failed to tender the full amount of the redemption price. The spouses thus filed
the present action to recover ownership over the subject property.
RTC ruled in favor of the spouses holding that there was substantial compliance in the
redemption. CA affirmed.
In SC, the Court reversed CA holding that the
redemption of the subject property.
Spouses Dizon failed to effect a valid
DOCTRINE: The right of redemption should be exercised within the period required by law,
which should be counted not from the date of foreclosure sale but from the time the
certificate of sale is registered with the Register of Deeds. Fixing a definite term within which
a property should be redeemed is meant to avoid prolonged economic uncertainty over the
ownership of the thing sold.
Redemption within the period allowed by law is not a matter of intent but a question of
payment or valid tender of the full redemption price. It is irrelevant whether the mortgagor
is diligent in asserting his or her willingness to pay. What counts is that the full amount of
the redemption price must be actually paid; otherwise, the offer to redeem will be ineffectual
and the purchaser may justly refuse acceptance of any sum that is less than the entire
amount.
The general rule in redemption is that it is not sufficient that a person offering to redeem
manifests his/her desire to do so. The statement of intention must be accompanied by an
actual and simultaneous tender of payment. This constitutes the exercise of the right to
repurchase. Bona fide redemption necessarily implies a reasonable and valid tender of the
entire purchase price, otherwise, the rule on the redemption period fixed by law can easily
be circumvented. There is no cogent reason for requiring the vendee to accept payment by
installments from the redemptioner, as it would ultimately result in an indefinite extension of
the redemption period.
To be valid and effective, the offer to redeem must be accompanied by an actual tender of
the redemption price. Redemption price should either be fully offered in legal tender or
validly consigned in court. Only by such means can the auction winner be assured that the
offer to redeem is being made in good faith.
The right to redeem becomes functus officio on the date of its expiry, and its exercise after
the period is not really one of redemption but a repurchase. Distinction must be made
because redemption is by force of law; the purchaser at public auction is bound to accept
redemption. Repurchase, however, of foreclosed property, after redemption period, imposes
no such obligation. After expiry, the purchaser may or may not re-sell the property but no
law will compel him to do so. And, he is not bound by the bid price; it is entirely within his
discretion to set a higher price, for after all, the property already belongs to him as owner.
Considering that the creditor-mortgagee is a banking institution, the determination of the
redemption price is governed by Section 78 of Republic Act No. 337 or The General Banking
Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1828, the amount at which the foreclosed
property is redeemable is the amount due under the mortgage deed, or the outstanding
obligation of the mortgagor plus interest and expenses in accordance with Section 78 of the
General Banking Act. It cannot be denied is that the amount of P90,000.00 paid by the
Spouses Dizon during the redemption period is less than half of P181,956.72 paid by the
Bank at the extrajudicial foreclosure sale held on September 13, 1993. If only to prove their
willingness and ability to pay, the Spouses Dizon could have tendered a redemption price
that they believe as the correct amount or consigned the same.
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_________________________________________________________________________________
NEW WORLD DEVELOPERS v. AMA COMPUTER LEARNING CENNTER
G.R. Nos. 187930 & 188250; Feb. 23, 2015; Sereno, CJ
SUMMARY:
AMA entered into a contract of lease for the entire 2nd floor of New Worlds building for an 8yr. period. The contract provided that AMA may preterminate the contract by sending notice
in writing atleast 6 mos. before the intended date, and that AMA shall be liable for an
amount equivalent to 6 mos. current rental as liquidated damages. However, 6 yrs into the
contract, AMA removed all its office equipment and furniture, and sent a letter to New World
stating that it preterminated the contract effective immediately on the ground of business
losses due to a drastic decline in enrolment. It also demanded the refund of its advance
rental and security deposit. New World countered that AMA had unpaid rent, which was not
sufficiently answered for by the advance rental and security deposit. Thus, New World, filed
a complaint for a sum of money and damages against AMA. RTC ordered AMA to pay the
unpaid rentals and damages, ruling that AMA never denied the unpaid rent. CA affirmed but
reduced the amount of liquidated damages from 6 mos. worth to 4 mos. SC reinstated the
RTC ruling on liquidated damages, and added exemplary damages. However, it ruled that
the unpaid rentals have been extinguished by applying the advance rental and the security
deposit. The remaining amount for liquidated damages shall bear interest at the rate of 6%
per annum.
DOCTRINE:
The law does not relieve a party from the consequences of a contract it entered into with all
the required formalities. Courts have no power to ease the burden of obligations voluntarily
assumed by parties, just because things did not turn out as expected at the inception of the
contract.
In the sphere of personal and contractual relations governed by laws, rules and regulations
created to promote justice and fairness, equity is deserved, not demanded. The application
of equity necessitates a balancing of the equities involved in a case, for he who seeks
equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Persons
in dire straits are never justified in trampling on other persons rights. Litigants shall be
denied relief if their conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest as to the
controversy in issue.
Exemplary damages are designed by our civil law to permit the courts to reshape behaviour
that is socially deleterious in its consequence by creating negative incentives or deterrents
against such behaviour. As such, they may be awarded even when not pleaded or prayed
for.
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CRIMINAL
People v. Casacop
G.R. 208685; March 9, 2015; Leonen, J.
SUMMARY:
An information was filed against Casacop stating that he sold and delivered shabu to a
poseur buyer. The RTC of San Pedro, Laguna found Casacop guilty of violating Sec. 5 of
Dangerous Drugs Act (RA 9165). The CA affirmed the conviction. The issue for resolution
before the SC was whether or not the guilty of Casacop was proven beyond reasonable
doubt. The SC granted Casacops appeal and acquitted him. The Court said that the chain of
custody as provided in Sec. 21 of RA 9165 was not observed. The prosecution failed to show
that the integrity of the seized item was preserved. The arresting officers statement that he
saw Casacop hand over something creates reasonable doubt whether the item given by
the poseur-buyer to the police is the same something that Casacop allegedly gave the
poseur-buyer. As regards marking the seized item, in the absence of specifics on how, when
and where the markings were done and who witnessed the marking procedure, the Court
cannot accept markings as compliance with required chain of custody requirement. By
failing to establish the identity of the corpus delicti, non-compliance with Sec. 21 of RA 9165
indicates a failure to establish an element of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
The Court also noted that the non-presentation of the poseur-buyer also defeats the case of
the prosecution, since the poseur-buyer had personal knowledge of the transaction since he
conducted the actual transaction.
DOCTRINES:
The elements of Sec. 5 of RA 8196 are: 1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object
and the consideration; and 2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. What is
material is the proof that the transaction actually took place, coupled with the presentation
before the court of the corpus delicti.
In dangerous drugs cases, the corpus delicti is the dangerous drug itself. Thus, it is
imperative that the integrity of the seized dangerous drug be preserved.
People v. Remigio restated the chain of custody required in buy-bust operations as follows:
First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused
by the apprehending officer;
Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer;
Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and,
Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic
chemist to the court.
Compliance with the chain of custody requirement provided by Sec.21 ensures the integrity
of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in four respects:
first, the nature of the substance or items seized; second, the quantity of the substances or
items seized; third, the relation of the substances or items seized to the incident allegedly
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causing their seizure; and fourth, the relation of the substances or items seized to the
person/s alleged to have been in possession or peddling them. Compliance with this
requirement forecloses opportunities for planting, contaminating, or tempering of evidence
in any manner.
_________________________________________________________________________________
PEOPLE v. CHARLIE OROSCO
G.R. No. 209227; March 25, 2015; Villarama, J.
SUMMARY:
Orosco, along with 2 other men, were charged with robbery with homicide under Art. 294 of
the RPC after robbing the store of Lourdes Yap. She was later stabbed in the chest and died.
A witness, Albert Arca, another customer buying at the store of Yap, testified and identified
Oroscos companions, and not the appellant himself. Oroscos defense was that he was at
home on the date and time of the alleged incident. He also reiterated that the witness could
not point to him during the trial, hence he could not be imputed to the homicide (and cannot
be charged with the complex crime; if anything, only the robbery.) The RTC convicted him of
the crime charged. The CA upheld the conviction. The SC denied Oroscos petition. Both the
trial and appellate courts found the testimony of the lone eyewitness Arca convincing,
notwithstanding his slow narration and initial desistance from physically pointing out the
appellant. The Supreme Court also held that the prosecution clearly showed that the
appellant acted in conspiracy with his co-accused since he held the victim, allowing the
other accused to stab her. Hence he should be charged with the complex crime with robbery
with homicide.
DOCTRINE:
When a homicide takes place by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who
took part shall be guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide whether they
actually participated in the killing, unless there is proof that there was an endeavor to
prevent the killing. There was no evidence adduced in this case that the appellant
attempted to prevent the killing. Thus, regardless of the acts individually performed by the
appellant and his co-accused, and applying the basic principle in conspiracy that the act of
one is the act of all, the appellant is guilty as a co-conspirator. As a result, the criminal
liabilities of the appellant and his co-accused are one and the same.
_________________________________________________________________________________
CHERRY ANN M. BENABAYE V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 203466; February 25, 2015; PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
SUMMARY:
Petitioner was the Loans Bookkeeper of Siam Bank. Sometime in 2001, the bank conducted
an audit investigation of its loan transactions, and thereby found out that fraud and certain
irregularities attended the same. Specifically, it discovered the non-remittance of some loan
payments received from its clients based on the provisional receipts issued by its account
officers, as well as the daily collection reports corresponding to the said provisional receipts.
In a memorandum, the Bank directed Benabaye and her supervisor (Tupag) to explain,
among others, the discrepancies between the provisional receipts she had issued and the
unremitted money involved. Likewise, the Bank made a final demand upon them to return
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the amount of the money involved. Apparently dissatisfied with their explanations, Siam
Bank terminated them and also filed a criminal case for Estafa against them.
RTC found both of them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa. CA affirmed petitioners
conviction for Estafa (her supervisors appeal was denied). Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari.
SC: Records show that Benabaye was merely a collector of loan payments from Siam Bank's
clients. As an employee of Siam Bank, specifically, its temporary cash custodian whose
tasks are akin to a bank teller, she had no juridical possession over the missing
funds but only their physical or material possession. Also, Benabaye's discharge for the
crime of Estafa is applicable to Tupag.
Doctrine:
The elements of Estafa: (a) the offender's receipt of money, goods, or other personal
property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (b) misappropriation or conversion by
the offender of the money or property received, or denial of receipt of the money or
property; (c) the misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
(d) demand by the offended party that the offender return the money or property received.
Under the first element, when the money, goods, or any other personal property is received by
the offender from the offended party (1) in trust or (2) on commission or (3) for administration,
the offender acquires both material or physical possession and juridical possession of the thing
received. Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right
over the thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner.
It bears to stress that a sum of money received by an employee on behalf of an

employer is considered to be only in the material possession of the employee. The
material possession of an employee is adjunct, by reason of his employment, to a
recognition of the juridical possession of the employer. So long as the juridical possession of
the thing appropriated did not pass to the employee-perpetrator, the offense committed
remains to be theft, qualified or otherwise. Hence, conversion of personal property in
the case of an employee having mere material possession of the said property
constitutes theft, whereas in the case of an agent to whom both material and
juridical possession have been transferred, misappropriation of the same
property constitutes Estafa.
Guzman v. CA: There is an essential distinction between the possession of a receiving teller
of funds received from third persons paid to the bank, and an agent who receives the
proceeds of sales of merchandise delivered to him in agency by his principal. In the former
case, payment by third persons to the teller is payment to the bank itself; the
teller is a mere custodian or keeper of the funds received, and has no
independent right or title to retain or possess the same as against the bank. An
agent, on the other hand, can even assert, as against his own principal, an independent,
autonomous, right to retain the money or goods received in consequence of the agency; as
when the principal fails to reimburse him for advances he has made, and indemnify him for
damages suffered without his fault.
_________________________________________________________________________________
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. DOMINGO GALLANO y JARANILLA
G.R. No. 184762; February 25, 2015; BERSAMIN, J.
SUMMARY:
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On Jan 2, 2003, in Silay City, Gallano allegedly had carnal knowledge with his niece
(daughter of his wifes sister), AAA, a 12-year-old minor, against the latter's will. Gallano
denied the charge and insisted that he was working in the sugarcane field at the time the
alleged rape was committed. RTC: AAAs testimony is credible, and it had not been
established convincingly that it was physically impossible for Gallano to be present at the
scene of the crime; thus, it convicted Gallano of rape, qualified by minority and relationship.
Gallano is sentenced to a death penalty. CA affirmed with modification due to RA 9346,
death penalty was prohibited, hence, only reclusion perpetua should be imposed on Gallano.
SC affirmed the conviction of Gallano, however, the characterization of the crime as qualified
rape is set aside. He could be held guilty only of simple rape and be charged with a penalty
of reclusion perpetua. Although Gallano's relationship with AAA went uncontroverted
because both he and BBB had testified that they were legally married, AAA's minority was
not thereby competently established no birth certificate or any acceptable substitutionary
documentary evidence to prove AAA's age; the parties contradicting testimonies cast doubt
on BBB's personal knowledge of AAA's age and date of birth; and not only did Gallano
declare that he did not know how old AAA was at the time of the commission of the crime,
but also that he had been vague and indefinite on the matter as borne out by his tentative
response of "12 or 13 years old" when asked during cross-examination.
DOCTRINE:
To convict an accused charged with qualified rape instead of rape in its simple form not only
condemns him to a more serious offense but also exposes him to an even greater liability. As
such, the State is mandated to sufficiently allege in the information and to competently
prove during trial the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship with equal
certainty and clearness as the crime itself.
Rape is a crime that is almost always committed in isolation or in secret, usually leaving only
the victim to testify about the commission of the crime. As such, the accused may be
convicted of rape on the basis of the victim's sole testimony provided such testimony is
logical, credible, consistent and convincing. Moreover, the testimony of a young rape victim
is given full weight and credence considering that her denunciation against him for rape
would necessarily expose herself and her family to shame and perhaps ridicule.
In order that the accused is convicted of qualified rape under Art 266-B (1) RPC, two
requisites must be met, namely: (1) the victim must be a less than 18 years old; and (2) the
offender must either be related to the victim by consanguinity of by affinity within the third
civil degree, or is the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. These two requisites
must be both alleged and proved with absolute certainty. Otherwise, the accused could only
be held guilty of simple rape. The qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority
remain to be relevant in the crime of rape despite the abolition of the death penalty under
RA 9346. The accused's civil liability depends on the mode of rape he committed.
People v. Pruna controlling guidelines in evaluating evidence presented to prove a rape
victim's minority:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true
copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to
prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's
mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to
testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended
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party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under
the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of
the victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony
will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The
failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken
against him.
_________________________________________________________________________________
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. BENJAMIN CASAS Y VINTULAN
SUMMARY:
Two criminal Informations were filed before the RTC charging Casas of Murder of Joel and
Frustrated Murder of Eligio.
RTC found Casas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder (treachery was present - Casas
stabbed Joel twice when the latter slipped, fell, and lay prostrate, and in that position Joel
could not defend himself) and Attempted Homicide (circumstances that would qualify the
case to Murder were not attendant, and the prosecution was not able to prove that Casas
performed all the acts of execution which would consummate the Homicide nor show the
nature of Eligios wounds) the evidence on record did not support Casas theory of selfdefense, observing that the victims showed no unlawful aggression towards Casas.
Furthermore, Casas suffered only nine injuries, which did not, collectively or individually,
threaten his life at any time. Conversely, Joel was killed because of the stab wounds that
Casas inflicted, while Eligio was stabbed multiple times the second requirement under
Article 11 (1) of the RPC, i.e., the reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the
unlawful aggression, was non-existent.
CA affirmed but increased the amount of the damages awarded in order to conform with
recent jurisprudence. Hence, the appeal to SC.
SC: The appeal is partly meritorious. Casas should not be convicted of Murder (only of
Homicide re Joel) since the prosecution failed to prove the existence of treachery. Joel was
fully aware of the danger posed in assisting Eligio he knew that Casas was armed with a
knife and had just used the same on Eligio. Joel elected to intervene, and even armed
himself with a bamboo pole. It does not equally appear that Casas deliberately adopted
means in order to ensure that Joel had no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate Casas
just happened to stab Joel as the latter had just slipped on the floor when the former caught
up with him (Joel).
DOCTRINE:
Statutory basis of self-defense:
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RPC. Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1
Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances
concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Upon invoking the justifying circumstance of self-defense, the accused assumed the burden
of proving the justification of his act with clear and convincing evidence. This is because his
having admitted the killing required him to rely on the strength of his own evidence, not on
the weakness of the prosecutions evidence, which, even if it were weak, could not be
disbelieved in view of his admission.
There can be no self-defense unless the victim committed unlawful aggression
against the person who resorted to self-defense. For unlawful aggression to be
appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger
thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude, as against the one claiming selfdefense.
It is well-settled that the moment the first aggressor runs away, the unlawful aggression on
the part of the first aggressor ceases to exist; and when unlawful aggression ceases, the
defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor;
otherwise, retaliation, and not self-defense, is committed. Retaliation is not the same
as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured party already
ceased when the accused attacked him, while in self-defense the aggression was still
existing when the aggressor was injured by the accused.
The elements of Murder that the prosecution must establish are: (a) that a person was
killed; (b) that the accused killed him or her; (c) that the killing was attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) that the killing is not
parricide or infanticide.
To appreciate treachery, it must be shown that: (a) the means of execution employed gives
the victim no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (b) the methods of execution
were deliberately or consciously adopted; indeed, treachery cannot be presumed, it must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence.
People v. Se: The Court explained that the essence of treachery is the sudden, unexpected,
and unforeseen attack on the victim, without the slightest provocation on the latters
part. The victim must not have known the peril he was exposed to at the moment
of the attack. Should it appear, however, that the victim was forewarned of the
danger he was in, and, instead of fleeing from it he met it and was killed as a
result, then the qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be appreciated.
People v. Discalsota: the Court held that treachery cannot be appreciated in instances
when the victim had the opportunity to flee or defend himself.
Formula for the computation of loss of earning capacity is as follows: Net earning capacity =
Life Expectancy x [Gross Annual Income - Living Expenses (50% of gross annual income)],
where life expectancy = 2/3 (80 - the age of the deceased).
_________________________________________________________________________________
Gary Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva v Elpidio Malicse, Sr. and People of
the Philippines
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GR No 190912; January 12, 2015; Peralta, J.

SUMMARY:
Elpidio, who was inebriated, was cursed at by his nephew and his sister, causing him to slap
his sister. This started a commotion which eventually died down when the barangay
chairman came. Elpidio was sent home but later went back to his sisters house to apologize.
However, he was cursed at by his nephew and nephew-in-law. Angered by this, he kicked
down the door but was later beaten up by his relatives there (weapons: rattan stick,
tomahawk axe, lead pipe, piece of wood) causing several fractures in different parts of his
body. Despite his pleas for them to stop and the intervention of their neighbors, they
continued battering him and only stopped when a bystander fainted. He pretended to be
dead and was rushed to PGH. A case for Attempted Murder was filed against those who beat
him but only Fantastico (hacked him with a tomahawk) and Villanueva (hit Elpidio from
behind with a lead pipe) were found guilty (the Iguirons and Ballesteros were acquitted). MR
was denied. CA affirmed the RTC and denied the MR.
The SC dismissed the case. It held that the appeal by certiorari was improper as petitioners
raised questions of fact and not law. It also said that the information was not defective since
it stated all the elements of the crime charged (Sec 6 Rule 110 RoCP) and disregarded the
argument that the phrase not necessarily mortal in the information meant that there was
an absence of an intent to kill on their part. Whats important is that all the elements of
attempted murder are alleged in the information. In any case, it is too late to assail the
sufficiency of the information pursuant to Sec. 9 Rule 117 RoC (shouldve done so in a MtQ).
The positive identification by Eligio through his testimony was also corrobrated by the
medico-legal findings by Dr. Eufemio (PGH Chief Resident Doctor of the Department of
Orthopedics).Lastly, the SC also appreciated the aggravating circumstance of superior
strength but not that of treachery since the attack was spontaneous.
DOCTRINES:
1. The distinction between a question of law and a question of fact is settled. There is a
question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state
of facts, and which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the
doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when
there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom
is correct, is a question of law.
2. In Rivera v. People, this Court considered the following factors to determine the presence
of an intent to kill: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and
number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, at the
time, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which
the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. This Court also considers motive
and the words uttered by the offender at the time he inflicted injuries on the victim as
additional determinative factors
3. Greater weight is given to the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution
witness than the accused's denial and explanation concerning the commission of the crime.
This is so inasmuch as mere denials are self-serving evidence that cannot obtain evidentiary
weight greater than the declaration of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative
matters (People v Alvarado)
4. For treachery to be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of means
of execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or
retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.
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5. Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces

between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength
notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the
commission of the crime (People v Daquipil). The fact that there were two persons who
attacked the victim does not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of
superior strength, there being no proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the
victim (People v Casingal). The evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought
the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage (People v
Escoto).To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out
of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked (People v
Ventura).The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size, and
strength of the parties (People v Moka).
_________________________________________________________________________________
People v Arnaldo Bosito Y Chavenia
GR No 209346; January 12, 2015; Carpio, J.
SUMMARY:
Bosito was charged with murder after hacking Bonaobra four times with a bolo without
warning. The victim was able to crawl away but expired at the hospital. Bositos version was
that he used his bolo to defend himself after hed been ganged up on and attacked with a
piece of wood. RTC found him guilty of murder with treachery and abuse of superior strength
based on the testimony of Bositos nephew (which was straighforward) and disregarded his
claim of self-defense seeing as hes unharmed. CA affirmed with modification as to the
damages awarded (deleted actual damages and damages for loss of earnign capacity).
SC agreed with the lower courts that the prosecution was able to fully establish Bositos
guilt. The Court disregarded his claim of self-defense because the means he employed the
supposed unlawful aggression was beyond what was reasonably necessary. By invoking selfdefense, Bosito admits to killing the victim and the constitutional presumption of innocence
is effectively waived. He also failed to present the knife which he claimed to have used in
the tussle. Finally, the Court said that treachery was correctly appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance, and that abuse of superior strength is deemed absorbed by treachery. Since
treachery qualifies murder, the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength is necessarily included in the former. Bosito was sentenced to reclusion perpetua
without eligibility for parole.
DOCTRINES:
1
By invoking self-defense, appellant admits killing the victim and the constitutional
presumption of innocence is effectively waived. The burden of evidence then shifts to the
appellant that the killing was justified and that he incurred no criminal liability (Beninsig
v People). Thus, it is incumbent upon appellant to prove the elements of self-defense: (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person claiming self-defense (Art 11 par 1 RPC). Self-defense, to be successfully invoked,
must be proven by clear and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal
aggression on the part of the person invoking it (People v Obordo).
The failure to account for the non-presentation of the weapon allegedly wielded by the
victim is fatal to the plea of self-defense.
_________________________________________________________________________________
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PEOPLE v TIBAYAN AND PUERTO

G.R. Nos. 209655-60; 14 January 2015; Perez, J.
SUMMARY:
This is a case involving crime of Syndicated Estafa, defined and penalized under Item 2 (a),
Paragraph 4, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in relation to Presidential Decree
No. (PD) 1689.
Tibayan Group Investment Company, Inc. (TGICI) is is an open-end investment company
registered with the SEC. When SEC conducted an investigation on TGICI and its subsidiaries,
it discovered that TGICI was selling securities to the public without a registration statement
in violation of Republic Act No. 8799, (The Securities Regulation Code) and that TGICI
submitted a fraudulent Treasurers Affidavit. Resultantly, SEC revoked TGICIs corporate
registration for being fraudulently procured. Private complainants were enticed to invest in
TGICI due to the offer of high interest rates, as well as the assurance that they will recover
their investments. After giving their money to TGICI, they received a Certificate of Share
and post-dated checks.Upon encashment, the checks were dishonored, thus they went to
TGICI office. At the office, the TGICI employees took the said checks, gave private
complainants acknowledgement receipts, and reassured that their investments, as well as
the interests, would be paid. However, the TGICI office closed down without private
complainants having been paid. This led to the filing of multiple criminal cases for
Syndicated Estafa against the incorporators and directors of TGICI including the accusedappellants and their arrests.
In their defense, accused-appellants denied having conspired with the other TGICI
incorporators. Tibayan and Puerto claimed that their signatures in the Articles of
Incorporation of TGICI were forged and that since January 2002 Puerto was no longer a
director, and Tibayan was neither an incorporator nor a director.
RTC: Guilty of SIMPLE Estafa. Prosec failed to allege in the informations that appellants
formed a syndicate with the intention of defrauding the public, or it failed to adduce
documentary evidence substantiating its claims that the accused-appellants committed
Syndicated Estafa.
CA: Modified. Guilty of SYNDICATED Estafa. TGICI and its subsidiaries were engaged in
a Ponzi scheme which relied on subsequent investors to pay its earlier investors and is
what PD 1689 precisely aims to punish. CA concluded that as incorporators/directors of
TGICI, accused-appellants and their cohorts conspired in making TGICI a vehicle for the
perpetuation
of
fraud
against
the
unsuspecting
public.
Since
the
TGICI
incorporators/directors comprised more than five (5) persons, accused-appellants criminal
liability should be upgraded to that of Syndicated Estafa
SC: Appeals denied. Affirmed CA.
DOCTRINE:
1. All the elements of Syndicated Estafa are present, to wit:: (a) Estafa or other forms of
swindling, as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC,, is committed; (b) the Estafa or
swindling is committed by a syndicate of five (5) or more persons; and (c) defraudation
results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural
banks, cooperative, samahang nayon(s), or farmers associations, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.
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It is committed through a Ponzi scheme where (a) the incorporators/directors of TGICI

comprising more than five (5) people, including herein accused-appellants,, made false
pretenses and representations to the investing public in this case,the private complainants
regarding a supposed lucrative investment opportunity with TGICI in order to solicit money
from them; (b) the said false pretenses and representations were made prior to or
simultaneous with the commission of fraud; (c) relying on the same, private complainants
invested their hard earned money into TGICI; and (d) the incorporators/directors of TGICI
ended up running away with the private complainants investments, obviously to the latters
prejudice.
In a criminal case, an appeal throws the whole case wide open for review. Issues whether
raised or not by the parties may be resolved by the appellate court. Hence, accusedappellants appeal conferred upon the appellate court full jurisdiction and rendered it
competent to examine the records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the
penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.
_________________________________________________________________________________
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, VS. ROWENA TAPUGAY Y
VENTURA, accused-appellant
G.R. No. 200336; February 11, 2015; Perez, J.
SUMMARY:
Appellant was charged before RTC, Branch 16, Laoag City for violation of Section 5, Article II
of R.A No. 9165 in an information for selling drugs in a buy-bust operation. RTC found
Rowena guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. CA found no reason to
disturb the findings of the RTC and upheld in toto its ruling. In this appeal, the issue raised is
whether the trial court gravely erred in convicting appellant despite the arresting officers
non-compliance with the requirements for the proper custody of seized dangerous drugs
under R.A. No. 9165.
The SC found the appeal bereft of merit. In the prosecution of a case of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, it is necessary that the prosecution is able to establish the essential
elements. After a careful evaluation of the records, we find that these elements were clearly
met. The prosecutions evidence positively identified PO2 Garcia as the buyer and Rowena
as the seller of the shabu. Likewise, the prosecution presented in evidence one heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing shabu as the object of the sale and the marked
Php500.00 as consideration thereof. Finally, the delivery of the shabu sold and its payment
were clearly testified to by the prosecution witnesses. Relevant to the instant case is the
procedure to be followed in the custody and handling of the seized dangerous drugs as
outlined in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No.
9165
DOCTRINE:
In the prosecution of a case of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it is necessary that the
prosecution is able to establish the following essential elements: (1) the identity of the buyer
and the seller, the object of the sale and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and its payment. What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took
place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. The delivery
of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money
successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction
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The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory
and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at
the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items
_________________________________________________________________________________
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, VS. OSCAR SANTOS Y ENCINAS,
appellant.
G.R. No. 205308; February 11, 2015; Carpio, J.
SUMMARY:
Appellant Santos was charged in 16 informations with one count of rape (in relation to RA
7610) and 15 counts of acts of lasciviousness (violation of Art. 336 of the RPC in relation to
Sec. 5 of RA 7610). The information on rape alleged that in June 1997, appellant had carnal
knowledge with AAA, his seven-year old goddaughter. The 15 charges of acts of
lasciviousness alleged that appellant kissed AAAs neck and lips, and licked her sex organ on
different dates from July 1997 to September 1998. AAA testified that sometime in June 1997,
appellant, whom she calls Ninong Boy, grabbed her while she was playing alone outside
their house. AAA could not shout for help because appellant covered her mouth with his
right hand. Appellant then brought AAA to his house nearby. Inside the house, appellant
brought her to a room, removed her panties and licked her vagina. Appellant then poked his
penis into her vagina. AAA felt pain and tried to resist but appellant held both her hands and
told her to lie still. Appellant also kissed her lips and neck. Appellant, the sole witness for the
defense, denied sexually abusing AAA. He testified that as a fisherman, he was always at
sea fishing particularly during the period of the alleged incidents. Appellant testified that
from June 1997 to September 1998, the only time he took a day off from fishing was on
Good Friday.
RTC found Santos guilty. CA affirmed RTC decision. Hence, this appeal. The SC found the
appeal with merit. The Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the ruling of the trial court
that appellants guilt of the crimes he was accused of was clearly established by the
witnesses and the evidence of the prosecution. The trial courts findings are accorded great
respect unless the trial court has overlooked or misconstrued some substantial facts, which
if considered might affect the result of the case. Under Article 266-A(2) of the RPC, as
amended by RA 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, rape is also committed when a person
inserts his penis into another persons mouth through force or intimidation. RA 8353
expanded the definition of rape and reclassified rape as a crime against persons. Thus, the
two incidents in July and August 1997 would have been categorized as rape had these
incidents happened after RA 8353 took effect on 22 October 1997. However, since the two
incidents happened prior to the effectivity of RA 8353, the informations for Criminal Case
Nos. 7588 and 7589 correctly charged the accused with acts of lasciviousness (violation of
Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5 of RA 7610).
DOCTRINE:
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Denial and alibi, which are self-serving negative evidence and easily fabricated, especially
when uncorroborated, cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive
testimony of a credible witness.
Rape is also committed when a person inserts his penis into another persons mouth through
force or intimidation.
_________________________________________________________________________________
PEOPLE v. NESTOR SUAREZ Y MAGTAGNOB
G.R. No. 201151; 14 January 2015; Perez, J.
SUMMARY:
In an Information dated 28 July 2009, Suarez was indicted before the RTC for the rape of his
minor niece (with special aggravating/qualifying circumstance that the offender is a relative
within the 3rd civil degree by affinity and aggravating circumstance of nighttime). During the
pre-trial, it was stipulated that accused is the uncle of the victim (his wife is the sister of
victims mother), that the victim was born on 18 December 1993, and that the distance
between the house of accused and that of victim is about 30 meters with 2 houses in
between.
AAA testified that around 10pm of 21 December 2008, she was awakened by someone
mashing her breasts. She saw her uncle on top of her legs wearing only his briefs. He
threatened to harm her sister if she made any noise. She tried to free herself but she was
too weak. After successfully having sexual intercourse with her, he threatened her again and
then left. AAA could not sleep and just kept on crying. Her parents arrived only around
11pm, but she did not immediately tell them of her ordeal. Her monthly period stopped in
January 2009 and related the same to the accused. He gave her a white tablet and told her
to take it in January and again in February. AAA refused to take another tablet in March. On
April, AAA told her cousin Ate Helen about the rape incident. The latter related the same to
her father, who in turn told AAAs sister, BBB.
BBB corroborated AAAs testimony and assisted the latter in executing a sworn statement
before the Woman and Children Protection Desk of Virac. The Medico Legal Certificate
showed that AAA had whitish vaginal discharge, healed vaginal laceration at 6 oclock
position, and was positive for pregnancy.
Accused, as the sole witness on his behalf, testified that he was at home, already asleep at
8pm, woke up at 12mn to urinate, then went back to sleep. He asserted that he was falsely
accused of the crime because AAAs mother held a grudge against him and his family over
an inherited property. He also claimed that he saw the man courting AAA fetch the latter on
29 November 2008. His denial and alibi was corroborated by his wife and daughter.
Accused alleged that AAAs version of the incident reeks of improbabilities as there appears
to be no significant resistance on the part of AAA, who did not shout when accused was
allegedly defiling her and her parents were just a house away at that time. He also pointed
out that it was strange that AAA would cooperate with him in trying to conceal her
impending pregnancy. Moreover, he contests the medical findings because the cause of the
vaginal laceration was not revealed, hence there is a possibility of consensual sex with
another man.
RTC: Suarez guilty of rape. AAAs testimony is credible. Penalty is reclusion perpetua,
P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
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CA: Affirmed with modification. Civil indemnity and moral damages increased to P75,000
each, while exemplary damages increased to P30,000.
SC: Affirmed CA with modification as to amount of damages (see doctrine).
Accused is guilty of the crime of rape, qualified by minority and relationship. Both qualifying
circumstances were sufficiently alleged in the information. AAAs testimony is clear,
spontaneous and straightforward. Prosecution evidence is sufficient proof for conviction.
DOCTRINE:
4
7
8
The conviction or acquittal of one accused of rape most often depends almost entirely on the
credibility of the complainants testimony. By the very nature of this crime, it is generally
unwitnessed and usually the victim is left to testify for herself. Her testimony is most vital and must
be received with the utmost caution. When a rape victims testimony is straightforward and marked
with consistency despite grueling examination, it deserves full faith and confidence and cannot be
discarded. Once found credible, her lone testimony is sufficient to sustain a conviction.
The law does not impose a burden on the rape victim to prove resistance because it is not an
element of rape. Not all victims react the same way. The failure of a rape victim to offer tenacious
resistance does not make her submission to criminal acts of the accused voluntary. What is
necessary is that the force employed against her was sufficient to consummate the purpose which
he has in mind.
The medical examination of the victim is not an element of rape. It does not seek to establish who
committed the crime. Rather, it merely corroborates the testimony of the rape victim that she has
been raped. The prime consideration in the prosecution of rape is the victims testimony, not
necessarily the medical findings. The latter is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. The
victims testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict.
Testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, for when a woman or a girl-child says
that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed
committed. Youth and immunity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.
Alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony and identification of the
complainant. Alibi must be supported by credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses,
otherwise, it is fatal to the accused. For alibi to prosper, it must be demonstrated that it was
physically impossible for appellant to be present at the place where the crime was committed at the
time of its commission.
In accordance with People v. Gambao (2013), the amount of damages are as follows:
P100,000 as civil indemnity, P100,000 as moral damages (victim is assumed to have
suffered and thus needs no proof), and P100,000 as exemplary damages (to set an
example for the public good).
_________________________________________________________________________________
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESVS. RONALD NICAL Y ALMINARIO,
G.R. No. 210430; February 18, 2015; Reyes, J.
SUMMARY:
The Information dated August 28, 2007 charged the accused-appellant with the crime of
rape. The accused-appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment, and when trial ensued, the
prosecution presented AAA, the victim, and Dr. Angelito Magno (Dr. Magno), a gynecologist
at the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) who examined her. The accused-appellant testified
alone in his defense. AAA worked as a maid for a certain Ate Michelle. In 2007, AAA was
folding laundry in a room inside the big house when the accused-appellant, who was also a
household helper staying in the small house, suddenly entered the room and immediately
proceeded to embrace her. She tried to run but the accused-appellant grabbed her by her
shorts and pushed her so hard against the concrete wall of the room that she hit her head
against it and became dizzy. Sensing the dark intentions of the accused-appellant, AAA
managed to stand up and kick him in the leg and run out of the room. The accused-appellant
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gave chase and caught up with her in the sala, where again he embraced her. At that point,
AAA lost consciousness, and when she woke up, she was back inside the room she had fled,
lying naked with the accused-appellant on top of her and half naked. The accused-appellant
inserted his penis into her vagina and she felt pain, but she was able to muster enough
strength to push him off with her knee and make her escape. She ran to the other house and
told Nelyn Nacion (Nelyn), another maid, what the accused-appellant had just done to her.
Nelyn then texted AAAs sister, BBB, who soon arrived, and they reported the incident to the
barangay officials. Two days later, AAA submitted herself for examination by Dr. Magno at
the PGH. From the hospital, BBB took her sister AAA away from her employer. Dr. Magno
testified that he examined AAA and he entered the results in a Gynecologic Emergency
Sheet. He found no signs of any injury, sexual abuse, lacerations, lesions and bleeding in the
private parts of AAA, whose hymen he noted was no longer intact. Dr. Magno clarified that
AAA could have had prior sexual intercourse months or years earlier, although his medical
findings do not exclude the possibility that AAA was raped or sexually abused by the
accused-appellant a few days earlier.
RTC gave full credence to AAAs narration of her ordeal and found the accused-appellant
guilty as charged. CA affirmed RTC decision. In this automatic appeal by the SC, the assailed
decisions yield no new matters that could prompt a reconsideration or reversal of the
accused-appellants conviction. In her testimony, AAA gave a clear, credible and complete
narration of damning details showing that the accused-appellant did in fact assault her
sexually.
The accused-appellant insisted that he could not be convicted of rape because the medical
examination results showed that AAA suffered no lacerations, abrasions or contusions. But
while AAA testified that she hit her head against the concrete wall and the hard knock
caused her to pass out, Dr. Magno apparently conducted only vaginal and bodily
examinations, and did not examine her for concussion or head contusion. Nonetheless, he
admitted that while AAA had had previous sexual relations, it did not preclude the fact that
she was sexually abused. Truly, the absence of lacerated wounds in the complainants
vagina does not negate sexual intercourse. No young woman would admit that she was
raped, make public the offense and allow the examination of her private parts, undergo the
troubles and humiliation of a public trial and endure the ordeal of testifying to all the gory
details, if she had not in fact been raped
As regards due process, in convicting appellant, the trial court relied upon a finding that
complainant was unconscious when the appellant had carnal knowledge of her. This
contradicts the allegation in the information. Appellant was charged with rape committed by
means of force or intimidation. Otherwise put, his offense fell under Article 266-A (1) (a) of
the Revised Penal Code. But in convicting him of rape committed while his victim was
supposedly unconscious, the trial court applied Article 266-A (1) (b) of said Code. As the
prosecution failed to present evidence to substantiate the charge of rape through force,
threat and intimidation, we are duty-bound to uphold appellants innocence. It is an
elementary rule in criminal procedure that an accused cannot be convicted of an offense
unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information. But although the Information
below does not allege that the accused-appellant raped AAA while she was unconscious, the
prosecution however alleged and proved the use of force and violence against her. Article
266-A(1)(a) of the RPC was satisfied because accused-appellant grabbed and pulled AAA by
her shorts and then pushed her hard against the concrete wall, and the impact of her head
bouncing against the wall made her dizzy, weak, and then unconscious, and this enabled the
accused-appellant to consummate his bestial design on her. Her unconsciousness resulted
directly from the force and violence employed by the accused-appellant against her.
DOCTRINE:
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It is settled that the absence of physical injuries or fresh lacerations does not negate rape,
and although medical results may not indicate physical abuse or hymenal lacerations, rape
can still be established since medical findings or proof of injuries are not among the
essential elements in the prosecution for rape. A medical examination is not indispensable in
a prosecution for rape. In fact, there can be rape even if the medical examination shows no
vaginal laceration.
In People v. Alicante, the Court held that the accused may be convicted on the basis of the
lone, uncorroborated testimony of the rape victim, provided that her testimony is clear,
positive, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.
Where the evidence gives rise to two possibilities, one consistent with the accuseds
innocence and the other indicative of his guilt, that which favors the accused should be
properly considered
_________________________________________________________________________________
PEOPLE v. BASILIO
G.R. No. 195774; Feb. 23, 2015; Del Castillo, J.
SUMMARY:
Basilio was charged of violating Section 5, Art. II of RA 9165. He was arrested during a buybust operation, when he sold shabu to the police. The RTC and the CA found him guilty. The
SC affirmed the decision, ruling that all the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs were
present, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drug was preserved.
DOCTRINE:
To obtain a conviction for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 involving a buybust operation, the following essential elements must be established: (1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and its payment. What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually
took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. Thus,
the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked
money consummate the illegal transaction.
To be admissible, the prosecution must show by records or testimony, the continuous
whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into possession of the police
officers and until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition up to the time
it was offered in evidence.
While R.A. No. 9165 provides for the immediate marking of the seized item, it does not
specify a time frame when and where said marking should be done. In fact, in People v.
Resurreccion, the Court had the occasion to rule that marking upon immediate confiscation
contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team.
_________________________________________________________________________________
PEOPLE v. BAYABOS ET AL
GR No. 171222 & 174786; Feb. 18, 2015; Sereno, CJ
SUMMARY: Fernando Balidoy Jr., a probationary midshipman and new entrant in the
Philippine Merchant Marine Academy died during the Indoctrination and Orientation Period
of said school. The Office of the Special Prosecutor filed a criminal case with the
Sandiganbayan against respondents, who are PMMAs school authorities, charging them as
accomplices to the crime of hazing. The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution quashing the
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information and dismissing the case, ruling that the fact that the charge against the
principal accused was dismissed with finality, there was no one else with whom respondents
could have cooperated in the execution of the crime, and that the information charged no
offense. The Office of the Ombudsman thus filed a petition with the SC questioning the
Sandiganbayans resolution. The SC ruled that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the
case outright, but affirmed the quashal of the information against respondents since the
information does not include all the material facts constituting the crime of accomplice to
hazing.
DOCTRINE: The case against those charged as accomplices is not ipso facto dismissed in
the absence of trial of the purported principals; the dismissal of the case against the latter;
or even the latters acquittal, especially when the occurrence of the crime has in fact been
established. The corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice, and accessory
are distinct from each other. As long as the commission of the offense can be duly
established in evidence, the determination of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can
proceed independently of that of the principal. Accordingly, so long as the commission of the
crime can be duly proven, the trial of those charged as accomplices to determine their
criminal liability can proceed independently of that of the alleged principal.
The crime of hazing is committed when the following essential elements are established: (1)
a person is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situation or subjected to physical or
psychological suffering or injury; and (2) these acts were employed as a prerequisite for the
persons admission or entry into an organization. In the crime of hazing, the crucial
ingredient distinguishing it from the crimes against persons defined under Title Eight of the
Revised Penal Code is the infliction by a person of physical or psychological suffering on
another in furtherance of the latters admission or entry into an organization.
In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct participation
in the act, they may nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is shown that (1) hazing, as
established by the above elements, occurred; (2) the accused are school authorities or
faculty members; and (3) they consented to or failed to take preventive action against
hazing in spite actual knowledge thereof.
Under the Anti-Hazing Law, the breadth of the term organization includes but is not limited
to groups, teams, fraternities, sororities, citizen army training corps, educational
institutions, clubs, societies, cooperatives, companies, partnerships, corporations, the PNP,
and the AFP. Attached to the Department of Transportation and Communications, the PMMA
is a government-owned educational institution established for the primary purpose of
producing efficient and well-trained merchant marine officers. Clearly, it is included in the
term organization within the meaning of the law.
_________________________________________________________________________________
PEOPLE v. ALAGARME
G.R. No. 184789; Feb. 23, 2015; Bersamin, J.
SUMMARY: Alagarme was charged with the violation of Sections 5 and 11, Art. II of RA
9165. She was apprehended during a buy-bust operation conducted by the police and the
Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council. Alagarme denied selling and possessing shabu, stating that
she was a victim of a frame-up. The RTC convicted her of the two offenses charged. CA
affirmed. SC aquitted Alagarme because of the States failure to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, since the requirement of marking under the law was not complied with.
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DOCTRINE: The accused cannot be pronounced guilty of the offense if all the links of the
chain of custody of the drug subject of the illegal sale the corpus delicti itself - are not
shown. The reason is that the drug presented as evidence at the trial is not shown beyond
reasonable doubt that it was the drug subject of the illegal sale.
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment
of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.
The marking upon seizure serves a two-fold function, the first being to give to succeeding
handlers of the specimens a reference, and the second being to separate the marked
evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time of seizure
from the accused until their disposition at the end of criminal proceedings, thereby obviating
switching, planting, or contamination of evidence.
_________________________________________________________________________________
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JULIE GRACE K. VILLANUEVA
GR No. 163662; Feb 25, 2015; Bersamin, J.
SUMMARY: Villanueva was charged with the crime of estafa as defined and penalized under
Art.315 par. 2(d) of the RPC for issuing postdated checks which were dishonoured for
insufficiency of funds as payment for various jewelries purchased from complainant Loreto
Madarang. Villanuevas defense was that she issued the checks with the understanding that
they had an agreement that the checks were not to be deposited until she advised
Madarang of the sufficiency of funds in her account. RTC found Villanueva guilty as charged.
CA affirmed the conviction but differed on the application of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, modifying the sentence imposed by the RTC from 14 yrs, 8 mos, and 1 day to 20 yrs
both of reclusion temporal, to 8 yrs and 1 day of prision mayor to 30 yrs of reclusion
perpetua. The CA then certified the case to the SC per Sec. 13, Rule 124 RoC. The SC
affirmed the conviction, ruling that all the elements of estafa were present, and that there
was no proof of their agreement. The SC also affirmed the CAs application of the ISL, but
changed the interest from 12% to 12% per annum from the filing of the information until the
decision of the court, and 6% per annum from the day after the decision until its full
satisfaction.
DOCTRINE: The estafa as defined and penalized under Art. 315 par.2(d) may be committed
when: (1) the offender has postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation
contracted at the time of the postdating or issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or
issuance of said check, the offender has no funds in the bank, or the funds deposited are not
sufficient to cover the amount of the check; and (3) the payee has been defrauded. The
deceit should be the efficient cause of the defraudation, and should either be prior to, or
simultaneous with, the act of the fraud.
Estafa will not lie when the parties waive the negotiable character of the check, and instead
treat the same as proof of an obligation. When there is an agreement between the parties at
the time of the issuance and postdating of the checks that the obligee shall not encash or
present the same to the bank, the obligor cannot be prosecuted for estafa because the
element of deceit is lacking. When the payee was informed that the checks are not covered
by adequate funds, bad faith or estafa shall not arise.
_________________________________________________________________________________
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ALEJANDRO C. ALMENDRAS, JR. v. ALEXIS C. ALMENDRAS

G.R. No. 179491; January 14, 2015; Sereno, C.J.
SUMMARY:
Alexis filed an action for damages from libel and defamation against Alejandro, his brother.
This resulted from letters allegedly printed, distributed, circulated and published by
Alejandro, assisted by Atty. Layug, with evident bad faith and manifest malice to destroy
Alexis good name. RTC awarded damages in favor of Alexis. CA and SC affirmed the RTC.
The letters are libelous in nature and do not fall within the purview of privileged
communication. In the instant case, the letters tag respondent as a reknown black mailer,
a vengeful family member who filed cases against his mother and siblings, and with
nefarious designs. Even an impartial mind reading these descriptions would be led to
entertain doubts on the persons character, thereby affecting that persons reputation.
DOCTRINE:
A written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as privileged when it is
published and circulated among the public.
_________________________________________________________________________________
People of the Philippines v. Michael Joson Y Rogando
G.R. No. 206393; January 21, 2015; Perez, J.
SUMMARY:
Appellant Michael raped his 14 year-old sister living with him and his common law partner
who was then away when he committed said act. The TC, CA and SC found him guilty. They
found credible the sole testimony of the victim. The absence of any resistance on the part of
the victim does not raise doubts as to whether the sexual congress was without her consent.
The accused-appellant was the victim's older brother who had definitely moral ascendancy
over her.
DOCTRINE:
The failure of the victim to shout for help or resist the sexual advances of the rapist is not
tantamount to consent. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when threats
and intimidation are employed and the victim submits herself to her attackers of because of
fear.
Besides physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman voluntarily
succumbed to the lust of an accused. Rape victims show no uniform reaction. Some may
offer strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all.
After all, resistance is not an element of rape and its absence does not denigrate AAA's (the
victim's) claim that the accused-appellant consummated his bestial act.
_________________________________________________________________________________
Richard Ricalde v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 211001; January 21 ,2015; , Leonen, J.
SUMMARY:
Ricalde, 31 years old, is a distant relative and textmate of XXX (a boy), then 10 years old. On
January 30, 2002, when Ricalde spent the night at the house of XXX, he raped XXX by
inserting his penis into the anus of XXX. The RTC, affirmed by the CA, found Ricalde guilty of
rape through sexual assault. Ricalde claims that reasonable doubt exists in his favor,
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specifically pointing out (1) the testimony of the medico legal that there was no physical
signs or external signs of recent trauma [in XXXs] anus or any spermatozoa, (2) that XXX
did not categorically say that a penis was inserted his anal orifice, or that he saw a penis or
any object being inserted into his anal orifice and (3) that performing anal coitus while
wearing pants with an open zipper poses a challenge. SC affirmed the conviction. The
testimony of XXX was straightforward, unequivocal and convincing. Also, the absence of
spermatozoa in XXXs anal orifice does not negate the possibility of an erection and
penetration. Finally, the court ruled that the variance doctrine does not apply since no
variance exists between what was charged and what was prove during trial.
DOCTRINE:
Rape under the second paragraph of Article 266-A is also known as instrument or object
rape, gender-free rape, or homosexual rape.
The gravamen of rape through sexual assault is the insertion of the penis into another
persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another persons genital or
anal
orifice.
Nevertheless, this interpretation [in People v. Bonaagua] (like in the crime of rape whereby
the slightest penetration of the male organ or even its slightest contact with the outer lip or
the labia majora of the vagina already consummates the crime, in like manner, if the
tongue, in an act of cunnilingus, touches the outer lip of the vagina, the act should also be
considered as already consummating the crime of rape through sexual assault, not the
crime of acts of lasciviousness. Notwithstanding, in the present case, such logical
interpretation could not be applied) can apply by analogy when the victim is a man in that
the slightest penetration to the victims anal orifice consummates the crime of rape through
sexual assault.
The gravamen of the crime is the violation of the victims dignity. The degree of penetration
is not important. Rape is an assault on human dignity.
Having sex with a 10-year-old is child abuse and is punished by a special law (Republic Act
No. 7610). It is a progression from the Revised Penal Code to provide greater protection for
children.
The first paragraph of Article III, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610 clearly provides that
children . . . who . . . due to the coercion . . . of any adult . . . indulge in sexual
intercourse . . . are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The label children exploited in . . . other sexual abuse inheres in a child who has been the
subject of coercion and sexual intercourse.
Rape is rape. Rape of a child is clearly, definitely, and universally child abuse.
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MERCANTILE
TAIWAN KOLIN CORPORATION v. KOLIN ELECTRONICS CO.
G.R. No. 209843; March 25, 2015; Velasco Jr., J
SUMMARY:
Taiwan Kolin filed a trademark application for the use of KOLIN on colored TVs,
refrigerators, air conditioners, electric fans, and water dispensers. The application also
eventually included other applicances, including cassette recorders, VCD amplifiers,
camcorders and other audio/video equipment, flat iron, vaccum cleaners, cordless handsets,
and other automatic goods. The application was duly published.
Kolin Electronics opposed Taiwan Kolins application. They argued that the mark Taiwan Kolin
seeks to register is identical and confusingly similar with its KOLIN mark already
registered, covering products such as regulators, converters, rechargers, stereo boosters, et.
al. The BLA-IPO denied Taiwan Kolins application, citing Sec. 123(d) of the IP Code. A mark
cannot be registered if it is identical with a registered mark belonging to a different
proprietor in respect of the same or closely-related goods. On the other hand the IPO
Director General reversed the BLA-IPO decision. The CA found for Kolin Electronics.
But the SC ruled that Taiwan Kolin is entitled to its trademark registration of KOLIN,
because its goods are not closely related to those of Kolin Electronics. Identical marks may
be registered for products from the same classification and the products covered by Taiwan
Kolin's application and Kolin Electronics' registration are unrelated.
DOCTRINE:
A certificate of trademark registration confers upon the trademark owner the exclusive right
to sue those who have adopted a similar mark not only in connection with the goods or
services specified in the certificate, but also with those that are related thereto.
The doctrine in Mighty Corporation v. Gallo Winery is authoritative. There, the Court held
that the goods should be tested against several factors before arriving at a sound conclusion
on the question of relatedness. Among these are:
a
the business (and its location) to which the goods belong;
the class of product to which the goods belong;
the products quality, quantity, or size, including the nature of the package, wrapper
or container;
the nature and cost of the articles;
the descriptive properties, physical attributes or essential characteristics with

reference to their form, composition, texture or quality;
the purpose of the goods;
whether the article is bought for immediate consumption, that is, day-to-day
household items;
the fields of manufacture;
the conditions under which the article is usually purchased; and
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the channels of trade through which the goods flow, how they are distributed,
marketed, displayed and sold.
_________________________________________________________________________________
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. V. BPI/MS INSURANCE CORP., & MITSUI
SUMITOMO INSURANCE CO., LTD.
G.R. No. 182864; January 12, 2015; PEREZ, J.
SUMMARY: BPI/MS and Mitsui (insurers against all risks) filed a Complaint against ESLI and
ATI to recover actual damages (US$17,560.48) with legal interest, attys fees and costs. The
2 shipments of various Steel Sheet coils were rejected by Calamba Steel since they were
damaged the damages was attributed to ESLI (carrier) and ATI (arrastre operator) in
charge of the handling and discharge of the coils. Calamba filed an insurance claim for the
cargos total amount, thus the insurers subrogated the former.
RTC found ESLI and ATI jointly and severally liable for the damages. CA upheld ESLIs liability
but absolved ATI. SC affirmed - no adequate explanation is given as to how the deterioration,
loss, or destruction of the goods happened.
ESLI cannot invoke its non-liability solely on the manner the cargo was discharged and
unloaded. The actual condition of the cargoes upon arrival prior to discharge is equally
important and cannot be disregarded. Proof is needed that the cargo arrived at the port of
Manila in good order condition and remained as such prior to its handling by ATI. Also, it
would be unfair for ESLI to invoke the limitation under COGSA when the shipper in fact paid
the freight charges based on the value of the goods. Lastly, it is inconceivable that a
shipping company with maritime experience and resource like the ESLI will admit the
existence of a maritime document like an invoice even if it has no knowledge of its contents
or without having any copy thereof.
DOCTRINE: Common carriers, from the nature of their business and on public policy
considerations, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods
transported by them. Subject to certain exceptions enumerated under Art 1734 CC, common
carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods. The
extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier lasts from the time the goods are
unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by the carrier for transportation
until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to
the person who has a right to receive them.
The bills of lading represent the formal expression of the parties rights, duties and
obligations. It is the best evidence of the intention of the parties which is to be deciphered
from the language used in the contract, not from the unilateral post facto assertions of one
of the parties, or of third parties who are strangers to the contract. Thus, when the terms of
an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed
upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of
such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
If the said bill has no notation of any defect or damage in the goods, it is considered
as a clean bill of lading. A clean bill of lading constitutes prima facie evidence of
the receipt by the carrier of the goods as therein described.
Mere proof of delivery of the goods in good order to a common carrier and of their arrival in
bad order at their destination constitutes a prima facie case of fault or negligence against
the carrier. If no adequate explanation is given as to how the deterioration, loss, or
destruction of the goods happened, the transporter shall be held responsible.
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UP PORTIA SORORITY
According to NCC, the law of the country to which the goods are to be transported shall
govern the liability of the common carrier for their loss, destruction or deterioration. The
Code takes precedence as the primary law over the rights and obligations of common
carriers with the Code of Commerce and COGSA applying suppletorily.
NCC provides that a stipulation limiting a common carriers liability to the

value of the goods appearing in the bill of lading is binding, unless the
shipper or owner declares a greater value. In addition, a contract fixing the sum
that may be recovered by the owner or shipper for the loss, destruction, or
deterioration of the goods is valid, if it is reasonable and just under the
circumstances, and has been fairly and freely agreed upon.
COGSA Sec 4 Subsec 5, on the other hand, provides that an amount recoverable in
case of loss or damage shall not exceed US$500 per package or per customary
freight unless the nature and value of such goods have been declared by the shipper
before shipment and inserted in the bill of lading.
Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the admissions. Pre-trial
admission in civil cases is one of the instances of judicial admissions explicitly provided for
under ROC Sec 7 Rule 18, which mandates that the contents of the pre-trial order shall
control the subsequent course of the action, thereby, defining and limiting the issues to be
tried.
Bayas v. Sandiganbayan: Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed
by the parties and their counsels, they become binding on the parties who made
them. They become judicial admissions of the fact or facts stipulated. Even if placed
at a disadvantageous position, a party may not be allowed to rescind them
unilaterally, it must assume the consequences of the disadvantage.
Alfelor v. Halasan: A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge that fact
as judicial admissions are a waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed with.
xxx Consequently, an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by
the party making such admission and are conclusive as to such party, and all proofs
to the contrary or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is
interposed by the party or not
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UP PORTIA SORORITY
LABOR
WATERFRONT CEBU CITY CASINO HOTEL, INC. AND MARCO PROTACIO vs.
ILDEBRANDO LEDESMA
G.R. No. 19755; March 25, 2015; VILLARAMA, JR., J.
SUMMARY: Ledesma was employed as a House Detective at Waterfront Hotel. A complaint
was filed against him by Christe Mandal for allegedly kissing and mashing her brasts inside
the hotels elevator, and by Rosanna Lofranco, for having exhibited his penis and asking
Lofranco to masturbate him at the conference room of the hotel. After an administrative
hearing conducted by the hotel, Ledesma was dismissed. Subsequently, he filed an illegal
dismissal case against Waterfront. LA ruled that Ledesma was illegally dismissed. NLRC
reversed, saying that the acts constituted grave misconduct which justified the dismissal.
NLRCs resolution denying Ledesmas MR was received by Atty. Abellana (Ledesmas counsel
of record) on March 15, 2010. 63 days later, or on May 17, 2010, said counsel filed a Rule 65
petition
before
the
CA.
On August 5, 2010, Ledesma, now assisted by a new counsel, filed an amended petition
contending that his receipt on March 24, 2010 (and not the receipt on March 15, 2010 by
Atty. Abellana), is the reckoning date of the 60-day reglementary period within which to file
the petition. Hence, Ledesma claims that the petition was timely filed on May 17, 2010. CA
granted the petition and reversed the NLRC ruling. SC found that Ledesmas petition was not
properly filed. It also found that Ledesma was validly dismissed.
DOCTRINE: The unjustified failure of Ledesma to file his petition for certiorari before the CA
within the 60-day period is a ground for the outright dismissal of said petition. If the Court
intended to retain the authority of the proper courts to grant extensions under Section 4 of
Rule 65, the paragraph providing for such authority would have been preserved. The
removal of the said paragraph under the amendment by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC of Section 4,
Rule 65 simply meant that there can no longer be any extension of the 60-day period within
which to file a petition for certiorari. As the Rule now stands, petitions
for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from
the order denying a motion for reconsideration. (Additional emphasis and
underscoring by the Court)
However, as an exception, the Court may relax the rules and allow an extension but there is
a necessity for the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious
explanation for the failure to file the petition for certiorari within the 60-day period. In this
case, Ledesma never invoked the liberality of the CA nor endeavored to justify the belated
filing of his petition. On the contrary, Ledesma remained firm that his petition was filed with
the CA within the reglementary period. Absent valid and compelling reasons for the
procedural lapse, the desired leniency cannot be accorded to Ledesma.
_________________________________________________________________________________
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HOCHENG PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. ANTONIO M.

FARRALES, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 211497; March 18, 2015; J. Reyes
SUMMARY: Employee Farrales was terminated by his employer Hocheng Phil. Co. for
stealing from the company, its employees and officials, or from its contractors, visitors or
clients, which they conclude is akin to serious misconduct and fraud or willful breach by the
employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative,
which are just causes for termination of employment under Article 282 of the Labor Code,
allegedly because the saw via CCTV that a person they identified as Farrales stole a
motorcycle helmet of a fellow employee. Farrales filed a case for illegal dismissal.
LA ruled in favor of Farrales. NLRC reversed, holding that there is substantial evidence to
warrant Farrales dismissal.
CA reversed NLRC, holding that Farrales taking of his fellow employees helmet did not
amount to theft, holding that HPC failed to prove that Farrales conduct was induced by a
perverse and wrongful intent to gain, in light of the admission of Eric that he did let Farrales
borrow one of his two helmets, only that Farrales mistook Reymars helmet as the one
belonging to him.
SC affirmed CA.
DOCTRINE: Theft committed by an employee against a person other than his employer, if
proven by substantial evidence, is a cause analogous to serious misconduct. Misconduct is
improper or wrong conduct, it is the transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent
and not mere error in judgment. The misconduct to be serious must be of such grave and
aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant. Such misconduct, however
serious, must, nevertheless, be in connection with the employees work to constitute just
cause for his separation.
But where there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal cause for termination of
employment, the law considers the case a matter of illegal dismissal. If doubts exist
between the evidence presented by the employer and that of the employee, the scales of
justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. The employer must affirmatively show rationally
adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause.
_________________________________________________________________________________
PURISIMO CABAOBAS et al. v. PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 176908; March 25, 2015; Peralta, J.
SUMMARY:
Pepsi-Cola implemented a company-wide retrenchment program as a result of business
losses amounting to Php29-M in 1999. It laid off 47 employees of its Tanauan Plant. Twentyseven (27) of said employees filed complaints for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. They
alleged that Pepsi-Cola Products was not facing serious financial losses, because after their
termination it regularized 4 employees and hired replacements for the 47 previously
dismissed employees. Pepsi-Cola countered that the petitioners were dismissed pursuant to
its Corporate-wide Rightsizing Program (CRP) to save the company from total bankruptcy
and collapse; thus, it sent notices to them and to the DOLE. The LA rendered a decision
finding the dismissal of the petitioners as illegal. The NLRC nullified the LA decision and
dismissed the complaints for illegal dismissal, and instead declared the retrenchment
program a valid exercise of management prerogatives. The CA affirmed the NLRC decision.
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UP PORTIA SORORITY
The SC ruled in favor of Pepsi-Cola and affirmed the CA decision. Pepsi-Cola had validly
implemented its retrenchment program and had complied with the requirements
prerequisite thereof.
DOCTRINE:
Essentially, the prerogative of an employer to retrench its employees must be exercised only
as a last resort, considering that it will lead to the loss of the employees' livelihood. It is
justified only when all other less drastic means have been tried and found insufficient or
inadequate. Corollary thereto, the employer must prove the requirements for a valid
retrenchment by clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, said ground for termination
would be susceptible to abuse by scheming employers who might be merely feigning losses
or reverses in their business ventures in order to ease out employees. These requirements
are:
1
That retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business losses

which, if already incurred, are not merely de minimis, but substantial, serious, actual
and real, or if only expected, are reasonably imminent as perceived objectively and in
good faith by the employer;
That the employer served written notice both to the employees and to the
Department of Labor and Employment at least one month prior to the intended date
of retrenchment;
That the employer pays the retrenched employees separation pay equivalent to one
(1) month pay or at least one-half () month pay for every year of service, whichever
is higher;
That the employer exercises its prerogative to retrench employees in good faith for
the advancement of its interest and not to defeat or circumvent the employees right
to security of tenure; and
That the employer used fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be
dismissed and who would be retained among the employees, such as status,
efficiency, seniority, physical fitness, age, and financial hardship for certain workers.
_________________________________________________________________________________
VICENTE C. TATEL V. JLFP INVESTIGATION SECURITY AGENCY, INC., JOSE
LUIS F. PAMINTUAN, AND/OR PAOLO C. TURNO
SUMMARY:
In 1998, Tatel is hired as one of JLFP Security Agencys security guards. More than 11 years
later, Tatel filed a complaint in NLRC for underpayment of salaries and wages, etc. After 10
days, he was placed on "floating status", and after the lapse of 6 months therefrom, without
having been given any assignments, he filed another complaint for illegal dismissal,
reinstatement, backwages, etc. As a defense, the respondents maintained that Tatel
abandoned his work. LA dismissed Tatels complaint for lack of merit LA did not give
credence to Tatel's allegation of dismissal in light of the inconsistent statements he made
under oath in the 2 labor complaints he had filed against the respondents. NLRC reversed
Tatel illegally dismissed. CA reinstated LA.
SC: As the "off-detail" period/floating status had already lasted for more than six (6)
months, Tatel is therefore deemed to have been constructively dismissed. Also, the
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UP PORTIA SORORITY
respondents failed to establish that Tatel abandoned his work the said charge is belied by
the high improbability of Tatel intentionally abandoning his work, taking into consideration
his length of service and, concomitantly, his security of tenure with JLFP. The discrepancies
in his statements were also qualified. SC reversed CA and reinstated NLRC with modification,
reckoning the computation of back wages from the date of petitioner's constructive
dismissal.
DOCTRINE:
Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 ROC
since the SC is bound by the findings of fact made by the appellate court. Thus, SCs
jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the lower
court.
In New City Builders, Inc. v. NLRC, the exceptions to the aforementioned rule are the
following:
1
2
3
4
5
6
when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;

when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
when there is grave abuse of discretion;
when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
when the findings of facts are conflicting;
when in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
7 when the findings are contrary to the trial court;
8 when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based;
9 when the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the petitioner's main and reply
briefs, are not disputed by the respondent;
10 when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; and
11 when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
Salvaloza v NLRC: Temporary "off-detail" or "floating status" is the period of time when
security guards are in between assignments or when they are made to wait after being
relieved from a previous post until they are transferred to a new one. It takes place when the
security agency's clients decide not to renew their contracts with the agency, resulting in a
situation where the available posts under its existing contracts are less than the number of
guards in its roster. It also happens in instances where contracts for security services
stipulate that the client may request the agency for the replacement of the guards assigned
to it even for want of cause, such that the replaced security guard may be placed on
temporary "off-detail" if there are no available posts under the agency's existing contracts.
During such time, the security guard does not receive any salary or any financial assistance
provided by law. It does not constitute a dismissal, as the assignments primarily depend on
the contracts entered into by the security agencies with third parties, so long as such status
does not continue beyond a reasonable time. When such a "floating status" lasts for more
than six (6) months, the employee may be considered to have been constructively
dismissed.
Relative thereto, constructive dismissal exists when an act of clear discrimination,
insensibility, or disdain, on the part of the employer has become so unbearable as to leave
an employee with no choice but to forego continued employment, or when there is cessation
of work because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely, as
an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay.
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UP PORTIA SORORITY
To constitute abandonment, two elements must concur: (a) the failure to report for work or
absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (b) a clear intention to sever the employeremployee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being
manifested by some overt acts. Mere absence is not sufficient. The employer has the burden
of proof to show a deliberate and unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his
employment without any intention of returning. Abandonment is incompatible with
constructive dismissal.
An employee who forthwith takes steps to protest his layoff cannot, as a general rule, be
said to have abandoned his work, and the filing of the complaint is proof enough of his
desire to return to work, thus negating any suggestion of abandonment.
_________________________________________________________________________________
ZENAIDA PAZ v. NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING CO., INC., AND/OR ANGELO
ANG.
G.R. No. 199554, February 18, 2015, Leonen, J.
SUMMARY:
NTRCI hired Zenaida Paz (Paz) sometime in 1974 as a seasonal sorter, paid P185.00 daily.
NTRCI regularly re-hired her every tobacco season since then. On May 18, 2003,6 Paz was
63 years old when NTRCI informed her that she was considered retired under company
policy. A year later, NTRCI told her she would receive P12,000.00 as retirement pay. Paz,
filed a Complaint for payment of retirement benefits, damages, and attorneys fees as
P12,000.00 seemed inadequate for her 29 years of service. Based on Art 287 of the Labor
Code, NTRCI raised the requirement of at least six months of service a year for that year to
be considered in the retirement pay computation. It claimed that Paz only worked for at
least six months in 1995, 1999, and 2000 out of the 29 years she rendered service. The LA
awarded P12,487.50. NLRC awarded P 60,356.25. The Court of Appeals found that while
applying the clear text of Article 287 resulted in the amount of P12,487.50 as retirement
pay. It discussed jurisprudence on financial assistance and deemed it appropriate to apply
the formula: One-half-month pay multiplied by 29 years of service divided by two yielded
P60,356.25 as Pazs retirement pay. SC affirmed.
DOCTRINE:
In the case at bar, while it may appear that the work of petitioners is seasonal, inasmuch as
petitioners have served the company for many years, some for over 20 years, performing
services necessary and indispensable to LUTORCOs business, serve as badges of regular
employment. ..This Court has already settled that seasonal workers who are called to work
from time to time and are temporarily laid off during off-season are not separated from
service in said period, but are merely considered on leave until re-employed. Herein
respondents,having performed the same tasks for petitioners every season for several
years, are considered the latters regular employees for their respective tasks.
Retirement is the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary agreement between the
employer and the employee whereby the latter, after reaching a certain age, agrees to sever
his or her employment with the former. Article 287, as amended, allows for optional
retirement
at
the
age
of
at
least
60
years
old.
Consequently, if the intent to retire is not clearly established or if the retirement is
involuntary, it is to be treated as a discharge. Petitioner Paz was only 63 years old on May
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UP PORTIA SORORITY
18, 2003 with two more years remaining before she would reach the compulsory retirement
age of 65.
Article 287 of the Labor Code on retirement pay similarly provides that a fraction of at least
six (6) months being considered as one whole year... An employee must have rendered at
least six months in a year for said year to be considered in the computation.
Based on these factual findings, retirement pay pursuant to Article 287 of the Labor Code
was correctly computed at P12,487.50 and was awarded to petitioner Paz. In addition, this
court agrees with the Court of Appeals award of financial assistance in the amount of
P60,356.25 by applying the following formula: one-half-month pay multiplied by 29 years in
service and then divided by 2. The amount of P12,487.50 is indeed too meager to support
petitioner Paz who has become old, weak, and unable to find employment. This court has
awarded financial assistance as a measure of social justice [in] exceptional circumstances,
and as an equitable concession.
_________________________________________________________________________________
MAERSK-FILIPINAS CREWING, INC., A.P. MOLLER SINGAPORE PTE. LIMITED,
AND JESUS AGBAYANI, v. TORIBIO C. AVESTRUZ
G.R. No. 207010, February 18, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J
SUMMARY:
On April 28, 2011, petitioner Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc. (Maersk), on behalf of its foreign
principal, petitioner A.P. Moller Singapore Pte. Ltd. (A.P. Moller), hired Avestruz as Chief Cook
on board the vesselM/V Nedlloyd Drake for a period of six (6) months. Captain Woodward
called Avestruz and asked him to stand near the garbage bin (which Avestruz was tasked to
clean_ where the former took the latters right hand and swiped it on the oily cover of the
garbage bin, telling Avestruz to feel it. Shocked, Avestruz remarked, Sir if you are looking
for [dirt], you can find it[;] the ship is big. Tell us if you want to clean and we will clean it.
Captain Woodward replied by shoving Avestruzs chest, to which the latter complained and
said, Dont touch me, causing an argument to ensue between them On the very same day,
Captain Woodward informed Avestruz that he would be dismissed from service and be
disembarked in India. Avestruz filed a case for illegal dismissal, payment for the unexpired
portion of his contract, damages, and attorneys fees as there was no investigation
conducted nor notice prior to his dismissal.
The LA found that he failed to perform his duty of maintaining cleanliness in the galley, and
that he also repeatedly failed to obey the directives of his superior, which was tantamount to
insubordination. the NLRC sustained the validity of Avestruzs dismissal but found that
petitioners failed to observe the procedures laid down in Section 17 of the POEA-SEC (notice,
investigation, notice of penalty and grounds), and thus were held liable to 30k nominal
damges. the CA reversed and set aside the rulings of the NLRC and instead, found Avestruz
to have been illegally dismissed. The SC affirmed and held that there was illegal dismissal
and a failure to comply with the proper procedure.
DOCTRINE:
It was incumbent upon the petitioners to present other substantial evidence to bolster their
claim that Avestruz committed acts that constitute insubordination as would warrant his
dismissal.
Insubordination, as a just cause for the dismissal of an employee, necessitates the
concurrence of at least two requisites: (1) the employees assailed conduct must have been
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UP PORTIA SORORITY
willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated
must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain to the
duties
which
he
had
been
engaged
to
discharge. 61cralawred
In this case, the contents of Captain Woodwards e-mails do not establish that Avestruzs
conduct had been willful, or characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude.
Similarly, the Court affirms the finding of the CA that Avestruz was not accorded procedural
due process, there being no compliance with the provisions of Section 17 of the POEA-SEC
_________________________________________________________________________________
CLUB FILIPINO and DE LEON v BAUTISTA et.al.
G.R. No. 168406; 14 January 2015; Leonen, J.
SUMMARY: Club Filipino Employees Association (CLUFEA) is a union representing the
employees of Club Filipino, Inc. Before CLUFEA and Club Filipino, Inc.s last collective
bargaining agreement expired and within the 60-day freedom period, CLUFEA had made
several demands on Club Filipino, Inc. to negotiate a new agreement. Club Filipino, Inc failed
to negotiate. CLUFEA then filed before NCMB a request for preventive mediation. However,
there was a deadlock. Several offers and counters were given. However, a bargaining
deadlock still ensued. Thus, CLUFEA filed with the NCMB a Notice of Strike on the ground of
bargaining deadlock. Thereafter a strike vote under DOLEs supervision was conducted. It
should be noted however, that counter-proposals were sent by the corporation after the
Notice and strike vote. Still not arriving at an agreement, CLUFEA staged a strike on the
ground of bargaining deadlock.
Club Filipino filed before NLRC a Petition to Declare [CLUFEAs] Strike Illegal on the grounds
that the Notice did not comply with the requirements under Rule XXII, Section 4 (LCs IRR)
and that the employees allegedly committed several acts. LA decided that the strike is
illegal since the Notice of Strike did not contain CLUFEAs written proposals and Club Filipino,
Inc.s counterproposals. NLRC dismissed the appeal since it found out that new officers
already replaced the impleaded officers of CLUFEA. CLUFEA, under a new leadership, sent a
letter expressing their intent not to appeal. However, the CA reversed LAs ruling, and
declared employees who were dismissed have the right to question the legality of their
dismissal, and that the strike is valid. It ruled that Rule XXII, Section 4 only requires that the
proposals and counterproposals be attached to the Notice of Strike as far as practicable.
Since CLUFEA had already filed a Notice of Strike when Club Filipino, Inc. submitted its
counterproposals, it was not practicable for CLUFEA to attach Club Filipino, Inc.s
counterproposals to the Notice of Strike. This was affirmed by the SC. The SC also denied
the motion for reconsideration file by Club Filipino. Consequently, an Entry of Judgment was
ordered. Pending this case, Club Filipino implemented a retrenchment program which led to
a Complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC, questioning the validity of the retrenchment
program by the retrenched employees. Considering that the NLRC had finally resolved that
respondents were not illegally dismissed and had already ordered that respondents be paid
separation pay under the retrenchment program, Club Filipino, Inc. filed a supplemental
motion for reconsideration and argued that the NLRCs Resolution of the issue constituted
res judicata as to bar the Court of Appeals from declaring that respondents were illegally
dismissed and from awarding respondents separation pay in the illegal strike case.
SC: Supplemetal Motion for Reconsideration denied. Entry of Judgment affirmed.
DOCTRINE:
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UP PORTIA SORORITY
1. The filing of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration did not prevent this
courts Resolution denying the petition for certiorari of Club Filipino sustaining
CAs decision, from becoming final and executory. It is immaterial that the Entry of
Judgment was made without the Court having first resolved the second motion for
reconsideration. This is because the issuance of the entry of judgment is reckoned from
the time the parties received a copy of the resolution denying the first motion for
reconsideration. The filing by the corporation of several pleadings after receipt of the
resolution denying its first motion for reconsideration does not in any way bar the finality
or entry of judgment. Besides, to reckon the finality of a judgment from receipt of the
denial of the second motion for reconsideration would be absurd. First, the Rules of
Court and the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court prohibit the filing of a second motion
for reconsideration. Second, some crafty litigants may resort to filing prohibited
pleadings just to delay entry of judgment.
2. NLRCs Decision on the illegal dismissal case was not res judicata on the illegal
strike case. Res judicata has two (2) aspects. The first is bar by prior judgment that
precludes the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of
action.[84] The second aspect is conclusiveness of judgment, which states that issues
actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case
between the same parties involving a different cause of action.The elements of res
judicata are:
(1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;
(2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties;
(3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and
(4) there must be as between the first and second action identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action.
In this case, the cause of action for declaration of illegal strike and the cause of action for
illegal dismissal are different. In an action for declaration of illegal strike, the cause of action
is premised on a union or a labor organizations conduct of a strike without compliance with
the statutory requirements. On the other hand, in an action for illegal dismissal, the cause of
action is premised on an employers alleged dismissal of an employee without a just or
authorized cause as provided under Articles 282, 283, and 284 of the Labor Code. However,
it was possible that an employee who had already availed of the benefits under the
retrenchment program would be declared entitled to separation benefits under the illegal
strike case. Thus, to prevent double compensation, the Court of Appeals ordered that those
who already retired and received their benefits may no longer claim full backwages,
benefits, and separation pay under the decision in the illegal strike case, which is proper.
_________________________________________________________________________________
ROMMEL B. DARAUG v. KGJS FLEET MANAGEMENT MANILA, INC., KRISTIAN
GERHARD JEBSEN SKIPSREDER, MR. GUY DOMINO A. MACAPAYAG AND/OR
M/V IBIS ARROW
G.R. No. 211211; January 14, 2015; Mendoza, J.
SUMMARY:
Daraug was employed by KGJS Fleet Management Manila as motorman on board a vessel.
On December 23, 2007, while he was working in the storage room, several steel plates feel
and hit his leg. This resulted in the fracture of his right fibula and tibia. He was medically
repatriated, examined and treated by the company-designated physicians, Dr. Chua and Dr.
Lim. After treatment, the doctors concluded that his right leg was fully healed and that he
was fit to work. On January 16, 2009, he executed a certificate of fitness to work. In May
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UP PORTIA SORORITY
2009, He was hired again by KGJS as a motorman. He encountered another accident, injuring
his right leg again. He was diagnosed with contusion hematoma. In December, Dr. Lim found
that he had recovered and declared him fit to work. In 2010, he filed a complaint seeking
permanent disability benefits. Daraug sought the services of Dr. Jacinto who attested that he
was suffering from open fracture on his right fibula and was no longer fit to work. LA ruled in
favor of Daraug. NLRC reversed LA. CA and SC affirmed NLRC. The POEA-SEC and the CBA
govern the employment relationship between Dumadag and the petitioners. Daraug failed to
observe the prescribed procedure of having the conflicting assessments on his disability referred
to a third doctor for a binding opinion. Also, when he filed the complaint, he had yet to consult his
own physician.
DOCTRINE:
The two instruments (POEA-SEC and CBA) are the law between them.
A seafarer may have basis to pursue an action for total and permanent disability benefits, if
any of the following conditions are present:
(a) The company-designated physician failed to issue a declaration as to his fitness to
engage in sea duty or disability even after the lapse of the 120-day period and there is no
indication that further medical treatment would address his temporary total disability,
hence, justify an extension of the period to 240 days;
(b) 240 days had lapsed without any certification issued by the company designated
physician;
(c) The company-designated physician declared that he is fit for sea duty within the 120-day
or 240-day period, as the case may be, but his physician of choice and the doctor chosen
under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC are of a contrary opinion;
(d) The company-designated physician acknowledged that he is partially permanently
disabled but other doctors who he consulted, on his own and jointly with his employer,
believed that his disability is not only permanent but total as well;
(e) The company-designated physician recognized that he is totally and permanently
disabled but there is a dispute on the disability grading;
(f) The company-designated physician determined that his medical condition is not
compensable or work-related under the POEA-SEC but his doctor-of-choice and the third
doctor selected under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC found otherwise and declared him
unfit to work;
(g) The company-designated physician declared him totally and permanently disabled but
the employer refuses to pay him the corresponding benefits; and
(h) The company-designated physician declared him partially and permanently disabled
within the 120-day or 240-day period but he remains incapacitated to perform his usual sea
duties after the lapse of said periods.
_________________________________________________________________________________
NORIEL R. MONTIERRO v. RICKMERS MARINE AGENCY PHILS., INC.
SUMMARY:
Montierro was hired as an ordinary seaman by Rickmers Marine Agency Phils, Inc. on behalf
its principal Global Management Limited. In 2010, Montierro injured his right knee when he
lost balance and twisted his legs as he was going down a crane ladder on board the vessel.
As a result, he was repatriated and had to undergo surgery and treatment. He filed a
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UP PORTIA SORORITY
complaint for recovery of permanent disability compensation, sickness allowance plus moral
and exemplary damages and attorneys fees with the labor arbiter. A medical certificate
recommending total permanent disability grading and explaining his condition was used as
support. LA and NLRC ruled in Montierros favor granting him permanent total disability
benefits, 1-month sickness allowance and attys fees. CA ruled that he is only entitled to
permanent partial disability benefits. SC agreed with the CA. Since Montierro filed his
complaint on December 3, 2010, the 240 day rule applied. Montierros treatment by the
company doctor began on 4 June 2010. It ended on 3 January 2011, when the company
doctor issued a Grade 10 final disability assessment. Counting the days from 4 June 2010
to 3 January 2011, the assessment by the company doctor was made on the 213 th day, well
within the 240-day period. The extension of the period to 240 days is justified by the fact
that Dr. Alegre issued an interim disability grade of 10 on 3 September 2010, the 91 stday
of Montierros treatment, which was within the 120-day period.
DOCTRINE:
If the maritime compensation complaint was filed prior to 6 October 2008, the 120-day rule
applies; if, on the other hand, the complaint was filed from 6 October 2008 onwards, the
240-day rule applies.
When a seafarer sustains a work-related illness or injury while on board the vessel, his
fitness for work shall be determined by the company-designated physician. The physician
has 120 days, or 240 days, if validly extended, to make the assessment. If the physician
appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment of the company-designated
physician, the opinion of a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the
seafarer, whose decision shall be final and binding on them.
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UP PORTIA SORORITY
POLITICAL
ANGEL ABAD VS. HERMINIO DELA CRUZ
G.R. No. 207422, March 18, 2015 LEONEN
SUMMARY
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Angel Abad assailing the Court of
Appeals Decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Civil Service Commission Resolution.
This Resolution affirmed the permanent appointment of Herminio Dela Cruz as City
Government Department Head III. Mayor Jaime R. Fresnedi appointed (Dela Cruz) as City
Assessor of the City Government of Muntinlupa in a permanent capacity on December 28,
2006.The City Assessor is given the item of City Government Department Head III. In
Resolution No. 06-361, majority of the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City
Government of Muntinlupa concurred in the appointment of Dela Cruz as City Government
Department Head III. Pursuant to Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 02-1235 granting
the City Government of Muntinlupa the power to take final action on its appointments, the
appointment of Dela Cruz was considered attested to by the Civil Service Commission.
(Abad), Local Assessment Operations Officer V in the Office of the City Assessor, wrote the
Civil Service Commission and expressed the disapproval of Dela Cruz's appointment alleging
that the position of City Government Department Head III corresponded to Salary Grade 27,
nine (9) salary grades higher than Dela Cruz's former position as Local Assessment
Operations Officer III with Salary Grade 18. According to Abad, Dela Cruz's appointment
violated Item 15 of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 3, Series of 2001,
which prohibits the promotion of an employee to a position more than three (3) salary
grades above his or her former position. Abad added that being a qualified next-in-rank, he
applied for the position of City Government Department Head III. However, he and three (3)
other qualified applicants were allegedly excluded from the selection process, in violation of
Item 10 of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 3, series of 2001. According
to Abad, the appointment of Dela Cruz caused "demoralization within [their] ranks." Due to a
fire, the City Government of Muntinlupa, therefore, failed to act on Abad's Letter. Abad filed
with the Mayor's Office the letter-complaint reiterating his request for disapproval of Dela
Cruz's permanent appointment as City Government Department Head III. Mayor San Pedro
referred Abad's letter-complaint to the City Government of Muntinlupa's Personnel
Department The Grievance Committee recommended the invalidation of Dela Cruz's
permanent appointment as City Government Department Head III. Mayor San Pedro's
approval to this recommendation was then referred to the CSC-NCR. CSC-NCR invalidated
Dela Cruz's permanent appointment as City Government Department Head III. CSC reversed
this decision on dela Cruzs appeal. CSC ruled that Dela Cruz's appointment was an
exception to the three-salary-grade rule. Dela Cruz underwent a deep selection process
rendering his appointment "very meritorious[.]"
CA dismissed petition for review and affirmed the appointment. CA held that the threesalary-grade rule "only gives preference to the person occupying the position next in rank to
a vacancy, but does not by any means give [the employee next in rank] [the] exclusive right
to be appointed to the said vacancy." As long as the employee appointed to the position
possesses the minimum qualifications for the position, the appointment is valid. SC found
that the present petition must be denied.
DOCTRINE: Appointments in the civil service are made fundamentally on the basis of merit.
Both the Constitution and law ensure that those appointed are fit for the position. While
those who are next in rank to a vacant position may be given some preference, no one has a
vested right to a government position. Seniority and salary grades should be given their due
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weight but should not trump the public interest. The Civil Service Commission-National
Capital Region and the Civil Service Commission agree that respondent possesses the
minimum qualifications under the law for the position of City Government Department Head
III. Moreover, the appointment of Dela Cruz was confirmed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod
ng Muntinlupa in Resolution No. 06-361. The next-in-rank rule is a rule of preference on who
to consider for promotion. The rule does not give employees next in rank a vested right to
the position next higher to theirs should that position become vacant. Appointment is a
discretionary power of the appointing authority. So long as the appointee possesses the
qualifications required by law, the appointment is valid. Petitioner failed to discharge his
burden of proving that he was a qualified next-in-rank. Re 3-salary-grade rule, case falls
under one of the exceptions (deep selection process).
_________________________________________________________________________________
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH v. PHILIP MORRIS
G.R. No. 202943; March 25, 2015; Perlas-Bernabe
SUMMARY:
Philip Morris Philippines (PMPMI) applied for a sales promotion permit before the BFAD. More
than 15 days passed without BFAD acting upon the application, so PMPI inquired about its
status. PMPI was only verbally informed of the existence of a Memorandum by the DOH
purportedly prohibiting tobacco companies from conducting any tobacco promotional
activities in the country. PMPIs application was denied. PMPI filed an administrative appeal
before the DOH Secretary, assailing the BFADs denial of its application. It maintained that
under RA 9211, promotion is not prohibited but merely restricted, and that while there are
specific provisions therein totally banning tobacco advertising and sponsorships, no similar
provision could be found banning promotion. The DOH denied PMPIs appeal, ruling that the
intent and purpose of RA 9211 was to completely ban tobacco advertisements, promotions,
and sponsorships, as promotion is inherent in both advertising and sponsorship. The CA
nullified the CA decision upon finding that the provisions of RA 9211 were clear when it
distinguished promotion from advertising and sponsorship, so much so that while the latter
two activities were completely banned because of the memorandum, the same does not
hold true with regard to promotion, which was only restricted. The SC agreed with the CA. RA
7394 provides that no person shall conduct any sales without first securing a permit from
the concerned department, in this particular case, the DOH. On the other hand, RA 9211
provides for the creation of the IAC-Tobacco, a committee which shall have the exclusive
power and function to administer and implement the provisions of this act, as regards
tobacco companies. Hence, the creation of the IAC-Tobacco effectively repealed RA 7394,
thereby removing the authority of DOH to rule upon applications for sales promotional
permits filed by tobacco companies such as those filed by PMPMI.
DOCTRINE:
If the IAC-Tobacco was created and expressly given the exclusive authority to
implement the provisions of RA 9211 in accordance with the foregoing State policy, it
signifies that it shall also take charge of the regulation of the use, sale, distribution,
and advertisements of tobacco products, as well as all forms of promotion which
essentially includes sales promotion. Therefore, with this regulatory power
conferred upon the IAC-Tobacco by RA 9211, the DOH and the BFAD have been
effectively and impliedly divested of any authority to act upon applications for
tobacco sales promotional permit, including PMPMIs.
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RA 9211 is a special legislation which exclusively deals with the subject of tobacco
products and related activities. On the other hand, RA 7394 is broader and more
general in scope, and treats of the general welfare and interests of consumers vis-vis proper conduct for business and industry. As such, lex specialis derogat generali.
General legislation must give way to special legislation on the same
subject, and generally is so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which
the special provisions are not applicable. In other words, where two
statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one
specially designed therefore should prevail.
_________________________________________________________________________________
ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, ALFREDO S. LIM v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
G.R. No. 206666; January 21, 2015; Leonardo-De Castro, J.
SUMMARY:
In Sept 2007, former President Estrada was convicted of plunder and was imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the
sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification, along with forfeiture of certain amounts of
cash in the government's favor. On October 25, 2007, former president Arroyo extended him
executive clemency by way of pardon. The text of the pardon provided, among others that
he was "hereby restored to his civil and political rights". In 2009, Estrada filed a CoC for the
position of President. His candidacy earned three oppositions in the COMELEC. However, all
three were dismissed on the uniform grounds that (i.) the Constitutional proscription on
reelection applies to a sitting president; and (ii.) the pardon granted to Estrada restored his
right
to
vote
and
be
voted
for
public
office. Subsequent MRs were also denied by the COMELEC en banc. However, former Pres.
Estrada only garnered the second highest number of votes. Of the three petitions, only one,
Pormento,
sought
recourse
to the SC and filed a petition for certiorari. However, the SC dismissed the petition on the
ground of mootness since former Pres. Estrada had lost. In Oct. 2012, former Pres. Estrada
filed a CoC for Mayor of the city of Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a petition for disqualification before the COMELEC, citing Sec 40 of
the Local Government Code in relation to Sec 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. Sec 40 of
the
LGC
provides
for
disqualifications from running for any elective local position, including "Those sentenced by
final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one
year or more of imprisonment, within two years after serving sentence". Sec. 12 of the OEC
disqualifies, among others, any person who has been sentenced by final judgment for a
crime involving moral turpitude from being a candidate to or holding any public office,
unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The COMELEC dismissed the petition and a MR, prompting Risos-Vidal to file a petition for
certiorari before the SC. While the petition was pending, the elections took place and
Estrada was voted into office. Alfredo Lim, one of his opponents for the position of Mayor,
moved for leave to intervene, subscribing to Risos-Vidal's theory that former Pres. Estrada is
disqualified to run for and hold public office as his pardon failed to expressly remit his
perpetual disqualification. Risos-Vidal cites Arts 36 and 41 of the RPC. Art 36 provides that "A
pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold public office, or the right of
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon" while Art. 41
states that "The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them
that of civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and
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UP PORTIA SORORITY
that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though
pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in
the pardon."
DOCTRINE:
Former Pres Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and
political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal
point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former Pres Estrada is
complete,
unambiguous,
and
unqualified.
It
is
likewise
unfettered by Arts36 and 41 of the RPC. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional
interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Arts 36 and
41 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, the pardoning power of the President cannot be
limited
by
legislative
action.
Sec
19,
Art
VII
and Sec 5, Art IX of the 1987 Constitution provides that the President possesses the power
to grant pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency. It is apparent from the
foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in which the President may not
extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted
in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations
in which there was no favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it
can be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the
pardoning power of the President. Pursuant to the cases of Cristobal vs. Labrador, Pelobello
vs.
Palatino,
and
Monsanto
vs.
Factoran, Jr., it is the long-standing position of the Court that the exercise of the pardoning
power is discretionary in the President and may not be interfered with by Congress or the
Court, except only when it exceeds the limits provided for by the Constitution. This doctrine
of non-diminution or non-impairment of the Presidents power of pardon by acts of Congress,
specifically through legislation, was strongly adhered to by an overwhelming majority of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution when they flatly rejected a proposal to carve out an
exception from the pardoning power of the President in the form of offenses involving graft
and corruption that would be enumerated and defined by Congress through the enactment
of a law. Finally, Arts. 36 and 41 of the RPC both provides exceptions in the event of pardon.
A rigid and inflexible reading of the above provisions of law, as proposed by Risos-Vidal, is
unwarranted, especially so if it will defeat or unduly restrict the power of the President to
grant executive clemency.
The phrase in the presidential pardon at issue which declares that former Pres Estrada is
hereby restored to his civil and political rights substantially complies with the requirement
of express restoration. All that Arts 36 and 41 do is prescribe that, if the President wishes to
include in the pardon the restoration of the rights of suffrage and to hold public office, or the
remission of the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification, he or she should
do so expressly. Arts 36 and 41 only ask that the Pres state his or her intentions clearly,
directly, firmly, precisely, and unmistakably. To belabor the point, the President retains the
power to make such restoration or remission, subject to a prescription on the manner by
which he or she is to state it.
The text of the pardon extended to former Pres Estrada shows that both the principal
penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The
first sentence refers to the executive clemency extended to former President Estrada who
was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The latter is the principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment.
The sentence that followed, which states that (h)e is hereby restored to his civil and
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political rights, expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Arts 36 and 41 of the RPC, it is
indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and
perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In this jurisdiction, the right to seek public elective office is recognized by law as falling
under the whole gamut of civil and political rights. From both law and jurisprudence, the
right to seek public elective office is unequivocally considered as a political right. Sec 40 of
the LGC identifies who are disqualified from running for any elective local position. RisosVidal argues that former Pres Estrada is disqualified under item (a). Sec 12 of the OEC
provides for similar prohibitions, but it provides for an exception when "he has been given
plenary pardon or granted amnesty". While it may be apparent that the proscription in Sec
40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Sec 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape
from the prohibition a plenary pardon or amnesty. I.e. the latter provision allows any
person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment
of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office,
whether local or national position. In Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, the Court
acknowledged the aforementioned provision as one of the legal remedies that may be
availed of to disqualify a candidate in a local election filed any day after the last day for
filing of certificates of candidacy, but not later than the date of proclamation.
Contrary to Risos-Vidals declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e.,
[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective
position or office, neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion
that former President Estradas rights to suffrage and to seek public elective office have
been restored. This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a
condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term civil and political rights
as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act
as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment,
usually introduced by the word whereas. Where the scope and import of the executive
clemency extended by the President is in issue, the Court must turn to the only evidence
available to it, and that is the pardon itself. From a detailed review of the four corners of said
document, nothing therein gives an iota of intimation that the third Whereas Clause is
actually a limitation, proviso, stipulation or condition on the grant of the pardon, such that
the breach of the mentioned commitment not to seek public office will result in a revocation
or cancellation of said pardon. To the Court, what it is simply is a statement of fact or the
prevailing situation at the time the executive clemency was granted. It was not used as a
condition to the efficacy or to delimit the scope of the pardon.
_________________________________________________________________________________
TIMBOL v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 206004; Feb. 24, 2015; Leonen, J.
SUMMARY: Timbol filed a CoC for the position of Member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
the Second District of Caloocan City. His name was listed among those declared by the
COMELEC as nuisance candidates even before he was subpoenaed for a clarificatory
hearing. Despite the Election Officers favourable recommendation for Timbol, the latters
name was not removed from the mentioned list. 2 days before the printing of the ballots,
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UP PORTIA SORORITY
Timbol filed a petition with the COMELEC praying that his name be included in the certified
list of candidates, but the COMELEC denied the petition a day after the designated day of
the printing of the ballots for being moot, since the printing of the ballots had already begun.
Thus, Timbol flied this Petition for Certiorari with the SC, arguing that the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in declaring him a nuisance candidate. The SC denied the petition since
the case is moot and academic, the elections already been conducted with the winners
already proclaimed. However, the court still ruled that the COMELECs power to motu prorpio
deny due course to a COC is subject to the candidates opportunity to be heard.
DOCTRINE: The power of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to restrict a citizen's
right of suffrage should not be arbitrarily exercised. The COMELEC cannot motu proprio deny
due course to or cancel an alleged nuisance candidates certificate of candidacy without
providing the candidate his opportunity to be heard.
A case is moot and academic if it ceases to present a justiciable controversy because of
supervening events so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
When a case is moot and academic, the court generally declines jurisdiction over it. There
are recognized exceptions to this rule. The court has taken cognizance of moot and
academic cases when: (1) there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case
involved a situation of exceptional character and was of paramount public interest; (3) the
issues raised required the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar
and the public; and (4) the case was capable of repetition yet evading review.
Nuisance candidates are persons who file their certificates of candidacy to put the election
process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of
the names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly
demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the
certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true
will of the electorate.
_________________________________________________________________________________
IN THE MATTER OF: SAVE THE SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
AND FISCAL AUTONOMY MOVEMENT v. ABOLITION OF THE JUDICIARY
DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND REDUCTION OF FISCAL AUTONOMY
UDK-15143; January 21, 2015; Leonen, J.
SUMMARY:
This case involves the proposed bills abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund and
replacing it with the Judiciary Support Fund wherein the funds collected shall be remitted to
the national treasury and Congress shall determine how the funds will be used. Petitioner
Mijares prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in order to compel this court to
exercise its judicial independence and fiscal autonomy against the perceived hostility of
Congress. The SC denied the petition for failure to comply with the first two requisites for a
judicial review and for failure to show the requisites for the issuance of a writ of mandamus.
There is no actual case or controversy. The SC is not empowered to review proposed bills
because a bill is not a law. Also, petitioner has no legal standing. There is neither imminent
danger nor transcendental interest.
DOCTRINE:
Requisites for judicial review:
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest
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UP PORTIA SORORITY
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the
independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The
imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional
offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal
autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as
regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the
entire fabric of our constitutional system is based.
Courts are not constitutionally built to do political lobbying. By constitutional design, it is a
co-equal department to the Congress and the Executive. By temperament, our arguments
are legal, not political. We are best when we lay down all our premises in the finding of facts,
interpretation of the law and understanding of precedents. We are not trained .to produce a
political statement or a media release."67 "Because of the nature of courts, that is - that it
has to decide in favor of one party, we may not have a political base. Certainly, we should
not even consider building a political base. All we have is an abiding faith that we should do
what we could to ensure that the Rule of Law prevails. It seems that we have no champions
when it comes to ensuring the material basis for fiscal autonomy or judicial independence.
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UP PORTIA SORORITY
REMEDIAL
METROGUARDS SECURITY AGENCY CORPORATION (FORMERLY KNOWN AS
BEEGUARDS CORPORATION) and MS. MILAGROS T. CHAN, v. ALBERTO N.
HILONGO
G.R. No. 215630; March 09, 2015; Villarama, Jr., J.
SUMMARY:
On April 30, 2010, the Labor Arbiter ruled that Hilongo was illegally dismissed, and ordered
that Hilongo be paid his backwages from the date of dismissal to the date of the decision
and separation pay of one month pay per year of service, plus 10% thereof as attorneys
fees, which totalled P170, 520.31. The NLRC reversed the ruling of LA, but the CA reversed
the NLRC decision and reinstated the LAs. Petitioners MR was denied by the CA on March
26, 2013. Hilongo filed a motion for entry of judgment and motion for clarification of
Decision praying that the CAs Resolution be clarified and interpreted to include the amount
of the award as stated in the LAs decision and additional award computed from May 1, 2010
to March 26, 2013 (date the CA denied petitioners MR). The CA granted the motion and held
that when an appellate court affirms the LAs ruling, it is understood that awards due to the
illegally dismissed employee shall be recomputed in order to account for the period of time
that has lapsed from the rendition of the LAs decision up to its finality. The case was
remanded to the LA. Hilongo filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution alleging that
the CA resolution had confirmed that there is a need to compute additional monetary awards
reckoned from May 1, 2010 up to April 26, 2013 (presumed date of finality of decision). The
LA directed the issuance of a writ of execution and ruled that the award of P170, 520.31 as
stated in the decision dated April 30, 2010 prevails. Hilongo filed a petition for extraordinary
remedy before the NLRC which dismissed the petition and denied Hilongos MR. Hilongo filed
a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA granted the petition and set aside the NLRC
decision and ordered the LA to re-compute Hilongos monetary awards. Metroguards filed a
petition for review before the SC.
The SC held that the CA did not err in ordering the re-computation of the monetary awards.
The CA Decision became final and executory on April 26, 2013. Thus, the April 30, 2010
decision of the Labor Arbiter effectively ended the employment relationship of the parties on
April 26, 2013. However, CA incorrectly concluded that the April 30, 2010 decision of the LA
became final on June 11, 2013 contrary to its own finding that it became final and executory
on April 26, 2013. This led to its erroneous computation of the monetary awards and the
reckoning date of the 12% legal interest. The additional back wages and separation pay of
Hilongo should be computed from May 1, 2010 to April 26, 2013. The payment of legal
interest of 12% per annum should also be from April 26, 2013 up to June 30, 2013.
Thereafter, the legal interest computed from July 1, 2013 until the monetary awards were
fully satisfied will be 6% per annum.
DOCTRINE:
No essential change is made by a recomputation as this step is a necessary consequence
that flows from the nature of the illegality of dismissal declared by the labor arbiter in that
decision. A recomputation (r an original computation, if no previous computation has been
made) is part of the law specifically Article 279 of the Labor Code and the established
jurisprudence on this provision that is read into the decision. By the nature of an illegal
dismissal case, the reliefs continue to add up until full satisfaction, as expressed under
Article 279 of the Labor Code. The recomputation of the consequences of illegal dismissal
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UP PORTIA SORORITY
upon execution of the decision does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the final
decision being implemented. The illegal dismissal ruling stands; only the computation of
monetary consequences of this dismissal is affected, and this is not a violation of the
principle of immutability of final judgments.
_________________________________________________________________________________
NORMA JAVATE v. SPS. RENATO and LERMA TIOTUICO
G.R. No. 187606; March 9, 2015; Peralta, J.
SUMMARY:
Javate failed to pay her obligation and the Guagua Rural Bank foreclosed the mortgage. The
lot which secured the mortgage was sold at public auction where the Bank was the highest
bidder. Javate was not able to redeem the property. The Bank consolidated its ownership
over the same, and a new title was issued in the name of the Bank. Sps. Tiotuico bought the
subject lot from the Bank, and a new title was issued in their favour. Sps. Tiotuico filed a
Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession with the RTC. The RTC ruled in their favour.
Javate appealed the RTC Order. Sps. Tiotuico filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession pending appeal, which was granted. Javate filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA questioning the issuance of the writ. The CA denied the petition and the MR. Sps. Tiotuico
filed a motion to implement the writ of possession earlier issued. This motion was granted,
prompting Javate to file a special civil action for certiorari before the CA. This petition was
dismissed, resulting to the present petition for review on certiorari before the SC.
The issue raised was whether or not Sps. Tiotuico are entitled, as a matter of right, to the
issuance of a writ of possession when they merely bought the subject property through
private transaction and NOT through land registration proceedings, judicial foreclosure and
extrajudicial foreclosure. Javate contended that the Bank, being the buyer during the
foreclosure sale, is the only one entitled as a matter of right to the issuance of writ of
possession; that respondents as subsequent buyers should instead resort to ejectment or
accion reinvindicatoria in order to gain possession. The Court denied the petition. The Court
said that the issuance of a writ of possession is proper since, even though the petition for
issuance of writ of possession was filed ex-parte, a hearing was nonetheless conducted
when the RTC gave Javate her day in court by giving her the opportunity to file various
pleadings to oppose respondents petition. Also, Javate remained in possession of the
property prior to the issuance of the questioned writ. Thus it is clear that Sps. Tiotuicos
resort, as a subsequent or third-party purchaser, to the petition for the issuance of writ of
possession is proper.
DOCTRINES:
The remedy of a writ of possession, a remedy that is available to the mortgagee-purchaser
to acquire possession of the foreclosed property from the mortgagor, is made available to a
subsequent purchaser, but only after hearing and after determining that the subject
property is still in the possession of the mortgagor. Unlike if the purchaser is the mortgage or
third party during the redemption period, a writ of possession may issue ex-parte or without
hearing. In other words, if the purchaser is a third party who acquired the property after the
redemption period, a hearing must be conducted to determine whether possession over the
subject property is still with the mortgagor or is already in the possession of a third party
holding the same adversely to the defaulting debtor or mortgagor. If the property is in the
possession of the mortgagor, a writ of possession could thus be issued. Otherwise, the
remedy of a writ of possession is no longer available to such purchaser, but he can wrest
possession over the property through an ordinary action of ejectment.
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UP PORTIA SORORITY
Immediately requiring the subsequent purchaser to file a separate case of ejectment instead
of a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession, albeit not ex-parte, will only prolong the
proceedings and unduly deny the subsequent purchaser of possession of the property which
he already bought.
_________________________________________________________________________________
JOSE PEPE SANICO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JENNIFER SONTENIO
G.R. No. 19875; March 25, 2015; BERSAMIN, J.:
SUMMARY: Jose Sanico and Marsito Batiquin were convicted by MCTC for theft of minerals
(RA 7942) on April 2, 2009. On April 22, 2009, Sanicos counsel filed a notice of appeal in the
MCTC. On January 5, 2010, the RTC ordered Sanico to file his memorandum on appeal.
Sanico did not comply; hence, the RTC dismissed the appeal with prejudice on March 16,
2010. The CA also dismissed the Petition for Review filed by Sanico due to procedural
infirmities.
An entry of judgment was issued on March 30, 2011, and the writ of execution on April 19,
2011; and execution sales covering several personal properties of the petitioner were made
on June 14 and June 16, 2011, and the certificates of sale were issued in favor of respondent
Jennifer Tenio. SC reversed CAs dismissal of the appeal and ruled that it was properly filed in
the RTC despite non-submission of the memorandum of appeal. SC remanded the case to
RTC for appellate review.
DOCTRINE:
The failure to file the memorandum on appeal is a ground for the RTC to dismiss the appeal
only in civil cases (Sec. 7 (b), Rule 40). The same rule does not apply in criminal cases,
because Section 9 (c) of Rule 122 imposes on the RTC the duty to decide the appeal on the
basis of the entire record of the case and of such memoranda or briefs as may have been
filed upon the submission of the appellate memoranda or briefs, or upon the expiration of
the period to file the same. Hence, the dismissal of the petitioners appeal cannot be
properly premised on the failure to file the memorandum on appeal.
_________________________________________________________________________________
NOVECIO v. LIM
G.R. No. 193809; March 23, 2015; J. Brion
SUMMARY: Private respondents Tuazon and Nieto filed an action for forcible entry against
petitioners whom they claim were squatting over the subject property owned by the former.
Petitioners claim that they were in possession over the land for more than two years and
that the subject property were divided among them by virtue of the CARL.
MTC ruled for the petitioners. RTC reversed. While on appeal to CA, petitioners moved for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and a 60-day TRO when the respondents, despite
the pendency of the CA appeal, sought to execute the RTC judgment. CA granted the TRO
but ultimately denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
In SC, petitioners now contend that CA acted in GAD for denying their motion for preliminary
injunction. SC ruled that CA acted in GAD and henceforth set aside the CA denial.
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UP PORTIA SORORITY
DOCTRINE: A preliminary injunction is proper when the plaintiff appears to be clearly

entitled to the relief sought and has substantial interest in the right sought to be defended.
As this Court has previously ruled, "while the existence of the right need not be conclusively
established, it must be clear."
A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial or incomplete evidence.
Such evidence need only be a sampling intended merely to give the court an evidence of
justification for a preliminary injunction pending the decision on the merits of the case, and
is not conclusive of the principal action which has yet to be decided.
In a prayer for preliminary injunction, the plaintiff is not required to submit conclusive and
complete evidence. He is only required to show that he has an ostensible right to the final
relief prayed for in his complaint. We ought to remember that the grant of preliminary
injunction would have only been provisional and would not be conclusively determinative of
the principal action. The issuance of the writ would have served its purpose, i.e., to preserve
the status quo or to prevent future wrongs in order to preserve and protect the interests of
the petitioners during the pendency of the action.
_________________________________________________________________________________
NATANYA JOANA D. ARGEL vs. GOV. LUIS C. SINGSON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
THE GOVERNOR OF THE PROVINCE OF ILOCOS SUR
G.R. No. 202970; March 25, 2015; PEREZ, J.:
SUMMARY: Argel was appointed by then Ilocos Sur Governor Savellano as Nurse II under
permanent status at the Gabriela Silang General Hospital. However, the Civil Service
Commission Field Office (CSCFO) Ilocos Sur disapproved the appointment on the ground
that she still lacks 4 months out of the 1 year experience required. Upon appeal with the
CSC Regional Office No. 1 (CSCRO1), Argel was appointed as Nurse II.
In a letter dated August 16 2010, the Director of CSCFO forwarded to Governor Singson,
successor of Governor Savellano, a photocopy of the decision, with a directive that unless
appealed within fifteen (15) days from receipt, the decision of the CSCRO1 should be
implemented. On September 15 2010, the Provincial Government of Ilocos Sur filed a Notice
of Appeal before the Commission. It was dismissed by the Commission on the ground that it
was filed beyond the 15 day reglementary period required under the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. CA granted Governor Singsons Petition for Review
with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order. SC ruled that
procedurally and on the merits, the petition must be granted.
DOCTRINE: The settled and firmly established rule is that a decision that has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of immutability precludes the
modification of the judgment, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact and law. Indeed, the principle of conclusiveness of prior adjudications is
not confined in its operation to the judgments of courts, but extends as well to those of all
other
tribunals
exercising
adjudicatory
powers.
(emphasis
by
the
Court)
Even assuming in arguendo that Argel failed to strictly meet the relevant experience
required for the position, the appointment must be upheld, in view of the fact that
the Commission has allowed the appointment of employees who were initially lacking in
experience but eventually obtained the same.
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UP PORTIA SORORITY
_________________________________________________________________________________
COMGLASCO CORPORATION v. SANTOS CAR CHECK CENTER
G.R. No. 202989; March 25, 2015; Reyes, J.
SUMMARY:
Santos Car Check Center leased out its showroom to Comglasco Corporation for 5
years. A year later, Comglasco advised Santos that it was pre-terminating their
lease contract. Santos refused to accede to the pre-termination, reminding
Comglasco that their contract was for 5 years. Comglasco later vacated the leased
premises and stopped paying any further rentals. Santos filed a suit for breach of
contract. The RTC ruled in favor of Santos and ordered Comglasco to comply with its
obligation and pay its unpaid rentals. A writ of execution was granted in favor of
Santos. The CA affirmed the RTC judgment. The SC ruled that the RTC acted
correctly in resorting to Sec. 1 of Rule 34 on Judgment on the Pleadings, to cut short
a needless trial. Comglasco had recourse to move for summary judgment, wherein it
could have adduced supporting evidence to justify its action on the parties' lease,
but it did not do so.
DOCTRINE:
A judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded, and is based
exclusively upon the allegations appearing in the pleadings of the parties and the
accompanying annexes. It is settled that the trial court has the discretion to grant a
motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by a party if there is no controverted
matter in the case after the answer is filed. A genuine issue of fact is that which
requires the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from a sham, fictitious,
contrived or false issue.
_________________________________________________________________________________
FAJ CONSTRUCTION v. SUSAN SAULOG
G.R. No. 200759; March 25, 2015; Del Castillo, J.
SUMMARY:
FAJ Construction and Saulog entered into an agreement for the construction of a residential
building in Makati for Php 12.5-M. Payment to FAJ Construction shall be on a progress billing
basis, after inspection of work by Saulog. For 2 progress billing statements, Saulog refused
to pay. FAJ Construction terminated the construction contract, pursuant to Art 27(b) of the
Uniform General Conditions of COngrat for Private Construction (Document 102) of the
Construction Industry Authority of the Philippines. FAJ Construction sent demand letters to
Saulog, but Saulog claimed that FAJ Constructions work was defective and that it should
instead be made liable thereon. FAJ Construction filed of sum of money. After several
opportunities for the presentation of its first witness, FAJ failed to proceed with trial. Hence
the RTC dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. CA affirmed the RTC decision, declaring
that FAJ adopted a pattern of delay and impeded the administration of justice. FAJ
Construction sought that a new trial of the case be held; it argued that res judicata cannot
be made as basis to deny it the opportunity to question the dismissal of its case because the
dismissal was not an adjudication of the case on its merits. The SC denied the petition.
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UP PORTIA SORORITY
DOCTRINE:
The Court has repeatedly said that minute resolutions dismissing the actions filed
before it constitute actual adjudications on the merits. They are the result of
thorough deliberation among the members of the Court. When the Court does not
find any reversible error in the decision of the CA and denies the petition, there is no
need for the Court to fully explain its denial, since it already means that it agrees
with and adopts the findings and conclusions of the CA.
It has already been held that the determination of the existence of a breach of
contract is a factual matter not usually reviewable in a petition filed under Rule 45.
We will not review, much less reverse, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals
especially where, as in this case, such findings coincide with those of the trial court,
since we are not a trier of facts.
_________________________________________________________________________________
YUK LING ONG V. BENJAMIN T. CO
G.R. No. 206653; February 25, 2015; MENDOZA, J.
SUMMARY:
Yuk Ling Ong (British-HK national), and Benjamin Co (Filipino), were married on 1982 at
Ellinwood-Malate Church. Then in 2008, Ong received a subpoena directing her to appear
before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation because her permanent residence visa
was being subjected to cancellation proceedings. It was reported that her marriage with Co
was nullified by RTC in 2002.
Thus, Ong filed a petition for annulment of RTCs judgment on the grounds of extrinsic fraud 1
and lack of jurisdiction2, claiming that she was never notified of the cases filed against her.
CA denied.
SC finds merit in the petition Manotoc requirements were not met; invalid substituted
service of summons; and the decision annulling the marriage null and void. In this case, the
process server immediately opted for substituted service of summons after only two (2) days
from the issuance of the summons. Also, the servers return utterly lacks sufficient detail of
the attempts undertaken by the process server to personally serve the summons on
petitioner - the server simply made a general statement that summons was effected after
several futile attempts to serve the same personally.
DOCTRINE: Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in
exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. Rule 47 of the
1997 Rules of CivPro governs actions for annulment of judgments or final orders and
resolutions, and Section 2 thereof explicitly provides only two grounds for annulment of
judgment: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Annulment of judgment is an equitable
1 Allegedly, Co deliberately indicated a wrong address to prevent her from participating in the trial.
2 Jurisdiction over her person was not acquired because of an invalid substituted service of summons
as no sufficient explanation, showing impossibility of personal service, was stated before resorting to
substituted service of summons; and that the alleged substituted service was made on a security
guard of their townhouse and not on a member of her household.
63
UP PORTIA SORORITY
principle not because it allows a party-litigant another opportunity to reopen a judgment

that has long lapsed into finality but because it enables him to be discharged from the
burden of being bound to a judgment that is an absolute nullity to begin with.
Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or final order is
either lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. The former is a matter of substantive law
because statutory law defines the jurisdiction of the courts over the subject matter or nature
of the action. The latter is a matter of procedural law, for it involves the service of summons
or other processes on the petitioner.
Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or
the defendant's voluntary appearance in court.
In court proceedings, there is no right more cherished than the right of every litigant to be
given an opportunity to be heard. This right begins at the very moment that summons is
served on the defendant. The Rules of Court places utmost importance in ensuring that the
defendant personally grasp the weight of responsibility that will befall him. Thus, it is only in
exceptional circumstances that constructive notification, or substituted service of summons,
is allowed. If the server falls short of the rigorous requirements for substituted service of
summons, then the Court has no other option but to strike down a void judgment, regardless
of the consequences.
Landmark case of Manotoc v. CA - the rigorous requirements of a substituted service of
summons:
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by
the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period of one month
which eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. "Several
attempts" means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In
addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that
impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.
(2) Specific Details in the Return
The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances
surrounding the attempted personal service. The efforts made to find the defendant and
the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date
and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the
defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant
and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be
specified in the Return to justify substituted service.
(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion
The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or
residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipient's relationship with the
defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the
summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the
defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically
described in the Return of Summons.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty was never intended to be
applied even in cases where there are no showing of substantial compliance with the
requirements of the rules of procedure. Such presumption does not apply where it is patent
that the sheriffs or servers return is defective.
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UP PORTIA SORORITY
The stricter rule in substituted service of summons was meant to address [t]he numerous
claims of irregularities in substituted service which have spawned the filing of a great
number of unnecessary special civil actions of certiorari and appeals to higher courts,
resulting in prolonged litigation and wasteful legal expenses.
_________________________________________________________________________________
Ruben Manalang, et al v Bienvenido and Mercedes Bacani
GR No 156995; January 12, 2015; Bersamin, J.
SUMMARY: A relocation and verification survey of a co-owned lot by the petitioners showed
that respondents encroached on said lot. This finding was confirmed by a preliminary
relocation survey by the Land Mgt Section of DENR. Respondents refused to vacate
prompting the filing of an unlawful detainer case by the petitioners. MTC Branch 2 dismissed
case for lack of jurisdiction (should be accion reinvindicatoria since theres no averment of
the existence of a contract and no showing that respondents occupied said portion by
petitioners mere tolerance). RTC remanded saying that this was not a proper case for accion
reinvindicatoria (not a mere transfer of boundary). Upon remand, MTC Branch 1 dismissed
for lack of merit. Petitioners appealed to the RTC which ordered the conduct of a relocation
survey and also heard the testimony of the surveyor. RTC reversed the MTC and ruled that
the respondents had encroached on petiitoners property. CA reinstated MTC (RTCs act of
ordering the survey amounted to a reopening of the trial which isnt allowed under Sec.
13(3) Rule 70 RoC; the survey was also inconclusive; and the complaint (alegations: illegal
use and occupation) made out a case for either accion reinvindicatoria or publiciana which is
under the RTCs original jurisdiction). SC affirmed CA stating that the RTC, in appeal of a
judgment in an ejectment case, shall not conduct a rehearing or a trial de novo based on
Sec. 18 Rule 70 RoC.
DOCTRINES:
1. The judgment of final order shall be appealable to the appropriate RTC which shall decide
the same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and
such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the RTC.
The RTC violated this rule by ordering the conduct of the relocation and verificaiton survey in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction and by hearing the testimony of the surveyor.
2. A boundary dispute must be resolved in the context of accion reinvindicatoria, not an
ejectment case. The boundary dispute cannot be settle summarily under Rule 70 RoC, the
proceedings under which are limited to unlawful detainer and forcible entry. In unlawful
detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds the possession of the premises upon the
expiration or termination of his right to hold such possession under any contract, express or
implied. The defendants possession was lawful at the beginning, becoming unlawful only
because of the expiration or termination of his right of possession. In forcible entry, the
possession of the defendant is illegal from the very beginning, and the issue centers on
which between the plaintiff and the defendant had the prior possession de facto.
3. It is fundamental that the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief
sought by the complaint determine the nature of the action and the court that has
jurisdiction over the action.[28] To be clear, unlawful detainer is an action filed by a lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by
virtue of any contract, express or implied.[29] To vest in the MTC the jurisdiction to effect the
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UP PORTIA SORORITY
ejectment from the land of the respondents as the occupants in unlawful detainer, therefore,
the complaint should embody such a statement of facts clearly showing the attributes of
unlawful detainer.
_________________________________________________________________________________
SENATOR JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, PETITIONER, VS. BERSAMIN, OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN, FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND ATTY. LEVITO D. BALIGOD,
RESPONDENTS.
G.R. Nos. 212140-41; January 21, 2015
SUMMARY:
Sen. Estrada filed a request to be furnished with copies of counter-affidavits of his corespondents, affidavits of new witnesses, and other filings in a plunder complaint filed
against him. His request was made pursuant to a respondent's right to examine the
evidence
submitted
by
the
complainant
which
he
may
not
have
been
furnished (Sec 3b, Rule 112, RoC) and to have access to the evidence on record (Sec 4c,
Rule II, Rules of Procedure of Office of the Ombudsman). The Ombudsman denied the
request, finding that the foregoing provisions did not entitle Sen. Estrada to be furnished all
the filings of the other parties. The Ombudsman subsequently found probable cause to indict
Sen. Estrada and his co-respondents with one count of plunder and 11 counts of violation of
Sec 3(e), RA No. 3019. He filed a MR of the Joint Resolution finding probable cause, praying
for the dismissal of the charges against him, and without filing a MR of the order denying his
request, Sen. Estrada filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the same.
The
SC
held
that
he was not entitled to the copies of the requested documents.
DOCTRINE:
Sen. Estrada failed to specify a law or rule which states that it is a compulsory requirement
of due process in a preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman furnish a respondent with
the
counter-affidavits
of
his co-respondents. Neither Sec 3(b), Rule 112 of the Rev. rules of CrimPro nor Sec 4(c), Rule
II, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supports his claim. What the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman to furnish the
respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting affidavits and documents at the
time the order to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to the respondent. At this point, there
is still no counter-affidavit submitted by any respondent. Clearly, what Sec 4(b) refers to are
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, not the affidavits of the co-respondents.
Obviously, the counter-affidavits of the co-respondents are not part of the supporting
affidavits of the complainant. No grave abuse of discretion can thus be attributed to the
Ombudsman for the issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order which denied Sen. Estradas
Request. Although Sec 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
provides
that
a
respondent
shall
have
access
to
the
evidence
on
record, this provision should be construed in relation to Sec 4(a) and (b) of the same Rule,
as well as to the Rules of Criminal Procedure. First, Sec 4(a) states that the investigating
officer shall require the complainant or supporting witnesses to execute affidavits to
substantiate the complaint. The supporting witnesses are the witnesses of the
complainant, and do not refer to the co-respondents. Second, the affidavits referred to in Sec
4(b) which provides that "the investigating officer shall issue an order attaching a copy of
the affidavits..." are those in Sec 4(a), i.e. those of the complainant and his supporting
witnesses. Sec 4(c) which provides that a respondent should have access to the evidence on
record should be read in relation to Secs 4a and b of the same Rule II. Thus, a respondent's
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UP PORTIA SORORITY
access to evidence on record in Sec 4c, RuleII of the Ombudsman's Rules of Procedure refers
to the affidavits and supporting documents of the complainant or supporting witnesses in
Sec 4(a) of the same Rule II. Third, Sec 3b Rule 112 of the Rev. Rules of CrimPro providing a
respondent's right to examine refers only to the evidence submitted by the complainant.
Thus, whether under Rule 112 of the Rev Rules of CrimPro or under Rule II of the
Ombudsman's Rules of Procedure, there is no requirement whatsoever that the affidavits
executed by the co-respondents should be furnished to a respondent. likewise devoid of
cogency is petitioners argument that thetestimonies of Galarion and Hanopol are
inadmissible as to him since he was not granted the opportunity of cross-examination.
The accused in a preliminary investigation has no right to cross-examine the witnesses
which the complainant may present. Sec 3, Rule 112 of the RoC expressly provides that the
respondent shall only have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other
evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to propound
clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be
present but without the right to examine or cross-examine. Thus, even if petitioner was not
given the opportunity to cross-examine Galarion and Hanopol at the time they were
presented to testify during the separate trial of the case against Galarion and Roxas, he
cannot assert any legal right to cross-examine them at the preliminary investigation
precisely because such right was never available to him. The admissibility or inadmissibility
of said testimonies should be ventilated before the TC during the trial proper and not in the
preliminary investigation. Furthermore, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on
the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation. If
by its very nature a preliminary investigation could be waived by the accused, we find no
compelling justification for a strict application of the evidentiary rules. In addition,
considering
that
under
Sec
8,
Rule
112
of
the
RoC, the record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of the record of the case
in the RTC, then the testimonies of Galarion and Hanopol may not be admitted by the trial
court if not presented in evidence by the prosecuting fiscal. And, even if the prosecution
does present such testimonies, petitioner can always object thereto and the trial court can
rule on the admissibility thereof; or the petitioner can, during the trial, petition said court to
compel the presentation of Galarion and Hanopol for purposes of cross-examination.
Moreover, a person under preliminary investigation, as Sen. Estrada is in the present case
when he filed his Request, is not yet an accused, and hence cannot demand the full exercise
of the rights of an accused person.
Considering the low quantum and quality of evidence needed to support a finding of
probable cause, we also hold that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion in
refusing
to
call
the
NBI
witnesses
for
clarificatory questions. The decision to call witnesses for clarificatory questions is addressed
to the sound discretion of the investigator and the investigator alone. If the evidence on
hand already yields a probable cause, the investigator need not hold a clarificatory hearing.
In
the
Philippines,
there
are
four
instances
in
the Rev. Rules of CrimPro where probable cause needed to be established: (1) In Secs 1 and
3 of Rule 112; (2) In Secs 3 and 9 of Rule 112; (3) In Sec 5(b) of Rule 113; and (4) In Sec 4 of
Rule 126. In all these instances, the evidence necessary to establish probable cause is based
only on the likelihood, or probability, of guilt. The determination of probable cause needs
only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and
there is enough reason to believe that it was committed by the accused. It is also important
to stress that the determination of probable cause does not depend on the validity or merits
of a partys accusation or defense or on the admissibility or veracity of testimonies
presented,
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UP PORTIA SORORITY
which are matters better ventilated during the trial proper. Thus, probable cause can be
established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary
investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally
adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.
_________________________________________________________________________________
SPOUSES JOSE O. GATUSLAO AND ERMILA LEONILA LIMSIACO-GATUSLAO,
PETITIONERS, VS. LEO RAY V. YANSON, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 191540, January 21, 2015
SUMMARY:
The late Felicisimo Limsiaco was the registered owner of two parcels of land which he
mortgaged, along with a house thereon, to PNB. When he failed to pay, PNB foreclosed on
the mortgage and sold the properties at public auction where it was the highest bidder.
Some years later, PNB sold the properties to respondent Yanson, who filed for issuance of a
writ of possession under Sec 7, Act No 3135. Petitioners argued that he was not entitled to
the same since he was not the buyer of the properties at the public auction sale and only
purchased these through a subsequent sale, and that an action for annulment of the
foreclosure and auction sale had already been filed. The RTC granted the issuance of the writ
of possession. Petitioners directly resorted to the SC, in violation of the hierarchy of courts;
the SC resolved the case due to the length of time the petition had been pending, and
denied the petition, ruling in respondent's favor.
DOCTRINE:
A pending action for annulment of mortgage or foreclosure sale does not stay the issuance
of the writ of possession. The TC, where the application for a writ of possession is filed, does
not need to look into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure. The
purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession without prejudice to the outcome of the pending
annulment case. This is in line with the ministerial character of the possessory writ. To stress
the ministerial character of the writ of possession, the Court has disallowed injunction to
prohibit its issuance, just as it has held that its issuance may not be stayed by a pending
action for annulment of mortgage or the foreclosure itself. Clearly then, until the foreclosure
sale of the property in question is annulled by a court of competent jurisdiction, the issuance
of a writ of possession remains the ministerial duty of the trial court. The same is true with
its implementation; otherwise, the writ will be a useless paper judgment a result inimical to
the mandate of Act No. 3135 to vest possession in the purchaser immediately. Although the
Sec 7, Act 3135 clearly pertains to a writ of possession availed of and issued within the
redemption period of the foreclosure sale, the same procedure also applies to a situation
where a purchaser is seeking possession of the foreclosed property bought at the public
auction sale after the redemption period has expired without redemption having been made.
The only difference is that in the latter case, no bond is required therefor. Respondent, as a
transferee or successor-in-interest of PNB by virtue of the contract of sale between them, is
considered to have stepped into the shoes of PNB. As such, he is necessarily entitled to avail
of the provisions of Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, as if he is PNB. Further,
respondent may rightfully take possession of the subject properties through a writ of
possession, even if he was not the actual buyer thereof at the public auction sale.
_________________________________________________________________________________
REYNALDO H. JAYLO, WILLIAM VALENZONA AND ANTONIO G. HABALO, v.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HEIRS OF
COL. ROLANDO DE GUZMAN, FRANCO CALANOG AND AVELINO MANGUERA
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G.R. Nos. 183152-54; January 21, 2015; Sereno, C.J.

SUMMARY:
In the course of a buy-bust operation, PNP officers Jaylo, Valenzona, Habalo and Castro shot
three persons involved in drug transactions. The Sandiganbayan convicted them for
homicide. Despite notice, none of the accused appeared during the promulgation of the
Sandiganbayan's judgment, which was promulgated in absentia on April 17, 2007. The
accuseds' bail bonds were canceled, and warrants for their arrest issued. Counsel for Jaylo,
Valenzona and Habalo filed a Motion for Partial MR on April 30. The Sandiganbayan took no
action on the motion and ordered implementation of the warrants of arrest, stating that they
had lost the remedies available under the Rules for failure to give a justifiable cause for
absence within the 15-day period from promulgation. The SC affirmed.
DOCTRINE:
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the
accused shall lose the remedies available in the RoC against the judgment. Thus, it is
incumbent upon the accused to appear on the scheduled date of promulgation, because it
determines the availability of their possible remedies against the judgment of conviction.
When the accused fail to present themselves at the promulgation of the judgment of
conviction, they lose the remedies of filing a motion for a new trial or reconsideration (Rule
121) and an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122). The reason is simple. When
the accused on bail fail to present themselves at the promulgation of a judgment of
conviction,
they
are
considered
to
have
lost their standing in court. Without any standing in court, the accused cannot invoke its
jurisdiction to seek relief.
_________________________________________________________________________________
EDMUND SIA v ARCENAS, LOPEZ, RAFANAN
G.R. Nos. 209672-74; 14 January 2015; Perlas-Bernabe, J.
SUMMARY: Due to the real property tax delinquencies of Panay Railways, Incorporated (PRI)
over the subject lots, the City Treasurer auctioned the subject lots, with Sia as the highest
bidder. Despite the issuance of a certificate of sale and lapse of the one year redemption
period, the City Treasurer refused to issue a Final Bill of Sale in favour of Sia; further, Mayor
Alba issued EO 08-97 nullifying the sale. Thus, Sia was not able to possess the same, and
was constrained to file a Petition for the annulment of EO 08-97, mandamus, and damages
seeking for the issuance a Final Bill of Sale. RTC decided the case in Sias favour. Sia moved
for execution of the said decision, thereafter, the writ was issued. City Treasurer still refused
to issue the Final Bill of Sale, positing that petitioner still had to settle the delinquent real
property taxes over the subject lots. Instead of paying the taxes, Sia filed a Motion for Order
Divesting Panay Railway, [Inc. of] Title and Vesting Title to Plaintiff Edmund Sia, which was
granted by the RTC in a decision dated 21 Mar 2001. RTC further held that Sia cannot be
held liable for any real property tax prior to the issuance of a Final Bill of Sale.
Thereafter, Sia moved for the delivery of the possession of the subject lots as they were
already being occupied by third parties, as lessees by PRI, including herein respondents
Wilfredo Arcenas, Fernando Lopez, and Pablo Rafanan (respondents). Thus, a Writ of
Possession and eventually, a Writ of Demolition were issued in petitioners favor.
Respondents moved for the quashal of the writs, essentially contending that the RTC
decision dated 21 Mar 2001 sought to be executed arose from a mandamus petition where a
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writ of possession is proscribed. They posited that the execution of a final judgment in a
mandamus case is similar to the execution of special judgments as provided in Section 11,
Rule 39 in relation to Section 9, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In his Opposition, petitioner argued that the ruling the orders directing the issuance of the
Final Bill of Sale and the divesting of PRIs title over the subject lots entitles him to their
possession
RTC: Motion to Quash denied. Proceedings for tax delinquency sale at a public auction
takes the nature of an extrajudicial foreclosure, thus necessitating the issuance of the
corresponding writs of possession and demolition.
CA: Set aside the writs . Writs of possession and demolition issued by the RTC Br. 15 are
null and void as they were issued beyond the ambit of the March 21, 2001 Decision. Since
the petition is one for mandamus, RTCs power in executing the judgment therein is limited
to directing compliance with the judgment (i.e., ordering the City Treasurer to issue a Final
Bill of Sale in petitioners favor) and, in case of refusal, punish with contempt the person
required by law to obey the same.
SC: Affirmed CA.
DOCTRINE:
1. A writ of mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction,
in the name of the state or sovereign, directed to an inferior court, tribunal, or board, or
to some corporation or person, requiring the performance of a particular duty therein
specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is
directed, or from operation of law. It is employed to compel the performance, when
refused, of a ministerial duty, which, as opposed to a discretionary one, is that which an
officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience
to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his or its own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.
2. The issuance of a writ of mandamus is in the nature of a special judgment that is which
a judgment directs the performance of a specific act requiring the party or person to
personally do because of his personal qualifications and circumstances. As such,
execution of the said judgment should be governed by Section 11, Rule 39 ROC. The rule
therefore is that the service and execution of a special judgment, such as a favorable
judgment in mandamus should be deemed to be limited to directing compliance with the
judgment, and in case of disobedience, to have the disobedient person required by law to
obey such judgment punished with contempt.
3. A writ of possession is defined as a writ of execution employed to enforce a judgment to
recover the possession of land. It commands the sheriff to enter the land and give its
possession to the person entitled under the judgment. It may be issued under the
following instances: (a) land registration proceedings under Section 17[51] of Act No. 496,
otherwise known as The Land Registration Act; (b) judicial foreclosure, provided the
debtor is in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to the
foreclosure suit, had intervened; (c) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage
under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118;[55] and (d) in execution
sales. Proceeding therefrom, the issuance of a writ of possession is only proper in order to
execute judgments ordering the delivery of specific properties to a litigant, in accordance
with Section 10, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court.
4. Orders pertaining to execution of judgments must substantially conform to the dispositive
portion of the decision sought to be executed. As such, it may not vary, or go beyond, the
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terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce. Where the execution is not in harmony with the
judgment which gives it life and exceeds it, it has no validity.Had the petitioner pursued
an action for ejectment or reconveyance, the issuance of writs of possession and
demolition would have been proper; but not in a special civil action for mandamus, as in
this case.
_________________________________________________________________________________
SARA LEE PHILIPPINES v MACATLANG ET.AL
G.R. No. 180147; 14 January 2015; Perez, J.
*This is a case of consolidated petitions filed by several companies against Macatlang.
SUMMARY: This is an MR of the first Supreme Court decision which modified the amount of
the bond imposed by CA to the petitioners and directing NLC to resolve the case on merit.
Aris (one of the petitioners) permanently ceased operations displacing thousands of rankand-file employees. Thereafter, FAPI (another petitioner) was incorporated prompting former
Aris employees to file a case for illegal dismissal on the allegations that FAPI was a
continuing business of Aris. Major stockholders of FAPI and officers of Aris were impleaded.
LA found the dismissal of Aris employees illegal and awarded them monetary benefits
amounting to P 3,453,664,710.86.. The Corporations filed a Notice of Appeal with Motion to
Reduce Appeal Bond. They posted a P4.5 Million bond. The NLRC granted the reduction of
the appeal bond and ordered the Corporations to post an additional P4.5 Million bond. The
former Aris employees, represented by Emilinda Macatlang (Macatlang petition), filed a
petition for review before the Court of Appeals insisting that the appeal was not perfected
due to failure of the Corporations to post the correct amount of the bond which is equivalent
to the judgment award. While the case was pending before the appellate court, the NLRC
prematurely issued an order setting aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter for being
procedurally infirmed. It should be noted that there is no TRO issued by the CA. The Court of
Appeals ordered the Corporations to post an additional appeal bond of P1 Billion. This order
was modified by SC, ordering the petitioners to pay P725 Million, in cash or surety bond. SC
also vacated the NLRC decision for being premature and directed NLRC to resolve the case
on merit. It should also be noted that the petitioner-corporations entered into a compromise
with some of the former Aris employees which they designate as Confession of Judgment,
because of the impossibility to obtain the consent to a compromise of all the
complainants.
SC: Denied MR.
DOCTRINE:
1. In McBurnie v Ganzon, the Court stated that a bond equivalent to 10% of the monetary
award pertains to the reasonable amount which the NLRC would accept as the minimum of
the bond that should accompany the motion to reduce bond in order to suspend the period
to perfect an appeal under the NLRC rules. The 10% is based on the judgment award and
should in no case be construed as the minimum amount of bond to be posted in order to
perfect appeal. The percentage of the bond set is PROVISIONAL. NLRC retains its authority
and duty to resolve the motion and determine the final amount of bond that shall be posted
by the appellant, still in accordance with the standards of "meritorious grounds" and
"reasonable amount." Should the NLRC, after considering the motions merit, determine that
a greater amount or the full amount of the bond needs to be posted by the appellant, then
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the party shall comply accordingly. The appellant shall be given a period of 10 days from
notice of the NLRC order within which to perfect the appeal by posting the required appeal
bond.
2. As regards the NLRCs decision pending the petition for review before the CA, the Court
discussed the concept of judicial courtesy.
Principle of judicial courtesy is to justify the suspension of the proceedings before the lower
court even without an injunctive writ or order from the higher court. However, the
application of judicial courtesy is limited and qualified. In order to maintain the efficacy of
Section 7, Rule 65 ROC, the principle of judicial courtesy applies only if there is a strong
probability that the issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and moribund as
a result of the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court. SC clarified that the
principle of judicial courtesy remains to be the exception rather than the rule.
3. Further, the Court discussed the difference between a compromise agreement and a
confession of judgment.
A motion for judgment on consent is not to be equated with a judgment by confession. The
former is one the provisions and terms of which are settled and a agreed upon by the parties
to the action, and which is entered in the record by the consent and sanction of the court,
Hence, there must be an unqualified agreement among the parties to be bound by the
judgment on consent before said judgment may be entered. The court does not have the
power to supply terms, provisions, or essential details not previously agreed to by the
parties. On the other hand, a judgment by confession is not a plea but an affirmative and
voluntary act of the defendant himself. Here, the court exercises a certain amount of
supervision over the entry of judgment, as well as equitable jurisdiction over their
subsequent status.
Both, however, stand upon the same footing in that both may not be executed by counsel
without knowledge and authority of the client. Thus, because of the impossibility to
obtain the consent to a compromise of all the complainants, the confession of
judgment is void. Even if such confession will be considered as a compromise agreement,
the same cannot be approved since accepting an outrageously low amount of consideration
as compromise defeats the complainants legitimate claim and the basic policy of the State
behind Art 227, LC..
Article 227, LC authorizes compromise agreements voluntarily agreed upon by the parties, in
conformity with the basic policy of the State to promote and emphasize the primacy of free
collective bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation and
conciliation, as modes of settling labor or industrial disputes.
_________________________________________________________________________________
DOA ADELA EXPORT INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner, VS. TRADE AND
INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (TIDCORP), AND THE BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (BPI), respondents.
G.R. No. 201931; February 11, 2015; Villarama Jr., J.
SUMMARY:
Petitioner Doa Adela Export International, Inc. filed a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency. The
RTC, after finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, issued an order declaring
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petitioner as insolvent and staying all civil proceedings against petitioner. Thereafter, Atty.
Arlene Gonzales was appointed as receiver. After taking her oath, Atty. Gonzales proceeded
to make the necessary report, engaged appraisers and required the creditors to submit proof
of their respective claims. Atty. Gonzales filed a Motion for Parties to Enter Into Compromise
Agreement incorporating therein her proposed terms of compromise. On May 26, 2011,
petitioner, through its President Epifanio C. Ramos, Jr., and Technology Resource Center
(TRC) entered into a Dacion En Pago by Compromise Agreement wherein petitioner agreed to
transfer a 351-square meter parcel of land covered by TCT No. 10027 with existing
improvements situated in the Barrio of Jolo, Mandaluyong City, in favor of TRC in full
payment of petitioners obligation. The agreement bears the conformity of Atty. Gonzales as
receiver. TRC filed on May 26, 2011 a Compliance, Manifestation and Motion to Approve
Dacion En Pago by Compromise Agreement. On August 11, 2011, creditors TIDCORP and BPI
also filed a Joint Motion to Approve Agreement. Epifanio Ramos, Jr. filed a Manifestation and
Motion to the Proposed Compromise Agreement of TIDCORP and BPI wherein he stated that
petitioner has a personality separate and distinct from its stockholders and officers. He
argued that he cannot be held liable for the expenses and taxes as a consequence of the
auction or distribution/payment of said machineries to the creditors; hence, his name should
be deleted as a party to the Compromise Agreement.
The RTC rendered the assailed Decision approving the Dacion En Pago by Compromise
Agreement and the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement. Hence, this petition. The main issue
for consideration is whether the petitioner is bound by the provision in the BPI-TIDCORP Joint
Motion to Approve Agreement that petitioner shall waive its rights to confidentiality of its
bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405, as amended, otherwise known as the Law on Secrecy of
Bank Deposits and R.A. No. 8791, otherwise known as The General Banking Law of 2000.
The SC finds the petition meritorious. In this case, the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement
was executed by BPI and TIDCORP only. There was no written consent given by petitioner or
its representative, Epifanio Ramos, Jr., that petitioner is waiving the confidentiality of its
bank deposits. The provision on the waiver of the confidentiality of petitioners bank
deposits was merely inserted in the agreement. It is clear therefore that petitioner is not
bound by the said provision since it was without the express consent of petitioner who was
not a party and signatory to the said agreement. Neither can petitioner be deemed to have
given its permission by failure to interpose its objection during the proceedings. n addition,
considering that petitioner was already declared insolvent by the RTC, all its property, assets
and belongings were ordered delivered to the appointed receiver or assignee. Thus, in the
order of the RTC appointing Atty. Gonzales as receiver, petitioner was directed to assign and
convey to Atty. Gonzales all its real and personal property, monies, estate and effects with
all the deeds, books and papers relating thereto, pursuant to Section 32 of the Insolvency
Law
DOCTRINE:
A judgment rendered on the basis of a compromise agreement between the parties in a civil
case is final, unappealable, and immediately executory
It is an elementary rule that the existence of a waiver must be positively demonstrated since
a waiver by implication is not normally countenanced. The norm is that a waiver must not
only be voluntary, but must have been made knowingly, intelligently, and with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. There must be
persuasive evidence to show an actual intention to relinquish the right. Mere silence on the
part of the holder of the right should not be construed as a surrender thereof; the courts
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must indulge every reasonable presumption against the existence and validity of such
waiver
_________________________________________________________________________________
DIANA YAP-CO, petitioner, VS. SPOUSES WILLIAM T. UY AND ESTER GO-UY,
respondents.
G.R. No. 209295; February 11, 2015; Perlas-Bernabe, J.
SUMMARY:
On February 28, 2007, respondents-spouses William T. Uy and Ester Go-Uy (respondents)
had secured a favorable Decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Isabela,
Branch 23 in Civil Case No. 23-831 for collection of sum of money and damages against one
Joseph Chung (Chung). With the said Decision becoming final and executory, respondents
filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution thereof, which the said court granted in
an Order. After the lapse of the allowable period for redemption, respondents were issued a
Final Deed of Sale, which they registered with the Registry of Deeds of Manila. Respondents,
however, were unable to secure their new title after being informed that one had already
been issued in favor of petitioner. Respondents filed a Complaint for annulment of title and
damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order (subject complaint) against petitioner.
RTC grants the standing motion of the defendants to dismiss this case. CA annulled RTCs
dismissal. The issue for the Courts resolution is whether or not the CA erred in reinstating
Civil Case No. 09-122374 on considerations of equity, notwithstanding the rule on failure to
prosecute a case diligently under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. The SC ruled that
the petition lacks merit. Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court provides that [i]f plaintiff
fails to appear at the time of the trial, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length
of time, or to comply with these rules or any order of the court, the action may be dismissed
upon motion of the defendant or upon the courts own motion. This dismissal shall have the
effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by the court.
However, the application of the foregoing rule is not, to the Courts mind, warranted in this
case since, as correctly found by the CA, respondents counsel acted negligently in failing to
attend the scheduled hearing dates and even notify respondents of the same so as to enable
them to travel all the way from Aurora, Isabela to Manila and attend said hearings. At bench,
if We sustain the ruling of the court a quo to strike out from the records the testimony of
Petitioner [hereinafter respondent] ESTER GO-UY and dismiss the case, the Petitioners
[hereinafter respondents] would lose any opportunity to prove the legitimacy of their claims.
The Court takes note, however, that the cited motion to dismiss was not premised on the
respondents failure to prosecute their case but on the alleged failure of the complaint to
state a cause of action.
DOCTRINE:
Relief is accorded to the client who suffered by reason of the lawyers palpable mistake or
negligence and where the interest of justice so requires.
Fundamental is the rule that a motion to dismiss grounded on failure to state a cause of
action refers only to the insufficiency of the pleading. A complaint states a cause of action if
it avers the existence of the three essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) the
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legal right of the plaintiff; (b) the correlative obligation of the defendant; and (c) the act or
omission of the defendant in violation of said right.
_________________________________________________________________________________
DENR v. UPCI
G.R. No. 212081; Feb. 23, 2015; Perlas-Bernabe, J.
SUMMARY: The DENR, through the Land Mgt Bureau, entered into an Agreement for
Consultancy Services with UPCI in connection with the LMBS Land Resource Mgt Master
Plan. They agreed on a contract price, but DENR was only able to pay 47% of the total upon
completion by UPCI of the work required. The COA released a report finding the contract
price 84.14% excessive. This notwithstanding, DENR acknowledged its liability to UPCI for
the remaining balance. UPCI eventually file a complaint against DENR for failure to pay. It
was referred to arbitration proceedings. DENRs motion for extension to file its submissions
was denied by the Tribunal, and it failed to submit its draft decision in time for the
promulgation of the award, which was in favour of UPCI. The RTC confirmed the award. UPCI
moved for the issuance of a writ of execution, which was granted by the RTC. DENR filed a
motion to quash, but it was denied. CA dismissed the certiorari petition, ruling that the
petition essentially assailed the merits of the Arbitral Award, which is prohibited under the
Special AD Rules, and that the petition was filed out of time, way beyond 15 days from
notice of the RTCs order, also based on the ADR Rules. SC held that DENR failed to avail of
the remedies provided for in the Special ADR Rules before resorting to certiorari (motion for
correction of the final award, petition to vacate the Arbitral Award, seek reconsideration of
the confirmation order). SC held that the Special ADR Rules govern not only the confirmation
but also the execution of the Arbitral Award, and that resort to the RoC in a suppletory
capacity is not allowed under such rules. Also, DENR was not denied due process since it
was accorded ample opportunity to ventilate its position. It further ruled that the settlement
of the money claim is still subject to the primary jurisdiction of the COA.
DOCTRINE: The Special ADR Rules do not automatically govern the arbitration proceedings
itself. A pivotal feature of arbitration as an alternative mode of dispute resolution is that it is
a product of party autonomy or the freedom of the parties to make their own arrangements
to resolve their own disputes. Thus, Rule 2.3 of the Special ADR Rules explicitly provides that
parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed in the conduct of arbitral
proceedings. Failing such agreement, the arbitral tribunal may conduct arbitration in the
manner it considers appropriate.
Under Section 17.2, Rule 17 of the CIAC Rules, no motion for reconsideration or new trial
may be sought, but any of the parties may file a motion for correction of the final award,
which shall interrupt the running of the period for appeal, based on any of the following
grounds, to wit:
a. an evident miscalculation of figures, a typographical or arithmetical error;
b. an evident mistake in the description of any party, person, date, amount, thing or
property referred to in the award;
c. where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, not affecting
the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted;
d. where the arbitrators have failed or omitted to resolve certain issue/s formulated by the
parties in the Terms of Reference (TOR) and submitted to them for resolution, and
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e. where the award is imperfect in a matter of form not affecting the merits of the
controversy.
The motion shall be acted upon by the Arbitral Tribunal or the surviving/remaining members.
The special civil action for certiorari described in Rule 19.26 of the Special ADR Rules may be
filed to annul or set aside the following orders of the RTC:
a. Holding that the arbitration agreement is inexistent, invalid or unenforceable;
b. Reversing the arbitral tribunals preliminary determination upholding its jurisdiction;
c. Denying the request to refer the dispute to arbitration;
d. Granting or refusing an interim relief;
e. Denying a petition for the appointment of an arbitrator;
f. Confirming, vacating or correcting a domestic arbitral award;
g. Suspending the proceedings to set aside an international commercial arbitral award and
referring the case back to the arbitral tribunal;
h. Allowing a party to enforce an international commercial arbitral award pending appeal;
i. Adjourning or deferring a ruling on whether to set aside, recognize and or enforce an
international commercial arbitral award;
j. Allowing a party to enforce a foreign arbitral award pending appeal; and
k. Denying a petition for assistance in taking evidence.
While it appears that the Special ADR Rules remain silent on the procedure for the execution
of a confirmed arbitral award, it is the Courts considered view that the Rules procedural
mechanisms cover not only aspects of confirmation but necessarily extend to a confirmed
awards execution in light of the doctrine of necessary implication which states that every
statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or
privilege.
Execution is but a necessary incident to the Courts confirmation of an arbitral award. To
construe it otherwise would result in an absurd situation whereby the confirming court
previously applying the Special ADR Rules in its confirmation of the arbitral award would
later shift to the regular Rules of Procedure come execution. Irrefragably, a courts power to
confirm a judgment award under the Special ADR Rules should be deemed to include the
power to order its execution for such is but a collateral and subsidiary consequence that
may be fairly and logically inferred from the statutory grant to regional trial courts of the
power to confirm domestic arbitral awards.
_________________________________________________________________________________
ORTIGAS & COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP v. JUDGE TIRSO VELASCO AND
DOLORES V. MOLINA
DOLORES V. MOLINA v. HON. PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC, QUEZON CITY, BR. 105
AND MANILA BANKING CORPORATION
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DOLORES V. MOLINA v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND EPIMACO ORETA

THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION AND ALBERTO v. REYES, PETITIONERS, VS.
DOLORES V. MOLINA AND HON. MARCIANO BACALLA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 216
SUMMARY:
This consolidated cases stemmed from a Petition for Reconstitution of a TCT filed by Molina.
She claims that the the original copy of the TCT was allegedly lost when the QC ROD was
gutted by fire. In another case, an action for annulment of Transfer Cert. of Title was filed by
TMBC against Molina. TMBC claims that it is the owner of the parcels of land in question. In
another case, a complaint for falsification of public documents was filed by Oreta, head of
the security force hired by TMBC, against Molina. Another case involves an action for
quieting of title and annulment of title by Molina. The SC ruled against Molina. While the CA
erred dismissing the Petition on procedural grounds, it should still be dismissed on the
ground that Molina availed of the wrong remedy. While the trial court had acquired
jurisdiction over the case, Molina pursued another remedy, specifically, a review of the City
Prosecutor's finding of probable cause. Molina was also found guilty of forum shopping. The
two cases involved relitigating her claim of ownership over the properties
DOCTRINE:
The Justice Secretary is merely advised, as far as practicable, to refrain from entertaining a
petition for review of the prosecutor's finding when the Information is already filed in court.
In other words, the power or authority of the Justice Secretary to review the prosecutor's
findings subsists even after the Information is filed in court. The court, however, is not bound
by the Resolution of the Justice Secretary, but must evaluate it before proceeding with the
trial. While the ruling of the Justice Secretary is persuasive, it is not binding on courts
The proper remedy to review the Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice was the filing of a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
Forum shopping is defined as: [w]hen a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies
in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially
the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court.
Forum shopping consists of the following elements:
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both
actions;
(b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and
(c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the
other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action
under consideration.
_________________________________________________________________________________
VIRGILIO C. BRIONES v. COURT OF APPEALS AND CASH ASIA CREDIT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 204444; January 14, 2015: Perlas-Bernabe, J.
SUMMARY:
Briones filed a complaint against Cash Asia for Nullity of Mortgage Contract, Promissory
Note, Loan Agreement, Foreclosure of Mortgage, Cancellation of TCT, and Damages. He
claims that his signature was forged in the contracts and that he never contracted loans
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from Cash Asia who was then proceeding to foreclose his property. Cash Asia filed a MTD on
the ground of improper venue. RTC denied the MTD. CA reversed the RTC. SC agreed with
the RTC. While there is a venue stipulation in the contract which is restrictive in nature, it
must be emphasized that Briones complaint directly assails the validity of the contracts.
Hence, he cannot be expected to comply with the venue stipulation.
DOCTRINE:
A complaint directly assailing the validity of the written instrument itself should not be
bound by the exclusive venue stipulation contained therein and should be filed in
accordance with the general rules on venue. It would be inherently consistent for a
complaint of this nature to recognize the exclusive venue stipulation when it, in fact,
precisely assails the validity of the instrument in which such stipulation is contained
_________________________________________________________________________________
BETTY GEPULLE-GARBO, REPRESENTED BY ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, MINDA G.
ROSALES (NOW REPRESENTED BY HER NEW ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, GARY
LLOYD G. ROSALES) v. SPOUSES VICTOREY ANTONIO GARABATO AND
JOSEPHINE S. GARABATO
G.R. No. 200013; January 14, 2015; Villarama, J.
SUMMARY:
Nick and Eduviges were married before 1978. They had a daughter named Florence who in
turn had a son Victorey. During the marriage of Nick and Eduviges, Nick cohabited with
Betty. In 1977, Eduviges sold a lot to Florence. The Deed of Sale was signed by Nick. 3
months after Eduviges passed away, Nick married Betty. Both Florence and Nick died.
Victorey married to Josephine registered the lot in his name by virtue of a Dees of Sale made
by Florence in his favor. Betty filed a petition for cancellation of the TCT claiming that the
signatures of Nick and Eduviges were forged by Florence. RTC, CA and SC dismissed the
complaint. Alabacea (the handwriting expert presented by Betty) did not explain the manner
of examination of the specimen signatures in reaching his conclusion. Albacea did not point
out distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and
false specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape notice or detection by an untrained
observer. Betty, in coming before us, had the onus of showing that the signatures were
forged.
DOCTRINE:
In any event, Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that the burden of proof is
the duty of a party to prove the truth of his claim or defense, or any fact in issue by the
amount
of
evidence
required
by
law.
As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing
evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery
The authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general
characteristics, similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. Dissimilarities as
regards spontaneity, rhythm, pressure of the pen, loops in the strokes, signs of stops,
shades, etc., that may be found between the questioned signature and the genuine one are
not decisive on the question of the formers authenticity. The result of examinations of
questioned handwriting, even with the benefit of aid of experts and scientific instruments, is,
at best, inconclusive. There are other factors that must be taken into consideration. The
position of the writer, the condition of the surface on which the paper where the questioned
signature is written is placed, his state of mind, feelings and nerves, and the kind of pen
and/or paper used, play an important role on the general appearance of the signature.
Unless, therefore, there is, in a given case, absolute absence, or manifest dearth, of direct or
circumstantial competent evidence on the character of a questioned handwriting, much
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weight should not be given to characteristic similarities, or dissimilarities, between that

questioned handwriting and an authentic one. The opinion of handwriting experts are not
necessarily binding upon the court, the experts function being to place before the court
data upon which the court can form its own opinion.
_________________________________________________________________________________
MANUEL R. PORTUGUEZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. 194499; January 14, 2015; Villarama, J.
SUMMARY:
Portuguez was accused of violating Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165 for illegal possession of 0.5
gram of metamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. His arrest resulted from being identified
as one who bought shabu from Bobot who was a the target of a buy-bust operation.
Portuguez claims that he was mistaken to be his younger brother Bobot and that the police
already had the sachet of shabu when he was arrested. RTC, CA and SC found him guilty.
Portuguez failed to present clear and convincing evidence to overturn the presumption that
the arresting officers regularly performed their duties. Except for his bare allegations of
denial and frame-up, and that the police officers had mistakenly identified him as Bobot, his
younger brother, nothing supports his claim that the police officers were impelled by
improper motives to testify against him. The chain of custody of the illicit drugs seized from
petitioner remains unbroken, contrary to the assertions of petitioner.
DOCTRINE:
In cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution
witnesses who are police officers, for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a
regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.
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TAXATION
SILICON PHILIPPINES, INC. (FORMERLY INTEL PHILIPPINES
MANUFACTURING, INC.) vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 173241; March 25, 2015: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
SUMMARY (Dates are impt):
On May 6, 1999 SPI filed an Application for Tax
Credit/Refund of Value-Added Tax Paid covering the Third Quarter of 1998. When CIR failed
to act upon its application, SPI filed on September 29, 2000 a Petition for Review before the
CTA Division. On November 24, 2003, the CTA Division partially granted the claim of SPI for
tax credit/refund. Upon SPIs Partial Motion for Reconsideration, CTA en banc upheld the CTA
Divisions Resolution.
During the pendency of this case, the SC en banc promulgated on February 12, 2013 its
Decision in the consolidated cases of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power
Corporation, Taganito Mining Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and Philex
Mining Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (hereinafter collectively referred to
as San Roque). In San Roque, the Court settled the rules on the prescriptive periods for
claiming credit/refund of input VAT under Section 112 of the 1997 Tax Code.
DOCTRINE: Section 112(A) and (C) of the 1997 Tax Code must be interpreted according to
its clear, plain, and unequivocal language. The taxpayer can file his administrative claim for
refund or credit at anytime within the two-year prescriptive period. If he files his claim on the
last day of the two-year prescriptive period, his claim is still filed on time. The Commissioner
will have 120 days from such filing to decide the claim. If the Commissioner decides the
claim on the 120th day, or does not decide it on that day, the taxpayer still has 30 days to
file his judicial claim with the CTA. This is not only the plain meaning but also the only logical
interpretation of Section 112(A) and (C).
The SC also took note of other jurisprudence regarding the prescriptive period, and listed a
summary of rules:
A. Two-Year Prescriptive Period
1
It is only the administrative claim that must be filed within the two-year prescriptive
period. (Aichi)
The proper reckoning date for the two-year prescriptive period is the close of the
taxable quarter when the relevant sales were made. (San Roque)
The only other rule is the Atlas ruling, which applied only from 8 June 2007 to 12
September 2008. Atlas states that the two-year prescriptive period for filing a claim
for tax refund or credit of unutilized input VAT payments should be counted from the
date of filing of the VAT return and payment of the tax. (San Roque)
B. 120+30 Day Period

1
The taxpayer can file an appeal in one of two ways: (1) file the judicial claim within
thirty days after the Commissioner denies the claim within the 120-day period, or (2)
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UP PORTIA SORORITY
file the judicial claim within thirty days from the expiration of the 120-day period if
the Commissioner does not act within the 120-day period.
2
The 30-day period always applies, whether there is a denial or inaction on the part of
the CIR.
As a general rule, the 30-day period to appeal is both mandatory and jurisdictional.
(Aichi and San Roque)
As an exception to the general rule, premature filing is allowed only if filed between
10 December 2003 and 5 October 2010, when BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was still in
force. (San Roque)
Late filing is absolutely prohibited, even during the time when BIR Ruling No. DA-48903 was in force. (San Roque)
SPI filed on May 6, 1999 its administrative claim for tax credit/refund of the input VAT
attributable to its zero-rated sales and on its purchases of capital goods for the Third Quarter
of 1998. The two-year prescriptive period for filing an administrative claim, reckoned from
the close of the taxable quarter, prescribed on September 30, 2000. Therefore, the herein
administrative claim of SPI was timely filed. However, SPI belatedly filed its judicial claim. It
filed its Petition for Review with the CTA 391 days after the lapse of the 120-day period
without the CIR acting on its application for tax credit/refund, way beyond the 30-day period
under Section 112 of the 1997 Tax Code.
As this Court has repeatedly emphasized, a tax credit or refund, like tax exemption, is
strictly construed against the taxpayer. Strict compliance with the mandatory and
jurisdictional conditions prescribed by law to claim such tax refund or credit is essential and
necessary for such claim to prosper. Although the issue regarding the prescriptive periods
was not raised by any party, the 120/30-day prescriptive periods are mandatory and
jurisdictional, and the matter of jurisdiction cannot be waived because it is conferred by law
and is not dependent on the consent or objection or the acts or omissions of the parties or
any one of them.
_________________________________________________________________________________
EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS v. CIR
G.R. No. 183531; March 25, 2015; Reyes, J.
SUMMARY:
Eastern Telecommunications Philippines (ETPI) is a registered VAT taxpayer. It filed an
administrative claim with the BIR on January 25, 2000 for a refund (Php 9,265,913)
representing excess input tax attributable to its effectively zero-rated sales in 1998. Pending
review by the BIR, On February 21, 2000, pending review by the BIR TPI filed a petition for
review before the CTA in order to toll the two-year reglementary period under Sec 229 of the
NIRC. The BIR Commissioner opposed the petition and averred that no judicial action can be
instituted by a taxpayer unless a claim has been duly filed before it. The BIR stressed that
ETPI did not file a formal claim for refund but merely submitted a quarterly VAT return for the
4th quarter of 1998, contrary to what Sec 229 prescribed. The CTA denied the petition
because the VAT official receipts presented by ETPI to support its claim failed to imprint the
word zero-rated on its face in violation of the invoicing requirements under Section 4.108-
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1 of RR No. 7-95. The CTA en banc affirmed the decision of the CTA and denied ETPIs claim
for refund of input taxes resulting from its zero-rated sales.
The SC agreed with the CA decision. The word zero-rated is required on the invoices or
receipts issued by VAT-registered taxpayers. ETPI's failure to do so disallows them from
recovering their refund. ETPI failed to substantiate its claim for refund or tax credit.
Considering that ETPI is engaged in mixed transactions that cover its zero-rated sales,
taxable and exempt sales, it is only appropriate and reasonable for it to present competent
evidence to validate all entries in its returns in order to properly determine which
transactions are zero-rated and which are taxable.
DOCTRINE:
Tax refunds, being in the nature of tax exemptions, are construed in strictissimi juris against
the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the government. Accordingly, it is a claimants burden
to prove the factual basis of a claim for refund or tax credit. Clearly, compliance with all the
VAT invoicing requirements provided by tax laws and regulations is mandatory. A claim for
unutilized input taxes attributable to zero-rated sales will be given due course; otherwise,
the claim should be struck off for failure to do so, such as what ETPI did in the present case.
_________________________________________________________________________________
NORTHERN MINDANAO POWER CORPORATION, v. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE.
G.R. No. 185115, February 18, 2015, Sereno, CJ.
SUMMARY:
NMPC incurred input VAT on its domestic purchases of goods and services that were used in
its production and sale of electricity to NPC. NMPC filed an administrative claim for a refund
on 20 June 2000 for the 3 rd and the 4th quarters of taxable year 1999, and on 25 July 2001 for
taxable year 2000. Alleging inaction of the CIR, NMPC filed a petition with the CTA on 28
September 2001.
The CTA First Division denied the Petition and MR and found that the term zero-rated was
not imprinted on the receipts or invoices presented by petitioner in violation of Section
4.108-1 of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95. On appeal to the CTA En Banc, the Petition was
likewise denied, ruling that official receipts are proofs of sale of services and cannot be
interchanged with sales invoices.
SC dismissed the petition for failure to comply with prescriptive periods. NMPCs claim for
the 3rd and the 4th quarters of taxable year 1999 was filed 319 days after the expiration of
the 30-day period to appeal to the CTA. NMPCs claims for 2000 were filed with the CTA only
64 days after filing with the CIR, and resulted in the failure to observe the mandatory 120day period within which the CIR may decide on the claim. On
28 September 2001 the
date on which petitioner filed its judicial claim for the period covering taxable year 2000 the 120+30 day mandatory period was already in the law and BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 had
not yet been issued. Considering this fact, petitioner did not have an excuse for not
observing the 120+30 day period.
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DOCTRINE:
Pursuant to Section 112(D) of the NIRC of 1997, the CIR had 120 days from the date of
submission of complete documents in support of the application within which to decide on
the administrative claim As laid down in San Roque, judicial claims filed from 1 January
1998 until the present should strictly adhere to the 120+30-day period referred to in Section
112 of the NIRC of 1997. The only exception is the period 10 December 2003 until 6 October
2010. Within this period, BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 is recognized as an equitable estoppel,
during which judicial claims may be filed even before the expiration of the 120-day period
granted to the CIR to decide on a claim for a refund.
The Court in San Roque has already settled that failure of the petitioner to observe the
mandatory 120-day period is fatal to its judicial claim and renders the CTA devoid of
jurisdiction over that claim.
This Court has consistently held as fatal the failure to print the word zero-rated on the VAT
invoices or official receipts in claims for a refund or credit of input VAT on zero-rated sales.
Finally, as regards the sufficiency of a company invoice to prove the sales of services to NPC,
we find this claim is without sufficient legal basisA sales or commercial invoice is a
written account of goods sold or services rendered indicating the prices charged therefor or
a list by whatever name it is known which is used in the ordinary course of business
evidencing sale and transfer or agreement to sell or transfer goods and services.A receipt
on the other hand is a written acknowledgment of the fact of payment in money or other
settlement between seller and buyer of goods, debtor or creditor, or person rendering
services and client or customerA VAT invoice is the sellers best proof of the sale of goods
or services to the buyer, while a VAT receipt is the buyers best evidence of the payment of
goods or services received from the seller. A VAT invoice and a VAT receipt should not be
confused
and
made
to
refer
to
one
and
the
same
thing.
_________________________________________________________________________________
REPUBLIC rep by CIR v TEAM ENERGY CORPORATION (FORMERLY MIRANT
PHILS. ENERGY)
G.R. No. 188016; 14 January 2015; Bersamin, J.
SUMMARY: This is a case for tax refund of Mirant Corporations overpaid income tax or
excess CWT for the calendar years 2002 and 2003. Mirant amended its Articles of
Incorporation reflecting a change in corporate name; and to include the business of
supplying and delivering electricity and providing services necessary in connection with the
supply or delivery of electricity. The inclusion of latter led Mirant to withheld CWT on its
services to Republic Cement Corporation, Mirant (Philippines) Industrial Power Corporation
and Solid Development Corporation for taxable years 2002 and 2003.
April 15, 2003, and 2004: Mirant filed their ITRs for the calendar year 2002 and 2003 where
they indicated therein their preference for the refund of the tax overpayments.
March 25, 2005: Mirant filed an administrative claim for refund with BIR. However, this was
not acted upon by the latter.
April 14, 2005: Mirant filed a petition for review with CTA to toll the running of the two-year
prescriptive period for claiming a refund under Section 229, NIRC. This was granted.
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CTA: Granted the petition and ordered BIR to refund or to issue a tax credit
certificate in favour of Mirant. CIR noted that i) Mirant signified in its ITRs for the same
years its intent to have its excess creditable tax withheld be refunded; ii) Mirants
administrative and judicial claims for refund had been timely filed within the two-year
prescriptive period under Section 204 (C) in relation to Section 229 of the NIRC; iii) that the
fact of withholding had been established through its submission of its certificate of CTW at
source constituting of the CWT withheld by the respondent on its services to Republic
Cement, Mirant Industrial and Solid Development for taxable years 2002 and 2003; iv) the
income from which the CWT had been withheld was duly declared as part of the
respondents income in its annual ITRs for 2002 and 2003.
CTA en Banc: Affirmed CTA Division.
SC: Affirmed CTA en Banc.
DOCTRINE:
1. Sec 76, NIRC outlines the mechanisms and remedies that a corporate taxpayer may opt to
exercise. In case the corporation is entitled to a tax credit or refund of the excess estimated
quarterly income taxes paid, the excess amount shown on its final adjustment return may be
carried over and credited against the estimated quarterly income tax liabilities for the
taxable quarters of the succeeding taxable years. Once the option to carry over and apply
the excess quarterly income tax against income tax due for the taxable years of the
succeeding taxable years has been made, such option shall be considered irrevocable for
that taxable period and no application for cash refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate
shall be allowed therefor.
The two options (i.e. carry-over, or tax refund/tax credit) are alternative and not
cumulative in nature, that is, the choice of one precludes the other. The logic behind the
rule, according to Philam Asset Management, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, is to
ease tax administration, particularly the self-assessment and collection aspects. In
Philippine Bank of Communications v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Court ruled
that a corporation must signify its intention whether to request a tax refund or claim a tax
credit by marking the corresponding option box provided in the FAR. While a taxpayer is
required to mark its choice in the form provided by the BIR, this requirement is only for the
purpose of facilitating tax collection. The carry-over option, once actually or constructively
chosen by a corporate taxpayer, becomes irrevocable.
2. The requirements for entitlement of a corporate taxpayer for a refund or the issuance of
tax credit certificate involving excess withholding taxes are as follows:
a
b
c
That the claim for refund was filed within the two-year reglementary period pursuant
to Section 229 of the NIRC;
When it is shown on the ITR that the income payment received is being declared part
of the taxpayers gross income; and
When the fact of withholding is established by a copy of the withholding tax
statement, duly issued by the payor to the payee, showing the amount paid and
income tax withheld from that amount.
3. Submission of quarterly returns of the taxpayer to show that it did not carry-over the
excess withholding tax to the succeeding quarter is not necessary for tax refund/issuance of
tax credits. When the taxpayer was able to establish prima facie its right to the refund by
testimonial and object evidence, BIR should have presented rebuttal evidence to shift the
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burden of evidence back to the respondent. BIR ought to have its own copies of the
respondents quarterly returns on file, on the basis of which it could rebut the taxpayers
claim that it did not carry over its unutilized and excess creditable withholding taxes for the
immediately succeeding quarters. The BIRs failure to present such vital document during
the trial was fatal.
_________________________________________________________________________________
CBK POWER COMPANY LTD. v CIR
CIR v CBK POWER COMPANY LTD.
GR no 193407-08; 14 January 2015; Perlas-Bernabe, J.
SUMMARY: CBK Power is a BOI-registered limited partnership, and primarily engaged in the
development and operation of the Caliraya, Botocan, and Kalayaan hydroelectric power
generating plants in Laguna (CBK Project). CBK Power obtained loans from several foreign
banks. In February 2001, CBK Power borrowed money from Industrial Bank of Japan, FortisNetherlands, Raiffesen Bank, Fortis-Belgium, and Mizuho Bank for which it remitted interest
payments from May 2001 to May 2003. It allegedly withheld final taxes from said payments
based on the following rates, and paid the same to the Revenue District Office No. 55 of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR): (a) fifteen percent (15%) for Fortis-Belgium, FortisNetherlands, and Raiffesen Bank; and (b) twenty percent (20%) for Industrial Bank of Japan
and Mizuho Bank.
However, according to CBK Power, under the relevant tax treaties (RP-Belgium, RPJapan, RP-Austria), the interest income derived by the aforementioned banks are subject
only to a preferential tax rate of 10%. Accordingly, on April 14, 2003, CBK Power filed a
claim for refund of its excess final withholding taxes allegedly erroneously withheld and
collected for the years 2001 and 2002 with the BIR Revenue Region No. 9. The claim for
refund of excess final withholding taxes in 2003 was subsequently filed on March 4, 2005.
It should be noted that CBK Power had requested for confirmation from the ITAD on June 8,
2001 and October 28, 2002.
CIR: Inaction. Since CIR did not act on the claim, Thus, CBK filed three petitions for review
before the CTA.
CTA First Division: Granted the petitions and ordered the refund of the overpaid
taxes applying the preferential rate of 10%. CA also declared the that the required
International Tax Affairs Division (ITAD) ruling was not a condition sine qua non for the
entitlement of the tax relief sought by CBK Power. However, upon MR, it lowered the amount
because CBK Power failed to obtain an ITAD ruling with respect to its transactions with FortisNetherlands (citing another BIR Ruling stating that an ITAD ruling must be obtained prior to
availing a preferential tax rate.)
CTA En Banc: Affirmed CTA 1st Div. ITAD is required by RMO 1-2000 which administrative
issuance has the force and effect of law and is just as binding as a tax treaty. It further
held that petitions for review were filed within the two-year prescriptive period provided
under Section 229 and it was proper that the petitions were filed without awaiting the final
resolution of its administrative claims for refund before the BIR;
DOCTRINE:
1. Obligation to comply with a tax treaty must take precedence over the objective
of RMO 1-2000. SC emphasized the principle of pacta sunt servanda which demands the
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performance in good faith of treaty obligations on the part of the states that enter into the
agreement. In this jurisdiction, treaties have the force and effect of law. Thus, the application
for a tax treaty relief from the BIR should merely operate to confirm the entitlement of the
taxpayer to the relief. Noncompliance with tax treaties has negative implications on
international relations, and unduly discourages foreign investors. While the consequences
sought to be prevented by RMO No. 1-2000 involve an administrative procedure, these may
be remedied through other system management processes, e.g., the imposition of a fine or
penalty. But we cannot totally deprive those who are entitled to the benefit of a treaty for
failure to strictly comply with an administrative issuance requiring prior application for tax
treaty relief. The objective of RMO No. 1-2000 is to avert the consequences of any erroneous
interpretation and/or application of treaty provisions, such as claims for refund/credit for
overpayment of taxes, or deficiency tax liabilities for underpayment. However, the
underlying principle of prior application with the BIR becomes moot in refund cases where
the very basis of the claim is erroneous or there is excessive payment arising from the nonavailment of a tax treaty relief at the first instance. Further, such imposition of requiring
prior application with ITAD is not found applicable in all tax treaties. Since CBK Power had
requested for confirmation before it filed on April 14, 2003 its administrative claim for refund
of its excess final withholding taxes, the same should be deemed substantial compliance
with RMO No. 1-2000.
2. Interpretation of Sec 229 NIRC
SEC. 306 (229). Recovery of tax erroneously or illegally collected. No suit or proceeding
shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax
hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any
penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have
been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has
been duly filed with the Collector of Internal Revenue; but such suit or proceeding may be
maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be begun after the expiration of two years from
the date of payment of the tax or penalty.
It will be noticed that, whereas the first sentence requires a claim to be filed with the
Collector of Internal Revenue before any suit is commenced, the last makes imperative the
bringing of such suit within two years from the date of collection. But the conflict is only
apparent and the two provisions easily yield to reconciliation, which it is the office of
statutory construction to effectuate, where possible, to give effect to the entire enactment.
The first is meant simply that the Collector of Internal Revenue shall be given an opportunity
to consider his mistake, if mistake has been committed, before he is sued, but not, as the
appellant contends that pending consideration of the claim, the period of two years provided
in the last clause shall be deemed interrupted. Nowhere and in no wise does the law imply
that the Collector of Internal Revenue must act upon the claim, or that the taxpayer shall
not go to court before he is notified of the Collectors action. x x x. We understand the filing
of the claim with the Collector of Internal Revenue to be intended primarily as a notice of
warning that unless the tax or penalty alleged to have been collected erroneously or illegally
is refunded, court action will follow.
_________________________________________________________________________________
LUCENA D. DEMAALA, petitioner, VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON COMMISSIONER MA. GRACIA M.
PULIDO TAN, respondent.
G.R. No. 199752; February 17, 2015; Leonen, J.
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SUMMARY:
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan enacted Provincial Ordinance No. 332-A, Series of
1995, entitled An Ordinance Approving and Adopting the Code Governing the Revision of
Assessments, Classification and Valuation of Real Properties in the Province of Palawan
(Ordinance). Section 48 of the Ordinance provides for an additional levy on real property tax
for the special education fund at the rate of one-half percent or 0.5%. In conformity with
Section 48 of the Ordinance, the Municipality of Narra, Palawan, with Demaala as mayor,
collected from owners of real properties located within its territory an annual tax as special
education fund at the rate of 0.5% of the assessed value of the property subject to tax. This
collection was effected through the municipal treasurer. On post-audit, Audit Team Leader
Juanito A. Nostratis issued Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 03-005 in which he
noted supposed deficiencies in the special education fund collected by the Municipality of
Narra. Regional Cluster Director Sy held Demaala, the municipal treasurer of Narra, and all
special education fund payors liable for the deficiency in special education fund collections.
Commission on Audit ruled against Demaala and affirmed LAO Local Decision No. 2006-056
with the modification that former Palawan Vice Governor Joel T. Reyes and the other
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan who enacted the Ordinance were held
jointly and severally liable with Demaala, the municipal treasurer of Narra, and the special
education fund payors. After MRs being denied, Demaala then filed with this court the
present Petition for Certiorari.
The SC ruled that respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in holding that there was a deficiency in the Municipality of Narras
collection of the additional levy for the special education fund and in holding petitioner
personally liable for the deficiency. The taxing powers of local government units must be
read in relation to their power to effect their basic autonomy. The limits on the level of
additional levy for the special education fund under Section 235 of the Local Government
Code should be read as granting fiscal flexibility to local government units. It is respondents
position that the option granted to a local government unit is limited to the matter of
whether it shall actually collect, and that the rate at which it shall collect (should it choose to
do so) is fixed by Section 235. In contrast, it is petitioners contention that the option given
to a local government unit extends not only to the matter of whether to collect but also to
the rate at which collection is to be made. The Court sustains the position of petitioner.
Having established the propriety of imposing an additional levy for the special education
fund at the rate of 0.5%, it follows that there was nothing erroneous in the Municipality of
Narras having acted pursuant to Section 48 of the Ordinance. It could thus not be faulted
for collecting from owners of real properties located within its territory an annual tax as
special education fund at the rate of 0.5% of the assessed value subject to tax of the
property. Likewise, it follows that it was an error for respondent to hold petitioner personally
liable for the supposed deficiency in collections. The actions of the officials of the
Municipality of Narra are consistent with the rule that ordinances are presumed valid.
DOCTRINE:
The power to tax is an attribute of sovereignty. It is inherent in the state. Provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays are mere territorial and political subdivisions of the state.
They act only as part of the sovereign. Thus, they do not have the inherent power to tax.
Their power to tax must be prescribed by law.
It is basic that laws and local ordinances are presumed to be valid unless and until the
courts declare the contrary in clear and unequivocal terms.
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_________________________________________________________________________________
ROHM APOLLO SEMICONDUCTOR PHILIPPINES v. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE
SUMMARY:
On December 11, 2000, Rohm Apollo Semiconductor Philippines filed a claim for refund or
credit for unutilized input VAT paid on capital goods purchased for the months of July 7 and
August 3, 2000. Instead of filing a judicial claim within 30 days from the lapse of the 120-day
period on April 10, or until May 10, 2001, Rohm Apollo filed a Petition for Review with the
CTA on September 11, 2001. On May 27, 2004, the CTA First Division denied the judicial
claim for a refund or tax credit, as well as the subsequent MR. The CTA en banc also denied
Rohm Apollos petition for review and MR. The SC denied the Rule 45 petition on the ground
that the taxpayers judicial claim for a refund/tax credit was filed beyond the prescriptive
period. Rohm Apollo filed a Petition for review with the CTA only on September 11, 2002.
DOCTRINE:
Section 112(D) of the 1997 Tax Code states the time requirements for filing a judicial claim
for the refund or tax credit of input VAT. The legal provision speaks of two periods: the period
of 120 days, which serves as a waiting period to give time for the CIR to act on the administrative
claim for a refund or credit; and the period of 30 days, which refers to the period for filing a
judicial claim with the CTA. The taxpayer can file an appeal in one of two ways: (1) file the judicial
claim within 30 days after the Commissioner denies the claim within the 120-day waiting period,
or (2) file the judicial claim within 30 days from the expiration of the 120-day period if the
Commissioner does not act within that period.
Strict compliance with the 120+30 day periods is necessary for such a claim to prosper,
whether before, during, or after the effectivity of the Atlas doctrine, except for the period
from the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 on 10 December 2003 to 6 October 2010
when the Aichi doctrine was adopted, which again reinstated the 120+30 day periods as
mandatory and jurisdictional.
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LEGAL ETHICS
ANTONINA S. SOSA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. MANUEL V. MENDOZA,
RESPONDENT.
A.C. No. 8776; March 22, 2015; J. Brion
SUMMARY: Atty. Manuel Mendoza obtained a loan from complainant Sosa for a sum of
P500k. Atty. Mendoza failed to pay on the agreed upon due date. Despite demand, Atty.
Mendoza still failed to comply with his obligation to Sosa, prompting the latter to file a
complaint for disbarment or suspension, charging Atty. Mendoza for violation of Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. This Rule states that [a] lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In the IBP, Atty. Mendoza was found to be administratively liable and ordered his suspension
from the bar for 6 months and for him to pay Sosa the sum due to her plus interest.
SC modifies IBP ruling, ordering Mendozas suspension be extended to a year but deleted
the order for payment.
DOCTRINE: Deliberate failure to pay just debts constitute gross misconduct, for which a
lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are
instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are
expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the peoples faith and confidence in the judicial
system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the
bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations.
Nonetheless, a proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the
complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken
and
prosecuted
solely
for
the
public
welfare.
The purpose of disbarment is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting
as an officer of the court and as participant in the dispensation of justice. The purpose of
disbarment is to protect the courts and the public from the misconduct of the officers of the
court and to ensure the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this
important function shall be competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and
clients may repose confidence.
In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court
is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. Our only concern is the
determination of respondents administrative liability. Our findings have no material bearing
on other judicial action which the parties may choose to file against each other. Furthermore,
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers do not involve a trial of an action, but rather
investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. The only question for
determination in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to
continue as a member of the Bar. Thus, this Court cannot rule on the issue of the amount of
money that should be returned to the complainant.
_________________________________________________________________________________
HEIRS OF PEDRO ALILANO REPRESENTED BY DAVID ALILANO vs. ATTY.
ROBERTO E. EXAMEN
A.C. No. 10132; March 24, 2015; VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
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SUMMARY: It appears that Sps. Alilano, who were holders of an OCT, executed Absolute
Deeds of Sale in favor of Ramon Examen and his wife, Edna. The documents were notarized
by respondent Atty. Roberto Examen, brother of the vendee. Sometime in September 1984,
Spouses
Examen
obtained
possession
of
the
property.
The heirs of Alilano filed a suit for recovery of possession against Edna Examen and Atty.
Roberto Examen. It was during this proceeding that Atty. Examen introduced into evidence
the
Absolute
Deeds
of
Sale.
The heirs of Alilano now filed this disbarment complaint alleging that Atty. Examen violated
the notarial law when he notarized the absolute deeds of sale since a notary public is
prohibited from notarizing a document when one of the parties is a relative by consanguinity
within the fourth civil degree or affinity within the second civil degree. It is also alleged that
Atty. Examen notarized the documents knowing that the cedula or residence certificate
number used by Ramon Examen was not actually his but the residence certificate number of
Florentina. Atty. Examen also falsely acknowledged that the two witnesses personally
appeared before him when they did not. Lastly, it is alleged that despite knowing the
infirmities of these documents, Atty. Examen introduced these documents into evidence
violating
his
oath
as
a
lawyer
and
the
CPR.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) found Atty. Examen liable for breach of the
Notarial Law and introducing false Absolute Deeds of Sale before court proceedings. It thus
recommended that the penalty of disbarment be imposed. The IBP Board of Governors
(BOG) adopted the IBP CBDs report but modified the penalty to suspension from the
practice of law for a period of two years and a suspension of Atty. Examens Notarial
Commission for a period of two years. One of Atty. Examens defenses was that the action
has prescribed because the IBP CBDs Rules of Procedure provide that such administrative
cases prescribe after two year.
The SC ruled that there is no prescription of actions for acts of erring members of the bar.
The Court also said that Atty. Examen was not incompetent to act as notary public because
the Spanish notarial law, which was used by the heirs as basis, was repealed by the Revise
Administrative Code. However, Atty. Examen is still liable under the RAC, in conjunction with
the Code of Professional Responsibility, for failing to personally examine the cedulas and for
failing to put proper notation in these cedula certificates, as required by the law on notarial
practice. Atty. Examen was suspended by SC from the practice of law for two years.
DOCTRINE: There can be no prescription in bar discipline cases. If the rule were otherwise,
members of the bar would be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers,
prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would immediately come
forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever administrative
liability they ought to answer for. It is the duty of this Court to protect the integrity of the
practice of law as well as the administration of justice. No matter how much time has
elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complained of and the time of the
institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the
disciplining arm of the Court.
A notary public must discharge his powers and duties, which are impressed with public
interest, with accuracy and fidelity. Good faith cannot be a mitigating circumstance in
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situations since the duty to function as a notary public is personal. We note that the error
could have been prevented had Atty. Examen diligently performed his functions: personally
checked the correctness of the documents. To say that it was his secretarys fault reflects
disregard and unfitness to discharge the functions of a notary public for it is he who
personally acknowledges the document. He was behooved under Section 251, Chapter 11 of
the Revised Administrative Code to check if the proper cedulas were presented and inspect
if the documents to be acknowledged by him reflected the correct details. This Court cannot
stress enough that notarization is not a routinary act. It is imbued with substantive public
interest
owing
to
the
public
character
of
his
duties.
_________________________________________________________________________________
SHIRLEY OLAYTA-CAMBA v. ATTY. OTILIO BONGON
A.C. No. 8826; March 25, 2015; Perlas-Bernabe, J.
SUMMARY:
Camba engaged the services of Atty. Bongon for the the titling and/or reconstituting the tiles
to the real estate properties of the late Bernabe Olayta in Albay. She claimed to have given
the aggregate amount of Php 112,499 to Bongon for his services. Bongon failed to update
Camba regarding the status of the matters, thus Camba terminated her engagement with
him and demanded for the return of the sum of money, but to no avail. Hence she filed an
administrative complaint. The IBP Investigating Commissioner found Bongon guilty of
violating Rule 16,01 and Rule 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
recommended that he be suspended for The SC concurred with the findings of the IBP.
Camba engaged the services of Atty. Bongon for the purpose of titling and/or reconstituting
the titles to the real estate properties of the late Bernabe Olayta, as well as preparing the
Deed, and in connection therewith, allegedly gave various amounts to respondent, of which
the latter admitted the receipt of only P55,000.00. Despite the foregoing, Bongon failed to
comply with his undertaking and offered the excuse that the reconstitution of the titles and
the preparation of the Deed were delayed due to the Deeds several revisions; and that
Bernabe Olaytas surviving heirs were living in different places, making it difficult to secure
their presence, much less obtain their signatures to the said Deed. Clearly, Bongon failed to
exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess and
exercise in such matters of professional employment and, hence, must be disciplined
accordingly.
DOCTRINE:
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
o
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
o
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.
Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when
due or upon demand.
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When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is
bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for
the intended purpose. Consequently, if not used accordingly, the money must be
returned immediately to the client. As such, a lawyers failure to return the money to
his client despite numerous demands is a violation of the trust reposed on him and is
indicative of his lack of integrity, as in this case.
_________________________________________________________________________________
SAMAHAN NG MGA BABAE SA HUDIKATURA (SAMABAHU) V. JUDGE CESAR
O. UNTALAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 149, MAKATI CITY
A.M. No. RTJ-13-2363 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4149-RTJ); February 25, 2015; J. VILLARAMA,
JR.
SUMMARY: The case of manyakis judge. An administrative case stemmed from an
unsigned letter charging respondent with sexual harassment received by the Office of the
Chief Justice (OCJ), purportedly written by a group of female court employees styled as
Samahan ng mga Babae sa Hudikatura (SAMABAHU). The anonymous letter was referred
to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) which then dispatched a team of four (4)
lawyers tasked to conduct a discreet investigation and submit a report two of the alleged
victims executed their respective affidavit-complaints before the City Prosecutor of Makati.
After evaluation, the OCA concluded that the allegations in the anonymous complaint are far
from being figments of the imagination as the complainants described in detail their
experience with respondent. It thus recommended that the case be docketed as a regular
administrative matter and referred to the CA Presiding Justice to be raffled off among their
Justices for investigation, report and recommendation. Respondent was placed under
preventive suspension and directed to file his comment to be submitted to the CA
Investigating Justice. In his Comment, respondent denied all the allegations of improper
conduct imputed to him and submitted the supporting affidavits of his three female
employees.
CA: The respondent is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of sexual harassment as he exercised
moral ascendancy over the complaining female court employees. He thus recommended
that respondent be meted the penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of
retirement benefits except accrued leave credits.
SC: After thorough evaluation of the records, we are unable to concur with the findings and
conclusions of the Investigating Justice. The respondent presented credible testimonial and
documentary evidence leading to a reasonable conclusion that he could not have committed
the alleged sexual advances.
Doctrine: In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the
allegations in his complaint with substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Further, it is
settled that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a function primarily lodged in
the Investigating Justice. The rule which concedes due respect, and even finality, to the
assessment of credibility of witnesses by trial judges in civil and criminal cases applies a
fortiori to administrative cases. However, there are some exceptions to the rule according
finality to the trial judges assessment of a witness testimony, such as when his evaluation
was reached arbitrarily or when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied
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some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which would affect the result of the
case.
Under Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-03-13-SC (Re: Rule on Administrative Procedure in Sexual
Harassment Cases and Guidelines on Proper Work Decorum in the Judiciary), work-related
sexual harassment is committed by an official or employee in the Judiciary who, having
authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work environment, demands,
requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the
demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the latter. It is committed
when the sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, reemployment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual
favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant
the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in any way
would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect said employee.
This Court has stressed that an anonymous complaint is always received with great caution,
originating as it does from an unknown author. But such nature of the complaint does not
always justify its outright dismissal for being baseless or unfounded, as it may easily be
verified and may, without much difficulty, be substantiated by other competent
evidence. While the herein letter-complaint may be treated as an anonymous complaint, the
Court must still prudently examine it in the light of all evidence presented.
Administrative complaints against members of the judiciary are viewed by this Court with
utmost care, for proceedings of this nature affect not only the reputation of the respondents
concerned, but the integrity of the entire judiciary as well. Considering that the
complainants failed to present substantial evidence to prove the alleged sexual advances
committed against them by respondent, elementary justice dictates that he be exonerated
from the said charge.
_________________________________________________________________________________
BENITO B. NATE, v. JUDGE LELU P. CONTRERAS, BRANCH 43, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, VIRAC, CATANDUANES (THEN CLERK OF COURT, RTC-IRIGA
CITY)
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2406 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-3638-RTJ], February 18, 2015, SERENO, C.J.:
SUMMARY:
This administrative case concerns allegations that respondent Judge Lelu P. Contreras
committed three counts of grave misconduct while she was still holding the position Clerk of
Court VI of RTCIriga City. First, respondent Contreras allegedly notarized an administrative
complaint that was prepared by her own father and filed with this Court. Next, respondent
certified a document as a true copy of the original, and that her sister-in-law later on used
the certified document in a labor case f9iled with the NLRC. Finally, Contreras appeared as
her fathers counsel before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP.(note: The 2004
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel3 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice4were not yet in
force when respondent committed the purported offenses).
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) agrees with complainant as regards the first and
the second acts. The OCA reiterates that as clerk of court and ex officio notary, respondent
Contreras may notarize documents or administer oaths only when these are related to the
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exercise of her official functions, as provided for under

Sections 41 and 42 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 in relation to Section D(1), 11 Chapter VI of the 2002 Revised
Manual for Clerks of Court.
SC upheld the decision of the OCA. Respondents act of affixing her signature to the jurat
portion of the administrative complaint prepared by her father had no direct relation to her
work as the then clerk of court of RTCIriga City. SC applied the same legal reasoning to her
certification of a copy of her sister-in-laws labor complaint filed before the NLRC. SC agreed
with the OCA recommendation that she did not commit any irregularity when she
represented her father before the IBP as she proved that she was granted authority by this
Court to represent her provided that she files the corresponding leaves of absence on the
scheduled dates of hearing of the case and that she will not use official time in preparing for
the case. She was merely reprimanded, and issued a warning.
DOCTRINE:
Ever since this clarification was made by the Court in the 1980 case Borre v. Moya, the
power of ex officio notaries public have been limited to notarial acts connected to the
exercise of their official functions and duties. They have no longer had the authority to
notarize documents that do not bear any relation to the performance of their official
functions, such as contracts and other acts of conveyance, affidavits, certificates of
candidacy, special powers of attorney, pleadings, sworn applications for business permits, or
other similar instruments Any one of them who does so would be committing an
unauthorized notarial act, which amounts to engaging in the unauthorized practice of
law and abuse of authority.
Consequently, the empowerment of ex officio notaries public to perform acts within the
competency of regular notaries public such as acknowledgments, oaths and
affirmations, jurats, signature witnessing, copy certifications, and other acts authorized
under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice is now more of an exception rather than a
general rule. They may perform notarial acts on such documents that bear no relation to
their official functions and duties only if (1) a certification is included in the notarized
documents attesting to the lack of any other lawyer or notary public in the municipality or
circuit; and (2) all notarial fees charged will be for the account of the government and turned
over to the municipal treasurer.
With regard to the third act, Section 7(b) thereof in relation to Rule X, Section 1(c) of its
implementing rules, provides that public officials and employees are prohibited from
engaging in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution,
law, or regulation; and under the condition that their practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with their official functionsFurthermore, they must not use official time in preparing
for the case and must file a leave of absence every time they are required to attend to the
case.
_________________________________________________________________________________
ROBERTO BERNARDINO v. ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS
A.C. NO. 10584 [FORMERLY CBD 10-2827] February 18, 2015, LEONEN, J
SUMMARY:
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UP PORTIA SORORITY
These cases involve administrative Complaints against Atty. Victor Rey Santos for violation of
Canon 10, Rule 10.012 and Canon 15, Rule 15.033 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Complainant Bernardino alleged that the death certificate of his aunt, Rufina de Castro Turla,
was falsified by Atty. Santos. Atty. Santos made it appear that Rufina Turla died in 1992,
when in fact, she died in 1990. He also prepared an affidavit of self-adjudication in favour of
Rufinas husband, Mariano, making it appear that he was the only heir, when if=fact, they
had a daughter, Marilu, whom Atty. Santos not represents in the case against Bernardino,
thus, representing clients with conflicting interests.
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended that
Atty. Santos be suspended for three (3) months. This was adopted by the Board of
Governors.
The SC affirmed and held that there was a conflict of interest and thus a violation of Canon
15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states: Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall
not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of the facts.
DOCTRINE:
The rule on conflict of interest is based on the fiduciary obligation in a lawyer-client
relationship. Lawyers must treat all information received from their clients with utmost
confidentiality in order to encourage clients to fully inform their counsels of the facts of their
case.
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty
to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he
argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other
client. This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used
Applying the test of conflict of interest to determine whether conflict of interest exists,
respondent would necessarily refute Mariano Turlas claim that he is Rufina Turlas sole heir
when he agreed to represent Marilu Turla. Worse, he knew that Mariano Turla was not the
only heir.
However, Rule 15.03 provides for an exception, specifically, by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Respondent had the duty to inform
Mariano Turla and Marilu Turla that there is a conflict of interest and to obtain their written
consent.
Mariano Turla died on February 5, 2009, while respondent represented Marilu Turla in March
2009. It is understandable why respondent was unable to obtain Mariano Turlas consent.
Still, respondent did not present evidence showing that he disclosed to Marilu Turla that he
previously represented Mariano Turla
This court notes that the wording of the IBP Board of Governors Resolutions dated May 10,
2013 and March 22, 2014 seems to imply that it is the Integrated Bar of the Philippines that
has the authority to impose sanctions on lawyers. This is wrong.The authority to discipline
members of the Bar is vested in this court under the 1987 Constitution. The authority given
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is based on Rule 139-B, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court, which provides that [p]roceedings for the disbarment, suspension or discipline of
attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines . . . upon the verified complaint of any person. However, this authority is only to
assist this court with the investigation of the case, to determine factual findings, and to
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recommend, at best, the penalty that may be imposed on the erring lawyer Only this court
can impose sanctions on members of the Bar.
_________________________________________________________________________________
Conchita S. Bahala v Cirilo Duca (Sheriff III MCTC Branch 1 Cagayan de Oro
City)
AM No P-08-2465; January 12, 2015; Bersamin, J.
SUMMARY: There was an adverse judgment rendered by the MTCC against Bahala. Pending
appeal, the RTC ruled on the compromise agreement of the parties wherein Bahala paid the
balance of the money judgment and monthly rentals for 2 years. After this period, she
offered to sell the building standing on the plaintiffs property but the latter refused and had
the judgment executed. Sheriff Duca served the writ of execution on several occasions,
demanding money from Bahala to delay its implementation. At first she paid the same but
when the sheriff kept demanding money, she started to evade him. Later, the sheriff served
a notice of auction of sale WITHOUT filing his return on the writ. Bahala opposed this and the
RTC granted her opposition. However, the sheriff still proceeded with the auction sale
(plaintiff was highest bidder) and denied all allegations against him. Hence, this present
administrative case along with the charge of violating RA 3019. The investigating judge
found that he committed simple misconduct for not filing his periodic report on the writ and
for adopting the computation of arrears made by the plaintiff. OCA agreed to the simple
misconduct (ground: sheriff based amount on plaintiffs computation) and added that hes
also liable for simple neglect of duty (ground: didnt comply with Sec 14 Rule 39 req of
submitting a return, AND report (within 30 says if full satisfaction of the judgment cant be
made)). SC agreed with OCA. Here, the sheriff only filed his return AFTER the property had
already been levied and sold on public auction (ie. he filed it more than 1 year later!). This
act constituted a simple neglect of duty (failure to give his attention to the task expected of
him). He was also found guilty of simple misconduct for relying on the plaintiffs computation
for arrears in rentals since it is his duty to compute and verify the same. Ths Court however,
dismissed the charge of violating RA 3019 for lack of substantial evidence.
DOCTRINE:
1
As an agent of the law, a sheriff must discharge his duties with due care and utmost
diligence. He cannot afford to err while serving the courts writs and processes without
affecting the integrity of his office and the efficient administration of justice. (Calo v
Dizon) He is not given any discretion on the implementation of a writ of execution;
hence, he must strictly abide by the prescribed procedure to avoid liability. (Vicsal
Development Corporation v Dela Cruz-Buendia)
It is mandatory for a sheriff to make a return of the writ of execution to the court issuing
it. If the judgment cannot be satisfied in full within thirty (30) days after his receipt of the
writ, the officer shall report to the court and state the reason or reasons therefore. The
court officer is likewise tasked to make a report to the court every thirty (30) days on the
proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full or its effectivity expires.
The raison d etre behind this requirement is to update the court on the status of the
execution and to take necessary steps to ensure the speedy execution of decision.
He should not have put undue reliance on the computation made by a private individual
not duly deputized by the court. It must be borne in mind that respondent sheriff has, as
an officer of the court, the duty to compute the amount due from the judgment debtor.
(Bagano v Paninsoro)
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_________________________________________________________________________________
ASCAO JR., ET AL v JACINTO (RTC JUDGE), RTC SAN JOSE ORIENTAL
MINDORO
AM No RTJ-15-2405; Janurary 12, 2015; Sereno, C.J.
SUMMARY: Complainants, who are allegedly the section leaders of the lessees of market
stalls in the public market of Mindoro, filed an administrative complaint against Judge Jacinto
for violating Sec 3(e) RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). They allege that the
judge only allowed 12/500+ members accompanying the complainants to enter the
courtroom and later, even had all the complainants escorted out, leaving only Toledo (who
was to testify that day). They also claim that the questions propounded to their witnesses
were all geared towards establishing that they should have no right to oppose the Mayors
plan (Mayor wanted to demolish the public market to put up the new San Jose Commercial
Complex). They allege that all these acts were due to the fact that the judge was beholden
to the Mayor. Justice Corales investigated the case and submitted his report and
recommendation. The SC adapted the findings and held that the alegation of bias and
partiality was not substantiated by the fact that the judge did not allow the 500+ members
into the courtroom (courtroom too small). Additionally, the exclusion of other witnesses while
Toldedo was giving her testimony is sanction by Sec. 15 Rule 132 RoC. It was also found that
Judge Jacinto failed to submit the transcript of notes for the hearing without plausible
reason, and raised his voice and made insulting, sometimes needlessly lengthy statements
in open court. These statements imperiled the respect and deference rightly due to Judge
Jacintos position and constituted a violation of Sec. 6 Canon 6, Sec. 1 Canon 2, and Sec 1
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. Judge Jacintos act
of excusing the Mayors abrupt exit during open trial and subsequent explanation for the
latters action gave complainants reason to doubt his integrity and impartiality (because its
the mayors laweyer who should explain). This violates Sec. 2 Canon 3.
DOCTRINE:
1. Mere suspicion that a judge Is partial is not enough. Clear and convincing evidence is
necessary to prove a charge of bias and partiality.
2. It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, litigant or witness. The act betrays
lack of patience, prudence and restraint. Thus, a judge must at all times be temperate in his
language. He must choose his words, written or spoken, with utmost care and sufficient
control. The wise and just man is esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech increases
his persuasiveness.
3. The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must
not only maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality; they must also avoid any
appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may erode the peoples faith in the Judiciary.
Members of the Judiciary should be beond reproach and suspicion in their conduct, and
should be free from any appearance of impropriety in the discharge of their official duties, as
well as in their personal behavior and everyday life.
_________________________________________________________________________________
JUDGE GODOFREDO B. ABUL, JR., COMPLAINANT, VS. GEORGE E. VIAJAR,
SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 4, BUTUAN CITY,
RESPONDENT.
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A.M. No. P-11-2940, January 21, 2015

SUMMARY:
RTC Judge Abul charged Sheriff Viajar with dishonesty, grave abuse of authority, usurpation
of judicial authority, and malfeasance and graft and corruption. Judge Abul issued a writ of
execution
on
March
26,
2010, and alleged that Sheriff Viajar received it on the same day, but Viajar withheld the writ
and filed the Sheriff's Return of Service only on June 21, 2010. Judge Abul further alleged
that Viajar arrogated judicial powers upon himself by receiving P68k from the judgment
creditor and failing to deposit it to the court; that he submitted an unreasonably high
Sheriff's fees through padded and imaginary charges; that he refused to follow the ROC
when he failed to demand payment directly from the judgment creditor; that he mailed a
copy of the writ of execution to the judgment debtor instead of serving the writ; that he
executed a levy garnishment and conducted an illegal sale; that he purpose did not give
notice to the judgment debtor and counsel and thus deprived some of the parties of their
right to participate; that he conducted a simulated bidding, received P800k for the bid but
did not deposit the money with the Clerk of Court; that he charged the judgment debtor
additional expenses and allowed the judgment debtor to withdraw an amount from him and
only informed the TC through an addendum of Return of Service; and that he refused the
TC's order to deposit the highest bidder's payment with only a vague explanation. The SC redocketed
the
complaint
as
a
regular administrative complaint and referred it to an Executive Judge. The Executive Judge
found that he had been remiss in the performance of his duties and recommended
sanctions. The OCA agreed with the investigating judge's findings. The SC adopted the
OCA's
findings
and
increased
the
recommended
penalty.
DOCTRINE:
Respondent had been remiss in performing his responsibilities. First, he violated a basic rule
by failing to do his ministerial duty to make periodic reports on the writ as provided by Sec
14, Rule 39 of the Revised RoC. Respondent likewise failed to show that he personally
demanded from the judgment debtor the immediate payment of the full amount stated in
the writ of execution, and of all lawful fees. In addition, respondent failed to show that he
accorded the judgment debtor the option to choose which among its real or personal
properties would be levied upon. In addition, respondents duty to execute a judgment is
ministerial
and
he need not look outside the plain meaning of the writ of execution. When a sheriff is faced
with an ambiguous execution order, prudence and reasonableness dictate that he seek
clarification
from
the judge.When confronted with the question of whether Fast Cargo Transport Corporation is
the same as Fast Cargo Logistics Corporation, respondent should have consulted with the
judge.
Instead,
he
decided
on his own that they are one and the same corporation. Respondent relied on the words of
Atty. Audie Bernabe, counsel of the judgment creditor, when his proper course of action
should
have
been
to
seek
clarification from the judge. Respondent failed to show that the Peoples Guardian was
selected by raffle in accordance with Sec 15(c), Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of CivPro.
Respondent also admitted that he accommodated the judgment creditors request to include
the amount of P176,112.60 as lawyers expenses which was not part of the decision. As
regards the Sheriffs expenses, respondent himself admitted that some of the amount he
included did not have receipts and were, therefore, not justified.
_________________________________________________________________________________
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HENRY ONG LAY HIN v. COURT OF APPEALS (2ND DIVISION), HON. GABRIEL
T. INGLES, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC BRANCH 58, CEBU CITY, AND THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
SUMMARY:
Ong was convicted of estafa by the RTC. The CA affirmed the RTC's ruling and denied Ong's
MR and supplemental MR. The CA declared that the case became final and executory on May
15, 2003, based on the date of receipt indicated in the registry return card, April 29, 2003
corresponding to the mail sent to Ong's former counsel denying Ong's MR. Ong was arrested
almost 6 years after, on February 12, 2010. On May 6, 2010, he filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, alleging that his former counsel had never received a copy of
the denial of the MR; and that if his former counsel had, they were grossly negligent in
failing to appeal, and that this gross negligent allegedly deprived him of due process and
should not bind him. The SC ruled against Ong.
DOCTRINE:
The general rule is that the negligence of counsel binds the client, even mistakes in the
application of procedural rules. The exception to the rule is when the reckless or gross
negligence of the counsel deprives the client of due process of law. his is when the
negligence of counsel is so gross, almost bordering on recklessness and utter incompetence,
that we can safely conclude that the due process rights of the client were violated. Even so,
there must be a clear and convincing showing that the client was so maliciously deprived of
information that he or she could not have acted to protect his or her interests. The error of
counsel must have been both palpable yet maliciously exercised that it should viably be the
basis for disciplinary action. For the exception to apply, the gross negligence should not be
accompanied by the clients own negligence or malice, considering that the client has the
duty
to
be
vigilant
in
respect
of
his interests by keeping himself up-to-date on the status of the case. Failing in this duty, the
client should suffer whatever adverse judgment is rendered against him. We fail to see how
petitioner could not have known of the issuance of the Resolution. We cannot accept a
standard of negligence on the part of a client to ail to follow through or address counsel to
get updates on his case. Either this or the alternative that counsels alleged actions are
merely subterfuge to avail a penalty well deserved.
_________________________________________________________________________________
RE: VIOLATION OF RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE
A.M. No. 09-6-1-SC; January 21, 2015
SUMMARY:
Three letter-complaints for violation of rules on notarial practice were endorsed tot he Office
of the Bar Confidant (OBC). The first was filed by commissioned notaries public against Atty.
Siapno for notarizing documents without a commission for and within the jurisdiction of
Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City, where he was practicing as a notary public. Instead,
he was commissioned to perform the same in San Carlos City, Pangasinan until Dec 2008,
but
this
was
never
renewed
upon
expiration.
They
also
alleged
that he delegated his notarial authority to his two secretaries who wrote legal instruments
and signed the documents on his behalf. The second letter-complaint was filed against Atty.
Santos,
who
notarized
an affidavit of loss for the complainant's lost driver's license. However, the affidavit was
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UP PORTIA SORORITY
denied for authentication when presented before the Notarial Section in Manila since Atty.
Santos
was
not
commissioned to perform notarial commission within the City of Manila. The third reported
that Atty. Evelyn had been notarizing and signing documents for and on behalf of several
lawyers.
With
respect
to
Atty.
Siapno, the SC affirmed the Executive Judge's Report and Recommendation that he violated
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Commission, but increased the recommended penalty by
permanently
barring
him
from
being commissioned as a notary public and suspending him from the practice of law for two
years. With respect to Atty. Santos and Atty. Evelyn, the complaints were re-docketed since
no
formal
investigation
had been conducted yet.
DOCTRINE:
Sec 11, Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that: "Jurisdiction and Term
A person commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in any place within the
territorial
jurisdiction
of the commissioning court for a period of 2 years commencing the first day of January of
the year in which the commissioning is made, unless earlier revoked or the notary public has
resigned
under
these
Rules and the Rules of Court." Under the rule, only persons who are commissioned as notary
public may perform notarial acts within the territorial jurisdiction of the court which granted
the
commission.
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routine act. It is invested with substantive
public interest that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.
Notarization
by
a
notary public converts a private document into a public document making that document
admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity. A notarial document is by law
entitled
to
full
faith
and
credit upon its face, and for this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the
basic requirements in the performance of their duties. By performing notarial acts without
the
necessary
commission from the court, Atty. Siapno violated not only his oath to obey the laws
particularly the Rules on Notarial Practice but also Canons 1 and 7 of the Code of
Professional
Responsibility
which
proscribes all lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct
and directs them to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, at all times.
_________________________________________________________________________________
AUGUSTO M. AQUINO VS. HON. ISMAEL P. CASABAR, AS PRESIDING JUDGE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-GUIMBA, NUEVA ECIJA, BRANCH 33 AND MA. ALA F.
DOMINGO AND MARGARITA IRENE F. DOMINGO, SUBSTITUTING HEIRS OF THE
DECEASED ANGEL T. DOMINGO
G.R. No. 191470; January 26, 2015; Peralta, J.
SUMMARY:
Atty. Domingo contracted Aquino on a contingency fee basis to represent him in an agrarian
case to determine just compensation for expropriation of the formers ricelands. The DAR
and Land Bank initially valued the property at P484,236.27. The RTC, acting as a Special
Agrarian Court, fixed it at P2,459,319.70. The CA affirmed. Meanwhile, Atty. Domingo died.
Aquino filed a Manifestation of his death and substitution by his legal heirs, Ma. Ala and
Margarita Irene Domingo. The SC denied Land Banks petition for review on certiorari and
MR. On Feb 11, 2009, Aquino informed Ma. Ala of the finality of the RTC/SAC decision as
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UP PORTIA SORORITY
affirmed by the CA and SC, and requested that she inform the Land Bank to segregate his
30% contingent attorneys fees out of the increase of the just compensation. Aquino claimed
that she never replied. The SCs resolution became final and executory. Later, Aquino was
informed that he was replaced by another attorney as the heirs counsel in the agrarian
case, and they filed a motion for execution of the decision. Aquino filed a Motion for
Approval of Charging Attorneys Lien and for the Order of Payment, which the heirs moved to
dismiss/expunge. Aquinos motion was denied for lack of jurisdiction, having ben filed after
the judgment had become final and executory. The SC reversed.
DOCTRINE:
A claim for attorneys fees may be asserted either in the very action in which the services of
a lawyer had been rendered or in a separate action. With respect to the first, the remedy for
recovering attorneys fees as an incident of the main action may be availed of only when
something is due to the client. Attorneys fees cannot be determined until after the main
litigation has been decided and the subject of the recovery is at the disposition of the court .
The issue over attorneys fees only arises when something has been recovered from which
the fee is to be paid. While a claim for attorneys fees may be filed before the judgment is
rendered, the determination as to the propriety of the fees or as to the amount thereof will
have to be held in abeyance until the main case from which the lawyers claim for attorneys
fees may arise has become final. Otherwise, the determination to be made by the courts will
be premature. Petitioner apparently filed his claim as an incident of the main action, as his
motion was for the courts approval of charging attorneys lien and the prayer thereto was to
direct the entry into the case records the attorneys fees he is claiming. The motion was not
intended to be filed as a separate action. Nevertheless, it is within his right to wait for the
finality of judgment, instead of filing it ahead of the courts resolution, since precisely the
basis of the determination of the attorneys fees is the final disposition of the case, i.e. the
just compensation.
_________________________________________________________________________________
LEAVE DIVISION O.A.S., OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR,
petitioner, VS. TYKE J. SARCENO, respondent.
A.M. No. P-11-2930 (Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 10-3318-P); February 17, 2015; En Banc, Per
Curiam
SUMMARY:
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended the bringing of an administrative
complaint for habitual absenteeism against respondent Tyke J. Sarceno, Clerk III of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, in Manila. The recommendation was based on a finding that
Sarceno had incurred 92 days of unauthorized absences in the months of June 2009 to
September 2009, inclusive. In his comment, Sarceno explained that he had been
experiencing abdominal pains, high fever, and influenza in the latter part of May 2009; that
when the abdominal pain had become unbearable in the following month, he had applied for
sick leave; that he did not seek medical assistance but only resorted to self-medication,
believing that he was only experiencing a common illness; that due to this, he could not
produce a medical certificate to support his application for sick leave; that in July 2009, he
had applied for vacation and sick leaves alternately to cover his absences; that he had then
sought medical assistance upon finding out that he was also suffering gonorrhea; that he
had returned to work on August 14, 2009 to file the necessary leave application; that he had
applied for vacation leave to cover the whole month of September 2009 because the nature
of his illness had required an extended time for recovery; [11] that he had harbored neither
malicious intent nor bad faith in incurring his absences Even so, Sarceno continued to
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UP PORTIA SORORITY
incur unexplained absences. His continuing absenteeism was discovered by Atty. Caridad A.
Pabello, Chief, Administrative Services of the OCA, A tracer letter dated September 23, 2010
was soon dispatched to Sarcenos residence requiring him to submit his bundy cards and/or
leave applications for July 2010 and August 2010, or else his name would be recommended
for dropping from the rolls. However, he did not respond. In its Administrative Matter for
Agenda (AMFA) dated December 14, 2010, the OCA submitted to the Court the following
observations and recommendations, and found that Sarceno is undoubtedly liable for
habitual absenteeism.
SC adopts the findings and recommendation of the OCA. Administrative Circular No. 14-2002
provides that an employee in the Civil Service shall be considered habitually absent if he or
she incurs unauthorized absences exceeding the allowable 2.5 days monthly leave credit
under the law for at least three (3) months in a semester or at least three (3) consecutive
months during the year. The OCA found that Sarceno had incurred absences totaling 92
days spread in the months of June, July, August, and September, all in 2009. Such
absenteeism already merited the imposition of the penalty for habitual absenteeism.
Sarceno was also guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the public service, yet
another administrative offense. Moreover, the Court has imposed dismissal from the service
on court employees who had gone absent without leave (AWOL) even if the offenses were
their first.
DOCTRINE:
In Loyao v. Manatad, the Court considered a court employees prolonged absence as conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the public service because of its adverse effect of
inefficiency in the public service. Conduct is prejudicial to the public service if it violates the
norm of public accountability and diminishes or tends to diminish the peoples faith in the
Judiciary.
_________________________________________________________________________________
RUBY v. ESPEJO and BAYOT
A.C. No. 10558; Feb. 23, 2015; Reyes, J.
SUMMARY: Ruby and his mother engaged the services of respondent-lawyers in connection
with a case for cancellation and nullification of deeds of donation. They agreed that
complainant would pay Espejo 100k as acceptance fee, 70k of which was paid upon the
signing of the agreement and the remaining 30k to be paid after the hearing on the prayer
for the issuance of a TRO; and 4k as appearance fee for every hearing. Later on, Espejo
asked for additional fees for filing and representation. The RTC denied the issuance of the
TRO. However, Ruby was not informed of the denial, and he only knew about it 2 months
later when he visited the RTC. Thereafter, the respondents failed to update him as to the
status of his complaint. Bayot denied being Rubys counsel, asserting that Espejo alone was
Rubys counsel and that he was merely a collaborating counsel. The Investigating
Commissioner of the IBP-CBD recommended the penalty of censure against respondents,
pointing out that Bayot and Ruby had a lawyer-client relationship. The IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the recommendation of the Commissioner, but modifying
the penalty imposed from censure to suspension from the practice of law for a period of one
year. The SC considered the case terminated as far as Espejo is concerned because she had
already died. The SC agreed that there existed a lawyer-client relationship between Bayot
and Ruby. However, Bayot may not be held liable for the failure to account for an return the
102
UP PORTIA SORORITY
excess of the 50k paid by Ruby to Espejo for the filing fees, since it was Espejo alone who
received and paid the filing fees. The SC also found that Bayot was not guilty of gross
neglect.
DOCTRINE: Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the employment of an
attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient
that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent
to his profession. Further, acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client
relationship.
Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as for the filing and processing of a
case if not utilized, must be returned immediately upon demand. Failure to return gives rise
to a presumption that he has misappropriated it in violation of the trust reposed on him. And
the conversion of funds entrusted to him constitutes gross violation of professional ethics
and betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.
_________________________________________________________________________________
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. CLERK OF COURT EMMANUELA
A. REYES, MTC, BANI, PANGASINAN
AM No. P-10-2872; Feb. 24, 2015; Per Curiam
SUMMARY: This is an admin case against Reyes filed by the OCA. Reyes was asked to
explain why she should not be held administratively liable for the delay in the remittances of
collections of the Judiciary Development Fund, Fiduciary Fund, Special Allowance for the
Judiciary Fund, Sheriffs Trust Fund, and Mediation Fund for the years 2004 to 2009. After a
thorough review and evaluation, the OCA recommended that Reyes be directed to pay a fine
of P5,000 for the interest that should have been earned and deposit the same to the SAJF
Account. Thereafter, Reyes incurred shortages in her unremitted collections, withdrew
money from the Municipal Treasurers Office without authorization, issued Official Receipts
late, and delayed remittances of the same funds for the years 2009 to 2011. The OCA
recommended that Reyes be dismissed from the service for gross neglect of duty,
dishonesty and grave misconduct, with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave
credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in the government service, including GOCCs. It
also ordered her to deposit any remaining balance of the shortages and penalties within 1
month from receipt of the resolution, after the money value of her leave credis shall have
been applied to her accountabilities. It also imposed a fine of P5,000 for the non-remittance
and delayed deposit of court collections, and a penalty of P1,437.28 for the loss of interest
that should have been earned had the collections been immediately remitted. The SC
affirmed the findings and recommendations of the OCA.
DOCTRINE: Under Admin Circular No. 35-2004, the daily remittance of JDF and SAJF
collections is required. Sec. 4 of OCA Circular No. 50-95 provides that all collections from
bailbonds, rental deposits, and other fiduciary collections shall be deposited by the Clerk of
Court concerned, within 24 hrs upon receipt thereof with the Landbank of the Phils.
_________________________________________________________________________________
ARCATOMY S. GUARIN v. ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN
A.C. No. 10576; January 14, 2015; Villarama, J.
SUMMARY:
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UP PORTIA SORORITY
Guarin filed a complaint for disbarment against Limpin for allegedly a false GIS with the SEC
thus violating Canon 1 and Rule 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Limpin listed Guarin as a stockholder, Chairman of the Board and President of LCI. However,
Guarin already resigned and never held any share nor was elected as chairperson of the
BOD or been President of LCI. Limpin claims that the GIS was only provisional, made and
submitted in good faith and that it would have been corrected in the future if not for LCIs
voluntary dissolution. IBP CBD found that Limpin violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and 1.02 of the
CPR and recommended her suspension from the practice of law for 3 months. This was
adopted in toto by the IBP Board of Governors. The SC agreed but lengthened her
suspension to 6 months. Limpin knew that the companys procedure of appointing directors
of officers solely by a certain Mr. Angeles was not legally permissible. There was also no
submission which would support the allegation that Guarin was in fact a stockholder.
DOCTRINE:
A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law
commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.
_________________________________________________________________________________
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, AS REPRESENTED BY DIRECTOR IV MARIA
LETICIA G. REYNA, complainant, VS. JOVILYN B. DAWANG, COURT
STENOGRAPHER I, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, TALUGTOG, NUEVA ECIJA,
respondent
A.M. No. P-15-3289; February 17, 2015; En Banc Resolution
SUMMARY:
Respondent Dawang is a Court Stenographer 1 in the Municipal Trial Court of Talugtog,
Nueva Ecija. Dawang had been working as a stenographer for various courts in a temporary
capacity since 1993, until she qualified as a permanent employee upon obtaining her
Certificate for Career Service Professional Eligibility. In 2011, the CSC informed the Office of
the Court Administrator that it was charging Dawang with serious dishonesty. According to
the CSC, Dawang conspired with another individual during the Career Service Professional
Examination held in 1996. Dawang, then Jovilyn S. Borillo, asked an impersonator to take the
examination in her stead. In 2007, Dawang requested for authentication of her Certificate of
Eligibility at the Integrated Records Management Office of the CSC. Upon verifying Dawang's
examination and employment records, the Integrated Records Management Office noted
marked differences in the facial features of the photographs and signatures on the pictureseat plan and the identification cards Dawang presented. The Examination, Recruitment, and
Placement Office required Dawang to show cause "why she should not be administratively
charged for having employed fraud. Dawang did not comply with the Show Cause Order. In
Dawangs answer she stated that she was "a victim of injustice caused by unscrupulous
person or persons particularly that lawyer who represented himself as officer of the CSC.
This Court agrees with the Office of the Court Administrator's Report. Dawang's acts
constituted serious dishonesty. It shares the CSC and the Office of the Court Administrator's
conclusion that the individual whose picture appears on the picture-seat plan is not Dawang.
The differences are apparent even to an ordinary person. Even if we believe Dawang's
narrative, her acts after learning she apparently passed the exam are marred with serious
dishonesty. When she received the letter from the Civil Service Commission and the
Certificate of Eligibility without her taking an actual examination, her first instinct was to
confirm her eligibility. She did not question how she could have passed without physically
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UP PORTIA SORORITY
taking the examination.

Under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Rule 10, Section 46,
serious dishonesty is a grave offense punishable by dismissal from the service. Dawang
denied that she conspired with another person to take the examination on her behalf. She
blamed the conspiracy on the lawyer-employee at the Civil Service Commission office.
However, her denial does not cure the dishonesty of writing the ill-gotten qualifications on
her Personal Data Sheet. By her act of dishonesty, respondent failed to meet the stringent
standards set for a judicial employee and does not, therefore, deserve to be part of the
judiciary
DOCTRINE:
Every employee of the judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty.
Like any public servant, he must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only
in the performance of his official duties but in his personal and private dealings with other
people, to preserve the court's good name and standing. It cannot be overstressed that the
image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the personnel
who work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of its personnel. Court employees have been
enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional
and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of justice
_________________________________________________________________________________
ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT AGAINST REYNALDO C. ALCANTARA,
UTILITY WORKER I, BR. 70, AND JOSEPH C. JACINTO, ELECTRICIAN, HALL OF
JUSTICE, BOTH OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BURGOS, PANGASINAN
A.M. No. P-15-3296 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 14-4364-P]; February 17, 2015; En Banc, Per
Curiam
SUMMARY:
This case stemmed from an undated Letter-Complaint, charging respondents Reynaldo C.
Alcantara (Alcantara) and Joseph C. Jacinto (Jacinto) with the commission of several illegal
activities in violation of Civil Service Rules. The Letter-Complaint was indorsed to the Office
of the Court Administrator. In the Report dated July 17, 2013, Executive Judge Abella
recommended that Alcantara and Jacinto be immediately dismissed from service. He found
that as early as 2009, Alcantara and Jacinto received and encashed checks of their coworkers without consent. Executive Judge Abella found that Alcantara's and Jacinto's actions
constituted grave misconduct and recommended their dismissal from service. It could not be
denied that they were the ones who committed these serious misconduct [sic] having
admitted in the presence of their victims and in the presence of Judge Aguilar, that they
either stole or received their co-employee's checks without proper authorization and
encashed them without the owner[s'] consent and used the cash proceeds for their own
personal use and benefit to the detriment of their co-workers who are the owners of the
checks. It is likewise very clear that the checks were encashed in another bank. . . forging
the signatures of the payees.
The Office of the Court Administrator found that Alcantara and Jacinto are guilty of grave
misconduct and dishonesty. The acts of respondents Alcantara and Jacinto clearly amounted
to dishonesty and grave misconduct. Under Rule 9, Section 46 of the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in Civil Service, promulgated on 18 November 2011, Serious
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UP PORTIA SORORITY
Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct are grave offenses punishable by dismissal from service
even on the first offense.
he court adopts the findings and recommendations of the Office of the Court Administrator.
There is no doubt that their acts of repeatedly stealing the checks and forging the signatures
of their co-workers constitute grave misconduct and dishonesty. Their alleged remorse for
what they have done does not erase the transgression they committed.
DOCTRINE:
Dishonesty is defined as the "[disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of, integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of
fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray."
Grave misconduct is committed when there has been '"a transgression of some established
and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a
public officer.' The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of
corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, all of which
must be established by substantial evidence, and must necessarily be manifest in a charge
of grave misconduct."
The Court had never and will never tolerate nor condone any conduct which would violate
the norms of public accountability, and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the
people in the justice system
_________________________________________________________________________________
WILFREDO ANGLO V. ATTY. JOSE MA. V. VALENCIA, ATTY. JOSE MA. J.
CIOCON, ATTY. PHILIP Z. DABAO, ATTY. LILY UY- VALENCIA, ATTY. JOEY P. DE
LA PAZ, ATTY. CRIS G. DIONELA, ATTY. RAYMUNDO T. PANDAN, JR., ATTY.
RODNEY K. RUBICA, AND ATTY. WILFRED RAMON M. PENALOSA
A.C. No. 10567; February 25, 2015; PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
SUMMARY: This is an administrative case stemming from a complaint-affidavit charging
respondents of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), specifically the rule
against conflict of interest. Complainant alleged that he availed the services of the law firm
for two (2) consolidated labor cases where he was impleaded as respondent. Atty. Dionela, a
partner of the law firm, was assigned to represent complainant.
Moreover, a criminal case for qualified theft was filed against complainant and his wife by a
corporation. The latter was represented by the law firm, the same law office which handled
complainant's labor cases. Aggrieved, complainant filed this disbarment case against
respondents.
IBP Commissioner found respondents to have violated the rule on conflict of interest and
recommended that they be reprimanded therefor. The termination of attorney-client relation
provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with
that of the former client.
IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the IBP Commissioner's Report and
Recommendation with modification. Instead of the penalty of reprimand, the IBP Board of
Governors dismissed the case with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall
be dealt with more severely. Upon the complainant MR, the Board then modified its decision
to reprimand the respondents for violation of the rule on conflict of interest; and (3) suspend
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UP PORTIA SORORITY
Atty. Dionela from the practice of law for one year, being the handling counsel of
complainant's labor cases.
SC: The law firm's unethical acceptance of the criminal case arose from its failure to
organize and implement a system by which it would have been able to keep track of all
cases assigned to its handling lawyers to the end of, among others, ensuring that every
engagement it accepts stands clear of any potential conflict of interest.
The Court finds no sufficient reason as to why Atty. Dionela should suffer the greater penalty
of suspension. As the Court sees it, all respondents stand in equal fault for the law firm's
deficient organization for which Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR had been
violated. As such, all of them are meted with the same penalty of reprimand, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar infraction would be dealt with more severely.
Doctrine:
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR provide:
CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
RULE 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
CANON 21 - A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT
EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP IS TERMINATED.
Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat: There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent
interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client,
it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other
client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he
argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been
bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new
retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client
in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new
relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation
will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty
to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof.[20]
A lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a
former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on
totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of public policy and
good taste.
The termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent
an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The client's confidence
once reposed should not be divested by mere expiration of professional employment.
_________________________________________________________________________________
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UP PORTIA SORORITY

January-March 2015 Case Digests

3) The old contract must be extinguished.

When is an action an attack on a title? It is when the object of the action or

Spouses Dizon failed to effect a valid

It bears to stress that a sum of money received by an employee on behalf of an

GR No 190912; January 12, 2015; Peralta, J.

5. Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces

PEOPLE v TIBAYAN AND PUERTO

It is committed through a Ponzi scheme where (a) the incorporators/directors of TGICI

ALEJANDRO C. ALMENDRAS, JR. v. ALEXIS C. ALMENDRAS

the business (and its location) to which the goods belong;

the class of product to which the goods belong;

the nature and cost of the articles;

the descriptive properties, physical attributes or essential characteristics with

the purpose of the goods;

the fields of manufacture;

the conditions under which the article is usually purchased; and

NCC provides that a stipulation limiting a common carriers liability to the

HOCHENG PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. ANTONIO M.

That retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business losses

when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;

DOCTRINE: A preliminary injunction is proper when the plaintiff appears to be clearly

principle not because it allows a party-litigant another opportunity to reopen a judgment

G.R. Nos. 183152-54; January 21, 2015; Sereno, C.J.

DOLORES V. MOLINA v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND EPIMACO ORETA

weight should not be given to characteristic similarities, or dissimilarities, between that

B. 120+30 Day Period

exercise of her official functions, as provided for under

A.M. No. P-11-2940, January 21, 2015

taking the examination.

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