IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS

)
BARON MONTERO JONES, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
V. ) CASE NO.____________________________
)
THE UNITED STATES )
Defendant. )

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL COMPLAINT

Plaintiff, BARON MONTERO JONES (hereinafter “JONES”), pro se, in good faith and

not for any indirect purposes, hereby alleges the following:

1. Honorable MARILYN JUSTMAN KAMAN (hereinafter “KAMAN”)

maliciously under color of law 18 U.S.C. §242, willfully conspired and subjected JONES in his

criminal conviction in the State of Minnesota to the deprivation of his rights, privileges, and

immunities secured and protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

2. KAMAN conspired with two or more persons 18 U.S.C. § 241, district

attorneys STEPHEN L. REDDING (hereinafter “REDDING”) and RACHELLE DRAKEFORD

(hereinafter “DRAKEFORD”), JONES’ defense counsel GREGORY MULLIGAN (hereinafter

“MULLIGAN”), and an Augsburg security guard JOSEPH GARCIA (hereinafter GARCIA), to

secure this deprivation JONES’ rights.

3. JONES’ basis for conspiracy arises under the Electronic Communications

Privacy Act (hereinafter “ECPA” Pub. L. 99-508, Oct. 21, 1986, 100 Stat. 1848, 18 U.S.C. §

2510). ECPA was enacted by the United States Congress to extend government restrictions on

wire taps. Specifically, ECPA was an amendment to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and

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Safe Streets Act of 1968 (hereinafter “Title III” Pub. L. No. 90-352, 82 Stat. 217, codified in 18

U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2522, the Wiretap Statute), was primarily designed to prevent unauthorized

government access to private electronic communications.

4. Forty-four other states and the District of Columbia adopted their own

version in the prohibition and disclosure of those unauthorized communications, including

Minnesota. See M.S.A. §§ 626A.01-626A.33.

5. JONES particularly alleges that the above conspirators primarily KAMAN

deprived him of his ECPA and Title III rights under the color of law, by ignoring JONES’ 4th and

5th constitutional rights while ignoring federal statutes that prohibited the admittance and use of

that evidence 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-252; by allowing REDDING to perjure himself 18 U.S.C. §

1621 and knowingly give false declarations and statements 18 U.S.C. § 1623 so that that

evidence could be used; and by ignoring motions suppressing that evidence before it was made

known that there was such evidence.

JURISDICTION

6. The United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction to render

judgment upon this complaint pursuant to the Tucker Act 28 U.S.C. § 1491. Under the Act, a

“complaint” may be filed by “any person” or “identified” by a chief judge. See 28 U.S.C. §

351(a) and (b). Under Rule 3(c)(1), complaints may be submitted by a person, in his or her

individual capacity, or by a professional organization. The Act, however, establishes an

administrative, inquisitorial process. For example, even absent a complaint under Rule 6, chief

judges are expected in some circumstances to trigger the process-- “identify a complaint,” see 28

U.S.C. § 351(b) and Rule 5-- and conduct an investigation without becoming a party. See 28

U.S.C. § 352(a)’ Breyer Committee Report, 239 F.R.D. at 214; Illustrative Rule 2(j). Even when

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a complaint is filed by someone other than the chief judge, the complainant lacks many rights

that a litigant would have, and the chief judge, instead of being limited to the “four corners of the

complaint,” must, under Rule 11, proceed as though misconduct or disability has been alleged

where the complainant reveals information of misconduct or disability but does not claim it as

such. See Breyer Committee Report, 239 F.R.D. at 183-84.

7. An allegation of misconduct or disability filed under Rule 6 is a

“complaint,” and the Rule so provides in subsection (c) (1). However, both the nature aof the

process and the use of the term “identify” suggest that the word “complaint” covers more than a

document formally triggering the process. The process relies on chief judges considering the

known information and triggering the process when appropriate. “Identifying” a “complaint,”

therefore, is best understood as the chief judge’s concluding that information known to the judge

constitutes probable cause to believe that misconduct occurred or a disability exists, whether or

not the information is framed as, or intended to be an accusation. This definition is codified in

(c) (2).

8. Rule 3(h)(3)(A) tracks the Act, 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(ii), in excluding

from the definition of misconduct allegations “[d]irectly related to the merits of a decision or

procedural ruling.” This exclusion preserves the independence of judges in the exercise of

judicial power by ensuring that the complaint procedure is not used to collaterally attack the

substance of a judge’s ruling. Any allegation that calls into question the correctness of an official

action of a judge—without more—is merits-related.

9. Conversely, an allegation—however unsupported—that a judge conspired

with a prosecutor to make a particular ruling is not merits-related, even though it “relates” to a

ruling in a colloquial sense. Such an allegation attacks the propriety of conspiring with the

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prosecutor and goes beyond a challenge to the correctness—“the merits”—of the ruling itself.

See Rule For Judicial-Conduct And Judicial-Disability Proceedings, Commentary on Rule 3 p.

6, ¶ 21-24.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

10. JONES incorporates and restates by reference statements within

paragraphs 1 through 10 of this complaint as if fully set forth herein. All actions described in

this complaint happened in Hennepin County, in Minnesota.

11. On or about October 3, 2003 JONES was being detained by Augsburg

security GARCIA for an alleged incident. While being detained GARCIA asked JONES some

questions about the activities that occurred that evening. JONES complied and was later placed

under arrest by GARCIA. (It was later made known that GARCIA, who was going to school to

be a police officer, secretly recorded JONES’ conversation; one of the foundations of this

complaint is partially founded upon GARCIA’s conduct). See Appendix A (Trial Transcript pp.

18, 267, 269, 275-276, and 281)

12. On or about October 6, 2003 REDDING filed and signed a document

NOTICE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY OF EVIDENCE AND IDENTIFICATION

PROCEDURES PURSUANT TO RULE 7.01, stating that the prosecution has “Evidence

obtained as a result of a search, search and seizure, wiretapping, and other forms of electronic

and mechanical eavesdropping,” of JONES’. See Appendix B (NOTICE OF PROSECUTING

ATTORNEY OF EVIDENCE AND IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES PURSUANT TO RULE

7.01, motion)

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Prior Statement

13. On or about January 5, 2004 in Hennepin County Courts during JONES’

trial, REDDING disclosed to the court that he received by email JONES’ statement that JONES

made to GARCIA. Upon further briefing REDDING stated that “the state didn’t know of this

until last week [today’s trial being 1/5/04].” Moreover, REDDING states”[t]here is nothing in

the security guard’s reports to indicate that anything was tape-recorded or in any other way

electronically preserved.” See Appendix A (Trial Transcript pp. 17-18) and Appendix C (JONES’

Prior Statement Transcript)

14. However, by REDDING’S own admission perjured himself 18 U.S.C. §

1621 and knowingly gave false declarations and statements under 18 U.S.C. § 1623 while

KAMAN apparently allowed this to happen. See Appendix A, supra.

15. JONES’ statement was recorded on a digital recorder GARCIA wore on

his belt. Those statements are considered “oral communications” as defined in 18 U.S.C.A. §

2510 (12). Title III authorizes the interception of private wire and oral communications, but only

when law enforcement officials are investigating specified serious crimes and receive prior

judicial approval that may not be given except upon compliance with stringent conditions, 18

U.S.C. § 2511.

16. The insistence upon “prior” consent precludes the authorities from

illegally wiretapping or bugging someone’s conversation and then coercing the victim into

consenting to the divulgence of his conversations. “Retroactive authorization would not be

possible” (Weiss v United States, 398 U.S. 321, 84 L.Ed. 298, 60 S.Ct. 269 (1939) Senate Report

1097, 90th Cong 2d Session (Majority Report of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary on

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the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968), 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.

News 2177, 2182; See also Wiretapping and Eavesdropping 2d § 6:1, pp. 6-3 – 6-4.

17. However, KAMAN still allowed JONES’ oral communication to be played

before the jury. All of JONES’ oral communications obtained through unauthorized interceptions

are crimes and those that violate its provisions can be prosecuted, 18 U.S.C. § 2511. Including

judges who disclose sensitive information concerning statutorily authorized wiretap. See, United

States v Aguilar, 584 U.S. 593, 115 S.Ct 2357, 132, L.Ed. 2d 520 (1995). Moreover, a prosecutor

who wile acting within scope of duties willfully deprives an accused of his constitutional rights

is subject to criminal punishments 18 U.S.C.A. § 242. Id; “the tendency of those who execute

the criminal laws should find no sanctions in the judgments of the courts, which are charged at

all times with the support of the constitution.” (citing Gelbard which involves government

abuse concerning wiretap) Gelbard v U.S., 408 U.S. 41, 33 L.Ed.2d.

18. All of JONES’ oral communications obtained through unauthorized

interceptions are crimes and those that violate its provisions can be prosecuted, 18 U.S.C. §§

2511, 2512, 2515. By JONES being the “aggrieved person,” 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (11), of such

interceptions, disclosures, and uses, he is entitled to recover civil damages of actual and punitive

damages, attorney’s fee, and any or other cost, against KAMAN, REDDING, DRAKEFORD,

MULLIGAN, and GARCIA, 18 U.S.C. § 2520. See also Alderman v United States, 394, U.S.

165, 89 S.Ct. 961 (1969). JONES can move to suppress that oral communication 18 U.S.C. §

2518 (10)(a). Title III also bars the use of that oral communication as evidence in any trial,

hearing, or other proceeding in a Federal or State court, 28 U.S.C. § 2518 (9)-(10). See also

Gelbard, supra.

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 19. JONES’ trial attorney MULLIGAN, objected to the use of these

statements in the pre-trial hearing, but KAMAN was unaware of any case law supporting

MULLIGAN’s motion and asked for additional cases, and would review them the following day.

The next day MULLIGAN failed to present any supporting case law or statutes for the

suppression of JONES’ statements and KAMAN believed that the case cited by the state was a

better position, and denied the suppression motion. See Appendix A (Trial Transcripts pp. 4-5,

38, 42-43)

20. MULLIGAN objected again to the use of those statements during trial,

after learning that GARCIA was a state employee and training to be a police officer. However,

KAMAN said that the Court’s ruling at the pre-trial hearing is maintained. See Appendix A

(Trial Transcript pp. 277-278)

21. Prior to JONES knowing about this prior statement, JONES’ public

defender filed a motion “to suppress any evidence as a result of a said search and seizure” on

November 3, 2003. A lot of judicial procedures were not adhered in JONES’ case. See

Appendix D (NOTICE OF MOTION AND PMNIBUS MOTION)

Present Statement

22. JONES also provided a statement while in custody to an investigator about

the occurrences that occurred. This statement for purposes in which you will see, will be labeled

“present statement.” See Appendix E (JONES’ Present Testimony Transcript)

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Jury Instructions

23. KAMAN in her jury instructions for JONES’ conviction provided an

instruction that further sustains this conspiracy complaint. This is what she said:

24. “In determining the believability and weight to be given the

testimony of a witness you may consider, one, evidence that the witness

has been convicted of a crime. You may consider whether the kind of

crime committed indicates the likelihood the witness is telling or not

telling the truth.

25. “You also may consider evidence of a statement by the witness on

some prior occasion that is inconsistent with present testimony. Evidence

of any prior inconsistent statement should be considered only to test the

believability and weight of the witness’s testimony.” See Appendix A

(Trial Transcript pp. 445-446)

26. This jury instruction KAMAN provides is misleading and deceptive.

Because JONES was the only witness who had a “prior” and a “present statement.” This

“charge to [the] jury, when considered in its entirety,” if it “correctly states the law, the

incorrectness of one paragraph or phrase alone is generally not considered to be reversible

error. Indeed, a misstatement of the law by a trial judge that ‘dilutes the specific intent

requirement error if the instruction as a whole suggest the appropriate standard be applied.”

U.S. v Greer, 939F.2d 1076, at 1084 (5 th Cir, 1991) (quoting United States v Durnim, 932 F.2d

1297, 1300 (5th Cir. 1980). However, by KAMAN explicitly giving “two instructions that are in

direct conflict and one is obviously prejudicial, that is reversible,” because “the jury” obviously
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“ha[d] followed her erroneous instructions[s].” Moreover, jurors are reasonable, and generally

follow the instructions that they are given. Yates v Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, at 403, 113 S.Ct. 1884,

at 1893 (1991) (citing Richardson v March, 481 U.S. 200, 211, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 1709, 95 L.Ed.2d

176 (1987)).

27. What further sustains this claim is that in the pre-trial hearing REDDING

and KAMAN were conversing in about JONES’ previous criminal history, and REDDING gave

notice that the state would impeach JONES, disclosing that he is a felon and has prior

convictions, should he choose to take the stand. REDDING concludes: “in terms of…the

credibility of a witness is crucial to a jury’s determination, for the jury to be able to see,…

J[ONES]…[as a] whole person.” See Appendix A (Trial Transcript pp. 10-12)

Structural Error

28. Which accumulates to a “structural error.” A “structural error” is an error

that “affect[s] the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the

trial process itself.” Arizona v Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302

(1991). Such errors “call into question the very accuracy and reliability of the trial process and

thus are not amenable to harmless error analysis, but require automatic reversal.” McGurk v

Stenberg, 163 F.3d 470 (8th Cir. 1998); see Fulminante, 594 U.S., at 309-10, 111 S.Ct. 1246).

Such Structural defects include a judge who is not impartial. Juarez v Minnesota, 217 F.3d

1014, at 1017 (8th Cir. 2000)(citing Fulminante, 299 U.S., at 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246). Because a

judge who is not impartial affects “[t]he entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end.”

Fulminante, 499 U.S., at 309, 111 S.Ct., at 1265.

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 PROCEDURAL HISTORY

29. As you can tell Baron is very familiar somewhat when it comes to drafting

petitions. The reason for this is because he has argued these issues here in this complaint and

more, since he was sentenced. Baron did a direct appeal to the;

30. Minnesota Court of Appeals and filed a pro se brief; the appellate court

affirmed the district courts decision on May 12, 2004;

31. His public defender then petitioned the Minnesota Supreme Court; that

review was denied on July 19, 2005;

32. JONES then did a pro se State Habeas Corpus 28 § 2254; the Report And

Recommendation, recommended that the petition be dismissed with prejudice; He Objected to

The R & R; the Court then adopted the Magistrate’s R & R, and that the petition be denied on

October 31, 2006;

33. JONES then applied for a Certificate of Appealablity (C.O.A.) 28 U.S.C. §

2253 to the United States Court Of Appeals For The Eighth Circuit; on June 13, 2007 that

application was denied and dismissed;

34. Around the time he was preparing for his C.O.A., JONES found out that

judge Kaman was bias and impartial in his trial, so he petitioned for a pro se state post-

conviction Minn. Stat. 590; that petition was denied by KAMAN on March 15, 2007;

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 35. He then appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals; and was denied by

them on May 9, 2008. See Appendix F (Minnesota Court of Appeals Unpublished Opinion;

Minnesota Supreme Court; United States District Court District of Minnesota 2254; United

States Court Of Appeals For The Eighth Circuit COA; Order Denying Petition For Post-Conviction

Relief; Minnesota Court of Appeals (second time))

Supplemental Information

36. JONES was released from prison November 5th, 2007. He had a paralegal

helping him with his case to get back in the courts when he was denied this past time; the

paralegal eventually took off with his money around June or July of 2008. JONES’ agent (parole

officer) gave him an erroneous directive and JONES parole was revoked and spent the following

months incarcerated: Sept. 8, 2008-Sept. 14, 2008, Sept. 18, 2008-Feb.19, 2009 and March 10,

2009-July20, 2009. JONES recently filed a complaint with the United States Department of

Justice, Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section. He is also contemplating on filling a federal Writ

In The Nature of Mandamus 28 U.S.C. § 1651, and or a federal Civil Suit 18 U.S.C.A § 2520; he is

currently working on them; all of them pro se. JONES is a college student, and currently

continues to pursue and seeks alternative vehicles to aid him in rectifying his conviction.

CONCLUSION

37. One of the most peculiar things that stick out the most about JONES’s, is

that none of the reviewing courts he has ever mentioned or even acknowledged Title III in their

opinions; which it is JONES’ contention that if they were it would automatically overturn his

conviction. As you can see Baron is a fighter and will keep fighting; and he files this petition in

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hopes of finally receiving some recognition and shedding some light upon his federal statues

and federal constitutional rights. But particularly, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and

Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, which was drafted by congress to protect

national security interest and to regulate the threat of organized crime in the public, and in its

public servants: “Political leaders, legislators, police officers, prosecutors, and judges have been

tainted by organized crime, and the public is the victim because there can be no true liberty or

justice under a corrupt government.” See Appendix G (Senate Report 1097, 90th Cong 2d

Session at 71)

38. Wherefore, it is JONES’ contention that if KAMAN was impartial as the

Codes of Judicial Conduct explicitly states, and did not conspire with REDDING, DRAKEFORD,

MULLIGAN, and GARCIA in securing the deprivations of his rights he would not now be suffering

from irreparable harm and all of its fruit. Wherefore, JONES’ is asking this Court for the

correction of his sentence, criminal punishment, and civil damages of actual and punitive

damages 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, and 2520 against the named conspirator’s in this complaint, and

the sum of $35,000,000 for Jones’ grievances.

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Cordially,

I Baron Montero Jones declare under

penalty of perjury that the

aforementioned and the following is true

Baron Montero Jones and correct to the best of my knowledge

Pro se and ability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746

P.O. Box 582685

Minneapolis, MN 55458-2685

Tel: (612) 217-0896

Dates:__________2010

P.S. Baron remembers at the end of trial that only five jurors got up and said guilty, he

instinctively remembers that he was about to get up and say “mistrial” but he trusted he Mr.

Mulligan’s judgment; however, the trial transcripts say all twelve jurors got up and said guilty.

See Appendix A (Trial Transcript pp. 461-464)

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 APPENDIX A

Trial Transcript pp. 4-5, 10-12, 17-18, 38, 42-43, 267, 269, 275-278, 281, 445-446, 461-464

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 APPENDIX B

NOTICE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY OF EVIDENCE AND IDENTIFICATION

PROCEDURES PURSUANT TO RULE 7.01

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 APPENDIX C

JONES’ Prior Statement Transcript

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 APPENDIX D

NOTICE OF MOTION AND OMNIBUS MOTION

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 APPENDIX E

JONES’ Present Testimony Transcript

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 APPENDIX F

Minnesota Court of Appeals Unpublished Opinion; Minnesota Supreme Court; United States

District Court District of Minnesota 2254; United States Court Of Appeals For The Eighth Circuit

COA; Order Denying Petition For Post-Conviction Relief; Minnesota Court of Appeals (second

time)

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 APPENDIX G

Senate Report 1097, 90th Cong 2d Session

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