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A Forcible Entry and Detainer is an action that a landlord, or new property owner can take if the
existing occupant refuses to leave after appropriate notice. This occupant could be either a tenant or
original owner of property that was sold at a foreclosure or trustee's sale.
The act of retaining possession of property without legal right.
The term unlawful detainer ordinarily refers to the conduct of a tenant who is in
possession of an apartment or leased property and refuses to leave the premises upon the
expiration or termination of the lease. Typically, the landlord wishes to evict the tenant for
not paying the rent or for endangering the safety of the other tenants or the landlord's
property.
n. 1) keeping possession of real property without a right, such as after a lease has expired, after being served with a notice to
quit (vacate, leave) for non-payment of rent or other breach of lease, or being a "squatter" on the property. Such possession
entitles the owner to file a lawsuit for "unlawful detainer," asking for possession by court order, unpaid rent and damages. 2) a
legal action to evict a tenant or other occupier of real property in possession, without a legal right, to declare a breach of lease,
and/or a judgment for repossession, as well as unpaid rent and other damages. Such lawsuits have priority over most legal
cases and therefore will be calendared for trial promptly.

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LEASE: An implied new lease or tacita reconduccion will set in when the following
requisites are found to exist: a) the term of the original contract of lease has expired; b) the
lessor has not given the lessee a notice to vacate; and c) the lessee continued enjoying the
thing leased for fifteen days with the acquiescence of the lessor. - G.R. No. 170509
An action for unlawful detainer exists when a person unlawfully withholds possession
of any land or building against or from a lessor, vendor, vendee or other persons, after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express
or implied.[16] The only issue to be resolved in an unlawful detainer case is physical or
material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any
of the parties involved.[17] Thus, when the relationship of lessor and lessee is established
in an unlawful detainer case, any attempt of the parties to inject the question of ownership
into the case is futile, except insofar as it might throw light on the right of possession.[18]
In the present case, it is undisputed that the petitioner and the respondent entered
into a contract of lease. We note in this regard that in her answer with affirmative defenses
and counterclaim before the MeTC, the petitioner did not deny that she signed the lease
contract (although she maintained that her signature was obtained through the
respondents misrepresentations). Under the lease contract, the petitioner obligated herself
to pay a monthly rental to the respondent in the amount of P3,960.00. The lease period was
for one year, commencing on January 1, 1997 and expiring on December 31, 1997. It bears
emphasis that the respondent did not give the petitioner a notice to vacate upon the
expiration of the lease contract in December 1997 (the notice to vacate was sent only on
August 5, 1998), and the latter continued enjoying the subject premises for more than 15
days, without objection from the respondent. By the inaction of the respondent as lessor,
there can be no inference that it intended to discontinue the lease contract.[19] An implied

new lease was therefore created pursuant to Article 1670 of the Civil Code, which expressly
provides:
Article 1670. If at the end of the contract the lessee should continue enjoying the
thing leased for fifteen days with the acquiescence of the lessor, and unless a notice to the
contrary by either party has previously been given, it is understood that there is an implied
new lease, not for the period of the original contract, but for the time established in Articles
1682 and 1687. The other terms of the original contract shall be revived.
An implied new lease or tacita reconduccion will set in when the following requisites
are found to exist: a) the term of the original contract of lease has expired; b) the lessor has
not given the lessee a notice to vacate; and c) the lessee continued enjoying the thing
leased for fifteen days with the acquiescence of the lessor.[20] As earlier discussed, all
these requisites have been fulfilled in the present case.
Article 1687 of the Civil Code on implied new lease provides:
Article 1687. If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from
year to year, if the rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from
week to week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily.
Since the rent was paid on a monthly basis, the period of lease is considered to be
from month to month, in accordance with Article 1687 of the Civil Code. [A] lease from
month to month is considered to be one with a definite period which expires at the end of
each month upon a demand to vacate by the lessor.[21] When the respondent sent a
notice to vacate to the petitioner on August 5, 1998, thetacita reconduccion was aborted,
and the contract is deemed to have expired at the end of that month. [A] notice to vacate
constitutes an express act on the part of the lessor that it no longer consents to the
continued occupation by the lessee of its property.[22] After such notice, the lessees right
to continue in possession ceases and her possession becomes one of detainer.[23]
http://attylaserna.blogspot.com/2015/08/thus-in-order-that-municipal-trial.html
Thus, in order that a municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court may acquire
jurisdiction in an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the complaint specifically
allege the facts constitutive of unlawful detainer. The jurisdictional facts must appear on the
face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of unlawful
detainer, an action for unlawful detainer is not a proper remedy and, thus, the municipal
trial court or metropolitan trial court has no jurisdiction over the case.
1.
In the case of ESTATE OF SOLEDAD MANANTAN, herein represented by GILBERT
MANANTAN vs. ANICETO SOMERA, G.R. No. 145867, April 7, 2009, involving unlawful
detainer, as in the instant case, and citing Sec. 1, Rule 70, it was held that a person
deprived of the possession of any land or building xxx against whom the possession of any
land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied xxx may, at any time within one
(1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the
proper first-level trial court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or

depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of
such possession, together with damages and costs.
1.1.
The Supreme Court held therein that unlawful detainer is as an action
may be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of
any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to
hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied.
1.2.
The SC stated that in unlawful detainer cases, the possession of the
defendant was originally legal, as his possession was permitted by the plaintiff on account
of an express or implied contract between them. However, defendants possession
became illegal when the plaintiff demanded that defendant vacate the subject property
due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess under their contract, and
defendant refused to heed such demand.
1.3.

We further wrote from the said ruling:

x x x.
Well-settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of the court, as well as the nature of the
action, are determined by the allegations in the complaint. To vest the court with the
jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant from the land in an action for unlawful
detainer, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts clearly
showing attributes of unlawful detainer cases, as this proceeding is summary in nature. The
complaint must show on its face enough ground to give the court jurisdiction without resort
to parol testimony.
Thus, in order that a municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court may acquire
jurisdiction in an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the complaint specifically
allege the facts constitutive of unlawful detainer. The jurisdictional facts must appear on
the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of unlawful
detainer, an action for unlawful detainer is not a proper remedy and, thus, the municipal
trial court or metropolitan trial court has no jurisdiction over the case.
X x x.
Further, it appears from the allegations in the Complaint that the respondent was
already in possession of the disputed portion at the time Manantan bought the subject
property from the Bayot family, and it was only after the conduct of a relocation survey,
which supposedly showed that respondent was encroaching on the subject property, did
Manantan begin asserting her claim of ownership over the portion occupied and used by
respondent.
Clearly, respondents possession of the disputed portion was not pursuant to any
contract, express or implied, with Manantan, and, resultantly, respondents right of
possession over the disputed portion is not subject to expiration or termination. At no point
can it be said that respondents possession of the disputed portion ceased to be legal and
became an unlawful withholding of the property from Manantan.
Since the Complaint in Civil Case No. 10467 failed to satisfy on its face the
jurisdictional requirements for an action for unlawful detainer, the Court of Appeals was
correct in holding that the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the said Complaint and should

have dismissed the same. There is no possible argument around the lack of jurisdiction of
MTCC over Civil Case No. 10467. In Laresma v. Abellana, the Court pronounced:
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are
determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the action
was commenced. Jurisdiction of the tribunal over the subject matter or nature of an action
is conferred only by law and not by the consent or waiver upon a court which, otherwise,
would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an action. Lack of
jurisdiction of the court over an action or the subject matter of an action cannot be cured by
the silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent of the parties. If the court has no
jurisdiction over the nature of an action, it may dismiss the same ex mero motu or motu
proprio. A decision of the court without jurisdiction is null and void; hence, it could
never logically become final and executory. Such a judgment may be attacked directly or
collaterally.

http://attylaserna.blogspot.com/2015/03/unlawful-detainer-vs-forcible-entry.html
There is no question that the holder of a Torrens title is the rightful owner of the property thereby covered and is entitled to
its possession. However, the Court cannot ignore that the statements in the petitioners complaint about the respondents
possession of the disputed property being by the mere tolerance of Eliseo could be the basis for unlawful detainer.
Unlawful detainer involves the defendants withholding of the possession of the property to which the plaintiff is entitled,
after the expiration or termination of the formers right tohold possession under the contract, whether express or
implied. A requisite for a valid cause of action of unlawful detainer is that the possession was
30

originally lawful, but turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess.
To show that the possession was initially lawful, the basis of such lawful possession must then be established. With the
averment here that the respondents possession was by mere tolerance of the petitioner, the acts of tolerance must be
proved, for bare allegation of tolerance did not suffice. At least, the petitioner should show the overt acts indicative of her
or her predecessors tolerance, or her co-heirs permission for him to occupy the disputed property. But she did not
adduce such evidence. Instead, she appeared to be herself not clear and definite as to his possession of the disputed
property being merely tolerated by Eliseo, as the following averment of her petition for review indicates:
31

6.9. Their ignorance of the said transaction of sale, particularly the petitioner, as they were not duly informed by the
vendor-co[-]owner Eliseo Quijano, [led] them to believe that the respondents occupancy of the subject premises was by
mere tolerance of Eliseo, so that upon partition of the whole property,said occupancy continued to be under tolerance of
the petitioner when the subject premises became a part of the land adjudicated to the latter; (emphasis supplied) In
contrast, the respondent consistently stood firm on his assertion that his possession of the disputed property was in the
concept of an owner, not by the mere tolerance of Eliseo, and actually presented the deeds of sale transferring ownership
of the property to him.
32

33

Considering that the allegation of the petitioners tolerance of the respondents possession of the disputed property was
not established, the possession could very well be deemed illegal from the beginning. In that case, her action for unlawful
detainer has to fail. Even so, the Court would not be justified to treat this ejectment suit as one for
34

forcible entry because the complaint contained no allegation thathis entry in the property had
been by force, intimidation, threats, strategy or stealth.

1. Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute

another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
http://attylaserna.blogspot.com/2015/05/unlawful-detainer-mvp-law-philippines.html
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally
withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract,
express or implied. The possession by the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became
illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess. The proceeding is summary in
nature, jurisdiction over which lies with the proper MTC or metropolitan trial court. The action must be
brought up within one year from the date of last demand, and the issue in the case must be the right to
physical possession. Firm is the rule that as long as these allegations demonstrate a cause of action for
unlawful detainer, the court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter. The requirement that the
complaint should aver, as jurisdictional facts, when and how entry into the property was made
by the defendants applies only when the issue is the timeliness of the filing of the complaint
before the MTC, and not when the jurisdiction of the MTC is assailed because the case is one
for accion publiciana cognizable by the RTC. This is because, in forcible entry cases,
the prescriptive period is counted from the date of defendants actual entry into the property; whereas,
in unlawful detainer cases, it is counted from the date of the last demand to vacate. Hence, to
determine whether the case was filed on time, there is a necessity to ascertain whether the complaint is
one for forcible entry or for unlawful detainer; and since the main distinction between the two actions is
when and how defendant entered the property, the determinative facts should be alleged in the complaint.
Unlawful detainer; how to count 1-year demand (G.R. No. 194880)
Whether or not petitioners action for unlawful detainer was brought within one year after the
unlawful withholding of possession will determine whether it was properly filed with the MeTC. If, as
petitioners argue, the one-year period should be counted from respondent Sunvars receipt on 03
February 2009 of the Final Notice to Vacate, then their Complaint was timely filed within the one-year
period and appropriately taken cognizance of by the MeTC. However, if the reckoning period is pegged
from the expiration of the main lease contract and/or sublease agreement, then petitioners proper
remedy should have been an accion publiciana to be filed with the RTC.
The Court finds that petitioners correctly availed themselves of an action for unlawful detainer
and, hence, reverses the ruling of the RTC.
Under the Rules of Court, lessors against whom possession of any land is unlawfully withheld after
the expiration of the right to hold possession may by virtue of any express or implied contract, and
within one year after the unlawful deprivation bring an action in the municipal trial court against the
person unlawfully withholding possession, for restitution of possession with damages and costs.[60]Unless
otherwise stipulated, the action of the lessor shall commence only after a demand to pay or to comply
with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee; or after a written notice of that
demand is served upon the person found on the premises, and the lessee fails to comply therewith within
15 days in the case of land or 5 days in the case of buildings.[61]
In Delos Reyes v. Spouses Odenes,[62] the Court recently defined the nature and scope of an
unlawful detainer suit, as follows:
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from
one who illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of
his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The
possession by the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but

became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.

The proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction over which lies with the
proper MTC or metropolitan trial court. The action must be brought up within
one year from the date of last demand, and the issue in the case must be the
right to physical possession. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it states the following
elements:
1.
Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of
the plaintiff.
2.
Eventually, the possession became illegal upon the plaintiffs notice to the defendant of the
termination of the latters right of possession.
3.
Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the
latters enjoyment.
4.
Within one year from the making of the last demand on the defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the Complaint for ejectment.[63]
On the other hand, accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which
should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year.
It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of
title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint, more than one year had elapsed since
defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendants possession had become illegal, the action
will be, not one of forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana.[64]
There are no substantial disagreements with respect to the first three requisites for an action for
unlawful detainer. Respondent Sunvar initially derived its right to possess the subject property from its
sublease agreements with TRCFI and later on with PDAF. However, with the expiration of the lease
agreements on 31 December 2002, respondent lost possessory rights over the subject property.
Nevertheless, it continued occupying the property for almost seven years thereafter. It was only on 03
February 2009 that petitioners made a final demand upon respondent Sunvar to turn over the property.
What is disputed, however, is the fourth requisite of an unlawful detainer suit.
The Court rules that the final requisite is likewise availing in this case, and that the one-year period should
be counted from the final demand made on 03 February 2009.
Contrary to the reasoning of the RTC,[65] the one-year period to file an unlawful detainer case is
not counted from the expiration of the lease contract on 31 December 2002. Indeed, the last demand for
petitioners to vacate is the reckoning period for determining the one-year period in an action for unlawful
detainer. Such one year period should be counted from the date of plaintiffs last demand on defendant to
vacate the real property, because only upon the lapse of that period does the possession become
unlawful.[66]
In case several demands to vacate are made, the period is
reckoned from the date of the
last demand.[67] In Leonin v. Court of
Appeals,[68] the Court, speaking through Justice
Conchita Carpio Morales, reckoned the one-year period to file the unlawful detainer Complaint filed on
25 February 1997 from the latest demand letter dated 24 October 1996, and not from the earlier
demand letter dated 03 July 1995:

Prospero Leonin (Prospero) and five others were co-owners of a 400-square

meter property located at K-J Street, East Kamias, Quezon City whereon was constructed
a two-storey house and a three-door apartment identified as No. 1-A, B, and C.
Prospero and his co-owners allowed his siblings, herein petitioners, to occupy
Apartment C without paying any rentals.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Petitioners further contend that respondents remedy is accion publiciana because their possession
is not de facto, they having been authorized by the true and lawful owners of the property; and that one
year had elapsed from respondents demand given on July 3, 1995 when the unlawful detainer
complaint was filed.
The petition fails.
Contrary to petitioners contention, the allegations in the complaint make out a case for unlawful
detainer. Thus, respondent alleged, inter alia, that she is the registered owner of the property and that
petitioners, who are tenants by tolerance, refused to vacate the premises despite the notice to vacate
sent to them.
Likewise, contrary to petitioners contention, the one-year period for filing a complaint for unlawful
detainer is reckoned from the date of the last demand, in this case October 24, 1996, the reason being
that the lessor has the right to waive his right of action based on previous demands and let the lessee
remain meanwhile in the premises. Thus, the filing of the complaint on February 25, 1997 was well within
the one year reglementary period.[69] (Emphasis supplied.)
From the time that the main lease contract and sublease agreements expired (01 January 2003),
respondent Sunvar no longer had any possessory right over the subject property. Absent any express
contractual renewal of the sublease agreement or any separate lease contract, it illegally occupied the
land or, at best, was allowed to do so by mere tolerance of the registered owners petitioners herein.
Thus, respondent Sunvars possession became unlawful upon service of the final notice on 03 February
2009. Hence, as an unlawful occupant of the land of petitioners, and without any contract between them,
respondent is necessarily bound by an implied promise that it will vacate upon demand, failing which a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.[70] Upon service of the final notice of
demand, respondent Sunvar should have vacated the property and, consequently, petitioners had one
year or until 02 February 2010 in which to resort to the summary action for unlawful detainer. In the
instant case, their Complaint was filed with the MeTC on 23 July 2009, which was well within the one-year
period.
The Court is aware that petitioners had earlier served a Notice to Vacate on 22 February 2008,
which could have possibly tolled the one-year period for filing an unlawful detainer suit. Nevertheless,
they can be deemed to have waived their right of action against respondent Sunvar and continued to
tolerate its occupation of the subject property. That they sent a final Notice to Vacate almost a year later
gave respondent another opportunity to comply with their implied promise as occupants by mere
tolerance. Consequently, the one-year period for filing a summary action for unlawful detainer with the
MeTC must be reckoned from the latest demand to vacate.
In the past, the Court ruled that subsequent demands that are merely in the nature of reminders
of the original demand do not operate to renew the one-year period within which to commence an
ejectment suit, considering that the period will still be reckoned from the date of the original demand.[71]
If the subsequent demands were merely in the nature of reminders of the original demand, the one-year
period to commence an ejectment suit would be counted from the first demand.[72]

However, respondent failed to raise in any of the proceedings below this question of fact as to the
nature of the second demand issued by the OSG. It is now too late in the proceedings for them to argue
that the 2009 Notice to Vacate was a mere reiteration or reminder of the 2008 Notice to Vacate. In any
event, this factual determination is beyond the scope of the present Rule 45 Petition, which is limited to
resolving questions of law.
The Court notes that respondent Sunvar has continued to occupy the subject property since the
expiration of its sublease on 31 December 2002. The factual issue of whether respondent has paid rentals
to petitioners from the expiration of the sublease to the present was never raised or sufficiently argued
before this Court. Nevertheless, it has not escaped the Courts attention that almost a decade has passed
without any resolution of this controversy regarding respondents possession of the subject property,
contrary to the aim of expeditious proceedings under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. With the
grant of the instant Petition and the remand of the case to the MeTC for continued hearing, the Court
emphasizes the duty of the lower court to speedily resolve this matter once and for all, especially since
this case involves a prime property of the government located in the countrys business district and the
various opportunities for petitioners to gain public revenues from the property.
x xx."

http://attylaserna.blogspot.com/2014/01/prescriptive-period-in-ejectment-cases.html
"x x x.
We also find that the action for unlawful detainer was not barred by prescription. Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court provides that actions for unlawful detainer must be filed within one (1) year after such
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession. In interpreting the foregoing provision, this Court, in
Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation,53 held that:

[T]he one-year period to file an unlawful detainer case is not counted from the expiration of the lease
contract on 31 December 2002. Indeed, the last demand for petitioners to vacate is the reckoning period
for determining the one-year period in an action for unlawful detainer. Such one year period should be
counted from the date of plaintiffs last demand on defendant to vacate the real property, because only
upon the lapse of that period does the possession become unlawful.54

HDSJs last demand was made on 3 March 2005, and it filed the complaint for unlawful detainer on 28
June 2005. Thus, the complaint was filed within the period provided under the Rules of Court.
x x x."