Demographic transition

Not to be confused with Demographic shift.

Births/ Deaths per 1000

Demographic transition (DT) refers to the transition

Birth Rate
from high birth and death rates to low birth and death
rates as a country develops from a pre-industrial to
an industrialized economic system. This is typically
demonstrated through a demographic transition model
(DTM). The theory is based on an interpretation of
Death Rate
demographic history developed in 1929 by the American demographer Warren Thompson (18871973).[1]
Thompson observed changes, or transitions, in birth and
death rates in industrialized societies over the previous
Total Population
200 years. Most developed countries are in stage 3
or 4 of the model; the majority of developing counTime
tries have reached stage 2 or stage 3. The major (relative) exceptions are some poor countries, mainly in
A plot of the demographic transition model, including stage 5
sub-Saharan Africa and some Middle Eastern countries,
which are poor or aected by government policy or civil
strife, notably Pakistan, Palestinian territories, Yemen,
and Afghanistan.[2] Adolphe Landry of France made similar observations on demographic patterns and population growth potential. In the 1940s and 1950s Frank
W. Notestein developed a more formal theory of demographic transition.[3]
Although this model predicts ever decreasing fertility
rates, recent data show that beyond a certain level of development fertility rates increase again.[4]
A correlation matching the demographic transition has
been established; however, it is not certain whether industrialization and higher incomes lead to lower popula- Demographic change in Sweden from 1735 to 2000.
tion or if lower populations lead to industrialization and Red line: crude death rate (CDR), blue line: (crude) birth rate
higher incomes.[5] In countries that are now developed (CBR)
this demographic transition began in the 18th century and
continues today. In less developed countries, this demobirth rates are high and roughly in balance. All
graphic transition started later and is still at an earlier
human populations are believed to have had this
stage.[6]
balance until the late 18th century, when this balance ended in Western Europe.[7] In fact, growth
This model became the basis for similar models,
rates were less than 0.05% at least since the Agriincluding the Migration Transition Model and the
cultural Revolution over 10,000 years ago.[7] PopEpidemiological Transition Model, which predict the patulation growth is typically very slow in this stage,
terns of international and intranational migration ow and
because the society is constrained by the available
the characteristics of disease, respectively.
food supply; therefore, unless the society develops
new technologies to increase food production (e.g.
discovers new sources of food or achieves higher
1 Summary of the theory
crop yields), any uctuations in birth rates are soon
matched by death rates.[7]
The transition involves four stages, or possibly ve.
In stage two, that of a developing country, the death
rates drop rapidly due to improvements in food sup-

In stage one, pre-industrial society, death rates and

1

3
ply and sanitation, which increase life spans and reduce disease. The improvements specic to food
supply typically include selective breeding and crop
rotation and farming techniques.[7] Other improvements generally include access to technology, basic healthcare, and education. For example, numerous improvements in public health reduce mortality,
especially childhood mortality.[7] Prior to the mid20th century, these improvements in public health
were primarily in the areas of food handling, water supply, sewage, and personal hygiene.[7] One of
the variables often cited is the increase in female literacy combined with public health education programs which emerged in the late 19th and early
20th centuries.[7] In Europe, the death rate decline
started in the late 18th century in northwestern Europe and spread to the south and east over approximately the next 100 years.[7] Without a corresponding fall in birth rates this produces an imbalance, and
the countries in this stage experience a large increase
in population.

STAGE TWO

which it applies to less-developed societies today remains

to be seen. Many countries such as China, Brazil and
Thailand have passed through the Demographic Transition Model (DTM) very quickly due to fast social and
economic change. Some countries, particularly African
countries, appear to be stalled in the second stage due to
stagnant development and the eect of AIDS.

2 Stage One
In pre-industrial society, death rates and birth rates were
both high, and uctuated rapidly according to natural
events, such as drought and disease, to produce a relatively constant and young population. Family planning
and contraception were virtually nonexistent; therefore,
birth rates were essentially only limited by the ability of
women to bear children. Emigration depressed death
rates in some special cases (for example, Europe and particularly the Eastern United States during the 19th century), but, overall, death rates tended to match birth rates,
often exceeding 40 per 1000 per year. Children contributed to the economy of the household from an early
age by carrying water, rewood, and messages, caring
for younger siblings, sweeping, washing dishes, preparing
food, and working in the elds.[8] Raising a child cost little more than feeding him or her; there were no education
or entertainment expenses. Thus, the total cost of raising
children barely exceeded their contribution to the household. In addition, as they became adults they become a
major input to the family business, mainly farming, and
were the primary form of insurance for adults in old age.
In India, an adult son was all that prevented a widow from
falling into destitution. While death rates remained high
there was no question as to the need for children, even if
the means to prevent them had existed.[9]

In stage three, birth rates fall due to access to

contraception, increases in wages, urbanization, a
reduction in subsistence agriculture, an increase in
the status and education of women, a reduction in
the value of childrens work, an increase in parental
investment in the education of children and other social changes. Population growth begins to level o.
The birth rate decline in developed countries started
in the late 19th century in northern Europe.[7] While
improvements in contraception do play a role in
birth rate decline, it should be noted that contraceptives were not generally available nor widely used in
the 19th century and as a result likely did not play a
signicant role in the decline then.[7] It is important
to note that birth rate decline is caused also by a transition in values; not just because of the availability During this stage, the society evolves in accordance with
of contraceptives.[7]
Malthusian paradigm, with population essentially deter During stage four there are both low birth rates and mined by the food supply. Any uctuations in food suplow death rates. Birth rates may drop to well below ply (either positive, for example, due to technology imreplacement level as has happened in countries like provements, or negative, due to droughts and pest invaGermany, Italy, and Japan, leading to a shrinking sions) tend to translate directly into population uctuapopulation, a threat to many industries that rely on tions. Famines resulting in signicant mortality are frepopulation growth. As the large group born dur- quent. Overall, population dynamics during stage one are
ing stage two ages, it creates an economic burden comparable to those of animals living in the wild.
on the shrinking working population. Death rates
may remain consistently low or increase slightly due
to increases in lifestyle diseases due to low exercise 3 Stage Two
levels and high obesity and an aging population in
developed countries. By the late 20th century, birth This stage leads to a fall in death rates and an increase
rates and death rates in developed countries leveled in population.[10] The changes leading to this stage in
o at lower rates.[6]
Europe were initiated in the Agricultural Revolution of
the 18th century and were initially quite slow. In the
As with all models, this is an idealized picture of popu- 20th century, the falls in death rates in developing counlation change in these countries. The model is a general- tries tended to be substantially faster. Countries in this
ization that applies to these countries as a group and may stage include Yemen, Afghanistan, the Palestinian terrinot accurately describe all individual cases. The extent to tories, Bhutan and Laos and much of Sub-Saharan Africa

80 +
75 - 79
70 - 74
65 - 69
60 - 64
55 - 59
50 - 54
45 - 49
40 - 44
35 - 39
30 - 34
25 - 29
20 - 24
15 - 19
10 - 14
5-9
0-4

World population, billions

6
5
4
3
2
1

1.0

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

0
10,000 BC

8000

6000

4000

2000

AD 1

1000

2000

Population pyramid of Angola 2005

World population 10,000 BC - 2000 AD

becomes increasingly youthful and more of these children

(but do not include South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana, enter the reproductive cycle of their lives while maintainSwaziland, Lesotho, Namibia, Kenya and Ghana, which ing the high fertility rates of their parents. The bottom of
the "age pyramid" widens rst, accelerating population
have begun to move into stage 3).[11]
growth. The age structure of such a population is illusThe decline in the death rate is due initially to two factors: trated by using an example from the Third World today.
First, improvements in the food supply brought
about by higher yields in agricultural practices and 4 Stage Three
better transportation prevent death due to starvation
and lack of water. Agricultural improvements intowards stability
cluded crop rotation, selective breeding, and seed Stage Three moves the population
[12]
through
a
decline
in
the
birth
rate.
Several
factors condrill technology.
tribute to this eventual decline, although some of them
Second, signicant improvements in public health remain speculative:
reduce mortality, particularly in childhood. These
are not so many medical breakthroughs (Europe
In rural areas continued decline in childhood death
passed through stage two before the advances of
means that at some point parents realize they need
the mid-20th century, although there was signicant
not require so many children to be born to ensure a
medical progress in the 19th century, such as the decomfortable old age. As childhood death continues
velopment of vaccination) as they are improvements
to fall and incomes increase parents can become inin water supply, sewerage, food handling, and gencreasingly condent that fewer children will suce
eral personal hygiene following from growing scito help in family business and care for them in old
entic knowledge of the causes of disease and the
age.
improved education and social status of mothers.
Increasing urbanization changes the traditional values placed upon fertility and the value of children
A consequence of the decline in mortality in Stage Two
in rural society. Urban living also raises the cost of
is an increasingly rapid rise in population growth (a
dependent children to a family. A recent theory sug"population explosion") as the gap between deaths and
gests that urbanization also contributes to reducing
births grows wider. Note that this growth is not due
the birth rate because it disrupts optimal mating patto an increase in fertility (or birth rates) but to a deterns. A 2008 study in Iceland found that the most
cline in deaths. This change in population occurred in
fecund marriages are between distant cousins. Genorth-western Europe during the 19th century due to the
netic incompatibilities inherent in more distant outIndustrial Revolution. During the second half of the 20th
breeding makes reproduction harder.[13]
century less-developed countries entered Stage Two, creating the worldwide population explosion that has demog In both rural and urban areas, the cost of children to
raphers concerned today. In this stage of DT, countries
parents is exacerbated by the introduction of comare vulnerable to become failed states in the absence of
pulsory education acts and the increased need to edprogressive governments.
ucate children so they can take up a respected poAnother characteristic of Stage Two of the demographic
transition is a change in the age structure of the population. In Stage One, the majority of deaths are concentrated in the rst 510 years of life. Therefore, more
than anything else, the decline in death rates in Stage Two
entails the increasing survival of children and a growing
population. Hence, the age structure of the population

sition in society. Children are increasingly prohibited under law from working outside the household
and make an increasingly limited contribution to the
household, as school children are increasingly exempted from the expectation of making a signicant
contribution to domestic work. Even in equatorial
Africa, children now need to be clothed, and may

6
even require school uniforms. Parents begin to consider it a duty to buy children books and toys. Partly
due to education and access to family planning, people begin to reassess their need for children and their
ability to raise them.[9]

STAGE FIVE

structure becomes less triangular and more like an elongated balloon. During the period between the decline in
youth dependency and rise in old age dependency there
is a demographic window of opportunity that can potentially produce economic growth through an increase in
the ratio of working age to dependent population; the
demographic dividend.
However, unless factors such as those listed above are allowed to work, a societys birth rates may not drop to a
low level in due time, which means that the society cannot proceed to Stage Three and is locked in what is called
a demographic trap.
Countries that have experienced a fertility decline of
over 40% from their pre-transition levels include: Costa
Rica, El Salvador, Panama, Jamaica, Mexico, Colombia,
Ecuador, Guyana, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri
Lanka, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, South
Africa, India, Saudi Arabia, and many Pacic islands.
Countries that have experienced a fertility decline of
25-40% include: Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua,
Paraguay, Bolivia, Vietnam, Myanmar, Bangladesh,
Tajikistan, Jordan, Qatar, Albania, United Arab Emirates, Zimbabwe, and Botswana.
Countries that have experienced a fertility decline of 1025% include: Haiti, Papua New Guinea, Nepal, Pakistan,
Syria, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Kenya, Ghana and Senegal.[11]

5 Stage Four
A major factor in reducing birth rates in stage 3 countries such
as Malaysia is the availability of family planning facilities, like
this one in Kuala Terengganu, Terengganu, Malaysia.

This occurs where birth and death rates are both low,
leading to a total population which is high and stable.
Death rates are low for a number of reasons, primarily
lower rates of diseases and higher production of food.
The birth rate is low because people have more opportunities to choose if they want children; this is made possible by improvements in contraception or women gaining more independence and work opportunities.[14] Some
theorists consider there are only 4 stages and that the population of a country will remain at this level. The DTM
is only a suggestion about the future population levels of
a country, not a prediction.

Increasing female literacy and employment lowers

the uncritical acceptance of childbearing and motherhood as measures of the status of women. Working women have less time to raise children; this
is particularly an issue where fathers traditionally
make little or no contribution to child-raising, such
as southern Europe or Japan. Valuation of women Countries that are at this stage (Total Fertility Rate of
beyond childbearing and motherhood becomes im- less than 2.5 in 1997) include: United States, Canada,
portant.
Argentina, Australia, New Zealand, most of Europe,
Improvements in contraceptive technology are now Bahamas, Puerto Rico, Trinidad and Tobago, Brazil, Sri
Iran, China, Turkey,
a major factor. Fertility decline is caused as much Lanka, South Korea, Singapore,
[11]
Thailand
and
Mauritius.
by changes in values about children and sex as by the
availability of contraceptives and knowledge of how
to use them.

6 Stage Five

The resulting changes in the age structure of the population include a reduction in the youth dependency ra- See also: Aging of Europe, Aging of Japan and
tio and eventually population aging. The population Evolutionary psychology

5
The original Demographic Transition model has just four lutionary adaptedness.[17] Thus, from the perspective of
evolutionary psychology, the modern environment is exerting evolutionary pressure for higher fertility.[18]
10000
5000

W
orld

7 Eects on age structure

Asia

2000
1000
Europe

The decline in death rate and birth rate that occurs during
the demographic transition leads to a radical transformaNorthern America
tion of the age structure. When the death rate declines
200
during the second stage of the transition, the result is pri100
marily an increase in the child population. The reason
50
is that when the death rate is high (stage one), the infant mortality rate is very high, often above 200 deaths
Oceania
20
per 1000 children born. When the death rate falls or improves, this, in general, results in a signicantly lower in10
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
fant mortality rate and, hence, increased child survival.
Over time, as cohorts increased by higher survival rates
United Nations population projections by location.
get older, there will also be an increase in the number of
Note the vertical axis is logarithmic and represents millions of older children, teenagers, and young adults. This implies
people.
that there is an increase in the fertile population which,
with constant fertility rates, will lead to an increase in the
stages, but additional stages have been proposed. Both number of children born. This will further increase the
more-fertile and less-fertile futures have been claimed as growth of the child population. The second stage of the
a Stage Five.
demographic transition, therefore, implies a rise in child
Some countries have sub-replacement fertility (that is, be- dependency.
low 2.1-2.2 children per woman). Replacement fertility
is typically 2.1-2.2 because this replaces the two parents
and boys are born more often than girls (somewhat 1.05- 8 Historical studies
1.1 to 1) and adds population to compensate for deaths
(i.e. members of the population who die without full reproducing, for example, in the age of 30-35, giving a birth 8.1 Britain
just to one baby) with approx. 0.1 additional. Many European and East Asian countries now have higher death Between 1750 and 1975 England experienced the tranrates than birth rates. Population aging and population de- sition from high levels of both mortality and fertility, to
cline may eventually occur, assuming that the fertility rate low levels. A major factor was the sharp decline in the
does not change and sustained mass immigration does not death rate for infectious diseases, which has fallen from
about 11 per 1,000 to less than 1 per 1,000. By conoccur.
trast, the death rate from other causes was 12 per 1,000
In an article in the August 2009 issue of Nature,
in 1850 and has not declined markedly. The agricultural
Myrskyla, Kohler and Francesco Billari argue that the
revolution and the development of transport, initiated by
previously negative relationship between development,
the construction of canals, led to greater availability of
as measured by the Human Development Index (HDI),
food and coal, and enabled the Industrial Revolution to
and birth rates has become J-shaped. The HDI is a comimprove the standard of living. Scientic discoveries and
posite of life expectancy, income, and level of education.
medical breakthroughs did not, in general, contribute imDevelopment promotes fertility decline at HDI levels beportantly to the early major decline in infectious disease
low 0.9, but further advances in HDI cause a minor remortality, and the decline in fertility occurred before efbound in fertility.[15] In many countries with very high
cient contraception became available.
levels of development, fertility rates are now approaching
two children per woman although there are exceptions,
notably Germany, Italy and Japan.[16]
8.2 Ireland
500

Africa

Latin America

In the current century, most developed countries have increased fertility. From the point of view of evolutionary
biology, richer people having fewer children is unexpected, as natural selection would be expected to favor
individuals who are willing and able to convert plentiful
resources into plentiful fertile descendants. This may be
the result of a departure from the environment of evo-

In the 1980s and early 1990s, the Irish demographic status converged to the European norm. Mortality rose
above the European Community average, and in 1991
Irish fertility fell to replacement level. The peculiarities
of Irelands past demography and its recent rapid changes
challenge established theory. The recent changes have

HISTORICAL STUDIES

mirrored inward changes in Irish society, with respect to 8.4 Asia

family planning, women in the work force, the sharply declining power of the Catholic Church, and the emigration McNicoll (2006) examines the common features befactor.[19]
hind the striking changes in health and fertility in
East and Southeast Asia in the 1960s1990s, focusing
on seven countries: Taiwan and South Korea (tiger
economies), Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia (sec8.3 France
ond wave countries), and China and Vietnam (marketFrance displays real divergences from the standard model Leninist economies). Demographic change can be seen
of Western demographic evolution. The uniqueness of as a byproduct of social and economic development tothe French case arises from its specic demographic his- gether with, in some cases, strong governmental prestory, its historic cultural values, and its internal regional sures. The transition sequence entailed the establishment
dynamics. Frances demographic transition was unusual of an eective, typically authoritarian, system of local
in that the mortality and the natality decreased at the same administration, providing a framework for promotion and
time, thus there was no demographic boom in the 19th service delivery in health, education, and family planning.
Subsequent economic liberalization oered new opporcentury.[20]
tunities for upward mobility and risks of backsliding
Frances demographic prole is similar to its European
, accompanied by the erosion of social capital and the
neighbors and to developed countries in general, yet it
breakdown or privatization of service programs.
seems to be staving o the population decline of Western countries. With 62.9 million inhabitants in 2006,
it is the second most populous country in the European 8.4.1 India
Union, and it displays a certain demographic dynamism,
with a growth rate of 2.4% between 2000 and 2005, As of year 2013, India is in later half of third stage deabove the European average. More than two-thirds of mographic transition with 1.23 billion population.[22] It is
that growth can be ascribed to a natural increase resulting nearly 40 years behind in demographic transition process
from high fertility and birthrates. In contrast, France is compared to EU countries, Japan, etc. The present deone of the developed nations whose migratory balance is mographic transition stage of India along with its higher
rather weak, which is an original feature at the European population base will yield rich demographic dividend in
level. Several interrelated reasons account for such singu- future decades.[23]
larities, in particular the impact of pro-family policies accompanied by greater unmarried households and out-ofwedlock births. These general demographic trends paral- 8.4.2 Korea
lel equally important changes in regional demographics.
Since 1982 the same signicant tendencies have occurred Cha (2007) analyzes a panel data set to explore how inthroughout mainland France: demographic stagnation in dustrial revolution, demographic transition, and human
the least-populated rural regions and industrial regions in capital accumulation interacted in Korea from 191638.
the northwest, with strong growth in the southwest and Income growth and public investment in health caused
along the Atlantic coast, plus dynamism in metropoli- mortality to fall, which suppressed fertility and promoted
tan areas. Shifts in population between regions account education. Industrialization, skill premium, and closing
for most of the dierences in growth. The varying de- gender wage gap further induced parents to opt for child
mographic evolution regions can be analyzed though the quality. Expanding demand for education was accommolter of several parameters, including residential facili- dated by an active public school building program. The
ties, economic growth, and urban dynamism, which yield interwar agricultural depression aggravated traditional inseveral distinct regional proles. The distribution of the come inequality, raising fertility and impeding the spread
French population therefore seems increasingly dened of mass schooling. Landlordism collapsed in the wake of
not only by interregional mobility but also by the resi- de-colonization, and the consequent reduction in inequaldential preferences of individual households. These chal- ity accelerated human and physical capital accumulation,
lenges, linked to congurations of population and the dy- hence leading to growth in South Korea.[24]
namics of distribution, inevitably raise the issue of town
and country planning. The most recent census gures
show that an outpouring of the urban population means 8.5 Africa
that fewer rural areas are continuing to register a negative migratory ow - two-thirds of rural communities Campbell has studied the demography of 19th-century
have shown some since 2000. The spatial demographic Madagascar in the light of demographic transition theory.
expansion of large cities amplies the process of peri- Both supporters and critics of the theory hold to an intrinurbanization yet is also accompanied by movement of se- sic opposition between human and natural factors, such
lective residential ow, social selection, and sociospatial as climate, famine, and disease, inuencing demography.
They also suppose a sharp chronological divide between
segregation based on income.[21]

8.7

United States

the precolonial and colonial eras, arguing that whereas

natural demographic inuences were of greater importance in the former period, human factors predominated
thereafter. Campbell argues that in 19th-century Madagascar the human factor, in the form of the Merina state,
was the predominant demographic inuence. However,
the impact of the state was felt through natural forces, and
it varied over time. In the late 18th and early 19th centuries Merina state policies stimulated agricultural production, which helped to create a larger and healthier population and laid the foundation for Merina military and
economic expansion within Madagascar. From 1820, the
cost of such expansionism led the state to increase its exploitation of forced labor at the expense of agricultural
production and thus transformed it into a negative demographic force. Infertility and infant mortality, which were
probably more signicant inuences on overall population levels than the adult mortality rate, increased from
1820 due to disease, malnutrition, and stress, all of which
stemmed from state forced labor policies. Available estimates indicate little if any population growth for Madagascar between 1820 and 1895. The demographic crisis in Africa, ascribed by critics of the demographic transition theory to the colonial era, stemmed in Madagascar
from the policies of the imperial Merina regime, which
in this sense formed a link to the French regime of the
colonial era. Campbell thus questions the underlying assumptions governing the debate about historical demography in Africa and suggests that the demographic impact
of political forces be reevaluated in terms of their changing interaction with natural demographic inuences.[25]

7
stage three. Though fertility rates rebounded initially and
almost reached 7 children/woman in the mid-1920s, they
were depressed by the 1931-33 famine, crashed due to
the Second World War in 1941, and only rebounded to
a sustained level of 3 children/woman after the war. By
1970 Russia was rmly in stage four, with crude birth
rates and crude death rates on the order of 15/1000 and
9/1000 respectively.
In the 1980s and 1990s Russia underwent a unique demographic transition; observers call it a demographic
catastrophe": the number of deaths exceeded the number of births, life expectancy fell sharply (especially for
males) and the number of suicides increased.[29] From
1992 through 2011, the number of deaths exceeded the
number of births.

8.7 United States

Greenwood and Seshadri (2002) show that from 1800 to
1940 there was a demographic shift from a mostly rural
US population with high fertility, with an average of seven
children born per white woman, to a minority (43%) rural
population with low fertility, with an average of two births
per white woman. This shift resulted from technological
progress. A sixfold increase in real wages made children
more expensive in terms of forgone opportunities to work
and increases in agricultural productivity reduced rural
demand for labor, a substantial portion of which traditionally had been performed by children in farm families.

A simplication of the DTM theory proposes an initial

decline in mortality followed by a later drop in fertility.
The changing demographics of the U.S. in the last two
8.6 Russia
centuries did not parallel this model. Beginning around
1800, there was a sharp fertility decline; at this time, an
Main article: Demographics of Russia
Russia entered stage two of the transition in the 18th average woman usually produced seven births per lifetime, but by 1900 this number had dropped to nearly four.
A mortality decline was not observed in the U.S. until almost 1900a hundred years following the drop in fertility.

Russian male and female life expectancy since 1950.[26][27]

century, simultaneously with the rest of Europe, though

the eect of transition remained limited to a modest decline in death rates and steady population growth. Population of Russia nearly quadrupled during the 19th century, from 30 million to 133 million, and continued to
grow until the First World War and the turmoil that
followed.[28] Russia then quickly transitioned through

However, this late decline occurred from a very low initial

level. During 17th and 18th century, crude death rates
in much of colonial North America ranged from 15 to
25 deaths per 1000 residents per year[30][31] (levels of up
to 40 per 1000 being typical during stages one and two).
Life expectancy at birth was on the order of 40 and, in
some places, reached 50, and a resident of 18th century
Philadelphia who reached age 20 could have expected, on
average, additional 40 years of life.
This phenomenon is explained by the pattern of colonization of the United States. Sparsely populated interior
of the country allowed ample room to accommodate all
the excess people, counteracting mechanisms (spread
of communicable diseases due to overcrowding, low real
wages and insucient calories per capita due to the limited amount of available agricultural land) which led to
high mortality in the Old World. With low mortality but

11

stage 1 birth rates, the United States necessarily experienced exponential population growth (from less than 4
million people in 1790, to 23 million in 1850, to 76 million in 1900.)
The only area where this pattern did not hold was the
American South. High prevalence of deadly endemic diseases such as malaria kept mortality as high as 45-50 per
1000 residents per year in 18th century North Carolina.
In New Orleans, mortality remained so high (mainly due
to yellow fever) that the city was characterized as the
death capital of the United States - at the level of 50
per 1000 population or higher - well into the second half
of the 19th century.[32]

REFERENCES

rates, e.g., the education of women. In recent decades

more work has been done on developing the social mechanisms behind it.[2]
DTM assumes that the birth rate is independent of the
death rate. Nevertheless, demographers maintain that
there is no historical evidence for society-wide fertility
rates rising signicantly after high mortality events. Notably, some historic populations have taken many years to
replace lives after events such as the Black Death.

Some have claimed that DTM does not explain the early
fertility declines in much of Asia in the second half of
the 20th century or the delays in fertility decline in parts
of the Middle East. Nevertheless, the demographer John
Today, the U.S. is recognized as having both low fertil- C Caldwell has suggested that the reason for the rapid
ity and mortality rates. Specically, birth rates stand at decline in fertility in some developing countries com14 per 1000 per year and death rates at 8 per 1000 per pared to Western Europe, the United States of America,
Canada, Australia and New Zealand is mainly due to govyear.[33]
ernment programs and a massive investment in education
both by governments and parents.[11]

Critical evaluation

It has to be remembered that the DTM is only a model

and cannot necessarily predict the future. It does however
give an indication of what the future birth and death rates
may be for an underdeveloped country, together with the
total population size. Most particularly, of course, the
DTM makes no comment on change in population due to
migration. It is not applicable for high levels of development, as it has been shown that after a HDI of 0.9 the
fertility increases again.[4]

9.1

Non-applicability
countries

to

less-developed

DTM has a questionable applicability to less economically developed countries (LEDCs), where wealth and
information access are limited. For example, the DTM
has been validated primarily in Europe, Japan and North
America where demographic data exists over centuries,
whereas high quality demographic data for most LEDCs
did not become widely available until the mid-20th
century.[34] DTM does not account for recent phenomena such as AIDS; in these areas HIV has become the
leading source of mortality. Some trends in waterborne
bacterial infant mortality are also disturbing in countries
like Malawi, Sudan and Nigeria; for example, progress in
the DTM clearly arrested and reversed between 1975 and
2005.[35]

10 See also
Birth dearth
Demographic dividend
Demographic economics
Demographic trap
Demographic window
Epidemiological transition
Malthusian catastrophe
Migration Transition Model
Overpopulation
Population pyramid
Waithood
World population milestones

11 References
[1] Warren Thompson. Encyclopedia of Population 2.
Macmillan Reference. 2003. pp. 93940. ISBN 0-02865677-6.

Economic development not sucient

cause to aect demographic change

[2] Caldwell, John C.; Bruce K Caldwell; Pat Caldwell; Peter F McDonald; Thomas Schindlmayr (2006). Demographic Transition Theory. Dordrecht, The Netherlands:
Springer. p. 239. ISBN 1-4020-4373-2.

DTM assumes that population changes are induced by industrial changes and increased wealth, without taking into
account the role of social change in determining birth

[3] Woods, Robert (2000-10-05). The Demography of Victorian England and Wales. Cambridge University Press. p.
18. ISBN 978-0-521-78254-8.

9.2

[4] Advances in development reverse fertility declines. Nature. 6 August 2009.

[27] Life Expectancy of the Russian Federation since 1992 Retrieved on 29 May 2008

[5] National Geographic (magazine), September 2011

[28] http://www.tacitus.nu/historical-atlas/population/russia.
htm. Missing or empty |title= (help)

[6] Demographic transition, Geography, About.

[7] Demographic transition, Geography, UWC.

[29] Demko, George J, ed. (1999), Population under Duress:

The Geodemography of Post-Soviet Russia, et al, Questia.

[8] Barcelona eldwork

[9] Caldwell (2006), Chapter 5
[10] BBC bitesize Archived October 23, 2007 at the Wayback
Machine
[11] Caldwell (2006), Chapter 10
[12] Demographic transition, Geography, Marathon, UWC.
[13] Kissing cousins, missing children, The Economist, 7
February 2008.
[14] Demographic, Main vision |rst1= missing |last1= in
Authors list (help).
[15] Myrskyla, M; Kohler, H-P; Billari, F (6 August 2009),
Advances in development reverse fertility declines,
Nature 460, pp. 74143.
[16] The best of all possible worlds?", The Economist, 6 August 2009.
[17] http://courses.washington.edu/evpsych/Daly%
26Wilson-HEP-AB1999.pdf
[18] Can we be sure the worlds population will stop rising?,
BBC News, 13 October 2012
[19] Coleman, DA (1992), The Demographic Transition
in Ireland in International Context, Proceedings of the
British Academy (79), pp. 5377, ISSN 0068-1202.
[20] http://www.ined.fr/fichier/t_publication/60/publi_pdf1_
pop_et_soc_francais_346.pdf
[21] Baudelle, Guy; Olivier, David (2006), Changement
Global, Mondialisation et Modle De Transition Dmographique: rexion sur une exception franaise parmi les
pays dvelopps, Historiens et Gographes (in French) 98
(395), pp. 177204, ISSN 0046-757X
[22] The arithmetics of Indian population. Retrieved 13
September 2013.
[23] India vs China vs USA vs World. Retrieved 13 September 2013.
[24] Myung, Soo Cha (July 2007), Industrial Revolution, Demographic Transition, and Human Capital Accumulation
in Korea, 191638 (PDF) (working Paper), KR: Naksungdae Institute of Economic Research.
[25] Campbell, Gwyn (1991), State and Pre-colonial Demographic History: the Case of Nineteenth-century Madagascar, Journal of African History 32 (3), pp. 41545,
ISSN 0021-8537.
[26] Life expectancy of the Russian Federation since 1950.
Demoscope.ru. 26 April 2011. Retrieved 14 May 2011.

[30] Herbert S. Klein. A Population History of the United

States. p. 39.
[31] Michael R. Haines, Richard H. Steckel. A Population History of North America. pp. 163164.
[32] The Urban Mortality Transition in the United States,
1800-1940.
[33] US, World factbook, USA: CIA.
[34] Lee, Ronald (2003), The Demographic Transition: Three
Centuries (PDF), UPenn.
[35] Nigeria:
Reversal of Demographic Transition,
Population action, 200611 Check date values in: |date=
(help).

12 Further reading
Carrying capacity
Caldwell, John C. (1976). Toward a restatement of demographic transition theory. Population and Development Review 2 (3/4): 32166.
doi:10.2307/1971615. JSTOR 1971615.
; Bruce K Caldwell; Pat Caldwell; Peter F McDonald; Thomas Schindlmayr
(2006). Demographic Transition Theory. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer. p. 418. ISBN
1-4020-4373-2.
Chesnais, Jean-Claude. The Demographic Transition: Stages, Patterns, and Economic Implications: A
Longitudinal Study of Sixty-Seven Countries Covering the Period 17201984. Oxford U. Press, 1993.
633 pp.
Coale, Ansley J. 1973. The demographic transition, IUSSP Liege International Population Conference. Liege: IUSSP. Volume 1: 5372.
; Anderson, Barbara A; Hrm,
Erna (1979), Human Fertility in Russia since the
Nineteenth Century, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Coale, Ansley J; Watkins, Susan C, eds. (1987), The
Decline of Fertility in Europe, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

10
Davis, Kingsley (1945), The World Demographic
Transition, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (237), pp. 111, JSTOR
1025490. Classic article that introduced concept of
transition.
Davis, Kingsley. 1963. The theory of change and
response in modern demographic history. Population Index 29(October): 34566.
Kunisch, Sven; Boehm, Stephan A.; Boppel,
Michael (eds): From Grey to Silver: Managing the
Demographic Change Successfully, Springer-Verlag,
Berlin Heidelberg 2011, ISBN 978-3-642-15593-2
Friedlander, Dov; S Okun, Barbara; Segal, Sharon
(1999), The Demographic Transition Then and
Now: Processes, Perspectives, and Analyses, Journal of Family History 24 (4), pp. 493533, ISSN
0363-1990, full text in Ebsco.
Oded Galor. 2005. The Demographic Transition and the Emergence of Sustained Economic
Growth. Journal of the European Economic Association, 3, 494504.
(2008), The Demographic
Transition, New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
(2nd ed.), Macmillan.
Gillis, John R., Louise A. Tilly, and David Levine,
eds. The European Experience of Declining Fertility,
18501970: The Quiet Revolution. 1992.
Greenwood, Jeremy; Seshadri, Ananth (2002).
The US Demographic Transition.
American Economic Review 92 (2):
15359.
doi:10.1257/000282802320189168.
JSTOR
3083393.
Harbison, Sarah F.; Robinson, Warren C. (2002).
Policy Implications of the Next World Demographic Transition.
Studies in Family
Planning 33 (1): 3748. doi:10.1111/j.17284465.2002.00037.x. JSTOR 2696331. PMID
11974418.
Hirschman, Charles (1994).
Why fertility
changes. Annual Review of Sociology 20: 203
233. doi:10.1146/annurev.so.20.080194.001223.
PMID 12318868.
Jones, GW, ed. (1997), The Continuing Demographic Transition, et al, Questia.
Korotayev, Andrey; Malkov, Artemy & Khaltourina, Daria (2006). Introduction to Social Macrodynamics: Compact Macromodels of the World System
Growth. Moscow, Russia: URSS. p. 128. ISBN
5-484-00414-4.

12 FURTHER READING
Kirk, Dudley (1996). The Demographic Transition.
Population Studies 50 (3): 36187.
doi:10.1080/0032472031000149536.
JSTOR
2174639. PMID 11618374.
Borgerho, Luttbeg B; Borgerho Mulder, M;
Mangel, MS (2000), To marry or not to marry?
A dynamic model of marriage behavior and demographic transition, in Cronk, L; Chagnon, NA;
Irons, W, Human behavior and adaptation: An anthropological perspective, New York: Aldine Transaction, p. 528, ISBN 0-202-02044-4
Landry, Adolphe, 1982 [1934], La rvolution dmographique tudes et essais sur les problmes de la
population, Paris, INED-Presses Universitaires de
France
McNicoll, Georey. Policy Lessons of the East
Asian Demographic Transition, Population and
Development Review, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Mar., 2006),
pp. 125
Mercer, Alexander (2014), Infections, Chronic Disease, and the Epidemiological Transition. Rochester,
NY: University of Rochester Press/Rochester Studies in Medical History, ISBN 978-1-58046-508-3
Montgomery, Keith, The Demographic Transition, Geography, UWC.
Notestein, Frank W. 1945. Population The
Long View, in Theodore W. Schultz, Ed., Food for
the World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Saito, Oasamu (1996), Historical Demography:
Achievements and Prospects, Population Studies
50 (3), pp. 53753, ISSN 0032-4728, JSTOR
2174646.
Soares, Rodrigo R., and Bruno L. S. Falco. The
Demographic Transition and the Sexual Division of
Labor, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 116, No.
6 (Dec., 2008), pp. 1058104
Szreter, Simon (1993), The Idea of Demographic
Transition and the Study of Fertility: A Critical Intellectual History, Population and Development Review 19 (4), pp. 659701, JSTOR 2938410.
; Nye, Robert A; van Poppel,
Frans (2003), Fertility and Contraception During
the Demographic Transition: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, Journal of Interdisciplinary
History 34 (2), pp. 14154, ISSN 0022-1953, full
text in Project Muse and Ebsco
Thompson, Warren S (1929), Population, American Journal of Sociology 34 (6), pp. 95975, After
the next World War, we will see Germany lose more
women and children and soon start again from a developing stage.

11

13
13.1

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