Brief Fact Summary.

The Supreme Court of the

United States held that the President may nullify
attachments and order the transfer of frozen Iranian
assets pursuant to Section 1702(a)(1) of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA). Based on the Courts inferences from
legislation passed by Congress (IEEPA and the
Hostage Act) regarding the Presidents authority to
deal with international crises and from the history of
congressional acquiescence in executive claims
settlement, the President may also suspend claims
pursuant to the Executive Order.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Where Congress has a
history of acquiescence, as with claims settlement, it
thereby implicitly approves of the Presidents actions
regarding that specific subject matter about which
Congress was silent.
Facts. In response to the seizure of American
personnel as hostages at the American Embassy in
Iran, the President issued various Executive Orders
and regulations by which the President nullified
attachments and liens on Iranian assets in the United
States, directed that theses assets be transferred to
Iran, and suspended claims against Iran that may be
presented to an International Claims Tribunal. On
December 19, 1979, Petitioner, Dames & Moore, filed
suit in the United Sates District Court against
Defendants, the government of Iran, the Atomic
Energy Organization of Iran, and many Iranian banks,
alleging that its subsidiary was a party to a contract
with the Atomic Energy Organization and that the
subsidiarys interest had been assigned to Petitioner.
Petitioner alleged it was owed over 3 million dollars.
The District Court issued orders of attachment
directed against the Defendants property and the
property of certain Iranian banks. In a January 20,
1981 Executive Agreement, the
President agreed to nullify attachments and ordered
the transfer of frozen Iranian assets. On February 24,
1981, the President ratified an earlier Order wherein
he suspended all claims which may be presented
to the Tribunal and provided that such claims shall
have no legal effect in any action now pending in U.S.
courts.
Issue. Whether the Presidents acts of nullifying
the attachments and ordering the transfer of all
frozen assets are specifically authorized by Congress.
Whether the President has authority to suspend
claims pending in American courts.
Held. Yes. Because the Presidents actions in
nullifying the attachments and ordering the transfer
of assets were taken pursuant to congressional
authorization (Section 1702 (a)(1) of IEEPA), it is
supported by the strongest of presumptions and
widest latitude of judicial interpretation and the
burden of persuasion rests heavily on any who might
attack it.
Yes. Based on the legislation (IEEPA and the Hostage
Act) which Congress has enacted in the area of the
Presidents authority to deal with international crises,
and from the history of congressional acquiescence

in executive claims settlement, the President was

authorized to suspend claims pursuant to the
Executive Order.
Discussion. The majority resorts to drawing
inferences from Congress legislation to conclude
that the President has authority to suspend claims in
American Courts.

USAFFE v. Treasurer of the Philippines (1959)

USAFFE VETERANS ASSOCIATION, INC. v TREASURER
OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET. AL. (June 30, 1959) Appeal
from a judgment of the CFI of Manila
FACTS:
Romulo-Snyder Agreement (1950): RP Govt
undertook to return to the US Govt in 10 annual
installments, a total of about $35M advanced by the
US to, but unexpended by, the Natl Defense Forces
of the RP.
Oct 1954: The Usaffe Veterans Associations Inc
prayed in its complaint before the CFI that said
Agreement be annulled; that payments thereunder
be declared illegal; & that defendants as officers of
RP be restrained from disbursing any funds in the
Natl Treasury in pursuance of said Agreement.
Usaffe Veterans further asked that the moneys
available, instead of being remitted to the US, should
be turned over to the Finance Service of the AFP for
the payment of all pending claims of the veterans
represented by plaintiff.
3 PROPOSITIONS OF PLAINTIFF IN COMPLAINT: 1)
that the funds to be returned under the Agreement
were funds appropriated by the US Congress for the
RP Army, actually delivered to the RP Govt & actually
owned by the said Government; 2) that U.S Secretary
Snyder of the Treasury, had no authority to retake
such funds from the RP Govt; 3) The RP Foreign
Secretary Carlos P. Romulo had no authority to return
or promise to return the aforesaid sums of money
through the Agreement.
The court eventually upheld the validity of the
Agreement. Plaintiff appealed.
July 26, 1941: Foreseeing the War in the Pacific,
Pres Roosevelt, called into the service of the US
Armed Forces, for the duration of the emergency, all
organized mil forces of the Commonwealth. (His
order was published here by Proc No 740 of Pres
Quezon on Aug 10, 1941)
October 1941: By 2 special orders, MacArthur,
Commanding Gen of USAFFE, placed under his
command all the RP Army units including Phil
Constabulary.
Thus, US Congress provided in its Appropriation Act
of Dec 17, 1941 (Public Law No. 353): For all
expenses necessary for the mobilization, operation &
maintenance of the RP Army, including expenses
connected w/ calling into the service RP mil forces
$269,000.00; to remain available til June 30, 1943,

w/c shall be available for payment to the

Commonwealth upon its written request, either in
advance of or in reimbursement for all or any part of
the estimated or actual costs, as authorized by the
USAFFE Commanding Gen, of the necessary
expenses for the purposes aforesaid.
Pursuant to the power reserved to him under Public
Law 353, Roosevelt issued EO 9011: 2(a) Necessary
expenditures from funds in the Phil Treasury for the
purposes authorized by Public Law 353, will be made
by disbursing officers of the RP Army on the approval
of authority of the Commandign General, USAFFE, &
such purposes as he may deem proper
P570,863,000.00 was transferred directly to the
AFP by means of vouchers w/c stated Advance of
Funds under Public Law 353 & EO 9011 This was
used mostly to discharge in RP the monetary
obligations assumed by the US as a result of the
induction of the AFP into the US Army, & its
operations beginning in 1941.
There remained unexpended & uncommitted $35M
in the possession of the AFP as of Dec 31, 1949. Bec
the RP Govt then badly needed funds, Pres Quirino,
through CB Gov Cuaderno, proposed to US officials
the retention of the $35M as a loan, & for its
repayment in 10 annual installments. This was the
Romulo-Snyder Agreement, signed in Washington on
Nov 6, 1950 by RP Foreign Affairs Sec Romulo, & US
Sec of Treasury, John Snyder.
PRESENT ACTION: Usaffes arguments 1) the
money delivered by the US to the AFP were straight
payments for mil services; ownership thus vested in
RP Govt upon delivery, & consequently, there was
nothing to return, nothing to consider as a loan; 2)
the Agreement was void bec there was no loan to be
repaid & bec it was not binding on the RP Govt for
lack of authority of the officers who concluded it.
ISSUES
Basic issue: Validity of the Romulo-Snyder
Agreement Court cant pass judgment
1. WON there is obligation to repay - YES
2. WON the officers who promised to repay had
authority to bind this Govt YES
RATIO:
1. YES
Note that the $269M appropriated in Public Law
353 (see 8th bullet) expressly said that the money is
to be handed to the RP Govt either in advance of or
in reimbursement thereof.
In any system of accounting, advances of funds for
expenditures contemplate disbursements to be
reported, & credited if approved, against such
advances, the unexpended sums to be returned later.
Congressional law itself required accounting in the
manner prescribed by US Pres - & said Pres in EO
9011, outlined the procedure whereby advanced
funds shall be accounted for.
It also requires as a condition sine qua non that all
expenditures shall first be approved by the USAFFE
Commanding Gen.
These ideas of funds advanced to meet

expenditures of the Phil Army as may be approved by

the USAFFE Comm-Gen, in connection w/ the
accounting requirement, evidently contradict
appellants thesis that the moneys represented
straight payments to RP Govt for its armed services,
& passed into the absolute control of such Govt
Instead of returning such amount into one lump
sum, our Exec Dept arranged for its repayment in 10
annual installments. Prima facie such arrangement
should raise no valid objection, given the obligation
to return.
2. YES (They have authority to bind Govt even w/o
Senate concurrence)
There is no doubt Pres Quirino approved the
negotiations. And he had the power to contract
budgetary loans under RA 213, amending RA 16.
The most impt argument, however, rests on the
lack of ratification of the Agreement by RP Senate to
make it binding on the Govt.
The ff explanation of the defendant was considered
persuasive by the Court
The agreement is not a treaty as that term is used
in CONSTI. However, a treaty is not the only form
that an intl agreement may assume. For the grant of
treatymaking power to the Executive & the Senate
does not exhaust the power of the govt over intl
relations.
Executive agreements may be entered into w/ other
states & are effective even w/o concurrence of
Senate.
In intl law, theres no difference betn treaties &
executive agreements in their binding effect upon
states concerned as long as the negotiating
functionaries have remained w/n their powers.
The distinction betn executive agreements &
treaties is purely a constl one & has not intl legal
significance.
Altman v. US: An intl compact negotiated betn the
reps of 2 sovereign nations & made in the name or
behalf of the contracting parties & dealing w/ impt
commercial relns betn the 2 countries, is a treaty
both internationally although as an executive
agreement it is not technically a treaty requiring the
advice & consent of the Senate
2 classes of Executive Agreements: 1) agreements
made purely as executive acts affecting external
relations & independent of or w/o legislative
authorization, w/c may be termed as presl
agreements; 2) agreements entered into in
pursuance of acts of Cong, w/c have been designated
as Congressional-Executive Agreements
The Romulo-Snyder Agreement may fall under any
of these 2 classes for on Sept 18, 1946, RP Congress
authorized the RP Pres to obtain such loans or incur
such indebtedness w/ the US.
Even granting theres no leg authorization, the
Agreement was legally & validly entered into to
conform to the 2nd category, namely, as agreements
entered into purely as executive acts w/o leg
authorization, w/c usu includes money agreements.
The Agreement was not submitted to the US Senate
either. But the Phil Senates Resolution No. 15

practically admits the validity & binding force of such

Agreement.
Further, the acts of Congress appropriating funds
for the yearly installments necessary to comply w/
such Agreement constitute a ratification thereof, W/C
PLACES THE QUESTION OF VALIDITY OUT OF THE
COURTS REACH, NO CONSTL PRINCIPLE HAVING
BEEN INVOKED TO RESTRICT CONGRESS PLENARY
POEWR TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS LOAN OR NO
LOAN.

copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by

specific congressional authorization but in conformity
with policies declared in acts of Congress with
respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff
acts; while still others, particularly those with respect
to the settlement of claims against foreign
governments, were concluded independently of any
legislation.

HELD: Plaintiff failed to make a clear case for the

relief demanded. Petition DENIED.

BAYAN v. ZAMORA
G. R. No. 138570
October 10, 2000

FACTS: EST was a shipping company charged in the

importation from Japan of onion and garlic into the
Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of Customs
ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the import
goods because EST was not able to comply with
Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars
were pursuant to EO 328 w/c sought to regulate the
importation of such non-dollar goods from Japan (as
there was a Trade and Financial Agreement b/n the
Philippines and Japan then). EST questioned the
validity of the said EO averring that the said EO was
never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue was
elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter
ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the EO is subject to the
concurrence of at least 2/3 of the Senate.
HELD: No, executive Agreements are not like treaties
which are subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3
of the members of the Senate. Agreements
concluded by the President which fall short of treaties
are commonly referred to as executive agreements
and are no less common in our scheme of
government than are the more formal instruments
treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the
form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of
more formal documents denominated agreements
or protocols. The point where ordinary
correspondence between this and other governments
ends and agreements whether denominated
executive agreements or exchanges of notes or
otherwise begin, may sometimes be difficult of
ready ascertainment. It would be useless to
undertake to discuss here the large variety of
executive agreements as such, concluded from time
to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other
than those entered into under the trade- agreements
act, have been negotiated with foreign
governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in
order to show that the trade agreements under the
act of 1934 are not anomalous in character, that they
are not treaties, and that they have abundant
precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes of
agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive
without the approval of the Senate. They cover such
subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation
dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission
of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial
relations generally, international claims, postal
matters, the registration of trade-marks and

Facts:
The United States panel met with the Philippine panel
to discussed, among others, the possible elements of
the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to
a series of conferences and negotiations which
culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter,
President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was
respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United
States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.
Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5,
1998 and on May 27, 1999, the senate approved it by
(2/3) votes.
Cause of Action:
Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art
XVIII of the 1987 constitution is applicable and not
Section 21, Article VII.
Following the argument of the petitioner, under they
provision cited, the foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities may be allowed in the Philippines unless
the following conditions are sufficiently met:
a) it must be a treaty,
b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified
by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum held for that purpose if so required by
congress, and
c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section
21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is requires
for such treaty to be valid and effective is the
concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the
members of the senate.
ISSUE: Is the VFA governed by the provisions of
Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the
Constitution?
HELD:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with
treaties involving foreign military bases, troops or
facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain
extent and in a limited sense, however, the
provisions of section 21, Article VII will find
applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole
purpose of determining the number of votes required
to obtain the valid concurrence of the senate.

The Constitution, makes no distinction between

transient and permanent. We find nothing in
section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or
facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the
Philippines.
It is inconsequential whether the United States treats
the VFA only as an executive agreement because,
under international law, an executive agreement is as
binding as a treaty.
GONZALES VS HECHANOVA
During the term of President Diosdado Macapagal, he
entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam
and Burma for the importation of rice without
complying with the requisite of securing a
certification from the National Economic Council
showing that there is a shortage in cereals or rice.
Hence, the then Executive Secretary, Rufino
Hechanova, authorized the importation of 67,000
tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local
planters. Ramon Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo
Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed the
executive agreements. Gonzales averred that
Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, because Republic Act 3452 prohibits the
importation of rice and corn by the Rice and Corn
Administration or any other government agency.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2
executive agreements entered into by Macapagal.
HELD: Yes. Under the Constitution, the main function
of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by
Congress. The former may not interfere in the
performance of the legislative powers of the latter,

except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not

defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the
status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same
through an executive agreement providing for the
performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.
In the event of conflict between a treaty and a
statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall
prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar,
Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the
contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such
justification can be given as regards executive
agreements not authorized by previous legislation,
without completely upsetting the principle of
separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances which are fundamental in our constitutional
set up.
As regards the question whether an executive or an
international agreement may be invalidated by our
courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the
Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by
providing that the SC may not be deprived of its
jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or
affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the
law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments
and decrees of inferior courts in All cases in which
the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in
question. In other words, our Constitution authorizes
the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts
with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs
counter to an act of Congress.