Doing Courts Justice? Studying Judicial Politics in Latin America

American Political Science Association
Cambridge University Press

Doing Courts Justice? Studying Judicial Politics in Latin America
Author(s): Diana Kapiszewski and Matthew M. Taylor
Source: Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Dec., 2008), pp. 741-767
Published by: American Political Science Association
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Articles
Doing
Politics
Courts
Justice?
in Latin
Studying
Judicial
America
Diana Kapiszewski and MatthewM. Taylor

The past decade has broughtan unprecedentedboom in thestudyof courtsas politicalactors inLatinAmerica.We examine the
on judicialpoliticsin theregion,identifying
thekeyquestions,findings,
extraordinary
diversity
of academic research
and theoretical
debates in the literature,
highlightingimportant
conceptualdisjunctions,and critiquingtheresearch
methods scholarsof judicial
work.We dose by suggesting
new avenuesof inquirytohelp advance thecollective
politicsinLatinAmericahave employedin their
efforttounderstandtherolescourtsplay inLatinAmericanpolitics.
ourtsare at theheartof a newwave of political

science,socio-legal,and public policy research
aroundtheglobe.Answeringa clarioncall forfur
thercomparative
of courtsfrom
Argenti
work,' scholars
na2 toZimbabwe3are increasingly
examiningthefactors
thatdrivejudicialdecision
making,therolethatjudiciaries
play indemocratic
politics,and thepracticalandpolitical
consequencesof courtsand law.The countriesof Latin
America,
with similarlegal-political
traditions
andbroadly
parallelpoliticalhistories,
providea particularly
promis
ingbatchof casesforanalysisand comparison.
Until recently,
however,thestudyof courtswas not a
priority
forscholarsof LatinAmericanpolitics:afterall,
one of thekey lessonsof theself-prodaimed
demiseof
theLaw andDevelopmentresearch
programthree
decades
agowas thatcourtswere seldomlikelytohavea positive
on politicaldevelopmentin thepresenceof execu
effect
tiveover-reaching.4
todemoc
Even thoughthetransitions
racyof the1980s had significant
implications
forLatin
Diana KapiszewskiisAssistant
Professor
ofPolitical
Science
at theUniversity
ofCalifornia,Irvine(dianakap@uci.
edu).Matthew
M. TaylorisAssistant
Professor
ofPolitical
Scienceat theUniversity
ofSdoPaulo (taylor@usp.
br).A
on
earlier
number
ofscholars
offered
helpfulfeedback
drafts
three
reviewers
ofthis
manuscript,
including
anonymous
at Perspectives
on Politics,aswellas theparticipants
on the
panelonLatinAmerican
thatwe orga
judicialpolitics
PoliticalScience
Association
nizedat the2006American
TomGinsburg,
annualmeeting,
as dis
whoserved
especially
andMartinShapiro,
cussant,
whoservedaas
chair.
Jefrey
Sta
tonandRobert
A. Kagan offered
comments
thatwere
inscopeand quality.
We alsoappreci
particularly
generous
atethehelpofallofthescholars
whoresponded
toourinfor
mal e-mailpollsregarding
in the
recentpublications
field.
doi:0.1
01 7/S105375927080813899
Americanjudiciaries,
on courtsin theregion
most research
beganwell afterthe "thirdwave" had passed through
most LatinAmericancountries.5Indeed,until the first
majorpost-authoritarian
volumeon courtsinLatinAmer
icandemocracies
was publishedin 1993,6most compar
on politicalinstitutions
in
ativepoliticalscienceresearch
the regionremainedfocusedon presidents,
partiesand
assemblies.
A first
setofworkson LatinAmericancourtsfocuses
primarily
on thejudicialreform
efforts
of thelate1980s
and 1990s,and on issuesof transitional
This lit
justice.
erature
has emphasizedthechallenges
of reform
(inpar
ticular,of simultaneously
addressingtheproblemsof
judicialindependence,
and accountabil
access,efficiency
ity),7as well as thedegreetowhich reformled to the
inways that
improvement
of courts'performance
might
A secondstrainin the
contributeto economicgrowth.8
literature
examinestheways inwhich the region's
new
to
authoritar
democraciesattempted addressremaining
ianenclavesand providetransitional
justice.9
The focusof theliterature
haswidenedmore recently
toencompasstwobroaderthemes:
courts'contribution
to
social justiceand judicialpolitics.Researchon thefirst
on theroleof courtsinadmittedly
themefocuses
unequal
LatinAmericansocietiesand, especially,
how theycan
contributeto bridginggaps in theapplicationof law,
includingthebreachbetweenformallegality
and actual
on thesecondthemeexaminesthe
practice.10
Scholarship
of courtsaspoliticalinstitutions,
performance
atboth the
level(deciding
who getswhat,when,and
micro-political
on disputesbetween
macro level(ruling
how),aswell as the
branches
of government,
and actingas a checkand a bal
anceon both theexecutive
and legislative
branches).
The focusof thisartide is thisfourthresearch
theme:
judicialpoliticsinthecontemporary
of
period.This strain
theliterature
and foremost
analyzescourtsfirst
fromthe
Decmber
2008
1Vol.
6/No.
741
Articles
I Doing Courts Justice?
in politics:itexamines
perspective
of theirinvolvement
theinstitutional
structures
thatunderpinand shapethat
involvement;
explores
how judgestakedecisionson polit
ical issues;and examineshow courtsdistribute
political
powerand affectpolicyoutcomes.The fieldcomprises
varioussub-themes,
suchas thejudicialization
ofpolitics,
judicial independence,
and judicialpower,and scholars
utilizemyriadapproachesto examineand explainvaria
tioninthesephenomena,ranging
fromlegalscholars'
focus
on factorssuch as the legalprocess,doctrine,and juris
prudencetomore typically
politicalscienceemphasessuch
as the impactof judicialinstitutional
structure
and cul
turalnorms,and thestrategic
motivations
and attitudinal
forjudges'decision-making.
Scholarsalsouse a variety
of
qualitative,
and game theoretic
quantitative,
methods to
and tocarry
outvarious
analyzedataand drawinferences,
typesof comparativeinquiry.
Perhapsdue to thisdiversity,
theresearch
programana
lyzingjudicialpoliticsinLatinAmerica remainslargely
uncoordinated.
Insofaras thequestionsbeingaskedvary
among scholars,thislackof coordinationisunfortunate
but understandable.
Yet a suboptimalamountof cross
occursamong scholarsaskingsimilarques
fertilization
tionsbut studying
different
or usingdifferent
countries,
approachesor analytic
methods.Further,littlecompara
tive
work isconducted-eithercross-nationally,
orwithin
countrycases (acrossprovinces,time,areasof law,policy
arenas,or levelsof thejudiciary,
forexample).
This articleexaminesthe richbreadthof research
on
judicialpoliticsinLatinAmericawith thegoalofcontrib
uting to thecoherentand progressive
accumulationof
knowledgein thisfield.
The remainder
of thearticlepro
ceeds in fivesections,inwhichwe reviewthemain ques
tionsscholarshaveposed regarding
courtsand politicsin
LatinAmerica; thenexaminethe literature's
main find
We nexthighlight
ingsand theoretical
debates.
keycon
ceptualdebates,analyzetheresearch
methodsscholars
have
somedirectionsin
employed,andwe closeby suggesting
which thestudyof judicialpoliticsinLatinAmericamight
proceed.
Main Research Questions

Surveyed Literature
in the
Figure 1
Type of publication
Articles
45% _
Chapters
32%
Unpublished
dissertations
11%
742
the large and heterogeneous
12%
Note: publisheddissertationsare counted onlyonce, as books.
and
judicialpoliticsinLatinAmerica involvesdifficult
controversial
decisions.Undoubtedlywe have failedto
will considergermaneto
includesomeworks thatothers
we
With thesecaveatsinmind, however,
judicialpolitics.
are reasonably
confidentthatthe90 pieces considered
hereare representative
stateof the
of thecontemporary
debateon judicialpoliticsinLatinAmerica.
We beginour inquiryby offering
a fewparameters.
in terms
of thisliterature
Figures1-3 showthedistribution
of type
ofpublication,
scope,and countries
underanalysis.
These figures
containsome signalsthatthestudyof
amaturingfield.
judicialpoliticsinLatinAmericaremains
First,thebulkof thework comprisesshortpieces (book
books.The
chaptersand articles)ratherthanfull-length
fewbooks thatfocusexclusively
on thetopicaremore or
lessequallydividedbetweencompilations
of disparately
themedsinglecountrychapters,
andmore in-depthcase
studies(often
springing
from
doctoraldissertations).13
Fur
demonstrate
thatscholars
of judicialpol
ther,thefigures
iticsinLatinAmericatendtofocuson one countryrather
thanengagingin explicitly
cross-national
inquiry.
With
respecttocountries
studied,
muchof theresearch
analyzes
fourof the21 countriesin theregion(Argentina,
Brazil,
TheBoundaries ofOur Inquiry

Lest thisenterprise
becometoounwieldy,
we havedelim
Figure 2
itedtheliterature
selectedforinclusioninour survey
using Scope of research
fouressentialcriteria.
Each piecesurveyed
here(1) focuses
on thesubjectof judicialpoliticsasdefined
primarily
above;
com
(2) iswritteninEnglish;11(3) iseithera dissertation
ormajor academicjour
pleted,or a book,book chapter,
Single country
nal articlepublished,between1980 and 2006; 12and (4)
study
examinesat leastone LatinAmericannation.
69%
Despite ourattemptstobe systematic,
drawingbound
aries around
Books
literature on
Perspectives on Politics
More thanone
country
31%
Figure 3
Countries studied
Mexico
18%
Braid
_1 6 to~~~~~~6
Argentina
31%
J_
Uruguay
1%
s
_
Bolivia_
1%
11
i l lrChile
15%
Colombia
Guatemala
2%
El Salvador
2%
/
Peru
2%
Costa Rica
4%
1
5%
Venezuela
3%
Note:We have excluded fromthiscount edited volumes

composed of countrychapters (each chapter is counted
separately here),works thatcompare more than5 countries
simultaneously,and works thatdo not specificallyidentify
a
particularLatinAmerican country.
Chile, andMexico);mostLatinAmericanjudiciaries
have
been examinedinonlyone or twochapter-length
studies
or havenot been studiedat all. Finally,althoughit isnot
shownin thesefigures,
themajorityof theworkon judi
cial politicsinLatinAmerica focusespredominantly
on
highcourts(supreme
courtsor constitutional
courts);full
nationalor federal
come ina distantsecond
courtsystems
place,onlyscantattentionispaid to statecourtsystems,
and practically
nowork examinesintra-judicial
relations
or dynamics.
Key Lines of Inquiry in theSurveyedLiterature
We place the literature
surveyedin thisarticlein three
one thatfocuses
on judiciaries'
categories:
interactions
with
otherbranches
ofgovernment;
a secondthatexaminesthe
affect
degreetowhich judiciaries
publicpolicyoutcomes;
one thatprovides
anda final
ormainlydescrip
classificatory
tiveanalysesof courtsand legalinstitutions.
The third
andmost-researched
questionregards
whether
andwhen courtschecktheelectedbranches.
While some
work in thisveinanalyzesjudicialassertiveness
inauthor
itarian
settings,
most research
examinesthequestionunder
democraticrule.16
The bulk of thisliterature
is steeped
in a normativesuppositionthatcheckson theelected
branches-and especially on the region'spowerful
executives-area positiveoccurrence.
While someof this
researchis largelydescriptive,seeking to understand
whetherand how courtsactuallyact tocheckexecutives,
most studiesadopt an explanatoryframework.'7
Some
scholarsquery thepoliticalconditionsunderwhich jus
ticesor courtsruleagainstthegovernment.'8
Othersques
tion theextenttowhich publicor societalsupporthas
permitted
courtsto challengeexecutives
and implement
or thedegreetowhich soci
judicialpolicypreferences,'9
etaldemandscan activatecourtsand influence
thedirec
tionof judicialdecision-making.20
Others investigate
the
importance
of institutional
factors:
Domingo, forexam
ple, askswhetherinstitutional
changesincreasetheabil
ityof courts to act independently
of the executive;21
Brinksexaminesthedegreetowhich judicialreform
affects
and decisionalindependence;22
judges'preferences
and
severalothersexplorehow institutional
and constitu
tionaldesignaffectjudicialindependence
and thescope
of judicialdecisions.23
Most of theseinquiriesconcerncountries-such as
ArgentinaandMexico-featuringhyper-presidential
sys
temsand a tradition
of judicialdependence.In suchset
tings,theexpectationis thatcourts
will be neither
willing
norable tochallengetheelectedbranches,
and theintrigu
ingquestionbecomestheparticular
of con
configuration
ditionsunderwhich theywill dare to do so.A smaller
groupof scholars-almostentirely
students
of theChil
ean judiciary-reverses
thequery,questioning
why seem
courtsfail to enforcecheckson the
inglyindependent
executive
and instead
deferto thegovernment.24
Finally,a
smallsubsetofwork addresses
bothquestions.Huneeus,
forexample,seekstoexplaintheevolution
ofChile's judi
intoa (selectively)
ciaryfroma deferential
lessquiescent
power,and Staton askswhyMexican courtsauthorita
at somepoints,but seemto
tively
resolve
politicalconflict
avoidcontroversial
issuesat others.25
Courtsaspolicy-makers.
The secondmain lineof inquiry
on publicpolicy.A recentInter
analyzescourts'effects
Interaction
between
and elected
thejudicial
branches.Three American
Bankpublication
summarizes
four
Development
questionsunderliemuch of the researchon the inter key rolesLatinAmericanjudiciaries
play in thepolicy
actionbetweenthejudicialand electedbranchesinLatin makingprocess(vetoplayer,policyplayer,impartialref
America.First,
whydo executives
delegatepowertocourts, eree,and societalrepresentative)
and positsthatlevelsof
andwhat sortof formalpower isdelegated?"4
A second judicialindependence
areamajor determinant
of courts'
of thejudicialization ability"to improvethestability,
question,usuallycouched in terms
or
public-regardingness,
of politics,iswhethercourtsarebeingincreasingly
drawn adaptability
ofpolicychoices."26
While thisreport
glosses
intopoliticaldebates,and ifso, inwhat patternsthispro
over thepotentialroleof courtsas reluctant
vetopoints
cessoccurs.15
activated
byotherpoliticalactors,and puts lessemphasis
December
2008
1Vol. 6/No. 4
743
Articles
thanitmighton thefactthatnot all judicialintervention A secondsubsetof literature

in thismore descriptive
in thepolicyrealmis likelytobe policy-enhancing,
other lineof inquiryiscomposedofhistorically-based
casestud
pieces in thislineof inquiry
developtheseissues.
iesof thedynamicsand institutions
crucialto theevolu
Rfos-Figueroa
questiontheeffect tionof judicialpoliticsin the region:judicialreview,39
andTaylor,forinstance,
on policyoutcomes, judicialization,40
of different
institutional
structures
judicialindependence,4"
thebroadersocial
inquiring
howvariousfacets
of judicialindependence
and
consequencesof legalchange,42
of
and thefunctioning
judicialreview
may lead to different
patternsof policy thelegalsystemand therelationships
betweenlaw,poli
43
contestationinBrazilianandMexican courts.27
Others
tics,and society.
In sum,thescopeof inquiry
exploretheeffects
of changesin judicialstructure
on pol
undertaken
by scholars
of
icyoutcomesand politicaldebates28andon courts'influ
judicialpolitics in LatinAmerica since 1980 has been
ence inspecific
et al. seek quitebroad.Significant
policyarenas.29
And Iaryczower
efforts
havebeenmade toclassify
tounderstand
how lobbyingin legislatures
may influence important
judicialstructures
and institutions,
and thelit
therolecourtsplay inpolicymaking
indirecdy,
by "alter erature
has askeda seriesof intriguing
questionsregarding
ingthepoliticalconstraints
under
which [they]
operate."30 thecausesand determinants
of judicial involvement
in
Finally,a smallbutgrowingsubsetof thejudicialpoli
politicsandpolicydebates.The nextsectionexaminesthe
on socialpolicyas
ticsliterature
focuseson courts'effects
findings
and theoretical
debatesthisresearch
hasgenerated.
a result
of societalactors'initiation
of socialandeconomic
rightslitigation.31
Courtis,forexample,examines
why it Findings and Theoretical Debates
toassume
forLatinAmericanjudiciaries
mightbe difficult
In thissectionwe outline the findingsand theoretical
and playan effective
rolein thecreation
of socialpolicy.32
debatesthathavearisenin theliterature
on judicialpoli
In a similar
vein,LimaLopes,exploringtheBraziliancase,
ticsinArgentina,Brazil,Chile, Colombia, andMexico.
discussesthepressurethatsocialrightslitigation
placeson
ScholarsofLatinAmericanjudicialpoliticshave focused
thejudicialbranchdue to itspublicpolicyimplications,
themost attention
on thesefivenations,and theresultant
the"distributive
deci
highlighting
sting"rights-enforcing
scholarshipcontains themain conclusions thathave
sionson suchcasescan carry.33
And Uprimnynotes that
emergedin thebroaderliterature.
We findfive
main areas
since1991 theColombianConstitutional
Courthasmade
of consensusand debate.
decisionsthathave expandedsocialpolicies
high-impact
consistent
with thebroad rightslaidout in theexpansive
1991 Constitution.34
He outlinestheeffects
theCourt's ActivatingtheJudiciary
rulingshavehad on thedesignof economicpolicy,and The first
areaof scholarship
examines
who accessescourts
describesthecontroversies
thatsurroundtheCourt'spol
tocontestpolicy,
institutional
which
features
and
facilitate
icyrole.In sum, thiswork suggeststhatcourts'assump
blockaccess,and towhat effect
courtsareused as an alter
tionof a roleinsocio-economic
iscontested: natepolicy-making
venue.In somecountries,
policymaking
suchasCosta
alikeareawarethatjudicialdeci
judgesandpolicy-makers
Rica, broad access to theconstitutional
chamberof the
means thatpolicyisopen tochallenge
socialand economicrightscan
sionson cases regarding
highcourt
byalmost
More
havesignificant
And inColombia,
policyandbudgetary
consequences.
anyonewith theenergyto filesuit.44
attentionto courts'willingnessand abilityto engagein
expansiveaccess to judicialreviewin combination
with
socialpolicy-making
and to theimplications
forgovern
thecreationof theConstitutional
Court in 1991 have
iscertainly
warranted.
meant a substantialrebalancing
of power inColombian
abilityand democraticstability
as previously
weak actorscan now flextheir
society,
mus
and descriptive
thejudiciary.45
SmulovitzandBehrendexam
Classificatory
analysesof courtsand legal clesthrough
A finallineof inquiry
institutions.
both the inethe"judicialization
ofprotest"inArgentina,analyzing
encompasses
of regionalcourtsand judicial how societalactorshaveusedcourtsas an elementin their
classification
comparative
of theevolu
andmore historical
mobilizationsagainstparticular
structures,
descriptions
government
policiesand
With respectto thefirst, practices,forcing
tionof courtsand legalsystems.
politicalactorsintoboth pre-emptive
a numberof earlystudiesfocusedon identifying
thestruc
and reactive
policychange.46
turalfeatures
ofLatinAmericanpoliticsinwhich judicial
Other scholars
working in thisarea,drawingon the
Laterstudiessoughttodevelop "havescomeout ahead" literature,47
was rooted.35
describetheopposite
dependence
measuresof judicialperformance,36 dynamic:how judicialrulesand structure
more encompassing
advantagecer
incom
tainpolicyactorsmore thanothersin thecourtsystem
and todassifyconstitutional
adjudicationsystems
Suchwork has contributed
to the and,consequently,
in thepoliticalsystem
parativeperspective.37
more generally.
of uniformvariablesand datasetsthatcan, Scholarsof theBrazilianjudiciary,
forinstance,explore
development
in turn,serveas a basis forfurther
research the effects
of thecombinationof relatively
comparative
progressive
on judicialperformance,
constitutional (thoughextraordinarily
lowercourts,
with a
and on particular
inefficient)
features
andtheir
effects.38
744
relatively
efficient
highcourtthatcanonlybe directly
accessedbya smallnumberof actors.48

This combination
hasmeant thattheentirejudiciary
has becomea "power
forquestioningor blockingdecisions
made
fulresource"
in thepoliticalarena,
while a fewvetoplayers
with stand
ingto filein thehighcourtareespecially
well empowered
toactivatethejudiciarytopolicyends.The greater
polit
icaluse of thecourtshasmade thepotentially
destabiliz
ingcounter-majoritarian
natureof abstractreviewstand
in
out high relief.49
The strategic
use of fullcourtsystems-fromlower
courtsthrough
highcourts-as a politicalbailiwickfor
acrossLatin
policyopponentsis a themethatis relevant
inviewof theubiquityof economic
America,particularly
in the 1990s,which impliedsignificant
reforms
costsfor
interest
well-organized
and entrenched
groupsthatoften
timeshad considerable
accesstocourts.50
BuildingJudicialPower
A secondarea of scholarshipseeks to understandhow
work examines
courtsacquirepower,and a subsetof that
thedialecticrelationship
betweenjudicialpowerand judi
betweenjudi
cial independence,
aswell as theinteraction
cialpowerand judicialaccountability.
Judicialpowercan be "delegated"by elected leaders
who implement
reforms
toentrust
powerto judiciariesin
new democracies,
and itcan be "constructed"
by judges
who zealously
calibratetheir
decisionsagainsttheexpected
of thepublic and theelectedbranches.
With
responses
regardto thefirst,
Finkel'sanalysisof theMexican case
can lead to judicialinde
showshowpoliticaluncertainty
delegatepower to
pendencewhen politicalincumbents
courtsso as to preservetheirrightsin case theyshould
become theopposition:shearguesthatthe1994 judicial
with itsintroduction
reform,
ofnew judicialreview
pow
ersand independence
was motivatedby the
guarantees,
rulingparty'sfearof losingpower.51
The PRI, in other
words,saw thewritingon thewall, and soughttheinsti
tutionalprotections
gainedbygranting
greater
powerto
thecourts.52
But thedelegationof powerto courts
may occureven
when electoraldefeatdoes not loom.As Domingo has
forevenwell-ensconced
exec
noted,thereare incentives
utivestofavorindependent
Predominant
courts.53
among
theseis theview thatcourts
cur
may serveto legitimate
rentpolicydecisions:
whileamore independent
court
may
a fewpolicieshereand there,
overturn
when itsupports
can
theactionsof theelectedbranches,thegovernment
point to thatsanctionas legallegitimation.
In terms
of "constructed"
power,judgesuse a number
of formal
and informal
tobuildcourtpower.
As
strategies
notedby severalauthorsin theGloppen et al. compen
may seektoconstruct
powerthrough
dium,courts
sym
bolic rulingsin largelyinsignficant
cases, ratherthan
through
hugely
momentous
legaljudgments.54
As they
attemptto "grow"theirinstitutional
power,judgesmay
seekoutmerelysymbolic
victoriesincaseswith little
prac
ticalrepercussion.55
While mostwould agreethatjudicialpowerand judi
cial independence
are inextricably
linked,thereis signif
icantdebatewith regardto thenatureof therelationship.
In Brazil forexample,thegradualconstruction
of judi
cial independencein an uncertainand extremely
chal
lenginginstitutional
environment
has been carriedout
piece-mealthroughelaboratekabuki-style
shadowbox
ingbetweentheexecutive
branchand thejudiciary.
The
highcourtinparticular
has used itspower to securefor
an "institutional
environment
itself
where itcan remain
freefromexternal
politicalinterference,"
via "tokendeci
sionsand declarations
by theCourt and itsjustices...
[which]functionas a formof pressurebargainingto
56Ithas been suggested,
preserve
incontrast,
autonomy."
thattheChilean judiciary
had to engagein self-restraint
(i.e.,limititsownpower)inorderto retainindependence:
the refusalof courts to actuallyexercisetheirpowersof judicial
controlof theconstitution. .. represented
thecontinuationof a
longheld strategicstanceaimed atmaintaining theveryauton
omy and political independencethathas historicallyallowed
themtoplay a crucialrolein thepromotionandmaintenanceof
the legalitythathas characterizedthecountry.57
raisesthe
Finally,increasing
judicialpower inevitably
issueof judicialaccountability,
or theage-oldquestionof
who guardstheguardians.
Given thecounter-majoritarian
of judicialreview,
character
powerful
courts
may at some
point issuedecisionsthatangera significant
portionof
theelectorate.In theColombian case, scholars
wonder
about thepotentialforbacklashagainstthesurprisingly
ConstitutionalCourt.58Similarquestions
progressive
regarding
judicialaccountability
are addressedinGlop
pen et al.:59How unaccountablearecourts,and atwhat
pointdoes theirlackofaccountability
becomea concern
or well before
onlywhen theybecome independent,60
then?61
These and relatedquestionswill gain increasing

rele
vance ifmore of the region'sjudiciariesfollowin their
Brazilian,
Colombian,andCostaRicancounterparts'
foot
stepsinbuildingjudicialpower.Consequently,thecon
structionof judicialpower and the interplay
between
areques
power,andaccountability
tionsripeforfurther
examinationinLatinAmerica.
ExercisingJudicialPower in thePoliticalArena
A thirdareaof inquiryrelatesto theconditionsunder
which courts
will exercise
theother
powerbychallenging
branchesof government
when theydeem thatelected
leadershave oversteppedtheirconstitutional
or legal
bounds.62
There is overallconsensusin the literature
on judi
cial politicsinLatinAmerica thatthejudiciariesin the
December
2008
IVol. 6/No. 4
745
Articles
A verydifferent
factorhas been used in theMexican
countriesthathavebeen thefocusof somestudycan be
divided intodiscretegroupsaccordingto thefrequency case toexplaincourts'
willingness
and abilitytochallenge
theactionsand policiesof theelectedbranches:theexis
and degreetowhich theircomponentcourtsassertpower
tenceof "basicsocialsupportstructures."70
in thepoliticalrealm.In the firstgroup,composedof
The general
Mexico,
Brazil,Colombia,Costa Rica, and increasingly,
argument,
which has also been raisedin theArgentine
power,thoughtheyplaysignif case,71is thatcourtsmay feelempoweredto challenge
courtsassertconsiderable
In a
rolesinnationalpolicydeliberations.
icantly
different
electedleadersinhigh-stakes
cases(even
when facing
oppo
ArgentinaandChile, courts sitionfroma hostileexecutive
branch)ifsufficient
societal
secondgroup,
which includes
formal
power,but fordiffer supportexistsfora challenging
decision.Statonalsohigh
theoretically
havesignificant
or unabletoassertitconsistently. lightstheimportance
of societalsupportin theMexican
ent reasonsarereluctant
exer
case,and itsrelevanceto judgesseekingtobuild institu
nationsinwhichcourtsrarely
A third
groupincludes
tionallegitimacy.72
He suggeststhatpublicsupportisan
inpoliticsisspas
cisepowerandwhere theirinvolvement
important
factor
in
justices'strategic
calculationsabout
of
import
and
generally
less
recurrent
modic,unpredictable,
on
will
topolicy(ifnot political)outcomes,suchasGuatemala, thecases which they challengetheelectedbranches
(greater
potentialsupportfora challengingdecision is
Peru,andVenezuela.
equatedwith a decreasedlikelihood
of subsequentattack
The main factorsused to explain thewillingnessof
poweraretheoverallpolit
by theelectedbranches).
courtstochallenge
government
withincourts.
Furtherexamination
of thesehypotheses
and thecon
and institutional
factors
icalenvironment,
of theArgentine ditionsunderwhichcourtsexercise
severalscholars
With regardto thefirst,
powerseemsmerited.
as a
In so doing, itmightbe salutarytomove towardtesting
highcourtview theuncertainpoliticalenvironment
Some scholars
causeof strategic
behavior
argue hypothesesthathave been advanced to explainjudicial
by judges.63
are lesslikelyto behaviorinotherpartsof theworld.For instance,
eachof
thatjudgesactingundersuchuncertainty
controlof
as thepresident's
the three
vote againstthegovernment
main approachesto thisquestion in theU.S.
literature-the
attitudinal
model, strategic
accounts,and
Congress increases.'Helmke points toboth theuncer
tainpoliticalenvironment
new institutional
approaches-hasexplanatory
potential
and institutional
weaknesssug
in theregion.
approachtheendof
While theattitudinal
model has caughton
executives
gestingthatas incumbent
ofLatinAmericancourts,thereare
secu
slowlyamongscholars
highcourtjudges"wholackinstitutional
theirterms,
in thatdirection:
to increasetheirantigovern some efforts
Helmke and Sanders,for
ritybeginfacingincentives
haveexaminedthe"goals"of judges,developing
ment rulingsto distancethemselves
froma weakening instance,
the
case, a game-theoretic
model thatlinksjudicialbehavior(includ
Argentine
Chavez,alsoaddressing
government."65
of
con
the
ing
challenging
electedleaders)to thosegoals,and iden
the
historical
political
emphasizes importance
of judges:loyalists,
four"idealtypes"
may
policyseekers,
configurations
text,notinghow similarinstitutional
tifying
Sincewe cannotassume
institutionalists,
and careerists.73
of different
levelsof checksand
lead to theemergence
arenot
on thedispersalof powerand com
thatLatinAmericanjudgesand justices'ideologies
balances"depending
importantto theirdecisionmaking, further
analysisof
petitivepolitics."66
on dem
where thereis
Incontrast
to the
Argentine
case,most research
judicialattitudes,especiallyin countries
seemswarranted.
stability,
ocraticChile assignslesscausalweight to thepolitical greaterinstitutional
accountsthatana
domi
Moreover,as notedabove,strategic
environment,
perhapsbecause thepost-transition
coalitionhasmeant
Concertacidn
lyzetheongoinggame among thebranchesof govern
nanceof thecenter-left
new and few,but showpromise,as in
The keypuzzle formost ment are relatively
littlevariationon thatvariable.
independent Iaryczower's
depictionof "strategiccompliance"and
studying
Chile iswhy relatively
researchers
of "strategic
defection"inArgenti
Most scholarsoffer Helmke'sdescription
courtsexercisepower so selectively.
ratherthanstrate na.74 In fact,many politicalsettingsin LatinAmerica
and culturalexplanations,
institutional
thatis thoughtto lead tostrategic
Hilbink, forexample, exhibittheuncertainty
gic accounts,of judicialpolitics.67
in"constitut judicialbehavior,
roleof judicialidentity
forinstance,
thatthisapproach
suggesting
positstheimportant
to judicialdecision-making
and theexertionof judicial
[ing]thegoals thatjudgeshave,ratherthansimplycon
goals," and
powermight have significant
power in the
strainingthe achievementof pre-existing
explanatory
isconstantly
due to
region.
reinforced
explainshow thatidentity
veinof theU.S. literature
rulesand
theChilean judiciary's
Finally,thenew institutional
particularinstitutional
takesintoaccounttheeffect
ofvariablesinter
increasingly
This new institutional
structure.68
approachhas counter
nal to judicialinstitutions,
has empha
rangingfromlegalcultureto
parts inMexico and Brazil,where research
viewofcourts
The new institutional
affect caseload
of judicial institutions
management.
sized how characteristics
to judiciariesinLatinAmerica,
constrain
pertinent
choicesituations,
standard
politicaland judicial seemsextremely
and limit(orempower)politicalactors' where factorssuch as a lifetimejudicialcareerand the
actors'strategies,
against
ability
tobring
challenges
government.69
746
formalism
of thelegalsystem
notonlyconstrain
judges'
of theirnormative
optionsbutmay also be constitutive
public policy.Miller, for
in cases regarding
preferences
of
example,suggeststhattheway inwhich a "sociology
developsand evolvesina politycan affect
judicialreview"
courts'abilitytoconstraintheexecutive.75
Of course,we are not suggestingthattheU.S. and
LatinAmericancontextsare so similarthattheoriesthat
would naturally
haveproventohavemerit in theformer
thatthelitera
are
we
suggesting
in
the
latter.
Nor
apply
of new
source
is
the
only
possible
tureon U.S. courts
on
the
region's
making
decision
totestregarding
hypotheses
courts.Our main point is thatthefieldof comparative
with one footplantedinpublic lawand
judicialpolitics,
mightwell benefitfrom
politics,
theotherincomparative
cross-regional
fertilization.
greater
heartofquestionsof judicialpowerand judicialpoliticsin

theregion,isclearlyneeded.
JudicialDynamics and Democracy

more tacitthanexplicit-debatein
A final-and perhaps
betweenjudicialinde
therelationship
theliterature
regards
pendenceand judicialpower,on theonehand,and regime
dynamicson theother.
in thisarticleeitherimplic
Much of thework surveyed
assumptionthat,as
holds thenormative
itlyor explicitly
fortheworking
al.
"courts
are
important
et
note,
Gloppen
Yet analysts
of
democratic
and consolidation
regimes."'81
courts
have different
viewpointsregarding
how,exactly,
affectregimedynamics.Some analystsare absolutely
on democracy.
Farer,for
sanguineabout courts'effects
courts)may
example,arguesthatlaw (and,presumably,
Arenas
TheExerciseofJudicialPower inDifferent
to "deepening[the]rootsand enhancing[the]
contribute
This belief
qualityof electedgovernments."82
A fourththemequestionstheexerciseof judicialpower democratic
inmuch of thecomparative
politicsliter
isalso reflected
theunevenexer
beyondthepoliticalrealm,researching
ofdemocracyin
and consolidation
arenasof public atureon thetransition
ciseof powerby courtsacrossdifferent
LatinAmerica,83
and indeed,thepotentialpositiveeffects
typesof cases.
lifeand in regardtodifferent
of thedeci
andon thelegitimacy
of courtson democracy
Mexican case,
Magaloni notestheincon
Discussingthe
continuetobe a
governments
checksthatcourts sionstakenbydemocratic
effective
betweentheincreasingly
gruity
on courtsin theregion.
branchsincethemid-1990s, keymotivationforresearch
haveplacedon theexecutive
biasneeds
suggestthatthisnormative
of thepoliticalsystemto successfully Others implicitly
and the inability
won
for
One
to
be
group,
example,
This
dis
appraised.
critically
threats
to
individual
rights.76
policewidespread
can
some
whether
courts'
ders
new-found
to
as
the
Madisonian
independence
what she refers
crepancybetween
on
effects
of powerhas been examined timesbe prejudicial,leadingto unpredictable
andHobbesian dimensions
ordemocracy.85
Othersseecause
executive
byDom
in theArgentineand, again,Mexican contexts
policymaking84
forcelebration
aswell as concern.PerezPerdomodescribes
of courtstoprovideany
who questionstheinability
ingo,
on individ how theverysameVenezuelanhigh courtjusticeskept
againstencroachments
protection
meaningful
politicalchangewithindemocraticlimitsat theend of
parties,evenas
ual rights
bymembersof thestateor third
the 1990sbut thenacted toblockpoliticaloppositionin
theyhavemanaged to checkexecutives(albeitinconsis
thenextdecade.86
And Faundezdrawson theColombian
In a relatedvein,Couso arguesthatChilean
tently).77
toarguethat
isnotan "abso
while legalreform
experience
theirdecisionmaking (i.e., tem
courtscircumscribed
itisundoubt
democratization,"
realmso as
lutelyfutile
path towards
peredtheirown power) in theconstitutional
one.87
decide lesscontentious, edlyan uncertain
topreservetheirpowerto freely
A finalgroupof scholarsis skeptical
about theimpact
in thelegalrealm.78
quotidianstruggles
Lar
on thisthemeisexempli courtsmighthave on many aspectsof democracy.
A secondbranchof research
thatArgentine
way"
kins,forexample,analyzesthestrategies
fiedbyRodriguezet al.,who questionthe"selective
exec
Menem (1989-1999) used to reconfigure
inwhich theColombian judiciaryfunctions,
givenover President
to commercialand financialinterestsand primarily utive-judicialrelationsin his favor.88
Taylor questions
areperpetu
forms
of corporatism
This view whetherlongstanding
absorbedby procedural,low-salienceissues.79
rulesgoverningconstitutional
with its ated by the institutional
of SpanishAmericanlaw,
echoesMirow'shistory
wonderwhetherour
And otherauthors
reviewinBrazil.89
emphasison thenotion thatdespite "wide swingsin
todemoc
courts'potentialcontribution
and . . . even innearcrisis,thesectors hopes regarding
politicalstability,
misplaced,especiallygiven thecounter
dependenton privatelaw ... havebeen able to function racyare simply
natureof judicialreview.90
with littledisturbance."80
majoritarian
thelinksbetween
These contradictory
regarding
findings
The studyof divergentpatternsof judicial per
no doubt reflect
authors'normative
courtsanddemocracy
formance-thatis,ofwhy judiciariesrapidlyabsorband
or
variationinLatinAmerica.Yet
certainissueswhile deflecting
processcases regarding
biases,aswell as empirical
we
the
most important
sourceof the
that
cases
other
issues-is
suggest
perhaps
of
clearly
resolution
involving
delaying
of
analysis
comparative
on politicalregimes
Further
within-country
regarding
courts'impacts
inchoate.
uncertainty
themain reason
why theissuehasnot
whichgetstothe and simultaneously
theunevennatureofcourtperformance,
December
2008
1Vol. 6/No. 4
747
Articles
amoreheateddebate-is thefactthatthelinks
generated
(2) judicialpower,and
between(1) judicialindependence,
are
while a backdroptomany inquiries,
(3) democracy,
rarely
an explicitfocusof research.In LatinAmericaas
and
we urgently
need to clearlyconceptualize
elsewhere,
operationalizethese threeconcepts,develop testable
among them,and
hypotheses
regarding
therelationships
empirically
explorethosepropositions.91
In sum,research
on judicialpoliticsinLatinAmerica
Yet theoreti
findings.
has produceda rangeof intriguing
We suggestfourfactors
cal debate remainsembryonic.
ofdebate.First,
that
may havehamperedthedevelopment
scholarsof judicialpolitics in the regionoften fail to
work, especially
when that
acknowledge
and cite related
nations in the region.Second,
work concernsdifferent
usedby those
scholarsarehesitanttoemployframeworks
who studyotherregionsin theworld,despitethewealth
of hypothesesand insightsthebroaderjudicialpolitics
While thefactthatLatinAmerica
literature
has to offer.
means
followsthecivilratherthancommonlawtradition
thattheories
developedtoexplainjudicialphenomenain
mightneedtobemodifiedinordertoaccount
otherregions
foroutcomesin theLatinAmericancontext,thisshould
not preventus fromadopting,adapting,and exploring
of thoseexplanations.
Third,thedearthofexplic
theutility
ofLatinAmerica(be
research
by scholars
itlycomparative
or subnational
comparisonacrossspace,
itcross-national,
time,issueareas,or judiciallevelstoname justa fewpos
sibilities)diminishesthebasis fordebate and compro
mises our abilityto adjudicateamong thecompeting
explanationsforkey phenomenaof judicialpolitics.A
debate
finalreasonforthelackofmorevibranttheoretical
may be thefactthatwe haveyet to completeimportant
forsuchdebate,achievingcleardefinitions
pre-requisites
forthecon
workableoperationalizations
and developing
The
blocks
of
our
theories.
the
that
form building
cepts
nextsectionexaminesthisissue.
Conceptual Debates
and Challenges
alsobriefly
mentionthreeadditionalconcepts:theruleof
law,politicization
(ofthejudiciary),
and judicialaccount
ability.
While spacedoesnot allowus todevelopa discus
sionof thissecondgroupof conceptshere,we pointout a
fewof thechallengestheypose forthe fieldof judicial
politics,both inLatinAmericaand beyond.Our aims in
thissectionare to showhow theconceptualization
chal
lenges
mentionedaboveare reflected
in thestudyof judi
cial politicsinLatinAmerica,and to offera foundation
thatcan be used tobegintobuild towardgreater
concep
tualawareness.
CentralConceptualDebates
Judicialization.Of thetermsreviewed
here,judicializa
tion is perhapstheone on which thereis thegreatest
degreeof conceptualconsensus.
Most of theauthorsin
thesurveyed
literature
who definethetermstartfromthe
essential
definition
offered
byVallinder.
Vallindersuggests
thatjudicializationinvolvesthe infusion
of courtsinto
politicalarenas,and theadoptionof court-like
or legalis
ticdecision-making
processesin non-judicialsettings.92
Nonetheless,most scholarsof judicialpolitics in Latin
America,whose essentialinterest
is incourts,definejudi
ofVallinder'stwodimensions.
cializationas justthefirst
A
Some scholars,
however,
departfromthatconsensus.
fewadopt narrower
definitions,
equatingjudicialization
oroperationalizing
with judicialpower,93
thetermas some
thingakin to judicialactivism.94
Others adopt broader
definitions.
Domingo, forexample,understands
judicial
izationas:
first,theprocessbywhich thereis an increasein the impactof
judicial decisions upon political and social processes. Sec
ond.... theprocessbywhich political conflictis increasingly
resolvedat the levelof the courts.Third .... [it] reflectsthe
constructed
degree towhich regimelegitimacyis increasingly
upon thepublic perceptionof thestate'scapacityand credibility
in terms
on ruleof law,and rights
ofdelivering
protection.Finally,
it refersto thegrowingtrend ... to use law and legalmecha
nisms tomobilize around specificpolicies, social and economic
interests
and demands.95
Threemain conceptualproblemsplaguestudiesof judi

consensusregarding
theubiquityof
cialpoliticsinLatinAmerica.First,
Despite therelative
many authorsfailto
mean
the
not
onwhich theirstudiesrely.
thebreadthof theterm's
phenomenon(if
definethekey terms
Second,
dynamicshighlighted
by scholars
when authorsdo definetheirterms,theyinfrequently ing),thejudicialization
con
of LatinAmerica contrastin interesting
or reconciletheir
wayswith the
definitions
acknowledge
competing
thecausesandconsequences
resulting generalizations
regarding
high
with thosepreviousdefinitions,
ceptualizations
To offerjust
in theinconsistent
oper
useof concepts.Finally,scholars'
lightedbyTate andVallinder,forinstance.
whereTate andVallindersee thespreadof
reflect twoexamples,
ofkeyterms
do notalwaysfaithfully
ationalizations
Siederet al. see
theirconceptualizations,
further
muddyingtheanalytic democracyas a causeof judicialization,96
as drivenby the"very
weaknessesof con
waters.
judicialization
inLatinAmerica."97
AndwhileTate
In thissection,
we identify
democracy
threecentralconceptsin the temporary
bias in
andVallinderseem toassumea kindof structural
on judicialpoliticsinLatinAmerica (judicial
literature
and judicialpower),and
favorof judicialization,
portraying
judgesas unwitting
ization,judicialindependence,
outlinethedebatesthatsurroundthem-acknowledging victimsof expandingand politicallyexplosivecaseloads,
We
debates
remain
incomplete
insomecases.
thatthose
748
someLatinAmerican
scholars
question
thisview.Perez
Perdomo,forinstance,
wonderswhetherjudicialization
is
theresult
of courts'voluntary
assumption
of amore active
role,or whether in factpoliticalactors invitejudicial
interventions.98
Debates aboutvariationin judicialization

arecentralto
theevolution
of thejudicialpoliticsliterature.
It seemsto
us, then,thatthesensiblecourse is to stickas closelyas
possibletoVallinder's
simpleconceptual
formulation,
noted
of enhancingtheprobability
and
above, in the interest
of comparative
work acrossandwithinLatin
tractability
Americancountries,
aswell as amongdifferent
of
regions
theworld.
The literature
on judicialpolitics
Judicialindependence.
is replete
with discussionsand analysesof judicialinde
of theterms
here.A
pendence,likelythetrickiest
explored
numberof simpledefinitions
exist,exemplified
by laryc
zoweret al.: "theextenttowhich justicescan reflect
their
in theirdecisionswithout facingretaliation
preferences
measures."99Such simpledefinitions,however,leave
implicit
one important
factorthatshouldbemore explic
itlyrecognized:the law.Judicialindependence
does not
mean completefreedomtodecidecases;it is thefreedom
todecidecases
withintheconstraints
imposed
bythecourt's
jurisdiction,
by existinglaw,and in lightof themeritof
thecaseat hand.100
As Miller suggestsandmany agree,one fundamental
isiden
challengeinconceptualizing
judicialindependence
whom" courtscouldor shouldbe indepen
"from
tifying
dent.101
Rios-Figueroaexpandsthispoint,arguingthat
twocleardistinctions
are apparentin thediscussionof
independence:
judicial"independenceto" takedecisions
in thecase of an
(forexample,againstthegovernment
unconstitutional
act), and judicial"independencefrom"
otherpoliticalactors,both in terms
of thelegalprovisions
thatestablishtherelationbetweenjudgesand theother
branchesof government,
andwhetherpoliticiansact in
with thoselegalprovisions.102
accordance
Butwhat does independence
entailinpractice?
There
is widespread agreementon three dimensions of
independence:
neither(1) identified
with,nor (2) unilaterally
influ
in theoutcomeof
encedbyanyonewith an interest
thedispute.In otherwords,judges
must have inde
pendencefromthepartiesto a suiton twodimen
sions:theirpreferences
and theirdecisions.109
3. Independence
of lowercourtjudgesfromtheirsupe
riorsin the judicialhierarchy-thatis, "internal
0 This dimensionof judicialinde
independence.""
pendenceobviouslyhasconsiderable
bearingon the
and uniformity
of a courtsystem's
efficiency
influ
ence on policyoutcomes.Other thingsequal, a
courtsystem
suchasChile's,with lowinternal
inde
pendence,can be expectedto perform
more uni
and efficiently
thana courtsystem
withhigh
formly
internalindependence,
suchas Brazil's.
There aremany difficulties

associated
with operation
Somework seekstomea
alizingjudicialindependence.
sureindependence
thefrequency
withwhich
byevaluating
courtsruleagainstthegovernment."'
Nonetheless,Jary
czoweret al.warn that"judicialindependence
cannotbe
measuredsimplyby considering
of gov
judicialreversals
ernmental
acts,"112andwe agree:interpreting
rulingsthat
seektoplace limitson theexercise
of government
power
as evidenceof judicialindependence
can bemisleading.
Moreover,doing so beliesscholars'tacitassumptionthat
courtsshouldruleagainstthegovernment-anassump
tionthatignoresfourcrucialpoliticalrealities.
First,it isundeniablythecase thatgovernments
often
actconstitutionally
thatjudicialendorsement
of
(implying
their
actionscannotbeequated
witheither
orsub
deference
servience).
Further,
oppositionpoliticalforcesfrequently
use thejudiciarytochallenge
perfectly
legaland constitu
tionalgovernmental
of their
policiesas an extension
polit
icalstrategies
elsewherein thepoliticalsystem.'113
Third,
evencourts
widelyconsideredtobe independent
more fre
of thegovernment.
quentlythannot rulein favor
Finally,
chal
dependentcourtsareperfectly
capableof selectively
lenginggovernments:
forinstance,
case selection
mecha
nisms(especially
inhighcourts)
maypermitjudgestoissue
inlesshighly
challenging
rulings
casesthatfall
within
charged
the"toleranceinterval"
of theexecutiveand legislative
1. Autonomyof thejudiciaryfromotherbranchesof
while avoidingmore controversial
cases.'15
branches,"14
referred
toalternately
as "political
auton
Thus evenwhen courtsdo challengetheelectedbranches,
government,
103
therangeof casesonwhich they
will do somay be circum
"autonomy," 104 or "political indepen
omy,"
dence."'05 This dimensionincludestheabilityto
ofoneof thosebranches,imply
scribedby thepreferences
6
takedecisions freeof pressurefromthe elected ingthattheyarenot, in fact,independent."
branches.
While we endorsethethree-dimensional
Obviously,a court'sdegreeof autonomy
of
definition
may be influenced
and
by itsinstitutional
stability,
we acknowledge
that
outlinedabove,
judicialindependence
and
fromseriousoperationalization
it,too,suffers
by rulesregarding
appointments,
tenure,
salary,
challenges.
courtsize.106
An initialsteptoward
thefirst
operationalizing
dimension
2. Independence
ofa courtfromthepartiestoa case,107 would be to thinkabout potentialempiricalindicators
sometimesreferred
to as "judicialimpartiality."'108of pressure
by theelectedbranches.Priorto a particular
Brinks,forexample,invokes
Shapiro's
model of tri
judicialdecision,onemightseekevidenceofvisitsto jus
adic disputeresolution,
notingthatjudgesmust be
ticesfromexecutive
branchpersonnel(oftencapturedin
December
2008
IVol. 6/No. 4
749
Articles
I Doing Courts JUstice?
a certainruling,onemight tryto
themedia); following
actsof retribution
(includingthenominationof
identify
or budget
new judges,changesincourts'administrative
aryconditions,or attacksin themedia) and otheracts
rebuketo thecourts(anover
thatconstitute
a significant
forexample).'17Inaddi
amendment,
ruling
constitutional
and retaliation
thatare
resistance
tionto the"extra-legal"
commonplacein someLatinAmericancontexts,anyof
legaland
theseactions(manyofwhich can be perfectly
repercussions
forjudi
couldhavesignificant
constitutional)
cial independence.
they
must issuerulingson conflictsintowhich theyare
unwillingly
pulledbypoliticalactorstakingadvantageof
judicial "veto points"122 or "legal opportunitystruc
tures.123Itwould thusseem thatjudges'discretionis
limitedfrommany directions.Yet in Latin America's
weakly institutionalized
contexts,room for innovation
oftenexists.For instance,
while judgesmay not be able
to createnew law out of whole doth, theycan often
exploitambiguitiesin the legal-institutional
contextto
with the elected
defensively
manage theirrelationship
branches.124
And asKapiszewski(2007) documents,
both
theArgentineand BrazilianSupremeCourts take full
advantageof thefactthattheyhave solecontroloverthe
timing
of theirdecisionsto"choosethepolitical
moment"
atwhich to hand down controversial
rulings.In short,
courts facing feweror ambiguouslydefined legal
institutional
and politicalconstraints
havemore discre
tion,and thus,greater
potentialpower.
is at theheartof activejudicial
Judicialassertiveness
power.An assertive
courtisone thatchallenges
powerful
Herewe againemphasizea keypointmade ear
actors.'25
lier:
whilemany studiesof judicialpoliticsinLatinAmer
icahave interpreted
judicialchallengestopowerful
actors
(in particular,the executivebranch)as an indicator
of
we proposethatit ismore accurate
toconsidersuchchallenges
of judicialassert
an indicator
iveness.
Understoodas such,judicialassertiveness
and the
ofpower(which
factors
thatguidecourts'selective
assertion
may varyacrosscountries,
courts,time,and types
of case,
among otheraxes), has been a major objectiveof the
research
on judicialpoliticsinLatinAmerica.
The finaldimensionof judicialpower,authoritative
ness,refers
to theextenttowhich a court'sdecisionsare
regarded
as legally
bindingand, inpractice,to theideaof
with judicialdecisionsby losingparties.
Draw
compliance
ingon the
Mexican case,Statonhas takena substantively
admirablefirst
andmethodologically
stepin theexamina
tionof compliance;
he arguesthatcourtssometimes
engage
in "strategic
public relations"-thatis,make public their
oppositiontogovernment
policies in a (not alwayssuc
of government
cessful)attemptto increasethelikelihood
compliancewith a judicialdecisionagainstthosepoli
cies.126
Gloppen et al. (2004) approachtheissuefromthe
ofaccountability,
perspective
askinghowwell courtsensure
and
transparency,
obligeanswerability
bypublicofficials
enforce
on governments
their
controllability
overstepping
bounds.We thinkfurther
studyof complianceshouldbe
on judicialpolitics
a keyobjectiveas theresearch
program
inLatinAmericamoves forward.
Judicialpower. The term"judicialpower" is used far

in the literature
on judicialpolitics in
less frequently
and few
LatinAmerica than is "judicialindependence,"
18
on thepowerof courts. None
analysesfocusexplicitly
theless,judicialpower is implicitinmuch of thewriting
on judicialpolitics:it is impliedinnotionsof horizontal
(withoutpower,
or politicalaccountability
accountability
courtactingin themost judi
eventhemost independent
cialized contextwill fail in its effortsto curb over
executives);
it is implicitin thenotionsof judicial
reaching
(judicialpower isa pre
impactor judicialpolicymaking
requisiteforboth); and it isobviouslyhighlyrelevantto
on theeffects
of courtson regime
dynamics.
any research
Further,theelementsthatwe suggestcomprisejudicial
in practicallyeverystudyconsid
powerare referenced
eredhere.
Culling ideasfroma rangeofwork (andguidedinpart
and authority
by thediscussionsof judicialassertiveness
inKapiszewski),'19
one useful
way toconceptualizejudi
cialpowermightbe tounderstanditas comprisingpoten
tialpowerand activepower.Potentialpowermight be
while assertive
and discretion,
composedof jurisdiction
activepower.
nessand authoritativeness
mightconstitute
matter
would referto"therangeof subject
Jurisdiction
While fewscholars
uponwhich thecourtsmay rule."'20
of judi
includethisattributein theirconceptualizations
cial power,it seemscommon sense to do so.Afterall,
able to ruleinall policyarenas:
courtsarenot necessarily
constitutional
may preventthemfromexer
stipulations
And, all else
on, say,politicalrights.
cisingjurisdiction
thata courtthatcan only
equal, itseemsstraightforward
ruleon a narrowrangeof topicshas lesspotentialpower
thanonewith broad jurisdiction.
The secondand relateddimensionofpotentialpower
latitudeiscon
isdiscretion.
Any court'sdecision-making
strained
bothby legal-institutional
rules,and bypolitical
As to thefirst
setof constraints,
and context.
calculations
asGargarellanotes,laws,constitutional
stipulations,
judi
and existingdoctrine
cial rules,previousjurisprudence,
In terms Related ConceptualChallenges
ofdecision.121
on courts'freedom
allplace limits
to thecom
Three otherconceptsthatare fundamental
of the secondgroupof constraints,
Taylor,as well as
are ruleof law,politi
Wilson and RodriguezCordero point out that judges' parativejudicialpoliticsenterprise
and accountability.
Althoughwe
when cizationof thejudiciary,
tochoosetheir
ownbattles
iscompromised
ability
750
Yet as
editedvolumeson theruleof law in theregion.130
theeditorsofoneof thesevolumesnotes,"the
meaningof
isaboutasmuddled as conceptsget in the
'accountability'
socialsciences.
"131This confusionisdue inpart to the
factthat"accountability"
has variouspotentialobjectives
(e.g.,probity,
andmay involve
policy,performance)
myr
iad
potential
actors
(e.g.,
elected
leaders,
prosecutors,
media,
Ruleof law. Among themany conceptsdiscussedin the
agencies,publics).
surveyed
literature,
one of themostwidelyusedand least judges,oversight
For
instance,
scholars
use the termin discussingthe
welldefinedandoperationalized
isthe"ruleof law."Rather
to
degree
which
courts
(and
oversight
agencies)engagein
thanenteringtheconceptualfray,
we will simplyexpress
routinized
control
elected
officials'
of
actionssuch that
twoconcerns.
First,efforts
todefinethetermboth in the
are
they
"answerable"
for
Yet thetermis
their
behavior.132
surveyedliterature
and in thebroaderfieldhave found
used
to
refer
to
also
or (as noted
judicial
accountability,
littlecommonground-existingdefinitions
of thecon
the
earlier)
old
dilemma
of
who
shall
guard theguard
Our secondconcerncenters
on
ceptvaryconsiderably.127
Conceptualized
as
ians.133
such,
of account
discussions
operationalization:
inone sense,theruleof lawrepresents
ability
with
of judicial
immediately
intersect
analyses
an important
conceptualshorthandforadherenceto the
independence:
does
judicial
independence
account
require
lawas amatterof socialpractice.
Yet as soon as thecon
to
some
it
ability
greater
to
an
authority
(be
oversight
ceptualrubberhits theempiricalroad, the ruleof law
body such as a judicialcouncilor to some amorphous
definedas suchbecomesinherently
immeasurable,
subjec
jurisprudential
ormight
tradition),
tive,and subjecttocategorical
rejection-thatis-we are notionsuchas received
in
such
fact
accountability
ultimately
compromise
judi
immediately
"dataproblem."
paralyzedby a significant
cial
The
central
dilemma
that
scholars
independence?
must
Neitherof thesechallenges
theconcept
justifies
discarding
account
in fact,
we hope bothwill serveasmotivation address,then,ishow todelimitaccountability:
altogether;
which
towhat
of
to
or
ability
actors
and
whom,
ideals,
towork toward
forresearchers
moremutuallyinformed
end?
conceptualization.
This necessarily
partialreviewof thecentralconcepts
and conceptualdebatesin theliterature
on judicialpoli
Politicization
of thejudiciary.Anothertermthatisoften ticsinLatinAmericasendsa critical
atten
message:greater
is
usedbut seldomclearlyconceptualizedin theliterature
tionmust be paid to thedefinition
and useofkey terms.
the"politicization"
of thejudiciary.
The termisgenerally We do not presumethatthediscussionsabovewill con
employedonlywhen authorsare arguingthatthephe
stitutethefinal
word on anyof theconcepts
mentioned.
nomenon inevitably
precedesor followsthejudicializa We do, however,
of theconceptual
hope thatrecognition
tionof politics,but scholarsrarelydefineor discuss limitations
and contributions
ofpastworkwill enablethe
as theyanalyzejudicializa
politicizationas thoroughly
fieldtobegintodevelopa dialogueabout terms
and con
Two possiblemeanings are the importance
of
tion.128
ceptsthattakesintoaccountexisting
thuspro
definitions,
politicalpartiesor partisanideologyto judicialappoint
vidinga commonstarting
point fortheory-building
and
ments or promotions,
and thedegreetowhich individ empiricaltesting.
To be clear,
we arenot endorsing
com
ual judges'decisionsalignwith theirpoliticalpartyor
If scholarsprefer
more
plete conceptualhomogeneity.
trackshiftsin partisandominancein government
(i.e., nuancedor inclusive
definitions
of fundamental
concepts
arenon-law-driven).
Others use thetermto referto the thanthoseused in related
work,we simplysuggestthat
focuson judicialdecisionsin debates in the theyindicatehow theirdefinitionsrelateto thosepro
increasing
broaderbodypolitic.One way or theother,theconcept's posed byotherscholars,
and offer
compellingreasonsfor
connotationis negativeinmuch of thework surveyed theirdeviationfromthosedefinitions.
We believesuch
Given thatcourtsappeartobe assumingamore
here.129
careful
useofconcepts
will facilitate
dialogueamongschol
activerole in politics in a numberof LatinAmerican ars,and help thejudicialpoliticsresearch
move
program
how politicsaffects
countries,
understanding
courtsand
as a coherent
forward
whole.
theirdecisions-and thusunderstanding
whatwe mean
by and how we measure the "politicization"of the
judiciary-willlikelybe increasingly
important.
Research Methods
do not have space toadequatelyaddresstheseimportant
conceptsin all theircomplexity,
we brieflylayout some
centralconcernsinhopes thatfuture
judicialpoliticsstud
of theseimpor
ieswillwork toclarify
conceptualizations
tantphenomena.
In thissection,we critiquewhat we see as the insuffi

isa conceptual
useof research
Accountability.
Accountability
upstart.Its cientlyself-conscious
methodsin thestudy
use indiscussionsof judicialpoliticsinLatin of judicialpoliticsinLatinAmerica.
increasing
We also suggest
how
Americahas corresponded
with thepublication thefailure
of thefieldasan explicitly
roughly
endeavor
comparative
byGuillermoO'Donnell ofvariousessayson thesubject, may be preventing
itfromrealizing
itssignificant
intellec
andhasbeencemented
by itsinclusionin thetitle
of three tualpotential.
December 2008
IVol. 6/No. 4
751
Articles
Data Colection
The types
of data and evidencepresentedin theworkwe
andquantitative.
surveyed
aredividedbetweenqualitative
On thequalitativefront,thewrittendecisionsof courts
are,perhaps,themost-often
used typeof data.Comple
mentaryqualitativesourcesincludemedia accounts;134
inter
primary
documentsavailableinnationalarchives;135
non-participant
viewdata;136and data gatheredthrough
observation.137
With regardto quantitative
data, the rangeincludes
surveys of judges,138 legal experts,
39 and broader
pub
data on lawcoursesand judicialsalaries;141

and
lics;140
data on thenumberof courtsand thechangein thedis
tribution
of casesamongdifferential
judicialinstances.'42
Other researchers
createdtheirown data and databases:
mea
measuresof institutional
evolution;143cross-national
suresof constitutions;144
measuresof judicialopinions
and thevotesof individualjusticeson particular
cases;145
contentanalysis
of inter
andmeasuresbasedon systematic
view transcripts.146
the studies listedabove constitutea
Unfortunately,
While manyotherauthors
of theworkssurveyed.
minority
and likely
usedvarious
probablycarriedout fieldresearch
data sourcesin theiranalyses(beyondjudicialdecisions),
a substantial
of thestudiesreviewed
hereare
proportion
to
narrative
historicalaccountsthatmake littlereference
or explainhow
thespecific
data thatsupporttheanalysis,
thosedatawere collected.
Most of the
A secondconcernregardscase selection.
thetechnique
herefailedtoreport
employed
workssurveyed
was
to selectthejudicialdecisionsonwhich theanalysis
based.This isdangerousin a numberofways. First,it
bias theirsamplestoward
means scholarscould in theory
cases thatsupporttheirarguments.
Also, unlessrigorous
techniquesare employed,scholarscan tend to re-select
frompre
thecases thataremost familiar
and re-analyze
vious research.
Such casesand decisions
may ormay not
of thecourts
of thedocketand rulings
be representative
and theirre-selection
understudy,
may leadtotherecycling
of erroneouscondusionsabout how courtsbehave.We
case-selection
advocatethatscholarsemploysystematic
techniques-andthattheyincludein theiranalysesa dear
of thattechniqueaswell as a
and justification
description
universeof cases,so
of theresulting
generaldescription
readers
knowwhetherthescholarexamined,forinstance,
only "dramatic"cases,all cases inwhich a decisionwas
all cases in theuniverseof a particularlegal
rendered,
all of thecaseson a court'sdocket,etc.
instrument,
AnalyticMethods
A numberof analytic
methodscouldpotentially
be used
tostudyjudicialpolitics.Scholars
mightengageindescrip
tiveor explanatory
work,and ineitherrealm,
mightcarry
out large-n
research
(which
tends
tOlenditself
toquan
752
titative
analyticstrategies),
or small-nor case study
work
(towhich theywould be more likelyapplyqualitative
analytictechniques).147
In theexplanatory
realm,schol
arsmight approach theiranalytictaskdeductivelyor
inductively.
The bulk of the researchsurveyed

here fallsinto the
descriptive
camp,providingin-depthreportsof courts'
in judicialpolitics,148
or alternately,
involvement
describ
ingcourts'historicalevolutionovera certainperiod.149
The legalcase reviewsinour survey,
aswell asmore socio
legalanalysis150
also fallin thisdescriptive
camp,as do
many of thecontributions
to theeditedvolumeson the
region.As theircategorization
as "descriptive"
suggests,
these
worksaregenerally
not intendedto testhypotheses,
ina given
but rathertodepictthecurrentstateof affairs
country,
documentthepresence
of judicialpoliticsor judi
cialization,
build theconceptsthatformthebasisof our
inquiries,
and providecloseanalysisof particularjudicial
features.
These areobviouslyallworthygoals.
With respectto thesubsetofwork thatisexplanatory
innature,fewpiecesmake effective
useof themany excel
lentresearchtoolsthatareavailableto carryout qualita
or theequallyusefulsetofquantitative
tivecausalanalysis,
A fewexceptions
analytictechniques.
thusstandout.With
regardto qualitative
methods,Larkinsutilizesa critical
inhis longitudinal
framework
juncture/path-dependence
of theArgentineandPeruvianjudiciaries,15'
examination
and variousstudiesutilizeprocesstracingtohelp explain
court-executive
Anothersmallsubsetof the
relations.'52
work
uses
explanatory
methodstodrawcausal
quantitative
statistical
inferences,
models.153
including
And a finaltiny
subsetuses game theoretic
methods to explainjudicial
phenomena.'54
Beyond thesefew
works,however,
most scholarssimply
do not report
research
methodsofanytype.
usingrigorous
Given thatthenuancedand causallycomplexnatureof
would seemto lenditself
judicialpolitics
naturallyto the
useof rigorous
suchas con
qualitative
analytictechniques
counterfactual
gruencetesting,
analysis,
necessary/sufficient
conditionsframeworks,
Ragin's"qualitative
comparative
analysis"(QCA), and fuzzy-set
analysis,to name justa
of suchtoolsisdisappointing
andunfor
few,theunder-use
bothStaton'sandHelmke'sinquiriesillus
tunate.
Further,
tratethevalidityand utility
ofgame theoretic
methods in
thestudyof judicialpoliticsinLatinAmerica.
In lightof the field'srelative
youth,it isperhapsno
on courtsinLatinAmerica is
surprisethattheliterature
suchwork servesas thefoun
predominantly
descriptive;
As theresearch
dationof anyfield.
programadvances,the
more frequent
use of qualitativeor quantitative
methods
todrawinferences
and identify
patternsin judicialbehav
iorwould further
our descriptive
base.We also
improve
feelitwould be advantageous
toslidetheresearch
program's
centerof gravity
closerto theexplanatory
endof thespec
trum,
therichvariety
ofmethods
applying
mentioned
heretounderstanding
thecausesand consequences
ofcru
cialjudicialprocesses.
Moving inthatdirection
couldeven
tuallyleadus tobroadertheoretical
conclusions
that
would
be testable
beyondtheLatinAmericancountriesinwhich
theywere generated,includingin contextsoutside the
and theverydifferent
formsthatjudicial
judicialsystems,
politicstakes,LatinAmericaseemsto represent
an ideal
laboratory
foranalysesthatprivilege
breadthoverdepth.
Moreover,
with twonotableexceptions,16"
fewauthorsgo
beyondLatinAmericatodrawcomparative
lessons,
despite
region.
thefactthatexistingresearch
on Spain,Portugal,
Korea,
India,SouthAfrica,and a numberofothercasesoffers
the
potentialforhighlyrevealing
cross-regional
comparative
Methods ofComparison
analysis.
In short,the abundanceof existingsingle-country
an important
Our surveysuggests
imbalancein theLatin
American judicialpolitics researchprogram:while an
studies-themajorityofwhich arecareful
anddetailed
incredibly
richbodyof case studieshas been produced, offers
a richopportunity
formeta-synthesis
and compar
in
been
ison
that
thefieldhas
lesseffective undertaking
couldlikely
yieldimportant
forthebroader
compara
returns
withinor acrosscountries.
fieldof judicialpolitics.Extending
tiveinquiry
Martin Shapiro'splea
thesurveyed
lit
thatscholarsstudyany lawbut constitutional
Regarding
comparison,
within-country
law,any
eraturedoes includea numberof piecesof exemplary courtbut theSupremeCourt, and anycountrybut the
withinthesamenation.155 UnitedStates,
research
acrossvariousperiods
we encouragefurther
comparative
examina
However,as noted earlier,fewstudiescomparedifferent tionacrosstypesof law,courts,and countries.'62
of particular
subnationalregions
countries-forinstance,
ofdifferent
thedecision-making
statesupreme
contrasting
fewstudies
courts.
Further,
comparejudicialpractices,
judi Conclusion
cial rulingsor,more generally,
how courtsfunctionat Over itsbarelytwodecadesof development,
thefieldof
different
levelsof thejudiciaryina particular
country,156 judicialpoliticsinLatinAmericahasgrownquicklyintoa
despitethe factthatfederalsystemssuch asArgentina, eclecticand excitingareaof inquiry.
Our surveyof the
Brazil,andMexico would lendthemselves
to suchanaly
literature
revealedthree
major linesof studyaround
which
most important
sis.
While somescholarshavebegun tocomparejudicial the
theoretical
debatesrevolve.
First,schol
acrossvarying
arenasofpublic life(refer arshave exploredtherelations
betweenthejudicialand
decision-making
toour discussionof theexercise
of judicialpowerindif
electedbranches
ofgovernment,
and inparticular
thecon
ferent
work has comparedjudicialdecision
ditionsunderwhichLatinAmericancourtsaremore apt
areas),little
makingacrossdifferent
policyareasina certainpolity,157 to check(ormore likelytodeferto) electedleaders.In a
or acrossdifferent
areasof law(publicand privatelaw,for region
thisisobviously
pronetohyper-presidentialism,
an
A secondlineof inquiryrelatesto the
base
with such a strongdescriptive
concern.
example).In short,
important
courtshaveon thepolicyprocessand policyout
laid,thereisenormouspotentialforsubnational
compar
effects
ativework.
comes.Given thecrucialimportance
ascribedtothewaves
in theregionover
toearlierthatattempt of economicand socialpolicyreforms
Further,
beyondstudiesreferred
incourts'involve
to categorizejudiciaries
institutional
fea
thepastquartercentury,
scholars'
alongdifferent
interest
alsoseemsquiteappropriate.
tures,thereis littlerigorouscross-national
inquiry,for ment inpolicymaking
Finally,
of different
example,of thepolicyeffects
judicialframe a thirdlineof studyincludesclassificatory
and descriptive
or cultures.
While severalunpublished analyses
ofcourtsand legalinstitutions.
The thickdescrip
works,histories,
158and a handfulof articles159offer
dissertations
explicitly tion theseworks generateformsthebedrockof our
evenbook
cross-national
analyses,
theyareinthe
minority;
knowledge.
of nationalcase studies-a format
Our survey
also revealed
a greatdeal about thetheoret
lengthcompilations
icalorientation
thatshouldfacilitate
comparative
inquiry-donotneces
of the field.Scholarsof LatinAmerica
drawout thecross-national
forbeingquitegood at produc
sarily
comparisons
implicitin haveearneda reputation
theanalysesthatconstitutethem.To some degree,the ing local levelknowledge,aswell as carrying
out strong
lackofcross-national
analysisisunderstandable
(andinher "mid-level,
theoretically
informed
empiricalstudyof one
163
To what extentis thattrueof the
Engagingincross-national
comparison ormore countries."
entlydefensible).
can involveserious
methodologicalchallenges:collecting studyof judicialpoliticsinLatinAmerica?In a sense,this
mannerinmore thanone coun
is thewrongplace toanswerthatquestion,sinceour sur
gooddata ina consistent
trycan be quite difficult,
as can drawinganything
more
veyof the literature-bydesign-excludeswork that is
thantentative
lessonsfrompairedcaseswith fewer
obser
But it is fairly
evidentthatwhilework
solelytheoretical.
vationsthanexplanatory
on judicialpoliticsinLatinAmericahas addressedsome
Yet on thewhole,
variables.160
we believethatour collectivefailuretoproducerigorous importanttheoretical
debates-such as thoseregarding
cross-national
analysisrepresents
a missed opportunity. theactivation
of judicialactors,thedelegationand con
Given thebroadsimilarities
thatcharacterize
theregion's struction
of judicialpowerand itsexercisein thepolitical
December
2008
IVol. 6/No. 4
753
Articles
betweenjudicialinde
realm,aswell as therelationship
tobe thefocusof sustainedinquiry.In theremainder
of
dynam
thisconclusion,
we highlight
someprimecandidatesfor
pendenceandpoweron theonehand,and regime
on judicialpoliticsinLatin
icson theother-the literature
future
examination.
We first
mentionsomeof theactors,
thatwe might bring into
America is not at the leadingedge of theory-building. courts,and legal institutions
That privilegebelongsto scholarsofU.S. andEuropean
future
study.
We thenadvocatean expandedfocuson the
of judicialrulings.
Finally,
we endorse
morework
judicialpolitics.
Why might thisbe thecase?
aftermath
identifying
and analyzingtheconnections
betweencourts
One obviousansweris time:thefieldofLatinAmeri
can judicialpoliticshas existedforlessthantwodecades. and regime
dynamics.
haveinhib
othercharacteristics
Yetwe believeat leastthree
toconceptualiza
progress:
our inattention
itedthefield's
tion,our lackof methodologicalrigor,and our weak Actors,Courts,and Legal Institutions
inquiry.
With regardto thefirst, There has been littleanalysis(inEnglish)ofLatinAmer
emphasison comparative
scholars
ican judicialelites.165
holdof
For themost part,we know little
our review
of thevariousunderstandings
or preferences
conceptsin thefieldsuggests about thebackgrounds,
ideologies,
of the
severalof thefundamental
region'sjudgesand justices,and have barelybegun to
of judicialpoliticsinLatinAmericahavenot
thatstudents
or the
on developing
andemploy
explorethepoliticization
of theregion's
judiciaries
placednearlyenoughemphasis
definitions
forkey terms, implications
of thatdynamicforthose
who populateLatin
ingclearand operationalizable
or on takingintoaccountexistingconceptualcontribu Americancourts.166
Although thecareerpathsof some
We suggestthat LatinAmericanjudgescan be longer,
more bureaucratic,
toacceptor rejectthem).
tions(whether
more insulatedthanthoseof their
workwhen defining
keycon
and toa certaindegree
scholarsdrawon previous
NorthAmericancolleagues,thisis not alwaysthecase,
reinventing
thewheel.More
ceptsratherthanconstantly
culture,and atti
would doubdessaid thefield and evenwhere it is,justices'ideology,
"self-aware"
conceptualization
exert
in
some
on
more
broadly
applicable
tudes
must
effect
their
decision-making.
of judicialpolitics generating
Additionalstudyof thesepowerfulindividuals
mightgo a
contributions.
theoretical
our analysesof judicialpolitics.
longway in informing
Second,perhapsbecausescholarshavebeen racingto
of judicialpoliticsin theregion Scholars
find
cataloguetheemergence
wishingto takethisapproachcouldcertainly
in thejudicialpoliticslit
most analystshavecarriedout
foundations
strongtheoretical
and analyzeitsdynamics,
withoutusing rigorous
methods to select eraturefromoutsidetheregion.
theirinquiries
or drawinferences.
Yet we also proposea sharperfocuson the involve
Without greater
cases,gatherevidence,
methodologicalcare the fieldwill have enormousdiffi ment in and importanceto judicialpoliticsof actors
as a scholarly
enterprise.
beyondjudges.Here we may be jumpingon a moving
movingforward
culty
A finalissue thatmay have hinderedfurther
theory traingivenrecent
publicationsin thisspirit.For instance,
and sub
Perez Perdomohas authoreda book examiningLatin
buildingis theabsenceof deepercross-national
Also, an editedvolumebyHalliday
With regardto theformer, American lawyers.
nationalcomparative
inquiry.
while thefieldhas produceda hostofwonderfulcountry et al.,which includesthreechapterson LatinAmerica,
on politicalliberalism
ofwhat they
case studies,and evena handfulof cross-national
studies, examinestheeffects
themand drawout their referto as the"legalcomplex"(thebench, thebar,and
little
has beendone to integrate
"allotherlegally-trained
who under
lessons.LatinAmerica is a regionof
broadertheoretical
personnelina society
char
takelegalwork");while theoutcomeof interest
isdiffer
with historicaland linguistic
countries
similarities,
and
thatfacilitate
cross-national
acteristics
examination,
ent,thefocuson thisbroadersetof actorsis instructive.167
we echoEpsteininurgingscholarsto "graspthecompar Garro has takena lookat theroleof thepublicministry
inArgentina,and theroleof Brazil'squasi-independent
ativeadvantage."'64
Moreover,as thediscussionsabove
has sparkeda burgeoningliterature.168
Com
subnational
prosecutors
analysiscan take
myr
comparative
suggested,
withotherprosecutorial
bodiesin theregion
parison
might
iad forms,
and engagingin thatsortof studyallowsana
without provideeffective
which
insightsinto choices regarding
of comparativeinquiry
lyststo reapthebenefits
crimestoprosecuteandwhich policysubjectstopriori
facingthemethodologicalchallengesinherentin cross
ofprosecution,
and theoveralleffect
We firmly
ofLatin
nationalanalysis.
believethatifscholars
tize,theeffectiveness
in
on
more
of
these
American judicialpoliticsengage
comparative
dynamics judicialpolitics.Futureworkmight
of theoffice
of theombudsmen
will likelyproducenew find
exploretheinvolvement
of eithersort,they
inquiry
and inform (oftenreferred
to as theDefensor
delPueblo),of auditors,
with thepotentialto influence
ingsand insights
of councilsof state,and of judicialcouncilsin judicial
of theworld.
debatesaboutcourtsinotherregions
Related to the issueof theory-building-and
despite politics.169
Finally,inparticularinLatinAmericawhere
law professors
often litigate,litigators
often teach,and
advancesthefieldhasmade and thefasci
theintellectual
academicscan be a sourceof authoritative
ithasgenerated-webelievethata num
doctrine,it
natingfindings
tOconsider
theimpacts
thatlegal
haveyet couldbe informative
politics'
mostinteresting
dynamics
berofjudicial
754
academics(and legaleducation)may have on judicial lateralentryispermitted,

whetherjudicialcareersexist,
politics.
and how appointment
and promotionoccur.Those rela
On a similarnote,we believe it is crucial thatour
in turn,
tionships,
may influence
thefulljudiciary's
effect
move beyondhighcourtstoexamineotherjudi
on policyand politicaloutcomes inways thatare not
analyses
cial bodies.We would highlightlowercourtsand elec
revealed
through
research
thatfocuses
on highcourtsalone.
toralcourtsas twoparticularly
interesting
candidatesfor In short,to arriveat a clearerpictureofLatinAmerican
additionalstudy.
While theinterventions
of highcourts judiciaries
and judicialpolitics,it iscrucialthat
we move
aredoubtlessimportant,
thefactthattheyoftentransfix our studiesdown and acrossthejudicialranks,thatwe
us can lead to insufficient
attentionto the"everyday"
or
examinecourtsfromtheinsideout,and that
we examine
"routine"justicecarriedout by lowercourts,which
theirinter-relationships.
canbemore sociallyrelevant
and certainly
influence
Finally,
we suggestthatgreater
judi
advancescouldbemade
cial politics.170
As Beer has found,for instance,local
inourunderstanding
of judicialpoliticsinLatinAmerica
levelconditions
iflaw itself
variancein judi
may lead to significant
were tobecomeamore prominent
consider
cialperformance
For theirpart,electoral ation inour analyses.
acrossstates.171
We arenot suggesting
thatpolitical
courtsby theirverynatureplay at thesensitive
coreof
scientists
becomelegalscholars.
we simplybelieve
Rather,
thedemocraticprocess.
While thesecourtshave trig
thatinour analysesof thejudicialization
of politics,of
themfurther
into courts'increasing
geredrecentinterest,172
incorporating
inpolicy-making,
involvement
and of
thejudicialpoliticsfoldmightprovideusefulintellectual theirwillingnessand abilityto assertpower,we keep
and lead tonew insightintojudicialpolitics.
inmind thatlegalrulesare thefundamental
synergies
background
Our nextpointsconcernwhich facetsof thecourts for judicial behavior.Even in Latin America's least
Fewauthorshaveclosely institutionalized
mightbeworthyofgreater
study.
settings,
constitutions,
substantive
and
examinedtheinternal
of theregion's
courts.In
procedural
dynamics
codes,laws,legaldoctrines,
theories
of judicial
much of the literature,
courtsare typically
describedin
interpretation,
and existingjurisprudence
allmotivate,
theaggregate;littleattentionisgiventohow individual enable,and constrainjudicialactors.175
Consequently,
"on theinside"or tohow thisand other investigating
courtsfunction
and includingsuch legalinstitutions
inour
features
examinations
of judicialdynamics-evenifdoingsomakes
might differacrosscourtsand over time.Few
analysesfocuson whetherhigh court presidentsare
ourexplorations
more time-consuming
andcomplicated
appointedor elected(andbywhom) andwhat rolethey would doubtlessenrichourdescriptions
and explanations
overcases;who
play;whetherhighcourtsorallydeliberate
of judicialbehaviorand politics.
(ifanyone)controlsthedocketand the timingof deci
and intellectually,
sions;and how,logistically
courtsdeal
ofJudicialDecisions
with theirfrequently
immensecase loads.'73Studying TheAftermath
courts'internalrulesand processes,examiningand con
We also suggestfurther
of theaftermath
exploration
of
theirformal
and informal
trasting
institutional
To statetheideaplainly:ifwe carewhat
rules,and
judicialrulings.
make decisionsall seem difference
how,procedurally,
exploring
they
courtsactually
make (aswe assumeallwho study
tobe endeavorsthat
would improve
ourunderstanding
of
judicialpoliticsdo), we must investigate
what happens
inparticular,
and judicialbehaviorin afterthey
judicialefficiency
make thecrucialrulings
onwhichour inquiries
tend to focus.A first
general.
missing element is attentionto
We also advocatefurther
studyof thenatureof the whether,
when, towhat degree,andwhy thoseagainst
relationships
amongdifferent
courtsanddifferent
instances whom courtsrulecomplywith judicialdecisions.The
of thejudiciary.
For instance,
forcountriesthathaveboth
speedatwhich and degreetowhich executives
adhereto
a constitutional
tribunal
and a supremecourt(e.g.,Chile,
theletter
and spirit
of judicialrulingsthatchallengetheir
and potentialfor exercise
of powerareobviouslyof particularimportance
Colombia, and Peru), the interactions
incourtsaspotentialagentsof "hor
competitionbetweenthesetwobodies is importantto
forstudiesinterested
understand.
thereisalready
someconsensus
Further,
among izontalaccountability."
Without compliance,judicialrul
those
who analyzejudicialpoliticsinChile andBrazilthat ingsmatterfarless.
What ismore, a lackof compliance
inter-instance
relations(specifically,
a highlydisciplined with a court'scontroversial
andhigh-profile
decisions
may
inChile and a somewhat
verticalstructure
disjointedone
endup significantly
As a result,
weakeningitspower.
judges
inBrazil)are important
to theshapeof judicialpoliticsin maymake strategic
choicesas theyconsider
whetheror
thosecountries.
One can easilyimaginethatthere
not to challengetheelectedbranches,
may be
ponderthetiming
variationin local judges'influence
considerable
on high of their
decisions,andmold thebreadthand reachof their
courtsaswell as theirsusceptibility
topressures
fromthose rulings.
courts.174
More generally,
Indeed,therelationships
amongcourtsat dif
we hope the literature
will
however,
ferentlevelsof a judiciary
may be greatlyinfluenced
by
begin to examinethebroader impactof judicialdeci
how strictly
hierarchical
thejudiciaryis,whetheror not
sions,andwhatwe can inferfromthatimpactabout the
December
2008
1Vol. 6/No. 4
755
Articles
or rolesthatcourtsplay in thecountries
of the
functions
region.
To offerjustone example,
while scholars
ofLatin
Americancourtshavebegun to addressthecrucialtopic
of social rightsadjudication,176
theextraordinary
policy
consequences-andeconomicramifications-that
courts'
rulingsin thisareacanhaveareseldomfully
addressedin
thosestudies.
To understandjudicialimpact,
we need to
knowhow judicialdecisions-such as thosemandating
free
medicineor electoralrecounts
or pensionincreases
ripplethrough
politicalsystems,
provideammunitionin
politicalbattles,and affect
politicaland policyoutcomes.
By tracingthe resultsand broaderaftermath
of judicial
what function
decisions,we will be able to determine
courtsareactually
playingin thepolitiesunderstudy,
be
itas an effective
defender
of socialrights,
guardianof the
or any of
democraticprocess,economicpolicy-maker,
myriadrolescourtshave thepotentialtoplay.177
Courtsand RegimeDynamis
Democracyis theelephantin thecorner.It loomsoverall
of judicialpolitics,as both a motivatingforcebehind
in
research,
and as an oftensilentbut centralconspirator
of research
While thereissome
theformulation
questions.
thingof a consensusinmuch of thecomparative
politics
courtsareimportant
thatstrong
forstable,high
literature
qualitydemocraciesand thatweak courtscan imperil
them,178 as suggested above, no such consensus exists in
on judicialpoliticsin theregion.
theliterature
For instance,severalscholars
wonderabout theeffects
courtson executive
of strong
policyautonomyanddemoc
with powerfuljudiciaries,
racy.In countries
marginalized
of specificinterests
groupsor representatives
may be intro
with signif
duced intothepolicygamevia thecourts,'79
formajorities.To what degree
icantpolicyrepercussions
enhancethe"consensual
nature"
does theirintroduction
of somepoliticalsystems,'80
and how farcan thisprocess
go without testingthe limitsof majorities'patience?
What, in otherwords, are theconsequencesof judicial
181
anddemocratic
powerfor"policystability
governance"?
Towhat extentdo expandingjudicialpowerand lowjudi
an "explosiveformulafor
cial accountabilityrepresent
182
democracy'?
Somewhatparadoxically
weak
(giventhatcourtsremain
inmuch of theregion),scholars
have lesstosayabout the
A few
of judicialweaknessfordemocracy.
implications
connectionin
authorshave examinedthecourts-regime
out bothhistoricalstudies
theVenezuelancase,carrying
of theperformance
of courtsduringpast authoritarian
of therecentreversal
of the
interludes
and examinations
democraticorderand dilutionof judicialpower.'83
And
at leastone scholarhaswonderedwhethercertainpolitical
are inherently
dynamics(i.e.,dientelism184)
incompati
ble with strongcourts.Yet a seriesof other important
questions
remains
unasked.
Does judicial
weakness
inex
756
orablyencouragethetrampling
of institutional
limitsby
Are certaininstitutional
electedleaders?
frameworks
more
toexecutive
susceptible
abuse?How doescorruption
influ
ence judicialdynamics
and judicialpolitics?
Can legalcul
turesemerge-both in thecourtsand in society
more
broadly-thatprovideeffective
protections
againstexecu
tivetampering
and corruption?.85
A relatedconcernregardstheeffect
of democracyand
democraticbeliefson judicialbehavioritself.
We natu
rallyassumethatjudgesactdifferently
underauthoritar
ian and democraticconditions,yet few studiesfocus
explicidyon thiscontrast,
preventing
us fromperceiving
what difference
regimetypemakes to judicialdynamics
and judicialpolitics.'86
Moreover,theway inwhich judges
understand
democracy
may have an important
effect
on
theirbehavior.
Decisions aboutwhethertoenforcesocial
rights,
adjudicateso-calledpoliticalquestions,or givepri
orityto individualrightsover broadereconomiccon
cernsmay all revolvearound judges'understandings
of
democracyand theirbeliefsabout thebestwaysof pre
or expandingit.
While judgesarecertainlyinflu
serving
enced bymany other factors,
normsand beliefsabout
democracymay be more relevantthan the attention
devotedto themwould suggest.187
An equally importantissue is courts'involvement
in
fundamental
politicaldynamicsthatdo notnecessarily
butcertainly
can-have regimerepercussions.
LatinAmer
icandemocracies
periodically
experience
"critical
political
suchaswar or shiftsin thedominantnational
junctures"
politicalcoalition.
Moreover,likedevelopingdemocracies
theworld over,theyhavebeenparticularly
susceptibleto
repeated
political,economic,and institutional
crises.Such
events
ofconflicts
thatpoliticaland social
producean array
actorsare increasingly
turningto the region'scourtsto
resolve.
How do LatinAmericancourtsrespondwhen
theyaredrawn intosuchprocessesof dramaticchange,
andwhat lessons
do theseepisodessuggest
aboutthenature
of judicialpoliticsand the relationship
betweencourts,
law,and democratic
politics?
In sum,therelationship
betweenjudicialpoweron the
one hand, and politicaldynamicsand thequalityand
ofdemocracy
on theotherremains
stability
quiteunclear.
As suggestedearlier,
we believethatthislackof clarity
at leastinpartfromthefactthatfewscholarsfocus
results
on theempiricallinksbetweenjudicialdynam
specifically
icsand regime
This isnot tosuggestthatstudy
dynamics.
ingjudicialpoliticsforitsown sake isnot important-it
obviouslyis.But giventheconsensusthatcourtshave the
insub
democratic
potentialtoaffect
qualityand stability
stantial
ways-and that thequalityof democracy
may
influence
courtbehavior-focusedinquiry
on thecourts
regimeconnectionshouldbe of paramountimportance.
It isno longerreasonabletoarguethatLatinAmerican
courts
areunderstudied.
Theyarelessstudied
than
arethe
but theyare thefocus

and legislatures,
executives
region's
ofmore inquirythanin thepast,and are thesubjectof
more recentresearchthancourtsin anyotherregionof
Yetwhile judicialpoliticsinLatin
world.188
thedeveloping
we
vibrantnew fieldof inquiry,
Americaisan undeniably
program
Whether theresearch
stillhavemuch to learn.
spreadsitswingswill depend in greatparton howwell
past studiesand buildson
futureresearchincorporates
and on
themes,
research
themto addressunder-analyzed
employ
scholars'carefuluse of conceptsand systematic
program's
methods.Given theresearch
ment of research
theinter
momentum,
and
andcurrent
strong
foundations
address
estLatinAmerica'scourtscontinueto generate,
worthyendeavor.
ingthesechallengesisan especially
Notes
1974.
5 Huntington 1991.
6 Stotzky 1993.
7 E.g., Hammergren 1998; Prillaman 2000; Ungar
2002.
8 E.g., Buscaglia et al. 1997; Buscaglia and Ulen
1997; Castelar Pinheiro 2000.
9 E.g., MacAdams
1997; Barahona De Brito,
and Aguilar 2001.

Gonzalez-Enriquez,
and Pinheiro 1999;
10 E.g., M?ndez, O'Donnell,
O'Donnell
1994. More recentwork in this vein
includes Brinks 2008.

research on Latin American courts, of course,
is published in Latin America, in Spanish or Portu
guese.While some of thework considered here
11 Most
that
references
literature,
we
recognize
that
the
English-language consumption of local literature

may
not
always
accurately
reflect
local
debates.
We
firmlybelieve that a major goal of U.S.-based schol

arswho contribute to this research program should
be to enter into dialogue with the authors of the
literatureproduced in the region and hope that our
discussion of one segment of the literaturewill serve
to
encourage
such
Gloppen, Gargarella, and Skaar 2004; Sieder,

Schjolden, and Angel? 2005; Gargarella, Domingo,
and Roux 2006; and Peruzzotti and Smulovitz
2006a. Five published dissertations are Chavez
2004a;Helmke 2005;Hilbink 2007; Finkel2008;
and Taylor 2008.

14 See, for instance, Larkins 1998b; Skaar 2002; Mag
aloni 2003; and Finkel 2005, 2008.
15 Faro de Castro 1997; Domingo 2004; and Sieder,
Schjolden, and Angel?, for example, all investigate
the judicialization of politics in the region.
16 Among the issues explored in studies of courts in
authoritarian regimes (e.g., Fuenzalida Faivovich

2003; Pereira 2005; Hilbink 2007; Ginsburg and
Moustafa 2008) arewhy and how courts supported
military usurpation of the democratic rule of law,
what effects theyhad on authoritarian regimes'
1 Epstein 1999.
2 E.g., Chavez 2004b.
3 Widner2001.
4 Trubek and Galanter
outside this temporal horizon: Kapiszewski 2007

and Taylor 2008.
13 The main compilations are Friedman and P?rez
Perdomo 2003; Mainwaring andWelna 2003;
collaboration.
12 The bulk of the literaturewas published post-1993.

While we strove to examine both the political sci
ence and law literatures,given the abundance of

on
judicial politics in
political science literature
Latin America and given that legal scholarship less
often has a judicial politics bent, our searchwas
We apologize to any au
tilted towards the former.
thorwho feels he or she has been incorrectly ex
cluded as the result of our necessary, but inherently
we have taken the
subjective, decisions. Finally,
twoworks that fall
of
authors' privilege
including
policy goals, and towhat degree they protected

human rights.
17 E.g., Uprimny 2004.

18 E.g., Iaryczower, Spiller, andTommasi 2002;
Helmke 2002, 2005; Chavez 2003, 2004a, 2004b;
Finkel 2003; Scribner 2004.
19 E.g., Staton 2004.
20 Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2000, 2003.
21 Domingo 2000.
22 Brinks 2005.
23 Colon 2003; Navia and Rios-Figueroa 2005; Rios
Figueroa 2006.
24 Hilbink 2003, 2007; Couso 2002, 2004, 2005a.
25 Huneeus 2006; Staton 2002.
26 Stein et al. 2006.
27 Rios-Figueroa and Taylor 2006.

28 E.g., Arantes 2000; Rodr?guez, Uprimny, and
Garc?a-Villegas 2003; Wilson 2005; Wilson and
Rodr?guez Cordero 2006.
29 E.g., Ballard 1999 on privatization; Skaar 2002 on
human rights; and Macaulay 2005 on domestic
violence.
30 Iaryczower, Spiller, and Tommasi 2006, 94.

31 Note thatwe have excluded from our sample work
that examines social and economic rights litigation
but
does
not
reference
courts'
effects
on
socio
economic policy-, such work falls under the third

research themementioned in the Introduction and
thus outside the purview of this analytic review.
The fact that littleof thework on social and eco
nomic rights litigation in Latin America addresses
the policy implications of judicial decisions illus
trates our
claim,
made
later
in the article,
that
the
literatureon judicial politics in the region seldom

December
2008
1Vol.
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757
Articles
examines compliance with or the broader aftermath

of judicial decisions.
32 Courtis 2006.
33 Lima Lopes 2006, 203.

34 Uprimny2006.
35 E.g., Verner 1984; Rosenn 1987.

36 For instance, Staats, Bowler, and Hiskey 2005 evalu
ate judicial performance
using a composite measure
comprising judicial independence, efficiency,access,
accountability, and effectiveness.
37 Navia and Rios-Figueroa 2005.
38 As in Skaar 2002; Colon 2003; Rios-Figueroa 2006.
39 E.g. Nino 1993 on Argentina; Farer 1995 on the
region as a whole; and several pieces from a sympo

sium on judicial review in the SouthwesternJournal
ofLaw and Trade in theAmericas (Barker 2000 on
Mexico; Friedler 2000 on Chile; Furnish 2000 on
Costa Rica; Rosenn 2000 on Brazil; andWilson
2000 on the region as a whole).
40 E.g., Faro de Castro 1997 and Arantes 2005, both
addressing Brazil.
41 E.g., Fiss 1993, examining Argentina and Chile.
42 E.g., L?pez-Ayll?n and Fix-Fierro 2003 addressing
Mexico.
43 E.g., P?rez Perdomo 2005 exploring Venezuela.
44 Wilson 2005.
45 Cepeda Espinosa 2005, 90-91.

46 Smulovitz 2006; Behrend 2006.
47 Galanter
1974.
48 Taylor2006b, 2008.
49 This phenomenon is perhaps best described?

outside the Latin American case?by Stone 1992,
1995.
50 E.g., Ballard 1999; Kapiszewski 2007.

51 Finkel2004.
52 Ramos Romeu 2006 comes to similar conclusions in
his large cross-national study of constitutional
courts. Ginsburg 2003, in his study of a trio of
Asian cases, refers to this delegation of power to the
courts as the outcome of "electoral market
logic;"
the "hegemonic preservation thesis" expounded in
Hirschl 2004 is also similar.
53 Domingo 2004. Whittington 2005 makes a similar
point regarding theU.S. Supreme Court.
54 Gloppen, Gargarella, and Skaar 2004.
55 See also Dodson and Jackson 2003.
56 Faro de Castro 1997, 251.
57 Couso 2002, 5. A logical question that arises with
regard to theChilean case iswhether a court that
58
59
60
61
758
must limit its actions in order to retain its

indepen
dence is, in fact, independent to begin with.
Cepeda Espinosa 2005; Uprimny 2004.
Gloppen, Gargarella, and Skaar 2004
As Santiso 2004 suggests.
As Gargarella 2004 argues.
62 As we will explain in furtherdetail below, while

some analysts of judicial dynamics consider
judicial
challenges to the exercise of government power to be
an indicator of
judicial independence, we under
stand such challenges to the elected branches as
demonstrations of judicial power.

63 E.g., Gargarella 2004. The "strategic revolution' that
has occurred in the study of judicial politics in other
parts of theworld (e.g., Epstein and Knight 2000)
has not yet had a significant impact on the study of
judicial dynamics in Latin America. Nonetheless, a
subset of the surveyed literaturedraws on a "soft"
strategicmodel (often inspired byNorth andWein
gast 1989 andWeingast 1997, and more recently
Schedler, Diamond, and Plattner 1999 and Maravall
and Przeworski 2003) tomake arguments about the
emergence of checks and balances in the regions

new democracies
(e.g., Iaryczower, Spiller, and Tom
masi 2002, Chavez 2004a). Helmke 2002, 2005;
Staton 2002; and Scribner 2004 also employ the
strategic actor approach, and both Helmke and
Scribner, particularly, apply that approach within a

separation of powers framework. Herrero 2008
extends the analysis by suggesting that strategic
behaviour on theArgentine Supreme Court results
from the absence of ideologically-based political
parties inArgentina and the country's persistent
regime instability.
64 E.g., Iaryczower, Spiller, andTommasi
Scribner 2004.
2002, 713;
65 Helmke 2002, 291; Helmke and Sanders 2006.

66 Chavez 2004a, 164.
67 Scribner 2004 represents an exception, arguing that
Chilean judges can and do act strategically.
68 Hilbink 2007, 31.
69 E.g., Arantes 2005; Rios-Figueroa and Taylor 2006;
Kapiszewski 2007; and Taylor 2008.

70 L?pez-Ayll?n and Fix-Fierro 2003.
71 Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2003.
72 Staton 2002, 2004.
73 Helmke and Sanders 2006.
74 E.g., Helmke
masi 2002.
2002;
Iaryczower, Spiller, and Tom
75 Miller 1997.
76 Magaloni 2003.
77 Domingo 2004,
78 Couso2002.
123.
79 Rodriguez, Uprimny, and Garc?a-Villegas 2003.

80 Mirow 2004, 240.
81 Gloppen, Gargarella, and Skaar 2004, 1.
82 Farer 1995, 1299.
83 E.g., Linz and Stepan 1996.
84 Santiso2004;Wilson 2005.
85 Fiss 1993.
86 P?rez Perdomo 2005,
154.
87 Faundez 2005, 749.

88 Larkins 1998a.
89 Taylor 2008, eh. 6.
90 E.g., Domingo 2000.
91 We acknowledge that this is far easier said than

done. Scholars have fought over the proper defini
tion and conceptualization of democracy for de
cades, generating a vast literatureon the topic (see
Collier and Levitsky 1997 for one summary of the
issues). The challenging nature of the enterprise,
however, does nothing to diminish its importance.
92 Vallinder 1995, 13.
93 Faro de Castro 1997.
94 Couso 2005a.
95 Domingo 2004, 110.
1995, 2.
and
Sieder, Schjolden,
Angel? 2005, 11.
P?rez Perdomo 2005.
Iaryczower, Spiller, and Tommasi 2002, 699.
See, for example, Finkel 2003, 779; Verner 1984,
96 T?te and Vallinder

97
98
99
100
463.
101Miller 2000.
106 Chavez 2003, 419. We would highlight an addi

tional differentiation: between "formal" or "de jure"
political independence (the degree towhich courts
"should" be independent based on constitutional
of
budgetary
autonomy,
the rules
re
garding appointment and tenure, etc.), and "practi

cal" or "defacto" political independence (the degree
are able to take decisions
towhich
judges actually
without undo interferenceby other political ac
tors). Particularly in institutionally insecure con
texts,which some Latin American countries
represent, the difference between formal and practi
cal independence can be quite dramatic. For fur
therdiscussion of this distinction, see Feld and
Voigt 2003 and Rios-Figueroa 2006.
107 Couso 2005a.
108 Domingo 2000.
109 Brinks 2005; Shapiro 1981. To these first two
dimensions of independence, Domingo 2000, 708,
introduces a seldom-considered concern: indepen
dence from democratic pressures. To the degree
that such pressures are carried through the elected
branches of government, dimensions (1) and (2)
may
incorporate
her
solution to this problem, however, which analyzes

the frequencywith which theArgentine Supreme
Court ruled against the constitutionality ofmea
sures
taken
by
the government.
113 E.g., Taylor 2008, ch. 5, which analyzes the tactical

use of the courts by opposition parties in Brazil.
114 Epstein, Knight, and Shvetsova 2001.
115 Robert A. Kagan reminded us of one furtherprob
lemwith many measures of independence that is
extremely relevant in Latin America's more institu
tionally robust contexts. There are at least two
types of rulings against governments: those that are

"legally inescapable" (that is, required under cur
rent law and impossible for even themost depen
dent courts to avoid), and those that are
"escapable" (that is, not mandated by existing legal
tradition and doctrine). Of course, inmany parts
of Latin America, courts at times fail to rule to
102 Rios-Figueroa 2006.

103 Couso 2005a.
104 Rios-Figueroa and Taylor 2006.
105 Domingo 2000.
guarantees
courts should be more or less likely to rule against

the government, they each posit a connection
between rulings on cases involving government
interests,and judicial independence.
112 Iaryczower, Spiller, andTommasi 2002, 699. We
are somewhat less convinced by their practical
concern.
110 Rios-Figueroa 2006.

111 E.g., Helmke 2002, 2005; Chavez 2003, 2004a,
2004b; and Colon 2003. While there is some
divergence among these scholars in terms of the
conditions under which they suggest dependent
limit the exercise of government power evenwhen

such a decision would seem "legally inescapable."
Personal communication, September 17, 2006.

116 Another possibility is that courtsmay lack inde
pendence from powerful ?^-governmental actors,
and may rule against the government in order to
favor
those
allies. We
thank
an
anonymous
re
viewer for this insight.

117 We recognize, of course, that it can be quite diffi
cult to tie particular government actions to specific
judicial rulings.
118 Of the literature surveyed here, only fiveworks
reference "judicial power" and expressly focus on
defining,
operationalizing,
measuring,
and
explain
ing it: Staton 2002; Finkel 2003, 2005; Uprimny

2004; andWilson and Rodr?guez Cordero 2006.
119 Kapiszewski 2007.
120 Jurisdiction has been referred to as "institutional
scope" in Larkins 1998a, 423 and in Larkins
1998b, 612-13, and is part of Finkel's 2003 defini
tion of judicial power.
121 Gargarella 2004.
122 Taylor 2006b.
123 Wilson and Rodr?guez Cordero 2006.
124 Roux 2004, 93.
125 Of course, courts can challenge within existing
or go beyond them. Courts that
legal constraints,
issue decisions that go beyond existing legal con
straints are either acting illegally or are activist (or
both), with the interpretation of the court's behav
ior depending mainly upon the interpreter'spoint
December
2008
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Articles
of view. Such decisions may, but do not necessarily,

a
more power.
imply that court has
126 Staton 2002, 2006. Some scholars of judicial poli
tics in other regions (e.g. Caldeira and Gibson
1995 and Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird 1998) pose
just such a link, positing that "diffusepublic sup
port" may award courts "political capital" that
makes itmore difficult to challenge their decisions.
See also Kapiszewski 2007 on compliance in the
cases ofArgentina and Brazil.
127 E.g., Harvey 1961; Shapiro 1981; Fletcher 1996;

O'Donnell
2000; Maravall and Przeworski 2003;
and Tamanaha 2004.
128 Kapiszewski 2007 represents something of an
exception; she engages in an explicit discussion of
the term "politicization," suggesting it represents
one of several strategies elected leaders could adopt
in order to "shape" a high court.
129 E.g., Domingo 2004; Scribner 2004.
130 O'Donnell 1996, 1999,2003, and 2006 (which

discusses the "various accountabilities and their
inter-relations").The edited volumes areMainwar
2003; Gloppen, Gargarella, and
Skaar 2004; and Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006a
(which builds on Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2000
ing andWelna
and 2003).
131 Mainwaring 2003, 5. To their credit, the authors in

theMainwaring andWelna volume take seriously
the task of "defining and delimiting the concept"
(Mainwaring 2003, 3).
132 It is in this sense that the term is used, for instance,
in Larkins 1998b and Scribner 2004; in theMain
waring andWelna 2003 volume; in several chapters
in theGloppen, Gargarella, and Skaar 2004
volume; and inDomingo 2005. To organize this
understanding of accountability, Peruzzotti and
Smulovitz (2006b, 5-6) distinguish between
account
"political accountability" (or "democratic
to
which
refers
the
ability"),
"responsiveness of
to
the
preferences of
governmental policies
the electorate;" and "legal accountability" (or
"constitutional accountability"), which "refers
to a set of institutionalmechanisms aimed at
are
ensuring that the actions of public officials
legally and constitutionally framed." Peruzzotti
and Smulovitz also introduce the notion of "social

a framework to understand civil
accountability,"
and
media-based
effortstomonitor the
society
state action generated by the ineffective
of
legality
ness of "intra-state" forms of accountability
(2006b, 3-4).
133 As noted above, Gargarella 2004 and Santiso 2004
both use the term in this sense as do Staats,
Bowler, and Hiskey 2005.
134 E.g., Uprimny 2004; P?rez Perdomo 2005.
760
135 E.g., Helmke 2002; Hilbink 2007.

136 E.g., Couso 2002; Scribner 2004.
137 E.g., Huneeus 2006.
138 E.g. P?rez-Li??n, Ames, and Seligson 2006.

139 E.g., Staats, Bowler, and Hiskey 2005.
140 E.g., Dodson and Jackson 2003.
141 Fuenzalida Faivovich 2003.
142 P?rez Perdomo 2005.
143 E.g., L?pez-Ayll?n and Fix-Fierros 2003 data on
constitutional amendments and legal change and
Skaar s 2002 data on constitutional reforms.
144 Colon
2003; Rios-Figueroa 2006.

145 E.g. Iaryczower, Spiller, and Tommasi 2002 and
2006; Staton 2002; Rodriguez, Uprimny, and
Garc?a-Villegas 2003; Helmke 2002; and Scribner
2004.
146 Huneeus 2006.
147 For a substantial examination of such techniques,
see Brady and Collier 2004 or George and Bennett
2005.
148 E.g., Faro de Castro 1997; Domingo 2005.
149 E.g., P?rez Perdomo 2003; Wilson
150 E.g. Bergoglio 2003.
151 Larkins 1998b.
2005.
152 E.g. Domingo 2000 and Chavez 2004a.

153 E.g., Iaryczower, Spiller, and Tommasi 2002; Skaar
2002; Colon 2003; Scribner2004;Helmke 2005;
Taylor 2006b, 2008; P?rez-Li??n, Ames, and Selig

son 2006.
154 E.g., Staton 2002; Helmke 2005.
155 E.g., Helmke 2002; Iaryczower, Spiller, and Tom
masi 2002; Scribner 2004.
156 Notable exceptions include Skaar 2002; Chavez
2003, 2004a; Staton 2004; Beer 2006; and
Huneeus 2006.
157 Herrero 2008 represents an exception.
158 E.g., Scribner 2004; Rios-Figueroa 2006; and
Kapiszewski 2007.
159 E.g., Brinks 2005; Rios-Figueroa and Taylor 2006.
160 We thank an anonymous reviewer for reminding us
of these challenges.
161 Gloppen, Gargarella, and Skaar 2004; Gargarella,
Domingo, and Roux 2006.
162 Stated, for example, in Shapiro 2005, 278.
163 Drake andHilbink 2003, 25.
164 Epstein 1999, and by extension T?te 2002a,

2002b.
165 This question has been addressed by local scholars,
albeit not in English, as inKant de Lima 1989;
Werneck et al. 1997; Sadek 2006.
166 Again, this is not universally true:Miller 2000 and
Gargarella 2004 both discuss the personal loyalties
and motives ofArgentine Supreme Court justices,
for instance.
167 P?rez Perdomo 2006; Halliday
et al. 2008, 7.
168 Garro 2000; see Castilho and Sadek 1998; Arantes

2002; Sadek and Cavalcanti 2003; Kerche 2003;
McAllister 2008.
169 For an overview of judicial councils, seeHammer
gren 2002; for an examination of judicial reform
-.
Paulo: EDUC.
-.
in the region that includes an analysis of the role

of police, prosecutors, ombudsmen, and other
seeHammergren
important supporting actors,
2007.
170 Uprimny 2004, 66.
171 E.g., Beer 2006.
172 E.g., Eisenstadt 2004a, 2004b; Mozaffar and

Schedler 2002.
173 Kapiszewski 2007 represents an exception.
174 E.g., P?rez-Li??n, Ames, and Seligson 2006.
175 For a useful primer on law in the region, see
Oquendo 2006.
176 E.g., Courtis 2006; Couso
2006.
2006; and Uprimny
177 The Center for the Study of Law and Society at

UC Berkeley is currently running a Sawyer Semi
nar on theDilemmas of Judicial Power, which it is
an edited volume with several
hoped will generate
on
Latin
America
chapters
addressing precisely this
question.
178 E.g., Diamond

1999; Linz and Stepan 1996.
179 E.g., Wilson and Rodr?guez Cordero 2006; Taylor
2006b.
180 Arantes 2005; Lijphart 1999.
181 Wilson 2005, 62.
182 Gloppen, Gargarella, and Skaar 2004, 199.
183 E.g., Fuenzalida Faivovich 2003; P?rez Perdomo
2003, 2005.
184 P?rez Perdomo 2003, 2005.
185 Although it lies outside the temporal scope of this
essay and examines areas in addition to Latin
America, a robust discussion (rooted in compara
tive law) of the effectsof judicial review on democ
racy can be found in Schor 2008.
186 Scribner2004;Helmke 2005; andHilbink 2007

represent
important
exceptions.
187 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting

this insight.
188 Yet the gap is smaller thanwe might think.Munck
and Snyder note that articles about judicial institu
-.
tions represent about 1.9% of all published work
in the comparative politics subfield,while work on
the executive and legislative branches together
represents 6.6% (2007, 9).
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American Political Science Association

Cambridge University Press

Diana Kapiszewski and MatthewM. Taylor

ourtsare at theheartof a newwave of political

I Doing Courts Justice?

Main Research Questions

the large and heterogeneous

Note: publisheddissertationsare counted onlyonce, as books.

TheBoundaries ofOur Inquiry

Note:We have excluded fromthiscount edited volumes

I Doing Courts Justice?

thanitmighton thefactthatnot all judicialintervention A secondsubsetof literature

accessedbya smallnumberof actors.48

These and relatedquestionswill gain increasing

I Doing Courts Justice?

heartofquestionsof judicialpowerand judicialpoliticsin

JudicialDynamics and Democracy

I Doing Courts Justice?

Threemain conceptualproblemsplaguestudiesof judi

Debates aboutvariationin judicialization

There aremany difficulties

I Doing Courts JUstice?

Judicialpower. The term"judicialpower" is used far

In thissection,we critiquewhat we see as the insuffi

I Doing Courts Justice?

data on lawcoursesand judicialsalaries;141

The bulk of the researchsurveyed

I Doing Courts Justice?

academics(and legaleducation)may have on judicial lateralentryispermitted,

I Doing Courts Justice?

but theyare thefocus

and Aguilar 2001.

includes Brinks 2008.

English-language consumption of local literature

firmlybelieve that a major goal of U.S.-based schol

Gloppen, Gargarella, and Skaar 2004; Sieder,

2004a;Helmke 2005;Hilbink 2007; Finkel2008;

and Taylor 2008.

authoritarian regimes (e.g., Fuenzalida Faivovich

outside this temporal horizon: Kapiszewski 2007

12 The bulk of the literaturewas published post-1993.

ence and law literatures,given the abundance of

policy goals, and towhat degree they protected

17 E.g., Uprimny 2004.

27 Rios-Figueroa and Taylor 2006.

30 Iaryczower, Spiller, and Tommasi 2006, 94.

economic policy-, such work falls under the third

literatureon judicial politics in the region seldom

I Doing Courts Justice?

examines compliance with or the broader aftermath

33 Lima Lopes 2006, 203.

35 E.g., Verner 1984; Rosenn 1987.

region as a whole; and several pieces from a sympo

43 E.g., P?rez Perdomo 2005 exploring Venezuela.

45 Cepeda Espinosa 2005, 90-91.

49 This phenomenon is perhaps best described?

50 E.g., Ballard 1999; Kapiszewski 2007.

must limit its actions in order to retain its

62 As we will explain in furtherdetail below, while

demonstrations of judicial power.

emergence of checks and balances in the regions

Scribner, particularly, apply that approach within a

65 Helmke 2002, 291; Helmke and Sanders 2006.

Kapiszewski 2007; and Taylor 2008.