PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND

CORRESPONDENCE
Ople v. Torres
BLAS F. OPLE v. RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR
VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA
REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD
OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Facts:
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to
prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice
Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men." Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative
Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification
Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz:
(1) it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and
(2) it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.
We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need
stronger barriers against further erosion.
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January
22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant
petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the
heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency
Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308.
On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its
implementation.

Issue: WON the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity of A.O. No. 308
Ruling: YES
Rationale:
As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues
relating to the standing to sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of the case at
bar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal interest to
uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be
promulgated.
These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a
distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the
requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308

is a usurpation of legislative power. 4 As taxpayer and member of the Government

Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the
misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O.
No. 308.
The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that
the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner
Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action
is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects.
Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O.
No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent
Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the
manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. Respondent Executive
Secretary Torres has publicly announced that representatives from the GSIS and
the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identification system.
All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O.
No. 308 and we need not wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on
its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that we tighten the rule
on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an
important constitutional principle and a fundamental right.

Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals

253 SCRA 699 [GRN. 107383, February 20, 1996]
FACTS: Petitioner, Cecilia Zulueta is married to private respondent, Dr. Alfredo
Martin. That petitioner accused her husband of infidelity. That on March 26, 1982,
petitioner went to the clinic of private respondent, who is a doctor of medicine,
without the consent of the latter. That on the same date mentioned, petitioner
opened the drawers and cabinet of her husband and took 157 documents and
papers consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged
paramours. The documents found by petitioner were seized for use as evidence in
a case for legal separation filed by Zulueta. Dr. Martin brought this action below
for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against petitioner.
The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, decided in favor of private
respondent, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of properties described
and ordering petitioner to return the properties to Dr. Martin and pay him nominal
and moral damages and attorneys fees, and cost of the suit. Furthermore,
petitioner and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from using or
submitting/admitting as evidence the documents and papers in question.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision made by the Regional Trial
Court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the documents and papers in question are admissible in evidence.
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court held that the documents and papers in question
are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy
of communication and correspondence [to be]

inviolable(Sec.3,Par.1,Art.III,1987 Consti) is no less applicable simply because

it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the
party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the provision in the constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a]
court or when public safety or order requires otherwise as provide by
law.(Sec.3,Par.1,Art.III,1987 Consti) Any violation of this provision renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
(Sec.3,Par.2,Art.III,1987 Consti)
A person, by contracting marriage does not shed his/her integrity or his right to
privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him
or to her.
The law ensures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by
making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other
without consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.
(Sec.22,Rule130,Rules of Court). Neither maybe examined without the consent of
the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other
during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. (Sec.24,Rule130,Rules of
Court)
PETITION DENIED.

Ayer Production v. Capulong

FACTS:
Petitioner Hal McElroy is an Australian filmmaker planning to reenact the historic
peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA, in a film. The motion picture is entitled
The Four Day Revolution. This would be done through the eyes of 4 fictional
characters situated in the Philippines during the days surrounding the revolution.
The project was also to be done with the help of Australian playwright David
Williamson and American historian Al McCoy.
When discussed with local movie producer, lope V. Juban, Ayer Productions was
told to get the consent of certain government agencies, as well as that of Gen.
Ramos and Sen. Enrile. All the proper consent was given, except by Enrile who
did not want his name, or that of his family, to be used in the film. Ayer
Productions decided to go on with the film, but delete the name of Sen. Enrile.
During the filming, Sen. Enrile filed a complaint in Court for a TRO to enjoin
petitioner Ayer from filming, saying that the making of the movie without
respondents consent as a violation of his right to privacy. A writ of
preliminary injunction was issued upon Ayer as a result.
Ayer then filed with the SC through a petition of certiorari. The court granted a
TRO on the injunction, allowing Ayer to film those parts of the movie not related
to Sen. Enrile.
Respondent invokes the right to privacy. Petitioner invokes
expression.
ISSUE:

freedom of

WON the medias freedom of expression may encroach on the right to privacy of
a public figure.
HELD: Yes it may
RATIO:
The case is basically one of superiority of rights; the filmmakers freedom of
expression vs. Enriles right to privacy. In the case at bar, the Court decided that
freedom of expression must prevail.
(Some important things to note are that freedom of expression extends to local
and foreign filmmakers in the country. It also extends to public and private film
companies.)
Now the court says that the right to privacy is not absolute. Allowable is a limited
intrusion where the person is a public figure and the information is of public
interest. In this case, the subject matter is of public interest as it was a historical
event, and Sen. Enrile played a big part in this event, thus making his character a
public figure. Therefore, a limited intrusion is allowable. Furthermore, the
portrayal of Sen. Enrile is not the main focus of the film, but is necessary, again,
due to the large part he played in it. Private respondent is a public figure
precisely because, inter alia, of his participation as a principal actor in the
culminating events of the change of government in February 1986.
(This was contrasted to an earlier ruling regarding the life of Moises Padilla. But in
that case, Moises Padilla was the main focus of the film. Enrile is not so in this
one.)
The Court also talks about the privilege of enlightening the public, which is the
privilege of the press. The Court said that this privilege is also extended to film.
Brought up were 2 doctrines. The clear and present danger doctrine and the
balancing of interest doctrine. These are seen as limitations upon the freedom
of expression. However, use of either would not matter as the result would be the
same.
On the balancing of interest rule: The principle requires a court to take
conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a
given situation or type of situation.
WHAT ITS ABOUT: ENRILE EDSA DOCUMENTARY
Petitioner was to create a 6 hour mini-series featuring the ESDA 1 Revolution
and the events leading to it. It has already gotten approval from the MTRCB and
Gen. Fidel Ramos.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, however, stated that he will not approve of the use,
appropriation, reproduction, or exhibition of his name, picture, or any member of
his family and stated that no reference whatsoever should be made to him or any
member of his family.
Enrile also filed for a Temporary Restraining Order in the RTC which was
approve by Hon. Judge Capulong. The TRO ordered petitioner to cease and desist

from producing and filming the mini-series, but was eventually partially lifted to
only enjoin them from making reference to Sen. Enrile.
Petitioners claim that the film is an exercise of free speech, while Enrile claims
that the film is an intrusion into his right to privacy.
The Court held that the film is not an intrusion into the privacy of respondent.
It does not relate to the individual life of Enrile, and the extent of the intrusion
would be limited in character and is one of public concern.
THE COUNTERBALANCING something. Look for it. Find.
Balance of Privacy and Expression
A limited intrusion into a persons privacy has long been regarded as permissible
where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from
him or to be published about him constitute matters of a public character.
1. Constitutionally founded.
2. somethingsomething. Check the case.
3. The interest sought to be protected by the right of privacy is the right to be
free from unwarranted publicity from the wrongful publicizing of the private
affairs
and activities of an individual which are outside the realm of legitimate public
concern.
Public Figure, 3 reasons why they have a limited right to privacy.
1. They sought publicity and consented to it.
2. Their personalities and affairs have already become public, and could no longer
be regarded as private business.
3. Press has a privilege under the Constitution to inform the public about those
who have become legitimate public interest.
AYER PROD PTY. LTD v. JUDGE CAPULONG
160 SCRA 865 (1988)
FACTS:
Hal McElroy, an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Ayer
Productions Pty. Ltd. envisioned the filming for commercial viewing the historic
EDSA revolution. The proposed motion picture would essentially be a
reenactment of the events that made possible the revolution; it is designed to be
viewed ina 6-hour mini-series television play, presented in a docu-drama style,
creating 4 fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual
documentary footage as background.
In a letter dated 16 Dec 1987, Hal McElroy informed Juan Ponce Enrile about the
projected motion picture. Enrile replied that he would not approve of the use,
appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of
any member of his family in any cinema, film, or other medium of commercial
exploitation. Enrile further advised McElroy that in the production, showing, or
distribution of said or similar film, no reference whatsoever (whether written,
verbal or visual) should be made to him or any member of his family, much less
to any matter purely personal to him. McElroy acceded to this demand, deleted
Enriles name from the movie script, and proceeded with the project.

On 23 Feb 1988, Enrile filed a Complaint alleging that the production of the miniseries film without his consent and over his objection constitutes an obvious
violation of his right of privacy. The RTC ruled for Enrile and ordered the Ayer
Prod to cease and desist from producing and filming The Four Day Revolution.
ISSUE:
Whether Ayer Prod., in filming The Four Day Revolution, is validly exercising its
freedom of speech and of expression protected under the Constitution.
HELD:
YES. The right of freedom of expression occupies a preferred position in he
heirarchy of civil liberties (Phil Blooming Mills). It is not, however, without
limitations.
The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a
limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and
ofthe press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television
and the movies, is the balancing-of-interests test. The principle requires a court
to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests
observable in a given situation or type of situation.
Here, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by Enrile and the
right of freedom of expression invoked by Ayer Prod. Taking into account the
interplay of those interests, the SC holds that under the particular circumstances
presented, and considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement
entered into by Ayer Prod., the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld
particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are reached when
expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern.
Whether the balancing-of-interests test or the clear and present danger test b e
applied in respect of the instant Petitions, the Court believes that the production
and filming by Ayer Prod. of the projected motion picture does not, in the
circumstances of this case, constitute an unlawful intrusion upon Enriles right to
privacy.
Note: The Court also put into consideration that the portrayal of Enrile in the
movie was as a public figure. Public figure has been defined as a person who, by
his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or
calling which gives the public a legitimate in his doings, his affairs, and his
character, has become a public personage.
Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent, their right of privacy
for 3 reasons:
* they had sought publicity and consented to it
*their personalities and their affairs had already become public
*the press had a privilege, under the Constitution, to inform the public about th
ose who have become legitimate matters of public interests.

In the case at bar, film was not intrusive of Enriles right to privacy because he
was a public figure. The court defined public figure as a person who, by his
accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling
which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his
character, has become a public personage. It includes anyone who has arrived
at a position where public attention is focused upon him as a person. As a public
person, Enrile had lost, to some extent, their right to privacy. Aside from that, the
EDSA Revolution was clearly a subject matter of public interest. It was
not about the personal life of Enrile. It merely included Enrile as a public figure
and not as a private person. Since only his actions as a public figure are referred
to in the film, a license from Enrile was not needed to show such actions.

G.R. No. L-32066 August 6, 1979

LAGUNZAD vs. VDA. DE GONZALES & CA
FACTS
Petitioner Manuel Lagunzad, a newspaperman, began the production of a movie
entitled "The Moises Padilla Story" portraying the life of Moises Padilla, a
mayoralty candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the Municipality of Magallon,
Negros Occidental and for whose murder, Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of
the Liberal Party then in power and his men were tried and convicted.

[GR 32066, Aug. 6, 1979]

Although the emphasis of the movie was on the public life of Moises Padilla, there
were portions which dealt with his private and family life including the portrayal in
some scenes, of his mother, Maria Soto, private respondent herein, and of one
"Auring" as his girl friend.

Petitioner Manuel Lagunzad, a newspaperman, began the production of a movie

entitled "The Moises Padilla Story" under the name of his own business outfit, the
"MML Productions." It was based mainly on the copyrighted but unpublished book
of Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr., entitled "The Long Dark Night in Negros" subtitled
"The Moises Padilla Story.

Padillas half sister, for and in behalf of her mother, Vda. de Gonzales, objected to
the "exploitation" of his life and demanded in writing for certain changes,
corrections and deletions in the movie.

Lagunzad v. Gonzales

The Supreme Court held that while it is true that petitioner had purchased the
rights to the book, that did not dispense with the need for prior consent and
authority from the deceased heirs to portray publicly episodes in said deceased's
life and in that of his mother and the members of his family. As held by the court,
a privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a deceased person to protect
his memory, but the privilege exists for the benefit of the living, to protect their
feelings and to prevent a violation of their own rights in the character and
memory of the deceased.
Petitioner's averment that private respondent did not have any property right
over the life of Moises Padilla since the latter was a public figure, is likewise not
well taken by the court. It ruled that the right to invade a person's privacy to
disseminate public information does not extend to a fictional or novelized
representation of a person, no matter how public a figure he or she may be. In
the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-tolife story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little romance in
the film because without it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality.
In the case at bar, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by
respondent and the right of freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. Taking
into account the interplay of those interests, it was held under the particular
circumstances of this case, and considering that the petitioner assumed
obligations under a Licensing Agreement, the validity of such agreement will have
to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are reached
when expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern.

After some bargaining as to the amount to be paid Lagunzad and Vda. de

Gonzales, executed a "Licensing Agreement" whereby the latter as LICENSOR
granted Lagunzad authority and permission to exploit, use, and develop the life
story of Moises Padilla for purposes of producing the picture for consideration of
P20,000.00.
Lagunzad paid Vda. de Gonzales the amount of P5,000.00. Subsequently, the
movie was shown in different theaters all over the country.
Because petitioner refused to pay any additional amounts pursuant to the
Agreement, Vda. de Gonzales instituted the present suit against him praying for
judgment in her favor ordering petitioner 1) to pay her the balance of
P15,000.00, with legal interest from the filing of the Complaint; and 2) to render
an accounting of the proceeds from the picture and to pay the corresponding 21/2% royalty therefrom, among others.
Petitioner contended in his Answer that the episodes in the life of Moises Padilla
depicted in the movie were matters of public knowledge and occurred at or about
the same time that the deceased became and was a public figure; that private
respondent has no property right over those incidents; that the Licensing
Agreement was without valid cause or consideration and constitutes an
infringement on the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press;
and that he paid private respondent the amount of P5,000.00 only because of the
coercion and threat employed upon him. As a counterclaim, petitioner sought for
the nullification of the Licensing Agreement,
Both the trial court and the CA ruled in favor of Vda. de Gonzales.

ISSUES
1.
2.

3.

WON the fictionalized representation of Moises Padilla is an intrusion

upon his right to privacy notwithstanding that he was a public figure.
WON Vda. de Gonzales., the mother, has any property right over the
life of Moises Padilla considering that the latter was a public figure.
WON the Licensing Agreement constitutes an infringement on the
constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press.

into account the interplay of those interests, and considering the obligations
assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity of
such agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom
of expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of essentially
private concern.

RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

Miranda v. Arizona

HELD
1.YES
Being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto a person's
right to privacy. The right to invade as person's privacy to disseminate public
information does not extend to a fictional or novelized representation of a person,
no matter how public a figure he or she may be. In the case at bar, while it is
true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-to-life story of Moises Padilla,
petitioner admits that he included a little romance in the film because without it,
it would be a drab story of torture and brutality.
2. YES
Lagunzad cannot dispense with the need for prior consent and authority from the
deceased heirs to portray publicly episodes in said deceased's life and in that of
his mother and the members of his family. As held in Schuyler v. Curtis, "a
privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a deceased person to protect his
memory, but the privilege exists for the benefit of the living, to protect their
feelings and to prevent a violation of their own rights in the character and
memory of the deceased."
3.NO
Lagunzad claims that as a citizen and as a newspaperman, he had the right to
express his thoughts in film on the public life of Moises Padilla without prior
restraint. The right of freedom of expression, indeed, occupies a preferred
position in the "hierarchy of civil liberties." It is not, however, without limitations.
One criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press is
the "balancing-of-interests test." The principle requires a court to take conscious
and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given
situation or type of situation."
In the case at bar, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by
respondent and the right of -freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. Taking

A look into the Supreme Court case of Miranda v Arizona, and how it changed
suspect rights
Of all cases to make its way to the Supreme Court, Miranda v Arizona may well
be the most popular to date. Virtually everyone has heard of the "Miranda Rights"
which are read to suspects. While many people may be familiar with the
terminology from television shows, not nearly as many understand the true
origins of the Miranda rights. The actual case of Miranda v Illinois may be the
case the "Miranda Rights" are named after, but several other Supreme Court
decisions all came together to form the ruling, including Escabedo v Illinois.
However, since Miranda was the final case to be decided at the time covering this
issue, it is considered the father of the "Right to remain silent."
On March 13, 1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested at Arizona his home. The
police took him into custody, and transported him to a Phoenix police station. The
witness whom had filed the complaint identified him. Miranda was then lead to
the interrogation room. Then, the police officers proceeded to question him.
Miranda had never been informed of his rights prior to the questioning. He was
never told he had the right to an attorney to be present during the questioning.
After two hours, the officers had succeeded in getting a written confession signed
by Miranda. Located on the top of the confession was a typed paragraph stating
that the confession was voluntary, without any promises of immunity or threats.
The statement also said that Miranda signed the confession "with full knowledge
of my legal rights, understanding any statement I make may be used against
me."
When Miranda's case went to trial, the prosecution used the written confession as
evidence against him. The defense objected, asking for the evidence to be
suppressed. However, the judge allowed the confession to be admitted. Miranda
was convicted of all counts, which consisted of kidnapping and rape. On each
count he was sentenced to 20 to 30 years, with the sentences running
concurrently. On Miranda's first appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona ruled that
his rights had not been violated by the admission of the confession, and therefore
affirmed the conviction. The basis for the decision was connected to the fact that
Miranda never specifically requested council.
Miranda eventually appealed his case to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
ruled that based off the testimony given by the police officers, and the admission

of Miranda, it was obvious that he had never been told in any form of his right to
council, or his right to have one during his questioning. The court also stated that
Miranda was never informed of his right to not be compelled to incriminate
himself. The Court also stated that without these warnings, all statement from
Miranda were inadmissible. They went on to rule that, just because the
confession had a typed statement saying Miranda had full knowledge of his rights,
never reaches the level needed for one to intelligently waive their constitutional
rights. Based on this information, the Supreme Court reversed the decision.
The Supreme Court went on to say that the process of interrogation is
intimidating by its very nature, and that a suspect must be read his or her rights
to counteract this intimidation. The Court continued by specifically outlining how a
suspect must be informed of his or her rights. First, a suspect needs to be read
his rights only before he is to be interrogated. An officer may arrest a suspect
without reading the Miranda rights as long as her does not question or interrogate
the suspect in any way.
When questioning begins, the first statement to be made is "You have the right to
remain silent and refuse to answer questions. Do you understand?" The officer
must receive a verbal or written confirmation that the suspect understands his
right to remain silent. The officer is then to say "Anything you do say can and will
be used against you in a court of law. Do you understand?" Once again, as with
all the Miranda rights, the officer must have a verbal or written acknowledgement
of his right. The next statement is "You have the right to consult an attorney
before speaking to the police and to have an attorney present during questioning
now or in the future. Do you understand?" That statement is followed by "If you
cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you before any questioning if
you wish. Do you understand?" The next Miranda right states that "If you decide
to answer questions now without an attorney present you will still have the right
to stop answering at any time until you talk to an attorney. Do you understand?"
The last Miranda right specifically asks "Knowing and understanding your rights
as I have explained them to you, are you willing to answer my questions without
an attorney present?"
These Miranda rights have revolutionized the way police handle suspects. Most
judges hold these rights as critical to the due process of Americans. Simply
confusing one word, for example saying "anything you say may be used against
you", as opposed to "can and will be used against you", has been grounds for
dismissal. While some feel that it is unreasonable for the guilty to go free on
technicalities, it is currently held that it is necessary to occasionally allow the
guilty to go free to protect the innocent form undue hardship.

People v Mahinay
Facts: Accused was convicted for rape and homicide of a 12 year old girl. He
assailed the court decisions contending that his conviction was based on
circumstantial evidence that fails to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
that an extrajudicial confession was taken from him in violation of his
constitutional rights on custodial interrogation.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused merely on
ground of circumstantial evidence and not beyond reasonable ground and WON
his rights to lawful custodial investigation was violated.
Held: The court held that absence of direct proof does not necessarily absolve
him from any liability because under the Rules on evidence and pursuant to
settled jurisprudence, conviction may be had on circumstantial evidence provided
that the following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance;
(2). the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3). the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. The circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support
conviction must be consistent with each other which were proven in the case.The
extrajudicial confession taken from the accused was within the requirement of
Miranda rights and within lawful means where his confession was taken in the
presence of his lawyer.
Miranda Rights include:
1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be
informed in a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the
arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings,
information or communication must be in a language known to and understood
by said person;
2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that anystatement
he makes may be used as evidence against him;
3. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have
the presence of an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own
choice;
4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a
lawyer, one will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by
any person in his behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the
person arrested or one acting in his behalf;
5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed
that no custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the
presence of his counsel or after a valid waiver has been made;
6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to
communicate or confer by the most expedient means - telephone, radio, letter or
messenger - with his lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member of his
immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by
any one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with
duly accredited national or international non-government organization. It shall be
the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished;
7. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided
it is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood
the same;
8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be
informed that it must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel,
otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his
waiver and chooses to speak;
9. That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any
manner at any time or stage of the process that he does not wish to be

questioned with warning that once he makes such indication, the police may not
interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation must
ceased if it has already begun;
10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to
remain silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from
invoking it at any time during the process, regardless of whether he may have
answered some questions or volunteered some statements;
11. He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may
be, obtained in violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or
exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

People v. Obrero
G.R. NO. 122142 (2000)
Facts: A is a suspect in a crime. He was taken for custodial investigation wherein,
with the assistance of Attorney B., who was also the station commander of the
police precinct, he executed an extrajudicial confession.
Issue: Whether As right to counsel during a custodial investigation was violated.
Held: Yes. The Constitution requires that counsel assisting suspects in custodial
investigations be competent and independent. Here, A was assisted by Attorney
B., who, though presumably competent, cannot be considered an independent
counsel as contemplated by the law for the reason that he was station
commander of the police precinct at the time he assisted A. The independent
counsel required by the Constitution cannot be a special counsel, public or private
prosecutor, municipal attorney, or counsel of the police whose interest is
admittedly adverse to the accused.
***
Appellant was convicted of robberry with homicide.He executed a written
confession as a result of a custodial ivestigation.The issue is whether such is
valid.
Held:
The extrajudicial confession was invalid. The perfunctory reading of the Miranda
rights is inadequate to transmit information to the suspect. Also, Art IIISec12(1)
requires an independent and competent counsel of the suspects choice. Atty de
los Reyes was not an independent counsel being the PC Captain and Station
Commander. As held in P v Bandula, the independent counsel cannot be a special
prosecutor, private or public prosecutor, municipal attorney or counsel of the
police whose interest is adverse to the accused.
While there is evidence to the homicide consisting of the corpus delicti, there is
no evidence of the robbery except the confession. The lack of objection of
appellant to the introduction of the constitutionally proscribed evidence did not
satisfy the burden of proof which rested on the prosecution. Acquitted of robbery
with homicide.

Morales v. Enrile
Habeas Corpus The Right to Bail
In April 1982, Morales and some others were arrested while driving a motor
vehicle in Laong-Laan St, QC. They were charged in CFI Rizal for rebellion
punishable under the RPC. Morales alleged that they were arrested without any
warrant of arrest; that their constitutional rights were violated, among them the
right to counsel, the right to remain silent, the right to a speedy and public trial,
and the right to bail. Respondents countered that the group of Morales were
already under surveillance for some time before they were arrested and that the
warrantless arrest done is valid and at the same time the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus was already suspended.
ISSUE: Whether or not Morales et al can post bail.
HELD: Normally, rebellion being a non-capital offense is bailable. But because the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus remains suspended with respect to persons
at present detained as well as other who may hereafter be similarly detained for
the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and for all other crimes and offenses committed by them in
furtherance of or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith, the natural consequence is that the right to bail for the commission of
anyone of the said offenses is also suspended. To hold otherwise would defeat the
very purpose of the suspension. Therefore, where the offense for which the
detainee was arrested is anyone of the said offenses he has no right to bail even
after the charges are filed in court. The crimes of rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed
in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct attacks on the
life of the State. Just as an individual has right to self-defense when his life is
endangered, so does the State. The suspension of the privilege of the writ is to
enable the State to hold in preventive imprisonment pending investigation and
trial those persons who plot against it and commit acts that endanger the States
very existence. For this measure of self-defense to be effective, the right to bail
must also be deemed suspended with respect to these offenses. However, there is
a difference between preventive and punitive imprisonment. Where the filing of
charges in court or the trial of such charges already filed becomes protracted
without any justifiable reason, the detention becomes punitive in character and
the detainee regains his right to freedom. Quite notable in this case however is
that the 2nd division of the SC reiterated the Lansang Doctrine as opposed to what
they ruled in the Garcia-Padilla Case.

People v. Galit
PEOPLE vs. GALIT
MARCH 20, 1985
G.R. L-51770. 135 SCRA 465
CONCEPCION, JR., J.

Nature of the Case: Appeal from the Judgment of the Circuit Criminal Court of Pa
sig, Rizal.
FACTS
The defendant-appellant, Francisco Galit, was convicted for the crime of Robbery
with Homicide with death sentence as its penalty. Such being the case it is
subjected to the automatic review of the High Court. That on or about the 23rd of
August, 1977 in the municipality of Montalban, Province of Rizal, Mrs. Natividad
Fernando, a widow was found dead in the be droom of her house located at Barrio
Geronimo, Montalban, Rizal as a result of seven (7) stab wounds inflicted upon
the different parts of her body by a blant instrument. More than two (2) weeks
later, police authorities of Montalban picked up the herein defendant, an ordinary
contruction worker (pion) living in Marikina, Rizal on suspicion of the murder
based on the testimony of his son-in-law, Florentino Valentino. Valentino testified
that he heard accused Galit and hiswifes arguments in connection with the
robbery and killing of the victim which the former, together with two of his
accomplices, Juling Dulat and a certain Pabling perpetrated.

only evidence against the accused is his alleged confession. Such confession was
obtained after such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer which
does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his
rights under the Constitution and our laws. The court said that there should
instead be several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple
words in dialect or language known to the person under investigation. Accused is
from Samar and there is no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at
the time of his arrest, accused was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer,
a relative, or a friend, In fact his sisters were and other relatives did not know
that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about two
weeks after he had executed the salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit
him. His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet
during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment, again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. The court
declared that these constitute gross violations of his rights, hence, the alleged
confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as
evidence because they were obtained in a manner contrary to law.

People v. Rojas

ISSUE
Whether or not the alleged extra-judicial confession extracted and the pictures of
the supposed re-enactment obtained from the accused-defendant are admissible
as evidence?
RULING
After a review of the records, the Court found that the evidence presented by the
prosecution does not support a conviction. In fact, the findings of the trial court
relative to the acts attributed to the accused are not supported by competent
evidence. In the case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, the court laid down the correct
procedure for peace officers to follow when making an arrest and in conducting a
custodial investigation which, At the time the person is arrested, it shall be the
duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for his arrest ad he must
be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional
rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make
could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, pr anyone he chooses by the most
expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be
the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accompished. No
custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be conducted in the presence
of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone
on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be
valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in
violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in
whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
There were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from the accused, no state
witnesses and not even fingerprints of the accused at the scene of the crime. The

People v. Ayson
Facts:
Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its
Baguio City station. It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the
sales of plane tickets, the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted.
That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and
the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association
(PALEA)to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos stating his
willingness to settle the amount of P76,000.
The findings of the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of
tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered
a compromise however this did not ensue.
Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty.
Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos written admission and statement, to which
defendants argued that the confession was taken without the accused being represented by a
lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that accused was not reminded of
his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for
reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal
Issue:
Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence
theadmission and statement of accused.

Held:
No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against
self-incrimination (only to witnesses other than accused, unless what is
asked is relating to a different crime charged- not present in case at
bar).
This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of
subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding.
The right is not to "be compelled to be a witness against himself. It prescribes
an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of
inquiry." the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in
character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It
does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before
the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. It is a right that a witness knows or
should know. He must claim it and could be waived. Rights in custodial interrogation as
laid down in Miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the accused include: 1) he shall have
the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.2) nor
force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free
will shall be used against him.3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights
shall be inadmissible in evidence.
The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to
answer or make a statement. But unless and until such rights and waivers are demonstrated by
the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be
used against him

Gutang v. People
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 135406. July 11, 2000]
DAVID GUTANG Y JUAREZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Decision[1] dated September 9, 1998 rendered by the former Twelfth
Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19463. The assailed
Decision affirmed the judgment[2] dated October 13, 1995 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, finding petitioner David J. Gutang
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sections 8 and 16 of RA
6425, as amended, (for illegal possession and use of prohibited drugs) as
charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 2696-D and 2697-D, respectively.
The facts are as follows:
On March 5, 1994, accused-appellant David Gutang, together with
Noel Regala, Alex Jimenez and Oscar de Venecia, Jr., was arrested by
elements of the PNP NARCOM, in connection with the enforcement of a
search warrant[3] in his residence at No. 331 Ortigas Avenue, Greenhills,
San Juan, Metro Manila. When the police operatives of the PNP-NARCOM
served the search warrant, which was issued by Judge Martin Villarama,
Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, Metro Manila, they
found the petitioner and his three (3) companions inside the comfort
room of the masters bedroom, at the second floor of the house. [4] During
the search, the following materials were found on top of a glass table
inside the masters bedroom:
a. shabu paraphernalias, such as tooters;
b. aluminum foil;
c. two (2) burners (one small, one big);
d. fourteen (14) disposable lighters;
e. three (3) weighing scales;
f. plastic sealant used in repacking shabu;
g. several transparent plastic bags of different sizes;
h. about 1.4 grams of suspected marijuana fruiting tops contained in a
small white plastic;
i. about 0.7 gram of suspected dried marijuana contained in a small
plastic container.[5]

The PNP-NARCOM team also inspected the cars of accused Regala,

Jimenez and de Venecia, Jr. which were parked inside the compound of
the residence of petitioner Gutang. They found a Winchester Rayban
case (sunglasses) with an undetermined amount of suspected shabu
residues and tooters in a black plastic container and aluminum foil inside
the car of Regala. The cars of Jimenez and de Venecia, Jr. yielded
negative results. The items which were confiscated were then brought to
the crime laboratory of the Philippine National Police (PNP) at Camp
Crame, Quezon City for laboratory tests. The results of the laboratory
examinations showed that the said items found in the masters bedroom
of the residence of petitioner Gutang were positive for marijuana and
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). The items found inside the car
of Regala were also positive for shabu.
The findings are as follows:
PHYSICAL SCIENCES REPORT NO. D-168-94
CASE: Alleged Viol. Of RA 6425
SUSPECTS: DAVID GUTANG Y JUAREZ
NOEL REGALA Y YORRO
ALEX JIMENEZ Y ESPINOSA
CAREY DE VENECIA Y LOCSIN
TIME AND DATE RECEIVED: 1430H, 05 MARCH 1994
REQUESTING PARTY/UNIT: C, 2nd SOG NARCOM
Camp Crame, Q.C.
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Exh. A One (1) white plastic bag containing the following:
Exh. A-1 One (1) white film case with dried suspected marijuana fruiting tops
weighing 1.56 grams.
Exh. A-2 One (1) small black box with dried suspected marijuana fruiting tops
weighing 0.70 gram.
Exh. A-3 Two (2) pieces of improvised tooter with white crystalline residue.
Exh. A-4 Several foil and small plastic bag with white crystalline residue.
Exh. B One (1) white plastic bag marked ROEL REGALA containing the
following:
Exh. B-1 One (1) Winchester case with white crystalline substance.

10

Exh. B-2 One (1) black case containing several tooters with white crystalline
residue.
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of prohibited and/or regulated drug.
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave the following
results:
1. Exhs. A-1 and A-2 POSITIVE to the test for Marijuana, a
prohibited drug.
2. Exhs. A-3, A-4, B-1 and B-2 POSITIVE to the test for
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a regulated drug.
CONCLUSION
Exhs. A-1 and A-2 contain marijuana, a prohibited drug.
Exhs. A-3, A-4, B-1 and B-2 contain Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
(shabu) a regulated drug. xxx
REMARKS:
TIME AND DATE COMPLETED: 1630H, Or
6-8)

known as the Dangerous Drugs Act) as amended by Republic Act No.

7659. Incidentally, the charge against accused Oscar de Venecia, Jr. was
dismissed by the trial court in an Order [9] dated August 3, 1994 on the
ground that he voluntarily submitted himself for treatment, rehabilitation
and confinement at the New Beginnings Foundation, Inc., a private
rehabilitation center accredited by the Dangerous Drugs Board.
Upon arraignment, petitioner Gutang entered a plea of not guilty.
His
co-accused,
Regala
and
Jimenez,
likewise
pleaded
not
guilty. Thereafter, joint trial of the cases proceeded. However, petitioner
Gutang did not present any evidence.
After trial, the lower court rendered its decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the Court finds 1) accused DAVID GUTANG and
ALEXANDER JIMENEZ in Criminal Case No. 2696-D, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt for violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 as amended (Possession and use of
prohibited drug); and are hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of six (6) months
of arresto mayor to two (2) years, four (4) months of prision correccional and to
pay the costs; 2) In Criminal Case No. 2697-D (Possession) accused DAVID
GUTANG, NOEL REGALA and ALEXANDER JIMENEZ, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Section 16 (ibid) and are hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty
of six (6) months of arresto mayor to two (2) years, four (4) months of prision
correccional and to pay the costs; 3) accused NOEL REGALA, in Criminal Case No.
2698-D (Possession of regulated drugs) is hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of
six (6) months of arresto mayor to two (2) years, four (4) months of prision
correccional and to pay the costs.
The items confiscated are ordered forfeited in favor of the government and to be
disposed of in accordance with law.

March 1994
(Annex A, pp.

On the same day, March 5, 1994, immediately after Gutang, Regala,

Jimenez and de Venecia, Jr. were placed under arrest, they were brought
to the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame. According to PNP Forensic
Chemist Julita De Villa, their office received from PNP-NARCOM which is
also based in Camp Crame a letter-request for drug dependency test on
the four (4) men.[6] After receiving the said request, Mrs. Esguerra of the
PNP Crime Laboratory asked the four (4) men including the petitioner to
give a sample of their urine. The petitioner and his co-accused complied
and submitted their urine samples to determine the presence of
prohibited drugs. After examining the said urine samples, PNP Forensic
Chemist De Villa came out with Chemistry Report No. DT-107-94 [7] and
Physical Report No. DT-107-94[8] dated March 9, 1994, showing that the
said urine samples all tested positive for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).

SO ORDERED.[10]
The judgment of conviction of the lower court was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
Hence, this petition wherein the petitioner raises the following
assignments of error:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RECEIPT FOR
PROPERTY SEIZED; EXHIBIT I AND EXHIBIT R; THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE
REPORT NO. D-168-94. EXHIBIT D; THE CHEMISTRY REPORT NO. DT-10794, EXHIBIT L; AND THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE REPORT NO. DT-107-94,
EXHIBIT M ARE INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
II

Consequently, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 2696-D and

2697-D were filed in court against the petitioner and his companions for
violation of Sections 8 and 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, (otherwise

11

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PRESUMPTION OF

INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED HAS NOT BEEN OVERCOME BY PROOF BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
We affirm the conviction of the petitioner.
Petitioner insists that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence
Exhibits I and R, which are the Receipts of Property Seized,
considering that it was obtained in violation of his constitutional
rights. The said Receipts for Property Seized, which described the
properties seized from the petitioner by virtue of the search warrant,
contain his signature. According to petitioner, inasmuch as the said
evidence were obtained without the assistance of a lawyer, said evidence
are tantamount to having been derived from an uncounselled extrajudicial confession and, thus, are inadmissible in evidence for being
fruits of the poisonous tree.
We agree. It has been held in a long line of cases that the signature
of the accused in the Receipt of Property Seized is inadmissible in
evidence if it was obtained without the assistance of counsel. [11] The
signature of the accused on such a receipt is a declaration against his
interest and a tacit admission of the crime charged for the reason that, in
the case at bar, mere unexplained possession of prohibited drugs is
punishable by law. Therefore, the signatures of the petitioner on the two
(2) Receipts of Property Seized (Exhibits I and R) are not admissible in
evidence, the same being tantamount to an uncounselled extra-judicial
confession which is prohibited by the Constitution.
Petitioner further contends that since the Receipts for Property
Seized (Exhibits I and R) are inadmissible in evidence, it follows that the
Physical Science Reports Nos. D-168-94 and DT-107-94 (Exhibit D and M)
and Chemistry Report No. DT-107-94 (Exhibit L) finding the said items
seized to be positive for marijuana and shabu, are also inadmissible
inasmuch as they are mere conclusions drawn from the said Receipts and
hence a part thereof.
We disagree. The fact that the Receipts of Property Seized (Exhibits
I and R) are inadmissible in evidence does not render inadmissable the
Physical Science Reports (Exhibit D and M) and the Chemistry Report
(Exhibit L) inasmuch as the examined materials were legally seized or
taken from the petitioners bedroom on the strength of a valid search
warrant duly issued by Judge Villarama, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Metro Manila. Since the said materials were validly seized or taken
from the bedroom of the petitioner in his presence, the laboratory tests
conducted thereon were legally and validly done. Hence, the said
Reports containing the results of the laboratory examinations, aside from
the testimonial and other real evidence of the prosecution, are admissible
in evidence and sufficiently proved that the petitioner used and had the
said prohibited drugs and paraphernalia in his possession. In other
words, even without the Receipts of Property Seized (Exhibits I and R)
the alleged guilt of the petitioner for the crimes charged were proven
beyond reasonable doubt.

Petitioner also posits the theory that since he had no counsel during
the custodial investigation when his urine sample was taken and
chemically examined, Exhibits L and M, which are the respective
Chemistry and Physical Reports, both dated March 9, 1994, are also
inadmissible in evidence since his urine sample was derived in effect from
an uncounselled extra-judicial confession. Petitioner claims that the
taking of his urine sample allegedly violates Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution, which provides that:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or
things to be seized.
We are not persuaded. The right to counsel begins from the time a
person is taken into custody and placed under investigation for the
commission of a crime, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask
questions to elicit information and/or confession or admissions from the
accused. Such right is guaranteed by the Constitution and cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. However, what
the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communication from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body
in evidence, when it may be material. [12] In fact, an accused may validly
be compelled to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes
removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things
to be done, without running afoul of the proscription against testimonial
compulsion.[13] The situation in the case at bar falls within the exemption
under the freedom from testimonial compulsion since what was sought to
be examined came from the body of the accused. This was a mechanical
act the accused was made to undergo which was not meant to unearth
undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by
simple observation. In fact, the record shows that petitioner and his coaccused were not compelled to give samples of their urine but they in
fact voluntarily gave the same when they were requested to undergo a
drug test.[14]
Assuming arguendo that the urine samples taken from the
petitioner are inadmissible in evidence, we agree with the trial court that
the record is replete with other pieces of credible evidence including the
testimonial evidence of the prosecution which point to the culpability of
the petitioner for the crimes charged.
First of all, the petitioner has not satisfactorily explained the
presence in his bedroom of the assorted drug paraphernalia [15] and
prohibited drugs found atop a round table therein at the time of the raid.
[16]
Petitioners feeble excuse that he and his co-accused were not in the
masters bedroom but inside the comfort room deserves scant
consideration since the comfort room is part of the masters bedroom.
[17]
Prosecution witness Capt. Franklin Moises Mabanag, head of the said
PNP-NARCOM raiding team, testified that when petitioner was arrested,

12

the latter showed manifestations and signs that he was under the
influence of drugs, to wit:
By Fiscal Villanueva (To the witness)
Q: Mr. Witness, why was a drug defendant (sic) test requested on the persons
of David Gutang, Noel Regala, Alexander Jimenez and Oscar de Venecia?
A: A drug test was made on them because when we held these persons David
Gutang, Noel Regala, Alexander Jimenez and Oscar de Venecia, they
showed manifestations and signs that they are under the influence of
drugs.
Atty. Arias:
That is a conjectural answer. The witness is not authorized to testify on
that.
Fiscal Villanueva:
We agreed as to the expertise of this witness at the time when I was
qualifying him (interrupted)
By Fiscal Villanueva (To the witness)
Court:
At any rate, that was only his observation it is not necessarily binding to
the court, that is his testimony, let it remain.
Atty. Arias:
But the rule is clear.
Court:
That is what he observed.

It is worth noting that the search warrant was served only after
months of surveillance work by the PNP-NARCOM operatives led by Chief
Inspector Franklin Mabanag in the residence of petitioner. Earlier, a
confidential informant had even bought a gram of shabu from petitioner
Gutang. Prosecution witness Mabanag also found, during the
surveillance, persons who frequented the house of petitioner, and that
the confidential informant of the PNP-NARCOM had in fact gained entry
into the house. The police officers are presumed to have performed the
search in the regular performance of their work. Allegedly improper
motive on the part of the PNP-NARCOM team must be shown by the
defense, otherwise, they are presumed to be in the regular performance
of their official duties.[19] But the defense failed to do so.
All told, in the face of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it is
clear that petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
charged.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

Gamboa v. Cruz
Facts: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant. During a line-up of 5
detainees including petitioner, he was identified by a complainant to be a companion
in a robbery, thereafter he was charged. Petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit on the
ground that the conduct of the line-up, without notice and in the absence of his
counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process. The court
denied said motion. Hearing was set, hence the petition.

Fiscal Villanueva:
And what is this manifestation that you observed?
Atty. Arias:
Precisely, that is already proving something beyond what his eyes can
see.
Fiscal Villanueva:
That is part of his testimony.
Court:
Let the witness answer.
Witness:
I observed they are profusely sweating and their lips are dry, I let them
show their tongue and it was whitish and their faces are pale, reason why
we made the necessary request for drug test.[18]

Issue: Whether or Not petitioners right to counsel and due process violated.
Held: No. The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner
was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. He had not been held yet to answer
for a criminal offense. The moment there is a move or even an urge of said
investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which may
appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and
there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be
made in writing and in the presence of counsel.
On the right to due process, petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this
substantive and constitutional right, as he was duly represented by a counsel. He
was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to
substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted to file a
Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case. What due process abhors
is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.

13

GAMBOA v CRUZ
162 SCRA 642
PADILLA; June 27, 1988
NATURE
Peition for certiorari and prohibition to review the order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Br. 29
FACTS
Petitioner alleges that he was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant of arrest.
Thereafter, he was brought to Precinct 2, Manila where he was booked for vagrancy
and then detained therein together with several others. The next day, five
detainees, including petitioner, complainant Bernal pointed to petitioner and said,
that one is a companion. After the identification, the other detainees were brought
back to their cell but petitioner was ordered to stay on. While the complainant was
being interrogated by the police investigator, petitioner was told to sit down in front
of her. Subsquently, an information for robbery was filed against petitioner. He was
arraigned and thereafter hearings were held. The prosecution formally offered its
evidence and then rested its case. Petitioner, by counsel, instead of presenting his
defense, manifested in open court that he was filing a Motion to Acquit or Demurrer
to Evidence. Petitioner filed said motion on the ground that the conduct of the lineup without notice to, and in the absence of, his counsel violated his constitutional
rights to counsel and to due process. The respondent court issued an order denying
the Motion to Acquit. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE
WON the respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the assailed order
HELD
NO
If a defendant does not move to quash the complaint or information before
pleading, defendant is deemed to have waived all objections which are grounds for
a motion to quash, except where the complaint or information does not charge an
offense, or the court is without jurisdiction of the same. Here, petitioner filed a
Motion to Acquit only after the the prosecution presented its evidence and rested its
case. Since the exceptions above-stated, are not applicable, petitioner is deemed to
have waived objections which are grounds for a motion to quash. Besides, the
grounds relied upon by petitioner in his Motion to Acquit are not among the grounds
provided in Sec. 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court for quashing a complaint or
information. Consequently, the lower court did not err in denying petitioner's Motion
to Acquit.
Dispositive Petition dismissed.

US v. Wade

United States v. Wade

388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967)
Somebody wrapped their face up in tape and robbed a bank. The police
arrested Wade on suspicion of being the robber.

The police put Wade in a line-up with other people wearing tape, and he
was identified by two bank employees.
o This was done after Wade had been assigned an attorney but the
attorney was not notified of the line-up.
At trial, the employees again positively identified Wade as the robber.
The Trial Court convicted Wade of bank robbery. He appealed.
o Wade argued that the admission of the identifications was a
violation of his 6th Amendment right to counsel because his
attorney was not told about the line-up.
o Wade also unsuccessfully argued that being made to stand there
and let people look at his face was a violation of
his 5thAmendment right against self-incrimination.
The Appellate Court overturned the conviction. The prosecutor appealed.
o The Appellate Court found that once an identification is made
outside the presence of defense counsel, all futuer identifications
(either in-court or out of court) of the defendant by the witness
are inadmissible.
The US Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial.
o The US Supreme Court found that a defendant has
a 6th Amendment right to counsel not only at his trial but at any
critical confrontation by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings.
In cases of a line-up, it is possible that the police will
take some actions that will make it biased to the
defendant (the police may lead the witness into choosing
the suspect). Without a defense attorney present to
examine the facts of the identification, they cannot
adequately cross-examine the witness and thus cannot
provide effective counsel.
"Once a witness has picked out the accused at
the line-up, he is not likely to go back on his
word later on, so that in practice the issue of
identity may for all practical purposes be
determined there and then, before the trial."
Btw, when fingerprinting or DNA sampling, the
defense can always rebut with expert witnesses
after the fact. But forline-ups, it is difficult to
rebut at trial. Hence the need for counsel to
make sure that it is done correctly.
o The Court found that an in-court identification by a witness to
whom the accused was exhibited before trial in the absence of
counsel must be excluded unless it can be established that such
evidence had an independent origin or that the error in its
admission was harmless.
Once a witness has identified a defendant in a lineup without counsel being present, there will always be a
suspicion that there was a problem with the line-up.
Therefore, even if they identify the defendant in court,
you can never be sure if it is because they really know he
did it, or because they just remember seeing him in the
(faulty) line-up. So the prosecution has to show that they

14

1.

2.

3.

are making a good identification based on something

outside the line-up.
Aka the per se exclusionary rule.
o The Court remanded the case to see if there was any independent
evidence outside of the line-up that could account for the in-court
identification. If so, then the identification is admissible.
Otherwise, it would be inadmissible.
o The Court noted that, in theory, if another procedure (like
videotaping) was suggested, it might satisfy the constitutional
requirements and excuse the failure to have a lawyer present.
Basically, an in-court identification is "fruit of the poisonous tree" if there
was an unconstitutional out-of-court identification. But, if there is
anindependent source that the prosecution can point to, then the in-court
identification can be admissible.
o For example, if the witness, prior to the flawed line-up, worked
with a police sketch artist and made a drawing that looked exactly
like the suspect, that would be an independent source of evidence
to prove the reliability of the in-court identification.
F: was arrested in connection with a bank robbery. The robber had worn
two strips of tape on his face and had told the cashier to give me the
money. After being appointed counsel an F.B.I. agent put him in a lineup
with several prisoners, had them all put tape on their faces, and had them
say give me the money. Both employees of the bank identified as the
robber. At trial they pointed him out in the courtroom.
I: Will in court W identification be inadmissible where the police showed the
suspect to the W before trial in a lineup without notice to and in absence of
counsel?
H:

f.

The Wong Sun attenuation of the taint test should be used (was
there exploitation of the primary illegality or by means purged of
the taint?).

People v. Pavillare
PEOPLE VS. EDUARDO PAVILLARE G.R. NO. 129970 (2000)
Facts:
A, without the assistance of counsel, was identified by the complainant in a policeline up as one of the kidnappers. He was subsequently found guilty with kidnapping
for ransom.
Issue:
Whether the identification made by the complainant in the police line-up is
inadmissible because A stood up at the line-up without the assistance of counsel.
Held:
No. The Constitution prohibits custodial investigation conducted without
the assistance of counsel. Any evidence obtained in violation of the
constitutional mandate is inadmissible in evidence. The prohibition
however, does not extend to a person in a police line-up because
that stage of an investigation is not yet a part of custodial

a.

b.

c.
d.
e.

The accused is guaranteed (by the 6 Amendment) that he need

not stand alone against the State at any stage of the prosecution,
formal or informal, in court or out, where counsels absence might
derogate from the accuseds right to a fair trial.
A lineup is different than the mere gathering of evidence (e.g.,
fingerprints, blood sample, etc). They are scientific procedures the
accuracy of which is well known, and can be attacked at triali.e.,
there is no prejudice to the defendant of not having his L present.
A lineup is much more riddled with vagaries and variables which
might crucially derogate from a fair trial.
Both and his counsel should have been notified of the lineup,
and counsel should have been there absent an intelligent waiver.
Either legislatures or police departments can set up policies that
would take lineups out of the critical stage category, in which
case the 6th would not be violated if counsel were not informed.
But a per se rule of exclusion of courtroom identification is
unjustified. The govt. should have the opportunity to prove
w/clear and convincing evidence that the in-court i.d.s were based
on observations of the suspect other than lineup identification.
i.
But, a rule that solely excluded the
lineup evidence would render the 6th Amendment right an
empty one.
th

investigation. Custodial investigation commences when a person is

taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the
commission of the crime under investigation and the police officers
begin to ask questions on the suspects participation therein and
which tend to elicit an admission. The stage of the investigation
wherein a person is asked to stand in a police line-up is outside the
mantle of protection of the right to counsel because it involves a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime and is purely investigatory
in

nature.

Police line-ups
Kidnapping with ransom
Accused-appellants were charged and convicted of kidnapping for ransom for
abducting an Indian national.

He contends that the identification made by the

private complainant in the police line-up is inadmissible because the appellant stood
at the line-up without the assistance of counsel, and that the money given to them

15

was not ransom money but was given in exchange for their dropping of the charges
of rape against private complainant.

Sixth Amendment.

Held:
The accused-appellants defense is without merit.

before they have been interrogated is a denial of assistance of counsel under the

Section 12 (1) Art III of the

Facts. After being arrested and taken into police custody as a suspect in the murder

Commission states that Any person under investigation for the commission of an

of his brother-in-law, the petitioner asked to speak to his attorney. His attorney

offense shall have the right to remain silent and to have competent and

arrived at police headquarters soon after the petitioner did and was not allowed to

independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the

speak to his client as the officers said they had not completed questioning. The

services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Thus the prohibition for custodial
investigation conducted without the assistance of counsel. Any evidence obtained in
violation of the constitutional mandate is inadmissible in evidence. The prohibition

petitioner also was not warned of his right to remain silent before the interrogation.
He was convicted of murder and the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed. He was then
granted certiorari.

however, does not extend to a person in a police line-up because that stage of an
investigation is not yet a part of custodial investigation. It has been repeatedly held

Issue. If a suspect has been taken into police custody and interrogated by police

that custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is

without their request to see an attorney being honored, nor being advised of their

singled out as a suspect in the commission of the crime under investigation and the
police officers begin to ask questions on the suspects participation therein and
which tend to elicit an admission. The stage of an investigation wherein a person is
asked to stand in a police line-up has been held to be outside the mantle of
protection of the right to counsel because it involves a general inquiry into an

right to remain silent, have they been denied effective assistance of counsel under
the Sixth Amendment?
Held. Yes. Reverse the petitioners conviction and remand the case.

unsolved crime and is purely investigatory in nature. It has also been held that an

The Sixth Amendment protects the right to effective assistance of counsel. Here,

uncounseled identification at the police line-up does not preclude the admissibility of

because the police investigation focused on the accused as a suspect rather than a

an in-court identification.

less specific investigation, refusing to allow an accused to speak with his attorney is

The duration of the detention even if only for a few hours does not alter the nature

a denial of this Sixth Amendment right. The incriminating statements he made must

of the crime committed. The crime of kidnapping is committed by depriving the

victim of liberty whether he is placed in an enclosure or simply restrained from
going home. As squarely expressed in Article 267, above-quoted the penalty of

thus not be admitted into evidence.

A law enforcement system that relies too much on the confession is more subject to

death is imposable where the detention is committed for the purpose of extorting

abuses than one that depends on evidence obtained through skillful investigation.

ransom, and the duration of the detention is not material.

The result here recognizes this idea.

case digests, case digests of supreme court decisions, case digests Philippines,
mobile phone deals, laptop computers, gadgets, free legal opinion, online jobs, best
law firms in Mindanao

Dissent. Justice John Marshall Harlan dissented on grounds that this result will
place obstacles in the way of legitimate methods of criminal law enforcement. Also,

Escobedo v. Illinois

he thought Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958) demanded a different result.
Justice Potter Stewart believed that the right to assistance of counsel should not

Brief Fact Summary. The petitioner Danny Escobedo asked to speak with his

arise until indictment or arraignment, and that this contrary result would cause

lawyer while in police custody but before being formally charged and was denied.

problems for fair administration of criminal justice.

Justice Byron White expressed the opinion that this result would make statements

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Not allowing someone to speak with an attorney, and

made to police inadmissible without the accused waiving their right to counsel. He

not advising them of their right to remain silent after they have been arrested and

16

linguistic variations, deliberately required that the complaint or information be

read to the accused in the language or the dialectknown to him, to ensure his
comprehension of the charges. The Court takes judicial notice, because it is
either of public knowledge or readily capable of unquestionable demonstration,
that in the central and northwestern part of Iloilo province and all the way up
to and throughout Antique, including necessarily San Joaquin where the
offenses were committed and of which appellant and his family are natives,
the local dialect is known as kinaray-a. Barring previous exposure to or as a
consequence of extended social or commercial intercourse, kinaray-a is not
readily understandable to nor spoken by those born to the Hiligaynon regional
language or who have lived in the areas under its sway for an appreciable
period of time. The converse is true for those whose native tongue is the
dialect of kinaray-a, since they are generally not well-versed in Ilonggo, or
Hiligaynon. Since all the complaints are not only in English but in technical
legal language, we are again at sea as to whether and how the indictments
were translated to Ilonggo and/or to kinaray-a, or that the appellant was
truly and honestly made aware of the charges and, especially, the
consequences of his guilty plea thereto. The records are silent and do not
reveal anything on this point, nor how the dialogue between the presiding
judge and appellant was translated. Yet a mans life is at stake while this
Court wrestles with that dilemma created by an omission of official duty.

believed this would effectively render the voluntariness test of the Fourteenth
Amendment useless, and make law enforcement more difficult.

People v. Estomaca
EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 117485-86. April 22, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MELCHOR ESTOMACA y

GARQUE, accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1.

2.

REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA;

AN INTEGRAL ASPECT OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION. - Section 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the arraignment
should be made in open court by the judge himself or by the clerk of court
furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or information with the list of
witnesses stated therein, then reading the same in the language or dialect that
is known to him, and asking him what his plea is to the charge. The
requirement that the reading be made in a language or dialect that the
accused understands and knows is a mandatory requirement, just as the
whole of said Section 1 should be strictly followed by trial courts. This the law
affords the accused by way of implementation of the all-important
constitutional mandate regarding the right of an accused to be informed of the
precise nature of the accusation leveled at him and is, therefore, really an
avenue for him to be able to hoist the necessary defense in rebuttal thereof. It
is an integral aspect of the due process clause under the Constitution.
ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT THAT THE COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION
BE READ TO THE ACCUSED IN THE LANGUAGE OR DIALECT KNOWN TO
HIM; NOT COMPLIED WITH BY THE TRIAL COURT IN CASE AT BAR.
- Likewise of very serious importance and consequence is the fact that the
complaints were supposedly read to appellant in Ilonggo/local dialect.
Parenthetically, there was no statement of record that appellant fully
understood that medium of expression. This assumes added significance since
Ilonggo, or properly called Hiligaynon, is a regional language, spoken in a
major part of Iloilo province, Negros Occidental and, with variations, in
Capiz. Within a province or major geographical area using a basic regional
language, there may be other local dialects spoken in certain parts thereof. If
said indication in the aforequoted portion of the transcript intended to convey
that Ilonggo is merely a local dialect and was also the idiom referred to, the
same is egregious error; it would be different if local dialect was used to
denote an alternative and different medium but, inexplicably, without
identifying what it was. The significance of this distinction is found right in the
provision of Section 1(a) of Rule 116 which, cognizant of the aforestated

3.

ID.; ID.; ID.; THE TRIAL COURT MUST FULLY DISCHARGE ITS DUTY TO
CONDUCT THE REQUISITE SEARCHING INQUIRY IN SUCH A WAY AS
TO INDUBITABLY SHOW THAT THE ACCUSED HAD MADE NOT ONLY A
CLEAR, DEFINITE AND UNCONDITIONAL PLEA, BUT HE DID SO WITH A
WELL INFORMED UNDERSTANDING AND FULL REALIZATION OF THE
CONSEQUENCES THEREOF. - The foregoing discussion brings us to the strict
injunction that the trial court must fully discharge its duty to conduct the
requisite searching inquiry in such a way as would indubitably show that
appellant had made not only a clear, definite and unconditional plea, but that
he did so with a well-informed understanding and full realization of the
consequences thereof. To ask an accused about his educational attainment
and then warn him that he might have admitted the crime because of his poor
intelligence is certainly not the logical approach in assaying the sufficiency of
his plea of guilty.

4.

ID.; ID.; ID.; NO VALID JUDGMENT CAN BE RENDERED UPON AN

INVALID ARRAIGNMENT. - Adverting once again to Alicando, we reiterated
therein that pursuant to Binabay vs. People, et al., (L-31008, January 30,
1971,37 SCRA 445) no valid judgment can be rendered upon an invalid
arraignment. Since in Alicando the arraignment of appellant therein was void,
the judgment of conviction rendered against him was likewise void, hence in
fairness to him and injustice to the offended party that case was remanded to
the trial court for further proceedings. The case at bar being on all fours with
the aforementioned cases on the particular determinant issue, we have
perforce to yield to the same doctrine and disposition.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE JUDICIAL CONSCIENCE CANNOT ACCEPT AS VALID A

PLEA OF GUILTY TO A CHARGE WITH A MANDATORY DEATH WHEN
ENTERED BY AN ACCUSED WITH BEFUDDLED STATE OF MIND AT AN
ARRAIGNMENT WITH REVERSIBLE LAPSES IN LAW. - It will be readily
observed, if one would analyze appellants responses during his irregular
arraignment, that his low intelligence quotient and lack of education combined

17

to deprive him of fully understanding what obviously appeared to him as

mysterious rituals and unfamiliar jargons. This was also what happened, and
what we duly noted, in People vs. Albert, (G.R. No. 114001, December 11,
1995). In the transcripts of said proceeding which are earlier quoted
extensively, there are italicized portions showing not only the grossly
inadequate or ambiguous, if not indifferent, questions of the lower court but
also the erratic answers of appellant which are neither responsive or
rational. There is no need to belabor them here since they speak for
themselves, but we are not impressed by the formulary questions posed by
the lower court while going through the motions of interviewing appellant. The
Court would want to stress here, therefore, that the judicial conscience cannot
accept as valid a plea of guilty to a charge with a mandatory death penalty
when entered by an accused with a befuddled state of mind at an arraignment
with reversible lapses of law.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE COURT CANNOT HOLD A LIFE FORFEIT, NO MATTER
HOW DESPICABLE THE OFFENDER, WHEN EFFECTIVE PROTECTION
FOR HIS BASIC RIGHTS WAS DENIED BECAUSE OF POVERTY OR
IGNORANCE. - Let it be clearly understood, especially by the
censorious: This Court will not hesitate to impose the capital punishment
when all the requisites therefor have been met in accordance with the law of
the land. It cannot, therefore, hold a life forfeit, no matter how despicable the
offender, when effective protection for his basic rights was denied because of
poverty or ignorance. Nor will the Court render a death sentence just to make
a meretricious obeisance to the vengeful call for blood. Judicious verdicts
evolve from the privacy of reasoned reflection in chambers and not from the
publicity of emotional acclaim on the podium.

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

On May 24, 1994, consequent to five separate complaints, Criminal Cases Nos.
43567,43568,43569,43570 and 43571 were filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch
38, Iloilo City charging herein appellant, an illiterate laborer, with rape committed
on five separate occasions against his own daughter, complainant Estelita Estomaca.
The trial court detailed its findings and the prosecutions contentions on the
multiple incestuous rapes, as follows:
Melita is the eldest daughter of the accused, the second husband of Melitas
mother. Melita has a full-blood younger brother around twelve (12) years old. She
has two (2) half-blood sisters (from) the first marriage of her mother who are
residing in Manila.
Melita claims that she was first raped in July 1993, at their residence at
Barangay Tiolas, San Joaquin, Iloilo. This is now the subject of Criminal Case No.
43567. The offense was repeated by her father before Christmas of December,
1993 (Criminal Case No. 43568); January 1994 (Criminal Case No. 43569);
February 1994 (Criminal Case No. 43570); and on March 6, 1994 (Criminal Case
No. 43571).[5]
There is some inconsistency in the statements on record as to what actually
took place on June 14, 1994 during the arraignment of appellant, assisted by his
government counsel de oficio, Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera. The decision of the court
below, dated July 15, 1994, declares that he entered a plea of guilty to Criminal
Cases Nos. 43568 and 43571, and a plea of not guilty to Criminal Cases Nos.
43567,43569 and 43570.[6]Obviously engendered by the insufficiency of the
proceedings conducted and the imprecision of the notes taken at this stage, this
matter will be further discussed hereafter.
The two criminal complaints, both subscribed by the offended party on April29,
1994 and which are the subject of the joint judgment of the lower court challenged
in this appellate review, respectively allege:

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Jose B. Tiongco for accused-appellant.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
With our recent adjudgment in People vs. Alicando[1] as a backdrop, even an
initial perusal of the records of these cases now before us on appeal and/or
automatic review gives a sense of paramnesia or, in the French term more often
used, deja vu. One cannot escape the illusion of remembering events when
experienced for the first time, or of something overly or unpleasantly familiar in the
present appellate review.
Indeed, the courtroom dramatis personae in the cases at bar are the same
as in Alicando, that is, the presiding judge, [2] the government counselde oficio,[3] and
the substitute counsel de parte.[4] The cases likewise involve the heinous crime of
rape and were repressed by the sentence of death. The crux of the controversy in
both is identically the validity vel non of the arraignment conducted by the same
trial court which followed closely equivalent procedures in conducting the questioned
proceedings. Hence, as will hereafter be demonstrated, the observations of this
Court will also inevitably converge and move along the same channels of thought.

Criminal Case No. 43568

That sometime in the month of December, 1993, in the Municipality of San

Joaquin, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, taking advantage of his superior strength, abuse
of confidence and trust, he being the father of the undersigned, with deliberate
intent and by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the undersigned who, at
that time, (was) 15 years of age.[7]

Criminal Case No. 43571

That on or about March 6, 1994, in the Municipality of San Joaquin, Province of

Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, being the father of the undersigned complainant, with deliberate

18

intent and by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse (with) the undersigned, who, at
that time, (was) 15 years of age.[8]
Proceeding upon the capital nature of the offenses involved, the trial court,
after appellant ostensibly waived the presentation of evidence for his defense,
required the prosecution to adduce evidence purportedly to establish appellants
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, on June 29, 1994, the complainant herself,
Melita Estomaca, appeared in court and testified that she was raped by her father
once in December, 1993 and, again, on March 6, 1994. Both incidents, according to
her, took place inside their residence at Sitio Tan-agan, Barangay Tiolas in San
Joaquin, Iloilo at nighttime and that, on those two occasions, she tried to resist her
fathers assaults to no avail. After the last rape, she gathered enough courage to
flee from their home, and thereafter she reported the incidents to her mother who
was then living separately from them. Apparently, appellant was later apprehended
and has since been under detention.[9]
On the authority of Republic Act No. 7659 which took effect on December 31,
1993, the lower court imposed upon appellant the penalty ofreclusion perpetua for
the sexual assault supposedly perpetrated in December, 1993, and the supreme
penalty of death with respect to the rape allegedly committed on March 6, 1994. In
each of the said cases, he was further ordered to indemnify the offended party in
the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.[10]
What disconcerts this Court, however, is the alarming consistency of noncompliance by the court a quo of the procedural rules to be observed for the validity
of the arraignment of an accused. Indeed, the importance of this particular stage of
a criminal proceeding, especially when capital offenses are involved, cannot be
over-emphasized. Hence, we pause at this juncture to once again briefly expound
on this vital procedural aspect which the trial court, once in Alicando and again in
the case at bar, appears to have treated with cavalier disregard or frustrating
misapprehension.

witnesses stated therein, then reading the same in the language or dialect that is
known to him, and asking him what his plea is to the charge. The requirement that
the reading be made in a language or dialect that the accused understands and
knows is a mandatory requirement, just as the whole of said Section 1 should be
strictly followed by trial courts. This the law affords the accused by way of
implementation of the all-important constitutional mandate regarding the right of an
accused to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation leveled at him and is,
therefore, really an avenue for him to be able to hoist the necessary defense in
rebuttal thereof.[14] It is an integral aspect of the due process clause under the
Constitution.
2. For a more graphic illustration, and thereby a clearer appreciation of what
actually transpired in the so-called arraignment of appellant in the court below, we
quote at length the pertinent transcripts of the stenographic notes taken at that
stage, with emphasis on significant portions:
Pros. Nelson Geduspan

: For the prosecution.

Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera

: For the accused.

arraignment.

Court

: The offended party is the daughter.

Interpreter

: (Reading
the
complaint
to
the
Ilongo/local dialect).

With exacting certitude, Section 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the arraignment
should be made in open court by the judge himself or by the clerk of court
furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or information with the list of

for

information/
accused
in

: For Crim. Case No. 43567, the

accused, pleads Guilty. For Crim.
Case No. 43568, the accused,
pleads Guilty For Crim. Case No.
43569,
the
accused,
pleads Guilty.For Crim. Case No.
43570,
the
accused,
pleads Guilty. For Crim. Case No.
43571, the accused, pleads Guilty.

1. In People vs. Albert,[11] we traced the developmental antecedents which

culminated and found expression in reglementary form in Section 3, Rule 116 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure governing a plea of guilty to a capital
offense. We there pointed out that the rationale behind the rule is that courts must
proceed with more care where the possible punishment is in its severest form death - for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is irrevocable and
experience has shown that innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty.[12]
We stressed the need to avoid improvident pleas of guilt since the accused
may thereby forfeit his life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning,
significance and consequences of his plea. [13] We lamented the confused application
adopted or the apathetic indifference in the application of said rule considering the
paramount importance of a valid arraignment, it being the stage where the issues
are joined in the criminal action and without which the proceedings cannot advance
further or, if held, will otherwise be void. We then enjoined the trial courts to
review and reflect upon the jurisprudential and statutory rules which evolved over
time in response to the injustice created by improvident pleas acknowledging guilt,
at times belatedly discovered under the judicial rug, if at all.

Ready

Court

:
What
is
attainment?

your

educational

Witness

: I was not able to finish Grade I.

Court

: The court would like to explain to

you in your plea of Guilty. If you
plead
Guilty
to
these
five (5)offenses, definitely, you will
have five (5) sentences.

Accused

: Yes, your honor.

19

guilty?
Court

: Under the New Law the least most

probably would be life sentence.

Accused

: Because I committed two acts

only.

Accused

: Yes, your honor.

Court

: Why is it that when you were

asked you entered a plea of guilty?

Court

: How old are you now?

Accused

Accused

: Forty two.

: Because what I recall is that I just

committed two acts of rape.

Court

: Because of this fact you have no

chance to get back to the new
society and your rights will be
affected.

Court

: Not Guilty in the three (3) charges

and Guilty in two (2) charges. Does
counsel and accused agree to pretrial conference?

Accused

: I know. Thats what they told to

me.

Atty. Antiquiera

: We dispense (with) the pre-trial

conference.

Court

: Despite of (sic) this fact you still

insist on your plea of guilty in these
five cases?

Court

Interpreter

: According to him, he performed

only two (2) acts.

: For the two charges (to) which he

pleads guilty, the court will receive
evidence in order to impose the
proper penalty and on the other
charges, the court will receive
evidence for the prosecution.[15]
(Italics
and
corrections
in
parentheses ours.)

Court

: When (were)
performed?

Accused

: December 1993 and March 1994.

Court

: The other cases charged against

you (are) not true?

these

two

acts

Accused

: It is not true maybe it was

committed by her boyfriend then it
was charged against me.

Court

: In so far as . . . What is not

included in the plea therefore, is the
month of July 1993, January 1994
and
the
month
of
February
1994. You
did
not
commit
these? Why is it that when you
were asked you entered a plea of

xxx

xxx

xxx

At the subsequent hearing, just like what happened in Alicando, the presiding
judge went through the same formality of having appellant stand again before him,
and this is what transpired:
Court

: Before the court allows the

prosecution to present evidence,
accused, please come here again.
(At this juncture, the accused came
near to the court)

Court

: The court informs you as accused

that you are charged (with) the
crime of rape; under the new law
which if you plead guilty, you will be
sentence(d) to death penalty, did
you understand that?

: Yes, Your Honor.

20

by anyone whomsoever?
Q

: Despite this warning for the

second time by the court to you, do
you still insist (o)n your plea of
guilty?

: Yes, Your Honor.

: Is this plea your voluntary will

without force or intimidation from
anyone
else
to
include
the
complaining witness or the family?

: No, Your Honor.

: So, therefore, the court will allow

you to present evidence if you
wis(h) to because you insist (o)n
your plea of guilty. Do you intend to
present evidence.

A
Court

: No, Sir.

:
In
connection
with
this,
therefore,definitely you will be
convicted in both cases?

: Yes, your honor.

:
What
is
attainment?

: Grade I.

:Being
Grade
I,
the
court
emphasized that you are swayed
by your own fashion because of
your low education?

: I am not.

: In other words, you still insist on

your plea of guilty?

: Yes, sir.

Court

:
Okey,
proceed
presentation
of
evidence.

: In this Criminal Case No. 43568,

do you intend to present evidence?

your

educational

: No, I will not present evidence.

: Okey, because of this the court
will
receive
evidence
of the
prosecution. In another case, the
last time when arraigned, you
admitted
that
sometime
in
December, 1993, you likewise raped
your daughter, do you still confirm
and affirm this?

: Yes, Your Honor.

: In this case, because this was

committed (i)n December 1993, the
penalty
here
is reclusion
perpetua.After learning this as
informed to you by the court, do
still insist on your plea of guilty?

: Yes, I will admit. I did it.

: Do you admit this voluntarily

without
force,
intimidation
or
physical injuries or mauling on you

: No, Your Honor.

Court

: Okey, proceed.[16]

xxx

xxx

with
the
prosecution

xxx

3. At threshold, what strikes this Court as peculiar is that the arraignment

appears to have consisted merely of the bare reading of the five complaints,
synthetically and cryptically reported in the transcript, thus: (Reading the
information/complaint to the accused in Ilonggo/local dialect). Since what was
supposed to have been read was stated in the singular, but there were five criminal
complaints against appellant, this Court is then left to speculate on whether all five

21

criminal complaints were actually read, translated or explained to appellant on a

level within his comprehension, considering his limited education.
Again, on the presumption of correctness, since this Court has no other
bearings to steer by, it may be assumed that all five complaints were read since the
clerk is supposed to have thereafter announced in cadence and in the consecutive
order of cases that appellant pleaded guilty to all the charges. What, however,
punctures this possible bubble of regularity is that appellant subsequently declared,
and the clerk consequently contradicted her previous recital, that he was not
pleading guilty to three of the complaints. This is hardly a respectable and credthle
performance in the solemnity of a court trial of five capital offenses.
We cannot, therefore, be persuaded that on this very basic procedure alone,
involving just the mechanical process of arraignment outlined in Section 1, there
was the necessary degree of compliance by the court below. Other considerations
reveal how flawed the supposed arraignment actually was. For instance, there is no
showing whether or not appellant or his counsel de oficio was furnished a copy of
each complaint with the list of witnesses against him, in order that the latter may
duly prepare and comply with his responsibilities. Of more troublous concern is the
fact that appellant was not specifically warned that on his plea of guilty, he
would definitely and in any event be given the death penalty under the New Law,
as the trial court calls Republic Act No. 7659. He was also not categorically advised
that his plea of guilty would not under any circumstance affect or reduce the death
sentence as he may have believed or may have been erroneously advised.
Such an erroneous notion on the part of appellant which may have impelled
him to plead guilty is not improbable or conjectural, especially when we consider his
mental state and the environmental situation. This is precisely what People vs.
Dayot[17] cautioned against, thus:
A searching inquiry, under the Rules, means more than informing cursorily the
accused that he faces a jail term (because the accused is aware of that) but so also,
the exact length of imprisonment under the law and the certainty that he will serve
time at the national penitentiary or a penal colony. Not infrequently indeed, an
accused pleads guilty in the hope, as we said, of a lenient treatment, or upon a bad
advice or promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit
guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to see to it that he does not
labor under these. mistaken impressions, x x x. (Italics supplied)
Likewise of very serious importance and consequence is the fact that the
complaints were supposedly read to appellant in Ilonggo/local dialect.
Parenthetically, there was no statement of record that appellant fully understood
that medium of expression. This assumes added significance since Ilonggo, or
properly called Hiligaynon, is a regional language,[18] spoken in a major part of Iloilo
province, Negros Occidental and, with variations, in Capiz. Within a province or
major geographical area using a basic regional language, there may be other local
dialects spoken in certain parts thereof. If said indication in the aforequoted portion
of the transcript intended to convey that Ilonggo is merely a local dialect and was
also the idiom referred to, the same is egregious error; it would be different if local
dialect was used to denote an alternative and different medium but, inexplicably,
without identifying what it was.
The significance of this distinction is found right in the provisions of Section
1(a) of Rule 116 which, cognizant of the aforestated linguistic variations,

deliberately required that the complaint or information be read to the accused in

the language or the dialect known to him, to ensure his comprehension of the
charges. The Court takes judicial notice, because it is either of public knowledge or
readily capable of unquestionable demonstration, [19] that in the central and
northwestern part of Iloilo province and all the way up to and throughout Antique,
including necessarily San Joaquin where the offenses were committed and of which
appellant and his family are natives, the local dialect is known as kinaray-a.
Barring previous exposure to or as a consequence of extended social or
commercial intercourse, kinaray-a is not readily understandable to nor spoken by
those born to the Hiligaynon regional language or who have lived in the areas under
its sway for an appreciable period of time. The converse is true for those whose
native tongue is the dialect of kinaray-a, since they are generally not well-versed
in Ilonggo, or Hiligaynon. Since all the complaints are not only in English but in
technical legal language, we are again at sea as to whether and how the
indictments were translated to Ilonggo and/or to kinaray-a, or that the appellant
was truly and honestly made of the charges and, especially, the consequences of his
guilty plea thereto. The records are silent and do not reveal anything on this point,
nor how the dialogue between the presiding judge and appellant was
translated. Yet a mans life is at stake while this Court wrestles with that dilemma
created by an omission of official duty.
4. The foregoing discussion brings us to the strict injunction that the trial court
must fully discharge its duty to conduct the requisite searching inquiry in such a
way as would indubitably show that appellant had made not only a clear, definite
and unconditional plea, but that he did so with a well-informed understanding and
full realization of the consequences thereof. To ask an accused about his
educational attainment and then warn him that he might have admitted the crime
because of his poor intelligence is certainly not the logical approach in assaying the
sufficiency of his plea of guilty.
In the same manner, a mere warning to him that he could possibly face extreme
retribution in the form of death or face a life sentence in jail is not even enough.
[20]
The trial judge should ascertain and be totally convinced that, for all intents and
purposes, the plea recorded has all the earmarks of a valid and acceptable
confession upon which an eventual judgment of conviction can stand. [21] Although
there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge may go about the
matter of a proper searching inquiry, it would be well for the court, for instance, to
require the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges against
him, or by making him reenact the manner in which he perpetrated the crime, or by
causing him to furnish and explain to the court missing details of significance. [22]
The trial court should also be convinced that the accused has not been coerced
or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming
from malevolent or avenging quarters and this it can do, such as by ascertaining
from the accused himself the manner in which he was subsequently brought into the
custody of the law; or whether he had the assistance of competent counsel during
the custodial and preliminary investigations; and, ascertaining from him the
conditions under which he was detained and interrogated during the aforestated
investigations. Likewise, a series of questions directed at defense counsel as to
whether or not said counsel had conferred with, and completely explained to the
accused the meaning of a plea and its consequences, would be a well-taken step
along those lines.[23]

22

Questions of these nature are undoubtedly crucial and no truer is this than in
the case of appellant for, again, the original records and rollo of this case now under
review are completely bereft of any document or record concerning his
apprehension,
detention
and
prior
investigation, whether
custodial
or
preliminary. The foregoing circumstances must be taken in addition to the
appropriate forewarnings of the consequences of a plea of guilty, as well as the
questions by the court regarding the age, educational attainment and socioeconomic status of the accused which may reveal contributory insights for a proper
verdict in the case.
And, on this latter aspect, we are inclined to quote from Alicando since, as
stated in limine the defective arraignment in the cases now before us is virtually a
reprise of what the same trial court with its presiding judge did or did not do in that
previous case:
Section 3 of Rule 116 which the trial court violated is not a new rule for it merely
incorporated the decision of this Court in People vs. Apduhan Jr. and reiterated in an
unbroken line of cases. The bottom line of the rule is that a plea of guilt must be
based on a free and informed judgment. Thus, the searching inquiry of the trial
court must be focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea; and (2) the full
comprehension of the consequences of the plea. The questions of the trial court
failed to show the voluntariness of the plea of guilt of the appellant nor did the
questions demonstrate appellants full comprehension of the consequences of the
plea. The records do not reveal any information about the personality profile of the
appellant which can serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and
informed plea of guilt. The age, socio-economic status, and educational background
of the appellant were not plumbed by the trial court. x x x. (Citations omitted).

Let it be clearly understood, however, especially by the censorious: This court

will not hesitate to impose the capital punishment when all the requisites therefor
have been met in accordance with the law of the land. It cannot, therefore, hold a
life forfeit, no matter how despicable the offender, when effective protection for his
basic rights was denied because of poverty or ignorance. Nor will the Court render
a death sentence just to make a meretricious obeisance to the vengeful call for
blood. Judicious verdicts evolve from the privacy of reasoned reflection in chambers
and not from the publicity of emotional acclaim on the podium.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo in Criminal Cases Nos. 43568
and 43571 convicting accused-appellant Melchor Estomaca y Garque of two crimes
of rape is hereby SET ASIDE. Said cases are REMANDED to the trial court for
further and appropriate proceedings, with instructions that the same be given
appropriate priority and the proceedings therein be conducted with deliberate
dispatch and circumspection.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Hermosisima, Jr., and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., in the result.
Torres, Jr., J., took no part.
Francisco, J., on leave.

People v. Espanola
SECOND DIVISION

It will be readily observed, if one would analyze appellants responses during

his irregular arraignment, that his low intelligence quotient and lack of education
combined to deprive him of fully understanding what obviously appeared to him as
mysterious rituals and unfamiliarjargons. This was also what happened, and what
we duly noted, in People vs. Albert, supra.
In the transcripts of said proceeding which are earlier quoted extensively,
there are italicized portions showing not only the grossly inadequate or ambiguous,
if not indifferent, questions of the lower court but also the erratic answers of
appellant which are neither responsive nor rational. There is no need to belabor
them here since they speak for themselves, but we are not impressed by the
formulary questions posed by the lower court while going through the motions of
interviewing appellant. The Court would want to stress here, therefore, that the
judicial conscience cannot accept as valid a plea of guilty to a charge with a
mandatory death penalty when entered by an accused with a befuddled state of
mind at an arraignment with reversible lapses in law.
5. Adverting once again to Alicando, we reiterated therein that pursuant to
Binabay vs. People, et al.,[24] no valid judgment can be rendered upon an invalid
arraignment. Since in Alicando the arraignment of appellant therein was void, the
judgment of conviction rendered against him was likewise void, hence in fairness to
him and injustice to the offended party that case was remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings. The case at bar being on all fours with the aforementioned
cases on the particular determinant issue, we have perforce to yield to the same
doctrine and disposition.

[G.R. No. 119308. April 18, 1997]

PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CHRISTOPHER

ESPANOLA y PAQUINGAN alias "Langga" or "Cocoy", JIMMY
PAQUINGAN y BATILO alias Jimmy" and JEOFFREY ABELLO y
SALADO alias "Beroy,accused-appellants.
DECISION

PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision [1] dated November 21, 1994, of the
Regional Trial Court of Lanao Del Norte, 12th Judicial Region, Branch 5, City of
Iligan, finding the accused-appellants Christopher Espanola y Paquingan, Jimmy
Paquingan y Batilo and Jeoffrey Abello y Salado guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principals for the murder of Jessette Tarroza in Criminal Case No. 3773. The three
accused were meted a prison term of reclusion perpetua with the accessory
penalties provided by law. They were ordered to indemnify jointly and severally
the heirs of the victim Jessette Tarroza the amount of P50,000.00 as actual
damages, P50,000.00 as compensatory damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages
andP25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The Amended Information charging the accused-appellants with the crime of
Murder and indicting another accused in the person of Joel Gonzales reads:

23

"AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned City Prosecutor of Iligan accuses CHRISTOPHER ESPANOLA y
Paquingan alias "Langga", JIMMY PAQUINGAN y Batilo, JEOFFREY ABELLO y Salado
alias "Beroy" and JOEL GONZALES alias "Awing" alias "Wingwing" of the crime
of MURDER, committed as follows:
'That on or about November 16, 1991, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who were all under the
influence of drugs (Marijuana), conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping each other with intent to kill and by means of treachery and with abuse of
superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, stab and hit one Jessette Tarroza, thereby inflicting upon the said Jessette
Tarroza the following physical injuries, to wit:
-

Incised wound 2.5 cms in length, lateral border of

(R) ala nasi
Triangular stab wound, neck (R) side, 4 cms x 3 cms x
5.5 cms
Incised wound, anterior neck, 6 cms x 4 cms x 3.5 cms
which traversed thru the trachea, external jugular vein
and 3/4 of the esophagus
Stab wound, anterior neck, (R) supraclavicular area, 2.5
cms x 1 cm x 4 cms
Stab wound, (L) anterior chest, midclavicular line 1.5
cms x 1 cm x 2.5 cms
Stab wound, (R) anterior chest, 4 cms x 2 cms with
fracture of the 4th and 5th rib with lung tissue out
Stab wound, (R) anterior chest, level of axilla, 2 cms x 1
cm x 5 cms
Stab wound, (R) anterior chest, 3rd ICS, midclavicular
line 2.5 x 1.4 cms
C-shaped stab wound, (R) anterior chest, midclavicular
line, 3.5 cms x 2 cms x 3 cms, 2nd ICS
Stab wound, (R) anterior chest, 2nd ICS, (R) parasteal
line, 2.5 cms x 1.5 cms x 4 cms
Confluent abrasion (R) elbow joint, anteromedial aspect
3 cms in diameter
Multiple punctured wounds (5), back, (R) side
Confluent abrasion 10 cms by 3 cms, back, lumbar area

and as a result thereof the said Jessette Tarroza died; that immediately after
inflicting fatal injuries on the said Jessette Tarroza, the herein accused took turns in
having sexual intercourse with the victim.'
Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code with the
aggravating circumstances of: (1) treachery and abuse of superior strength; (2)
cruelty in all (sic) ignominy; (3) that the accused were under the influence of drugs
at the time of the commission of the offense and (4) outraging or scoffing of (sic)
the corpse of the victim.

City of Iligan, November 29, 1991."

The facts of the case show that Jessette Tarroza went to work at the Mercy
Community Clinic, Camague, Iligan City, as a medical technologist at about 3 o'clock
in the afternoon of November 16, 1991. Her tour of duty was from 3 o'clock in the
afternoon to eleven o'clock in the evening. [2] After working for eight hours, she left
the clinic at about 11:15 p.m. with Claro Liquigan, a co-employee. When they
reached the junction road leading to her house at about 11:30 p.m., Claro offered to
escort Jessette to her house but she refused saying that she knew the people in the
area. She then walked towards her house while Claro rode his bicycle and went
home. When they parted ways, Claro noticed four (4) persons in the pathway
leading to Jessette's house. They were about 60 to 70 meters away from him and
he did not recognize whether they were male or female.[3]
Jessette Tarroza failed to come home that fateful evening. She was found
dead. Her father, Romeo Tarroza, rushed to the place where her body was
discovered.[4] He was shocked to see Jessette lying in a grassy area more or less
fifty (50) meters from their home and only fifteen (15) meters from the
pathway. Her body bore stab wounds. Her red blouse was wide open and her pants
removed. Her panty was likewise removed while her bra [5] was cut. The red
blouse[6] was torn with three (3) holes at the back, ten (10) holes on the front and
six (6) holes on the left sleeve. Her blouse, bra and shoes were stained with
blood. Her panty, found about two (2) feet away from her cadaver, had blood on
the front portion. A light green T-shirt with the print "Midwifery" at the back and
"ICC" on the front[7] was also found near the shoes of the victim. The T-shirt was
not hers.[8]
The law enforcement officers of Iligan City immediately conducted an
investigation. They found blood stains along the pathway which was approximately
fifteen (15) meters away from the place where the victim was found. There was a
sign of struggle as the plants and bushes at the scene of the crime were destroyed
and flattened. They extended their investigation to the neighboring sitios and purok
of Kilumco but found no lead as to the perpetrators of the crime. [9]
In the morning of November 19, 1991, SPO 4 Ruperto Neri received an
anonymous telephone call suggesting that a certain "Wing-wing" [10] be investigated
as he has knowledge of the crime. Antonio Lubang, Chief of the Homicide Section,
Intelligence and Investigation Division of the Iligan City Police Station, and his men
looked for "Wing-wing". Lubang knew "Wing-wing" as the latter frequently roamed
around the public plaza. They learned that the real name of "Wing-wing" is Joel
Gonzales. They then saw Gonzales at his house and invited him to the police
station. At the police station, Gonzales confessed that he was present when the
crime was committed and that he knew its perpetrators. He identified them as
"Beroy", "Langga" and "Jimmy". He informed that the three stabbed and raped
Jessette Tarroza. Gonzales, however, did not give the surnames of the three
suspects. The policemen asked Romeo Tarroza whether he knew the
suspects. Romeo Tarroza declared that they were his neighbors. He identified
"Jimmy" as Jimmy Paquingan, "Langga" as Christopher Espanola and "Beroy" as
Jeoffrey Abello.[11] On the same day, Gonzales was detained at the police station.
In the early morning of November 21, 1991, Chief Lubang invited
Paquingan, Christopher Espanola and Jeoffrey Abello to the police station
they were investigated. All denied the story of Gonzales. A police line-up of
(12) persons which included the three accused-appellants was then made

Jimmy
where
twelve
in the

24

police station. Gonzales was called and he pointed to Paquingan, Espanola and
Abello as his companions in the killing and rape of Jessette Tarroza. After the lineup, the three suspects were brought to the City Health Office for check-up because
the policemen saw that they had bruises and scratches on their faces, foreheads
and breasts.[12] They were examined by Dr. Livey J. Villarin. With respect to
Paquingan, the medical certificate (Exhibit "I") showed that he had scratch
abrasions on the right mandibular area (jaw), on the left side of the neck and on the
right mid-axillary (chest). Dr. Villarin testified that the abrasions could have been
caused by any sharp object or possibly fingernails. The medical certificate issued to
Espanola (Exhibit "J") showed that he had contusions on the right shoulder and
hematoma. Dr. Villarin testified that the injuries could have been effected by a jab
or sharp blow. The medical certificate issued to Abello (Exhibit "K") showed that he
sustained abrasion and contusion at the right deltoid area which according to Dr.
Villarin, could have been caused by a sharp or hard object or a fist blow that hit that
particular area of the body.[13]
On the same day, an information for rape with homicide [14] was filed against
Paquingan, Espanola and Abello. They were committed to the city jail after their
warrant of arrest was issued by Executive Judge Federico V. Noel. [15]
In the afternoon of November 25, 1991, Chief Lubang brought Jimmy
Paquingan to the City Prosecutor's Office for the taking of his confession after he
manifested to the jail warden his intention to confess. City Prosecutor Ulysses V.
Lagcao asked Paquingan if he would avail the services of counsel and he answered
in the affirmative. When asked if he had a counsel of his own choice, he answered in
the negative. He was provided with the services of Atty. Leo Cahanap, the legal
counsel of the City Mayor's Office, and Atty. Susan Echavez, a representative of the
IBP Legal Aid, Iligan City Chapter. They were given time to confer with him.
[16]
Paquingan then confessed. However, when asked to sign the stenographic notes,
Paquingan refused saying he would wait for his mother first. [17] The sworn statement
of Paquingan (Exhibit "L") was transcribed on November 29, 1991, but signed only
by the two lawyers. According to the statement, Abello slashed the neck of
Jessette. Jessette fell down and was brought to a bushy area where she was
sexually abused. The first to have sexual intercourse with the victim was
Abello. Paquingan then followed him. Espanola had his turn next; and Gonzales
was the last.[18]
Upon review of the records of the case, Fiscal Lagcao discovered that the
victim was sexually abused after she was murdered. Thus, he filed an Amended
Information on November 29, 1991, charging the three accused with the crime of
murder and indicting Joel Gonzales as the fourth accused. [19] A warrant for the
arrest of Gonzales was issued on the same date by Executive Judge Federico V.
Noel.[20]
All the accused pleaded "not guilty" when arraigned. After presenting several
witnesses, the prosecution filed on June 17, 1992, a motion to discharge accused
Joel Gonzales as a state witness [21] in accordance with Section 9, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court, alleging:
"1.
That accused Joel Gonzales has intimated to the undersigned City
Prosecutor that he is willing to testify for the prosecution as state
witness;

"2.
That there is absolute necessity for the testimony of accused Joel
Gonzales considering that the evidence for the prosecution in this case is
mainly circumstantial;
"3.
That the testimony of accused Joel Gonzales can be substantially
corroborated in its material points;
"4.

That the said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and

"5.
That he has not at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude."
In traversing the motion, the defense asserted:
"1.That there is no showing in the face of said motion that Joel Gonzales
agrees to be utilized as state witness;
"2.That Joel Gonzales appears to be the most guilty as he alone among
the accused has executed a confession regarding the killing of Jessette
Tarroza."
In an Order[22] dated June 26, 1992, the trial court discharged Gonzales as a
state witness.
In the course of the trial, Dr. Chito Rey Gomez, Medico-Legal Officer of the
Iligan City Health Office, testified that he conducted a post mortem examination on
the cadaver of Jessette Tarroza. He issued a Death Certificate (Exhibit "E") which
indicated that the cause of death was cardio respiratory arrest due to
pneumohemathorax of the right chest. He also prepared a Necropsy Report (Exhibit
"F") after the examination. He found five (5) stab wounds at the back of the victim
and ten (10) stab wounds at the front, consisting of an incised wound at the lateral
border of the ala nasi, right; triangular stab wounds on the right side of the neck
and lower neck; an incised wound which traversed through the trachea external
jugular vein and three-fourths (3/4) of the esophagus; a C-shaped stab wound that
penetrated the thorax cavity and a stab wound above the breast near the axilla. He
testified further that the wounds inflicted must have reached some vital organs of
the body, possibly the lungs and blood vessels, and that the wounds were probably
caused by three (3) different instruments. He likewise conducted a vaginal
examination on the victim and noted that there was a fresh complete hymenal
laceration at 3 o'clock and fresh complete lacerations at 7 o'clock and 8 o'clock,
which could have been caused by a finger or a sex organ inserted into the
vagina. When asked if the victim was sexually molested, he answered in the
affirmative.[23]
Another witness for the prosecution was Dr. Tomas P. Refe, Medico-Legal
Officer III of the National Bureau of Investigation, Central Visayas Regional
Office. He testified that he conducted an autopsy examination on the cadaver of
Jessette Tarroza and prepared Autopsy Report No. 91-27 (Exhibit "H"). He found
abrasions and thirteen (13) stab wounds on the front part of the chest, right side,
and at the back of the victim's chest. He also found an incised wound at the region
of the nose involving the upper portion of the right side of the mouth, an incised
wound on the front part of the neck cutting the trachea and partially the esophagus
and an incised wound at the anterior aspect right side of the neck. [24] He declared
that death was caused by the incised wounds and multiple stab wounds. The fatal
wounds were wound nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9 and 10 (Exhibits "H", "H-1"). He likewise
examined the vagina of the victim and found the hymen moderately thick and

25

narrow with lacerations complete at 3 o'clock and 6 o'clock, deep at 7 o'clock, 9

o'clock, 10 o'clock and 11 o'clock, and the edges of the lacerations were sharp and
coaptable. He opined that there could have been a sexual intercourse committed
after the death of the victim considering that the lacerations did not show any
evidence of vital reaction which is commonly found in lacerations during lifetime. [25]

who was then with Jeoffrey Abello. They went to the disco together. At the disco,
he joined the group of Lito Moraira and Titing Mingo and drank with them. There
was no occasion that he left the disco place until after 1 o'clock in the early morning
of November 17, 1991, when they went home. He woke up at 7 o'clock the
following morning and proceeded to the house of his grandmother to fetch water.[32]

The prosecution also presented Joel Gonzales who turned state witness. On
the basis of the demeanor of Gonzales and the manner he answered the questions,
the trial court gathered the impression that he was mentally retarded. [26] Gonzales
did not know how to read and write. [27] In any event, he was able to testify that on
the night of November 16, 1991, he went to Baybay, Camague, Iligan City, to
witness a dance. His companions were "Beroy", "Jimmy" and "Cocoy". He
identified Jeoffrey Abello as "Beroy", Christopher Espanola as "Cocoy" or
"Langga" and Jimmy Paquingan as "Jimmy".

Jeoffrey Abello narrated that in the early evening of November 16, 1991, he
was at their house in Kilumco, Camague. He left their house to watch a "beta" in
the house of Sima Ybanez. However, he was invited by Carmencita Gatase to go to
a disco in Baybay, Camague. He acceded and went to Gatase's house. Christopher
Espanola joined them on their way to the disco. They arrived at the disco at about
10 o'clock in the evening. He saw there a group of persons including Joel Gonzales
and Titing Mingo. While he saw Christopher at about 11 o'clock that evening, he did
not see Jimmy Paquingan. At about 1 o'clock in the early morning of November 17,
1991, he and Carmencita left ahead of Christopher. They then proceeded to the
house of Carmencita where they slept.[33]

At the dance, they drank one (1) bottle of Tanduay and smoked one (1) stick
of marijuana each. After the dance, he and his three (3) companions proceeded to
Bacayo. While on their way, they met a woman whom Beroy, Cocoy and Jimmy
followed. They brought the woman to a nipa hut and slept ("gidulgan") right beside
the woman.
When asked who killed the victim on the night of November 16, 1991, at
Kilumco, Camague, Iligan City, he answered "sila", referring to herein
appellants. He further testified that Beroy slashed the neck of Jessette Tarroza,
Langga slashed her breast, and Paquingan stabbed her at the back. The victim
resisted by scratching her attackers. [28] After she died, they carried her to a bushy
area and all of them sexually molested her. Beroy was first; Gonzales was second;
Cocoy was third and Jeoffrey was the last. Gonzales likewise identified the T-shirt
worn by Jeoffrey Abello that night as "That one Mercy." He declared that the
brownish discoloration on the T-shirt was caused by the blood of Jessette Tarroza. [29]
On cross-examination, Gonzales said that Jessette Tarroza was not the one
brought to the nipa hut, but a woman from Tambacan who went home later on. He
then reiterated that after their encounter with the unnamed woman, they went to
the school, met and followed Jessette Tarroza to a dark place. They encountered
her on the road. He affirmed that it was Beroy who slashed the neck of the victim
while Cocoy, also known as Langga, was the one who slashed her breasts. [30]
For their defense, all the appellants took the witness stand. Jimmy Paquingan
narrated that at about 6 o'clock to 9 o'clock in the evening of November 16, 1991,
he watched "beta" (movie) in the house of Sima Ybanez at Kilumco,
Camague. Thereafter, he went to the house of his grandmother located at the same
barangay and slept there. He did not go out again and woke up at 6 o'clock in the
morning of November 17, 1991. His testimony was corroborated by Emma Mingo
who testified that at about 6 o'clock in the evening of November 16, 1991, she
viewed "beta" in her residence at Kilumcol Camague, with her daughter and accused
Christopher Espanola. At about 9:30 in the evening, the film ended and Christopher
left. At about the same time, Jimmy Paquingan, her nephew, came and proceeded
to his room downstairs. As she waited for her husband to come home, she
continuously stayed at the porch until 1:30 in the early morning of November 17,
1991. In her long wait, she did not see Jimmy leave his room.[31]
Christopher Espanola alleged that he was at home in the evening of November
16, 1991. He went out to view a "beta" in the house of Sima Ybanez. From there,
he proceeded to a disco. On his way, he passed by the house of Carmencita Gatase

In her testimony, Carmencita Gatase identified the three (3) accused as her
neighbors and long-time acquaintances. At about 8 o'clock in the evening of
November 16, 1991, Jeoffrey Abello went to her house. At 9:30 in the evening, she
asked Jeoffrey and Christopher Espanola, who was then downstairs, to go with her
to the disco. They reached the place at about 10 o'clock. Christopher then asked
permission to join the group of his Uncle Mingo. She and Jeoffrey remained
conversing and standing at the side of the disco. They left the dancing area at 1:30
in the early morning of November 17, 1991, not noticing the whereabouts of
Christopher. On their way home, the two of them passed by the basketball court
which was only eighty (80) meters from their house. They did not notice anything
unusual. Jeoffrey then slept in her house.[34]
After considering the opposing versions of the parties, the trial court gave
credence to the evidence presented by the prosecution, particularly the testimony of
state witness Joel Gonzales. It found that Jessette Tarroza was killed by the
accused Christopher Espanola, Jimmy Paquingan and Jeoffrey Abello. It rejected
the defense of the accused as unnatural, incredible and riddled with
inconsistencies. The three accused were convicted of the crime of Murder as the
killing was attended by the aggravating circumstance of treachery. They were
sentenced to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua and to pay a total amount of
One Hundred Seventy Five Thousand pesos (P175,000.00) as damages to the heirs
of the victim.
Hence, this appeal where accused-appellants contend:
"1.
THAT THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ON THE BASIS OF THE TESTIMONY OF JOEL
GONZALES WHO WAS AN ADDITIONAL ACCUSED IN THE AMENDED
INFORMATION OF (sic) MURDER AND WHOSE DISCHARGE WAS SOUGHT
BY THE PROSECUTION AND GRANTED BY SAID COURT, INSPITE AND
DESPITE OPPOSITION BY THE DEFENSE.
"2.
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE
TESTIMONY OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT PAQUINGAN THAT THE TAKING OF
HIS AFFIDAVIT OF CONFESSION BY CITY PROSECUTOR LAGCAO WAS
NOT VOLUNTARY, AND IN FACT, HE REFUSED TO SIGN THE SAME,
CONTRARY TO THE STATEMENT OF SAID PROSECUTOR THAT IT WAS
VOLUNTARILY GIVEN BY THE SAID ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

26

"3.
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT PAQUINGAN TO
COUNSEL OF HIS OWN CHOICE, PREMISED FROM (sic) THE TAKING OF
THE AFFIDAVIT OF CONFESSION BY PROSECUTOR LAGCAO, AGAINST
HIS PENAL INTEREST. IN FACT HE TESTIFIED THAT SAID LAWYERS,
ATTYS. LEO CAHANAP, THE CITY LEGAL OFFICER OF ILIGAN, AND SUSAN
ECHAVEZ, WERE NOT THE COUNSELS OF HIS OWN CHOICE AND WERE
MERELY SUPPLIED BY THE PROSECUTOR.
"4.
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UTILIZING THE GROUND OF
ALIBI WHEN IT SAID THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ADVANCED IT AS
A MATTER OF DEFENSE. THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DID NOT CLING TO
IT AS A MATTER OF DEFENSE. THEY MERELY STATED WHAT WAS TRUE
AND FACTUAL IN SO FAR AS THEY WERE CONCERNED, AND IT WAS AN
ERROR ON THE PART OF THE LOWER COURT TO RULE ON THE ISSUE AS
ALIBI, WHICH PRECISELY, IN MANY DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT,(sic) THAT ALIBI NEED NOT BE INQUIRED INTO WHERE
THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE IS WEAK, AS IN THE CASE AT BAR.
"5.
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE
TESTIMONY OF JOEL GONZALES NOTWITHSTANDING THE
IMPROPRIETIES OF HIS DISCHARGE AS AN ACCUSED ON THE AMENDED
INFORMATION OF (sic) MURDER, MORE SO, ON THE MATERIAL
INCONSISTENCIES OF HIS TESTIMONIES, AS BORNE OUT BY THE
TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC NOTES, AND MOST ESPECIALLY ON HIS
MENTAL INCAPACITY, WHERE HIS TESTIMONIES WERE RUMBLING. (sic)
"6.
THAT THE LOWER COURT, AT THE INSTANCE OF HON. MOSLEMEN
MACARAMBON ERRED IN METING A PENALTY OFRECLUSION
PERPETUA AS AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANTS, THE LATTER, (sic) BEING
A DETAILED JUDGE IN RTC, BRANCH V, ILIGAN CITY, WAS THE ONE WHO
PREPARED AND RENDERED THE DECISION, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT HE
WAS NOT ABLE TO HEAR A SINGLE HEARING AND HAD NOT OBSERVED
THE DEMEANOR AND CHARACTER TRAITS OF WITNESSES AND ACCUSED
IN SAID CASE, AND INSPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE JUDGE WHO
TOTALLY HEARD THE CASE OF RTC, BRANCH V, ILIGAN CITY,(sic) STILL
CONNECTED WITH THE JUDICIARY, BUT MERELY DETAILED IN ONE OF
THE SALAS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, DAVAO CITY, AND HENCE,
NOT RETIRED OR FOR (sic) OTHERWISE, AND APPROPRIATELY, THE
RECORDS OF THE CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SENT TO HIM, FOR HIM TO
PREPARE THE DECISION AND TO (sic) SEND THE SAME TO THE CLERK OF
COURT OF RTC, BRANCH V, ILIGAN CITY, FOR PROMULGATION, AND
THUS WAS (sic) THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION BY JUDGE
MACARAMBON WAS NULL AND VOID."
We find the appeal unmeritorious.
We shall first discuss assigned errors numbers 1 and 5, in view of their interrelationship.
The appellants contend that the trial court violated the rule in discharging
Gonzales as a state witness. They claim that Gonzales was the only one who
executed an affidavit of confession, hence, he was the most guilty of the accused
and cannot be used as a state witness. To be discharged as state witness, Section
9, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that:

1. the discharge must be with the consent of the accused concerned;

2. his testimony must be absolutely necessary;
3. there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution
of the offense committed;
4. his testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
5. he does not appear to be the most guilty; and
6. he has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.
We do not agree that Gonzales is the most guilty of the accused. From the
evidence, it appears that Gonzales is mentally retarded. He could not have been a
leader of the group for he was intellectually wanting. He did not inflict any of the
fatal wounds that led to the death of the victim. The trial court's assessment that
he is not the most guilty is well-grounded.
It is also established that there was no eyewitness to the crime or other direct
evidence. The testimony of Gonzales was absolutely necessary for the proper
prosecution of the case against appellants. This was the decision of the prosecution
itself when it moved for the discharge of Gonzales as a state witness. Part of
prosecutorial discretion is the determination of who should be used as a state
witness to bolster the successful prosecution of criminal offenses. Unless done in
violation of the Rules, this determination should be given great weight by our
courts.
The records will also show that while Gonzales rambled in some parts of his
testimony in view of his low intellect, nonetheless, his testimony was substantially
corroborated in its material points. His declaration that the victim resisted and used
her bare hands in scratching her attackers is confirmed by the findings of Dr. Villarin
in Exhibits "I", "J" and "K". His statement that Beroy slashed the neck of the victim,
Langga slashed her breast and Jimmy stabbed her at the back finds support in the
result of the autopsy of the victim's cadaver by Dr. Refe and Dr. Gomez showing
incised wounds and numerous stab wounds on the front and back of the victim and
incised wounds on her trachea and esophagus. His assertion that he and the
appellants sexually abused the victim after her death is corroborated by the
lacerations found in the private part of the victim as determined by Dr. Gomez and
Dr. Refe.
Lastly, there is no showing that Gonzales has been convicted of an offense
involving moral turpitude. Gonzales also gave his consent to be utilized as state
witness.[35] In sum, all the requirements of Section 9, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules
of Court were satisfied by the prosecution and the trial court did not err in
discharging Gonzales as state witness.
Appellants also assail the testimony of Gonzales on the ground of his alleged
mental incapacity. Section 20 of Rule 130 provides that "except as provided in the
next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known their perception to others, may be witnesses." Section 21, inter alia,
disqualifies as witnesses, "those whose mental condition, at the time of their
production for examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making
known their perception to others." A mental retardate is not therefore, per se,
disqualified from being a witness. As long as his senses can perceive facts and if he

27

can convey his perceptions in court, he can be a witness. [36] In the case at bar, we
find that Gonzales had a tendency to be repetitious and at times had to be asked
leading questions, but he was not unintelligible to be beyond understanding. He
was clear and unyielding in identifying the appellants as the perpetrators of the
crime. On the whole, his account of the crime was coherent enough to shed light on
the guilt or innocence of the accused. To be sure, modern rules on evidence have
downgraded mental incapacity as a ground to disqualify a witness. [37] As observed
by McCormick, the remedy of excluding such a witness who may be the only person
available who knows the facts, seems inept and primitive. [38] Our rules follow the
modern trend of evidence.
Nor can the alleged inconsistencies between the sworn statement of Gonzales
and his testimony in court affect his credibility. Gonzales' testimony jibes on
material points. His inconsistencies on minor details of the crime are not earmarks
of falsehoods. On the contrary, they show that his testimony is honest and
unrehearsed.[39] Moreover, it is a well-settled rule that affidavits should not be
considered as the final and full repository of truth. Affidavits are usually taken exparte. They are oftentimes incomplete and inaccurate. Ordinarily in a question-andanswer form, they are usually and routinely prepared in police precincts by police
investigators. Not in frequently, the investigator propounds questions merely to
elicit a general picture of the subject matter under investigation. [40] Thus, the fact
that the sworn statement of Gonzales (Exhibit "M") did not mention a woman from
Tambacan whom they met and brought to a nipa hut and slept with on the night of
November 16, 1991, is attributable to the fact that he was not asked about women
other than Jessette Tarroza. His line of questioning was as follows:

FISCAL LAGCAO:
I object, your Honor. . .
COURT:
Witness may answer, let him answer.
A:

No.

COURT:
Proceed.
ATTY. FLORES:
Q:

You want to tell the Honorable Court, Mr. Witness that there was another
woman in the nipa hut?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Who was the woman in the nipa hut?

FISCAL LAGCAO:
Immaterial . . .
COURT:
Witness may answer.

"x x x
FISCAL LAGCAO:

A:

She is from Tambacan.

Q:

After 11:00 o'clock that night, where did you and your companions go?

Q:

Do you know her name.

A:

We went to a grassy place in Camague, Iligan City to wait for a certain

Jessette Tarroza.

A:

No.

Q:

Whose idea was it that you will wait for Jessette Tarroza in that secluded
place at Camague, Iligan City?

A:

Beroy, sir.

Q:

And eventually, did you see this Jessette?

A:

Yes, sir.

COURT:
In other words, for the Court's clarification, there were two (2) women
during that night that you found in the nipa hut that you mentioned?
A:

Yes.

COURT:
The other woman was killed - Jessette Tarroza?

x x x"
The presence of another woman came out only in response to questions propounded
to him during his cross-examination, viz:

A:

Yes.

COURT:
The other woman was not killed?

"x x x
ATTY. FLORES:

A:

No.

Q:

Who was that woman killed?

Q:

And this was not known to the authorities, the one that was not killed?

A:

Jessette Tarroza.

A:

No.

Q:

The same woman brought to the nipa hut?

Q:

What was only mentioned to the authorities was the one that was killed?

28

A:

Yes.

x x x. "

Q:

Now, this Cocoy which you are referring to, is he in the courtroom at
present?

A:

Yes, he is around.

Q:

Please identify him if he is around.

A:

(Witness pointing to a person who when asked to identify himself

answered that he is Christopher Espanola.)

[41]

Indeed, there is no rule of evidence that would stop an affiant from elaborating his
prior sworn statement at the trial itself.[42] Testimonies given during trials are more
exact and elaborate for their accuracy is tested by the process of cross-examination
where the truth is distilled from half truths and the total lies.
The appellants also contend that Gonzales mixed-up his identification of
appellants. In his sworn statement, he mentioned "Beroy, Jimmy and Langga" as
his companions on the night of November 16, 1991, and as the ones who killed
Jessette Tarroza, while in his direct testimony, he named and pointed at Beroy,
Cocoy and Jimmy. A reading of his testimony, however, will reveal the fact that he
consistently referred to appellant Jeoffrey Abello as "Beroy", Jimmy Paquingan as
"Jimmy" and Christopher Espanola as "Cocoy" or "Langga", viz:
"x x x
FISCAL LAGCAO:
Q:

Mr. Witness, do you know a certain Beroy?

A:

Yes.

Q:

If this Beroy is in court, will you please identify him by pointing at him?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

Please point to him if he is around.

A:

(Witness pointing to a person who when asked identified himself as

Jeoffrey Abello.)

Q:

Do you know a certain Langga?

A:

Yes.

Q:

If he is around, will you please identify him by pointing at him?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Please point at him.

A:

(Witness pointing to a person who identified himself as Christopher

Espanola.)

Q:

Do you know a certain Jimmy?

A:

Yes.

Q:

If he is around, will you please point to him?

A:

(Witness pointing
Paquingan).

to

person
"x x x

FISCAL LAGCAO:

who

identified

himself

as

Jimmy

x x x "[43]
The foregoing testimony of Gonzales clearly shows that appellant Christopher
Espanola is "Cocoy" or "Langga".
We are not also prepared to disbelieve Gonzales simply because of his
inconsistent statement as to the correct sequence the victim was sexually abused by
the appellants. It matters little that Gonzales was tentative on who molested the
victim first, second, third and last. What matters is that all the appellants molested
the dead Tarroza.
The appellants also capitalize on the discrepancy in the identification of the
print on the T-shirt worn by appellant Jeoffrey Abello. When asked to recall the
clothes worn by Abello that fateful night, Gonzales stated "That one Mercy." In
contrast, prosecution witness Romeo Tarroza testified that the light green T-shirt
found near the shoes of the victim was printed with "Midwifery" and "ICC". This
was corroborated by the testimony of Georgie Tarroza that he recalled having seen
Abello wearing that night a green T-shirt printed with "Midwifery" at the back and
"ICC" on the front. We uphold the explanation of the trial court that the discrepancy
could be attributed to the fact that Gonzales does not know how to read and write.
We now discuss assigned errors numbers 2 and 3. Appellants contend that the
trial court erred when it ruled that the sworn statement of Jimmy Paquingan was
voluntarily given by him though he refused to sign the same. Under the
Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must
satisfy the following requirements: 1) the confession must be voluntary; 2) the
confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent
counsel; 3) the confession must be express; and 4) the confession must be in
writing.[44] In People v. Bandula,[45] we ruled that an extra-judicial confession must
be rejected where there is doubt as to its voluntariness. The fact that appellant
Paquingan did not sign his sworn statement casts serious doubt as to the
voluntariness of its execution. It is inadmissible evidence.
Additionally, the claim of appellant Paquingan that he was not assisted by a
counsel of his own choice when his affidavit of confession was taken is worth
noting. Paquingan's sworn statement was taken on November 25, 1991, at 3
o'clock in the afternoon. At that time, an information for rape with homicide had
already been filed against him and his co-appellants. Hence, when Paquingan gave
his confession, Paquingan was no longer under custodial investigation [46] since he
was already charged in court. Nonetheless, the right to counsel applies in
certain pretrial proceedings that can be considered "critical stages" in the
criminal process.[47] Custodial interrogation before or after charges have
been filed and non-custodial interrogations after the accused has been
formally charged are considered to be critical pretrial stages. [48]The
investigation by Fiscal Lagcao of Paquingan after the latter has been formally
charged with the crime of rape with homicide, is a critical pretrial stage during

29

which the right to counsel applies. The right to counsel means right to competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. [49] It is doubtful whether the
counsels given to Paquingan were of his own choice. In her rebuttal testimony,
Rosita L. Abapo, declared to wit:
"x x x
ATTY. FLORES:
xxx
Q:

In other words, you want to tell this Honorable Court as you stated earlier
that it was Fiscal Lagcao who called up for these lawyers? Do you want to
tell the Honorable Court that these lawyers were not the counsel of
choice of Jimmy Paquingan at that time? They were not the counsel of
choice of Mr. Paquingan at that time?

COURT:
Mr. Counsel, this witness does not know what is a counsel of choice. Make it
clearer. It was not Mr. Paquingan who asked that Atty. Dalisay, Atty.
Echavez and Atty. Cahanap be called to represent him?
WITNESS:
A:

Yes, sir.
x x x"[50]

Moreover, we hold that Atty. Cahanap cannot qualify as an independent

counsel, he being a Legal Officer of Iligan City. An independent counsel cannot be
burdened by any task antithetical to the interest of an accused. As a legal officer of
the city, Atty. Cahanap provides legal assistance and support to the mayor and the
city in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people, including the
maintenance of peace and order. His office is akin to a prosecutor who undoubtedly
cannot represent the accused during custodial investigation due to conflict of
interest.[51] Assigned errors numbered 2 and 3 are therefore ruled in favor of the
appellants.
As to the fourth assignment of error, we subscribe to the finding of the trial
court that the evidence of the accused-appellants proffers the defense of alibi. Time
and again, we have ruled that both denial and alibi are weak defenses which cannot
prevail where there is positive identification of the accused by the prosecution
witnesses.[52] For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused is
somewhere else when the crime was committed but he must likewise demonstrate
that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or in its
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. [53] In the case at bar, it was not
physically impossible for the appellants to be at the crime scene considering the
proximity of the place where they claimed they were and the spot where Jessette
Tarroza was brutally murdered.
We also reject appellants' claim that the decision of the trial court is void on
the ground that the judge who penned the decision, Judge Moslemen T.
Macarambon, was not the one who heard and tried the case. We have ruled in
People v. Rayray, 241 SCRA 1 [1995], that the fact that the judge who heard the
evidence is not himself the one who prepared, signed and promulgated the decision
constitutes no compelling reason to jettison his findings and conclusions, and does

not per se render his decision void. While it is true that the trial judge who
conducted the hearing would be in a better position to ascertain the truth or falsity
of the testimonies of the witnesses, it does not necessarily follow that a judge who
was not present during the trial cannot render a valid and just decision. [54] For a
judge who was not present during the trial can rely on the transcript of stenographic
notes taken during the trial as basis of his decision. [55] Such reliance does not violate
substantive and procedural due process of law.
We now review the award of damages to the heirs of Jessette Tarroza. When
death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to the
amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the victim without need of any
evidence or proof of damages.[56] Accordingly, we award P50,000.00 to the heirs of
Jessette Tarroza for her death. As for actual damages, we find the award
of P50,000.00 proper considering that Romeo Tarroza spent more or less the same
amount for the interment and burial of his deceased daughter.[57]
We have also awarded indemnity for the loss of earning capacity of the
deceased -- an amount to be fixed by the court considering the victim's actual
income at the time of death and his probable life expectancy.[58] The trial court
awarded P50,000.00 as compensatory damages. We find the same inadequate
considering that Jessette, who was twenty-four (24) years old at the time of her
death, was employed as a medical technologist earning P99.00 per day.[59] To
compute the award for Jessette's loss of earning capacity, her annual income should
be fixed at P39,146.25.[60].
We also find the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages proper considering
the mental anguish suffered by the parents of the victim on account of her brutal
murder. We likewise uphold the award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages
considering that the killing of Jessette Tarroza was attended by treachery. She was
also raped while already lifeless. All these are shocking to conscience. The
imposition of exemplary damages against the appellants will hopefully deter others
from perpetrating the same evil deed.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATION the assailed Decision
dated November 21, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 5) of Lanao del
Norte, Iligan City, in Criminal Case No. 3773. Accordingly, the monetary awards
granted in favor of the heirs of Jessette Tarroza are modified as follows:
a) Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as indemnity for her death;
b) Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as actual damages;
c) Six Hundred Fifty Nine Thousand Two Hundred Ninety Four pesos and
Fifty centavos (P659,294.50) for loss of earning capacity of said
deceased;
d) Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as moral damages; and
e) Twenty Five Thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

30

People v. Sunga
EN BANC
[G. R. No. 126029. March 27, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. REY SUNGA, RAMIL LANSANG,
INOCENCIO PASCUA, LITO OCTAC and LOCIL CUI @ GINALYN
CUYOS, accused,
REY SUNGA, RAMIL LANSANG and INOCENCIO PASCUA, appellants.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

upon JOCELYN TAN by repeatedly stabbing and smashing a stone on her head,
thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds and multiple fractures on her skull which
were the direct cause of her death shortly thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
x x x.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 11984.
Upon arraignment all the accused pleaded not guilty.
On September 26, 1994, the accused through counsel filed a petition for bail,
underscoring the weakness of the Peoples evidence, there being no direct
evidence against them, a fact admitted by the City Prosecutor in his resolution [4] for
their indictment. Hearings on the bail petition were conducted in the course of
which the prosecution, after presenting several witnesses, filed on October 18, 1994
a motion to discharge[5] accused Locil Cui (Locil) to be a state witness, averring
therein that the legal requisites for her discharge had been complied with, and
submitting her sworn statement[6] which detailed how her co-accused carried out the
crime. The respective counsels for the other accused opposed the motion, insisting
that it could only be filed during trial on the merits and that Locils testimony was
not absolutely necessary.[7] By Order of October 20, 1994,[8] the trial court deferred
the resolution of the bail petition until after the prosecution had rested its case, but
it granted the motion to discharge Locil.
[3]

The sole, uncorroborated testimony of an accused who turned state witness

may suffice to convict his co-accused if it is given unhesitatingly and in a
straightforward manner and is full of details which by their nature could not have
been the result of deliberate afterthought; [1] otherwise, it needs corroboration the
presence or lack of which may ultimately decide the cause of the prosecution and
the fate of the accused.
On July 12, 1994, the mutilated body of Jocelyn Tan (Jocelyn), a minor and a
high school student of Palawan Integrated National School, (PINS), was found at a
coffee plantation in Jacana, Barangay Bancao-Bancao in Puerto Princesa City,
Palawan.
The hunt for the possible killers of Jocelyn was swift, several arrests having
been made in a span of days, followed by the conduct of the requisite preliminary
investigation by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in Puerto Princesa City
which culminated in the filing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Puerto
Princesa City of the information for rape with homicide against the suspects. The
case was raffled to Branch 48 of the court.
Accused in the Information were Rey Sunga, Ramil Lansang, Inocencio Pascua,
Jr., and Lito Octac as principals, and Locil Cui alias Ginalyn Cuyos as accomplice the
accusatory portion of the information dated September 6, 1994 reads as follows:
xxx
That on or about June 29, 1994 in the afternoon, at Barangay Irawan, Puerto
Princesa City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force,
violence and intimidation, to wit: by pinning down one JOCELYN TAN, a minor,
fifteen (15) years of age, succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her against her
will and without her consent; that on the occasion of said rape and to enable them
to conceal the commission of the crime, the herein accused in furtherance of the
conspiracy together with LOCIL CUI, a minor, acting with discernment and who
cooperated in the execution of the offense as ACCOMPLICE, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, taking advantage of their superior number and
strength, with intent to kill, treacherously attack, assault, and use personal violence

The accused assailed the discharge of Locil via a petition for certiorari and
prohibition[9] before the Court of Appeals which issued a temporary restraining order
(TRO) enjoining the trial court from proceeding with the trial of the case. [10] The
TRO lapsed, however, without a preliminary injunction being issued, hence, the trial
of the case resumed.
Through state witness Locil, then 14 years old and an elementary school
dropout who had been living away from her parents and using the alias Ginalyn
Cuyos[11] to evade, by her own account,[12] her mother and aunt who were looking
for her after she got pregnant (the pregnancy was later aborted), the prosecution
established the following version:
At about 2:00 p. m. of June 29, 1994, Locil boarded a tricycle bearing the
marking Ryan-Ryan from the Social Security System (SSS) Office in Puerto
Princesa City. Already on board the tricycle was a lesbian who had a birthmark on
the right side of the face and who invited Locil for a joy ride. [13] Upon instruction of
the lesbian, the tricycle driver, whom she did not know but whom she later identified
and who answered to the name Rey Sunga (Sunga), repaired to the Mendoza Park.
At the Mendoza Park, the lesbian alighted and spoke to Jocelyn Tan, the victim,
who was dressed in a PINS uniform. The lesbian, together with Jocelyn, then joined
Locil aboard the tricycle which was already driven by Inocencio Pascua (Pascua) vice
Sunga who had in the meantime left. Still aboard the tricycle, the four of them
proceeded to and reached Barangay Irawan, Puerto Princesa City and on reaching a
forested area, Jocelyn was met by Sunga who held her and by Ramil Lansang
(Lansang) who wrapped his arm around her waist as they dragged her to a nearby
buho clumps. There, Jocelyn was made to lie down. Her skirt was raised and her
panty was taken off by Lansang. As she lay face up with both her hands held by

31

Sunga and Pascua, Lansang stripped naked, placed himself on top of Jocelyn,
inserted his penis into her vagina and seemed to be pumping.[14]
After Lansang, Sunga took turn to have sexual intercourse with Jocelyn as
Lansang and one who was not known to Locil and whom the latter described as one
who has chinky or narrow eyes, later identified to be Pascua, kept Jocelyn
pinned down by her hands.[15]
Pascua too subsequently had carnal knowledge of Jocelyn who all along
struggled against her malefactors.[16]
After Pascua satisfied his lust, Sunga, with a sharp bladed weapon, stabbed
the abdomen of the motionless Jocelyn, drawing her to rise to a sitting position and
clutch her abdomen. Sunga then passed on the bladed weapon to Lansang who
smashed Jocelyns head with an irregularly shaped stone, causing her to fall to the
ground lifeless. Locil, who witnessed everything, was then pulled by the lesbian and
led back into the tricycle where they awaited Lansang, Sunga and Pascua to ride
with them. All five thereafter headed back to Puerto Princesa City proper, leaving
Jocelyns body behind.[17]
When the five reached the Mendoza Park where Locil alighted, she heard the
voice of someone from inside the tricycle warning her to keep mum about the
incident, otherwise something would also happen to her. Locil then repaired to her
boarding house. Until she was arrested following the discovery on July 12, 1994 of
Jocelyns corpse, she did not report the incident to anyone. [18]
The other prosecution
circumstances after the fact.

witnesses

provided

testimonies

pertaining

he was referring to, Lansang replied that he would return. Lansang did not return,
however, prompting Tan to relay to law enforcers the statements of Lansang, his
neighbor who was courting Jocelyn at the time and with whose family his own family
was in good terms.[21]
Testifying on the autopsy she conducted on Jocelyn, Dr. Ma. Carla Gallego Vigonte (Dr. Vigonte) affirmed the following findings in her report [22]dated July 12,
1994:
POST-MORTEM FINDINGS
1. The cadaver was seen in advanced stage of decomposition.
2. Depressed fracture noted at the frontal bone of the skull about 2 cm anterior to
the bregma, measuring 2.5 cm in width and 3.5 cm in length, with a rounded hole
at its right side with irregular edges measuring 4 cm x 5 cm in diameter; with a
linear fracture about 2 cm in length extending from the depressed fracture up to the
bregma; linear fracture about 3 cm in length along the coronal suture, right side,
extending from the hole to the bregma.
3. Multiple linear fracture with lengths ranging from 2 cm to 5 cm, noted at the
lambdoid suture, about 2 cm right side of the lambda, extending to the right side of
the occipital and parietal bones of the skull.

to

Oscar Devilleres, a garbage truck driver, recalled that he was on his way home
in Jacana, Barangay Bancao-Bancao at 12:30 a. m. of June 30, 1994, a day after
the incident, when from a distance of about 30 meters, he saw Lansang walking
back and forth and appearing restless near the coffee plantation in Jacana,
Barangay Bancao-Bancao where Jocelyns body was later found on July 12,
1994. Although it was then nighttime, Devilleres had a good look at Lansang due to
the illumination provided by the electric light post under which Lansang was
situated.[19]
Igleceria Gabinete, a resident of Jacana, declared that she was among those
who saw the mutilated body of Jocelyn in the morning of July 12, 1994 at a coffee
plantation near her place; that in the afternoon of that date and while tending her
sari-sari store, a tricycle arrived with three men on board, one of whom, Lito Octac
(Octac) alighted, leaving the two inside the tricycle who seemed to be hiding their
faces; that one of those two men inside the tricycle inquired from her whether the
discovered corpse, that of Jocelyn, was from Barangay Caroray; that the following
day, she reported to the police about the three suspicious looking men who went to
her store; and that two days later, she was made to, as she did, identify Lansang at
the police station as one of the men who went to her store in the afternoon of July
12, 1994 and inquired as to Jocelyns corpse. [20]
Galahad Tan (Tan), Jocelyns father, recounted as follows: During the wake of
his daughter at the Sampaton Funeral Parlor, at 1:30 a. m. of July 14, 1994
(15th day following the incident), Lansang arrived and told him as follows: Total
tayo ay magkaisang barangay lang ay ayosin natin itong kaso at magtulungan na
lang, mayroon na akong alam na makakapagturo kung sino and may kagagawan sa
krimen. Huwag na lang nating sabihin sa mga polis. When he asked Lansang who

PROBABLE CAUSE OF DEATH: Intracranial Hemorrhage secondary to multiple

fractures of the skull.
Dr. Vigonte opined that a blunt object or instrument like a hard wood or a rock
caused the injury noted in post-mortem finding no. 2 which was fatal, it being a
deep wound in the skull affecting its inner organ and lacerating the tissues of the
brain, thus causing hemorrhage; that for said fatal wound, the assailant was
probably at Jocelyns left side; that for the injury in post-mortem finding no. 3, the
attacker was at the back of Jocelyn; and that in light of the multiple injuries, there
were more than one perpetrator.[23] Dr. Vigonte was, however, unable to determine
whether Jocelyn was also raped.[24]
The prosecution adduced documentary evidence consisting mainly of two
supposed extrajudicial confessions made by Sunga.
In a sworn statement (Exhibit A) [25] dated July 18, 1994 which was executed
before SPO2 Jose P. Janoras (SPO2 Janoras), Sunga made the following disclosures:
At about 10:00 a. m. of the day of the incident, June 29, 1994, as he was then
at work as a tricycle dispatcher, Lansang arrived in a tricycle bearing the marking
Ryan-Ryan and invited him to accompany him in fetching Jocelyn at the PINS. He
obliged and just before reaching their destination, Locil boarded the tricycle. At the
gate of the school, Lansang talked to Jocelyn who was then wearing the school
uniform after which the two boarded the tricycle which he (Sunga) drove to a spot
at the corner of Rizal Avenue and Lacao St. in the Puerto Princesa City proper where
the four of them (Sunga, Lansang, Locil and Jocelyn) transferred to an owners
jeep brought by Octac alias Toto. The group then proceeded to and reached
Barangay Irawan at around 10:30 a. m. and at a forested area in Sitio Tagaud,

32

everyone alighted except for Octac. Lansang then forcibly undressed Jocelyn and
raped her while he (Sunga) and Locil watched. After consummating his carnal
desire, Lansang hit Jocelyn with a 2 x 2 piece of wood on her head and
successively on different parts of her body. When Jocelyn was already dead, Locil
also whacked Jocelyns body many times. The group then headed back to the city
proper, leaving Jocelyns remains at the scene of the crime.
In accordance with their previous agreement, he (Sunga), Lansang and Locil
returned to Barangay Irawan aboard a jeep driven by Octac four days after June 29,
1994 and took Jocelyns body for the purpose of bringing it to Jacana in Barangay
Bancao-Bancao in accordance with Lansangs wish. On their way to Bancao-Bancao,
Locil inserted a cigarette into the corpses mouth . pinasigarilyo ni [Locil] ang
bangkay upang ikubli sa maaaring makakita ang tunay na kaanyuan ni Jocelyn
Tan.[26] At Barangay Bancao-Bancao, he (Sunga), Lansang and Locil carried the
victims body and left the same at a coffee plantation fifty meters away from Jacana
Road while Octac served as a lookout by the roadside. On their return to the
city, the four parted ways at the corner of Rizal Avenue and Lacao Street. He
(Sunga) then drove the tricycle with the marking Ryan-Ryan with Locil aboard
while Lansang and Octac remained together at the jeep.[27]
The above sworn statement bears Sungas signature and that of his assisting
counsel, Atty. Agustin Rocamora (Atty. Rocamora), Puerto Princesa City Legal
Officer.
Testifying as to the investigation he conducted upon Sunga, SPO2 Janoras
recalled that he was on duty at the Puerto Princesa City police precinct in the
morning of July 18, 1994 when SPO4 Boy Pantollano and patrolman Bolos arrived
together with Sunga. The two brought Sunga inside a room and asked him
questions pertaining to Jocelyns death and after about thirty minutes, Sunga was
presented before him (SPO2 Janoras) for investigation. He initially asked Sunga
whether he knew anything about Jocelyns death and Sunga replied affirmatively,
prompting him to inform him of his rights under custodial interrogation. After
Sunga signified his desire to avail of the services of a lawyer, Sunga chose Atty.
Rocamora to be his counsel from among the names of lawyers mentioned by him
(SPO2 Janoras). He thereupon fetched Atty. Rocamora from his residence. Atty.
Rocamora briefly conferred with Sunga, asking him if he wanted to give a confession
and informing him of the consequences thereof. Thereafter, the investigation
proceeded with Sunga voluntarily giving his answers to questions he (SPO2 Janoras)
propounded at the end of which investigation Sunga and Atty. Rocamora affixed
their respective signatures on the recorded statement.[28]
The execution of Exhibit A was, during the preliminary investigation before
the Municipal Trial Court,[29] affirmed by Sunga. Apart from acknowledging its
contents, Sunga answered the investigating judges other queries as he implicated
Lansang, Locil and Octac in the killing of Jocelyn. This time, however, he alleged
that not only Lansang but also Octac raped Jocelyn, adding that he merely held
Jocelyns hand.[30]
Subsequently or on August 3, 1994, Sunga executed another sworn statement
(Exhibit I)[31] before Special Investigator Reynaldo O. Abordo of the Puerto
Princesa office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Exhibit I varied in a
number of respects from Exhibit A. In Exhibit I, Sunga declared that in the
morning of June 28, 1994 he already had an agreement with Lansang to fetch
Jocelyn from her school on the following day; that at 8:00 a. m. of the following
day, June 29, 1994, he, together with Lansang, Lito Octa (should be Octac) and a

certain Jun left Mendoza Park and proceeded to Irawan after asking Locil, one Bing
Manila,
and
a
certain
Josie
to
fetch
Jocelyn
at
her
school; that Jun drove the tricycle backto the city proper and he
transported their female companions including Jocelyn to Irawan;
that
at
Irawan, Lansang raped the struggling Jocelyn whose hands were then held by
Josie; that after Lansang and Jun raped Jocelyn, Lansang smashed her head twice in
accordance with his plan to kill her which plan was known to him (Sunga), Locil,
Octac and Jun; that at 1:30 a. m. of June 30, 1994, Lansang, Sunga, Octa and
Jun returned to Irawan, took Jocelyns corpse and dumped it at a coffee
plantation in Jacana Road; and that he did not take part in the rape or killing of
Jocelyn but merely joined the group due to Lansangs promise to give
him P500.00. Exhibit I embodied a waiver by Sunga of his right to
counsel.[32]
The prosecution evidence with respect to Jocelyns familys incurring of the
amount of P11,000.00 for Jocelyns funeral expenses was admitted by the defense.
[33]

Upon the other hand, all the accused proffered alibi.

Accused-appellant Sunga, who had previously been convicted for robbery with
homicide, denied having anything to do with the rape and killing of Jocelyn. He
branded as false the testimony of Locil whom he claimed is a prostitute and a pimp
and was always seen loitering at Mendoza Park. While he acknowledged knowing
Octac and Pascua, he denied being in their company on June 29, 1994 or in
Lansangs.[34]
Confronted with his sworn statement-Exhibit A, Sunga explained the
circumstances behind his execution thereof as follows: After having been arrested
without a warrant by the police in the evening of July 15, 1994 at the corner of Rizal
and Valencia streets while picking up passengers, he was brought to the police
station where he was subjected to violence and intimidation by SPO2 Pantollano and
a certain Ka Ronnie to coerce him to pinpoint to anybody, and he involuntarily
did. After being mauled and kicked, he was made to appear before police
investigator Janoras on that same night of July 15, 1994 during which he signed the
second and third pages of a three paged affidavit embodying his questioned
extrajudicial confession without the assistance of counsel and under threats and
intimidation from SPO2 Pantollano. He was later brought on July 18, 1994 to the
Capitol building where he signed the first page of his confession after which Atty.
Agustin Rocamora also signed the same.[35]
As to his other sworn statement-Exhibit I executed before the NBI, Sunga
initially affirmed having given the answers to questions propounded therein by the
NBI Investigator and having executed the confession for the purpose of applying
to become a state witness in the case.[36] He subsequently retracted his
acknowledgement of Exhibit I as his own confession. [37] While he admitted having
participated in the preliminary investigation at the MTCC of Puerto Princesa City, he
could not remember having given most of the statements he made therein. [38]
The defense presented other witnesses.
Joel Esquela Mayo (Mayo), an employee of Puerto Princesa Citys crime
watchdog Bantay Puerto, declared that in the morning of July 14, 1994 he and a
co-employee Miguel Abrina (Abrina) were at Jacana in Barangay Bancao-Bancao
upon orders from their superior to be on the lookout for the possible return thereto

33

of the perpetrators behind Jocelyns killing; seeing Locil uneasy as she alighted from
a tricycle, they approached and asked her how she was related to Jocelyn to which
she replied that she was a friend; then Locil brought the two to the very spot where
Jocelyns remains were found and while there she acted as if she was looking for
something; Locil later commented that it was there that Jocelyn and she had a
fight; and Locil was subsequently apprehended by the police. [39]
Abrina substantially corroborated Mayos story.[40]
Another witness, Orlando Lacsamana (Lacsamana), a detainee at the Puerto
Princesa City jail, testified that while he was conversing with Locil, also a detainee,
on August 15, 1994, they saw Lansang being brought inside. Lacsamana asked
Locil if she knew Lansang but she denied having known Lansang or having been her
companion.[41]
Detention prisoners John Pulga (Pulga) and Jerry Galgarin (Galgarin) as well as
Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) personnel Joel Rabanal (Rabanal)
and SPO2 Conrado Guzman Rafael (SPO2 Rafael) testified as to Locils failure to
correctly identify Lansang on separate occasions.
Thus detention prisoner Pulga narrated that on July 21, 1994, he was made to
form part of a police line-up together with three other detainees; and that when
Locil was asked by the police to identify who among them was Lansang, she pointed
to him (Pulga) whom she called Ramil Lansang.[42]
Corroborating Pulgas testimony was BJMP personnel Rabanal who brought
out Pulga and the three others for the police line-up, he too alleging that Locil
indeed pointed to Pulga as Lansang.[43]
Detention prisoner Galgarin, who was detained at the 263 rd Mobile Post of
the Philippine National Police on July 23, 1994, declared that he saw Locil arrive in a
police car after which Lansang and three other detainees were made to stand in a
police line-up; and that when Locil was asked to identify Lansang, she said he was
not there.[44]
SPO2 Rafael testified that while he was on duty in the aforesaid PNP Mobile
Post on August 23, 1994, Locil hesitated to identify Lansang even after the police
assured her not to be afraid.[45]
Accused-appellant Pascua disclaimed knowledge of anyone of his co-accused
prior to the June 29, 1994 incident. He denied having anything to do with the killing
or rape of Jocelyn and branded Locils account as a lie. He claimed that he was
staying with his uncle Victor de Felipe at 27 E. Burgos St., Puerto Princesa City from
April to July 14, 1994; that while he was driving the tricycle with the marking
Ryan-Ryan for a living, he returned it to its owner on June 27, 1994 due to engine
trouble and never drove it again; that at about 8:00 a. m. of June 29, 1994, he,
together with his uncle Victor De Felipe and a carpenter, went to San Pedro also in
Puerto Princesa City where he helped in recovering materials from De Felipes
demolished house thereat for use in the latters other residence at Burgos St.; and
that he was at San Pedro until 4:00 p. m. of the same day.[46]
Continuing, Pascua declared that on July 14, 1994, he left for his stepfathers
home at Barangay Burirao of the town of Narra where he was, on July 23, 1994,
arrested without a warrant by the police on suspicion that he might have been
involved in the subject crime, he having driven for sometime the tricycle bearing the
marking Ryan-Ryan; that the apprehending policemen sought his cooperation so

he could be utilized as a witness against Lansang, even offering him a P100,000.00

reward and his exclusion from the criminal information, but he refused for he knew
nothing about the crime; that inside a small room at the police station in the city,
he again refused to obey SPO4 Pantollanos order for him to say certain things
about the crime, thereby infuriating Pantollano who threatened to implicate
him; that while still under detention on July 24, 1994, he was brought before Locil
for identification purposes but Locil denied knowing him; and that he did not go
into hiding after June 29, 1994 for he took up a farming course at the Palawan
National Agricultural College (PNAC).[47]
Victor De Felipe corroborated his accused nephews testimony as to his
whereabouts on June 29, 1994 and his returning the tricycle two days before the
incident.[48] Felix Mayor, De Felipes carpenter, confirmed Pascuas being with him
and De Felipe the whole day of June 29, 1994 at Barangay San Pedro to retrieve
building materials from De Felipes demolished house in the said place. [49]
The testimony of witness Espiridion Labotoy was dispensed with when the
prosecution admitted its corroboration of Pascuas allegation that the latter returned
the tricycle to its owner on June 27, 1994.[50]
Filomena Pascua-Tesorio also corroborated her nephew Pascuas claim that
Locil did not identify him as one of those who wronged Jocelyn. And she added that
during her visit to Pascua at the police station on July 24, 1994, she asked Locil if
she was acquainted with Pascua and she replied in the negative, saying it was her
first time to see Pascua.[51]
Cesar Batin (Batin), an instructor at PNAC, attested that Pascua was enrolled
at PNAC Abo-Abo Center in Brookes point on July 18, 1994 but that he attended
classes for only about a week and resumed his studies on August 16, 1994 until
October 11, 1994. Batin affirmed the certification he issued as to Pascuas school
attendance.[52]
Pascuas mother Teodora Espaola testified that she accompanied her
arrested son when he was brought by the police to Puerto Princesa City on July 23,
1994 and confirmed that the policemen offered Pascua a reward in exchange for his
admitting responsibility for the crime but that she rebuffed them. [53]
Lito Octac, also clinging to alibi, alleged that on the day of the incident he
was working at Pambato Forwarder loading cargoes and pieces of baggage, in
support of which he presented an entry (Exhibit 9) [54] in his employers logbook
showing that he reported for work from 1:00 to 5:00 p. m. of June 29, 1994.[55]
Lansang, who operated a pump boat that ferried passengers from Barangay
Caruray, San Vicente, Palawan where his parents reside, to Barangay Bahile, Puerto
Princesa City and vice-versa, declared as follows: At about 8:30 a. m. of June 29,
1994, he met his sister Gloria Negosa in her office at the Philippine Ports Authority
for the purpose of borrowing from her P3,000.00 which he would use to buy pieces
of plywood and paint for his boat. His sister, however, directed him to get the
money from his mother who happened to be at her office at the time and who
received two PCIB checks both dated June 29, 1994 payable to cash, one in the
amount of two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos, and another in the amount of Nine
Thousand Six Hundred Sixteen (P9,616.00) pesos from Gloria. Shortly after, he and
his mother went to the PCI Bank where he, instead of his mother who did not have
any identification card and Community Tax Certificate, did the encashing (at 9:53 a.
m.) of the checks- (Exhibits 12 and 12-A). The two left the bank and proceeded

34

to the Palawan Poultry store from which they purchased fertilizer. Thereafter, they
bought plywood and paint at the Unico Merchandising. [56] (An official receipt dated
June 6, 1994 of P2,206 representing the purchase price of the goods was marked as
Exhibit 11.)[57]
Continuing, Lansang declared that while his mother left to make her other
purchases, he remained at the Unico Merchandising until 12:00 noon when he went
to the house of his brothers-in-law to pick up her mothers goods. At the said
house, he briefly met a resident thereof named Ariel Bactad and then took his
mothers goods. He loaded all their purchases in a jeep bound for Barangay Bahile
from which point they were to be transported via a pump boat to his parents home
in Barangay Caruray. As his mother no longer showed up, he was constrained to
accompany his cargo aboard the jeep which departed at 1:00 p. m. and reached
Barangay Bahile at 3:00 p. m. of the same day, June 29, 1994. At Barangay Bahile,
he loaded the goods into his boat with the help of the boat driver, Arnel
Tulonghari. He then took lunch at the carinderia of a certain Jerry (or Jerico)
Rufano where he waited in vain for two hours for his mother to come to Barangay
Bahile. At 5:00 p. m. of June 29, 1994, Rufano drove him to Barangay Salvacion
where he got a jeepney ride on his way home to the city proper, arriving there at
about 8:30 p. m. still of the same day.[58]
Lansang further declared that he had never been to Barangay Irawan or to
Jacana in Barangay Bancao-Bancao. While he admitted that he, together with one
Joel Egaa, went to the Sampaton Funeral Parlor in the evening of July 13, 1994 to
condole with the Tans, he denied having told Tan that he (Lansang) knew somebody
who could pinpoint those responsible for the crime. He likewise denied asking Tan to
refrain from seeking the assistance of law enforcers, he having merely informed Tan
that Sunga, with whom (he) Lansang got to be acquainted earlier that same
evening, knew Jocelyn. Finally, Lansang disclaimed having been Jocelyns suitor for
he had a live-in partner named Mary Ann Dineros whom he intended to marry but
could not do so due to his indictment in the case at bar.[59]
Witnesses Jerry Rufano, Arnel Tulonghari and Ariel Bactad corroborated
pertinent parts of Lansangs testimony as to his whereabouts and activities on June
29, 1994.[60]
Joel
Egaa also affirmed having accompanied Lansang to Sampaton Funeral parlor on th
e night of July 13, 1994.[61]
Melisa P. Mateo, on the other hand, testified that as a bank teller of PCI
Bank, she received and processed for encashment the two checks (Exhibit 12)
[62]
from Lansang at almost 10:00 a. m. of June 29, 1994, which checks as well as
Lansangs signatures and hers and other inscriptions thereon she identified. [63]
Edgardo Caisip declared that he was the driver of the jeepney which Lansang
rode on together with his cargo for a trip from the city proper to Barangay Bahile
from 1:00 to 3:00 p. m. of June 29, 1994. Caisip added that he already knew
Lansang before that time, the Lansangs having been his usual passengers. [64]
Finally, Freddie Gallego, a barangay councilor of Barangay Caruray, claimed
that Lansang was with him in the afternoon of July 12, 1994 on the occasion of a
birthday party in the said barangay.[65]
By decision of March 7, 1996, the trial court convicted Sunga and Lansang as
principals of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced each to suffer the

penalty of DEATH, and Pascua as principal in the crime of Rape. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads, quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused REY SUNGA and RAMIL
LANSANG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime charged and
are sentenced to each suffer the penalty of DEATH. Accused INOCENCIO PASCUA,
JR., is also found GUILTY as principal of the crime of Rape and is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Accused RAMIL LANSANG, REY
SUNGA and INOCENCIO PASCUA, JR. are jointly and severally liable to indemnify
the heirs of Jocelyn Tan the sum of P150,000.00 as moral, actual and compensatory
damages with all the accessory penalties provided for the law and to pay the costs.
For failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of accused LITO OCTAC beyond
reasonable doubt, he is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
It appearing that Lito Octac is detained and Locil Cui alias Ginalyn Cuyos is still
under the custody of the PNP, Puerto Princesa City their release are hereby ordered
unless held for other lawful cause or causes.
The City Jail Warden of Puerto Princesa City and Chief of Jimmy Carbonell of Puerto
Princesa City, are hereby ordered to transfer immediately the bodies of accused REY
SUNGA and RAMIL LANSANG to the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila
pending review by the Supreme Court of this decision.
SO ORDERED.[66]
Hence, the automatic review of the case by this Court pursuant to Article 47 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Sunga, Lansang and Pascua filed their respective appeal briefs.
In the Appellees Brief, the Solicitor General prays for the affirmance of Sunga
and Lansangs conviction and the modification of Pascuas conviction such that he be
also convicted for rape with homicide and sentenced to suffer the penalty of death.
The issues in the case boil down to:
(1) Whether the discharge by the lower court of Locil Cui as a state witness is in
accordance with law; and
(2) Whether the guilt of appellants has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
After examining the record of the proceedings prior to the trial courts
questioned issuance of the order discharging Locil to become, as she did, a state
witness, this Court is satisfied that there was nothing irregular therewith. Her
discharge was ordered in the course of what originally were hearings on the petition
of the accused for bail and after the prosecution had presented several of its
witnesses and submitted Locils sworn statement. Contrary to accuseds counsels
argument that a motion for discharge could only be filed during trial on the merits,
it could be done at any stage of the proceedings, and discharge can be effected

35

from the filing of the information to the time the defense starts to offer any
evidence.[67]
From the records, it appears that the following conditions for Locils discharge
under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court were satisfied:
1. the discharge must be with the consent of the accused sought to be a state
witness;
2. his testimony is absolutely necessary;
3. no other direct evidence is available for the proper
committed except his testimony;

prosecution of the offense

4. his testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points;

5. he does not appear to be the most guilty; and
6. he has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
It is undisputed that at the start of the trial, the prosecution did not have
direct evidence, testimonial or otherwise, to establish the culpability of the accused.
Based on Locils sworn statement, she was the only person who saw what
happened to Jocelyn. Her testimony was thus indispensable. That she did not
appear to be the most guilty among the accused and that she had not been
convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude were shown, as was the
susceptibility of material corroboration of her testimony at the time of her discharge
in view of the other evidence in the hands of the prosecution.
That the trial court ordered Locils discharge a day before the scheduled
hearing on the motion for her discharge is of no moment. The requirement of a
hearing in support of the discharge had been substantially complied with when the
trial court, during the hearings on the bail petition, already received evidence from
the prosecution including Locils sworn statement and also heard in open court the
defenses arguments in opposition thereto. A hearing did take place but
interspersed with the hearings on the bail petition. So long as the trial court was
able to receive evidence for and against the discharge, its subsequent order
granting or denying the motion for discharge is in order notwithstanding the lack of
actual hearing on said motion.[68]
In fine, even if Locils discharge failed to comply with all the requirements
embodied in Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, her testimony would not, for
that sole reason, be discarded or disregarded for, in the discharge of a codefendant, the trial court may reasonably be expected to commit error which is not
reversible, the underlying principle being that it does not affect the competency and
quality of testimony of the discharged defendant.[69]
From the prosecution evidence, the testimony of the erstwhile accused-turned
state witness Locil is the most pivotal, for it is an eyewitnessaccount of what
transpired before and at the time of Jocelyns death. Her testimony is the only
direct evidence identifying appellants and relating in detail their specific overt acts.

Yet like any other testimony, this Court may not readily accept Locils
statements hook, line and sinker because in the assessment of the testimony of a
co-accused-turned state witness, the same must be received with great caution
and must be carefully scrutinized.[70]
The rule in this jurisdiction is that the testimony of a self-confessed
accomplice or co-conspirator imputing the blame to or implicating his coaccused cannot, by itself and without corroboration, be regarded as proof
to a moral certainty that the latter committed or participated in the
commission of the crime. The testimony must be substantially corroborated
in its
material points[71] by unimpeachable
testimony
and
strong
circumstances and must be to such an extent that its trustworthiness
becomes manifest.[72]
Was Locils testimony corroborated in its material points by the prosecutions
other
evidence? If
in
the
affirmative,
was
the
corroborative
evidence unimpeachable testimony and strong circumstances to such an extent
that Locils trustworthiness becomes manifest?
Appellant Sungas two extrajudicial confessions, which strictly speaking
were admissions for they referred to statements of fact which did not directly
involve an acknowledgement of guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense
with which he was charged,[73] could have lent corroborative support to Locils
testimony, having likewise given details of how the crime took place. Contrary,
however, to the trial courts ruling, this Court finds Sungas admissions to be
inadmissible in evidence not only against him but also against his co-accused
appellants.
A person under investigation for the commission of an offense is guaranteed
the following rights by the Constitution: (1) the right to remain silent; (2) the right
to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice, and to be provided
with one if he cannot afford the services of counsel; and (3) the right to be informed
of these rights.[74]
The right to counsel was denied Sunga during his execution of Exhibit A admission before the police on the ground that the counsel who assisted him, Atty.
Agustin Rocamora, was the City Legal Officer of Puerto Princesa.
In People v. Bandula,[75] this Court made it sufficiently clear that the
independent counsel for the accused in custodial investigations cannot be a special
counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney
whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. A legal officer of the city, like
Atty. Rocamora, provides legal aid and support to the mayor and the city in carrying
out the delivery of basic services to the people, which includes maintenance of
peace and order and, as such, his office is akin to that of a prosecutor who
unquestionably cannot represent the accused during custodial investigation due to
conflict of interest.[76] That Sunga chose him to be his counsel, even if true, did not
render his admission admissible. Being of a very low educational attainment,
[77]
Sunga could not have possibly known the ramifications of his choice of a city
legal officer to be his counsel. The duty of law enforcers to inform him of his
Constitutional rights during custodial interrogations to their full, proper and precise
extent does not appear to have been discharged.
Notatu dignum is the fact that nothing in the records shows that Atty.
Rocamora exerted efforts to safeguard Sungas rights and interests, especially that

36

of his right not to be a witness against himself. In fact, glaringly, Atty. Rocamora
was not even made to testify so he could have related the extent of legal
assistance he extended to Sunga at the police station. This Court is thus
constrained to rely on the following verbatimtestimony of SPO2 Janoras which
described how Atty. Rocamora assisted Sunga during the investigation:
ATTY. ENRIQUEZ (Defense Counsel) Q:

Did not Atty. Rocamora warn you, as the investigator, that simply he
is invoking his clients right to remain silent? Did not Atty.
Rocamora first confer with the accused Rey Sunga prior to the
investigation?

A:

They conversed.

Q:

You said a while ago that immediately upon your arrival you already
started the investigation. And now you are claiming that they had a
conversation first. Which is correct?

A:

They conversed for a very short while because everybody was

already there. I was on my typewriter and they were seated just
very near me (Emphasis supplied.)[78]
xxx

ATTY. CRUZAT (Defense Counsel) Q:

And you informed Atty. Rocamora that allegedly Mr. Rey Sunga
wanted to confess his alleged participation in the commission of the
offense, Mr. Witness?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

And so upon arrival at the police station it did not take Atty.
Rocamora a long time to confer with Rey Sunga before the alleged
investigation started, as you said 6:00 oclock in the morning?

A:

Yes, sir. It did not take long

ready (Emphasis supplied.) [79]

because

they

were

already

xxx
COURT Q:

Who propounded the questions to accused Rey Sunga?

A:

I was the one, Your Honor.

Q:

And who gave the answers?

A:

Rey Sunga was the one answering me, Your Honor.

Continue.
PROSECUTOR GONZALES Q:

And what, if any, did Atty. Agustin Rocamora do, if any, at the time
these questions were being asked Rey Sunga?

A:

He instructed Rey Sunga to just answer the questions, sir (Emphasis

supplied.)[80]
xxx

From the foregoing testimony of SPO2 Janoras, it can be gathered that Atty.
Rocamora did not, if at all, fully apprise Sunga of his rights and options prior to
giving his (Sungas) admission. Evidently, Atty. Rocamora, without more, merely
acted to facilitate the taking of the admission from Sunga.
Moreover,
that
Sunga
was
first
questioned
by
SPO4
Pantollano and Patrolman Bolos before he was investigated by SPO2 Janoras does
not escape the attention of this Court. Although Sunga failed to present evidence
as to the maltreatment he claimed to have suffered in the hands of SPO4 Pantollano
and Patrolman Bolos, he did not have any lawyer by his side at the time these two
policemen started asking him questions about Jocelyns death. At that point, Sunga
was already under custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel.
Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer
a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of
interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements (Italics in the
original; Emphasis supplied.). [81] Under such circumstances, this Court cannot but
entertain serious misgivings as to the admission Sunga subsequently gave to SPO2
Janoras.
Like Exhibit A, Sungas second extrajudicial admission-Exhibit I is
inadmissible, due to the absence of counsel to assist him when he executed it on
August 3, 1994 before the NBI of Puerto Princesa City. Although Sunga declared in
open court that he made such admission in connection with his desire to apply as
state witness which admission he later repudiated, this does not make Exhibit I
admissible. Sunga was at the time still under detention at the NBI office and had
been languishing in jail since his arrest in mid-July 1994. His desire to regain his
freedom is not difficult to understand, he having lost it once due to his conviction for
another crime. His admission which was done without the benefit of counsel
consisted of answers to questions propounded by the investigating agent of the NBI
and not of a unilateral declaration of his participation in the crime. To this Court,
these conditions are constitutive of an atmosphere pervading that of a custodial
investigation
and
necessitating
the
assistance
of
a competent and independent counsel of Sungas choice as a matter of right
but which he had none.
Any information or admission given by a person while in custody which may
appear harmless or innocuous at the time without the competent assistance of an
independent counsel must be struck down as inadmissible. [82] Even if the confession
contains a grain of truth or even if it had been voluntarily given, if it was made
without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible. [83]
The waiver by Sunga of his right to counsel as contained in his sworn
statement-Exhibit I was not a valid waiver for, on its face, it was executed not in
the presence of counsel, contrary to the express requirement of the Constitution. [84]
Sunga having had no counsel when he made his admission before the NBI and
his waiver of the right to have one being invalid, his statement- Exhibit I is
inadmissible.

37

The testimony of Sunga during the preliminary investigation before the

Municipal Trial Court whereby he expressly acknowledged having executed Exhibit
A and affirmed the
contents thereof did not render his extrajudicial
admission into a judicial one which could be used against him and his coappellants. Neither could his other statements in such proceeding admitting his
participation in the crime be utilized to establish his and the other appellants
guilt. For in that preliminary investigation, Sunga again was effectively denied of
his essential right to counsel. Atty. Rocamora was appointed Sungas counsel de
officio but just like the assistance he extended during the execution of Exhibit A,
Atty. Rocamora utterly did nothing in defense of Sungas cause. While Sunga was
being asked by the judge a barrage of questions calling for answers which could and
did incriminate him, Atty. Rocamora did not offer the slightest objection to shield his
client from the damning nature thereof.

In the appreciation of circumstantial evidence, there must be at least two

proven circumstances which in complete sequence lead to no other logical
conclusion than that of the guilt of the accused. [88] The circumstances that Lansang
was seen on June 30, 1994, a day after the incident, walking back and forth and
appearing restless near the place where Jocelyns body was eventually found; that
Lansang was in the company of Octac and inquired, the day after Jocelyns body
was discovered on July 12, 1994, if Jocelyn was from Barangay Caruray; that
Lansang told Jocelyns father that he knew someone who could pinpoint those
responsible for the crime; and that Jocelyn was fatally hit on the head by a blunt
object are too fragile to lead to the inference that Lansang and his co-appellants are
liable for Jocelyns rape and slaying. These circumstances in the scheme of things
are not indubitable pieces of evidence of a persons commission of a crime for they
are susceptible of explanations which do not necessarily speak of guilt or culpability.

The right to counsel applies in certain pretrial proceedings that can be deemed
critical stages in the criminal process. [85] The preliminary investigation can be no
different from the in-custody interrogations by the police, for a suspect who takes
part in a preliminary investigation will be subjected to no less than the States
processes, oftentimes intimidating and relentless, of pursuing those who might be
liable for criminal prosecution. In the case at bar, Sunga was thrust into the
preliminary investigation and while he did have a counsel, for the latters lack of
vigilance and commitment to Sungas rights, he was virtually denied his right to
counsel.

Standing alone and uncorroborated, can Locils testimony serve as a basis for
appellants conviction? As an exception to the general rule on the requirement of
corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice or co-conspirator-turned state
witness, her testimony may, even if uncorroborated, be sufficient as when it is
shown to be sincere in itself because it is given unhesitatingly and in
a straightforward manner and full of details which, by their nature, could
not have been the result of deliberate afterthought.[89] An exhaustive review of
the transcript of stenographic notes of Locils testimony reveals, however, that the
manner by which she related it was punctuated with marks of tentativeness,
uncertainty andindecisiveness which the trial court unfortunately failed to take
note of in its decision on review.

The right to counsel involves more than just the presence of a

lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and
objections; rather it means an efficient and decisive legal assistance and not a
simple perfunctory representation. [86] As in People v. Abano[87]where the confession
by the therein accused in the preliminary investigation was excluded as inadmissible
due to the absence of her counsel, this Court will not admit Sungas. This makes it
unnecessary to discuss and emphasize the conflict on material points of Sungas and
Locils accounts of the incident.
As for the rest of the prosecution evidence, it fails to corroborate Locils
testimony. The declarations of witnesses Tan, Devilleres and Gabinete can in no
way enhance the veracity of the essential, material aspects of Locils account for
they relate not to the crime itself but to events thereafter.
Tans testimony that Lansang informed him that he knew someone who could
reveal the identity of Jocelyns assailants and that Lansang suggested to him to no
longer report to the police does not at all constitute incriminating evidence, for
there was no admission, express or implied, by Lansang of any wrongdoing or
criminal participation on his part. Besides, why would Lansang suggest to Tan not
to report to the police when the police early on had its hands full in trying to solve
the crime.
Dr. Vigontes affirmation of her finding of a fatal injury on Jocelyns head is
supportive only of the fact that the victim was hit with something on her head which
caused her death, but this by no means is evidence that appellants inflicted said
fatal injury.
As for the circumstances testified to by the other witnesses, they do not, by
and in themselves, rise to the level of circumstantial evidence which warrant
appellants conviction.

Consider the following portions of her testimony, quoted verbatim:

COURT:
Q

Do you know the name of the woman who died?

Jocelyn Tan

ATTY. GACOTT [Private Prosecutor]:

Maybe we can use the sound system.
ATTY. GACOTT:
Q:

Miss Witness, you said that you are fourteen years old. How come
that you are 14 years old?

A:

(Witness handing a document to counsel.)

(To the Court:)

Your Honor, the witness handed to me a birth certificate.
ATTY. CRUZAT (Defense Counsel): We are requesting for the witness
to speak loud and not merely hand over certain documents.
COURT: Instruct the witness to speak louder. (Emphasis supplied.)
[90]

xxx
ATTY. GACOTT -

38

Q:

Miss Witness, how many times did you attain your Grade I
schooling?

A:

Three times.

Q:

What about your Grade II schooling?

A:

Two years.

Q:

How about your Grade III schooling?

A:

One year.

ATTY. CRUZAT: I am already tired of requesting this Honorable

Court to instruct the witness to speak quite louder. She is
just whispering to the interpreter.
COURT: You speak louder (Emphasis supplied.) [91]
xxx
ATTY. GACOTT Q:

Now, Miss Witness, where were you last June 29, 1994 at around
2:00 oclock in the afternoon?

A:

In Mendoza.

COURT Q:

What is that Mendoza?

A:

Mendoza Park.

ATTY. GACOTT Q:

During that date, do you remember any unusual thing that happened
to you?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

Could you please relate to this Honorable Court what happened

during that date?

A:

Yes, sir.

ATTY. CRUZAT: I may be compelled to ask this Honorable Court for

a coercive authority to declare her in contempt for
repeatedly disobeying the instruction of the Court for her to
speak louder.
COURT: You speak louder, otherwise you will be cited in contempt
of court.
WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor.[92]
xxx
ATTY. GACOTT -

Q:

You mean to say, Miss Witness, that this Tomboy that you are
referring to went upstairs of Mendoza Park, and once there she
talked to the woman sitting there?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

Do you know the name of that woman?

A:

No, sir.

Q:

After getting near to that woman, what did they do after that?

A:

They talked, sir.

Q:

Then what happened next?

ATTY. CRUZAT: This woman does not speak quite loud, Your Honor.
COURT: You talk louder (Emphasis supplied.) [93]
xxx
A scrutiny of her testimony likewise reveals a strain of improbability ingrained
therein. To recapitulate, Locil claimed that on June 29, 1994 she boarded a tricycle
bearing a lesbian who invited her for a joyride, proceeded to the Mendoza Park and
picked up Jocelyn, whom she was not acquainted with, then brought by the same
tricycle to Irawan where the latter was raped and brutally murdered. In other
words, she wanted to convey that she was deliberately brought by appellants with
them on June 29, 1994 to the place where they were to carry out, which they did,
their abominable acts against Jocelyn. This strikes this Court as improbable if not
bizarre. For it is contrary to human nature and experience for those who undertake
the commission of a crime to bring a spectator thereof. A criminal would certainly
take steps to evade detection or discovery of his criminal act, to keep it from being
witnessed or known by others who might later turn against him. Yet, from Locils
testimony, appellants took the trouble of bringing her to the locus criminis so she
could bear witness to a horrible crime which appellants carried out with evident
secrecy in a remote, uninhabited place in Puerto Princesa City.
That appellants required Locils presence at the time and place of the crime
only to threaten her later against divulging what she had witnessed thus defies
comprehension.
Evidence to be believed should not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness but should also be credible in itself such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. [94]
This Court is not in fact prepared to accord Locil credibly as a witness. Who
can trust one who, in her early teens, gets pregnant, flees home and stays in a
boarding house albeit she has no visible means of income to pay therefor, and
carries an alias name to evade being traced by her mother and aunt?
Locils testimony on how appellants put her in a position to have direct
knowledge of their malevolent acts despite taking measures to conceal their deeds
fails to inspire belief and must, therefore, be discredited.
A serious question too abounds on Locils identification of appellant Pascua
as one of those who raped Jocelyn. She described Pascua, the man who according

39

to her raped the victim after appellants Lansang and Sunga did, as having, among
other things, singkit (chinky) eyes. But as Pascua did not have singkit eyes, even
the trial court was prompted to ask her if she was sure that the third person who
raped Jocelyn had singkiteyes.[95] Thus, with the courts approval, the defense made
it of record that Pascua did not have chinky eyes, contrary to Locils description of
him.[96]
The
aforementioned
observations
pertaining
to
both
the
weak,
incomprehensible voice with which Locil gave her testimony, the improbability with
which she was precisely made by appellants to be a witness to their crime, and the
failure of her description of Pascuas eyes to match the latters actual physical
feature cannot but engender serious doubts as to the reliability of her testimony
against all appellants. This Court thus finds her uncorroborated account to have
failed the jurisprudentially established touchstone for its credibility and sufficiency,
that of straightforwardness and deliberateness, as evidence to warrant appellants
conviction.
In light of the weak evidence for the prosecution, the defense of alibi as
as of denial by appellants is accorded credence, for it is precisely when
prosecutions case is weak that the defense of alibi assumes importance
becomes crucial in negating criminal liability.[97] It bears noting that the
proffered by appellants, especially that by Lansang, had been corroborated.

well
the
and
alibi

In fine, regardless of the probative weight of appellants alibi, the prosecution

still has the onus of proving the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the accused and
cannot rely on the weakness of the defense evidence. The prosecution having failed
to discharge its burden, appellants presumed innocence remains and must thus be
acquitted.
WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the guilt of appellants Rey Sunga, Ramil Lansang and Inocencio Pascua in Criminal
Case No. 11984 the decision therein is hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED and said
appellants are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to cause the IMMEDIATE
RELEASE of the appellants from custody, unless they are being held for some other
lawful cause, and to INFORM this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this
Decision of the date appellants were actually released from confinement.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

consummated crime. In the absence of evidence that shows that the crime was
consummated the accused was acquitted but the court held judgment of
prosecuting his conviction for attempted estafa thru falsification of official and
commercial document which is necessarily included in the crime charged. Accused
invokes the defense of double jeopardy since his acquittal from the charge involving
RA 3019 is a bar for prosecution on the crime of attempted estafa thru falsification
of official and commercial document and that the accused was not informed of this
charge against him in the filing of the information.
Issue: Whether or not the accused was informed of the nature and cause of the
crime to which he is convicted
Held: The court presented the objectives of the right of the accused to be informed
of the nature and cause of the crime he is charged with as follows:
1.
2.
3.

To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as
will enable him to make his defense;
To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further
prosecution for the same cause;
To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they
are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.

In order that this requirement may be satisfied facts must be stated: not
conclusions of law. The complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact
and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime. What determines the real
nature and cause of accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts
stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the
information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have
been violated, they being conclusions of law. It follows then that an accused may be
convicted of a crime which although not the one charged, is necessarily included in
the latter. It has been shown that the information filed in court is considered as
charging for two offenses which the counsel of the accused failed to object therefore
he can be convicted for both or either of the charges.
However by reviewing the case at bar the SC finds lack of sufficient evidence that
would establish the guilt of the accused as conspirator to the crime of estafa beyond
reasonable doubt, the prior decision of the SC was deemed to be based merely on
circumstantial evidence, thus the accused was acquitted.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna,
JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.

People v. Legaspi

Pecho v. People

robbery with homicide The right against self-incrimination is simply a prohibition

against legal process to extract from the accuseds own lips, against his ill,
admission of his guilt. It does NOT apply when the evidence sought is NOT an
incriminating
statement
but
an
object
evidence;
Miranda
rights

covers only inadmissibility of extrajudicial confession or admission made during

custodial investigation; other evidence (like IDs, wallet, keys, etc) is not affected
even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation.

Facts: The decision of the Supreme Court for convicting the accused for the
complex crime of attempted estafa thru falsification of official and commercial
document was assailed with the contention of the defense that the accused may not
be convicted of the crime for double jeopardy. The charge against the accused was
on violation of RA 3019 of which he was acquitted because it only penalizes

People v. Malimit

40

People v. Wong Chuen Ming

violation of their constitutional rights is inadmissible against them. The fact that all
accused are foreign nationals does not preclude application of the exclusionary
rule because the constitutional guarantees embodied in the Bill of Rights are given
and extend to all persons, both aliens and citizen

Facts:

A PAL flight arrived in the Philippines which contained the 11 accused in

this case 2 of which were Hong Kong (British) Nationals, while the rest were
Malaysians.
After passing through and obtaining clearance from immigration officers at
theNAIA, the tour group went to the baggage claim area to retrieve their respective
checked-in baggages. They placed the same in one pushcart and proceeded to
ExpressLane5 which at that time was manned by customs examiner Danilo Gomez.
At first, Gomez paid no mind to the boxes labeled Alpen Cereals which he
found in the first 2 baggages. However, when he found the same boxes in the third
baggage, he became suspicious and opened the boxes. He found that they
contained a crystalline substance that was in a plastic bag.
Gomez informed an airport official of his findings. As Gomez pulled out
these boxes from their respective baggages, he bundled said boxes by putting
masking tapearound them and handed them over to the airport official. Upon
receipt of these bundled boxes, the official called out the names of accused as listed
in the passengers manifest and ordered them to sign on the masking tape placed
on the boxes allegedly recovered from their respective baggages.
Capt. Francisco testified that shortly after all boxes of Alpen Cereals were
recovered, he conducted a field test on a sample of the white crystalline substance.
His test showed that the substance was indeed shabu. Capt. Francisco
immediately informed the eleven (11) accused that they were under arrest. They
were brought toCamp Crame. At Camp Crame, they were also made to sign the
plastic bags that contained the shabu.
All the accused assail the conviction of the court below by alleging the
evidence
was
inadmissible.
Issue:
W/N the evidence was admissible.
Held:
The evidence is inadmissible.
At the outset, the Court holds that the signatures of accused on the boxes, as well
as on the plastic bags containing shabu, are inadmissible in evidence. A careful
study of the records reveal that accused were never informed of their fundamental
rights during the entire time that they were under investigation. Specifically,
accused were not informed of their Miranda rights i.e. that they had the right to
remain silent and to counsel and any statement they might make could be used
against them, when they were made to affix their signatures on the boxes of Alpen
Cereals while they were at the NAIA and again, on the plastic bags when they were
already taken in custody at Camp Crame.
By affixing their signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals and on the
plastic bags, accused in effect made a tacit admission of the crime charged for mere
possession ofshabu is punished by law. These signatures of accused are
tantamount to an unconcealed extra-judicial confession which is not sanctioned by
the Bill of Rights(Section 12[1][3], Article III, 1987 Constitution).They are,
therefore, inadmissible as evidence for any admission wrung from the accused in

People v. Morico
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 92660 July 14, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. SIXTO MORICO, AccusedAppellant.chanrobles virtual law library
QUIASON, J.: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite, Branch 18, Tagaytay City in Criminal Case No. TG-1304-88, finding appellant
guilty of violation of Sections 4 and 15, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
I
The information against appellant charging him of violation of Section 4, Article II of
R.A. No. 6425, reads as follows:
That on or about November 12, 1987 at Brgy. Sabutan, Municipality of Silang,
Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, sell, deliver, distribute and give away to another,
three (3) hand rolled (sic) sticks of marijuana leaves which are legally considered
prohibited drugs (Rollo, p. 11).
Appellant, assisted by his counsel-de-oficio, asserted his innocence to the charge.
Subsequently, another lawyer entered his appearance as counsel-de-parte. Trial
then ensued.
On July 28, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision finding appellant guilty of
violation of Sections 4 and 15 of R.A. No. 6425, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, finding
accused SIXTO MORICO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation
of Sections 4 and 15, of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended by PD Nos. 44, 1675, 1683, 1708 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 179,
and neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances being present, hereby
imposes upon him a straight penalty ofRECLUSION PERPETUA and a FINE of
TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND (P25,000.00) PESOS, with no subsidiary imprisonment in
the event of insolvency, the penalty herein imposed being higher than prision
correccional, pursuant to Art. 39, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code (Rollop. 17).

41

II
On November 12, 1987, at about 3:00 P.M., elements of the Anti-Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) in Bacoor, Cavite received an information from their
confidential informant that a certain "Sixto," a resident of Barangay Sabutan,
Silang, Cavite, was engaged in the sale of marijuana leaves. A team, composed of
Sgt. Rodrigo Espiritu, CIC Roberto Gelido and Pat. Allan Alcantara, was formed to
conduct a buy-bust operation. A marked ten-peso bill was given to the informant,
who was also tasked to act as the poseur-buyer. The poseur-buyer then went to the
house of appellant and engaged him in a conversation. Later, the poseur-buyer
handed the marked ten-peso bill to appellant, who in turn, gave him a small
package. It was at that instant that the poseur-buyer raised his t-shirt, the prearranged signal. The members of the team swooped down on appellant and arrested
him. They recovered from him the marked ten-peso bill. Thereafter, appellant was
brought to the district office of the NARCOM in Imus, Cavite.
The three hand-rolled sticks of marijuana leaves confiscated from appellant were
found positive for marijuana by the National Bureau of Investigation.
Appellant claimed that he was working as a mason at Barangay Sabutan when he
was arrested. When appellant asked why he was arrested, he was told that he was
peddling marijuana. Appellant was then brought to the municipal building in Silang,
Cavite. From Silang, appellant was brought to Imus. He related that he saw the
sticks of marijuana presented in evidence against him for the first time in Imus. He
also claimed that a policeman got the marked money from the pocket of Sgt.
Espiritu and handed the same to him.
On the third day of his detention, he was manhandled and ordered to sign the
"Receipt of Seized property" without the assistance of counsel. He was threatened
with bodily harm if be failed to sign the document.
Appellant also claimed that when he signed the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report
(Exh. "D"), the same was never explained to him nor was he assisted by counsel.
On the fourth day of his detention, the policemen demanded money from him for
his release. He refused.

An accused cannot be convicted of an offense not charged in the information. To do

so would constitute a violation of his constitutional rights, i.e., to be informed of the
charges against him and his right to due process (People v. Guevarra, 179 SCRA
740 [1989]).
Likewise, there is no evidence showing that he sold, administered, delivered, or
distributed any regulated drug.
Appellant also avers that the trial court erred in lending credence to the testimonies
of the prosecution's witnesses despite their irreconcilable and unexplained
contradictions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses refer to minor or
trivial matters and incidents which do not detract us from the fact that appellant
was caught in flagrante delicto as a result of the buy-bust operation.
Moreover, as long as the testimonies of the witnesses corroborate each other on
material points, the minor inconsistencies therein cannot destroy their credibility.
Such inconsistencies are but natural and even enhance their truthfulness as they
wipe out any suspicion of a counseled testimony (People v. Arcega, 207 SCRA 681
[1992]).
Appellant also contends that the non-presentation of the informant is fatal to the
case of the prosecution as there is no convincing evidence pointing to him as having
sold marijuana.
We do not agree.
This Court has laid down the rule, in a long line of cases, that the matter of
presentation of prosecution witnesses is not for the appellant or for the trial court to
decide as it is the prerogative of the prosecutor (People v. Eligino, 216 SCRA 321
[1992]; People v. Alerta Jr., 198 SCRA 656 [1991]). Apparently, the prosecution
deemed it unnecessary to present their informant poseur-buyer as there was
already sufficient evidence to pin down appellant (People v. San Andres, 222 SCRA
666 [1993]). Besides, if appellant believed that the testimony of the poseur-buyer
could have exculpated him, he could have availed of the compulsory process to have
the latter produced as his witness (People v. Nabunat, 182 SCRA 52 [1990]).

III
In this appeal, appellant claims that the trial court erroneously convicted him of an
offense which is not charged in the information. Appellant's argument should be
sustained.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The information only charged appellant with violating Section 4, Article II of R.A.
No. 6425, as amended. However, he was convicted of violating Sections 4 and 15 of
the same law. Section 4 and Section 15 are two separate and distinct offenses.
Section 4 penalizes any person who, unless authorized by law, sells, administers
delivers, distributes and transports any prohibited drugs. Section 15 penalizes any
person who without authority of law, sells, administers, distributes and transports
any regulated drugs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Hence, the presumption - that the testimony of the poseur-buyer was suppressed as
it would be fatal to the prosecution's case if presented - cannot arise.
In this case, the testimony of the poseur-buyer would only be corroborative (People
v. Fernandez, 209 SCRA 1 [1992]) as the members of the buy-bust team: namely,
Sgt. Espiritu and CIC Gelido sufficiently established the consummation of the
transaction (TSN, June 14, 1988, pp. 4-9, 26-27).
Sgt. Espiritu's testimony was further corroborated by CIC Roberto Gelido, another
member of the buy-bust team. Sgt. Espiritu and CIC Gelido are both law enforcers
and as such they have in their favor the presumption of regularity in the

42

performance of their duties (People v. Juma, 220 SCRA 432 [1993]). Likewise,
appellant failed to impute any false motive to the policemen who arrested him.
Appellant also claims that his signatures on the Receipt of Property Seized from him
(Exh. "C"), the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report (Exh. "D") and the
"Pansamantalang Pagtalikod sa mga Karapatan sa Artikulo 125" (Exh. "F") were
obtained in violation of his constitutional right to counsel during custodial
investigation.
With regard to the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, we ruled in People v. Bandin,
226 SCRA 299 (1993):
. . . [t]he Court reiterates its ruling in People v. Rualo, 152 SCRA 635, that when an
arrested person signs a Booking Sheet and Arrest Report at a police station, he does
not admit the commission of an offense nor confess to any incriminating
circumstance. The Booking Sheet is merely a statement of the accused's being
booked and of the date which accompanies the fact of an arrest. It is a police report
and maybe useful in charges of arbitrary detention against the police themselves. It
is not an extra-judicial statement and cannot be the basis of a judgment of
conviction" (at p. 303).
However, we sustain appellant's contention that his signature on the Receipt of
Property Seized (Exh. "C") is inadmissible as evidence, as it was given without the
assistance of counsel. In People v. Mauyao, 207 SCRA 732 (1992), we stated that
appellant's signature on this document is a declaration against his interest and a
tacit admission of the crime charged. Any admission taken from appellant, as a
result of a violation of his constitutional right, is inadmissible in evidence against
him. But even disregarding this exhibit, the remaining evidence on record is
sufficient to sustain appellant's conviction.
IV chanrobles virtual law library
The trial court sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
pay a fine of P20,000.00 under Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended by B.P. Blg. 179. However, this law was further amended by R.A.
No. 7659.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Section 4, Article II of the old law provides a penalty of imprisonment ranging from
12 years and one day to 20 years and a fine ranging from P12,000.00 to
P20,000.00 to any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer,
deliver, distribute or transport prohibited drugs.
Under the new law, where the quantity of the prohibited drugs involved is less than
that for which the law imposes a fine together with the penalty of imprisonment, the
penalty
to
be
imposed
shall
be
imprisonment
ranging
fromprision
correccional to reclusion perpetua without any fine.
In People v. De Lara, G.R. No. 94953, September 5, 1994, we ruled that if the
quantity of marijuana involved is below 250 grams, the penalty to be imposed under
R.A. No. 7659 is prision correccional.

Considering that the provisions of R.A. No. 7659 with regard to the penalty imposed
for violation of Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act favor appellant, we
shall apply it retroactively in his favor (Revised Penal Code, Article 22).
Hence, the maximum penalty that can be imposed when the offense charged
involves not more than 10.0161 grams of dried marijuana, is prision correccional.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty which this Court
can impose on appellant is arresto mayor (People v. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, July
29, 1994).
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: (1) that appellant shall suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6)
MONTHS of arresto mayor, as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional,
as maximum; and (2) that the fine of P25,000.00 imposed by the trial court is
deleted.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Kapunan, JJ., concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Bellosillo, J., is on leave.

People v. Andan
People v. Domantay
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
DOMANTAY, @ "JUNIOR OTOT," accused-appellant.

vs.

BERNARDINO

FACTS: Appellant, 29 years old, was charged with rape with homicide for the death
of Jennifer Domantay, a 6-year old girl whose body was found in a bamboo grove
with 38 stab wounds at the back and whose hymen was completely lacerated on the
right side, though found fully clothed in blue shorts and white shirt. The trial court
found appellant guilty as charged and was sentenced to death.
Conviction was based primarily on the testimonies of SPO1 Espinoza and Celso
Manuel, a radio reporter. SPO1 Espinoza testified that appellant confessed to the
killing of Jennifer and disclosed to him the location of the bayonet used which was
submitted as evidence for the prosecution. According to him, appellant waived
assistance of counsel but the waiver was not put in writing nor made in the
presence of counsel. On the other hand, Manuel declared that appellant, in an
interview, admitted the brutal killing of Jennifer; that he was just outside the cell
when he interviewed appellant accompanied by his uncle inside the jail, that the
nearest policemen were about 2-3 meters from him and that no lawyer assisted
appellant during the interview. Also presented as a witness was Dr. Bandonill,

43

medico-legal expert of the NBI, who testified that it was possible that the
lacerations on the victim could have been caused by something blunt other than the
male organ.
ISSUE: W/N the two confessions made before SPO1 Espinoza and Manuel which
appellant claimed to have been obtained from him were admissible.
HELD: The right to counsel of a person under custodial investigation can be waived
only in writing and with assistance of counsel and that confessions or admissions
obtained in violation thereof are inadmissible in evidence. However, this
prohibition does not apply to confessions or admissions made to private
individuals, such as radio reporters.
For an extrajudicial confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the following
requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in
writing.
In the case at bar, when accused-appellant was brought to the Malasiqui police
station in the evening of October 17, 1996, he was already a suspect, in fact the
only one, in the brutal slaying of Jennifer Domantay. He was, therefore, already
under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed in Art. III, 12 (1) of the
Constitution applied to him. . . . But though he waived the assistance of counsel,
the waiver was neither put in writing nor made in the presence of counsel. For this
reason, the waiver is invalid and his confession is inadmissible. SPO1 Espinoza's
testimony on the alleged confession of accused-appellant should have been
excluded by the trial court. So is the bayonet inadmissible in evidence, being, as it
were, the "fruit of the poisonous tree."
However, the SC agreed with the Solicitor General that accused-appellant's
confession to the radio reporter, Celso Manuel, is admissible. In People v. Andan, the
accused in a rape with homicide case confessed to the crime during interviews with
the media. In holding the confession admissible, despite the fact that the accused
gave his answers without the assistance of counsel, this Court said: [A]ppellant's
[oral] confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and
(3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern
itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual.
It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The
prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents.

People v. Morada
People of the Philippines v. Hon. Judge Palma and Romulo Intia y Morada
Case No. 219
G.R. No. L-44113 (March 31, 1977)
FACTS:
Private Respondent Romulo, 17 years of age, was charged with vagrancy.
Respondent Judge dismissed the case on the ground that her court has no
jurisdiction to take further cognizance of this case without prejudice to the re-filing
thereof in the Juvenile Court, because he believed that jurisdiction over 16 years
olds up to under 21 was transferred to the Juvenile Court by the issuance of PD 603

or the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which defines youthful offenders as those over
9 years of age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense.
ISSUE:
W/N the issuance of PD 603 transferred the case of the accused from the regular
courts to the Juvenile Court.
HELD:
The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court expressly confers upon it a special and
limited jurisdiction over criminal cases wherein the accused is under 16 years of
age at the time of the filing of the case. The subsequent issuance of PD 603 known
as the Child and Youth Welfare Code and defines a youth offender as one who is
over 9 years of age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense did
not by such definition transfer jurisdiction over criminal cases involving accused who
are 16 and under 21 years of age from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court.

Acevedo v. Sarmiento
So said the SC in Acevedo v. Sarmiento, 36 SCRA 247 (1970), a case involving the
prosecution for damage to property through reckless imprudence which had been
pending for 6 years, the last step taken being the start of the cross-examination of
the complaining witness, who did not appear thereafter. The SC ordered the case
dismissed with prejudice, thus acquitting the accused.
Acevedo v. Sarmiento, 36 SCRA 247 (1970)

People v. Tampal
PEOPLE VS. TAMPAL [244 SCRA 202; G.R. NO. 102485; 22 MAY
1995]

Facts:
Luis Tampal, Domingo Padumon, Arsenio Padumon, Samuel Padumon,
Pablito Suco, Dario Suco and Galvino Cadling were charged of robbery with
homicide and multiple serious physical injuries in the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga with Hon. Wilfredo Ochotorena as presiding judge. However,
only private respondents, Luis Tampal, Domingo Padumon, Arsenio
Padumon, and Samuel Padumon were arrested, while the others remained
at large.
The case was set for hearing on July 26, 1991, but Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Wilfredo Guantero moved for postponement due to his failure to
contact the material witnesses. The case was reset without any objection
from the defense counsel. The case was called on September 20, 1991 but
the prosecutor was not present. The respondent judge considered the
absence of the prosecutor as unjustified, and dismissed the criminal case
for failure to prosecute. The prosecution filed a motion for
reconsidereation, claiming that his absence was because such date was a

44

Muslim holiday and the office of the Provincial prosecutor was closed on
that day. The motion was denied by respondent judge.

They told the guard: "Surrender po kami, sir. Gumanti lang po kami."
The officer of the day investigated the incident right away. In his written report

Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the postponement is a violation of the right of the
accused
to
a
speedy
disposition
of
their
cases.
(2) Whether or Not the dismissal serves as a bar to reinstatement of the
case.

Held: In determining the right of an accused to speedy disposition of their

case, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the
number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. What are
violative of the right of the accused to speedy trial are unjustified
postponements which prolong trial for an unreasonable length of time. In
the facts above, there was no showing that there was an unjust delay
caused by the prosecution, hence, the respondent judge should have given
the prosecution a fair opportunity to prosecute its case.
The private respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy.
In several cases it was held that dismissal on the grounds of failure to
prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar another prosecution
for the same offense, but in this case, this does not apply, considering that
the rights of the accused to a speedy trial was not violated by the State.
Therefore, the order of dismissal is annulled and the case is remanded to
the court of origin for further proceedings.

submitted on the same day when the tragic occurrence transpired, he stated that,
according to his on-the-spot investigation, Avila stabbed Saminado when the latter
was armed in the comfort room and his back was turned to Avila, while Tampus
stabbed the victim on the chest and neck
Two days after the killing, or on January 16, another prison guard investigated
Tampus and Avila and obtained their extrajudicial confessions wherein they admitted
that they assaulted Saminado.
The trial was held at the state penitentiary at the insistence of the Avila. The court
found Tampus and Avila guilty for the murder of Saminado.
In this review of the death sentence, the counsel de oficio of appellant raises the
following issues:
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the confession of Tampus was taken in violation of Section 20,
Article IV of the Constitution (now Sec. 12, Art. IV of the 1987 Const)
2. W/N the trial court should have advised defendant Tampus of his right to remain

People v. Tampus
G.R. No. L-44690 March 28, 1980
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE TAMPUS Y
PONCE, accused whose death sentence is under review.
FACTS:
At around ten o'clock in the morning of January 14, 1976, Celso Saminado, a
prisoner in the national penitentiary at Muntinlupa, went to the toilet to answer a
call of nature and to fetch water.
The accused, Jose Tampus and Rodolfo Avila, prisoners in the same penal
institution, followed Saminado to the toilet and, by means of their bladed weapons,
assaulted him. Saminado died upon arrival in the prison hospital. After emerging
from the toilet, Tampus and Avila surrendered to a prison guard with their knives.

silent after the fiscal had presented the prosecution's evidence and when counsel de
oficio called upon Tampus to testify
3. W/N defendant Tampus was denied to his right to public trial because the
arraignment and hearing were held at the state penitentiary
HELD:
1. No. Even before the investigation for the killing was inititated, Tampus and Avila
had already admitted it when, after coming out of the scene of the crime, they
surrendered to the first guard whom they encountered, and they revealed to him
that they had committed an act of revenge. That spontaneous statement, elicited
without any interrogation, was part of the res gestae and at the same time was a
voluntary confession of guilt.
Not only that. The two accused, by means of that statement given freely on the
spur of the moment without any urging or suggestion, waived their right to remain
silent and to have the right to counsel. That admission was confirmed by their
extrajudicial confession, plea of guilty and testimony in court.

45

I have grave doubts as to the alleged waiver by the accused of his constitutional
Under the circumstances, it is not appropriate for counsel de oficio to rely on the

right to counsel and to remain silent given in the middle of his "voluntary"

rulings in Escobedo vs. Illinois and Miranda vs. Arizona regarding the rights of the

extrajudicial confession during his custodial interrogation by the prison investigator,

accused to be assisted by counsel and to remain silent during custodial

who at such late stage (in propounding question No. 6, not at the beginning of the

interrogation.

interrogation) purportedly took time out to admonish and inform the accused of his
rights to counsel and to silence. The fundamental rights of such unfortunate

It should be stressed that, even without taking into account Tampus' admission of

disadvantaged persons as the accused should all the more be clearly protected and

guilt, confession, plea of guilty and testimony, the crime was proven beyond

observed. At the very least, such alleged waiver must be witnessed by a responsible

reasonable doubt by the evidence of the prosecution.

official of the penitentiary, if not by the municipal judge of the locality.

Counsel for the accused's second assigned error is also well taken. After the

2. No, considering that Tampus pleaded guilty and had executed an extrajudicial

prosecutor had presented the State's evidence at the hearing for the purpose, and

confession.

when counsel de oficio then called upon the accused to testify, it became the trial

The court during the trial is not duty-bound to apprise the accused that he has the

court's duty (contrary to the majority's ruling) to apprise and admonish him of his

right to remain silent. It is his counsel who should claim that right for him. If he

constitutional rights to remain silent and against self-incrimination, i.e. the right not

does not claim it and he calls the accused to the witness stand, then he waives that

to be compelled to be a witness against himself.

right

Under the above-cited section 20 of the Bill of Rights, any confession or

incriminatory statement obtained in violation thereof is expressly declared

3. No. The record does not show that the public was actually excluded from the

"inadmissible in evidence."

place where the trial was held or that the accused was prejudiced by the holding of
the trial in the national penitentiary.
Besides, there is a ruling that the fact that for the convenience of the witnesses a
case is tried in Bilibid Prison without any objection on the part of the accused is not
a ground for reversal of the judgment of conviction (U.S. vs. Mercado, 4 Phil. 304).
The accused may waive his right to have a public trial as shown in the rule that the
trial court may motu propio exclude the public from the courtroom when the
evidence to be offered is offensive to decency or public morals. The court may also,
upon request of the defendant, exclude from the trial every person except the
officers of the court and the attorneys for the prosecution and defense.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

The extra-judicial confession of the accused is manifestly barred from admission
under the Bill of Rights.

Dela Camara v. Enage

The (Moot and Academic)Facts*:
November 7, 1968 - Then Magsaysay Misamis Oriental Mayor de la Camara was
arrested and detained at the Provincial Jail of Agusan, for his alleged participation in
the killing of fourteen and the wounding of twelve other laborers of the Tirador
Logging Co., on August 21, 1968. 18 days later, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed
with the CFI a cases of multiple frustrated murder and for multiple murder against
petitioner, his co-accused Tagunan and Galgo.
January 14, 1969- An application for bail filed by petitioner with the lower court,
premised on the assertion that there was no evidence to link him with such fatal
incident of August 21, 1968. He likewise maintained his innocence. Respondent
Judge started the trial of petitioner on February 24, 1969, the prosecution resting
its case on July 10, 1969. As of the time of the filing of the petition, the defense had
not presented its evidence.
August 10, 1970- Judge Enage issued an order granting petitioner's application for
bail, admitting that there was a failure on the part of the prosecution to prove that
petitioner would flee even if he had the opportunity, but fixed the amount of the bail
bond at the excessive amount of P1,195,200.00 (P840,000.00 for the 14 counts of
multiple murder plus P355,200.00 for the 12 counts of multiple frustrated murder.)
There was a motion for reconsideration to reduce the amount. Enage however
remained adamant. De la Camara then files a petition for certiorari assailing Enages
order and prays for its nullification.

46

March 5, 1971- Enage answers that set forth the circumstances concerning the
issuance of the above order and the other incidents of the case, which, to his mind,
would disprove any charge that he was guilty of grave abuse of discretion. It
stressed, moreover, that the challenged order would find support in circulars of the
Department of Justice given sanction by this Court. He sought the dismissal of the
petition for lack of merit.
March 31, 1971- both De la Camara and Enage did not appear at the hearing with
De la Camara, upon written motion was given 30 days to submit a memorandum in
lieu of oral argument, Enage in turn having 30 days from receipt of memorandum to
file his reply. De la Camara submitted the memorandum on April 6, 1971.
May 26, 1971-Enage, instead of a reply, submitted a supplemental answer wherein
he alleged that petitioner escaped from the provincial jail on April 28, 1971 and had
since been remained at large. There was a reiteration then of the dismissal of his
petition for lack of merit, to which petitioner countered in a pleading dated June 7,
1971, and filed with this Court the next day with this plea: "The undersigned
counsel, therefore, vehemently interpose opposition, on behalf of petitioner, to
respondent's prayer for dismissal of the present petition for lack of merit. For, the
issue in this case is not alone the fate of petitioner Ricardo de la Camara. The issue
in the present petition that calls for the resolution of this Honorable Tribunal is the
fate of countless other Ricardo de la Camaras who may be awaiting the clear-cut
definition and declaration of the power of trial courts in regard to the fixing of bail."
* While the facts of this case is moot and academic, it did not preclude the SC from
setting forth in language clear and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the
part of lower court judges to the unequivocal command of the Constitution that
excessive bail shall not be required.
ISSUE: WAS THE AMOUNT OF BAIL ORDERED BY ENAGE EXCESSIVE?
HELD: Yes yes yo kabayo! Sayang lang at pumuga/tumakas si mayor, kaya nga
moot (court) & academic ang petition
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, this case is dismissed for being moot and academic.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SCs rationale for requirement of non-excessive bail:
1.
Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with capital
offenses when the evidence of guilt is strong. Such a right flows from the
presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to
the lass of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt
be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It is not beyond the realm of probability,
however, that a person charged with a crime, especially so where his defense is
weak, would just simply make himself scarce and the frustrate the hearing of his
case. A bail is intended as a guarantee that such an intent would be thwarted. Nor is
there anything unreasonable in denying this right to one charged with a capital
offense when evidence of guilt is strong, as the likelihood is, rather than await the
outcome of the proceeding against him with a death sentence, an ever present
threat, temptation to flee the jurisdiction would be too great to be resisted.

2.
Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory
by requiring a sum that is excessive. So the Constitution commands. It is
understandable why. If there were no such prohibition, the right to bail becomes
meaningless. It would have been more forthright if no mention of such a guarantee
were found in the fundamental law. Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the
challenged order of August 10, 1970 fixing the amount of P1,195,200.00 is clearly
violative of this constitutional provision. Under the circumstances, there being only
two offenses charged, the amount required as bail could not possibly exceed
P50,000.00 for the information for murder and P25,000.00 for the other information
for frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored in this case that the Department of
Justice did recommend the total sum of P40,000.00 for the two offenses.
3.
There is an attempt on the part of respondent Judge to justify what, on its
face, appears to be indefensible by the alleged reliance on Villaseor v. Abao case.
The guidelines in the fixing of bail was there summarized, in the opinion of Justice
Sanchez, as follows: "(1) ability of the accused to give bail; (2) nature of the
offense; (3) penalty for the offense charged; (4) character and reputation of the
accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and strength of the evidence; (7)
probability of the accused appearing in trial; (8) forfeiture of other bonds; (9)
whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) if the
accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases." Enage ignored the
decisive consideration appearing at the end of the above opinion: "Discretion,
indeed, is with the court called upon to rule on the question of bail. We must stress,
however, that where conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would
amount to a refusal thereof and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we
will not hesitate to exercise our supervisory powers to provide the required
remedy."
No attempt at rationalization can therefore give a color of validity to the
challenged order. Nor is there any justification then for imputing his inability to fix a
lesser amount by virtue of an alleged reliance on a decision of this Tribunal. Even if
one were charitably inclined, the mildest characterization of such a result is that
there was a clear misreading of the Abao opinion when such a meaning was
ascribed to it. No doctrine refinement may elicit approval if to do so would be to
reduce the right to bail to a barren form of words.
excessive bail Where the right to bail exists, is should not be rendered nugatory
by requiring a sum
that is so excessive;
Guidelines in fixing the bail:
1) ability of the accused to give bail;
2) nature of the offense;
3) penalty for the offense charged;
4) character and reputation of the accused;
5) health of the accused;
6) character and strength of evidence;
7) probability of the accused appearing in trial;
8) forfeiture of other bonds;
9) whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested;
10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases.

Tolentino v. Camano
47

Facts:
Respondent Judge is being charged with gross ignorance of the law, grave
abuse of discretion, grave abuse of authority, violation of Canons 1, 2, and 3 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics and incompetence in connection with granting bail to the
accused in a criminal case for child abuse.

are disposable lands, thereby inducing said inspector to recommend approval of his
application for free patent. On August 10, 1989 an information for violation of RA
3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was then filed in the Sandiganbayan after
an ex parte preliminary investigation. A motion to quash the information was filed
by the private respondent contending among others that he is charged for an
offence which has prescribed. Said motion was granted. The crime was committed
on January 21, 1976, period of prescriptionwas 10 years, therefore it has prescribed
in
1986.
Now
the
motion
to
quash
was
being
assailed.

The complaint alleges that respondent Judge granted bail while pending the
holding of a preliminary investigation. The defense moved to quash the information
against the accused on the alleged absence of a preliminary investigation.
Consequently, respondent Judge ordered that a preliminary investigation be had by
the state prosecutor. During the pendency of this, he granted bail in favor of the
defendant after several notices of hearing to the state prosecutor to which the latter
failed to appear. After such grant, complainant herein now accuses respondent of
denying the prosecution the chance to adduce evidence to show that the guilt of
the accused was strong and that bail should not have been granted in his favor.
Held:
NOT GUILTY. There was no denial of due process. It was not necessary to
hold hearing so that the prosecution could show that evidence of guilt of the
accused was strong since a preliminary investigation had been ordered by the court.
At that point, bail was still a matter of right. Respondent judge, knowing that bail
was indeed a matter of right at that stage, nevertheless set the hearing for the
petition for bail four times. However, complainant failed to appear and present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused was strong. It thus appears that
complainant is actually the one who was remiss in the performance of his duties.
Considering that the case was referred to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for
preliminary investigation, the accused could be considered as entitled to bail as a
matter of right. Thus, respondent judges decision granting bail to the accused was
proper and in accordance with law and jurisprudence.

Enrile v. Perez
People v. Sandiganbayan
Facts: Two letter complaints were filed with the Tanodbayan by Teofilo Gelacio on
October 28,1986 and December 9, 1986, a political leader of Governor Valentina
Plaza, wife of Congressman Democrito Plaza of Agusan del Sur, shortly after private
respondent had replaced Mrs. Plaza as OIC/provincial Governor of Agusan del
Sur on March 1986 The complaint questioned the issuance to Governor Paredes,
when he was still the provincial attorney in 1976 of a free patent title for a lot in the
Rosario public land subdivision in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. He misrepresented
to a Lands Inspector of the Bureau of Lands that the lands subject herein

Issue: Whether

or

Not

the

motion

to

quash

validly

granted.

Held: Yes. RA 3019, being a special law the computation of the period for
the prescription of the crime is governed by Sec. 29 of Act No. 3326, which begins
to run from the day of the commission of the crime and not the discovery of it.
Additionally, BP 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, amending Sec. 11 of
RA 3019 by increasing ten to fifteen years of the period for the prescription or
extinguishment of a violation of RA 3019 may not be given retroactive application to
the crime which was committed by Paredes, as it is prejudicial to the accused. To
apply BP 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post facto law1 for it would alter his
situation to his disadvantage by making him criminally liable for a crime that had
already been extinguished under the law existing when it was committed.

Bulaong v. People
BULAONG v CA (PEOPLE)
181 SCRA 618
MEDIALDEA; January 30, 1990
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of CA
FACTS
- In March 1984, petitioner Bulaong filed with the RTC of Zambales an action for
sum of money against Vistan, Buenaventura and Sta. Maria. Later, Vistan also filed
a complaint against Bulaong for rescission of contract with damages. The said cases
were consolidated and are pending trial.
- In Nov. 1984, Bulaong filed a criminal complaint for estafa with the City Fiscal of
Pasay against Vicente Vistan and Leonardo Buenaventura. The complainant and the
defendants filed their affidavit and counter-affidavits respectively.
- In Jan. 1985, petitioners Bulaong and his counsel de Guzman submitted to City
Fiscal of Pasay a reply-affidavit containing statements which are alleged to be
libelous. Hence, Vistan and Buenaventura filed a complaint for libel against Bulaong
and his counsel de Guzman with the City Fiscal. The latter conducted an
investigation, and thereafter, filed an information for libel against petitioners. The
said information was later amended on.
- Petitioners moved to quash the Information on the ff. grounds: (1) that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense; and 2) that the fiscal has no authority to file
the Information. They further argue that the reply-affidavit was submitted and
sworn to by petitioner Bulaong not only because he was required to do so by the
investigating fiscal but also because it was in compliance with his legal and moral
duty as complainant in the case for estafa against Vistan and Buenaventura and

48

hence, the reply-affidavit belongs to the class of absolutely privileged

communications
- The assistant city fiscal filed an opposition to the motion to quash filed by
petitioners. RTC of Pasay City denied the motion to quash. Petitioners filed MFR but
was denied. Petitioners filed with CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
with preliminary injunction. CA dismissed petition for lack of merit. Hence, the
instant petition for review on certiorari was filed
ISSUE
WON the procedure availed by petitioners after denial by the RTC of the motion to
quash (MTQ) was correct
HELD
NO
Ratio: Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are not the correct remedies against
an order denying a motion to quash. The defendant should instead, go to trial
without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his
motion and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal
therefrom in the manner authorized by law
Reasoning: [a] Sec. 1, Rule 117 of the ROC provides that, upon arraignment,
defendant shall immediately either move to quash the complaint or information or
plead thereto, or do both and that, if the defendant moves to quash, without
pleading, and the motion is withdrawn or overruled, he should immediately plead,
which means that trial must proceed. If, after trial on the merits, judgment is
rendered adversely to the movant in the MTQ, he can appeal the judgment and
raise the same defenses or objections earlier raised in his MTQ which would then be
subject to review by the appellate court. [b] An order denying a MTQ, like an order
denying a motion to acquit, is interlocutory and not a final order, and thus, not
appealable. Neither can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari. Such order of
denial may only be reviewed, in the ordinary course of law, by an appeal from the
judgment, after trial. [c] In Collins vs. Wolfe and reiterated in Mill vs. Yatco, the
accused, after the denial of his MTQ, should have proceeded with the trial of the
case in the court below, and if final judgment is rendered against him, he could then
appeal, and upon such appeal, present the questions which he sought to be decided
by the appellate court in a petition for certiorari.[d] Whether or not the alleged
libelous statements in the reply-affidavit are covered within the mantle of absolutely
privileged communications, is a defense which petitioners could raise upon the trial
on the merits, and, if that defense should fail, they could still raise the same on
appeal. The MTQ the information for libel on the ground of qualified privilege, duly
opposed by the prosecution, is properly denied, as the prosecution is entitled to
prove at the trial that there was malice in fact on the part of the petitioners
Dispositive Petition is DENIED. CA decision is AFFIRMED.

People v. Relova
PEOPLE V. RELOVA
148 SCRA 292
FELICIANO; March 6, 1987

NATURE
Petition for certiorari and mandamus, the People seek to set aside the orders of the
respondent Judge of the CFI of Batangas in a criminal case, quashing an information

for theft filed against private respondent Manuel Opulencia on the ground of double
jeopardy and denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
FACTS
- CIRCUMSTANCES: On 1 February 1975, members of the Batangas City Police
together with personnel of the Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a
search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas City, searched and examined the
premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and operated
by the private respondent Manuel Opulencia. The police discovered that electric
wiring, devices and contraptions had been installed, without the necessary authority
from the city government, and "architecturally concealed inside the walls of the
building" owned by the private respondent. These electric devices and contraptions
were, in the allegation of the petitioner "designed purposely to lower or decrease
the readings of electric current consumption in the electric meter of the said electric
[ice and cold storage] plant."
During the subsequent investigation, Manuel
Opulencia admitted in a written statement that he had caused the installation of the
electrical devices "in order to lower or decrease the readings of his electric meter.
- CASE: On 24 November 1975, an information against Manuel Opulencia for
violation of Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1974, Batangas City. Manuel Opulencia
pleaded not guilty. On 2 February 1976, he filed a motion to dismiss the
information upon the grounds that the crime there charged had already prescribed
and that the civil indemnity there sought to be recovered was beyond the
jurisdiction of the Batangas City Court to award. Batangas City Court granted the
motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription, it appearing that the offense
charged was a light felony which prescribes two months from the time of discovery
thereof, and it appearing further that the information was filed by the fiscal more
than nine months after discovery of the offense charged in February 1975.
- Fourteen (14) days later, another information against Manuel Opulencia, this time
for theft of electric power under Article 308 in relation to Article 309, paragraph
(1), of the Revised Penal Code. Before he could be arraigned thereon, Manuel
Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash, alleging that he had been previously
acquitted of the offense charged in the second information and that the
filing thereof was violative of his constitutional right against double
jeopardy.
-Respondent Judge granted the accused's Motion to Quash and ordered the case
dismissed. An MOR was denied.
- On 1 December 1976, the present Petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed
in this Court by the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City on behalf of the People.
ISSUE
WON the defense of double jeopardy applies in this case. (Yes)
HELD
RATIO: Where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while
the other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of
the acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to
have given rise to the two offenses: the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy is available so long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the
first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have
given rise to the offense charged under a statute.
REASONING: Constitutional provision on double jeopardy reads:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If
an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either

49

shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. (Article IV (22),
1973 Constitution)
This case must be examined, not under the terms of the first sentence of Article IV
(22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather under the second sentence of the same
section. The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second
prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or
prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based upon
the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an
exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against
double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance
be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as
the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set
of acts.
Put a little differently, where the offenses charged are penalized either by
different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the
important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charged: the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an Identity
is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. In
contrast, where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while
the other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of
the acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to
have given rise to the two offenses: the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy is available so long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the
first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have
given rise to the offense charged under a statute.
The question of Identity or lack of Identity of offenses is addressed by examining
the essential elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are
set out in the respective legislative definitions of the offenses involved. The question
of Identity of the acts which are claimed to have generated liability both under a
municipal ordinance and a national statute must be addressed, in the first instance,
by examining the location of such acts in time and space. When the acts of the
accused as set out in the two informations are so related to each other in time and
space as to be reasonably regarded as having taken place on the same occasion and
where those acts have been moved by one and the same, or a continuing, intent or
voluntary design or negligence, such acts may be appropriately characterized as an
integral whole capable of giving rise to penal liability simultaneously under different
legal enactments (a municipal ordinance and a national statute).
DISPOSITION
Petition for certiorari and mandamus is DENIED. Let the civil action for related civil
liability be remanded to the CFI of Batangas City for further proceedings.

Melo v. People

50