EVIDENCE WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 166676

Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.

- versus -

JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN,
Respondent.

Promulgated:
September 12, 2008

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DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising
purely questions of law and seeking a reversal of the Decision[1] dated January 12,
2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which
granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B.
Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of entries in Cagandahans birth
certificate: (1) the name Jennifer Cagandahan changed to Jeff Cagandahan and (2)
gender from female to male.
The facts are as follows.
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for
Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate [2] before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan,
Laguna.
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was
registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she
developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted
possess both male and female characteristics. She further alleged that she was

diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent
an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen,
tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing
and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all
interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male
person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender
be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to
Jeff.
The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three
(3) consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the
court. The Solicitor General entered his appearance and authorized the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr.
Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of
the PhilippinesPhilippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical
certificate stating that respondents condition is known as CAH. He explained that
genetically respondent is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her
female organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs female and
male. He testified that this condition is very rare, that respondents uterus is not
fully developed because of lack of female hormones, and that she has no monthly
period. He further testified that respondents condition is permanent and
recommended the change of gender because respondent has made up her mind,
adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change would be advantageous
to her.
The RTC granted respondents petition in a Decision dated January 12,
2005 which reads:
The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he is
entitled to the reliefs prayed [for]. Petitioner has adequately presented to the Court
very clear and convincing proofs for the granting of his petition. It was medically
proven that petitioners body produces male hormones, and first his body as well
as his action and feelings are that of a male. He has chosen to be male. He is a
normal person and wants to be acknowledged and identified as a male.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna
is hereby ordered to make the following corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of
Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed fees:

a)
By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF
CAGANDAHAN; and
b)

By changing the gender from female to MALE.

It is likewise ordered that petitioners school records, voters registry,

baptismal certificate, and other pertinent records are hereby amended to conform
with the foregoing corrected data.
SO ORDERED.[3]

Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a
reversal of the abovementioned ruling.
The issues raised by petitioner are:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION CONSIDERING
THAT:
I.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT
HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH; AND,
II.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE
OF SEX OR GENDER IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE
RESPONDENTS MEDICAL CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL
HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE HER A MALE.[4]

Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the
correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or
gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition known as
CAH, and her name from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court.
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for noncompliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because while the local
civil registrar is an indispensable party in a petition for cancellation or correction
of entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondents petition
before the court a quo did not implead the local civil registrar.[5] The OSG further
contends respondents petition is fatally defective since it failed to state that
respondent is a bona fide resident of the province where the petition was filed for

at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing as mandated under Section
2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.[6] The OSG argues that Rule 108 does not
allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondents claimed
medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male.[7]
On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil
Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not formally named a party in the Petition for
Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was furnished
a copy of the Petition, the Order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all
pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings, [8] respondent is
actually a male person and hence his birth certificate has to be corrected to reflect
his true sex/gender,[9] change of sex or gender is allowed under Rule 108,[10] and
respondent substantially complied with the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of
the Rules of Court.[11]
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:

Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
SECTION 1. Venue. A person desiring to change his name shall present the
petition to the Regional Trial Court of the province in which he resides, [or, in the
City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court].
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for change of name shall be signed and
verified by the person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his
behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where
the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such
filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;
(c) The name asked for.
SEC. 3. Order for hearing. If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance,
the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and
place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be published
before the hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some
newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as the court shall
deem best. The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to
an election nor within four (4) months after the last publication of the notice.

SEC. 4. Hearing. Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the
petition. The Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear
on behalf of the Government of the Republic.
SEC. 5. Judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the
order that such order has been published as directed and that the allegations of the
petition are true, the court shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for
changing the name of the petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed in
accordance with the prayer of the petition.
SEC. 6. Service of judgment. Judgments or orders rendered in connection with
this rule shall be furnished the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the
court issuing the same is situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil
register.
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order
or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the
civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any
entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid
grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected:
(a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of
annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural
children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil
interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of
a minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is
sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by
an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable
notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall
also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of
such notice, file his opposition thereto.

SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceedings is brought

may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary
injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such
proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an
order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified
copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall
annotate the same in his record.

The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for noncompliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because respondents
petition did not implead the local civil registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that
the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceedings. Likewise, the local civil
registrar is required to be made a party in a proceeding for the correction of name
in the civil registry. He is an indispensable party without whom no final
determination of the case can be had.[12] Unless all possible indispensable parties
were duly notified of the proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much
too short of the requirements of the rules.[13] The corresponding petition should also
implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other persons who may have or
may claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby.[14] Respondent,
however, invokes Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which states that courts
shall construe the Rules liberally to promote their objectives of securing to the
parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the matters brought before
it. We agree that there is substantial compliance with Rule 108 when respondent
furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil registrar.
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal
issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the
Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order.

Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was amended
by Republic Act No. 9048[17] in so far as clerical or typographical errors are
involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep.
Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the

correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and
corrections in entries in the civil register.[18]
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the
change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change
for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.[19]
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the
Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons
shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of
marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction;
(14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor;
and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil
Code include even those that occur after birth.[20]
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or
inappropriate appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with
this condition produces too much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has
XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the
urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male
than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as
the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features start
to appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to
menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH.
CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex anatomy. During the
twentieth century, medicine adopted the term intersexuality to apply to human
beings who cannot be classified as either male or female. [22] The term is now of
widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality is the state of a living thing
of a gonochoristicspecies whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex

characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. An

organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and
female sexes.
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In
most societies, intersex individuals have been expected to conform to either a male
or female gender role.[23] Since the rise of modern medical science in Western
societies, some intersex people with ambiguous external genitalia have had their
genitalia surgically modified to resemble either male or female genitals. [24] More
commonly, an intersex individual is considered as suffering from a disorder which
is almost always recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking
lifetime medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as possible into the
category of either male or female.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of
the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright
denial. It has been suggested that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a
no-mans land for those individuals who are neither truly male nor truly female.
[25]
The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be
classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere
appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is
no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we determine,
based
on
medical
testimony
and
scientific
development
showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the
subjects birth certificate entry is in order.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently
and categorically female nor consistently and categorically male)
composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However, respondents
body system naturally produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a
result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features of a male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or
naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what
the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good
reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and

considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there
is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth
inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is
fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken
unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly,
he has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could have undergone
treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication, [26] to force his body into
the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has
instead taken its due course in respondents development to reveal more fully his
male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on
respondent concerning a matter so innately private as ones sexuality and lifestyle
preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse
the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having
erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a
female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take
medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently
knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live
with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of
happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what
courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and
maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an incompetent[27] and in
the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm
other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the
Court affirms as valid and justified the respondents position and his personal
judgment of being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature;
and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words,
we respect respondents congenital condition and his mature decision to be a
male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how
respondent deals with hisunordinary state and thus help make his life easier,
considering the unique circumstances in this case.
As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that
a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised

in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow.[28] The
trial courts grant of respondents change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a
change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that
respondents change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit
in respondents change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the
entry in his birth certificate from female to male.
WHEREFORE, the Republics petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna,
is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. Nos. 100901-08. July 16, 1998]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JAILON

KULAIS, CARLOS FALCASANTOS @ Commander Falcasantos,
AWALON KAMLON HASSAN @ Commander Kamlon, MAJID
SAMSON @ Commander Bungi, JUMATIYA AMLANI DE
FALCASANTOS, NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, SALVADOR
MAMARIL y MENDOZA, HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH, JAINUDDIN
HASSAN y AHMAD, IMAM TARUK ALAH y SALIH, JALINA
HASSAN DE KAMMING, FREDDIE MANUEL @ Ajid and several
JOHN and JANE DOES, accused, JAILON KULAIS, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The trial courts erroneous taking of judicial notice of a witness testimony in another
case, also pending before it, does not affect the conviction of the appellant, whose guilt
is proven beyond reasonable doubt by other clear, convincing and overwhelming
evidence, both testimonial and documentary. The Court takes this occasion also to
remind the bench and the bar that reclusion perpetua is not synonymous with life
imprisonment.
The Case

On August 22, 1990, five Informations for kidnapping for ransom (Crim. Case
Nos. 10060, 10061, 10062, 10063 and 10064) and three Informations for kidnapping
(Crim Case Nos. 10065, 10066 and 10067), all dated August 14, 1990, were
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City against Carlos Falcasantos,
Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, Jalina Hassan de Kamming,
Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jaimuddin Hassan, Imam Taruk Alah, Freddie
Manuel alias Ajid, and several John and Jane Does. The Informations for kidnapping for
ransom, which set forth identical allegations save for the names of the victims, read as
follows:
[1]

[2]

[3]

That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of Zamboanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, being all private individuals, conspiring and confederating
together, mutually aiding and assisting one another, with threats to kill the
person of FELIX ROSARIO [in Criminal Case No. 10060] and for the purpose
of extorting ransom from the said Felix Rosario or his families or employer, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, KIDNAP the person of said
Felix Rosario, a male public officer of the City Government of Zamboanga,
who was then aboard a Cimarron vehicle with plate No. SBZ-976 which was
being ambushed by the herein accused at the highway of Sitio Tigbao Lisomo,
Zamboanga City, and brought said Felix Rosario to different mountainous
places of Zamboanga City and Zamboanga del Sur, where he was detained,
held hostage and deprived of his liberty until February 2, 1989, the day when
he was released only after payment of the ransom was made to herein
accused, to the damage and prejudice of said victim; there being present an
aggravating circumstance in that the aforecited offense was committed with
the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.
[4]

[5]

[6]

The three Informations for kidnapping, also under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, likewise alleged identical facts and circumstances, except the names of the
victims:
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of Zamboanga and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being all private
individuals, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting one
another, by means of threats and intimidation of person, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously KIDNAP, take and drag away and detain the person of
MONICO SAAVEDRA Y LIMEN [Criminal Case No. 10065] a male public officer of the
City Government of Zamboanga, against his will, there being present an aggravating
circumstance in that the aforecited offense was committed with the aid of armed men or
persons who insure or afford impunity.
[7]

Of the twelve accused, only nine were apprehended, namely, Jailon Julais,
Jumatiya Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin,
Jainuddin Hassan, Imam Taruk Alah, Jalina Hassan and Freddie Manuel.
[8]

On their arraignment on September 13, 1990, all the accused pleaded not
guilty. Joint trial on the merits ensued. On April 8, 1991, Judge Pelagio S. Mandi
rendered the assailed 36-page Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, above premises and discussion taken into consideration, this

Court renders its judgment, ordering and finding:
1. FREDDIE MANUEL, alias AJID and IMAM TARUK ALAH y SALIH [n]ot
[g]uilty of the eight charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom and for [k]idnapping,
their guilt not having been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Their immediate release from the City Jail, Zamboanga City is ordered, unless
detained for some other offense besides these 8 cases (Crim. Cases Nos.
10060-10067).
2. JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, JAILON KULAIS, SALVADOR MAMARIL
y MENDOZA and HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH [g]uilty as principals by
conspiracy in all these 8 cases for [k]idnapping for [r]ansom and for
[k]idnapping (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10067).
Their guilt is aggravated in that they committed the 8 offenses with the aid of
armed men who insured impunity. Therefore, the penalties imposed on them
shall be at their maximum period.
WHEREFORE, for the five charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom, and pursuant
to Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, five life imprisonments are imposed on
Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and
Kadjirul Plasin y Alih (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).
For kidnapping Mrs. Virginia San Agustin-Gara, a female and public officer
and pursuant to Art. 267, Revised Penal Code (par. 4.), another life
imprisonment is imposed on Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais,
Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and Hadjirul Plasin y Alih (Crim. Case No.
10066)
For kidnapping Monico Saavedra y Limen, and Calixto Francisco y Gaspar,
and their kidnapping not having lasted more than five days, pursuant to Art.
268, Revised Penal Code, and the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the same
four accused - Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y

Mendoza and Hadjirul Plasin y Alih - are sentenced to serve two (2) jail terms
ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum, to eighteen (18)
years of reclusion temporal as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065 and
10067).
3. JAMATIYA AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS [n]ot [g]uilty in the three charges of
[k]idnapping and she is acquitted of these charges. (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065,
10066 and 10067).
But Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is [g]uilty as accomplice in the five
charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom.
WHEREFORE, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is sentenced to serve five (5)
imprisonments, ranging from TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as minimum
to EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS ofreclusion temporal as maximum (Crim. Cases
Nos. 10060-10064).
4. NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, 18 years old, and JALIHA HUSSIN
(charged as Jalina Hassan de Kamming), 15 years old, [n]ot [g]uilty in the
three charges for [k]idnapping and are, therefore, ACQUITTED of these three
charges. (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065, 10066 & 10067).
But Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are found [g]uilty as
accomplices in the five charges for [k]idnapping for [r]ansom. Being minors,
they are entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority which
lowers the penalty imposable on them by one degree.
WHEREFORE, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are sentenced
to serve five imprisonments ranging from SIX (6) YEARS of prision
correccional as minimum to TEN YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY OF prision
mayor as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).
Due to the removal of the suspension of sentences of youthful offenders
convicted of an offense punishable by death or life by Presidential Decree No.
1179 and Presidential Decree No. 1210 (of which [k]idnapping for [r]ansom is
such an offense) the sentences on Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jaliha
Hussin de Kamming are NOT suspended but must be served by them.
Januddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul Plasin are
sentenced further to return the following personal effects taken on December
12, 1988, the day of the kidnapping, or their value in money, their liability
being solidary.

To Jessica Calunod:

One (1) Seiko wrist watch P 250.00

One Bracelet P 2,400.00
One Shoulder Bag P 200.00
Cash P 200.00
To Armado C. Bacarro:

One (1) wrist watch P 800.00

One Necklace P 300.00
One Calculator P 295.00
Eyeglasses P 500.00
One Steel Tape P 250.00
To Edilberto S. Perez

One (1) Rayban P 1,000.00

One Wrist Watch P 1,800.00
Cash P 300.00
To Virginia San Agustin-Gara

One (1) Wrist Watch P 850.00

The benefit of Art. 29, Revised Penal Code, on preventive suspension, shall
be extended to those sentenced.
The cases against Majid Samson, alias Commander Bungi Awalon Kamlon
a.k.a. Commander Kamlon Carlos Falcasantos and several John Does and
Jane Does are ARCHIVED until their arrest.
Costs against the accused convicted.
SO ORDERED.

[9]

On May 7, 1991, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos, Norma Sahiddan

de Kulais and Jaliha Hussin filed their joint Notice of Appeal. In a letter dated February
6, 1997, the same appellants, except Jailon Kulais, withdrew their appeal because of
their application for amnesty. In our March 19, 1997 Resolution, we granted their
motion. Hence, only the appeal of Kulais remains for the consideration of this Court.
[10]

[11]

The Facts
The Version of the Prosecution
The solicitor general summarized, in this wise, the facts as viewed by the People:

On December 12, 1988, a group of public officials from various government

agencies, organized themselves as a monitoring team to inspect government
projects in Zamboanga City. The group was composed of Virginia Gara, as the
head of the team; Armando Bacarro, representing the Commission on Audit;
Felix del Rosario, representing the non-government; Edilberto Perez,
representing the City Assessors Office; Jessica Calunod and Allan Basa of the
City Budget Office and Monico Saavedra, the driver from the City Engineers
Office. (p. 3, TSN, October 22, 1990.)
On that particular day, the group headed to the Lincomo Elementary School to
check on two of its classrooms. After inspecting the same, they proceeded to
the Talaga Footbridge. The group was not able to reach the place because on
their way, they were stopped by nine (9) armed men who pointed their guns at
them (p. 4, TSN, ibid.).
The group alighted from their Cimarron jeep where they were divested of their
personal belongings. They were then ordered to walk to the mountain by the
leader of the armed men who introduced himself as Commander Falcasantos
(p. 5, TSN, ibid.)
While the group was walking in the mountain, they encountered government
troops which caused their group to be divided. Finally, they were able to
regroup themselves. Commander Kamlon with his men joined the others. (pp.
7-8, TSN, ibid.).
The kidnappers held their captives for fifty-four (54) days in the forest. During
their captivity, the victims were able to recognize their captors who were at all
times armed with guns. The wives of the kidnappers performed the basic
chores like cooking. (pp.9-10. TSN, ibid.)

Commander Falcasantos also ordered their victims to sign the ransom notes
which demanded a ransom of P100.000.00 and P14,000.00 in exchange for
twenty (20) sets of uniform. (p.15, TSN, ibid.)
On February 3, 1989, at around 12:00 oclock noontime, the victims were
informed that they would be released. They started walking until around 7:00
o clock in the evening of that day. At around 12:00 o clock midnight, the
victims were released after Commander Falcasantos and Kamlon received
the ransom money. (p. 19, TSN, ibid.) The total amount paid wasP122,000.00.
The same was reached after several negotiations between Mayor Vitaliano
Agan of Zamboanga City and the representatives of the kidnappers. (pp. 2, 6,
TSN, Nov. 11, 1990)
x x x.

[12]

The prosecution presented fifteen witnesses, including some of the kidnap victims
themselves: Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro, Edilberto Perez, Virginia San AgustinGara, Calixto Francisco, and Monico Saavedra.
The Version of the Defense
The facts of the case, according to the defense, are as follows:

[13]

On May 28, 1990, at about 10:00 o clock in the morning, while weeding their
farm in Sinaburan, Zamboanga del Sur, accused-appellant Jumatiya Amlani
was picked up by soldiers and brought to a place where one army battalion
was stationed. Thereat, her five (5) co-accused, namely Salvador Mamaril,
Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin Hassin, Imam Taruk Alah and Freddie Manuel were
already detained. In the afternoon of the same day, appellants spouses Jailon
Kulais and Norma Sahiddan were brought to the battalion station and likewise
detained thereat. On May 30, 1990, the eight (8) accused were transported to
Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City. Here on the same date, they were joined by
accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin.
At the time Amlani was picked up by the military, she had just escaped from
the captivity of Carlos Falcasantos and company who in 1988 kidnapped and
brought her to the mountains. Against their will, she stayed with Falcasantos
and his two wives for two months, during which she slept with Falcasantos as
aide of the wives and was made to cook food, wash clothes, fetch water and
run other errands for everybody. An armed guard was assigned to watch her,
so that, for sometime, she had to bear the ill-treatment of Falcasantos other

wives one of whom was armed. After about two months, while she was
cooking and Falcasantos and his two wives were bathing in the river, and
while her guard was not looking, she took her chance and made a successful
dash for freedom. (TSN, January 29, 1992, pp. 2-15)
Likewise a kidnap victim herself is accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin, who was
thirteen years old at the time (she was fifteen years old when the trial of the
instant cases commenced). She was kidnapped by Daing Kamming and
brought to the mountains where he slept with her. She stayed with him for less
than a month sleeping on forest ground and otherwise performing
housekeeping errands for Kamming and his men. She made good her escape
during an encounter between the group of Kamming and military troops. She
hid in the bushes and came out at Ligui-an where she took a bachelor bus in
going back to her mothers house at Pudos, Guiligan, Tungawan, Zamboanga
del Sur. One day, at around 2:00 o clock in the afternoon, while she was
harvesting palay at the neighboring village of Tigbalangao, military men picked
her up to Ticbanuang where there was an army battalion detachment. From
Ticbawuang, she was brought to Vitali, then to Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City,
where on her arrival, she met all the other accused for the first time except
Freddie Manuel. (Ibid., pp. 16-21)
Another female accused is appellant Norma Sahiddan, a native of Sinaburan,
Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur. At about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of a day
in May, while she and her husband were in their farm, soldiers arrested them.
The soldiers did not tell them why they were being arrested, neither were they
shown any papers. The two of them were just made to board a six by six
truck. There were no other civilians in the truck. The truck brought the
spouses to the army battalion and placed them inside the building where there
were civilians and soldiers. Among the civilians present were her six coaccused Hadjirul Plasin, Salvador Mamaril, Jaimuddin Hassan, Ima[m] Taruk
Alah, Freddie Manuel and Jumatiya Amlani. That night, the eight of them were
brought to Tictapul, Zamboanga City; then to Vitali; and, finally, to the
Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City where they stayed for six days and six nights.
On the seventh day, the accused were brought to the City Jail, Zamboanga
City. (TSN, January 30, 1991, pp. 6-11)
The husband of Norma Sahiddan is Jailon Kulais who, as heretofore narrated,
was arrested with his wife the day the soldiers came to their farm on May 28,
1990. He has shared with his wife the ordeals that followed in the wake of
their arrest and in the duration of their confinement up to the present. (TSN,
January 22, 1991 pp. 2-4).

The Trial Courts Ruling

The trial court found Appellant Kulais guilty of five counts of kidnapping for ransom
and one count of kidnapping a woman and public officer, for which offenses it imposed
upon him six terms of life imprisonment. It also found him guilty of two counts of slight
illegal detention for the kidnapping of Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco. The trial
court ratiocinated as follows:

Principally, the issue here is one of credibility - both of the witnesses and their
version of what had happened on December 12, 1988, to February 3, 1989.
On this pivotal issue, the Court gives credence to [p]rosecution witnesses and
their testimonies. Prosecution evidence is positive, clear and convincing. No
taint of evil or dishonest motive was imputed or imputable to [p]rosecution
witnesses. To this Court, who saw all the witnesses testify, [p]rosecution
witnesses testified only because they were impelled by [a] sense of justice, of
duty and of truth.
Contrarily, [d]efense evidence is weak, uncorroborated and consisted only of
alibis. The individual testimonies of the nine accused dwel[t] principally on
what happened to each of them on May 27, 28 and 29, 1990. None of the
accused explained where he or she was on and from December 12, 1988, to
February 3, 1989, when [p]rosecution evidence show[ed] positively seven of
the nine accused were keeping the five or six hostages named by
[p]rosecution evidence.
The seven accused positively identified to have been present during the
course of the captivity of the five kidnap-victims-complainants are: (1)
Jumatiya Amlani; (2) Jaliha Hussin; (3) Norma Sahiddan; (4) Jailon Kulais; (5)
Hadjirul Plasin; (6) Salvador Mamaril and (7) Jainuddin Hassan.
The two accused not positively identified are: Freddie Manuel alias Ajid, and
Imam Taruk Alah. These two must, therefore, be declared acquitted based on
reasonable doubt.
The next important issue to be examined is: Are these seven accused guilty
as conspirators as charged in the eight Informations; or only as accomplices?
Prosecution evidence shows that the kidnapping group to which the seven
accused belonged had formed themselves into an armed band for the
purpose of kidnapping for ransom. This armed band had cut themselves off
from established communities, lived in the mountains and forests, moved from
place to place in order to hide their hostages. The wives of these armed band
moved along with their husbands, attending to their needs, giving them

material and moral support. These wives also attended to the needs of the
kidnap victims, sleeping with them or comforting them.
xxxxxxxxx
II) The guilt of Jainuddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul
Plasin. The Court holds these four men guilty as conspirators in the 8 cases of
kidnapping. Unlike the three women-accused, these male accused were
armed. They actively participated in keeping their hostages by fighting off the
military and CAFGUS, in transferring their hostages from place to place, and
in guarding the kidnap hostages. Salvador Mamaril and Jailon Kulais were
positively identified as among the nine armed men who had kidnapped the
eight kidnap victims on December 12, 1988.
The higher degree of participation found by the Court of the four accused is
supported by the rulings of our Supreme Court quoted below.
(1) The time-honored jurisprudence is that direct proof is not essential to prove
conspiracy. It may be shown by a number of infinite acts, conditions and
circumstances which may vary according to the purposes to be accomplished
and from which may logically be inferred that there was a common design,
understanding or agreement among the conspirators to commit the offense
charged. (People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil 64; People vs. Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868.)
(2) The crime must, therefore, in view of the solidarity of the act and intent
which existed between the sixteen accused, be regarded as the act of the
band or party created by them, and they are all equally responsible for the
murder in question. (U.S. vs. Bundal, et. al. 3 Phil 89, 98.)
(3) When two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through
the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual
whose evil will actively contribute to the wrongdoing is in law responsible for the whole,
the same as though performed by himself alone. (People vs. Peralta, et. al. 25 SCRA
759, 772 (1968).)
[14]

The Assigned Errors

The trial court is faulted with the following errors, viz:
I

The trial court erred in taking judicial notice of a material testimony given
in another case by Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who allegedly was the team
leader of the government troops which allegedly captured the accusedappellants in an encounter; thereby, depriving the accused-appellants their
right to cross-examine him.
II

On the assumption that Lt. Felicianos testimony could be validly taken

judicial notice of, the trial court, nevertheless, erred in not disregarding the
same for being highly improbable and contradictory.
III

The trial court erred in finding that accused-appellants Jumatiya Amlani,

Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan provided Carlos Falcasantos, et. al.,
with material and moral comfort, hence, are guilty as accomplices in all the
kidnapping for ransom cases.
IV

The trial court erred in denying to accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin and Norma
Sahiddan the benefits of suspension of sentence given to youth offenders
considering that they were minors at the time of the commission of the offense.

[15]

As earlier noted, Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan had
withdrawn their appeal, and as such, the third and fourth assigned errors, which pertain
to them only, will no longer be dealt with. Only the following issues pertaining to
Appellant Jailon Kulais will be discussed: (1) judicial notice of other pending cases, (2)
sufficiency of the prosecution evidence, and (3) denial as a defense. In addition, the
Court will pass upon the propriety of the penalty imposed by the trial court.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
First Issue:
Judicial Notice and Denial of Due Process
Appellant Kulais argues that he was denied due process when the trial court took
judicial notice of the testimony given in another case by one Lt. Melquiades Feliciano,
who was the team leader of the government troops that captured him and his purported

cohorts. Because he was allegedly deprived of his right to cross-examine a material

witness in the person of Lieutenant Feliciano, he contends that the latters testimony
should not be used against him.
[16]

[17]

True, as a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence
presented in other proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the
same court, or have been heard and are actually pending before the same judge. This
is especially true in criminal cases, where the accused has the constitutional right to
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.
[18]

Having said that, we note, however, that even if the court a quo did take judicial
notice of the testimony of Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in deciding
the cases against the appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais was not denied due process.
His conviction was based mainly on the positive identification made by some of the
kidnap victims, namely, Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez. These
witnesses were subjected to meticulous cross-examinations conducted by appellants
counsel. At best, then, the trial courts mention of Lieutenant Felicianos testimony is a
decisional surplusage which neither affected the outcome of the case nor substantially
prejudiced Appellant Kulais.
Second Issue:
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
Appellant was positively identified by Calunod, as shown by the latters testimony:
CP CAJAYON D MS:
Q And how long were you in the custody of these persons?
A We stayed with them for fifty-four days.
Q And during those days did you come to know any of the persons who were with the group?
A We came to know almost all of them considering we stayed there for fifty-four days.
Q And can you please name to us some of them or how you know them?
A For example, aside from Commander Falcasantos and Commander Kamlon we came to
know first our foster parents, those who were assigned to give us some food.
Q You mean to say that the captors assigned you some men who will take care of you?
A Yes.
Q And to whom were you assigned?
A To lla Abdurasa.
Q And other than your foster [parents] or the parents whom you are assigned to, who else
did you come to know?

A Pagal and his wife; Tangkong and his wife Nana; the two (2) wives of Commander
Falcasantos - Mating and Janira - another brother in-law of Commander Kamlon,
Usman, the wife of Kamlon, Tira.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Now, you said that you were with these men for fifty-four days and you really came to
know them. Will you still be able to recognize these persons if you will see the[m] again?
A Yes, maam.
Q Now will you look around this Honorable Court and see if any of those you mentioned are
here?
A Yes, they are here.
Q Some of them are here?
A Some of them are here.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Where is Tangkong? What is he wearing?
A White t-shirt with orange collar. (witness pointing.) He was one of those nine armed men
who took us from the highway.
RTC INTERPRETER:
Witness pointed to a man sitting in court and when asked of his name, he gave his name
as JAILON KULAIS.
CP CAJAYON D MS:
Q Aside from being with the armed men who stopped the vehicle and made you alight, what
else was he doing while you were in their captivity?
A He was the foster parent of Armando Bacarro and the husband of Nana.
COURT:
Q Who?
A Tangkong.

xxxxxxxxx

[19]

Likewise clear and straightforward was Bacarros testimony pointing to appellant as

one of the culprits:
FISCAL CAJAYON:
xxxxxxxxx
Q And what happened then?
A Some of the armed men assigned who will be the host or who will be the one [to] g[i]ve
food to us.
Q [To] whom were you assigned?
A I was assigned to a certain Tangkong and [his] wife Nana.

xxxxxxxxx
Q Now, you said you were assigned to Tangkong and his wife. [D]o you remember how he
looks like?
A Yes.
Q Now, will you please look around this Court and tell us if that said Tangkong and his wife
are here?
A Yes, maam.
Q Could you please point this Tangkong to us?
A Witness pointed to a person in Court. [W]hen asked his name he identified [himself] as
Jailon Kulais.
Q Why did you say his name is Tangkong? Where did you get that name?
A Well, that is the name [by which he is] usually called in the camp.
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. FABIAN (counsel for accused Kulais)
Q When did you first meet Tangkong?
A That was on December 11, because I remember he was the one who took us.
Q When you were questioned by the fiscal a while ago, you stated that Mr. Mamaril was one
of those who stopped the bus and took you to the hill and you did not mention
Tangkong?
A I did not mention but I can remember his face.
xxxxxxxxx
Q And because Tangkong was always with you as your host even if he did not tell you that he
[was] one of those who stopped you, you would not recognize him?
A No, I can recognize him because he was the one who took my shoes.
COURT:
Q Who?
A Tangkong, your Honor.

xxxxxxxxx

[20]

Also straightforward was Ernesto Perez candid narration:

FISCAL CAJAYON:
xxxxxxxxx
Q Who else?
A The last man.
Q Did you come to know his name?

A Only his nickname, Tangkong. (Witness pointed to a man in Court who identified himself
as Jailon Kulais.)
Q And what was Tangkong doing in the mountain?
A The same, guarding us.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. SAHAK
Q Engr. Perez, you stated that you were ambushed by nine armed men on your way from
[the] Licomo to [the] Talaga Foot Bridge. [W]hat do you mean by ambushed?
A I mean that they blocked our way and stopped.
Q They did not fire any shots?
A But they were pointing their guns at us.
Q And among the 9 armed men who held you on your way to [the] Talaga Footbridge, you
stated [that] one of them [was] Commander Falcasantos?
A Yes.
Q Could you also recognize anyone of the accused in that group?
A Yes.
Q Will you please identify?
A That one, Tangkong. (The witness pointed to a man sitting in court who identified himself
as Jailon Kulais.)
xxxxxxxxx
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. FABIAN
Q You said Jailon Kulais was among those who guarded the camp?
FISCAL CAJAYON:
Your Honor, please, he does not know the name of Julais, he used the word Tangkong.
ATTY. FABIAN
Q You said Tangkong guarded you[. W]hat do you mean?
A He guarded us like prisoners[. A]fter guarding us they have their time two hours another
will be on duty guarding us.
Q Where did you meet Tangkong?
A He was one of the armed men who kidnapped us.

xxxxxxxxx

[21]

It is evident from the foregoing testimonies of Calunod, Bacarro and Perez that
kidnapping or detention did take place: the five victims were held, against their will, for
fifty-three days from December 12, 1988 to February 2, 1989. It is also evident that
Appellant Kulais was a member of the group of armed men who staged the kidnapping,
and that he was one of those who guarded the victims during the entire period of their

captivity. His participation gives credence to the conclusion of the trial court that he was
a conspirator.
Kidnapping
for Ransom
That the kidnapping of the five was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom is
also apparent from the testimony of Calunod, who was quite emphatic in identifying the
accused and narrating the circumstances surrounding the writing of the ransom letters.
CP CAJAYON D MS:
Q Now, you were in their captivity for 54 days and you said there were these meetings for
possible negotiation with the City Government. What do you mean by this? What were
you supposed to negotiate?

A Because they told us that they will be releasing us only after the terms.

[22]

Q And what were the terms? Did you come to know the terms?
A I came to know the terms because I was the one ordered by Commander Falcasantos to
write the letter, the ransom letter.
Q At this point of time, you remember how many letters were you asked to write for your
ransom?
A I could not remember as to how many, but I can identify them.
Q Why will you able to identify the same?
A Because I was the one who wrote it.
Q And you are familiar, of course, with your penmanship?
A Yes.
Q Now we have here some letters which were turned over to us by the Honorable City Mayor
Vitaliano Agan. 1,2,3,4,5 - there are five letters all handwritten.
COURT:
Original?
CP CAJAYON D MS:
Original, your Honor.
Q And we would like you to go over these and say, tell us if any of these were the ones you
were asked to write.
A (Witness going over [letters])
This one - 2 pages. This one - 2 pages. No more.
Q Aside from the fact that you identified your penmanship in these letters, what else will
make you remember that these are really the ones you wrote while there?

A The signature is there.

Q There is a printed name here[,] Jessica Calunod.
A And over it is a signature.
Q That is your signature?
A Yes, maam.
Q How about in the other letter, did you sign it also?
A Yes, there is the other signature.
Q There are names - other names here - Eddie Perez, Allan Basa, Armando Bacarro, Felix
Rosario, Jojie Ortuoste and there are signatures above the same. Did you come up to
know who signed this one?
A Those whose signatures there were signed by the persons. [sic]
Q And we have here at the bottom, Commander Kamlon Hassan, and there is the signature
above the same. Did you come to know who signed it?
A [It was] Commander Kamlon Hassan who signed that.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Jessica, I am going over this letter ... Could you please read to us the portion here which
says the terms? ...
A (Witness reading) Mao ilang gusto nga andamun na ninyo and kantidad nga P100,000
ug P14,000 baylo sa 20 sets nga uniforms sa Biyernes (Pebrero 3, 1989).[23]
xxxxxxxxx
INTERPRETER (Translation):
This is what they like you to prepare[:] the amount of P100,000.00 and P14,000.00 in
exchange [for] 20 sets of uniform on Friday, February 3, 1989.
xxxxxxxxx

Q Now you also earlier identified this other letter and this is dated January 21, 1988.
Now, could you please explain to us why it is dated January 21 1988 and the
other one Enero 31, 1989 or January 31, 1989?
[24]

A I did not realize that I placed 1989, 1988, but it was 1989.
Q January 21, 1989?
A Yes
xxxxxxxxx
Q Now, in this letter, were the terms also mentioned? Please go over this.
A (Going over the letter)
Yes, maam.
Q Could you please read it aloud to us?

A (Witness reading)
Gusto nila and P100,000.00 ng kapinan nu ug 20 sets nga completong uniformer (7
colors marine type wala nay labot ang sapatos), tunga medium ug tunga large size.[25]
xxxxxxxxx
INTERPRETER:
They like the P100,000.00 and an addition of 20 sets of complete uniform (7 colors,
marine-type not including the shoes), one half medium, one half large.
xxxxxxxxx
Q After having written these letters, did you come to know after [they were] signed by your
companions and all of you, do you know if these letters were sent? If you know only.
A I would like to make it clear. The first letter was ordered to me by Falcasantos to inform the
City Mayor that initial as P500,000.00, and when we were already - I was asked again to
write, we were ordered to affix our signature to serve as proof that all of us are alive.
[26]
[sic]

Calunods testimony was substantially corroborated by both Armando Bacarro and

Edilberto Perez. The receipt of the ransom letters, the efforts made to raise and deliver
the ransom, and the release of the hostages upon payment of the money were testified
to by Zamboanga City Mayor Vitaliano Agan and Teddy Mejia.
[27]

[28]

[29]

[30]

The elements of kidnapping for ransom, as embodied in Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, having been sufficiently proven, and the appellant, a private individual,
having been clearly identified by the kidnap victims, this Court thus affirms the trial
courts finding of appellants guilt on five counts of kidnapping for ransom.
[31]

Kidnapping of
Public Officers
Victims Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco were
members of the government monitoring team abducted by appellants group. The three
testified to the fact of kidnapping; however, they were not able to identify the
appellant. Even so, appellants identity as one of the kidnappers was sufficiently
established by Calunod, Bacarro and Perez, who were with Gara, Saavedra and
Francisco when the abduction occurred.
That Gara, Saavedra and Francisco were detained for only three hours does not
matter. In People vs. Domasian, the victim was similarly held for three hours, and was
released even before his parents received the ransom note. The accused therein
argued that they could not be held guilty of kidnapping as no enclosure was involved,
and that only grave coercion was committed, if at all. Convicting appellants of
kidnapping or serious illegal detention under Art. 267 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, the
Court found that the victim, an eight-year-old boy, was deprived of his liberty when he
was restrained from going home. The Court justified the conviction by holding that the
offense consisted not only in placing a person in an enclosure, but also in detaining or
[32]

[33]

[34]

depriving him, in any manner, of his liberty. Likewise, in People vs. Santos, the Court
held that since the appellant was charged and convicted under Article 267, paragraph 4,
it was not the duration of the deprivation of liberty which was important, but the fact that
the victim, a minor, was locked up.
[35]

[36]

Thus, in the present case, the detention of Gara, Saavedra and Francisco for only a
few hours is immaterial. The clear fact is that the victims were public officers -- Gara
was a fiscal analyst for the City of Zamboanga, Saavedra worked at the City Engineers
Office, and Francisco was a barangay councilman at the time the kidnapping
occurred. Appellant Kulais should be punished, therefore, under Article 267, paragraph
4 of the Revised Penal Code, and not Art. 268, as the trial court held.
[37]

The present case is different from People vs. Astorga, which held that the crime
committed was not kidnapping under Article 267, paragraph 4, but only grave
coercion. The appellant in that case had tricked his seven-year-old victim into going with
him to a place he alone knew. His plans, however, were foiled, when a group of people
became suspicious and rescued the girl from him. The Court noted that the victims
testimony and the other pieces of evidence did not indicate that the appellant wanted to
detain her, or that he actually detained her.
[38]

In the present case, the evidence presented by the prosecution indubitably

established that the victims were detained, albeit for a few hours. There is proof beyond
reasonable doubt that kidnapping took place, and that appellant was a member of the
armed group which abducted the victims.
Third Issue:
Denial and Alibi
The appellants bare denial is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face
of the prosecution witnesses positive identification of him. Jurisprudence gives greater
weight to the positive narration of prosecution witnesses than to the negative
testimonies of the defense. Between positive and categorical testimony which has a
ring of truth to it on the one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former generally
prevails. Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez testified in a clear,
straightforward and frank manner; and their testimonies were compatible on material
points. Moreover, no ill motive was attributed to the kidnap victims and none was found
by this Court.
[39]

[40]

We agree with the trial courts observation that the appellant did not meet the
charges against him head on. His testimony dwelt on what happened to him on the day
he was arrested and on subsequent days thereafter. Appellant did not explain where he
was during the questioned dates (December 12, 1988 to February 3, 1989); neither did
he rebut Calunod, Bacarro and Perez, when they identified him as one of their
kidnappers.
Reclusion Perpetua, Not Life Imprisonment

The trial court erred when it sentenced the appellant to six terms of life
imprisonment. The penalty for kidnapping with ransom, under the Revised Penal Code,
is reclusion perpetua to death. Since the crimes happened in 1988, when the capital
penalty was proscribed by the Constitution, the maximum penalty that could have been
imposed was reclusion perpetua. Life imprisonment is not synonymous with reclusion
perpetua. Unlike life imprisonment, reclusion perpetua carries with it accessory
penalties provided in the Revised Penal Code and has a definite extent or duration. Life
imprisonment is invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized by special laws,
while reclusion perpetua is prescribed in accordance with the Revised Penal Code.
[41]

WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Jailon Kulais as principal in five counts of

kidnapping for ransom and in three counts of kidnapping is AFFIRMED, but the penalty
imposed is hereby MODIFIED as follows: Appellant is sentenced to five terms
of reclusion perpetua, one for each of his five convictions for kidnapping for ransom;
and to three terms of reclusion perpetua, one each for the kidnapping of Public Officers
Virginia Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco. Like the other accused who
withdrew their appeals, he is REQUIRED to return the personal effects, or their
monetary value, taken from the kidnap victims. Additionally, he is ORDERED to pay the
amount of P122,000 representing the ransom money paid to the kidnappers. Costs
against appellant.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 114776. February 2, 2000]

MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND
SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks
to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 29, 1993, in
C.A. G.R. No. CV 34476, as well as its Resolution dated February 28, 1994,
which denied the motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent appellate court are as
follows:
"Sometime in 1978, plaintiff [Menandro B. Laureano, herein
petitioner], then Director of Flight Operations and Chief Pilot of Air
Manila, applied for employment with defendant company [herein
private respondent] through its Area Manager in Manila.

On September 30, 1978, after the usual personal interview,

defendant wrote to plaintiff, offering a contract of employment as
an expatriate B-707 captain for an original period of two (2) years
commencing on January 21, 1978, Plaintiff accepted the offer and
commenced working on January 20, 1979. After passing the sixmonth probation period, plaintiff's appointment was confirmed
effective July 21, 1979. (Annex "B", p. 30, Rollo).
On July 21, 1979, defendant offered plaintiff an extension of his
two-year contract to five (5) years effective January 21, 1979 to
January 20, 1984 subject to the terms and conditions set forth in
the contract of employment, which the latter accepted (Annex "C",
p. 31, Rec.).
During his service as B-707 captain, plaintiff on August 24, 1980,
while in command of a flight, committed a noise violation offense
at the Zurich Airport, for which plaintiff apologized. (Exh. "3", p.
307, Rec.).
Sometime in 1980, plaintiff featured in a tail scraping incident
wherein the tail of the aircraft scraped or touched the runway
during landing. He was suspended for a few days until he was
investigated by a board headed by Capt. Choy. He was
reprimanded. Scjuris
On September 25, 1981, plaintiff was invited to take a course of A300 conversion training at Aeroformacion, Toulouse, France at
defendant's expense. Having successfully completed and passed
the training course, plaintiff was cleared on April 7, 1981 for solo
duty as captain of the Airbus A-300 and subsequently appointed
as captain of the A-300 fleet commanding an Airbus A-300 in
flights over Southeast Asia. (Annexes "D", "E" and "F", pp. 34-38,
Rec.).
Sometime in 1982, defendant, hit by a recession, initiated costcutting measures. Seventeen (17) expatriate captains in the
Airbus fleet were found in excess of the defendant's requirement

(t.s.n., July 6, 1988. p. 11). Consequently, defendant informed its

expatriate pilots including plaintiff of the situation and advised
them to take advance leaves. (Exh. "15", p. 466, Rec.).
Realizing that the recession would not be for a short time,
defendant decided to terminate its excess personnel (t.s.n., July
6, 1988, p. 17). It did not, however, immediately terminate it's A300 pilots. It reviewed their qualifications for possible promotion to
the B-747 fleet. Among the 17 excess Airbus pilots reviewed,
twelve were found qualified. Unfortunately, plaintiff was not one of
the twelve. Jurissc
On October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff of his termination
effective November 1, 1982 and that he will be paid three (3)
months salary in lieu of three months notice (Annex "I", pp. 41-42,
Rec.). Because he could not uproot his family on such short
notice, plaintiff requested a three-month notice to afford him time
to exhaust all possible avenues for reconsideration and retention.
Defendant gave only two (2) months notice and one (1) month
salary. (t.s.n., Nov. 12, 1987. p. 25).
Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for illegal
dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. Defendant moved to dismiss
on jurisdictional grounds. Before said motion was resolved, the
complaint was withdrawn. Thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant case
for damages due to illegal termination of contract of services
before the court a quo (Complaint, pp. 1-10, Rec.).
Again, defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a motion to dismiss
alleging inter alia: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case, and (2) that Philippine courts have no
jurisdiction over the instant case. Defendant contends that the
complaint is for illegal dismissal together with a money claim
arising out of and in the course of plaintiff's employment "thus it is
the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC who have the jurisdiction
pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code" and that, since plaintiff
was employed in Singapore, all other aspects of his employment

contract and/or documents executed in Singapore. Thus,

defendant postulates that Singapore laws should apply and courts
thereat shall have jurisdiction. (pp. 50-69, Rec.). Misjuris
In traversing defendant's arguments, plaintiff claimed that: (1)
where the items demanded in a complaint are the natural
consequences flowing from a breach of an obligation and not
labor benefits, the case is intrinsically a civil dispute; (2) the case
involves a question that is beyond the field of specialization of
labor arbiters; and (3) if the complaint is grounded not on the
employee's dismissal per se but on the manner of said dismissal
and the consequence thereof, the case falls under the jurisdiction
of the civil courts. (pp. 70-73, Rec.)
On March 23, 1987, the court a quo denied defendant's motion to
dismiss (pp. 82-84, Ibid). The motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied. (p. 95 ibid)
On September 16, 1987, defendant filed its answer reiterating the
grounds relied upon in its motion to dismiss and further arguing
that plaintiff is barred by laches, waiver, and estoppel from
instituting the complaint and that he has no cause of action. (pp.
102-115)"
[1]

On April 10, 1991, the trial court handed down its decision in favor of plaintiff.
The dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff
Menandro Laureano and against defendant Singapore Airlines
Limited, ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amounts of SIN$396,104.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the
current rate of exchange at the time of payment, as and for
unearned compensation with legal interest from the filing of the
complaint until fully paid; Jjlex

SIN$154,742.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the

current rate of exchange at the time of payment; and the further
amounts of P67,500.00 as consequential damages with legal
interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid;
P1,000,000.00 as and for moral damages; P1,000,000.00 as and
for exemplary damages; and P100,000.00 as and for attorney's
fees.
Costs against defendant.
SO ORDERED."

[2]

Singapore Airlines timely appealed before the respondent court and raised the
issues of jurisdiction, validity of termination, estoppel, and damages.
On October 29, 1993, the appellate court set aside the decision of the trial
court, thus,
"...In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal
termination was filed by plaintiff-appellee only on January 8, 1987
or more than four (4) years after the effectivity date of his
dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action
has already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The complaint is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED."

[3]

Newmiso

Petitioner's and Singapore Airlines' respective motions for reconsideration

were denied.
Now, before the Court, petitioner poses the following queries:
1. IS THE PRESENT ACTION ONE BASED ON CONTRACT
WHICH PRESCRIBES IN TEN YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1144
OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE OR ONE FOR DAMAGES ARISING

FROM AN INJURY TO THE RIGHTS OF THE PLAINTIFF WHICH

PRESCRIBES IN FOUR YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1146 OF THE
NEW CIVIL CODE?
2. CAN AN EMPLOYEE WITH A FIXED PERIOD OF
EMPLOYMENT BE RETRENCHED BY HIS EMPLOYER?
3. CAN THERE BE VALID RETRENCHMENT IF AN EMPLOYER
MERELY FAILS TO REALIZE THE EXPECTED PROFITS EVEN
IF IT WERE NOT, IN FACT, INCURRING LOSSES?
At the outset, we find it necessary to state our concurrence on the assumption
of jurisdiction by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9. The trial court
rightly ruled on the application of Philippine law, thus: Acctmis
"Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the
plaintiff is legal under the Singapore Laws because of the
defendant's failure to show which specific laws of Singapore Laws
apply to this case. As substantially discussed in the preceding
paragraphs, the Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice of the
laws of Singapore. The defendant that claims the applicability of
the Singapore Laws to this case has the burden of proof. The
defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine law should
be applied."
[4]

Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when defendant filed its

appeal before said court. On this matter, respondent court was correct when
it barred defendant-appellant below from raising further the issue of
jurisdiction.
[5]

[6]

Petitioner now raises the issue of whether his action is one based on Article
1144 or on Article 1146 of the Civil Code. According to him, his termination of
employment effective November 1, 1982, was based on an employment
contract which is under Article 1144, so his action should prescribe in 10 years
as provided for in said article. Thus he claims the ruling of the appellate court
based on Article 1146 where prescription is only four (4) years, is an error. The
appellate court concluded that the action for illegal dismissal originally filed

before the Labor Arbiter on June 29, 1983, but which was withdrawn, then
filed again in 1987 before the Regional Trial Court, had already prescribed.
In our view, neither Article 1144 nor Article 1146 of the Civil Code is here
pertinent. What is applicable is Article 291 of the Labor Code, viz:
[7]

[8]

"Article 291. Money claims. - All money claims arising from

employee-employer relations accruing during the effectivity of this
Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause
of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred.
x x x" Misact
What rules on prescription should apply in cases like this one has long been
decided by this Court. In illegal dismissal, it is settled, that the ten-year
prescriptive period fixed in Article 1144 of the Civil Code may not be invoked
by petitioners, for the Civil Code is a law of general application, while the
prescriptive period fixed in Article 292 of the Labor Code [now Article 291] is a
SPECIAL LAW applicable to claims arising from employee-employer relations.
[9]

More recently in De Guzman. vs. Court of Appeals, where the money claim
was based on a written contract, the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the
Court held:
[10]

"...The language of Art. 291 of the Labor Code does not limit its
application only to 'money claims specifically recoverable under
said Code' but covers all money claims arising from an employeeemployer relations" (Citing Cadalin v. POEA Administrator, 238
SCRA 721, 764 [1994]; and Uy v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 261 SCRA 505, 515 [1996]). ...
It should be noted further that Article 291 of the Labor Code is a
special law applicable to money claims arising from employeremployee relations; thus, it necessarily prevails over Article 1144
of the Civil Code, a general law. Basic is the rule in statutory
construction that 'where two statutes are of equal theoretical
application to a particular case, the one designed therefore should

prevail.' (Citing Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157

SCRA 282, 294.) Generalia specialibus non derogant."
[11]

In the light of Article 291, aforecited, we agree with the appellate court's
conclusion that petitioner's action for damages due to illegal termination filed
again on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effective date
of his dismissal on November 1, 1982 has already prescribed.
"In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal
termination was filed by plaintiff-appellee only on January 8, 1987
or more than four (4) years after the effectivity date of his
dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action
has already prescribed."
We base our conclusion not on Article 1144 of the Civil Code but on Article
291 of the Labor Code, which sets the prescription period at three (3) years
and which governs under this jurisdiction.
Petitioner claims that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled when he
filed his complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter of the National
Labor Relations Commission. However, this claim deserves scant
consideration; it has no legal leg to stand on. In Olympia International, Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, we held that "although the commencement of a civil action
stops the running of the statute of prescription or limitations, its dismissal or
voluntary abandonment by plaintiff leaves the parties in exactly the same
position as though no action had been commenced at all."
[12]

Now, as to whether petitioner's separation from the company due to

retrenchment was valid, the appellate court found that the employment
contract of petitioner allowed for pre-termination of employment. We agree
with the Court of Appeals when it said, Sdjad
"It is a settled rule that contracts have the force of law between
the parties. From the moment the same is perfected, the parties
are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly
stipulated but also to all consequences which, according to their
nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law. Thus,

when plaintiff-appellee accepted the offer of employment, he was

bound by the terms and conditions set forth in the contract,
among others, the right of mutual termination by giving three
months written notice or by payment of three months salary. Such
provision is clear and readily understandable, hence, there is no
room for interpretation."
xxx
Further, plaintiff-appellee's contention that he is not bound by the
provisions of the Agreement, as he is not a signatory thereto,
deserves no merit. It must be noted that when plaintiff-appellee's
employment was confirmed, he applied for membership with the
Singapore Airlines Limited (Pilots) Association, the signatory to
the aforementioned Agreement. As such, plaintiff-appellee is
estopped from questioning the legality of the said agreement or
any proviso contained therein."
[13]

Moreover, the records of the present case clearly show that respondent
court's decision is amply supported by evidence and it did not err in its
findings, including the reason for the retrenchment:
"When defendant-appellant was faced with the world-wide
recession of the airline industry resulting in a slow down in the
company's growth particularly in the regional operation (Asian
Area) where the Airbus 300 operates. It had no choice but to
adopt cost cutting measures, such as cutting down services,
number of frequencies of flights, and reduction of the number of
flying points for the A-300 fleet (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, pp. 17-18). As
a result, defendant-appellant had to layoff A-300 pilots, including
plaintiff-appellee, which it found to be in excess of what is
reasonably needed."
[14]

All these considered, we find sufficient factual and legal basis to conclude that
petitioner's termination from employment was for an authorized cause, for
which he was given ample notice and opportunity to be heard, by respondent

company. No error nor grave abuse of discretion, therefore, could be

attributed to respondent appellate court. Sppedsc
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court
of Appeals in C.A. CV No. 34476 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 143276. July 20, 2004]

LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES VICENTE

BANAL and LEONIDAS ARENAS-BANAL, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the registered

owners of 19.3422 hectares of agricultural land situated in San Felipe, Basud,
Camarines Norte covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6296. A portion
of the land consisting of 6.2330 hectares (5.4730 of which is planted to
coconut and 0.7600 planted to palay) was compulsorily acquired by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6657, as amended, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988.
[1]

In accordance with the formula prescribed in DAR Administrative Order

No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11,
Series of 1994, the Land Bank of the Philippines (Landbank), petitioner,
made the following valuation of the property:
[2]

[3]

Acquired property Area in hectares Value

Coconut land 5.4730 P148,675.19
Riceland 0.7600 25,243.36
==========

[4]

P173,918.55
Respondents rejected the above valuation. Thus, pursuant to Section
16(d) of R.A. 6657, as amended, a summary administrative proceeding was
conducted before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to
determine the valuation of the land. Eventually, the PARAD rendered its
Decision affirming the Landbanks valuation.
Dissatisfied with the Decision of the PARAD, respondents filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, designated as
a Special Agrarian Court, a petition for determination of just compensation,
docketed as Civil Case No. 6806. Impleaded as respondents were the DAR
and the Landbank. Petitioners therein prayed for a compensation
of P100,000.00 per hectare for both coconut land and riceland, or an
aggregate amount of P623,000.00.
During the pre-trial on September 23, 1998, the parties submitted to the
RTC the following admissions of facts: (1) the subject property is governed by
the provisions of R.A. 6657, as amended; (2) it was distributed to the farmersbeneficiaries; and (3) the Landbank deposited the provisional compensation
based on the valuation made by the DAR.
[5]

On the same day after the pre-trial, the court issued an Order dispensing
with the hearing and directing the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.
[6]

In its Decision dated February 5, 1999, the trial court computed the just
compensation for the coconut land at P657,137.00 and for the riceland
at P46,000.00, or a total of P703,137.00, which is beyond respondents
valuation of P623,000.00. The court further awarded compounded interest
at P79,732.00 in cash. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners, the spouses Dr.
Vicente Banal and Leonidas Arenas-Banal, for the 5.4730 hectares of
coconut land the sum of SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-SEVEN THOUSAND

ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN PESOS (P657,137.00) in cash and

in bonds in the proportion provided by law;
2. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners for the .7600 hectares
of riceland the sum of FORTY-SIX THOUSAND PESOS
(P46,000.00) in cash and in bonds in the proportion provided by law; and
3. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners the sum of SEVENTYNINE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO PESOS
(P79,732.00) as the compounded interest in cash.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

[7]

In determining the valuation of the land, the trial court based the same on
the facts established in another case pending before it (Civil Case No. 6679,
Luz Rodriguez vs. DAR, et al.), using the following formula:
For the coconut land
1. Average Gross Production (AGP) x .70 x 9.70 (price per kilo of coconut) =
Net Income (NI)
2. NI / 6% = Price Per Hectare (PPH) (applying the capitalization formula
under Republic Act No. 3844 )
[8]

For the riceland

1. 2.5 x AGP x Government Support Price (GSP) = Land Value (LV) or PPH
(using the formula under Executive Order No. 228 )
[9]

2. AGP x 6% compounded annually for 26 years x GSP = Interest (pursuant to

DAR AO No. 13, Series of 1994)
Forthwith, the Landbank filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52163.
On March 20, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision affirming in
toto the judgment of the trial court. The Landbanks motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied.
[10]

[11]

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

The fundamental issue for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals
erred in sustaining the trial courts valuation of the land. As earlier mentioned,
there was no trial on the merits.
To begin with, under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 405 (1990), the
Landbank is charged primarily with the determination of the land valuation and
compensation for all private lands suitable for agriculture under the Voluntary
Offer to Sell or Compulsory Acquisition arrangement For its part, the DAR
relies on the determination of the land valuation and compensation by the
Landbank.
[12]

Based on the Landbanks valuation of the land, the DAR makes an offer to
the landowner. If the landowner accepts the offer, the Landbank shall pay
him the purchase price of the land after he executes and delivers a deed of
transfer and surrenders the certificate of title in favor of the government. In
case the landowner rejects the offer or fails to reply thereto, the DAR
adjudicator conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine the
compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the Landbank and other
interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land.
These functions by the DAR are in accordance with its quasi-judicial powers
under Section 50 of R.A. 6657, as amended, which provides:
[13]

[14]

[15]

[16]

SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).
x x x.
A party who disagrees with the decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring
the matter to the RTC designated as a Special Agrarian Court for final
determination of just compensation.
[17]

[18]

In the proceedings before the RTC, it is mandated to apply the Rules of

Court and, on its own initiative or at the instance of any of the parties,
appoint one or more commissioners to examine, investigate and ascertain
facts relevant to the dispute, including the valuation of properties, and to file a
written report thereof x x x. In determining just compensation, the RTC is
required to consider several factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. 6657,
as amended, thus:
[19]

[20]

Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just compensation, the

cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual
use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the
assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and
economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the
Government to the property, as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured
from any government financing institution on the said land, shall be considered as
additional factors to determine its valuation.
These factors have been translated into a basic formula in DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended by DAR
Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, issued pursuant to the DARs
rule-making power to carry out the object and purposes of R.A. 6657, as
amended.
[21]

The formula stated in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended, is as

follows:
LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)
LV = Land Value
CNI = Capitalized Net Income
CS = Comparable Sales
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration
The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are present, relevant and
applicable.

A.1 When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the formula
shall be:
LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A.2 When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the formula
shall be:
LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A.3 When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the
formula shall be:
LV = MV x 2
Here, the RTC failed to observe the basic rules of procedure and the
fundamental requirements in determining just compensation for the
property. Firstly, it dispensed with the hearing and merely ordered the parties
to submit their respective memoranda. Such action is grossly erroneous since
the determination of just compensation involves the examination of the
following factors specified in Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended:
1. the cost of the acquisition of the land;
2. the current value of like properties;
3. its nature, actual use and income;
4. the sworn valuation by the owner; the tax declarations;
5. the assessment made by government assessors;
6. the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the
farmworkers and by the government to the property; and
7. the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing
institution on the said land, if any.

Obviously, these factors involve factual matters which can be established

only during a hearing wherein the contending parties present their respective
evidence. In fact, to underscore the intricate nature of determining the
valuation of the land, Section 58 of the same law even authorizes the Special
Agrarian Courts to appoint commissioners for such purpose.
Secondly, the RTC, in concluding that the valuation of respondents
property is P703,137.00, merely took judicial notice of the average production
figures in the Rodriguez case pending before it and applied the same to
this case without conducting a hearing and worse, without the knowledge or
consent of the parties, thus:
x x x. In the case x x x of the coconut portion of the land 5.4730 hectares, defendants
determined the average gross production per year at 506.95 kilos only, but in the very
recent case of Luz Rodriguez vs. DAR, et al., filed and decided by this court in
Civil Case No. 6679 also for just compensation for coconut lands and Riceland
situated at Basud, Camarines Norte wherein also the lands in the above-entitled case
are situated, the value fixed therein was 1,061.52 kilos per annum per hectare for
coconut land and the price per kilo is P8.82, but in the instant case the price per
kilo is P9.70. In the present case, we consider 506.95 kilos average gross production
per year per hectare to be very low considering that farm practice for coconut lands is
harvest every forty-five days. We cannot also comprehended why in
the Rodriguez case and in this case there is a great variance in average production per
year when in the two cases the lands are both coconut lands and in the same place of
Basud, Camarines Norte.We believe that it is more fair to adapt the 1,061.52 kilos per
hectare per year as average gross production. In the Rodriguez case, the defendants
fixed the average gross production of palay at 3,000 kilos or 60 cavans per year. The
court is also constrained to apply this yearly palay production in
the Rodriguez case to the case at bar.
xxxxxxxxx
As shown in the Memorandum of Landbank in this case, the area of the coconut land
taken under CARP is 5.4730 hectares. But as already noted, the average gross
production a year of 506.96 kilos per hectare fixed by Landbank is too low as
compared to the Rodriguez case which was 1,061 kilos when the coconut land in
both cases are in the same town of Basud, Camarines Norte, compelling this

court then to adapt 1,061 kilos as the average gross production a year of the
coconut land in this case. We have to apply also the price of P9.70 per kilo as this is
the value that Landbank fixed for this case.
The net income of the coconut land is equal to 70% of the gross income. So, the net
income of the coconut land is 1,061 x .70 x 9.70 equals P7,204.19 per
hectare. Applying the capitalization formula of R.A. 3844 to the net income
of P7,204.19 divided by 6%, the legal rate of interest, equals P120,069.00 per
hectare. Therefore, the just compensation for the 5.4730 hectares is P657,137.00.
The Riceland taken under Presidential Decree No. 27 as of October 21, 1972 has an
area of .7600 hectare. If in the Rodriguez case the Landbank fixed the average gross
production of 3000 kilos or 60 cavans of palay per year, then the .7600 hectare in this
case would be 46 cavans. The value of the riceland therefore in this case is 46 cavans
x 2.5 x P400.00 equals P46,000.00.
[22]

PARC Resolution 94-24-1 of 25 October 1994, implemented by DAR AO 13, granted

interest on the compensation at 6% compounded annually. The compounded interest
on the 46 cavans for 26 years is 199.33 cavans. At P400.00 per cavan, the value of the
compounded interest is P79,732.00. (emphasis added)
[23]

Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice
of the contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been
tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge. They may
only do so in the absence of objection and with the knowledge of the opposing
party, which are not obtaining here.
[24]

[25]

Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to all

proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts. In this regard, Section 3,
Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on the necessity of a
hearing before a court takes judicial notice of a certain matter, thus:
SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. During the trial, the court, on its
own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial
notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own
initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow

the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the
case. (emphasis added)
The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.
Lastly, the RTC erred in applying the formula prescribed under Executive
Order (EO) No. 228 and R.A. No. 3844, as amended, in determining the
valuation of the property; and in granting compounded interest pursuant to
DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994. It must be stressed that
EO No. 228 covers private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and
corn, while R.A. 3844 governs agricultural leasehold relation between the
person who furnishes the landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee,
usufructuary, or legal possessor, and the person who personally cultivates the
same. Here, the land is planted to coconut and rice and does not involve
agricultural leasehold relation. What the trial court should have applied is the
formula in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended by DAR
Administrative Order No. 11 discussed earlier.
[26]

[27]

[28]

[29]

As regards the award of compounded interest, suffice it to state that DAR

Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994 does not apply to the subject land
but to those lands taken under Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive
Order No. 228 whose owners have not been compensated. In this case, the
property is covered by R.A. 6657, as amended, and respondents have been
paid the provisional compensation thereof, as stipulated during the pre-trial.
[30]

While the determination of just compensation involves the exercise of

judicial discretion, however, such discretion must be discharged within the
bounds of the law. Here, the RTC wantonly disregarded R.A. 6657, as
amended, and its implementing rules and regulations. (DAR Administrative
Order No. 6, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No.11).
In sum, we find that the Court of Appeals and the RTC erred in
determining the valuation of the subject land. Thus, we deem it proper to
remand this case to the RTC for trial on the merits wherein the parties may
present their respective evidence. In determining the valuation of the subject
property, the trial court shall consider the factors provided under Section 17 of
R.A. 6657, as amended, mentioned earlier. The formula prescribed by the

DAR in Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended by DAR

Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, shall be used in the valuation of
the land. Furthermore, upon its own initiative, or at the instance of any of the
parties, the trial court may appoint one or more commissioners to examine,
investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the dispute.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated March 20, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 52163 is
REVERSED. Civil Case No. 6806 is REMANDED to the RTC, Branch 40,
Daet, Camarines Norte, for trial on the merits with dispatch. The trial judge is
directed to observe strictly the procedures specified above in determining the
proper valuation of the subject property.
SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC GLASS CORPORATION G.R. No. 144413

and GERVEL, INC.,
Petitioners, Present:
Davide,
Jr., C.J., Chairman,
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago, - versus - Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.

Promulgated:
LAWRENCE C. QUA,
Respondent. July 30, 2004

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review [1] assailing the 6 March
2000 Decision[2] and the 26 July 2000 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54737. The Court of Appeals set aside
the Order[3] of 3 May 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 63 (RTC-Branch 63), in Civil Case No. 88-2643 and
reinstated the Decision[4] of 12 January 1996 in respondents favor.

The Facts

Petitioners Republic Glass Corporation (RGC) and Gervel, Inc.

(Gervel) together with respondent Lawrence C. Qua (Qua) were
stockholders of Ladtek, Inc. (Ladtek). Ladtek obtained loans from
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) [5] and Private
Development Corporation of the Philippines [6] (PDCP) with RGC,
Gervel and Qua as sureties. Among themselves, RGC, Gervel and
Qua executed Agreements for Contribution, Indemnity and Pledge
of Shares of Stocks (Agreements).[7]

The Agreements all state that in case of default in the payment of Ladteks loans,
the parties would reimburse each other the proportionate share of any sum that any
might pay to the creditors.[8] Thus, a common provision appears in the Agreements:

RGC, GERVEL and QUA each covenant that each will respectively
reimburse the party made to pay the Lenders to the extent and subject to
the limitations set forth herein, all sums of money which the party made
to pay the Lenders shall pay or become liable to pay by reason of any of
the foregoing, and will make such payments within five (5) days from
the date that the party made to pay the Lenders gives written notice to
the parties hereto that it shall have become liable therefor and has
advised the Lenders of its willingness to pay whether or not it shall have
already paid out such sum or any part thereof to the Lenders or to the
persons entitled thereto. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the same Agreements, Qua pledged 1,892,360 common shares of stock of
General Milling Corporation (GMC) in favor of RGC and Gervel. The pledged
shares of stock served as security for the payment of any sum which RGC and
Gervel may be held liable under the Agreements.

Ladtek defaulted on its loan obligations to Metrobank and PDCP. Hence,

Metrobank filed a collection case against Ladtek, RGC, Gervel and Qua docketed
as Civil Case No. 8364 (Collection Case No. 8364) which was raffled to the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149 (RTC-Branch 149). During the
pendency of Collection Case No. 8364,RGC and Gervel paid Metrobank P7
million. Later, Metrobank executed a waiver and quitclaim dated 7 September
1988 in favor of RGC and Gervel. Based on this waiver and quitclaim,
[9]

Metrobank, RGC and Gervel filed on 16 September 1988 a joint motion to

dismiss Collection Case No. 8364 against RGC and Gervel. Accordingly, RTCBranch 149 dismissed the case against RGC and Gervel, leaving Ladtek and Qua
as defendants.[10]

In a letter dated 7 November 1988, RGC and Gervels counsel, Atty. Antonio
C. Pastelero, demanded that Qua pay P3,860,646, or 42.22% of P8,730,543.55,
[11]

as reimbursement of the total amount RGC and Gervel paid to Metrobank and

PDCP. Qua refused to reimburse the amount to RGC and Gervel. Subsequently,
RGC and Gervel furnished Qua with notices of foreclosure of Quas pledged shares.
Qua filed a complaint for injunction and damages with
application for a temporary restraining order, docketed as Civil

Case No. 88-2643 (Foreclosure Case No. 88-2643), with RTCBranch 63 to prevent RGC and Gervel from foreclosing the
pledged shares. Although it issued a temporary restraining order
on 9 December 1988, RTC-Branch 63 denied on 2 January 1989
Quas Urgent Petition to Suspend Foreclosure Sale. RGC and
Gervel eventually foreclosed all the pledged shares of stock at
public auction. Thus, Quas application for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction became moot.[12]

Trial in Foreclosure Case No. 88-2643 ensued. RGC and

Gervel offered Quas Motion to Dismiss [13] in Collection Case No.
8364 as basis for the foreclosure of Quas pledged shares. Quas
Motion to Dismiss states:
8.

The foregoing facts show that the payment of

defendants Republic Glass Corporation and Gervel, Inc.
was for the entire obligation covered by the Continuing
Surety Agreements which were Annexes B and C of the
Complaint, and that the same naturally redound[ed] to the
benefit of defendant Qua herein, as provided for by law,
specifically Article 1217 of the Civil Code, which states that:

xxx

10. It is very clear that the payment of defendants Republic Glass

Corporation and Gervel, Inc. was much more than the amount
stipulated in the Continuing Surety Agreement which is the basis
for the action against them and defendant Qua, which was just
SIX
MILLION
TWO
HUNDRED
[THOUSAND]
PESOS
(P6,200,000.00), hence, logically the said alleged obligation
must now be considered as fully paid and extinguished.

RGC and Gervel likewise offered as evidence in Foreclosure

Case No. 88-2643 the Order dismissing Collection Case No. 8364,
[14]
which RTC-Branch 149 subsequently reversed on Metrobanks
motion for reconsideration. Thus, RTC-Branch 149 reinstated
Collection Case No. 8364 against Qua.

On 12 January 1996, RTC-Branch 63 rendered a Decision in

Foreclosure Case No. 88-2643 (12 January 1996 Decision)
ordering RGC and Gervel to return the foreclosed shares of
stock to Qua. The dispositive portion of the 12 January 1996
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby renders
judgment ordering defendants jointly and severally liable to return to
plaintiff the 1,892,360 shares of common stock of General Milling
Corporation which they foreclosed on December 9, 1988, or should the
return of these shares be no longer possible then to pay to plaintiff the
amount of P3,860,646.00 with interest at 6% per annum from
December 9, 1988 until fully paid and to pay plaintiff P100,000.00 as
and for attorneys fees. The costs will be for defendants account.
SO ORDERED.[15]

However, on RGC and Gervels Motion for Reconsideration,

RTC-Branch 63 issued its Order of 3 May 1996 (3 May 1996
Order) reconsidering and setting aside the 12 January 1996
Decision. The 3 May 1996 Order states:

After a thorough review of the records of the case, and an

evaluation of the evidence adduced by the parties as well as their
contentions, the issues to be resolved boil down to the following:

1. Whether or not the parties obligation to reimburse,

under the Indemnity Agreements was premised on the payment
by any of them of the entire obligation;

2. Whether or not there is basis to plaintiffs apprehension

that he would be made to pay twice for the single obligation;
and

3. Whether or not plaintiff was benefited by the payments

made by defendants.

Regarding the first issue, a closer scrutiny of the pertinent

provisions of the Indemnity Agreements executed by the parties would
not reveal any significant indication that the parties liabilities are
indeed premised on the payment by any of them of the entire
obligation. These agreements clearly provide that the parties
obligation to reimburse accrues upon mere advice that one of them
has paid or will so pay the obligation. It is not specified whether the
payment is for the entire obligation or not.

Accordingly, the Court stands corrected in this regard. The

obvious conclusion that can be seen now is that payment of
the entire obligation is not a condition sine qua non for the
paying party to demand reimbursement. The parties have
expressly contracted that each will reimburse whoever is made to pay
the obligation whether entirely or just a portion thereof.

On the second issue, plaintiffs apprehension that he would be

made to pay twice for the single obligation is unfounded. Under the
above-mentioned Indemnity Agreements, in the event that the
creditors are able to collect from him, he has the right to ask
defendants to pay their proportionate share, in the same way

defendants had collected from the plaintiff, by foreclosing his pledged

shares of stock, his proportionate share, after they had made
payments. From all indications, the provisions of the Indemnity
Agreements have remained binding between the parties.

On the third issue, there is merit to defendants assertion that

plaintiff has benefited from the payments made by defendants. As
alleged by defendants, and this has not been denied by
plaintiff, in Civil Case No. 8364 filed before Branch 149 of this
Court, where the creditors were enforcing the parties liabilities
as sureties, plaintiff succeeded in having the case dismissed by
arguing that defendants payments [were] for the entire
obligation, hence, the obligation should be considered fully
paid and extinguished. With the dismissal of the case, the
indications are that the creditors are no longer running after plaintiff to
enforce his liabilities as surety of Ladtek.

Whether or not the surety agreements signed by the parties and

the creditors were novated is not material in this controversy. The fact
is that there was payment of the obligation. Hence, the Indemnity
Agreements govern.

In the final analysis, defendants payments gave rise to plaintiffs

obligation to reimburse the former. Having failed to do so, upon
demand, defendants were justified in foreclosing the pledged shares of
stocks.

xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated January

12, 1996 is reconsidered and set aside. The above-entitled complaint
against defendants is DISMISSED.
Likewise, defendants counterclaim is also dismissed.

SO ORDERED.[16] (Emphasis supplied)

Qua filed a motion for reconsideration of the 3 May 1996 Order

which RTC-Branch 63 denied.

Aggrieved, Qua appealed to the Court of Appeals. During the

pendency of the appeal, Qua filed a Manifestation [17] with the
Court of Appeals attaching the Decision [18]of 21 November 1996
rendered in Collection Case No. 8364. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering defendants Ladtek, Inc. and Lawrence C. Qua:

1.
To pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiff the amount
of P44,552,738.34 as of October 31, 1987 plus the stipulated interest of 30.73%
per annum and penalty charges of 12% per annum from November 1, 1987 until
the whole amount is fully paid, less P7,000,000.00 paid by defendants
Republic Glass Corporation and Gervel, Inc., but the liability of defendant
Lawrence C. Qua should be limited only to P5,000,000.00 and P1,200,000.00,
the amount stated in the Continuing Suretyship dated June 15, 1983, Exh. D
and Continuing Suretyship dated December 14, 1981, Exh. D-1, respectively,
plus the stipulated interest and expenses incurred by the plaintiff.

2.
To pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiff an amount equivalent to
ten (10%) percent of the total amount due as and by way of attorneys fees;

3.

To pay the cost of suit.

The Counterclaims of the defendants Ladtek, Inc. and Lawrence C. Qua

against the plaintiff are hereby dismissed.

Likewise, the cross-claims of the defendants are dismissed.

SO ORDERED.[19] (Emphasis supplied)

On 6 March 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered the questioned

Decision setting aside the 3 May 1996 Order of RTC-Branch 63
and reinstating the 12 January 1996 Decision ordering RGC and
Gervel to return the foreclosed shares of stock to Qua. [20]

Hence, this petition.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In reversing the 3 May 1996 Order and reinstating the 12 January

1996 Decision, the appellate court quoted the RTC-Branch 63s 12
January 1996 Decision:
The liability of each party under the indemnity agreements therefore is
premised

on

the

payment

by

any

of

them

of

the

entire

obligation. Without such payment, there would be no corresponding

share

to

reimburse. Payment

of

the

entire

obligation

naturally

redounds to the benefit of the other solidary debtors who must then
reimburse the paying co-debtors to the extent of his corresponding
share.
In the case at bar, Republic Glass and Gervel made partial payments
only, and so they did not extinguish the entire obligation. But Republic
Glass and Gervel nevertheless obtained quitclaims in their favor and so
they ceased to be solidarily liable with plaintiff for the balance of the
debt (Exhs. D, E, and I). Plaintiff thus became solely liable for the
unpaid portion of the debt even as he is being held liable for
reimbursement on the said portion.

What happened therefore, was that Metrobank and PDCP in effect

enforced the Suretyship Agreements jointly as against plaintiff and
defendants. Consequently, the solidary obligation under the Suretyship
Agreements was novated by the substantial modification of its
principal conditions. xxx The resulting change was from one with three

solidary debtors to one in which Lawrence Qua became the sole

solidary co-debtor of Ladtek.

Defendants cannot simply pay off a portion of the debt and then
absolve themselves from any further liability when the obligation has
not been totally extinguished.

xxx

In the final reckoning, this Court finds that the foreclosure and sale of
the shares pledged by plaintiff was totally unjustified and without basis
because the obligation secured by the underlying pledge had been
extinguished by novation. xxx[21]

The Court of Appeals further held that there was an implied

novation or substantial incompatibility in the suretys mode or
manner of payment from one for the entire obligation to one
merely of proportionate share. The appellate court ruled that RGC
and Gervels payment to the creditors only amounted to their
proportionate shares of the obligation, considering the following
evidence:
The letter of the Republic to the appellant, Exhibit G, dated June 25,
1987, which mentioned the letter from PDCP confirming its willingness
to release the joint and solidary obligation of the Republic and Gervel

subject to some terms and conditions, one of which is the appellants

acceptable repayment plan of his pro-rata share; and the letter of
PDCP to the Republic, Exhibit H, mentioning full payment of the pro
rata share of the Republic and Gervel, and the need of the appellant to
submit an acceptable repayment plan covering his pro-rata share, the
release from solidary liability by PDCP, Exhibit J, mentioning full
payment by the Republic and Gervel of their pro rata share in the loan,
as solidary obligors, subject however to the terms and conditions of the
hold out agreement; and the non-payment in full of the loan, subject of
the May 10, 1984 Promissory Note, except the 7 million payment by
both Republic and Gervel, as mentioned in the Decision (Case No.
8364, Metrobank vs. Ladtek, et al). Precisely, Ladtek and the appellant,
in said Decision were directed to pay Metrobank the balance
of P9,560,798, supposedly due and unpaid.

Thus, the payment did not extinguish the entire obligation and did
not benefit Qua. Accordingly, RGC and Gervel cannot demand
reimbursement. The Court of Appeals also held that Qua even
became solely answerable for the unpaid balance of the
obligations by virtue of the quitclaims executed by Metrobank and
PDCP in favor of RGC and Gervel. RGC and Gervel ceased to be
solidarily liable for Ladteks loan obligations. [22]

The Issues

RGC and Gervel raise the following issues for resolution:

I.

WHETHER THE PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL APPLIES TO QUAS

JUDICIAL STATEMENTS THAT RGC AND GERVEL PAID THE
ENTIRE OBLIGATION.
II.
WHETHER PAYMENT OF THE ENTIRE OBLIGATION IS A
CONDITION SINE QUA NON FOR RGC AND GERVEL TO
DEMAND REIMBURSEMENT FROM QUA UNDER THE
INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS EXECUTED BY THEM AFTER RGC
AND GERVEL PAID METROBANK UNDER THE SURETY
AGREEMENT.
III.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THERE WAS NOVATION OF
THE SURETY AGREEMENTS SIGNED BY THE PARTIES AND
THE CREDITORS, WHETHER THE NOVATION IS MATERIAL
IN THIS CASE.[23]

The Courts Ruling

We deny the petition.

Whether Qua was in estoppel

RGC and Gervel contend that Qua is in estoppel for making

conflicting statements in two different and separate cases. Qua
cannot now claim that the payment made to Metrobank
was not for

the entire obligation because of his Motion

to

Dismiss Collection Case No. 8364 where he stated that RGC and
Gervels payment was for the entireobligation.

The essential elements of estoppel in pais are considered in

relation to the party to be estopped, and to the party invoking the
estoppel in his favor. On the party to be estopped, such party
(1)

commits

conduct

amounting

to false

representation

or

concealment of material facts or at least calculated to convey the

impression that the facts are inconsistent with those which the
party subsequently attempts to assert; (2) has the intent, or at

least expectation that his conduct shall at least influence the

other party; and (3) has knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
real facts. On the party claiming the estoppel, such party (1)
has lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth
on the facts in question; (2) has relied, in good faith, on the
conduct or statements of the party to be estopped; (3) has acted
or refrained from acting based on such conduct or statements
as to change the position or status of the party claiming the
estoppel, to his injury, detriment or prejudice. [24]

In this case, the essential elements of estoppel are

inexistent.

While Quas statements in Collection Case No. 8364 conflict

with his statements in Foreclosure Case No. 88-2643, RGC and
Gervel miserably failed to show that Qua, in making those
statements, intended to falsely represent or conceal the material
facts. Both parties undeniably know the real facts.

Nothing in the records shows that RGC and Gervel relied

on Quas statements in Collection Case No. 8364 such that they
changed their position or status, to their injury, detriment or
prejudice. RGC and Gervel repeatedly point out that it was the

presiding judge[25] in Collection Case No. 8364 who relied on

Quas statements in Collection Case No. 8364. RGC and Gervel
claim that Qua deliberately led the Presiding Judge to believe
that

their

payment

to

Metrobank

was

for

the

entire

obligation. As a result, the presiding judge ordered

the

dismissal of Collection Case No. 8364 against Qua. [26]

RGC and Gervel further invoke Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules
of Court to support their stance:

Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a

party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require
proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was
made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings filed by

the parties, (b) during the trial either by verbal or written
manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of the judicial
proceeding.[27]

The elements of judicial admissions are absent in this case.

Qua made conflicting statements in Collection Case No. 8364 and
in Foreclosure Case No. 88-2643, and not in the same case as
required in Section 4 of Rule 129. To constitute judicial admission,
the admission must be made in the same case in which it is
offered. If made in another case or in another court, the fact of
such admission must be proved as in the case of any other fact,
although if made in a judicial proceeding it is entitled to greater
weight.[28]

RGC and Gervel introduced Quas Motion to Dismiss and the

Order dismissing Collection Case No. 8364 to prove Quas claim
that the payment was for the entire obligation. Qua does not deny
making such statement but explained that he honestly believed
and pleaded in the lower court and in CA-G.R. CV No. 58550 that
the entire debt was fully extinguished when the petitioners
paid P7 million to Metrobank.[29]

We find Quas explanation substantiated by the evidence on

record. As stated in the Agreements, Ladteks original loan from
Metrobank was only P6.2 million. Therefore, Qua reasonably
believed that RGC and Gervels P7 million payment to Metrobank
pertained to the entire obligation. However, subsequent facts
indisputably show that RGC and Gervels payment was not for the
entire obligation. RTC-Branch 149 reinstated Collection Case No.
8364 against Qua and ruled in Metrobanks favor, ordering Qua to
pay P6.2 million.

Whether payment of the entire obligation is an

essential condition for reimbursement

RGC and Gervel assail the Court of Appeals ruling that the
parties liabilities under the Agreements depend on the full
payment of the obligation. RGC and Gervel insist that it is not an
essential condition that the entire obligation must first be paid
before they can seek reimbursement from Qua. RGC and Gervel
contend that Qua should pay 42.22% of any amount which they
paid or would pay Metrobank and PDCP.

RGC and Gervels contention is partly meritorious.

Payment of the entire obligation by one or some of the

solidary debtors results in a corresponding obligation of the other
debtors to reimburse the paying debtor. [30]However, we agree with
RGC and Gervels contention that in this case payment of the
entire obligation is not an essential condition before they can seek
reimbursement from Qua. The words of the Agreements are clear.

RGC, GERVEL and QUA each covenant that each will

respectively reimburse the party made to pay the Lenders to the extent
and subject to the limitations set forth herein, all sums of money which
the party made to pay the Lenders shall pay or become liable to
pay by reason of any of the foregoing, and will make such payments
within five (5) days from the date that the party made to pay the Lenders
gives written notice to the parties hereto that it shall have become liable
therefor and has advised the Lenders of its willingness to pay whether or
not it shall have already paid out such sum or any part thereof to the
Lenders or to the persons entitled thereto. (Emphasis supplied)

The Agreements are contracts of indemnity not only against

actual loss but against liability as well. In Associated Insurance
& Surety Co., Inc. v. Chua,[31] we distinguished between a
contract of indemnity against loss and a contract of indemnity
against liability, thus:[32]

The agreement here sued upon is not only one of indemnity against
loss but of indemnity against liability. While the first does not render
the indemnitor liable until the person to be indemnified makes
payment or sustains loss, the second becomes operative as soon
as the liability of the person indemnified arises irrespective of
whether or not he has suffered actual loss.(Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, whether the solidary debtor has paid the creditor, the
other solidary debtors should indemnify the former once his
liability becomes absolute. However, in this case, the liability of
RGC, Gervel and Qua became absolute simultaneously when
Ladtek defaulted in its loan payment. As a result, RGC, Gervel and
Qua all became directly liable at the same time to Metrobank and
PDCP. Thus, RGC and Gervel cannot automatically claim for
indemnity from Qua because Qua himself is liable directly to
Metrobank and PDCP.

If we allow RGC and Gervel to collect from Qua his

proportionate share, then Qua would pay much more than his
stipulated liability under the Agreements. In addition to
the P3,860,646 claimed by RGC and Gervel, Qua would have to
pay his liability of P6.2 million to Metrobank and more than P1
million to PDCP. Since Qua would surely exceed his proportionate
share, he would then recover from RGC and Gervel the excess
payment. This situation is absurd and circuitous.

Contrary to RGC and Gervels claim, payment of any

amount will not automatically result in reimbursement. If a
solidary debtor pays the obligation in part, he can recover

reimbursement from the co-debtors only in so far as his

payment exceeded his share in the obligation.[33] This is precisely
because if a solidary debtor pays an amount equal to his
proportionate share in the obligation, then he in effect pays only
what is due from him. If the debtor pays less than his share in the
obligation, he cannot demand reimbursement because his
payment is less than his actual debt.

To determine whether RGC and Gervel have a right to

reimbursement, it is indispensable to ascertain the total
obligation of the parties. At this point, it becomes necessary to
consider the decision in Collection Case No. 8364 on the parties
obligation to Metrobank. To repeat, Metrobank filed Collection
Case No. 8364 against Ladtek, RGC, Gervel and Qua to collect
Ladteks unpaid loan.

RGC and Gervel assail the Court of Appeals consideration of

the decision in Collection Case No. 8364[34] because Qua did not
offer the decision in evidence during the trial in Foreclosure Case
No. 88-2643 subject of this petition. RTC-Branch 62 [35] rendered
the decision in Collection Case No. 8364 on 21 November
1996 while Qua filed his Notice of Appeal of the 3 May 1996 Order
on 19 June 1996. Qua could not have possibly offered in evidence
the decision in Collection Case No. 8364 because RTC-Branch 62
rendered the decision only after Qua elevated the present case to
the Court of Appeals. Hence, Qua submitted the decision in
Collection Case No. 8364 during the pendency of the appeal of
Foreclosure Case No. 88-2643 in the Court of Appeals.

As found by RTC-Branch 62, RGC, Gervel and Quas total

obligation was P14,200,854.37 as of 31 October 1987.[36] During
the pendency of Collection Case No. 8364, RGC and Gervel paid
Metrobank P7 million. Because of the payment, Metrobank
executed a quitclaim[37] in favor of RGC and Gervel. By virtue of
Metrobanks quitclaim, RTC-Branch 62 dismissed Collection Case
No. 8364 against RGC and Gervel, leaving Ladtek and Qua as
defendants. Considering that RGC and Gervel paid only P7 million
out of the total obligation of P14,200,854.37, which payment was
less than RGC and Gervels combined shares in the obligation, [38] it
was clearly partial payment. Moreover, if it were full payment,
then the obligation would have been extinguished. Metrobank
would have also released Qua from his obligation.

RGC and Gervel also made partial payment to PDCP. Proof

of this is the Release from Solidary Liability that PDCP executed
in RGC and Gervels favor which stated that their payment
of P1,730,543.55 served as full payment of their corresponding
proportionate
[39]

share

in

Ladteks

foreign

currency

loan.

Moreover, PDCP filed a collection case against Qua alone,

docketed as Civil Case No. 2259, in the Regional Trial Court of

Makati, Branch 150.[40]
Since they only made partial payments, RGC and Gervel
should clearly and convincingly show that their payments to
Metrobank and PDCP exceeded their proportionate shares in the
obligations before they can seek reimbursement from Qua. This
RGC and Gervel failed to do. RGC and Gervel, in fact, never

claimed that their payments exceeded their shares in the

obligations. Consequently, RGC and Gervel cannot validly seek
reimbursement from Qua.

Whether there was novation of the Agreements

RGC and Gervel contend that there was no novation of the

Agreements. RGC and Gervel further contend that any
novation

of

the

Agreements

is

immaterial

to

this

case. RGC and Gervel disagreed with the Court of Appeals

on the effect of the implied novation which supposedly
transpired in this case. The Court of Appeals found that
there

was

an

implied

novation

or

substantial

incompatibility in the mode or manner of payment by the

surety from the entire obligation, to one merely of
proportionate share. RGC and Gervel claim that if it is true
that an implied novation occurred, then the effect would
be to release respondent (Qua) as the entire obligation is
considered extinguished by operation of law. Thus, Qua
should now reimburse RGC and Gervel his proportionate
share under the surety agreements.
Novation extinguishes an obligation by (1) changing its
object or principal conditions; (2) substituting the person of the
debtor; and (3) subrogating a third person in the rights of the
creditor. Article 1292 of the Civil Code clearly provides that in
order that an obligation may be extinguished by another which
substitutes the same, it should be declared in unequivocal terms,
or that the old and new obligations be on every point
incompatible with each other.[41] Novation may either be extinctive
or modificatory.Novation is extinctive when an old obligation is

terminated by the creation of a new obligation that takes the

place of the former. Novation is merely modificatory when the old
obligation subsists to the extent it remains compatible with the
amendatory agreement.[42]

We find that there was no novation of the Agreements. The

parties did not constitute a new obligation to substitute the
Agreements. The terms and conditions of the Agreements remain
the same. There was also no showing of complete incompatibility
in the manner of payment of the parties obligations. Contrary to
the Court of Appeals ruling, the mode or manner of payment by
the parties did not change from one for the entire obligation to
one merely of proportionate share. The creditors, namely
Metrobank and PDCP, merely proceeded against RGC and Gervel
for their proportionate shares only. [43] This preference is within the
creditors discretion which did not necessarily affect the nature of
the obligations as well as the terms and conditions of the
Agreements. A creditor may choose to proceed only against some
and not all of the solidary debtors. The creditor may also choose
to collect part of the debt from some of the solidary debtors, and
the remaining debt from the other solidary debtors.

In sum, RGC and Gervel have no legal basis to seek

reimbursement from Qua. Consequently, RGC and Gervel cannot
validly foreclose the pledge of Quas GMC shares of stock which
secured his obligation to reimburse.[44] Therefore, the foreclosure
of the pledged shares of stock has no leg to stand on.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision dated 6 March

2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54737
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 155110. March 31, 2005]

HABAGAT
GRILL
Through
Proprietor/Manager, petitioner, vs.
DEVELOPER, INC., respondent.

LOUIE
DMC-URBAN

BIRAOGO,
PROPERTY

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Entitlement to physical or material possession of the premises is the issue

in an ejectment suit. The two forms of ejectment suits -- forcible entry and
unlawful detainer -- may be distinguished from each other mainly by the fact
that in forcible entry, the plaintiffs must prove that they were in prior
possession of the premises until they were deprived thereof by the
defendants; in unlawful detainer, the plaintiffs need not have been in prior
physical possession.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review [1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
challenging the April 12, 2002 Decision[2] and the August 19, 2002
Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 53524. The
assailed Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the petition, the Court REVERSES the appealed
Decision and renders judgment:

1. Commanding [Petitioner] Louie Biraogo and all persons acting for and in his behalf
or by his authority to remove the Habagat Grill and all improvements he has
introduced into the lot in question and to vacate said lot; and
2. Ordering said [petitioner] to pay the [respondent] P10,000.00 monthly
compensation for the occupation of the land in question until the possession from
December 1, 1993 of said property shall have been completely restored to the
[respondent]; and
3. Ordering [petitioner] to pay [respondent] P10,000.00 as attorneys fees.[4]
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The antecedents were ably summarized by the CA as follows:
On June 11, 1981, David M. Consunji, Inc. acquired and became the owner of a
residential lot situated in Matina, Davao City and covered by TCT No. T-82338. This
lot shall henceforth be called the lot in question. On June 13, 1981, David M.
Consunji, Inc. transferred said lot to its sister company, the DMC Urban Property
Developers, Inc. (DMC) in whose favor TCT No. T-279042 was issued. Alleging that
Louie Biraogo forcibly entered said lot and built thereon the Habagat Grill in
December, 1993, DMC filed on March 28, 1994 a Complaint for Forcible Entry
against Habagat Grill and/or Louie Biraogo. The Complaint was docketed as Civil
Case No. 1233-D-94 in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, in Davao City.
The Complaint alleged that as owner DMC possessed the lot in question from June 11,
1981 until December 1, 1993; that on that day, December 1, 1993, Louie Biraogo, by
means of strategy and stealth, unlawfully entered into the lot in question and
constructed the Habagat Grill thereon, thus illegally depriving DMC of the possession
of said lot since then up to the present; that the reasonable rental value of said lot
is P10,000.00 a month.
Louie Biraogo in his Answer denied illegally entering the lot in question. He averred
that Habagat Grill was built in 1992 inside Municipal Reservation No. 1050
(Presidential Proclamation No. 20) and so DMC has no cause of action against him.
Since one of the vital issues in the case was the location of Habagat Grill, the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities constituted a team composed of three members, one a

Geodetic Engineer representing the DMC, another Geodetic Engineer representing

Biraogo and the third from the DENR which was tasked with the duty of determining
where precisely was Habagat Grill located, on the lot in question or on Municipal
Reservation No. 1050. Biraogo was directed by the court to furnish the team with a
copy of Municipal Reservation No. 20. Biraogo never complied. Worse, his
designated Geodetic Engineer Panfilo Jayme never took oath as such and did not
participate in the Relocation survey. The ones who conducted the survey were Engr.
Edmindo Dida of the DENR and Engr. Jose Cordero, DMCs representative. After
conducting the relocation survey on March 30, 1998, engineers Dida and Cordero
submitted their report to the Court specifically stating that the Habagat Grill
Restaurant was occupying 934 square meters of the lot in question.
After necessary proceedings, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities rendered a Decision
on August 6, 1998 dismissing the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and lack
of cause of action. DMC appealed from said Decision to the Regional Trial Court and
the same was docketed in Branch 12, in Davao City as Civil Case No. x x x
26,860.98. On February 16, 1999, said court rendered judgment affirming the
appealed Decision. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed but was denied in the
courts Order dated April 21, 1999.[5]
Consequently, respondent interposed an appeal to the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Granting respondents appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the court of
origin had jurisdiction over the Complaint for Forcible Entry.[6] The CA gave
greater weight to the testimony of respondents real property manager,
Bienamer Garcia, that Habagat Grill had been built on December 1, 1993.
[7]
The appellate court opined that his testimony was credible, because he had
personal knowledge of the facts he had testified to -- it was his task to know
such matters. On the other hand, it was not clear in what capacity petitioners
witness, Samuel Ruiz, came to know of the facts he had testified to. [8] The CA
further held that the minutes of the Urban Planning and Economic
Development hearings -- submitted by petitioner to prove the construction of
Habagat Grill in 1992 -- were immaterial, as these referred to another
establishment.[9]

The CA faulted petitioner for not presenting any other documentary

evidence to establish the date of Habagat Grills construction. [10] It added that
the court of origin had improperly adjudged the subject property as part of the
public domain. The appellate court explained that the lower court could take
cognizance of Presidential Proclamation No. 20, but not of the situational
relation between the property covered by the Proclamation and the land in
question. The CA further criticized petitioner for not presenting any evidence
to show the basis of the latters alleged authority to build Habagat Grill on the
property.[11]
Hence, this Petition.[12]
The Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for our
consideration:
1. That, with due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the
Honorable Court of First Level has no jurisdiction over this case as petitioners
possession and occupation of the lot where Habagat Grill was constructed on the
subject premises was yet in 1992 or for more than one (1) year prior to the filing of
this case on April 7, 1994 and that respondents predecessor (David M. Consunji, Inc.)
had not been in prior and physical possession of the subject premises, as a matter of
fact, it failed to allege the same in its Complaint in this case; and
2. That, with due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the
Complaint of respondents predecessor (David M. Consunji, Inc.) in this case failed to
state a valid cause of action as the lot referred to therein is not particularly described
and is different from the lot on which the Habagat Grill was constructed. [13]
Simplified, the issues are (1) whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the
case, and (2) whether respondent alleged a sufficient cause of action in its
Complaint.
This Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.

First Issue:
Jurisdiction
Petitioner argues that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case, because mere allegation of ownership did not, by itself, show that
respondent had prior possession of the property.[14]
We disagree. Jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined by the
allegations pleaded in the complaint.[15] As long as these allegations
demonstrate a cause of action either for forcible entry or for unlawful detainer,
the court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter. This principle holds,
even if the facts proved during the trial do not support the cause of action thus
alleged, in which instance the court -- after acquiring jurisdiction -- may
resolve to dismiss the action for insufficiency of evidence.
The necessary allegations in a Complaint for ejectment are set forth in
Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which reads thus:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the provisions of
the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or
building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee,
or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue
of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper
Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or
depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the
restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.
In the present case, the Complaint filed before the trial court on March 28,
1994, stated:
2. That [respondent] had been in lawful and peaceful possession of a
residential lot at Tulip Drive, Ecoland and Subdivision covered by TCT T-82338 of
the Registry of Deeds of Davao City being owner thereof, since June 11, 1981, until
the day and incident in the following paragraph hereof.

3. That on or about December 1, 1993, [petitioner] by means of strategy and

stealth, unlawfully entered and occupied a portion of said residential lot and
constructed what is now known as the Habagat Grill, thereby illegally depriving
[respondent] of the possession of the premises.[16]

Notably, petitioner alleged (1) prior possession, (2) deprivation thereof by

strategy and stealth, and (3) the date such unlawful deprivation started, which
was less than one year from the filing of the Complaint. Considering the
presence in the Complaint of all the necessary allegations, [17] the trial court
evidently acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
Date of Entry
Petitioner further contends that, as determined by the court of origin and
the regional trial court, respondent has not adduced preponderance of
evidence to prove that this case was filed within the one-year prescriptive
period.[18] Petitioner presented the testimony of a certain Samuel Ruiz and
offered the minutes of the hearings conducted by the Urban Planning and
Economic Development (UPED) to prove that the construction of the Habagat
Grill began in 1992.[19]
Respondent counters that the CA properly relied on the testimony of the
formers real property manager, Bienamer Garcia, as he had personal
knowledge of the facts.[20] On the other hand, the two trial courts allegedly
relied on the hearings conducted by the UPED in resolving that petitioner had
been in possession of the property since 1992. Respondent avers that those
hearings referred to a restaurant located 330 meters away, not to Habagat
Grill.[21]
The determination of the date of entry into the subject lot is a question of
fact. This Court has held in a long line of cases that the review of cases
brought before it via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to errors of law.
Findings of fact by the CA are conclusive except in a number of instances,
one of which is when its factual findings are contrary to those of the courts
below, as in the present case.[22]
The appellate court held that the minutes of the UPED hearing pertained
to matters relating to a different establishment, the Kawayan Restaurant.

Thus, the UPED minutes did not have any material bearing on the
resolution of the present case. Consequently, the determination of the date of
entry into the subject lot boils down to the appreciation of the testimonies of
Garcia and Ruiz.
[23]

Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side

is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other.
[24]
Where the evidence presented by one side is insufficient to ascertain the
claim, there is no preponderance of evidence.[25] In criminal cases in which the
quantum of evidence required is greater than in civil cases, the testimony of
only one witness -- if credible, straightforward, and worthy of belief -- is
sufficient to convict.[26] With more reason then, Garcias testimony, if clear and
positive, may be sufficient to establish respondents claim.
Under Section 1 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, among the facts and
circumstances to be considered by the court in determining which of the
presented evidence has superior weight is the witnesses means and
opportunity to know the facts to which they testify.[27]
The extent of such means and opportunity are determined by the following
considerations:
First, the Actor Rule. This rule maintains that a persons recollection of his own acts
and of the attendant circumstances is more definite and trustworthy than another
persons recollection of it, especially if it was an act done in the performance of a duty,
or if the other persons testimony is little more than an expression of opinion or
judgment. Apart from comparative tenacity of memory, the actor usually knows better
than any one else what he did or did not do, and his testimony is generally, but not
always, entitled to superior weight on that account. Thus, the execution and attestation
of a will or other legal document may be so far regarded as the act of the lawyer who
superintends the transactions and knows the formalities required by law, and his
testimony to the circumstances will generally outweigh that of a non-professional
witness.
The Actor Rule has been applied in a multitude of admiralty cases and any other cases
where a persons testimony concerning his own conduct conflicts with the testimony of
a non-participating observer or with inconclusive inferences from facts proved,

especially where the actor witness testifies to an act which the duties of his
employment required him to perform. But it said that the testimony of one who
evidently speaks rather to his custom than to his acts on the particular occasion will
hardly suffice to put him in the category of those who are specially favored by the
Actor Rule.
Second, the witness who had the greater interest in noticing and remembering the facts
is to be believed in preference to the one that had a slighter interest to observe or was
wholly indifferent. Interest has effect on the power of observation of witness. Thus, it
has been held that it was not remarkable that witnesses would not have observed
traces of blood along the route through which the deceased was taken because said
witnesses had no reason to suspect that the crime was not committed in the place
where the dead body was found. Similarly, the failure of witnesses to notice whether
or not there were houses at the place where they say the accused maltreat the offended
party was attributed as due to the fact that their attention was concentrated to what
they say, and they had no interest in knowing whether or not there were houses in or
around the place.
Third, the witness who gives reasons for the accuracy of his observations is preferred
to him who merely states the fact to be so, without adverting to any circumstances
showing that his attention was particularly called to it. Thus, the testimony of the crew
of a vessel that their light on the night of a collision was red, and nothing more, was
easily overcome by testimony of witnesses on the other vessel that the light was
white, not red, and that fact was a matter of remark among them when the light was
observed.
Fourth, the witness in a state of excitement, fear, or terror is generally incapable of
observing accurately. This is so because, if men perceive the most insignificant facts
in the most diverse ways, even when it is impossible that these facts should produce
on the observer any emotion preventing him from observing with absolute calm, even
much more will their impressions be diversified under circumstances calculated to
produce in the onlookers excitement, fear or terror.
Fifth, intoxication tends to impair accuracy both of observation and memory of a
witness.[28] (Citations omitted)

Based on the foregoing criteria, the testimony of Garcia must be given

greater weight, considering that it was his task -- as the real property manager
of respondent -- to know about matters involving the latters properties. In
contrast, it was not explained how Ruiz could be deemed competent and
credible in his testimony as to those matters.
The lower courts dismissed the testimony of Garcia -- regardless of how
clear, positive and straightforward it was -- solely on the ground that he was
not a disinterested witness. True, he was an employee of respondent;
relationship, however, will not by itself determine the true worth of ones
testimony.[29] The essential test is whether such testimony is disencumbered,
credible, and in accord with human experience.[30] It cannot easily be
dismissed by the mere invocation of the witness relationship with respondent.
In sum, we have no reason to disagree with the CAs evaluation that, being
credible, Garcias direct testimony was sufficient to establish respondents
claim that petitioner had entered the premises on December 1, 1993.
Second Issue:
Cause of Action
Petitioner avers that no cause of action was alleged by respondent, as
shown by the following circumstances: (1) the latters property was not
encroached upon by Habagat Grill, which had allegedly been constructed on a
portion of land owned by the City Government of Davao; [31] and (2) respondent
failed to prove that its predecessor-in-interest had prior possession of the
property.[32]
On the other hand, respondent argues that the trial court indiscriminately
ignored the Report of the survey team that had been constituted to determine
the exact location of Habagat Grill. Respondent further contends that the trial
court erred in taking judicial notice of the metes and bounds of the property
covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 20.[33] Although the lower court may
take judicial notice of PD No. 20, it may not do so in regard to the metes and
bounds of Times Beach. Neither, may it claim knowledge of the situational
relation between the land in question and Times Beach.

Location of the Property

We agree with respondent. Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain
facts which judges may properly take and act on without proof because they
already know them.[34] Its object is to save time, labor and expense in securing
and introducing evidence on matters that are not ordinarily capable of dispute
or actually bona fide disputed, and the tenor of which can safely be assumed
from the tribunals general knowledge or from a slight search on its part.
Indeed, municipal courts may take judicial notice of the municipal
ordinances in force in the municipality in which they sit.[35] Such notice,
however, is limited to what the law is and what it states. [36] As can be gleaned
from its discussions, the trial court took judicial notice of the existence of
Presidential Proclamation No. 20, which declared Times Beach a recreation
center. The MTC also took judicial notice of the location of the beach, which
was from the shoreline to the road towards the shoreline. On the basis of
these premises, the trial court resolved that the lot on which petitioners
restaurant was located should necessarily be inside Times Beach, which was
owned by the City of Davao. Hence, it was the City -- not respondent -- that
had a cause of action against petitioner. To arrive at this conclusion, the MTC
made its own estimate of the location of the metes and bounds of the property
mentioned by the law.[37]
The location of Habagat Grill cannot be resolved by merely taking judicial
notice of Presidential Proclamation No. 20; such location is precisely at the
core of the dispute in this case. Moreover, considering respondents allegation
that the supposed lot covered by the Ordinance has been lost due to
inundation by the sea, we cannot fathom how the trial court could have known
of the actual location of the metes and bounds of the subject lot.
Neither may the MTC take discretionary judicial notice under Section 2 of
Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, because the exact boundaries of the lot
covered by that law are not a matter of public knowledge capable of
unquestionable demonstration. Neither may these be known to judges
because of their judicial functions.

Hence, the CA was correct in disregarding the findings of the trial courts,
because they had erred in taking judicial notice of the exact metes and
bounds of the property. The appellate court aptly relied on the Report
submitted by the survey team that had been constituted by the trial court,
precisely for the purpose of determining the location of Habagat Grill in
relation to respondents lot.
Prior Possession
Finally, petitioner avers that respondent failed to prove that the latters
predecessor-in-interest had prior possession of the property.[38] Conversely,
respondent alleges that its predecessor was in prior physical possession of
the property as the registered owner thereof since June 11, 1981. [39] Again, we
rule for respondent.
There is only one issue in ejectment proceedings: who is entitled to
physical or material possession of the premises; that is, to possession de
facto, not possession de jure? Issues as to the right of possession or
ownership are not involved in the action; evidence thereon is not admissible,
except only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession.[40]
The two forms of ejectment suits -- forcible entry or unlawful detainer -may be distinguished from each other mainly by the fact that in forcible entry,
the plaintiffs must prove that they were in prior possession of the premises
until they were deprived thereof by the defendant; in unlawful detainer, the
plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession.[41]
Spouses Benitez v. CA[42] has held that possession can be acquired not
only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the
action of ones will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for
acquiring such right.
Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts to which the
law gives the force of acts of possession. Examples of these are donations,
succession, x x x execution and registration of public instruments, and the
inscription of possessory information titles.[43] For one to be considered in
possession, one need not have actual or physical occupation[44] of every

square inch of the property at all times. In the present case, prior possession
of the lot by respondents predecessor was sufficiently proven by evidence of
the execution and registration of public instruments and by the fact that the lot
was subject to its will from then until December 1, 1993, when petitioner
unlawfully entered the premises and deprived the former of possession
thereof.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the challenged Decision and
Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 148372. June 27, 2005]

CLARION
PRINTING
HOUSE,
INC.,
and
EULOGIO
YUTINGCO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Third Division) and
MICHELLE MICLAT, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

Respondent Michelle Miclat (Miclat) was employed on April 21, 1997 on a

probationary basis as marketing assistant with a monthly salary of P6,500.00
by petitioner Clarion Printing House (CLARION) owned by its co-petitioner
Eulogio Yutingco. At the time of her employment, she was not informed of the
standards that would qualify her as a regular employee.
On September 16, 1997, the EYCO Group of Companies of which
CLARION formed part filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) a Petition for the Declaration of Suspension of Payment, Formation and
Appointment of Rehabilitation Receiver/ Committee, Approval of Rehabilitation
Plan with Alternative Prayer for Liquidation and Dissolution of
Corporation[1] the pertinent allegations of which read:
xxx

5. The situation was that since all these companies were sister companies and were
operating under a unified and centralized management team, the financial
requirements of one company would normally be backed up or supported by one of
the available fundings from the other companies.
6. The expansion exhausted the cash availability of Nikon, NKI, and 2000 because
those fundings were absorbed by the requirements of NPI and EYCO Properties, Inc.
which were placed on real estate investments. However, at the time that those
investments and expansions were made, there was no cause for alarm because the
market situation was very bright and very promising, hence, the decision of the
management to implement the expansion.
7. The situation resulted in the cash position being spread thin. However, despite the
thin cash positioning, the management still was very positive and saw a very viable
proposition since the expansion and the additional investments would result in a
bigger real estate base which would be very credible collateral for further expansions.
It was envisioned that in the end, there would be bigger cash procurement which
would result in greater volume of production, profitability and other good results
based on the expectations and projections of the team itself.
8. Unfortunately, factors beyond the control and anticipation of the management came
into play which caught the petitioners flat-footed, such as:
a) The glut in the real estate market which has resulted in the bubble
economy for the real estate demand which right now has resulted in a
severe slow down in the sales of properties;
b) The economic interplay consisting of the inflation and the erratic chang
es in the peso-dollar exchange rate which precipitated a soaring
banking interest.
c) Labor problems that has precipitated adverse company effect on the media
and in the financial circuit.
d) Liberalization of the industry (GATT) which has resulted in flooding the
market with imported goods;
e) Other related adverse matters.

9. The inability of the EYCO Group of Companies to meet the obligations as they fall
due on the schedule agreed with the bank has now become a stark reality. The
situation therefore is that since the obligations would not be met within the scheduled
due date, complications and problems would definitely arise that would impair
and affect the operations of the entire conglomerate comprising the EYCO Group of
Companies.
xxx
12. By virtue of this development, there is a need for suspension of all accounts o[r]
obligations incurred by the petitioners in their separate and combined capacities in the
meantime that they are working for the rehabilitation of the companies that would
eventually redound to the benefit of these creditors.
13. The foregoing notwithstanding, however, the present combined financial condition
of the petitioners clearly indicates that their assets are more than enough to pay off the
credits.
x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)[2]
On September 19, 1997, the SEC issued an Order [3] the pertinent portions
of which read:
xxx
It appearing that the petition is sufficient in form and
substance, the corporate petitioners prayer for the creation of management or receivers
hip committee and creditors approval of the proposedRehabilitation Plan is hereby set
for hearing on October 22, 1997 at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon at the SICD, SEC
Bldg., EDSA, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City.
xxx
Finally, the petitioners are hereby enjoined from disposing any and all of their
properties in any manner, whatsoever, except in the ordinary course of business and
from making any payment outside of the legitimate business expenses during the
pendency of the proceedings and as a consequence of the filing of the Petition, all
actions, claims and proceedings against herein petitioners pending before any court,

tribunal, office board and/or commission are deemed SUSPENDED until further
orders from this Hearing Panel pursuant to the rulings of the Supreme Court in the
cases of RCBC v. IAC et al., 213 SCRA 830 and BPI v. CA, 229 SCRA 223.
(Underscoring supplied)
And on September 30, 1997, the SEC issued an Order[4] approving the
creation of an interim receiver for the EYCO Group of Companies.
On October 10, 1997, the EYCO Group of Companies issued to its
employees the following Memorandum:[5]
This is to formally announce the entry of the Interim Receiver Group represented by
SGV from today until October 22, 1997 or until further formal notice from the SEC.
This interim receiver groups function is to make sure that all assets of the company
are secured and accounted for both for the protection of us and our creditors.
Their function will involve familiarization with the different processes and controls in
our organization & keeping physical track of our assets like inventories and
machineries.
Anything that would be required from you would need to be in writing and duly
approved by the top management in order for us to maintain a clear line.
We trust that this temporary inconvenience will benefit all of us in the spirit of
goodwill. Lets extend our full cooperation to them.
Thank you. (Underscoring supplied)
On October 22, 1997, the Assistant Personnel Manager of CLARION
informed Miclat by telephone that her employment contract had been
terminated effective October 23, 1997. No reason was given for the
termination.
The following day or on October 23, 1997, on reporting for work, Miclat
was informed by the General Sales Manager that her termination was part of
CLARIONs cost-cutting measures.

On November 17, 1997, Miclat filed a complaint [6] for illegal dismissal
against CLARION and Yutingco (petitioners) before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC).
In the meantime, or on January 7, 1998, the EYCO Group of Companies
issued a Memorandum[7] addressed to company managers advising them of a
temporary partial shutdown of some operations of the Company commencing
on January 12, 1998 up to February 28, 1998:
In view of the numerous external factors such as slowdown in business and consumer
demand and consistent with Art. 286 of the Revised Labor Code of the Philippines, we
are constrained to go on a temporary partial shutdown of some operations of the
Company.
To implement this measure, please submit to my office through your local HRAD the
list of those whom you will require to report for work and their specific schedules.
Upon revalidation and approval of this list, all those not in the list will not receive any
pay nor will it be credited against their VL.
Please submit the listing no later than the morning of Friday, January 09, 1998.
Shutdown shall commence on January 12, 1998 up to February 28, 1998, unless
otherwise recalled at an earlier date.
Implementation of th[ese] directives will be done through your HRAD departments.
(Underscoring supplied)
In her Position Paper[8] dated March 3, 1998 filed before the labor arbiter,
Miclat claimed that she was never informed of the standards which would
qualify her as a regular employee. She asserted, however, that she qualified
as a regular employee since her immediate supervisor even submitted a
written recommendation in her favor before she was terminated without just or
authorized cause.
Respecting the alleged financial losses cited by petitioners as basis for her
termination, Miclat disputed the same, she contending that as marketing
assistant tasked to receive sales calls, produce sales reports and conduct

market surveys, a credible assessment on production and sales showed

otherwise.
In any event, Miclat claimed that assuming that her termination was
necessary, the manner in which it was carried out was illegal, no written notice
thereof having been served on her, and she merely learned of it only a day
before it became effective.
Additionally, Miclat claimed that she did not receive separation pay,
13th month pay and salaries for October 21, 22 and 23, 1997.
On the other hand, petitioners claimed that they could not be faulted for
retrenching some of its employees including Miclat, they drawing attention to
the EYCO Group of Companies being placed under receivership, notice of
which was sent to its supervisors and rank and file employees via a
Memorandum of July 21, 1997; that in the same memorandum, the EYCO
Group of Companies advised them of a scheme for voluntary separation from
employment with payment of severance pay; and that CLARION was only
adopting the LAST IN, FIRST OUT PRINCIPLE when it terminated Miclat who
was relatively new in the company.
Contending that Miclats termination was made with due process,
petitioners referred to the EYCO Group of Companies abovesaid July 21,
1997 Memorandum which, so they claimed, substantially complied with the
notice requirement, it having been issued more than one month before Miclat
was terminated on October 23, 1997.
By Decision[9] of November 23, 1998, the labor arbiter found that Miclat
was illegally dismissed and directed her reinstatement. The dispositive portion
of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering the respondent to reinstate complainant to her former or equivalent position
without loss of seniority rights and benefits and to pay her backwages, from the time
of dismissal to actual reinstatement, proportionate 13th month pay and two (2)
days salary computed as follows:

a.1) Backwages 10/23/97 to 11/30/98

P6,500.00 x 13.25 months = P86,125.00
a.2) Proportionate 13th month pay
1/12 of P86,125 = 7,177.08
b) 13th month pay - 1997
=P6,500 x 9.75 months/12 = 5,281.25
c) Two days salary
=P6,500/26 x 2 days = 500.00
TOTAL P 99,083.33
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to which
petitioners appealed, they argued that:[10]
1. [CLARION] was placed under receivership thereby evidencing the fact that it
sustained business losses to warrant the termination of [Miclat] from her
employment.
2. The dismissal of [Miclat] from her employment having been effected in
accordance with the law and in good faith, [Miclat] does not deserve to be
reinstated and paid backwages, 13th month pay and two (2) days salary.
And petitioners pointed out that CLARION had expressed its decision to
shutdown its operations by Memorandum[11] of January 7, 1998 to its company
managers.
Appended to petitioners appeal before the NLRC were photocopies of
their balance sheets from 1997 to November 1998 which they claimed to
unanimously show that x x x [petitioner] company experienced business
reverses which were made the basis x x x in retrenching x x x.[12]

By Resolution[13] of June 17, 1999, the NLRC affirmed the labor arbiters
decision. The pertinent portion of the NLRC Resolution reads:
There are three (3) valid requisites for valid retrenchment: (1) the retrenchment is
necessary to prevent losses and such losses are proven; (2) written notices to the
employees and to the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month
prior to the intended date of retrenchment; and (3) payment of separation pay
equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher. The two notices are mandatory. If the notice to the workers is
later than the notices sent to DOLE, the date of termination should be at least one
month from the date of notice to the workers.
In Lopez Sugar Corporation v. Federation of Free Workers Philippine Labor Union
Association (PLUA-NACUSIP) and National Labor Relations Commission, the
Supreme Court had the occasion to set forth four standards which would justify
retrenchment, being, firstly, - the losses expected should be substantial and not merely
de minimis in extent. If the loss purportedly sought to be forestalled by retrenchment
is clearly shown to be insubstantial and inconsequential in character, the bona fide
nature of the retrenchment would appear to be seriously in question; secondly, - the
substantial loss apprehended must be reasonably imminent, as such imminence can be
perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer. There should, in other words,
be a certain degree of urgency for the retrenchment, which is after all a drastic course
with serious consequences for the livelihood of the employees retired or otherwise
laid-off; thirdly, - because of the consequential nature of retrenchment, it must be
reasonably necessary and likely to effectively prevent the expected losses. The
employer should have taken other measures prior or parallel to retrenchment to
forestall losses, i.e., cut other cost than labor costs; and lastly, - the alleged losses if
already realized and the expected imminent losses sought to be forestalled, must be
proven by sufficient and convincing evidence.
The records show that these requirements were not substantially complied with.
And proofs presented by respondents-appellants were short of being sufficient and
convincing to justify valid retrenchment. Their position must therefore fail. The
reason is simple. Evidences on record presented fall short of the requirement of
substantial, sufficient and convincing evidence to persuade this Commission to
declare the validity of retrenchment espoused by respondents-appellants. The petition
before the Securit[ies] and Exchange Commission for suspension of payment does not

prove anything to come within the bounds of justifying retrenchment. In fact, the
petition itself lends credence to the fact that retrenchment was not actually reinstated
under the circumstances prevailing when it stated, The foregoing notwithstanding,
however, the present combined financial condition of the petitioners clearly indicates
that their assets are more than enough to pay off the credits. Verily, reading further
into the petition, We are not ready to disregard the fact that the petition merely seeks
to suspend payments of their obligation from creditor banks and other financing
institutions, and not because of imminent substantial financial loss. On this account,
We take note of paragraph 7 of the petition which stated: The situation resulted in
cash position being spread thin. However, despite the thin cash positioning, the
management was very positive and saw a very viable proposition since the expansion
and the additional investments would result in a bigger real estate base which would
be a very credible collateral for further expansions. It was envisioned that in the end,
there would a bigger cash procurement which would result in greater volume of
production, profitability and other good results based on the expectations and
projections of the team itself.Admittedly, this does not create a picture of retrenchable
business atmosphere pursuant to Article 283 of the Labor Code.
We cannot disregard the fact that respondent-appellants failed in almost all of the
criteria set by law and jurisprudence in justifying valid retrenchment. The two (2)
mandatory notices were violated. The supposed notice to the DOLE (Annex 4, List of
Employees on Shutdown) is of no moment, the same having no bearing in this case.
Herein complainant-appellee was not even listed therein and the date of receipt by
DOLE, that is, January 18, 1999, was way out of time in relation to this case. And no
proof was adduced to evidence cost cutting measures, to say the least. Nor was there
proof shown that separation pay had been awarded to complainant-appellee.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and finding no grave abuse of discretion on the
findings of Labor Arbiter Nieves V. De Castro, the appeal is DENIED for lack of
merit.
The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto. (Italics in the original;
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the NLRC resolution having
been denied by Resolution[14] of July 29, 1999, petitioners filed a petition

for certiorari[15] before the Court of Appeals (CA) raising the following
arguments:
1. PETITIONER CLARION WAS PLACED UNDER RECEIVERSHIP
THEREBY EVIDENCING THE FACT THAT IT SUSTAINED BUSINESS
LOSSES TO WARRANT THE TERMINATION OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT MICLAT FROM HER EMPLOYMENT.
2. THE DISMISSAL OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT MICLAT FROM HER
EMPLOYMENT HAVING BEEN EFFECTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE LAW AND IN GOOD FAITH, PRIVATE RESPONDENT DOES NOT
DESERVE TO BE REINSTATED AND PAID BACKWAGES, 13TH MONTH
PAY AND TWO (2) DAYS SALARY. (Underscoring supplied)
By Decision[16] of November 24, 2000, the CA sustained the resolutions of
the NLRC in this wise:
In the instant case, Clarion failed to prove its ground for retrenchment as well as
compliance with the mandated procedure of furnishing the employee and the
Department of Labor and Employment (hereafter, DOLE) with one (1) month written
notice and payment of separation pay to the employee. Clarions failure to discharge its
burden of proof is evident from the following instances:
First, Clarion presented no evidence whatsoever before the Labor Arbiter. To prove
serious business losses, Clarion presented its 1997 and 1998 financial statements and
the SEC Order for the Creation of an Interim Receiver, for
the first time on appeal before the NLRC. The Supreme Court has consistently
disallowed such practice unless the party making the belated submission of evidence
had satisfactorily explained the delay. In the instant case, said financial statements are
not admissible in evidence due to Clarions failure to explain the delay.
Second, even if such financial statements were admitted in evidence, they would not
alter the outcome of the case as statements have weak probative value. The required
method of proof in such case is the presentation of financial statements prepared by
independent auditors and not merely by company accountants. Again, petitioner failed
in this regard.

Third, even audited financial statements are not enough. The employer must present
the statement for the year immediately preceding the year the employee was
retrenched, which Clarion failed to do in the instant case, to prove not only the fact of
business losses but more importantly, the fact that such losses were substantial,
continuing and without immediate prospect of abatement. Hence, neither the NLRC
nor the courts must blindly accept such audited financial statements. They must
examine and make inferences from the data presented to establish business losses.
Furthermore, they must be cautioned by the fact that sliding incomes or decreasing
gross revenues alone are not necessarily business losses within the meaning of Art.
283 since in the nature of things, the possibility of incurring losses is constantly
present in business operations.
Last, even if business losses were indeed sufficiently proven, the employer must
still prove that retrenchment was resorted to only after less drastic measures such as
the reduction of both management and rank-and-file bonuses and salaries, going on
reduced time, improving manufacturing efficiency, reduction of marketing and
advertising costs, faster collection of customer accounts, reduction of raw materials
investment and others, have been tried and found wanting. Again, petitioner failed to
prove the exhaustion of less drastic measures short of retrenchment as it had failed
with the other requisites.
It is interesting to note that Miclat started as a probationary employee on 21 April
1997. There being no stipulation to the contrary, her probation period had a duration
of six (6) months from her date of employment. Thus, after the end of the probation
period on 22 October 1997, she became a regular employee as of 23 October
1997 since she was allowed to work after the end of said period. It is also clear that
her probationary employment was not terminated at the end of the probation period on
the ground that the employee failed to qualify in accordance with reasonable standards
made known to her at the time of engagement.
However, 23 October 1997 was also the day of Miclats termination from employment
on the ground of retrenchment. Thus, we have a bizarre situation when the first day of
an employees regular employment was also the day of her termination. However, this
is entirely possible, as had in fact happened in the instant case, where the employers
basis for termination is Art. 288, instead of Art. 281 of the Labor Code. If petitioner
terminated Miclat with Art. 281 in mind, it would have been too late to present such
theory at this stage and it would have been equally devastating for petitioner had it

done so because no evidence exists to show that Miclat failed to qualify with
petitioners standards for regularization. Failure to discharge its burden of proof would
still be petitioners undoing.
Whichever way We examine the case, the conclusion is the
same Miclat was illegally dismissed. Consequently, reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and full backwages from date of dismissal on 23 October 1997 until
actual reinstatement is in order.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the 29 July 1999 and 7
June 1999 resolutions of the NLRC are SUSTAINED. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
By Resolution[17] of May 23, 2001, the CA denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the decision.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari, petitioners contending
that:
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE ASSAILED DECISIONS OF
HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMISSION:
A. HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT MICLAT WAS ILLEGALLY
DISMISSED; and
B. ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT
MICLAT TO HER FORMER OR EQUIVALENT POSITION WITHOUT
LOSS OF SENIORITY RIGHTS AND BENEFITS AND PAYMENT OF
BACKWAGES, 1[3]TH MONTH PAY AND TWO (2) DAYS SALARY.[18]
Petitioners argue that the conclusion of the CA that no sufficient proof of
financial losses on the part of CLARION was adduced is patently erroneous,
given the serious business reverses it had gravely suffered as reflected in its
financial statements/balance sheets, thereby leaving as its only option the
retrenchment of its employees including Miclat.[19]

Petitioners further argue that when a company is under receivership and a

receiver is appointed to take control of its management and corporate affairs,
one of the evident reasons is to prevent further losses of said company and
protect its remaining assets from being dissipated; and that the submission of
financial reports/statements prepared by independent auditors had been
rendered moot and academic, the company having shutdown its operations
and having been placed under receivership by the SEC due to its inability to
pay or comply with its obligations.[20]
Respecting the CAs holding that the financial statements CLARION
submitted for the first time on appeal before the NLRC are inadmissible in
evidence due to its failure to explain the delay in the submission thereof,
petitioners lament the CAs failure to consider that technical rules on evidence
prevailing in the courts are not controlling in proceedings before the NLRC
which may consider evidence such as documents and affidavits submitted by
the parties for the first time on appeal.[21]
As to the CAs holding that CLARION failed to prove the exhaustion of less
drastic measures short of retrenching, petitioners advance that prior to the
termination of Miclat, CLARION, together with the other companies under the
EYCO Group of Companies, was placed under receivership during which
drastic measures to continue business operations of the company and
eventually rehabilitate itself were implemented.[22]
Denying Miclats entitlement to backwages, petitioners proffer that her
dismissal rested upon a valid and authorized cause. And petitioners assail as
grossly erroneous the award of 13thmonth pay to Miclat, she not having sought
it and, therefore, there was no jurisdiction to award the same.[23]
The petition is partly meritorious.
Contrary to the CAs ruling, petitioners could present evidence for the first
time on appeal to the NLRC. It is well-settled that the NLRC is not precluded
from receiving evidence, even for the first time on appeal, because technical
rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases.

The settled rule is that the NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence on appeal
as technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases. In fact, labor officials are
mandated by the Labor Code to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the
facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or
procedure, all in the interest of due process. Thus, in Lawin Security Services v.
NLRC, and Bristol Laboratories Employees Association-DFA v. NLRC, we held that
even if the evidence was not submitted to the labor arbiter, the fact that it was duly
introduced on appeal to the NLRC is enough basis for the latter to be more judicious
in admitting the same, instead of falling back on the mere technicality that said
evidence can no longer be considered on appeal. Certainly, the first course of action
would be more consistent with equity and the basic notions of fairness. (Italics in the
original; citations omitted)[24]
It is likewise well-settled that for retrenchment to be justified, any claim of
actual or potential business losses must satisfy the following standards: (1)
the losses are substantial and notde minimis; (2) the losses are actual or
reasonably imminent; (3) the retrenchment is reasonably necessary and is
likely to be effective in preventing expected losses; and (4) the alleged losses,
if already incurred, or the expected imminent losses sought to be forestalled,
are proven by sufficient and convincing evidence.[25] And it is the employer
who has the onus of proving the presence of these standards.
Sections 5 and 6 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A (P.D. 902-A)
(REORGANIZATION OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
WITH ADDITIONAL POWERS AND PLACING SAID AGENCY UNDER THE
ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT),
[26]
as amended, read:
SEC. 5 In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions of THE SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION over corporations, partnerships and other forms
of associations registered with it as expressly granted under existing laws and
decrees, it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
involving:
xxx

(d) Petitions of corporations, partnerships or associations declared in the state of

suspension of payments in cases where the corporation, partnership or
association possesses sufficient property to cover all debts but foresees the
impossibility of meeting them when they respectively fall due or in cases where
the corporation, partnership, association has no sufficient assets to cover its
liabilities, but is under the management of a Rehabilitation Receiver or
Management Committee created pursuant to this Decree.
SEC. 6. In order to effectively exercise such jurisdiction, the Commission shall
possess the following powers:
xxx
(c) To appoint one or more receivers of the property, real and personal, which is the
subject of the action pending before the Commission in accordance with the
provisions of the Rules of Court in such other cases whenever necessary in order to
preserve the rights of the parties-litigants and/or protect the interest of the investing
public and creditors: Provided, however, That the Commission may in
appropriate cases, appoint a rehabilitation receiver of corporations, partnerships
or other associations not supervised or regulated by other government agencies
who shall have, in addition to powers of the regular receiver under the provisions
of the Rules of Court, such functions and powers as are provided for in the
succeeding paragraph (d) hereof: x x x
(d) To create and appoint a management committee, board or body upon petition or
motu propio to undertake the management of corporations, partnership or other
associations not supervised or regulated by other government agencies in appropriate
cases when there is imminent danger of dissipation, loss, wastage or destruction
of assets or other properties or paralization of business operations of such
corporations or entities which may be prejudicial to the interest of minority
stockholders, parties-litigants of the general public: x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied).
From the above-quoted provisions of P.D. No. 902-A, as amended, the
appointment of a receiver or management committee by the SEC
presupposes a finding that, inter alia, a company possesses sufficient
property to cover all its debts but foresees the impossibility of meeting them

when they respectively fall due and there is imminent danger of dissipation,
loss, wastage or destruction of assets of other properties or paralization of
business operations.
That the SEC, mandated by law to have regulatory functions over
corporations, partnerships or associations,[27] appointed an interim receiver for
the EYCO Group of Companies on its petition in light of, as quoted above, the
therein enumerated factors beyond the control and anticipation of the
management rendering it unable to meet its obligation as they fall due, and
thus resulting to complications and problems . . . to arise that would impair
and affect [its] operations . . . shows that CLARION, together with the other
member-companies of the EYCO Group of Companies, was suffering
business reverses justifying, among other things, the retrenchment of its
employees.
This Court in fact takes judicial notice of the Decision [28] of the Court of
Appeals dated June 11, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 55208, Nikon Industrial
Corp., Nikolite Industrial Corp., et al.[including CLARION], otherwise known
as the EYCO Group of Companies v. Philippine National Bank, Solidbank
Corporation, et al., collectively known and referred as the Consortium of
Creditor Banks, which was elevated to this Court via Petition for Certiorari and
docketed as G.R. No. 145977, but which petition this Court dismissed by
Resolution dated May 3, 2005:
Considering the joint manifestation and motion to dismiss of petitioners and
respondents dated February 24, 2003, stating that the parties have reached a final and
comprehensive settlement of all the claims and counterclaims subject matter of the
case and accordingly, agreed to the dismissal of the petition for certiorari, the Court
Resolved to DISMISS the petition for certiorari (Underscoring supplied).
The parties in G.R. No. 145977 having sought, and this Court having
granted, the dismissal of the appeal of the therein petitioners including
CLARION, the CA decision which affirmed in toto the September 14, 1999
Order of the SEC, the dispositive portion of which SEC Order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is as it is hereby, granted and the
Order dated 18 December 1998 is set aside. The Petition to be Declared in State

of Suspension of payments is herebydisapproved and the SAC Plan terminated.

Consequently, all committee, conservator/ receivers created pursuant to said Order are
dissolved and discharged and all acts and orders issued therein are vacated.
The Commission, likewise, orders the liquidation and dissolution of the appellee
corporations. The case is hereby remanded to the hearing panel below for that
purpose.
x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
has now become final and executory. Ergo, the SECs disapproval of the
EYCO Group of Companies Petition for the Declaration of Suspension of
Payment . . . and the order for the liquidation and dissolution of these
companies including CLARION, must be deemed to have been unassailed.
That judicial notice can be taken of the above-said case of Nikon Industrial
Corp. et al. v. PNB et al., there should be no doubt.
As provided in Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice,
without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states,
their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of
nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of thelegislative,
executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure
of time, and the geographical divisions. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
which Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras interpreted as follows:
A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of facts
established in prior proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity of its own
records of another case between the same parties, of the files of related cases in the
same court, and of public records on file in the same court. In addition judicial
notice will be taken of the record, pleadings or judgment of a case in another court
between the same parties or involving one of the same parties, as well as of the record
of another case between different parties in the same court. Judicial notice will also be
taken of court personnel. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) [29]

In fine, CLARIONs claim that at the time it terminated Miclat it was

experiencing business reverses gains more light from the SECs disapproval of
the EYCO Group of Companies petition to be declared in state of suspension
of payment, filed before Miclats termination, and of the SECs
consequent order for the group of companies dissolution and liquidation.
This Courts finding that Miclats termination was justified notwithstanding,
since at the time she was hired on probationary basis she was not informed of
the standards that would qualify her as a regular employee, under Section 6,
Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code which reads:
SEC. 6. Probationary employment. There is probationary employment where the
employee, upon his engagement, is made to undergo a trial period during which the
employer determines his fitness to qualify for regular employment, based on
reasonable standards made known to him at the time of engagement.
Probationary employment shall be governed by the following rules:
xxx
(d) In all cases of probationary employment, the employer shall make known to
the employee the standards under which he will qualify as a regular employee at
the time of his engagement. Where no standards are made known to the employee at
that time, he shall be deemed a regular employee (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied),
she was deemed to have been hired from day one as a regular employee.[30]
CLARION, however, failed to comply with the notice requirement provided
for in Article 283 of the Labor Code, to wit:
ART. 283. CLOSURE OF ESTABLISHMENT AND REDUCTION OF
PERSONNEL. The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee
due to the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent
losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking
unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by
serving a written notice on the worker and the Ministry of Labor and

Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. x x x
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
This Court thus deems it proper to award the amount equivalent to Miclats
one (1) month salary of P6,500.00 as nominal damages to deter employers
from future violations of the statutory due process rights of employees. [31]
Since Article 283 of the Labor Code also provides that [i]n case of
retrenchment to prevent losses, . . . the separation pay shall be equivalent to
one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher. . . , [a] fraction of at least six (6) months [being]
considered one (1) whole year, this Court holds that Miclat is entitled to
separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary.
As to Miclats entitlement to 13th month pay, paragraph 6 of the Revised
Guidelines on the 13th Month Pay Law provides:
6. 13th Month Pay of Resigned or Separated Employee
An employee x x x whose services were terminated any time before the time for
payment of the 13th month pay is entitled to this monetary benefit in proportion to the
length of time he worked during the calendar year up to the time of his resignation or
termination from the service. Thus if he worked only from January up to September
his proportionate 13th month pay shall be equivalent to 1/12 of his total basic salary he
earned during that period.
xxx
Having worked at CLARION for six months, Miclats 13 th month pay should
be computed as follows:
(Monthly Salary x 6 ) / 12 = Proportionate 13th month pay
(P6,500.00 x 6) / 12 = P3,250.00
With the appointment of a management receiver in September 1997,
however, all claims and proceedings against CLARION, including labor
claims,[32] were deemed suspended during the existence of the receivership.

The labor arbiter, the NLRC, as well as the CA should not have proceeded
to resolve respondents complaint for illegal dismissal and should instead have
directed respondent to lodge her claim before the then duly-appointed
receiver of CLARION. To still require respondent, however, at this time to refile
her labor claim against CLARION under the peculiar circumstances of the
case that 8 years have lapsed since her termination and that all the
arguments and defenses of both parties were already ventilated before the
labor arbiter, NLRC and the CA; and that CLARION is already in the course of
liquidation this Court deems it most expedient and advantageous for both
parties that CLARIONs liability be determined with finality, instead of still
requiring respondent to lodge her claim at this time before the liquidators of
CLARION which would just entail a mere reiteration of what has been already
argued and pleaded. Furthermore, it would be in the best interest of the other
creditors of CLARION that claims against the company be finally settled and
determined so as to further expedite the liquidation proceedings. For the
lesser number of claims to be proved, the sooner the claims of all creditors of
CLARION are processed and settled.
[33]

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals November 24, 2000 Decision,

together with its May 23, 2001 Resolution, is SET ASIDE and another
rendered declaring the legality of the dismissal of respondent, Michelle Miclat.
Petitioners are ORDERED, however, to PAY her the following in accordance
with the foregoing discussions:
1) P6,500.00 as nominal damages for non-compliance with statutory due
process;
2) P6,500.00 as separation pay; and
3) P3,250.00 as 13th month pay.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the SEC Hearing Panel charged
with the liquidation and dissolution of petitioner corporation for inclusion, in the
list of claims of its creditors, respondent Michelle Miclats claims, to be
satisfied in accordance with Article 110 of the Labor Code in relation to the
Civil Code provisions on Concurrence and Preference of Credits.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R.

No. 152807. August 12, 2003]

HEIRS OF LOURDES SAEZ SABANPAN: BERNARDO S. SABANPAN,

RENE S. SABANPAN, DANILO S. SABANPAN and THELMA S.
CHU; HEIRS OF ADOLFO SAEZ: MA. LUISA SAEZ TAPIZ, MA.
VICTORIA SAEZ LAPITAN, MA. BELEN SAEZ and EMMANUEL
SAEZ; and HEIRS OF CRISTINA SAEZ GUTIERREZ: ROY SAEZ
GUTIERREZ and LUIS SAEZ JR., petitioners, vs. ALBERTO C.
COMORPOSA, HERDIN C. COMORPOSA, OFELIA C. ARIEGO,
REMEDIOS COMORPOSA, VIRGILIO A. LARIEGO, BELINDA M.
COMORPOSA and ISABELITA H. COMORPOSA, respondents.
[1]

1-a

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The admissibility of evidence should be distinguished from its probative

value. Just because a piece of evidence is admitted does not ipso facto mean
that it conclusively proves the fact in dispute.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to set aside the August 7, 2001 Decision and the February 27, 2002
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 60645. The
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:
[2]

[3]

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the
Decision dated 22 June 2000 rendered by Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court of
Digos, Davao del Sur, REVERSING andSETTING ASIDE the Decision of the
Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Su[r].
[4]

The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

[5]

The Facts
The CA summarized the factual antecedents of the case as follows:
A [C]omplaint for unlawful detainer with damages was filed by [petitioners] against
[respondents] before the Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur Municipal Trial Court.
The [C]omplaint alleged that Marcos Saez was the lawful and actual possessor of Lot
No. 845, Land 275 located at Darong, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur with an area of 1.2
hectares. In 1960, he died leaving all his heirs, his children and grandchildren.
In 1965, Francisco Comorposa who was working in the land of Oboza was terminated
from his job. The termination of his employment caused a problem in relocating his
house. Being a close family friend of [Marcos] Saez, Francisco Comorposa
approached the late Marcos Saezs son, [Adolfo] Saez, the husband of Gloria Leano
Saez, about his problem. Out of pity and for humanitarian consideration, Adolfo
allowed Francisco Comorposa to occupy the land of Marcos Saez. Hence, his nipa hut
was carried by his neighbors and transferred to a portion of the land subject matter of
this case. Such transfer was witnessed by several people, among them, Gloria Leano
and Noel Oboza. Francisco Comorposa occupied a portion of Marcos Saez property
without paying any rental.
Francisco Comorposa left for Hawaii, U.S.A. He was succeeded in his possession by
the respondents who likewise did not pay any rental and are occupying the premises
through petitioners tolerance.
On 7 May 1998, a formal demand was made upon the respondents to vacate the
premises but the latter refused to vacate the same and claimed that they [were] the
legitimate claimants and the actual and lawful possessor[s] of the premises. A
[C]omplaint was filed with the barangay office of Sta. Cruz[,] Davao del Sur, but the
parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement. Thus, the corresponding Certificate
to File Action was issued by the said barangay and an action for unlawful detainer was
filed by petitioners against respondents.
Respondents, in their Answer, denied the material allegations of the [C]omplaint and
alleged that they entered and occupied the premises in their own right as true, valid
and lawful claimants, possessors and owners of the said lot way back in 1960 and up
to the present time; that they have acquired just and valid ownership and possession of

the premises by ordinary or extraordinary prescription, and that the Regional Director
of the DENR, Region XI has already upheld their possession over the land in question
when it ruled that they [were] the rightful claimants and possessors and [were],
therefore, entitled to the issuance of a title.
The Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur rendered judgment in favor of
petitioners but the Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, on appeal, reversed
and set aside the said decision. x x x
[6]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Affirming the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the CA upheld the right of
respondents as claimants and possessors. The appellate court held that -although not yet final -- the Order issued by the regional executive director of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) remained in
full force and effect, unless declared null and void. The CA added that the
Certification issued by the DENRs community environment and natural
resources (CENR) officer was proof that when the cadastral survey was
conducted, the land was still alienable and was not yet allocated to any
person.
According to the CA, respondents had the better right to possess alienable
and disposable land of the public domain, because they have suffiently proven
their actual, physical, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous and
uninterrupted possession thereof since 1960. The appellate court deemed as
self-serving, and therefore incredible, the Affidavits executed by Gloria Leano
Saez, Noel Oboza and Paulina Paran.
Hence, this Petition.

[7]

The Issue
In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues for the Courts
consideration:
I

Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and [err] in sustaining the ruling
of the Regional Trial Court giving credence to the Order dated 2 April 1998 issued by
the regional executive director?
II

Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and err in sustaining the
Regional Trial Courts ruling giving weight to the CENR Officers Certification, which
only bears the facsimile of the alleged signature of a certain Jose F. Tagorda and,
[worse], it is a new matter raised for the first time on appeal?
III

Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and err in holding that the land
subject matter of this case has been acquired by means of adverse possession and
prescription?
IV

Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion, and err in declaring that, neither
is there error on the part of the Regional Trial Court, when it did not give importance
to the affidavits by Gloria Leano Saez, Noel [Oboza], and Paulina Paran for allegedly
being self serving?
[8]

To facilitate the discussion, the fourth and the third issues shall be
discussed in reverse sequence.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
The DENR Order of April 2, 1998
Petitioners claim that the reliance of the CA upon the April 2, 1998 Order
issued by the regional director of the DENR was erroneous. The reason was
that the Order, which had upheld the claim of respondents, was supposedly
not yet final and executory. Another Order dated August 23, 1999, issued
[9]

later by the DENR regional director, allegedly held in abeyance the effectivity
of the earlier one.
Under the Public Land Act, the management and the disposition of public
land is under the primary control of the director of lands (now the director of
the Lands Management Bureau or LMB), subject to review by the DENR
secretary. As a rule, then, courts have no jurisdiction to intrude upon matters
properly falling within the powers of the LMB.
[10]

[11]

[12]

[13]

The powers given to the LMB and the DENR to alienate and dispose of
public land does not, however, divest regular courts of jurisdiction over
possessory actions instituted by occupants or applicants to protect their
respective possessions and occupations. The power to determine who has
actual physical possession or occupation of public land and who has the
better right of possession over it remains with the courts. But once the DENR
has decided, particularly through the grant of a homestead patent and the
issuance of a certificate of title, its decision on these points will normally
prevail.
[14]

[15]

[16]

Therefore, while the issue as to who among the parties are entitled to a
piece of public land remains pending with the DENR, the question of recovery
of possession of the disputed property is a matter that may be addressed to
the courts.
Second Issue:
CENR Officers Certification
Petitioners contend that the CENR Certification dated July 22, 1997 is a
sham document, because the signature of the CENR officer is a mere
facsimile. In support of their argument, they cite Garvida v. Sales Jr. and
argue that the Certification is a new matter being raised by respondents for
the first time on appeal.
[17]

We are not persuaded.

In Garvida, the Court held:

A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and

reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one
elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified
amount of electric current. x x x
[18]

Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at
best exact copies. As such, they are not admissible in evidence, as there is no
way of determining whether they are genuine or authentic.
[19]

The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a

facsimile of the signature of CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda. The facsimile
referred to is not the same as that which is alluded to in Garvida. The one
mentioned here refers to a facsimile signature, which is defined as a signature
produced by mechanical means but recognized as valid in banking, financial,
and business transactions.
[20]

Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the Certification. In fact, the
DENR regional director has acknowledged and used it as reference in his
Order dated April 2, 1998:
x x x. CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda, in a CERTIFICATION dated 22 July 1997, certified
among others, that: x x x per records available in his Office, x x x the controverted lot
x x x was not allocated to any personx x x.
[21]

If the Certification were a sham as petitioner claims, then the regional

director would not have used it as reference in his Order. Instead, he would
have either verified it or directed the CENR officer to take the appropriate
action, as the latter was under the formers direct control and supervision.
Petitioners claim that the Certification was raised for the first time on
appeal is incorrect. As early as the pretrial conference at the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC), the CENR Certification had already been marked as evidence
for respondents as stated in the Pre-trial Order. The Certification was not
formally offered, however, because respondents had not been able to file their
position paper.
[22]

Neither the rules of procedure nor jurisprudence would sanction the

admission of evidence that has not been formally offered during the trial. But
this evidentiary rule is applicable only to ordinary trials, not to cases covered
by the rule on summary procedure -- cases in which no full-blown trial is held.
[23]

[24]

[25]

Third Issue:
Affidavit of Petitioners Witnesses
Petitioners assert that the CA erred in disregarding the Affidavits of their
witnesses, insisting that the Rule on Summary Procedure authorizes the use
of affidavits. They also claim that the failure of respondents to file their position
paper and counter-affidavits before the MTC amounts to an admission by
silence.
The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative
value. Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of
evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to the
question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus, a
particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight
depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of
evidence.
[26]

[27]

While in summary proceedings affidavits are admissible as the witnesses

respective testimonies, the failure of the adverse party to reply does not ipso
facto render the facts, set forth therein, duly proven. Petitioners still bear the
burden of proving their cause of action, because they are the ones asserting
an affirmative relief.
[28]

Fourth Issue:
Defense of Prescription
Petitioners claim that the court a quo erred in upholding the defense of
prescription proffered by respondents. It is the formers contention that since
the latters possession of the land was merely being tolerated, there was no
basis for the claim of prescription. We disagree.

For the Court to uphold the contention of petitioners, they have first to
prove that the possession of respondents was by mere tolerance. The only
pieces of evidence submitted by the former to support their claim were a
technical description and a vicinity map drawn in accordance with the survey
dated May 22, 1936. Both of these were discredited by the CENR
Certification, which indicated that the contested lot had not yet been allocated
to any person when the survey was conducted. The testimony of petitioners
witnesses alone cannot prevail over respondents continued and uninterrupted
possession of the subject lot for a considerable length of time.
[29]

[30]

Furthermore, this is an issue of fact that cannot, as a rule, be raised in a

petition for review under Rule 45.
[31]

WHEREFORE,
the
Petition
is DENIED and
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

the

assailed