FERNANDO LOPEZ, petitioner,

vs.
GERARDO ROXAS and PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL, respondents.
Vicente Francisco for petitioner.
Sycip and Salazar for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Petitioner Fernando Lopez and respondent Gerardo Roxas were the main
contenders for the Office of Vice-President of the Philippines in the general
elections held on November 9, 1965. By Resolution No. 2, approved on
December 17, 1965, the two Houses of Congress, in joint session assembled as
the board charged with the duty to canvass the votes then cast for President and
Vice President of the Philippines, proclaimed petitioner Fernando Lopez elected
to the latter office with 3,531,550 votes, or a plurality of 26,724 votes over his
closest opponent, respondent Gerardo M. Roxas, in whose favor 3,504,826 votes
had been tallied, according to said resolution. On January 5, 1966, respondent
filed, with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, Election Protest No. 2, contesting
the election of petitioner herein as Vice-President of the Philippines, upon the
ground that it was not he, but said respondent, who had obtained the largest
number of votes for said office.
On February 22, 1966, petitioner Lopez instituted in the Supreme Court the
present original action, for prohibition with preliminary injunction, against
respondent Roxas, to prevent the Presidential Electoral Tribunal from hearing
and deciding the aforementioned election contest, upon the ground that Republic
Act No. 1793, creating said Tribunal, is "unconstitutional," and that, "all
proceedings taken by it are a nullity."
Petitioner's contention is predicated upon the ground, that Congress may not, by
law, authorize an election contest for President and Vice-President, the
Constitution being silent thereon; that such contest tends to nullify the
constitutional authority of Congress to proclaim the candidates elected for
President and Vice-President; that the recount of votes by the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal, as an incident of an election contest, is inconsistent with the
exclusive power of Congress to canvass the election returns for the President
and the Vice-President; that no amendment to the Constitution providing for an
election protest involving the office of President and Vice-President has been
adopted, despite the constitutional amendment governing election contests for

Members of Congress; that the tenure of the President and the Vice-President is
fixed by the Constitution and cannot be abridged by an Act of Congress, like
Republic Act No. 1793; that said Act has the effect of amending the Constitution,
in that it permits the Presidential Electoral Tribunal to review the congressional
proclamation of the president-elect and the vice-president-elect; that the
constitutional convention had rejected the original plan to include in the
Constitution a provision authorizing election contest affecting the president-elect
and the vice-president-elect before an electoral commission; that the people
understood the Constitution to authorize election contests only for Members of
Congress, not for President and Vice-President, and, in interpreting the
Constitution, the people's intent is paramount; that it is illegal for Justices of the
Supreme Court to sit as members of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, since the
decisions thereof are appealable to the Supreme Court on questions of law; that
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is a court inferior to the Supreme Court; and
that Congress cannot by legislation appoint in effect the members of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
Pursuant to the Constitution, "the Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law.1
This provision vests in the judicial branch of the government, not
merely some specified or limited judicial power, but "the" judicial power under our
political system, and, accordingly, the entirety or "all" of said power, except, only,
so much as the Constitution confers upon some other agency, such as the power
to "judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications" of
members of the Senate and those of the House of Representatives which is
vested by the fundamental law solely in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the
House Electoral Tribunal, respectively.2
Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes
involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice
or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights.3 The proper exercise of said
authority requires legislative action: (1) defining such enforceable and
demandable rights and/or prescribing remedies for violations thereof; and (2)
determining the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide said controversies or
disputes, in the first instance and/or on appeal. For this reason, the Constitution
ordains that "Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion
the jurisdiction of the various courts," subject to the limitations set forth in the
fundamental law.4

Prior to the approval of Republic Act No. 1793, a defeated candidate for
president or vice-president, who believe that he was the candidate who obtained
the largest number of votes for either office, despite the proclamation by
Congress of another candidate as the president-elect or vice-president-elect,
had no legal right to demand by election protest a recount of the votes cast for
the office concerned, to establish his right thereto. As a consequence,
controversies or disputes on this matter were not justiciable.5
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1793, which provides that:
There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal ... which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the president-elect and the vice-president-elect of
the Philippines.
has the effect of giving said defeated candidate the legal right to contest judicially
the election of the President-elect or Vice-President-elect and to demand a
recount of the votes cast for the office involved in the litigation as well as to
secure a judgment declaring that he6 is the one elected president or vicepresident, as the case may be,7 and that, as such, he is entitled to assume the
duties attached to said office. And by providing, further, that the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal "shall be composed of the Chief Justice and the other ten
Members of the Supreme Court," said legislation has conferred upon such Court
an additional original jurisdiction of an exclusive character.8
Republic Act No. 1793 has not created a new or separate court. It has merely
conferred upon the Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral
Tribunal. The result of the enactment may be likened to the fact that courts of first
instance perform the functions of such ordinary courts of first instance,9 those of
court of land registration, 10 those of probate courts, 11 and those of courts of
juvenile and domestic relations. 12 It is, also, comparable to the situation
obtaining when the municipal court of a provincial capital exercises its authority,
pursuant to law, over a limited number of cases which were previously within the
exclusive jurisdiction of courts of first instance. 13
In all of these instances, the court (court of first instance or municipal court) is
only one, although the functionsmay be distinct and, even, separate. Thus the
powers of a court of first instance, in the exercise of its jurisdiction over ordinary
civil cases, are broader than, as well as distinct and separate from, those of the
same court acting as a court of land registration or a probate court, or as a court
of juvenile and domestic relations. So too, the authority of the municipal court of

a provincial capital, when acting as such municipal court, is, territorially more
limited than that of the same court when hearing the aforementioned cases which
are primary within the jurisdiction of courts of first instance. In other words, there
is only one court, although it may perform the functionspertaining to several types
of courts, each having some characteristics different from those of the others.
Indeed, the Supreme Court, 14 the Court of Appeals 15 and courts of first
instance, 16 are vested with original jurisdiction, as well as with appellate
jurisdiction, in consequence of which they are booth trial courts and appellate
courts, without detracting from the fact that there is only one Supreme
Court, one Court of Appeals, and one court of first instance, clothed with authority
to discharged said dual functions. A court of first instance, when performing the
functions of a probate court or a court of land registration, or a court of juvenile
and domestic relations, although with powers less broad than those of a court of
first instance, hearing ordinary actions, is not inferior to the latter, for one cannot
be inferior to itself. So too, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is not inferior to the
Supreme Court, since it is the same Court although the functions peculiar to said
Tribunal are more limited in scope than those of the Supreme Court in the
exercise of its ordinary functions. Hence, the enactment of Republic Act No.
1793, does not entail an assumption by Congress of the power of appointment
vested by the Constitution in the President. It merely connotes the imposition of
additional duties upon the Members of the Supreme Court.17
Moreover, the power to be the "judge ... of ... contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications" of any public officer is essentially judicial. As such
under the very principle of separation of powers invoked by petitioner herein it
belongs exclusively to the judicial department, except only insofar as the
Constitution provides otherwise. This is precisely the reason why said organic
law ordains that "the Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have
an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members" (Article VI,
Section 11, of the Constitution). In other words, the purpose of this provision was
to exclude the power to decide such contests relating to Members of Congress
which by nature is judicial 18 from the operation of the general grant of
judicial power 19 to "the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be
established by law.
Instead of indicating that Congress may not enact Republic Act No. 1793, the
aforementioned provision of the Constitution, establishing said Electoral
Tribunals for Members of Congress only, proves the exact opposite, namely: that
the Constitution intended to vest Congress with discretion 20 to determine by law

whether or not the election of a president-elect or that of a vice-president-elect

may be contested and, if Congress should decide in the affirmative, which court
of justice shall have jurisdiction to hear the contest. It is, even, debatable whether
such jurisdiction may be conferred, by statute, to a board, commission or tribunal
composed partly of Members of Congress and Members of the Supreme Court
because of its possible inconsistency with the constitutional grant of the judicial
power to "the Supreme Court and ... such inferior courts as may be established
by law," for said board, commission or tribunal would be neither "the Supreme
Court, 21 nor, certainly, "such inferior courts as, may be established by law."
It follows, therefore, not only that Republic Act No. 1793 is not inconsistent
with the Constitution or with the principle of separation of powers underlying the
same, but, also, that it is in harmony with the aforementioned grant of "the
judicial power" to said courts. Indeed, when Claro M. Recto, Chairman of the
Constitutional Convention, proposed that the original move therein to include in
the fundamental law a provision creating an Electoral Commission 22 to hear
election contests against the President-elect and the Vice-President-elect, be
given up, he expressed the view that the elimination of said provision would have
the effect of leaving in the hands of the legislative department the power to
decide what entity or body would "look into the protests for the positions of
President and Vice-President." 23 Twenty-two (22) years later, or on May 3, 1957
then Senator Recto reiterated this view, when, in the course of the debates on
the Bill which later became Republic Act No. 1793, he stated:
... Mr. President, as far as I can remember, the intention of the
constitutional convention was to leave this matter to ordinary
legislation.Such was, also, the impression of Dr. Jose M. Aruego,
another prominent Member of the Convention, who says24 that
Election protests for the Presidency and the Vice-Presidendency were
left to be judged in a manner and by a body decided by the National
Assembly. (Emphasis ours.)
No less than one of the main counsel for petitioner herein, himself, another
delegate to the Constitutional Convention, evidently shared this view as late as
September 30, 1965, for the introduction to his 1965 edition of "the Revised
Election Code" states that "he will always be remembered for ... his famous bill
creating the Presidential Electoral Tribunal ...". Indeed as a member of the
Senate, on January 3, 1950, he Introduced Senate Bill No. 1 seeking to create a
Presidential Electoral Tribunal "to try, hear and decide protests contesting the
election of the President and the Vice-President of the Philippines", which shall

be composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court, including the Chief Justice,
and four Senators and four Members of the House of Representatives.
Then, again, the records of the Convention show, that in voting eventually to
eliminate, from the draft of the Constitution, the provision establishing a
Presidential Electoral Commission, the delegates were influenced by the fact that
there was no similar provision in the Federal Constitution of the United States.
Having followed the pattern thereof, it must be assumed, therefore, in the
absence of any indicium to the contrary,25 that the Convention had adhered, also,
to the interpretation given to this feature of said Federal Constitution, as may be
deduced from the fact that, by an act of Congress of the United States, approved
on January 29, 1877, an Electoral Commission was created to hear and decide
certain issues concerning the election of the President of said nation held in
1876. It is, also worthy of notice that pursuant to said Act, nothing therein "shall
be held to impair or affect any right now existing under the Constitution and laws
to question, by proceedings in the judicial courts of the United States, the right or
title of the person who shall be declared elected, or who shall claim to be
President or Vice-President of the United States, if any such right exists". 26 Thus
the absence of a provision in said Federal Constitution governing protests
against the election of the President and the Vice-President had been construed
to be without prejudice to the right of the defeated candidate to file a
protest before the courts of justice of the United States, if the laws thereof
permitted it. In other words, the Federal Congress was deemed clothed with
authority to determine, by ordinary legislation, whether or not protests against the
election of said officers may properly be entertained by the judicial department.
Needless to say, the power of congress to declare who, among the candidates
for President and/or Vice-President, has obtained the largest number of votes, is
entirely different in nature from and not inconsistent with the jurisdiction vested in
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal by Republic Act No. 1793. Congress merely
acts as a national board of canvassers, charged with
the ministerial and executive duty 27 to make said declaration, on the basis of the
election returns duly certified by provincial and city boards of canvassers. 28 Upon
the other hand, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal has the judicial power to
determine whether or not said duly certified election returns have been irregularly
made or tampered with, or reflect the true result of the elections in the areas
covered by each, and, if not, to recount the ballots cast, and, incidentally thereto,
pass upon the validity of each ballot or determine whether the same shall be
counted, and, in the affirmative, in whose favor, which Congress has power to do.

It is, likewise, patent that the aforementioned authority of the Presidential

Electoral Tribunal to determine whether or not the protestant has a better right
than the President and/or the Vice-President declared elected by Congress
would not abridge the constitutional tenure. If the evidence introduced in the
election protest shows that the person really elected president or vice-president
is the protestant, not the person declared elected by Congress, then the latter
had legally no constitutional tenure whatsoever, and, hence, he can claim no
abridgement thereof.1wph1.t

GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YIGUEZ and

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by
its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY
ORDOEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE
VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive
Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of
National Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively, respondents.

It is similarly obvious that, in imposing upon the Supreme Court the additional
duty of performing the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal, Congress
has not, through Republic Act No. 1793, encroached upon the appointing power
of the Executive. The imposition of new duties constitutes, neither the creation of
an office, nor the appointment of an officer. 29
In view of a resolution of this Court dated July 8, 1966, upholding the validity of
Republic Act No. 1793, upon the ground that it merely vests additional jurisdiction
in the Supreme Court, petitioner has filed a motion dated July 13, 1966, praying
this Court "to clarify whether or not" this "election contest should as a
consequence ... be docketed with, and the records thereof transferred, to this
Supreme Court, and all pleadings, papers and processes relative thereto should
thence forth be filed with it". The motion is, evidently, based upon the premise
that the Supreme Court is different and distinct from the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, which is erroneous, as well as contrary to the ruling made in said
resolution.
Wherefore, the petition herein is hereby dismissed and the writs therein prayed
for denied accordingly. The aforesaid motion is, moreover, denied. With costs
against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 88211 October 27, 1989
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS.
JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE M. MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC,

RESOLUTION

EN BANC:
In its decision dated September 15,1989, the Court, by a vote of eight (8) to
seven (7), dismissed the petition, after finding that the President did not act
arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of
former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present
circumstances pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting
their return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, former President Marcos
died in Honolulu, Hawaii. In a statement, President Aquino said:
In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of
Mr. Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for
the tranquility of the state and order of society, the remains of
Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to our
country until such time as the government, be it under this
administration or the succeeding one, shall otherwise decide.
[Motion for Reconsideration, p. 1; Rollo, p, 443.]
On October 2, 1989, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners,
raising the following major arguments:
1. to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines
is to deny them not only the inherent right of citizens to return to their country of
birth but also the protection of the Constitution and all of the rights guaranteed to
Filipinos under the Constitution;

2. the President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has,
she had exercised it arbitrarily; and
3. there is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President
Marcos. Thus, petitioners prayed that the Court reconsider its decision, order
respondents to issue the necessary travel documents to enable Mrs. Imelda R.
Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Irene M. Araneta, Imee M. Manotoc, Tommy
Manotoc and Gregorio Araneta to return to the Philippines, and enjoin
respondents from implementing President Aquino's decision to bar the return of
the remains of Mr. Marcos, and the other petitioners, to the Philippines.
Commenting on the motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor General argued that
the motion for reconsideration is moot and academic as to the deceased Mr.
Marcos. Moreover, he asserts that "the 'formal' rights being invoked by the
Marcoses under the label 'right to return', including the label 'return of Marcos'
remains, is in reality or substance a 'right' to destabilize the country, a 'right' to
hide the Marcoses' incessant shadowy orchestrated efforts at destabilization."
[Comment, p. 29.] Thus, he prays that the Motion for Reconsideration be denied
for lack of merit.
We deny the motion for reconsideration.
1. It must be emphasized that as in all motions for reconsideration, the burden is
upon the movants, petitioner herein, to show that there are compelling reasons to
reconsider the decision of the Court.
2. After a thorough consideration of the matters raised in the motion for
reconsideration, the Court is of the view that no compelling reasons have been
established by petitioners to warrant a reconsideration of the Court's decision.
The death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening event, has
not changed the factual scenario under which the Court's decision was rendered.
The threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been
viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have ceased. On the
contrary, instead of erasing fears as to the destabilization that will be caused by
the return of the Marcoses, Mrs. Marcos reinforced the basis for the decision to
bar their return when she called President Aquino "illegal," claiming that it is Mr.
Marcos, not Mrs. Aquino, who is the "legal" President of the Philippines, and
declared that the matter "should be brought to all the courts of the world."
[Comment, p. 1; Philippine Star, October 4, 1989.]

3. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon

whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied
from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with
her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to
what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in
scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed
intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the
powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr.
Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific power of the President,
particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution
of the general grant of executive power.
That the President has powers other than those expressly stated in the
Constitution is nothing new. This is recognized under the U.S. Constitution from
which we have patterned the distribution of governmental powers among three
(3) separate branches.
Article II, [section] 1, provides that "The Executive Power shall
be vested in a President of the United States of America." In
Alexander Hamilton's widely accepted view, this statement
cannot be read as mere shorthand for the specific executive
authorizations that follow it in [sections] 2 and 3. Hamilton
stressed the difference between the sweeping language of
article II, section 1, and the conditional language of article I,
[section] 1: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States . . ." Hamilton
submitted that "[t]he [article III enumeration [in sections 2 and
31 ought therefore to be considered, as intended merely to
specify the principal articles implied in the definition of
execution power; leaving the rest to flow from the general grant
of that power, interpreted in confomity with other parts of the
Constitution...
In Myers v. United States, the Supreme Court accepted
Hamilton's proposition, concluding that the federal executive,
unlike the Congress, could exercise power from sources not
enumerated, so long as not forbidden by the constitutional text:
the executive power was given in general terms, strengthened
by specific terms where emphasis was regarded as
appropriate, and was limited by direct expressions where
limitation was needed. . ." The language of Chief Justice Taft in

Myers makes clear that the constitutional concept of inherent

power is not a synonym for power without limit; rather, the
concept suggests only that not all powers granted in the
Constitution are themselves exhausted by internal
enumeration, so that, within a sphere properly regarded as one
of "executive' power, authority is implied unless there or
elsewhere expressly limited. [TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 158-159 (1978).]
And neither can we subscribe to the view that a recognition of the President's
implied or residual powers is tantamount to setting the stage for another
dictatorship. Despite petitioners' strained analogy, the residual powers of the
President under the Constitution should not be confused with the power of the
President under the 1973 Constitution to legislate pursuant to Amendment No. 6
which provides:
Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister),
there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence
thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the
regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately
on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires
immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue
the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instruction, which
shall form part of the law of the land,
There is no similarity between the residual powers of the President under the
1987 Constitution and the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution
pursuant to Amendment No. 6. First of all, Amendment No. 6 refers to an express
grant of power. It is not implied. Then, Amendment No. 6 refers to a grant to the
President of thespecific power of legislation.
4. Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with
his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the
people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the
remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in
compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear showing that she
had acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this
decision, the Court will not enjoin the implementation of this decision.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for
lack of merit.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999

LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION

PUNO, J.:
For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution of this Court dated January 4, 1990 temporarily restraining the
execution of petitioner and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration. It is the submission of public respondents that:
1.

The Decision in this case having become final and executory,

its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the
executive authority. The issuance of the TRO may be
construed as trenching on that sphere of executive authority;

2.

The issuance of the temporary restraining order . . . creates

dangerous precedent as there will never be an end to litigation
because there is always a possibility that Congress may repeal
a law.

3.

Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death

penalty bill. To be certain, whatever question may now be
raised on the Death Penalty Law before the present Congress
within the 6-month period given by this Honorable Court had in
all probability been fully debated upon . . .

4.

Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the
law looks forward while the judge looks at the past, . . . the
Honorable Court in issuing the TRO has transcended its power
of judicial review.

5.

At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events

transpired to the effect that the repeal or modification of the law
imposing death penalty has become nil, to wit:
a.

The public pronouncement of President Estrada that

he will veto any law imposing the death penalty
involving heinous crimes.

b.

The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they

are against the repeal of the law;

on petitioner on automatic review of his conviction by this Court. The instant

motions were filed in this case, G.R. No. 132601, where the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 8177 (Lethal Injection Law) and its implementing rules and regulations
was assailed by petitioner. For this reason, the Court in its Resolution of January
4, 1999 merely noted the Motion to Set Aside of Rodessa "Baby" R. Echegaray
dated January 7, 1999 and Entry of Appearance of her counsel dated January 5,
1999. Clearly, she has no legal standing to intervene in the case at bar, let alone
the fact that the interest of the State is properly represented by the Solicitor
General.
We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public respondents.
I

c.

The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the

law only bears his signature and that of Senator
Pimentel.

In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, public

respondents attached a copy of House Resolution No. 629 introduced by
Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of
Representative to reject any move to review Republic Act No. 7659
which provided for the re-imposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the
Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the House of
Representative on this matter, and urging the President to exhaust all means
under the law to immediately implement the death penalty law." The Resolution
was concurred in by one hundred thirteen (113) congressman.
In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay order. . . is
within the scope of judicial power and duty and does not trench on executive
powers nor on congressional prerogatives; (2) the exercise by this Court of its
power to stay execution was reasonable; (3) the Court did not lose jurisdiction to
address incidental matters involved or arising from the petition; (4) public
respondents are estopped from challenging the Court's jurisdiction; and (5) there
is no certainty that the law on capital punishment will not be repealed or modified
until Congress convenes and considers all the various resolutions and bills filed
before it.
Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions concern matters
that are not incidents in G.R. No. 117472, where the death penalty was imposed

First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public respondents
that this Court lost its jurisdiction over the case at bar and hence can no longer
restrain the execution of the petitioner. Obviously, public respondents are
invoking the rule that final judgments can no longer be altered in accord with the
principle that "it is just as important that there should be a place to end as there
should be a place to begin litigation." 1 To start with, the Court is not changing
even a comma of its final Decision. It is appropriate to examine with precision the
metes and bounds of the Decision of this Court that became final. These metes
and bounds are clearly spelled out in the Entry of Judgment in this case, viz:
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
This is to certify that on October 12, 1998 a decision rendered
in the above-entitled case was filed in this Office, the
dispositive part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED
insofar as petitioner seeks to declare the assailed statute (Republic
Act No. 8177) as unconstitutional; but GRANTED insofar as Sections
17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act
No. 8177 are concerned, which are hereby declared INVALID
because (a) Section 17 contravenes Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659; and (b)
Section 19 fails to provide for review and approval of the Lethal
Injection Manual by the Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiably makes
the manual confidential, hence unavailable to interested parties
including the accused/convict and counsel. Respondents are hereby
enjoined from enforcing and implementing Republic Act No. 8177 until
the aforesaid Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to

Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are appropriately amended, revised

and/or corrected in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
and that the same has, on November 6, 1988 become final and
executory and is hereby recorded in the Book of Entries of
Judgment.
Manila, Philippine.
The records will show that before the Entry of Judgment, the Secretary of
Justice, the Honorable Serafin Cuevas, filed with this Court on October 21, 1998
a Compliance where he submitted the Amended Rules and Regulations
implementing R.A. No. 8177 in compliance with our Decision. On October 28,
1998, Secretary Cuevas submitted a Manifestation informing the Court that he
has caused the publication of the said Amended Rules and Regulations as
required by the Administrative Code. It is crystalline that the Decision of this
Court that became final and unalterable mandated: (1) that R.A. No. 8177 is not
unconstitutional; (2) that sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to
Implement R.A. No. 8177 are invalid, and (3) R.A. No. 8177 cannot be enforced
and implemented until sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to
Implement R.A. No. 8177 are amended. It is also daylight clear that this Decision
was not altered a whit by this Court. Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor
General, the rule on finality of judgment cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction
to execute and enforce the same judgment. Retired Justice Camilo Quiason
synthesized the well established jurisprudence on this issue as
follows: 2
xxx xxx xxx
the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost
all its powers nor the case. By the finality of the judgment, what
the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the
same. Even after the judgment has become final the court
retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. 3There is a
difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its
judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the
same. The former continues even after the judgment has
become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the
latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. 4 . . . For
after the judgment has become final facts and circumstances

may transpire which can render the execution unjust or

impossible.5
In truth, the arguments of the Solicitor General has long been rejected by this
Court. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, as early as 1915, this Court has
unequivocably ruled in the case of Director of Prisons v. Judge of First
Instance, 6 viz:
This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various
decisions, which constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in
criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and
the period for reopening the same cannot change or alter its
judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated . . . When in cases
of appeal or review the cause has been returned thereto for
execution, in the event that the judgment has been affirmed, it
performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it
does not follow from this cessation of functions on the part of
the court with reference to the ending of the cause that the
judicial authority terminates by having then passed completely
to the Executive. The particulars of the execution itself, which
are certainly not always included in the judgment and writ of
execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of the
judicial authority, while the executive has no power over the
person of the convict except to provide for carrying out of the
penalty and to pardon.
Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar,
which is that of execution of a capital sentence, it must be
accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can
be requested. There can be no dispute on this point. It is a
well-known principle that notwithstanding the order of
execution and the executory nature thereof on the date set or
at the proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in
sentences of death. Under the common law this postponement
can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the King; (2)
by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the
law. It is sufficient to state this principle of the common law to
render impossible that assertion in absolute terms that after the
convict has once been placed in jail the trial court can not
reopen the case to investigate the facts that show the need for
postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the court, it
is acknowledged that even after the date of the execution has
been fixed, and notwithstanding the general rule that after the
(court) has performed its ministerial duty of ordering the

execution . . . and its part is ended, if however a circumstance

arises that ought to delay the execution, and there is an
imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to order a
postponement. Then the question arises as to whom the
application for postponing the execution ought to be addressed
while the circumstances is under investigation and so to who
has jurisdiction to make the investigation.
The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of
jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for our
Constitution 7 vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law. To be sure, the important part of
a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions
where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and
compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent
unfairness. It is because of these unforseen, supervening contingencies that
courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its
processes and orders to make them conformable to law and justice. 8 For this
purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135 provides that "when by law jurisdiction is
conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other
means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer
and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not
specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of
proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law
or rules." It bears repeating that what the Court restrained temporarily is the
execution of its own Decision to give it reasonable time to check its fairness in
light of supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court,
contrary to popular misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted
by Congress.1wphi1.nt
The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public respondents that
this Court has no jurisdiction to restrain the execution of petitioner is that it can
diminish the independence of the judiciary. Since the implant of republicanism in
our soil, our courts have been conceded the jurisdiction to enforce their final
decisions. In accord with this unquestioned jurisdiction, this Court promulgated
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure which, among others, spelled
out the rules on execution of judgments. These rules are all predicated on the
assumption that courts have the inherent, necessary and incidental power to
control and supervise the process of execution of their decisions. Rule 39
governs execution, satisfaction and effects of judgments in civil cases. Rule 120
governs judgments in criminal cases. It should be stressed that the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was granted by our
Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of
Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose that

popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of

justice." 9 Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court
for it enhances its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this
Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was
granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject
to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13,
Article VIII provides:
Sec.13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure
in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said
rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The
existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject
to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the
same. The Congress have the power to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines.
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its
surface. In In re Cunanan 10Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules
of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar
Flunkers Act of 1953 11 which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70%
in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the
1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In
his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that " . . . the disputed law is not a
legislation; it is a judgment a judgment promulgated by this Court during the
aforecited years affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court
certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no
less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department,
that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these department would be a clear
usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in question." 12 The
venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to
grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law
passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other
authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license." By its ruling,
this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter
or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973
Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to

promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, . . .

which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang
Pambansa . . . ." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec.5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which,
however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang
Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the
independence of the judiciary by giving to it the additional power to promulgate
rules governing the integration of the Bar. 13
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary.
Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5),
Article VIII provides:

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time
was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first
time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasijudicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power
of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the
Executive. If the manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is to strengthen the
independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public respondents do, that
this Court has no jurisdiction to control the process of execution of its decisions,
a power conceded to it and which it has exercised since time immemorial.
To be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail the jurisdiction
of this Court to control and supervise the implementation of its decision in the
case at bar. As aforestated, our Decision became final and executory on
November 6, 1998. The records reveal that after November 6, 1998, or on
December 8, 1998, no less than the Secretary of Justice recognized the
jurisdiction of this Court by filing a Manifestation and Urgent Motion to compel
the trial judge, the Honorable Thelma A. Ponferrada, RTC, Br. 104, Quezon City
to provide him ". . . a certified true copy of the Warrant of Execution dated
November 17, 1998 bearing the designated execution day of death convict Leo
Echegaray and allow (him) to reveal or announce the contents thereof,
particularly the execution date fixed by such trial court to the public when
requested." The relevant portions of the Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed
by the Secretary of Justice beseeching this Court "to provide the appropriate
relief" state:

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.

5. Instead of filing a comment on Judge Ponferrada's Manifestation however,

herein respondent is submitting the instant Manifestation and Motion (a) to
stress, inter alia, that the non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein
respondent of vital information necessary for the exercise of his statutory
powers, as well as renders nugatory the constitutional guarantee that
recognizes the people's right to information of public concern, and (b) to ask this
Honorable Court to provide the appropriate relief.
6. The non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein respondent of vital
information necessary for the exercise of his power of supervision and control
over the Bureau of Corrections pursuant to Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV of
the Administrative Code of 1987, in relation to Title III, Book IV of such
Administrative Code, insofar as the enforcement of Republic Act No. 8177 and

the Amended Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 is
concerned and for the discharge of the mandate of seeing to it that laws and
rules relative to the execution of sentence are faithfully observed.
7. On the other hand, the willful omission to reveal the information about the
precise day of execution limits the exercise by the President of executive
clemency powers pursuant to Section 19, Article VII (Executive Department) of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out "without
prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive powers at all times."
(Emphasis supplied) For instance, the President cannot grant reprieve, i.e.,
postpone the execution of a sentence to a day certain (People v. Vera, 65 Phil.
56, 110 [1937]) in the absence of a precise date to reckon with. The exercise of
such clemency power, at this time, might even work to the prejudice of the
convict and defeat the purpose of the Constitution and the applicable statute as
when the date at execution set by the President would be earlier than that
designated by the court.
8. Moreover, the deliberate non-disclosure of information about the date of
execution to herein respondent and the public violates Section 7, Article III (Bill
of Rights) and Section 28, Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies)
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which read:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall
be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development shall, be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts
and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving
public interest.
9. The "right to information" provision is self-executing. It supplies "the rules by
means of which the right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on
the Constitutional Limitations, 167 [1972]) by guaranteeing the right and
mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the
fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the
ratification of the Constitution without need for any ancillary act of the
Legislature (Id., at p. 165) What may be provided for by the Legislature are
reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which
must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. II, Sec.

28). However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation may be

prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III, Sec. 7 have
become operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New
Charter." (Decision of the Supreme Court En Banc in Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, 150 SCRA 530, 534-535 [1987].
The same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal the date of execution of
petitioner Echegaray was filed by his counsel, Atty. Theodore Te, on December 7,
1998. He invoked his client's right to due process and the public's right to
information. The Solicitor General, as counsel for public respondents, did not
oppose petitioner's motion on the ground that this Court has no more jurisdiction
over the process of execution of Echegaray. This Court granted the relief prayed
for by the Secretary of Justice and by the counsel of the petitioner in its
Resolution of December 15, 1998. There was not a whimper of protest from the
public respondents and they are now estopped from contending that this Court
has lost its jurisdiction to grant said relief. The jurisdiction of this Court does not
depend on the convenience of litigants.
II
Second. We likewise reject the public respondents' contention that the "decision
in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive
ambit of authority of the executive department . . .. By granting the TRO, the
Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive
function." 14 Public respondents cite as their authority for this proposition, Section
19, Article VII of the Constitution which reads:
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in
this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures
after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power
to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
members of the Congress.
The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation suggested by
the public respondents. The provision is simply the source of power of the
President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and
forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It also provides the authority for the
President to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members
of the Congress. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the
power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In
truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses
collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For

instance, a death convict who become insane after his final conviction cannot be
executed while in a state of insanity. 15 As observed by Antieau, "today, it is
generally assumed that due process of law will prevent the government from
executing the death sentence upon a person who is insane at the time of
execution." 16 The suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an
exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of
reprieve though its effects is the same the temporary suspension of the
execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that
Congress can at any time amend R.A. No. 7659 by reducing the penalty of death
to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation
of sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination can the exercise by Congress of
its plenary power to amend laws be considered as a violation of the power of the
President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive,
the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude
each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.
Indeed, in various States in the United States, laws have even been enacted
expressly granting courts the power to suspend execution of convicts and their
constitutionality has been upheld over arguments that they infringe upon the
power of the President to grant reprieves. For the public respondents therefore to
contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after
his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of
the three branches of our government.
III
Third. The Court's resolution temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner
must be put in its proper perspective as it has been grievously distorted
especially by those who make a living by vilifying courts. Petitioner filed his Very
Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO on December 28, 1998 at about 11:30 p.m.
He invoked several grounds, viz: (1) that his execution has been set on January
4, the first working day of 1999; (b) that members of Congress had either sought
for his executive clemency and/or review or repeal of the law authorizing capital
punishment; (b.1) that Senator Aquilino Pimentel's resolution asking that
clemency be granted to the petitioner and that capital punishment be reviewed
has been concurred by thirteen (13) other senators; (b.2) Senate President
Marcelo Fernan and Senator Miriam S. Defensor have publicly declared they
would seek a review of the death penalty law; (b.3) Senator Paul Roco has also
sought the repeal of capital punishment, and (b.4) Congressman Salacrib
Baterina, Jr., and thirty five (35) other congressmen are demanding review of the
same law.
When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court was already in its traditional
recess and would only resume session on January 18, 1999. Even then, Chief
Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. called the Court to a Special Session on January 4,

1991 17 at 10. a.m. to deliberate on petitioner's Very Urgent Motion. The Court
hardly had five (5) hours to resolve petitioner's motion as he was due to be
executed at 3 p.m. Thus, the Court had the difficult problem of resolving whether
petitioner's allegations about the moves in Congress to repeal or amend the
Death Penalty Law are mere speculations or not. To the Court's majority, there
were good reasons why the Court should not immediately dismiss petitioner's
allegations as mere speculations and surmises. They noted that petitioner's
allegations were made in a pleading under oath and were widely publicized in the
print and broadcast media. It was also of judicial notice that the 11th Congress is
a new Congress and has no less than one hundred thirty (130) new members
whose views on capital punishment are still unexpressed. The present Congress
is therefore different from the Congress that enacted the Death Penalty Law
(R.A. No. 7659) and the Lethal Injection Law (R.A. No. 8177). In contrast, the
Court's minority felt that petitioner's allegations lacked clear factual bases. There
was hardly a time to verify petitioner's allegations as his execution was set at 3
p.m. And verification from Congress was impossible as Congress was not in
session. Given these constraints, the Court's majority did not rush to judgment
but took an extremely cautious stance by temporarily restraining the execution of
petitioner. The suspension was temporary "until June 15, 1999, coeval with
the constitutional duration of the present regular session of Congress, unless it
sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law is going to be
made." The extreme caution taken by the Court was compelled, among others,
by the fear that any error of the Court in not stopping the execution of the
petitioner will preclude any further relief for all rights stop at the graveyard. As life
was at, stake, the Court refused to constitutionalize haste and the hysteria of
some partisans. The Court's majority felt it needed the certainty that the
legislature will not petitioner as alleged by his counsel. It was believed that law
and equitable considerations demand no less before allowing the State to take
the life of one its citizens.
The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its desired result, i.e.,
the crystallization of the issue whether Congress is disposed to review capital
punishment. The public respondents, thru the Solicitor General, cite posterior
events that negate beyond doubt the possibility that Congress will repeal or
amend the death penalty law. He names these supervening events as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
a.

The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will

veto any law imposing the death penalty involving heinous
crimes.

b.

The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are

against the repeal of the law;

c.

The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only
bears his signature and that of Senator Pimentel. 18

In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor

General cited House Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez
entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representatives to
reject any move to review R.A. No. 7659 which provided for the reimposition of
death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department
of the position of the House of Representative on this matter and urging the
President to exhaust all means under the law to immediately implement the
death penalty law." The Golez resolution was signed by 113 congressman as of
January 11, 1999. In a marathon session yesterday that extended up 3 o'clock in
the morning, the House of Representative with minor, the House of
Representative with minor amendments formally adopted the Golez resolution by
an overwhelming vote. House Resolution No. 25 expressed the sentiment that
the House ". . . does not desire at this time to review Republic Act 7659." In
addition, the President has stated that he will not request Congress to ratify the
Second Protocol in review of the prevalence of heinous crimes in the country. In
light of these developments, the Court's TRO should now be lifted as it has
served its legal and humanitarian purpose.
A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that ". . . the question
of capital punishment had been the subject of endless discussion and will
probably never be settled so long as men believe in punishment." 19 In our clime
and time when heinous crimes continue to be unchecked, the debate on the legal
and moral predicates of capital punishment has been regrettably blurred by
emotionalism because of the unfaltering faith of the pro and anti-death partisans
on the right and righteousness of their postulates. To be sure, any debate, even if
it is no more than an exchange of epithets is healthy in a democracy. But when
the debate deteriorates to discord due to the overuse of words that wound, when
anger threatens to turn the majority rule to tyranny, it is the especial duty of this
Court to assure that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights to the minority fully hold.
As Justice Brennan reminds us ". . . it is the very purpose of the Constitution
and particularly the Bill of Rights to declare certain values transcendent,
beyond the reach of temporary political majorities."20 Man has yet to invent a
better hatchery of justice than the courts. It is a hatchery where justice will bloom
only when we can prevent the roots of reason to be blown away by the winds of
rage. The flame of the rule of law cannot be ignited by rage, especially the rage
of the mob which is the mother of unfairness. The business of courts in rendering
justice is to be fair and they can pass their litmus test only when they can be fair
to him who is momentarily the most hated by society. 21

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the public respondents' Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
and lifts the Temporary Restraining Order issued in its Resolution of January 4,
1999.
The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A. Ponferrada,
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 104) to set anew the date for
execution of the convict/petitioner in accordance with applicable provisions of law
and the Rules of Court, without further delay.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza, Martinez,
Quisumbing, Purisima and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., Please see Separate Opinion.
Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., took no part.

Acting
e
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-68635 May 14, 1987
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST
ATTY. WENCESLAO LAURETA, AND OF CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS
AGAINST EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE in G.R. No. 68635, entitled "EVA
MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET
AL."

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
Before us are 1) Atty. Wenceslao Laureta's Motion for Reconsideration of the Per
Curiam Resolution of this Court promulgated on March 12, 1987, finding him
guilty of grave professional misconduct and suspending him indefinitely from the
practice of law; and 2) Eva Maravilla-Ilustre's Motion for Reconsideration of the
same Resolution holding her in contempt and ordering her to pay a fine of
P1,000.00.
Essentially, Atty. Laureta maintains that the Order of suspension without hearing
violated his right to life and due process of law and by reason thereof the Order is
null and void; that the acts of misconduct imputed to him are without basis; that
the charge against him that it was he who had circulated to the press copies of
the Complaint filed before the Tanodbayan is unfounded such that, even in this
Court's Resolution, his having distributed copies to the press is not stated
positively; that the banner headline which appeared In the Daily Express is
regrettable but that he was not responsible for such "misleading headline;" that
he "did nothing of the sort" being fully conscious of his responsibilities as a law
practitioner and officer of the Court; that as a former newspaperman, he would
not have been satisfied with merely circulating copies of the Complaint to the
press in envelopes where his name appears; "he himself would have written
stories about the case in a manner that sells newspapers; even a series of juicy
articles perhaps, something that would have further subjected the respondent
justices to far worse publicity;" that, on the contrary, the press conference
scheduled by Ilustre was cancelled through his efforts in order to prevent any
further adverse publicity resulting from the filing of the complaint before the
Tanodbayan; that, as a matter of fact, it was this Court's Resolution that was
serialized in the Bulletin Today, which newspaper also made him the subject of a
scathing editorial but that he "understands the cooperation because after all, the
Court rendered a favorable judgment in the Bulletin union case last year;" that he
considered it "below his dignity to plead for the chance to present his side" with
the Editor, Mr. Ben Rodriguez, "a long-time personal friend" since he "can afford
to be the sacrificial lamb if only to help the Honorable Court uphold its integrity;"
that he was called by a reporter of DZRH and was asked to comment on the
case filed before the Tanodbayan but that his remarks were confined to the filing
of the case by Ilustre herself, and that the judgment of the trial Court had attained
its finality long ago; that he is not Ilustre's counsel before the Tanodbayan and did

not prepare the complaint filed before it, his professional services having been
terminated upon the final dismissal of Ilustre's case before this Court; that
similarities in the language and phraseology used in the Ilustre letters, in
pleadings before this Court and before the Tanodbayan do not prove his
authorship since other lawyers "even of a mediocre caliber" could very easily
have reproduced them; that the discussions on the merits in the Per Curiam
Resolution are "more properly addressed to the Tanodbayan, Justice Raul M.
Gonzales being competent to deal with the case before him;" that he takes
exception to the accusation that he has manifested lack of respect for and
exposed to public ridicule the two highest Courts of the land, all he did having
been to call attention to errors or injustice committed in the promulgation of
judgments or orders; that he has "not authorized or assisted and/or abetted and
could not have prevented the contemptuous statements, conduct, acts and
malicious charges of Eva Maravilla Ilustre who was no longer his client when
these alleged acts were done; that "he is grateful to this Court for the reminder on
the first duty of a lawyer which is to the Court and not to his client, a duty that he
has always impressed upon his law students;" and finally, that "for the record, he
is sorry for the adverse publicity generated by the filing of the complaint against
the Justices before the Tanodbayan."
In her own Motion for Reconsideration, Eva Maravilla-Ilustre also raises as her
main ground the alleged deprivation of her constitutional right to due process.
She maintains that as contempt proceedings are commonly treated as criminal in
nature, the mode of procedure and rules of evidence in criminal prosecution
should be assimilated, as far as practicable, in this proceeding, and that she
should be given every opportunity to present her side. Additionally, she states
that, with some sympathetic lawyers, they made an "investigation" and learned
that the Resolution of the First Division was arrived at without any deliberation by
its members; that Court personnel were "tight-lipped about the matter, which is
shrouded mystery" thereby prompting her to pursue a course which she thought
was legal and peaceful; that there is nothing wrong in making public the manner
of voting by the Justices, and it was for that reason that she addressed Identical
letters to Associate Justices Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, Isagani Cruz
and Florentino Feliciano; that "if the lawyers of my opponents were not a Solicitor
General, and member of the Supreme Court and a Division Chairman,
respectively, the resolution of May 14, 1986 would not have aroused my
suspicion;" that instead of taking the law into her own hands or joining any violent
movement, she took the legitimate step of making a peaceful investigation into
how her case was decided, and brought her grievance to the Tanodbayan "in
exasperation" against those whom she felt had committed injustice against her
"in an underhanded manner."

We deny reconsideration in both instances.

The argument premised on lack of hearing and due process, is not impressed
with merit. What due process abhors is absolute lack of opportunity to be heard
(Tajonera vs. Lamaroza, et al., 110 SCRA 438 [1981]). The word "hearing" does
not necessarily connote a "trial-type" proceeding. In the show-cause Resolution
of this Court, dated January 29, 1987, Atty. Laureta was given sufficient
opportunity to inform this Court of the reasons why he should not be subjected to
dispose action. His Answer, wherein he prayed that the action against him be
dismissed, contained twenty-two (22) pages, double spaced. Eva MaravillaIlustre was also given a like opportunity to explain her statements, conduct, acts
and charges against the Court and/or the official actions of the Justices
concerned. Her Compliance Answer, wherein she prayed that the contempt
proceeding against her be dismissed, contained nineteen (19) pages, double
spaced. Both were afforded ample latitude to explain matters fully. Atty. Laureta
denied having authored the letters written by Ilustre, his being her counsel before
the Tanodbayan, his having circularized to the press copies of the complaint filed
before said body, and his having committed acts unworthy of his profession. But
the Court believed otherwise and found that those letters and the charges
levelled against the Justices concerned, of themselves and by themselves,
betray not only their malicious and contemptuous character, but also the lack of
respect for the two highest Courts of the land, a complete obliviousness to the
fundamental principle of separation of powers, and a wanton disregard of the
cardinal doctrine of independence of the Judiciary. Res ipsa loquitur. Nothing
more needed to have been said or proven. The necessity to conduct any further
evidentially hearing was obviated (See People vs. Hon. Valenzuela, G.R. Nos.
63950-60, April 19, 1985, 135 SCRA 712). Atty. Laureta and Ilustre were given
ample opportunity to be heard, and were, in fact, heard.
(1)
In his Motion for Reconsideration, Atty. Laureta reiterates his allegations in his
Answer to the show-cause Resolution that his professional services were
terminated by Ilustre after the dismissal of the main petition by this Court; that he
had nothing to do with the contemptuous letters to the individual Justices; and
that he is not Ilustre's counsel before the Tanodbayan.
Significantly enough, however, copy of the Tanodbayan Resolution dismissing
Ilustre's Complaint was furnished Atty. Laureta as "counsel for the complainant"
at his address of record. Of note, too, is the fact that it was he who was following

up the Complaint before the Tanodbayan and, after its dismissal, the Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order of dismissal.
Of import, as well, is the report of Lorenzo C. Bardel, a process server of this
Court, that after having failed to serve copy of the Per Curiam Resolution of
March 12, 1987 of this Court on Ilustre personally at her address of record, "101
F. Manalo St., Cubao, Quezon City," having been informed that she is 6 not a
resident of the place," he proceeded to the residence of Atty. Laureta where the
latter's wife "voluntarily received the two copies of decision for her husband and
for Ms. Maravina-Ilustre" (p. 670, Rollo, Vol. 11).
That Ilustre subsequently received copy of this Court's Resolution delivered to
Mrs. Laureta is shown by the fact that she filed, as of March 27, 1987, a "Petition
for Extension of Time to file Motion for Reconsideration" and subsequently the
Motion for Reconsideration. In that Petition Ilustre acknowledged receipt of the
Resolution on March 12, 1987, the very same date Mrs. Laureta received copy
thereof. If, indeed, the lawyer-client relationship between her husband and Ilustre
had been allegedly completely severed, all Mrs. Laureta had to do was to return
to the Sheriff the copy intended for Ilustre. As it was, however, service on Atty.
Laureta proved to be service on Ilustre as well. The close tie- up between the
corespondents is heightened by the fact that three process servers of this Court
failed to serve copy of this Court's Per Curiam Resolution on Ilustre personally.
Noteworthy, as well, is that by Atty. Laureta's own admission, he was the one
called by a "reporter" of DZRH to comment on the Ilustre charges before the
Tanodbayan. If, in fact, he had nothing to do with the complaint, he would not
have been pinpointed at all. And if his disclaimer were the truth, the logical step
for him to have taken was to refer the caller to the lawyer/s allegedly assisting
Ilustre, at the very least, out of elementary courtesy and propriety. But he did
nothing of the sort. " He gave his comment with alacrity.
The impudence and lack of respect of Atty. Laureta for this Court again surfaces
when he asserts in his Motion for Reconsideration that he "understands the
cooperation" of the Bulletin Today as manifested in the serialized publication of
the Per Curiam Resolution of this Court and his being subjected to a scathing
editorial by the same newspaper "because after all, the Court rendered a
favorable judgment in the Bulletin union case last year." The malice lurking in that
statement is most unbecoming of an officer of the Court and is an added reason
for denying reconsideration.

Further, Atty. Laureta stubbornly contends that discussions on the merits in the
Court's Per Curiam Resolution are more properly addressed to the Tanodbayan,
forgetting, however, his own discourse on the merits in his Answer to this Court's
Resolution dated January 29, 1987. He thus incorrigibly insists on subordinating
the Judiciary to the executive notwithstanding the categorical pronouncement in
the Per Curiam Resolution of March 12, 1987, that Article 204 of the Revised
Penal Code has no application to the members of a collegiate Court; that a
charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that
a collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper; plus the clear and extended
dissertation in the same Per Curiam Resolution on the fundamental principle of
separation of powers and of checks and balances, pursuant to which it is this
Court "entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all
justifiable disputes, public and private. No other department or agency may pass
upon its judgments or declare them 'unjust' upon controlling and irresistible
reasons of public policy and of sound practice."

have allowed suspicion alone to blind their actions and in so doing degraded the
administration of justice. "Investigation" was utterly uncalled for. All conclusions
and judgments of the Court, be they en banc or by Division, are arrived at only
after deliberation. The fact that no dissent was indicated in the Minutes of the
proceedings held on May 14, 1986 showed that the members of the Division
voted unanimously. Court personnel are not in a position to know the voting in
any case because all deliberations are held behind closed doors without any one
of them being present. No malicious inferences should have been drawn from
their inability to furnish the information Ilustre and Atty. Laureta desired The
personality of the Solicitor General never came into the picture. It was Justice
Abad Santos, and not Justice Yap, who was Chairman of the First Division when
the Resolution of May 14, 1986 denying the Petition was rendered. Thereafter
Justice Yap inhibited himself from any participation. The fact that the Court en
banc upheld the challenged Resolutions of the First Division emphasizes the
irrespective of Ilustre's case irrespective of the personalities involved.

Atty. Laureta's protestations that he has done his best to protect and uphold the
dignity of this Court are belied by environmental facts and circumstances. His
apologetic stance for the "adverse publicity" generated by the filing of the
charges against the Justices concerned before the Tanodbayan rings with
insincerity. The complaint was calculated precisely to serve that very purpose.
The threat to bring the case to "another forum of justice" was implemented to the
fun. Besides, he misses the heart of the matter. Exposure to the glare of publicity
is an occupational hazard. If he has been visited with disciplinary sanctions it is
because by his conduct, acts and statements, he has, overall, deliberately sought
to destroy the "authenticity, integrity, and conclusiveness of collegiate acts," to
"undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justifiable
disputes," and to subvert public confidence in the integrity of the Courts and the
Justices concerned, and in the orderly administration of justice.

Additionally, Ilustre has been trifling with this Court. She has given our process
servers the run-around. Three of them failed to serve on her personally her copy
of this Court's Per Curiam Resolution of March 12, 1987 at her address of record.
Mrs. Laureta informed process server Lorenzo C. Bardel that Ilustre was residing
at 17-D, Quezon St., Tondo, Manila. Romeo C. Regala, another process server,
went to that address to serve copy of the Resolution but he reported:

In fine, we discern nothing in Atty. Laureta's Motion for Reconsideration that

would call for a modification, much less a reversal, of our finding that he is guilty
of grave professional misconduct that renders him unfit to continue to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to an attorney and officer
of the Court.
(2)
Neither do we find merit in Ilustre's Motion for Reconsideration. She has turned
deaf ears to any reason or clarification. She and her counsel have refused to
accept the untenability of their case and the inevitability of losing in Court. They

4. That inspite of diligent efforts to locate the address of

ms.Eva Maravilla-Ilustre, said address could not be located;
5. That I even asked the occupants (Cerdan Family) of No. 17
Quezon Street, Tondo, Manila, and they informed that there is
no such Ms. Eva Maravilla-Ilustre in the neighborhood and/or
in the vicinity; ... (p. 672, Rollo, Vol. 11).
The third process server, Nelson C. Cabesuela, was also unable to serve copy of
this Court's Resolution on Ilustre. He reported:
2. On March 17, 1987, at about 9:30 A.M., I arrived at the
house in the address furnished at; the notice of judgment (101
Felix Manalo St., Cubao, Quezon City), and was received by
an elderly woman who admitted to be the owner of the house
but vehemently refused to be Identified, and told me that she
does not know the addressee Maravilla, and told me further
that she always meets different persons looking for Miss

Maravilla because the latter always gives the address of her

house;
3. That, I was reminded of an incident that I also experienced
in the same place trying to serve a resolution to Miss Maravilla
which was returned unserved because she is not known in the
place; ... (p. 674, Rollo, Vol. II).
And yet, in her Petition for Extension of Time and in her Motion for
Reconsideration she persists in giving that address at 101 Felix Manalo St.,
Cubao, Quezon City, where our process servers were told that she was not a
resident of and that she was unknown thereat. If for her contumacious
elusiveness and lack of candor alone, Ilustre deserves no further standing before
this Court.
ACCORDINGLY, the respective Motions for reconsideration of Atty. Wenceslao
G. Laureta for the setting aside of the order suspending him from the practice of
law, and of Eva Maravilla Ilustre for the lifting of the penalty for contempt are
DENIED, and this denial is FINAL. Eva Maravilla Ilustre shall pay the fine of
P1,000.00 imposed on her within ten (10) days from notice, or, suffer
imprisonment for ten (10) days upon failure to pay said fine within the stipulated
period.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 74517 February 23, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BENNY DY, accused-appellant.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
At around midnight of 7 May 1984, death cast its shadow over Boracay Island, an
internationally known tourist spot famous for its powdery white sand beach.The
Island is accessible by an from Kalibo, Aklan, after a one-and-a-half hour trip. It
can also be reached in twenty (20) minutes by pumpboat from Barangay
Caticlan, the loading point for tourists going to the Island. Caticlan has a small
airfield which can service small planes. Felled by a gunshot wound on the neck,
which caused his death approximately, six (6) hours later, was Christian Langel y
Philippe, a Swiss tourist who was vacationing on the Island together with his
sister and some friends.
The following day, 8 May 1984, the following police report was entered as Entry
No. 3904 in the police blotter of the Malay Police Sub-station, Malay, Aklan:
That on or about 0700H 8 May 1984, Pat. Padilla RR reported
(to) this sub-station with the living body of one Beny Dy, with
caliber .38 Danao made, as suspect to the shooting incident at
Sitio Angol, Manoc-Manoc Malay, Aklan, which cause(d) the
untimely death of one Christian Langel Philippe, tourist, 24
years old and a Swiss nationale. Pat. Salibio rushed to the
hospital at Caticlan to obtain antemortem but the victim died at
about 0600H in the morning. Suspect Benny Dy voluntarily
surrendered to the sub-station commander with his caliber 38
with serial number 33169 Smith and Wesson (US), [Exhibit
"G"].

Acting on the report, Chief of Police Tambong, also on 8 May 1984, prepared a
Complaint (Exhibits "H" and 'H-l") charging the Accused, Benny Dy, the owner of
"Benny's Bar," situated on the Island, with the crime of Murder With the Use of
Unlicensed firearms (Ibid., p. 2, Original Record). The Complaint was subscribed
and sworn to before Judge Jaime R. Tonel of the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court
of Buruanga, Aklan, on 17 May 1984 (Exhibit "H-2") and docketed as Criminal
Case No. 1776 of that Court on the same day (Exhibit "H-3", Order, p. 4, Original
Record).
The witnesses listed in that Complaint, namely, Bernadette Langel of Chatelaine
Geneve, Switzerland, who is the victim's sister, and Ian Mulvey, of Essex,
England, executed separate Sworn Statements giving their respective versions of
the incident (Exhibits "H-4" and 'H-7"). They did not take the stand, however, for
fear of reprisal" so that said Statements were correctly considered by the Trial
Court as hearsay. On 17 May 1984, Judge Tonel issued the following:
ORDER
Having conducted the preliminary examination of this case, this
Court finds probable cause that the crime as charged has been
committed and that the accused may be responsible thereof.
WHEREFORE, let the records of this case be registered in the
docket. No warrant of arrest is issued for the apprehension of
the accused for the reason that he is already under police
custody before the filing of the complaint. For the provisional
liberty of the accused, bail is hereby fixed in the amount of
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00). (p. 4, Original Record)
The Accused posted the required bail on 13 June 1984, which was approved by
Judge Tonel on the same day. On 12 July 1984 the records of the case were
forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, Kalibo, Aklan, "for further
proceedings" (Order, p. 10, Original Record)
On 27 July 1984 the Provincial Fiscal filed the Information before the Regional
Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, charging the Accused with Murder. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 2001 in that Court.
After trial, the lower Court rendered judgment * on 9 December 1985 with the
following decretal portion:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the

accused BENNY DY y LIM guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of MURDER and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to indemnify the heirs, for the
death of the victim, in the sum of P30,000.00; actual damages
of P33,243.10; moral damages of P30,000.00; exemplary
damages of P30,000.00; and to pay the costs.
Hence, this appeal. The last Brief before this Court was filed on 26 February
1987 and the case was deliberated upon on 25 January 1988.
Testifying for the prosecution in the Court below, one Wilson TUMAOB, a
resident in the area, and a fisherman by occupation, gave his account of the
incident as follows:
At around 12:00 midnight while inside the bar, he saw the
accused Benny Dy shoot a white person, (meaning a
European) who was hit on the right side of the neck Tsn. Nov.
12, 1984, pp. 78, 80). He recognized the accused as the one
who shot the white person because of the light coming from
the petromax lamp which was in front of him and he was just
one-and-one-half meters from the accused and about the
same distance from the victim (Tsn. Nov. 12, 1984, p. 81).
When he saw the accused shoot the victim, he did not hear
any conversation between them (Tsn. Nov. 14, 1984, pp. 81,
82). At that precise time, there were many people of different
nationalities coming in and out of the bar. He did not know
anyone of them except the accused Benny Dy (Tsn. Nov. 14,
1984, p. 108). Neither did he know the helpers in the bar, nor
see anyone of these customers to be residents of, or friends of
his from, barrio Balusbos, Malay, where he resides.
In the courtroom during the trial, the witness Wilson Tumaob
demonstrated how the a shot the victim.
Q. When you said you saw Benny Dy shoot the victim, can you
demonstrate to the Court how he did it?

A (As demonstrated, the victim and the accused were sitting

and facing then immediately the accused stood up and shot
the victim. (Tsn. Nov. 14, 1984, pp. 117, 118).
Wilson Tumaob testified that the accused was about one meter
from the victim when the accused shot the latter. The table
where he was sitting was parallel to the table where the victim
was sitting. He was looking at the accused and the victim when
he saw the accused shoot the victim, and the chair occupied
by him and the chair occupied by the victim were at the same
side. (Tsn Nov. 14, 1984, pp. 119-120). After shooting the
victim, the accused remained at the place where the accused
was standing (Tsn. Nov. 14, 1984, p. 118).
The victim was carried by the victim's companions to the shore
and they loaded him on a pumpboat which was anchored
about fifty meters from the bar. Wilson Tumaob helped in
carrying the victim to the pumpboat to be brought to the
hospital in Caticlan (Tsn. Nov. 12, 1984, pp. 82, 83). After the
incident the eye-witness (Wilson Tumaob) went home and
slept at around 1:30 in the morning of May 8,1984. (pp. 4-5,
Annex '1', Appellant's Brief).
Additional prosecution evidence is to the effect that in the early
morning after the incident, the Accused confessed orally to Pat.
Rodolfo Padilla, the operator of the radio station on the Island,
and voluntarily surrendered the gun he had used in shooting
the victim. Pat. Padilla's testimony reads in part:
ATTY. RESURRECCION:
Q Sometime on May 8,1984, can you tell the Honorable Court
if you have met the accused Benny Dy?
A At home after coming from the radio station, Benny Dy came
to me and inquired if the Office of the Chief of Police was
opened?
Q And what did you answer him when the accused asked you
that?

A I answered him that the Office of the Chief of Police is

opened for twenty four hours.
Q Did you ask Benny Dy why he asked you if the Office of the
Chief of Police was opened?
A I inquired him why, then he answered me that he had shot a
tourist." (P. 6, t.s.n., October 17,1984).
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. RESURRECCION:
Q When Benny Dy answered you that he shot a tourist, what
did you do?
A I inquired him further if the tourist was dead but he answered
me that the victim was brought to the hospital.
Q What did you do as police officer when Benny Dy told you
that he shot a tourist? A He asked me to accompany him to the
Office of the Chief of Police and I further asked him the gun he
used in shooting the victim and he answered that it was still in
his house.
Q When Benny Dy told you that the gun he used in shooting
the tourist was in his house, what did you do?
A I advised him to get that gun and give it to me to be
deposited in the Office of the Chief of Police.
Q Were you able to get that gun from the house of Benny Dy A
Yes, sir. Q Were you alone when you went to the house of
Benny Dy to get that gun
A I called one of the policemen to accompany me.
Q What is the name of the policeman who accompanied you?

A Pat. Manuel Casimiro.

Q What time of May 8, 1984, did Benny Dy give to you and

Pat. Manuel Casimiro the gun he gave to you?

Q Were you able to get the gun from the house of Benny Dy
together with your companion Pat. Manuel Casimiro?

A About 6:00 in the morning. (pp. 7-9, Id.)

A Benny Dy voluntarily gave the gun to us.

xxx xxx xxx

Q So do we understand from you that it was Benny Dy also

together with your companion Manuel Casimiro who gave or
surrendered the gun to you?

Q When Benny Dy told you that he shot a tourist in his

establishment, known as Benny's Bar, what else did he tell
you?

ATTY. MARIN:

A He told me that after shooting the victim he requested

somebody to rush the victim to the hospital.

Benny Dy voluntarily gave the gun to him and Pat. Casimiro.

Q Did you ask him why he shot the victim?
COURT TO THE WITNESS:
A I did not.
Q Where did Benny Dy give to you and Pat. Manuel Casimiro
the gun that is surrendered to you?
A In their house.

Q You stated that the accused Benny Dy surrendered to you a

gun together with Pat. Manuel Casimiro, if that gun is shown to
you, will you be able to Identify the same?

COURT:

A Yes, sir.

Proceed.

Q I am showing to you a gun in a container revolver caliber.38

and one (1) bullet exhibit against Benny Dy, which we request
that this container be marked as Exhibit 'A' for the prosecution,
Your Honor.

ATTY. RESURRECCION:
Q Who were the persons present in the house of Benny Dy
when the gun was given to you by him?
A His houseboy called Tan-tan'.
Q Was this Tan-tan already adult or teen-ager?
A Teenager.

COURT:
Mark it.
ATTY. RESURRECCION:
Q Is this the same gun you are referring to which was
surrendered by Benny Dy?

A Yes, sir, this is the one. (Witness identifying the gun.) (pp. 1112, Id.)
The sequence of events presented by the prosecution then discloses that
Together with Pat, Manuel Casimiro, Pat. Padilla accompanied
Benny Dy to the police headquarters at the Poblacion of Malay.
At the police headquarters, Pat. Padilla gave the gun
surrendered by Benny Dy to Chief of Police Ariston Tambong
who in turn handed it over to police supply officer Pat. Romulo
Sijano for safekeeping (pp. 13-24, 27, Id). (pp- 7-9, Appellee's
Brief).
The defense version, on the other hand, professes the innocence of the Accused,
denies his presence inside the bar during the shooting, and attributes the offense
to an unrecognized person. Thus:
On May 7, 1984, Benny Dy was inside his bar. However, he
remained therein for a few hours as he had a headache. He
left his bar at around 9:30 or 10:00 o'clock in the evening, and
went to bed in a room at the annex building behind the bar. He
left his friend, Francisco Ureta known as Tan-tan and his new
helper, Romy, to attend and take charge of the bar.
In that evening of May 7, 1984, there were several customers
inside the bar. Some people were dancing. At about midnight,
a person entered Benny's Bar and in less than two (2) minutes,
an explosion was heard inside the bar. The explosion caused
the customers to scream; they rushed out of the bar including
the person who entered immediately before the explosion.
The loud explosion coupled with the screaming and rushing of
customers awakened Benny Dy. He was prompted to
immediately come out of his room and directly proceeded to
the bar. Inside the bar, Benny saw a man lying on the sand
floor with blood on his shirt.
Instinctively, Benny Dy carried this man to the beach, and
woke up Charlie the owner of a pump boat which could take
the wounded man to the hospital. While the wounded man was

being loaded in a pumpboat, several persons arrived including

Australian Nurses to render assistance. The wounded man
was finally brought to Aklan Baptist Hospital at Caticlan, Malay,
Aklan for treatment. Unfortunately, the patient, whose real
name is Christian Langel, died.
The shooting in Benny's Bar may nabaril sa Benny's Bar',
immediately, spread like forest wild fire in the small Island of
Boracay and rapidly transferred from one ear to another and in
the course thereof, it became distorted from 'may nabaril sa
Benny's Bar' to 'may nabaril sa Benny and finally may nabaril si
Benny'. Consequently, loose talks rapidly spread that
somebody was shot by Benny ('may nabaril si Benny').
Appellant Benny Dy who carried the victim to the shore to be
brought to the hospital to save the latter, and who facilitated
the surrender to Pat. Rodolfo Padilla a gun which his helper
found the following morning while cleaning the bar, eventually
found himself t suspect in shooting of Langel. (pp. 1-3,
Appellant's Brief)
All defense witnesses were one in testifying that the culprit was someone else
other than the Accused. Thus, Rodrigo Lumogdang, a carpenter allegedly hired
by a friend of the Accused to repair the kitchen of the bar, testified that around
11:30 P.M. of 7 May 1984, he saw a person go inside Benny's Bar but could not
recognize him because the petromax lamp in the bar was not so bright as it was
covered by colored red paper. In less than two minutes after said person entered,
a shot exploded from the inside of the bar. Thereafter he saw the man who had
just entered rush outside holding a gun tucked to his waist (t.s.n., June 25, 1985,
pp. 7-8). He then ran a few meters away and when he came back he saw the
Accused asking "Tantan" what had happened to which the latter replied that a
white person had been shot. In particular, Lumogdang stated that he did not see
the Accused at 6:30 P.M., when he took a stroll in the beach nor when he came
back at around 11:30 P.M. Much less did he see TUMAOB inside the bar.
Another defense witness, Rogelio Lakandula, testified that he went to Benny's
Bar at around 10:00 P.M. of 7 May 1984. While drinking beer thereat he saw a
white person, who was three meters away from him, shot by a person he did not
recognize but he saw him come from the door and enter Benny's Bar alone.
Before and after the shooting incident, he did not see either the Accused or
TUMAOB inside the bar.

Wolfer Tumaob, Jr., a nephew of the principal prosecution witness, TUMAOB,

testified that on 7 May 1984 at 11:00 P.M., TUMAOB, Jover Casidsid, Welmer
Taunan, Wolfer Tumaob, Sr., and he, went out fishing at midsea staying thereat
up to 6:00 A.M. of 8 May 1984 and that they did not pass Boracay Island at all on
7 May 1984 but went home on 8 May 1984.
The accused stoutly denied having made any oral confession alleging that he
went to Pat. Padilla not to report the incident but to state that a boy helper in the
bar had found a gun on the sand floor while cleaning and that Pat. Padilla picked
up the gun from the bar at his (Accused's) request (t.s.n., September 2, 1985, pp.
33-36). The Accused argues that even if he did make such a confession, the
same would be inadmissible in evidence.
The Trial Court found the testimonies of defense witnesses enmeshed in
contradictions on material points, rejected the disclaimers they had made,
accorded more credence to the prosecution version, and as previously stated,
rendered a judgment of conviction.

IV
The trial Court erred in holding that accused shot Langel.
V
The trial Court erred in holding that the conflicting testimonies of Pat. Padilla and
Casimiro relate to minor matters which do not affect their credibility.
VI
The trial Court erred in holding that appellant made the oral confession, and in
admitting the same as well as the entries in the police blotter.
VII

In this appeal, the accused raises the following

The trial Court erred in holding that compliance with the constitutional procedure
on custodial interrogation is not applicable in the instant case.

Assignments of Error

VIII

The trial Court erred in holding that the uncorroborated testimony of Wilson
Tumaob is sufficient to sustain appellant's conviction.

The trial Court erred in holding that the Smith & Wesson revolver cal. .38 with
Serial No. 33169 was the gun which caused the death of Christian Langel.
II
The trial Court erred in finding that Wilson Tumaob testified in court ahead of Dr.
Caturan, so the former's testimony on the relative position of the accused and
victim could not have been influenced or tailored to conform to Dr. Caturan's
findings on the trajectory of the bullet slug found in the victim's body.

IX
The trial Court erred in holding that the evidence adduced by the prosecution is
overwhelming and satisfied the test of proof beyond reasonable doubt in
convicting appellant.
X
The trial Court erred in holding that appellant's defense of alibi is weak.

III
XI
The trial Court erred in holding that Wilson Tumaob had no unfair motive to
fabricate a story different from what he actually witnessed, and in giving weight to
his testimony.

The trial Court erred in convicting accused-appellant.

XII
The trial Court erred in denying accused-appellant's motion for new trial.
The basic issue is actually one of credibility, the crucial question being whether
the Accused had orally admitted his authorship of the crime and surrendered the
gun he had used in shooting the victim, as the prosecution claims, or, whether he
had no involvement whatsoever, the gun surrendered having been found by a
boy helper inside the bar while cleaning the place the morning after the incident,
as the defense would have us believe.
The case history and the documentary evidence attest strongly to Appellant's oral
confession and voluntary surrender. Thus, (1) Entry No. 3904 in the police blotter
of the Malay Police Sub-station, dated 8 May 1984,supra, confirms three
significant details: a) Pat. Padilla's testimony that he had accompanied the
Accused to police headquarters in the early morning of 8 May 1984 after the
latter admitted having "shot a tourist;" b) Appellant's voluntary surrender to the
Chief of Police; and c) his surrender of his Smith & Wesson revolver, cal. .38,
also to the Chief of Police.
It may be that Chief of Police Ariston T. Tambong, who had presumably made
such entry, died on 15 August 1984 before the start of the trial of this case below
and was not in a position to Identify the same before the Court. His successor
(Lt. Audie Arroyo), however, was presented as a prosecution witness and
Identified said entry (t.s.n., October 17, 1984, pp. 29-33).
The revolver, marked as Exhibit "F", in turn, was Identified by Pat. Padilla as the
firearm surrendered by the Accused. When Pat. Padilla stated that he saw the
fatal gun, its serial number and name for the first time (t.s.n., October 17, 1984,
pp. 17-19) he was clearly referring to particulars which he did not concern himself
with at the time of surrender.
Appellant's assertion that the gun he had surrendered was merely found by a boy
helper while cleaning the bar deserves no credence for, if it were so, it would
have been absurd for him to have placed himself under police custody in the
early morning after the incident.
(2) The sworn Complaint for "Murder with Use of Unlicensed Firearm" signed by
the Chief of Police (Exhibit"H"), dated 8 May 1984, also attests to Appellant's oral
confession. Said officer could not have prepared the Complaint with such

promptitude sans investigation at "0700H" the morning after the incident were it
not for Appellant's outright admission. That Complaint forms part of the record of
the proceedings before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga, Aklan, and
is prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated (Section 38, Rule 130, Rules of
Court). That said Complaint was sworn to before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
Judge and filed before this Court only on 17 May 1984 will not detract from the
fact that the Chief of Police had taken official action promptly the very morning of
Appellant's surrender by charging him with "Murder with the Use of Unlicensed
Firearm" after having heard his admission.
(3) The fact of Appellant's surrender is further borne out by the Order of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge, Judge Tonel dated 17 May 1984,
categorically reciting that "no warrant of arrest is issued for the apprehension of
the accused for the reason that he is already under police custody before the
filing of the complaint." It would have been at variance with ordinary voluntarily
placed himself human behavior for Appellant to have under police custody absent
any culpability for any offense.
Contrary to the defense contention, the oral confession made by the accused to
Pat. Padilla that he had shot a tourist' and that the gun he had used in shooting
the victim was in his bar which he wanted surrendered to the Chief of Police
(t.s.n., October 17, 1984, pp. 6-9), is competent evidence against him. The
declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged may be
given in evidence against him (See. 29, Rule 130, Rules of Court). It may in a
sense be also regarded as part of the res gestae. The rule is that, any person,
otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to
testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood all of it.
An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such a case it must be
given in substance (23 C.J.S. 196, cited in People vs. Tawat, G.R. No. 62871,
May 25, 1985, 129 SCRA 431).
What was told by the Accused to Pat, Padilla was a spontaneous statement not
elicited through questioning, but given an ordinary manner. No written confession
was sought to be presented in evidence as a result of formal custodial
investigation. (People vs. Taylaran, G.R. No. 49149, October 31, 1981, 108
SCRA 373). The Trial Court, therefore, cannot be held to have erred in holding
that compliance with the constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation is not
applicable in the instant case, as the defense alleges in its Error VII.
With the indubitable official and documentary evidence on record, the identity of
the Accused as the victim's assailant is indisputable. The denials by the defense

immediately lose their credibility and the errors it has assigned are rendered
without any merit whatsoever.

denying Appellant's bid for acquittal contrary to the allegations in Errors IV, X and
XI.

Thus, contrary to Error I, the gun which Appellant surrendered to Pat. Padilla and
the Chief of Police, coupled with his voluntary surrender, cannot but be the
weapon which caused the death of the victim. That is no inference; it is clear and
direct evidence, To further require a ballistic examination and a paraffin test
would have been a superfluous exercise.

Lastly, neither was any error committed by the Trial Court in denying the defense
Motion for New Trial (Error XII) based on the affidavit of recantation of witness
TUMAOB that he was not at Benny's Bar when the victim was shot. Even
assuming that it can be considered as newly discovered evidence it is insufficient
to overturn the judgment already rendered, for, it bears emphasizing that
conviction is not based on TUMAOB's testimony alone. Moreover,

The issue raised in Error II as to who testified ahead, TUMAOB or the examining
physician, Dr. Othello Caturan, also becomes irrelevent, TUMAOB's testimony
being corroborated by the documentary evidence heretofore mentioned. Besides,
even without TUMAOB's testimony the documentary evidence on record more
than suffices to overcome the disclaimers by Appellant and on which his
assigned Errors VIII & IX are predicated.
TUMAOB's motive in testifying the way he did, further assailed in Error III, is
immaterial considering the corroboration his testimony received from Appellant's
proven actuations after the incident. Efforts by the defense to discredit him as a
"professional witness," who allegedly asked for a consideration from Appellant of
P500. 00 to swing the testimony in Appellant's favor, but which the latter rejected,
with the insinuation that he could have been paid by Swiss authorities to testify
the way he did in Court, is unavailing since conviction is not based on his
testimony alone.
Whatever inconsistencies there may have been in the testimonies of Patrolmen
Padilla and Casimiro, posited in Error V, are sufficiently overcome by the
documentary evidence of record.
As to the testimonial evidence presented by the defense, which the Trial Court
rejected, we find no reversible error in the meticulous assessment it had made
thereof, ably pointing out the material contradictions in the testimonies and
consequently their lack of credibility.
The entries in the police blotter were properly admitted by the Trial Court,
contrary to the allegation in Error VI forming, as they do, part of official records.
The defense of alibi must likewise be rejected in the face of overwhelming
evidence against the Accused. The Trial Court cannot ba faulted, therefore, for

Affidavits of retraction executed by witnesses who had

previously testified in court will not be countenanced for the
purpose of securing a new trial It would be a dangerous rule
for courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken before courts of
justice simply because the witnesses who had given them later
on change their mind for one reason or another, for such a rule
would make solemn trials a mockery and place the
investigation of truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.
Affidavits of retraction can be easily secured from poor and
ignorant witnesses usually for a monetary consideration.
Recanted testimony is exceedingly unreliable. So courts are
wary or reluctant to allow a new trial based on retracted
testimony. (People vs. Saliling, et al, L-27974, February
27,1976, 69 SCRA 427, cited in Ibabao vs. People, L-36957,
September 28, 1984, 132 SCRA 216).
The penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the Trial Court, however, will have
to be modified. With the abolition of the death penalty in the 1987 Constitution,
the penalty for Murder is now reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua. With the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to
which the Accused should be entitled, the penalty is imposable in its minimum
period or from seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to eighteen
(18) years and eight (8) months. For the application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the range of the penalty next lower is prision mayor in its
maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or, from ten (10)
years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.
WHEREFORE, the test of proof beyond reasonable doubt having been met, the
judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED but with the penalty MODIFIED to
an indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as

minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. Costs against the accused-appellant Benny Dy.

But, did the Win-Win Resolution culminate in victory for all the contending
parties?

SO ORDERED.

The above-named petitioners cried foul. They have come to this Court
urging us to annul and set aside the Win-Win Resolution and to enjoin
respondent Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao of the Department of Agrarian Reform
from implementing the said Resolution.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 131457. April 24, 1998]
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON,
HON. REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO,
BUKIDNON,
NQSR
MANAGEMENT
AND
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. HON. RENATO C. CORONA,
DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO,
SECRETARY
OF
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
AGRARIAN
REFORM, respondents.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
The dramatic and well-publicized hunger strike staged by some alleged
farmer-beneficiaries in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform compound in
Quezon City on October 9, 1997 commanded nationwide attention that even
church leaders and some presidential candidates tried to intervene for the
strikers cause.
The strikers protested the March 29, 1996 Decision[1] of the Office of the
President (OP), issued through then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres in OP
Case No. 96-C-6424, which approved the conversion of a one hundred forty-four
(144)-hectare land from agricultural to agro-industrial/institutional area. This led
the Office of the President, through then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C.
Corona, to issue the so-called Win-Win Resolution [2] on November 7, 1997,
substantially modifying its earlier Decision after it had already become final
and executory. The said Resolution modified the approval of the land
conversion to agro-industrial area only to the extent of forty-four (44) hectares,
and ordered the remaining one hundred (100) hectares to be distributed to
qualified farmer-beneficiaries.

Thus, the crucial issue to be resolved in this case is: What is the legal effect
of the Win-Win Resolution issued by the Office of the President on its earlier
Decision involving the same subject matter, which had already become final and
executory?
The antecedent facts of this controversy, as culled from the pleadings, may
be stated as follows:
1. This case involves a 144-hectare land located at San Vicente, Sumilao,
Bukidnon, owned by the Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and
Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners. The property is
covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14371[3] of the Registry of Deeds of
the Province of Bukidnon.
2. In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to the Philippine
Packing Corporation, now Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (DMPI), a multinational
corporation, for a period of ten (10) years under the Crop Producer and Growers
Agreement duly annotated in the certificate of title. The lease expired in April,
1994.
3. In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease, the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the entire 144-hectare property under compulsory
acquisition and assessed the land value at P2.38 million.[4]
4. NQSRMDC resisted the DARs action. In February, 1992, it sought and
was granted by the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), through its Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) in DARAB Case No. X-576, a writ of
prohibition with preliminary injunction which ordered the DAR Region X Director,
the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of Bukidnon, the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Sumilao, Bukidnon, the Land Bank of the
Philippines (Land Bank), and their authorized representatives to desist from

pursuing any activity or activities concerning the subject land until further orders.
[5]

5. Despite the DARAB order of March 31, 1992, the DAR Regional Director
issued a memorandum, dated May 21, 1992, directing the Land Bank to open a
trust account for P2.38 million in the name of NQSRMDC and to conduct
summary proceedings to determine the just compensation of the subject
property. NQSRMDC objected to these moves and filed on June 9, 1992 an
Omnibus Motion to enforce the DARAB order of March 31, 1992 and to nullify the
summary proceedings undertaken by the DAR Regional Director and Land Bank
on the valuation of the subject property.
6. The DARAB, on October 22, 1992, acted favorably on the Omnibus
Motion by (a) ordering the DAR Regional Director and Land Bank to seriously
comply with the terms of the order dated March 31, 1992; (b) nullifying the DAR
Regional Directors memorandum, dated May 21, 1992, and the summary
proceedings conducted pursuant thereto; and (c) directing the Land Bank to
return the claim folder of Petitioner NQSRMDCs subject property to the DAR until
further orders.[6]
7. The Land Bank complied with the DARAB order and cancelled the trust
account it opened in the name of petitioner NQSRMDC.[7]
8. In the meantime, the Provincial Development Council (PDC) of Bukidnon,
headed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, passed Resolution No. 6, [8] dated January
7, 1993, designating certain areas along Bukidnon-Sayre Highway as part of the
Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Zones where the subject property is situated.
9. What happened thereafter is well-narrated in the OP (TORRES) Decision
of March 29, 1996, pertinent portions of which we quote:
Pursuant to Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon, on March 4,
1993, enacted Ordinance No. 24 converting or re-classifying 144 hectares of land
in Bgy. San Vicente, said Municipality, from agricultural to industrial/institutional
with a view of providing an opportunity to attract investors who can inject new
economic vitality, provide more jobs and raise the income of its people.

Parenthetically, under said section, 4th to 5th class municipalities may authorize
the classification of five percent (5%) of their agricultural land area and provide
for the manner of their utilization or disposition.
On 12 October 1993, the Bukidnon Provincial Land Use Committee approved the
said Ordinance. Accordingly, on 11 December 1993, the instant application for
conversion was filed by Mr. Gaudencio Beduya in behalf of NQSRMDC/BAIDA
(Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Development Association).
Expressing support for the proposed project, the Bukidnon Provincial Board, on
the basis of a Joint Committee Report submitted by its Committee on Laws,
Committee on Agrarian Reform and Socio-Economic Committee approved, on 1
February 1994, the said Ordinance now docketed as Resolution No. 94-95. The
said industrial area, as conceived by NQSRMDC (project proponent) is supposed
to have the following components:
1. The Development Academy of Mindanao which constitutes the following:
Institute for Continuing Higher Education; Institute for Livelihood Science
(Vocational and Technical School); Institute for Agribusiness Research; Museum,
Library, Cultural Center, and Mindanao Sports Development Complex which
covers an area of 24 hectares;
2. Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Park which consists of corn processing for corn oil,
corn starch, various corn products; rice processing for wine, rice-based snacks,
exportable rice; cassava processing for starch, alcohol and food delicacies;
processing plants, fruits and fruit products such as juices; processing plants for
vegetables processed and prepared for market; cold storage and ice plant;
cannery system; commercial stores; public market; and abattoir needing about
67 hectares;
3. Forest development which includes open spaces and parks for recreation,
horse-back riding, memorial and mini-zoo estimated to cover 33 hectares; and
4. Support facilities which comprise the construction of a 360-room hotel,
restaurants, dormitories and a housing project covering an area of 20 hectares.
The said NQSRMDC Proposal was, per Certification dated January 4, 1995,
adopted by the Department of Trade and Industry, Bukidnon Provincial Office, as
one of its flagship projects. The same was likewise favorably recommended by
the Provincial Development Council of Bukidnon; the municipal, provincial and

regional office of the DAR; the Regional Office (Region X) of the DENR (which
issued an Environmental Compliance Certificate on June 5, 1995); the Executive
Director, signing By Authority of PAUL G. DOMINGUEZ, Office of the President
Mindanao; the Secretary of DILG; and Undersecretary of DECS Wilfredo D.
Clemente.
In the same vein, the National Irrigation Administration, Provincial Irrigation
Office, Bagontaas Valencia, Bukidnon, thru Mr. Julius S. Maquiling, Chief,
Provincial Irrigation Office, interposed NO OBJECTION to the proposed
conversion as long as the development cost of the irrigation systems thereat
which is P2,377.00 per hectare be replenished by the developer x x x. Also, the
Kisolon-San Vicente Irrigators Multi Purpose Cooperative, San Vicente, Sumilao,
Bukidnon, interposed no objection to the proposed conversion of the land in
question as it will provide more economic benefits to the community in terms
of outside investments that will come and employment opportunities that will be
generated by the projects to be put up x x x.
On the same score, it is represented that during the public consultation held at
the Kisolan Elementary School on 18 March 1995 with Director Jose
Macalindong of DAR Central Office and DECS Undersecretary Clemente, the
people of the affected barangay rallied behind their respective officials in
endorsing the project.
Notwithstanding the foregoing favorable recommendation, however, on
November 14, 1994, the DAR, thru Secretary Garilao, invoking its powers to
approve conversion of lands under Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, issued an Order
denying the instant application for the conversion of the subject land from
agricultural to agro-industrial and, instead, placed the same under the
compulsory coverage of CARP and directed the distribution thereof to all
qualified beneficiaries on the following grounds:
1. The area is considered as a prime agricultural land with irrigation facility;
2. The land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition (NCA);
3. The existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas covered by NCA is not
applicable;
4. There is no clear and tangible compensation package arrangements for the
beneficiaries;

5. The procedures on how the area was identified and reclassified for agroindustrial project has no reference to Memo Circular No. 54, Series of 1993, E.O.
No. 72, Series of 1993, and E.O. No. 124, Series of 1993.
A Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order was filed on January 9, 1995
by applicant but the same was denied (in an Order dated June 7, 1995).[9]
10. Thus, the DAR Secretary ordered the DAR Regional Director to proceed
with the compulsory acquisition and distribution of the property.[10]
11. Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon appealed[11] the order of denial
to the Office of the President and prayed for the conversion/reclassification of the
subject land as the same would be more beneficial to the people of Bukidnon.
12. To prevent the enforcement of the DAR Secretarys order, NQSRMDC,
on June 29, 1995, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition with preliminary injunction,[12] docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 37614.
13. Meanwhile, on July 25, 1995, the Honorable Paul G. Dominguez, then
Presidential Assistant for Mindanao, after conducting an evaluation of the
proposed project, sent a memorandum[13] to the President favorably endorsing
the project with a recommendation that the DAR Secretary reconsider his
decision in denying the application of the province for the conversion of the land.
14. Also, in a memorandum[14] to the President dated August 23, 1995, the
Honorable Rafael Alunan III, then Secretary of the Department of the Interior and
Local Government (DILG), recommended the conversion of the subject land to
industrial/institutional use with a request that the President hold the
implementation of the DAR order to distribute the land in question.
15. On October 23, 1995, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 37614,
issued a Resolution[15] ordering the parties to observe status quo pending
resolution of the petition. At the hearing held in said case on October 5, 1995, the
DAR, through the Solicitor General, manifested before the said court that the
DAR was merely in the processing stage of the applications of farmers-claimants
and has agreed to respect status quo pending the resolution of the petition.[16]
16. In resolving the appeal, the Office of the President, through then
Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres, issued a Decision in OP Case No. 96-C-

6424, dated March 29, 1996, reversing the DAR Secretarys decision, the
pertinent portions of which read:

are no beneficiaries to speak about, for the land is not tenanted as already
stated.

After a careful evaluation of the petition vis--vis the grounds upon which the
denial thereof by Secretary Garilao was based, we find that the instant
application for conversion by the Municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon is impressed
with merit. To be sure, converting the land in question from agricultural to agroindustrial would open great opportunities for employment and bring about real
development in the area towards a sustained economic growth of the
municipality. On the other hand, distributing the land to would-be beneficiaries
(who are not even tenants, as there are none) does not guarantee such benefits.

Nor can procedural lapses in the manner of identifying/reclassifying the subject

property for agro-industrial purposes be allowed to defeat the very purpose of the
law granting autonomy to local government units in the management of their local
affairs. Stated more simply, the language of Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, supra,
is clear and affords no room for any other interpretation. By unequivocal legal
mandate, it grants local government units autonomy in their local affairs including
the power to convert portions of their agricultural lands and provide for the
manner of their utilization and disposition to enable them to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities.

Nevertheless, on the issue that the land is considered a prime agricultural land
with irrigation facility it maybe appropriate to mention that, as claimed by
petitioner, while it is true that there is, indeed, an irrigation facility in the area, the
same merely passes thru the property (as a right of way) to provide water to the
ricelands located on the lower portion thereof. The land itself, subject of the
instant petition, is not irrigated as the same was, for several years, planted with
pineapple by the Philippine Packing Corporation.
On the issue that the land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory
Acquisition (NCA) and that the existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas
covered by NCA is not applicable, suffice it to state that the said NCA was
declared null and void by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) as early as March 1, 1992. Deciding in favor of NQSRMDC, the
DARAB correctly pointed out that under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6657, the subject
property could not validly be the subject of compulsory acquisition until after the
expiration of the lease contract with Del Monte Philippines, a Multi-National
Company, or until April 1994, and ordered the DAR Regional Office and the Land
Bank of the Philippines, both in Butuan City, to `desist from pursuing any activity
or activities covering petitioners land.
On this score, we take special notice of the fact that the Quisumbing family has
already contributed substantially to the land reform program of the government,
as follows: 300 hectares of rice land in Nueva Ecija in the 70s and another 400
hectares in the nearby Municipality of Impasugong, Bukidnon, ten (10) years ago,
for which they have not received just compensation up to this time.
Neither can the assertion that there is no clear and tangible compensation
package arrangements for the beneficiaries hold water as, in the first place, there

WHEREFORE, in pursuance of the spirit and intent of the said legal mandate
and in view of the favorable recommendations of the various government
agencies abovementioned, the subject Order, dated November 14, 1994 of the
Hon. Secretary, Department of Agrarian Reform, is hereby SET ASIDE and the
instant application of NQSRMDC/BAIDA is hereby APPROVED.[17]
17.On May 20, 1996, DAR filed a motion for reconsideration of the OP
decision.
18 On September 11, 1996, in compliance with the OP decision of March
29, 1996, NQSRMDC and the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS) executed a Memorandum of Agreementwhereby the former donated four
(4) hectares from the subject land to DECS for the establishment of the NQSR
High School.[18]
When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title over the 4-hectare donated
to DECS, it discovered that the title over the subject property was no longer in its
name. It soon found out that during the pendency of both the Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition, with Preliminary Injunction it filed against DAR in the Court
of Appeals and the appeal to the President filed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich,
the DAR, without giving just compensation, caused the cancellation of
NQSRMDCs title on August 11, 1995 and had it transferred in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines under TCT No. T-50264[19] of the Registry of Deeds of
Bukidnon. Thereafter, on September 25, 1995, DAR caused the issuance of
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00240227 and had it
registered in the name of 137 farmer-beneficiaries under TCT No. AT-3536 [20] of
the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon.

19. Thus, on April 10, 1997, NQSRMDC filed a complaint [21] with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay, Bukidnon (Branch 9), docketed as Civil
Case No. 2687-97, for annulment and cancellation of title, damages and
injunction against DAR and 141 others. The RTC then issued a Temporary
Restraining Order on April 30, 1997[22] and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction on May
19, 1997,[23] restraining the DAR and 141 others from entering, occupying and/or
wresting from NQSRMDC the possession of the subject land.
20. Meanwhile, on June 23, 1997, an Order[24] was issued by then
Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres denying DARs motion for reconsideration
for having been filed beyond the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days. The
said order further declared that the March 29, 1996 OP decision had already
become final and executory.
21. The DAR filed on July 11, 1997 a second motion for reconsideration of
the June 23, 1997 Order of the President.
22. On August 12, 1997, the said writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
RTC was challenged by some alleged farmers before the Court of Appeals
through a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
44905, praying for the lifting of the injunction and for the issuance of a writ of
prohibition from further trying the RTC case.
23. On October 9, 1997, some alleged farmer-beneficiaries began their
hunger strike in front of the DAR Compound in Quezon City to protest the OP
Decision of March 29, 1996. On October 10, 1997, some persons claiming to be
farmer-beneficiaries of the NQSRMDC property filed a motion for intervention
(styled as Memorandum In Intervention) in O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424, asking that
the OP Decision allowing the conversion of the entire 144-hectare property be
set aside.[25]
24. President Fidel V. Ramos then held a dialogue with the strikers and
promised to resolve their grievance within the framework of the law. He created
an eight (8)-man Fact Finding Task Force (FFTF) chaired by Agriculture
Secretary Salvador Escudero to look into the controversy and recommend
possible solutions to the problem.[26]
25. On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President resolved the strikers
protest by issuing the so-called Win/Win Resolution penned by then Deputy
Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Office of the President,

through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, dated March 29, 1996, is hereby
MODIFIED as follows:
1. NQSRMDCs application for conversion is APPROVED only
with respect to the approximately forty-four (44) hectare
portion of the land adjacent to the highway, as
recommended by the Department of Agriculture.
2. The remaining approximately one hundred (100) hectares
traversed by an irrigation canal and found to be suitable for
agriculture shall be distributed to qualified farmerbeneficiaries in accordance with RA 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law with a right of way to
said portion from the highway provided in the portion fronting
the highway. For this purpose, the DAR and other concerned
government agencies are directed to immediately conduct
the segregation survey of the area, valuation of the property
and generation of titles in the name of the identified farmerbeneficiaries.
3. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby directed to
carefully and meticulously determine who among the
claimants are qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
4. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby further directed
to expedite payment of just compensation to NQSRMDC for
the portion of the land to be covered by the CARP, including
other lands previously surrendered by NQSRMDC for CARP
coverage.
5. The Philippine National Police is hereby directed to render full
assistance to the Department of Agrarian Reform in the
implementation of this Order.
We take note of the Memorandum in Intervention filed by 113 farmers on October
10, 1997 without ruling on the propriety or merits thereof since it is unnecessary
to pass upon it at this time.
SO ORDERED.[27]

A copy of the Win-Win Resolution was received by Governor Carlos O.

Fortich of Bukidnon, Mayor Rey B. Baula of Sumilao, Bukidnon, and NQSRMDC
on November 24, 1997[28] and, on December 4, 1997, they filed the present
petition for certiorari, prohibition (under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court)
and injunction with urgent prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction (under Rule 58, ibid.), against then Deputy Executive
Secretary Renato C. Corona and DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao.
On December 12, 1997, a Motion For Leave To Intervene [29] was filed by
alleged farmer-beneficiaries, through counsel, claiming that they are real parties
in interest as they were previously identified by respondent DAR as agrarian
reform beneficiaries on the 144-hectare property subject of this case. The motion
was vehemently opposed[30] by the petitioners.
In seeking the nullification of the Win-Win Resolution, the petitioners claim
that the Office of the President was prompted to issue the said resolution after a
very well-managed hunger strike led by fake farmer-beneficiary Linda Ligmon
succeeded in pressuring and/or politically blackmailing the Office of the President
to come up with this purely political decision to appease the farmers, by reviving
and modifying the Decision of 29 March 1996 which has been declared final
and executory in an Order of 23 June 1997. [31] Thus, petitioners further allege,
respondent then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona committed grave
abuse of discretion and acted beyond his jurisdiction when he issued the
questioned Resolution of 7 November 1997.[32] They availed of this extraordinary
writ of certiorari because there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.[33] They never filed a motion for reconsideration of the
subject Resolution because (it) is patently illegal or contrary to law and it would
be a futile exercise to seek a reconsideration .[34]
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, opposed the petition and
prayed that it be dismissed outright on the following grounds:
(1) The proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a petition for
review directly with the Court of Appeals in accordance with Rule 43 of the
Revised Rules of Court;
(2) The petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed
Win-Win Resolution before filing the present petition; and
(3) Petitioner NQSRMDC is guilty of forum-shopping.

These are the preliminary issues which must first be resolved, including the
incident on the motion for intervention filed by the alleged farmer-beneficiaries.
Anent the first issue, in order to determine whether the recourse of
petitioners is proper or not, it is necessary to draw a line between an error of
judgment and an error of jurisdiction. An error of judgmentis one which the
court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable
only by an appeal.[35] On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where
the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial
body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which
is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.[36] This error is correctable only
by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.[37]
It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments, final orders
or resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial functions,
[38]
including the Office of the President,[39] may be taken to the Court of
Appeals by filing a verified petition for review[40] within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the said judgment, final order or resolution, [41] whether the appeal
involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.[42]
However, we hold that, in this particular case, the remedy prescribed in
Rule 43 is inapplicable considering that the present petition contains an
allegation that the challenged resolution is patently illegal[43]and was issued with
grave abuse of discretion and beyond his (respondent Secretary Renato C.
Coronas) jurisdiction[44] when said resolution substantially modified the earlier OP
Decision of March 29, 1996 which had long become final and executory. In other
words, the crucial issue raised here involves an error of jurisdiction, not an error
of judgment which is reviewable by an appeal under Rule 43. Thus, the
appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the assailed resolution is an original
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, as what the petitioners have
correctly done. The pertinent portion of Section 1 thereof provides:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

x x x x x x x x x.
The office of a writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases cases in
which the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void.[45]
The aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 65 mandates that the person aggrieved
by the assailed illegal act may file a verified petition (for certiorari) in the proper
court. The proper court where the petition must be filed is stated in Section 4 of
the same Rule 65 which reads:
SEC. 4. Where petition filed.- The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60)
days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the
Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a
corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also
be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves
the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided
by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the
Court of Appeals. (4a)
Under the above-quoted Section 4, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals
and Regional Trial Court have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari,[46] prohibition[47] and mandamus.[48] But the jurisdiction of these three (3)
courts are also delineated in that, if the challenged act relates to acts or
omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, the
petition must be filed with the Regional Trial Court which exercises jurisdiction
over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. And if it involves the
act or omission of a quasi-judicial agency, the petition shall be filed only with the
Court of Appeals, unless otherwise provided by law or the Rules of Court. We
have clearly discussed this matter of concurrence of jurisdiction in People vs.
Cuaresma, et. al.,[49] through now Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, thus:
x x x. This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not
exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of
First Instance), which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their
respective regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial
Court, with the Court of Appeals (formerly, Intermediate Appellate Court),
although prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14,
1981, the latters competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to

those in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not,

however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an
absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application
therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A
becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions
for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should be
filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of
Appeals. (Citations omitted)
But the Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance
of the petition filed directly to it if compelling reasons, or the nature and
importance of the issues raised, warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be
observed and which has been reiterated in subsequent cases, namely: [50] Uy vs.
Contreras, et. al.,[51] Torres vs. Arranz,[52] Bercero vs. De Guzman,
[53]
and Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al.[54] As we have further stated in Cuaresma:
x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue
these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established
policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the
Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over
the present petition in the interest of speedy justice [55] and to avoid future
litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present controversy which, as
correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the
magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed
resolution. Moreover, as will be discussed later, we find the assailed resolution
wholly void and requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with the Court of
Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.
That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher
interests of justice is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence. We reiterate what we
said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals:[56]
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must

always be avoided. Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and
excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher interests of
justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of the
proper procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved and
proceed directly to the merits of the case."
As to the second issue of whether the petitioners committed a fatal
procedural lapse when they failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the
assailed resolution before seeking judicial recourse, suffice it to state that the
said motion is not necessary when the questioned resolution is a patent nullity,
[57]
as will be taken up later.
With respect to the third issue, the respondents claim that the filing by the
petitioners of: (a) a petition for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction
(CA-G.R. SP No. 37614) with the Court of Appeals; (b) a complaint for annulment
and cancellation of title, damages and injunction against DAR and 141 others
(Civil Case No. 2687-97) with the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay, Bukidnon;
and (c) the present petition, constitute forum shopping.
We disagree.
The rule is that:
There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one
forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in
another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts but
also in connection with litigation commenced in the courts while an administrative
proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat administrative
processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a
favorable court ruling. This specially so, as in this case, where the court in which
the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction (citations omitted).

in both actions, as well as identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts, and the identity on the two preceding
particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the
action under consideration: all the requisites, in fine, of auter action
pendant.'[58]
It is clear from the above-quoted rule that the petitioners are not guilty of
forum shopping. The test for determining whether a party has violated the rule
against forum shopping is where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
adjudicata in the action under consideration. A cursory examination of the cases
filed by the petitioners does not show that the said cases are similar with each
other. The petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals sought the nullification of
the DAR Secretarys order to proceed with the compulsory acquisition and
distribution of the subject property. On the other hand, the civil case in RTC of
Malaybalay, Bukidnon for the annulment and cancellation of title issued in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines, with damages, was based on the
following grounds: (1) the DAR, in applying for cancellation of petitioner
NQSRMDCs title, used documents which were earlier declared null and void by
the DARAB; (2) the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title was made without payment
of just compensation; and (3) without notice to NQSRMDC for the surrender of its
title. The present petition is entirely different from the said two cases as it seeks
the nullification of the assailed Win-Win Resolution of the Office of the President
dated November 7, 1997, which resolution was issued long after the previous two
cases were instituted.

The test for determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping
has been laid down in the 1986 case of Buan vs. Lopez (145 SCRA 34), x x x
and that is, forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are
present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in
the other, as follows:

The fourth and final preliminary issue to be resolved is the motion for
intervention filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries, which we have to deny for lack
of merit. In their motion, movants contend that they are the farmer-beneficiaries
of the land in question, hence, are real parties in interest. To prove this, they
attached as Annex I in their motion a Master List of FarmerBeneficiaries. Apparently, the alleged master list was made pursuant to the
directive in the dispositive portion of the assailed Win-Win Resolution which
directs the DAR to carefully and meticulously determine who among the
claimants are qualified farmer-beneficiaries. However, a perusal of the said
document reveals that movants are those purportedly Found Qualified and
Recommended
for
Approval. In
other
words,
movants
are
merely recommendee farmer-beneficiaries.

There thus exists between the action before this Court and RTC Case No. 8636563 identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests

The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real party in interest is a party who
would be benefited or injured by the judgment or is the party entitled to the avails

of the suit. Real interest means a presentsubstantial interest, as distinguished

from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential
interest.[59] Undoubtedly, movants interest over the land in question is a mere
expectancy. Ergo, they are not real parties in interest.
Furthermore, the challenged resolution upon which movants based their
motion is, as intimated earlier, null and void. Hence, their motion for intervention
has no leg to stand on.

provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion
should not have been entertained considering that the first motion for
reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March
29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in reopening the case and substantially modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which
had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and
basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.
In San Luis, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.[60] we held:

Now to the main issue of whether the final and executory Decision dated
March 29,1996 can still be substantially modified by the Win-Win Resolution.
We rule in the negative.
The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President
of the Philippines are embodied in Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7 thereof
provides:
SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except
as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of
fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a
motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.
Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and
entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases. (Emphasis ours)
It is further provided for in Section 9 that The Rules of Court shall apply in a
suppletory character whenever practicable.
When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23,1997
declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has
seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its
jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its
jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain
the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which
second motion became the basis of the assailed Win-Win Resolution. Section 7
of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of
Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken
from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for
reconsideration was permitted to be filed in exceptionally meritorious cases, as

Since the decisions of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the
President had long become final and executory, the same can no longer be
reviewed by the courts. It is well-established in our jurisprudence that the
decisions and orders of administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to their
quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a
final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata [Brillantes v.
Castro, 99 Phil. 497 (1956), Ipekdijna Merchandizing Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax
Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72.] The rule of res
judicatawhich forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by
competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of
public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their
jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers
[Brillantes v. Castro, supra at 503].
The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions
of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules
and regulations. The noble purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all.
[61]
This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there
would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle
must always be maintained by those who wield the power of adjudication. Any
act which violates such principle must immediately be struck down.
Therefore, the assailed Win-Win Resolution which substantially modified
the Decision of March 29, 1996 after it has attained finality, is utterly void. Such
void resolution, as aptly stressed by Justice Thomas A. Street [62] in a 1918 case,
[63]
is a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or
ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.[64]
WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged
Resolution dated November 7, 1997, issued by the Office of the President in OP

Case No. 96-C-6424, is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Motion For
Leave To Intervene filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries is hereby DENIED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LORENZO J. GANA, PATROCNIO E.

MARGOLLES, ALICE E. SOTTO, VIRGINIA E. VILLONGCO, EDGARDO C.
ESPINOSA, LUCIA A. LAPERAL, NORMA C. ESPINOSA, TERESITA E.
CASAL, PELTAN DEVELOPMENT INC., THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
(formerly CFI) of RIZAL, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAS
PIAS, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PURISIMA, J.:

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 127022

June 28, 2000

FIRESTONE CERAMICS, INC., BOOMTOWN DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, Spouses CYNTHIA D. CHING and CHING TIONG KENG,
Spouses CARMEN SOCO and LORENZO ONG ENG CHONG, Spouses
SOLEDAD B. YU and YU SY CHIA and LETICIA NOCOM CHAN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, LORENZO J. GANA, PATROCINIO E. MARGOLLES,
ALICE E. SOTTO, VIRGINIA E. VILLONGCO, EDGARDO C. ESPINOSA,
LUCIA E. LAPERAL, NORMA C. ESPINOSA, TERESITA E. CASAL, PELTAN
DEVELOPMENT, INC., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (formerly CFI of Rizal) and
the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAS PIAS, METRO MANILA, respondents,
ALEJANDRO B. REY, petitioner-intervenor.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 127245
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR, LAND
MANAGEMENT BUREAU, petitioner,
vs.

This resolves petitioners' Motions to Refer to the Court En Banc these

consolidated cases, which the Third Division decided on September 2, 1999. The
motions for reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioners, Republic of the
Philippines and Firestone Ceramics, Inc., et al., are pending.
Under Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, dated February 7, 1989, as amended by
the Resolution of November 18, 1993:
. . ., the following are considered en banc cases:
1. Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, executive order, or
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance,
or regulation is in question;
2. Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the
death penalty;
3. Cases raising novel questions of law;
4. Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls;
5. Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the Civil
Service Commission, Commission on Elections, and
Commission on Audit;

6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a

judge, officer or employee of the judiciary, disbarment of a
lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of
more than one (1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00 or both;
7. Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the
court en banc or in division may be modified or reversed;
8. Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least
three (3) members thereof merit the attention of the court en
banc and are acceptable to a majority of the actual
membership of the courten banc; and
9. All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its
actual membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit
its attention.
The cases at bar involve a vast tract of land with an area of around
ninety-nine (99) hectares presumptively belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines, which land had been adjudicated to private individuals by a
court alleged to be without jurisdiction. Since the validity of the said
decision and the original certificate of title as well as transfer certificates
of title issued pursuant thereto hinges on the classification of subject
area at the time it was so adjudicated, determination of the validity of
the disposition thereof is in order.
The assailed decision does not indicate the classification of the land in
question, when the herein private respondents obtained their decree of
registration thereover.
In Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, the Court conceded
that it is not infallible. Should any error of judgment be perceived, it does
not blindly adhere to such error, and the parties adversely affected
thereby are not precluded from seeking relief therefrom, by way of a
motion for reconsideration. In this jurisdiction, rectification of an error,
more than anything else, is of paramount importance.
Here, there was submitted to the Court en consulta, petitioners' Motions
to Refer to the Court En Bancthese consolidated cases for the
consideration of the Court. A pleading, entitled "FOR THE

CONSIDERATION OF THE COURT EN BANC, EN CONSULTA," was

presented but when the same was first brought to its attention on March
7, 2000, the Court opined that since the Third Division had not yet acted
on subject motions to refer the cases to the Banc, it was then premature
for the Court to resolve the consulta. However, the Court succinctly
cautioned that the action of the Third Division on the matter would just
be tentative.
On March 8, 2000, the Third Division voted 4-1 to deny petitioners'
motion to transfer these cases to the Banc. Thus, on March 14, 2000,
the Court deliberated on the consulta and thereafter, voted 9-5 to accept
the cases for the Banc to pass upon in view of the finding that the cases
above entitled are of sufficient importance to merit its attention.
Evidently, the action of the Court under the premises is a legitimate and
valid exercise of its RESIDUAL POWER within the contemplation of
paragraph 9 of the Resolution En Bancof November 18, 1993, which
reads: "All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual
membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention."
(emphasis supplied)
Untenable is the contention of Justice Panganiban that the Chief Justice
and the eight (8) Associate Justices who voted to treat these
consolidated cases as En Banc cases, have not given any cogent or
compelling reason for such action. Considering that paragraph 9 of the
Resolution of this Court dated November 18, 1993, has been cited to
support the majority opinion, it is decisively clear that these consolidated
cases have been found to be of sufficient importance to merit the
attention and disposition of the entire Court en banc and therefore, the
prayer of the Republic of the Philippines and the private petitioners for
the Court en banc to hear and resolve their pending motions for
reconsideration, is meritorious. The aforesaid finding by the Court
constitutes a reason cogent and compelling enough to warrant the
majority ruling that the Court En Banc has to act upon and decide
petitioners' motions for reconsideration.1wphi1.nt
It bears stressing that where, as in the present cases, the Court En
Banc entertains a case for its resolution and disposition, it does so
without implying that the Division of origin is incapable of rendering
objective and fair justice. The action of the Court simply means that the
nature of the cases calls for en banc attention and consideration.
Neither can it be concluded that the Court has taken undue advantage

of sheer voting strength. It was merely guided by the well-studied finding

and sustainable opinion of the majority of its actual membership that,
indeed, subject cases are of sufficient importance meriting the action
and decision of the whole Court. It is, of course, beyond cavil that all the
members of this highest Court of the land are always embued with the
noblest of intentions in interpreting and applying the germane provisions
of law, jurisprudence, rules and Resolutions of the Court to the end
that public interest be duly safeguarded and rule of law be observed.
Reliance by Justice Panganiban on the ruling of the Court in the
Sumilao case is misplaced. The said case is not on all fours with these
cases. In the Sumilao case, before it was brought to the Banc en
consulta, the motion for reconsideration of the decision therein rendered
had been voted upon by the Second Division with a vote of 2-2. The
Court ruled that the stalemate resulting from the said voting constituted
a denial of the motion for reconsideration.
In the two consolidated cases under consideration, however, the
Motions for Reconsideration of the petitioners, Republic of the
Philippines and Firestone Ceramics, Inc., et al., are pending and
unresolved.
Taking into account the importance of these cases and the issues
raised, let alone the enormous value of the area in litigation, which is
claimed as government property, there is merit in the prayer of
petitioners that their pending motions for reconsideration should be
resolved by the Court En Banc.
WHEREFORE, these consolidated cases are considered and treated
as en banc cases; and petitioners' motions for reconsideration are
hereby set for oral argument on July 18, 2000, at 11:00 a.m. Let
corresponding notices issue.
SO ORDERED.
In Re Cunanan
IN RE CUNANAN [94 Phil 534; Resolution; 18 Mar 1954]
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful
Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.
Resoluti, 1954on

March 18
Facts:
Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the Bar
Flunkers Act of 1953. In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court
then passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an
average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions
for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while other motions for the
revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the
aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who
have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however,
invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the
court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or
not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.
Issue: Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.
Held:
RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those
candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and
inadequate preparation.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice
of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial
function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which
ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement
of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.
On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of
the judicial and legislative departments of the government.
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the
practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by
Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities may
say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 129742. September 16, 1998]

TERESITA G. FABIAN petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his

capacity as ombudsman; HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his capacity as
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon; and NESTOR V. AGUSTIN respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J:
Petitioner has appealed to us by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
from the "Joint Order" issued by public respondents on June 18, 1997 in OMB-Adm.
Case No. 0-95-0411 which granted the motion for reconsideration of and absolved private
respondents from administrative charges for inter alia grave misconduct committed by
him as then Assistant Regional Director, Region IV-A, Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH).
I
It appears from the statement and counter-statement of facts of the parties that
petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the
construction business. Private respondents Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent District
Engineering District (FMED) when he allegedly committed the offenses for which he
was administratively charged in the Officein the office of the Ombudsman.

subsumed under the category of oppression, misconduct, and disgraceful or immoral

conduct.
On January 31, 1996, Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a resolution
finding private respondents guilty of grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal from
the service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. His resolution bore the approval
of Director Napoleon Baldrias and Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera of their
office.
Herein respondent Ombudsman, in an Order dated February 26, 1996, approved the
aforesaid resolution with modifications, by finding private respondent guilty of
misconduct and meting out the penalty of suspension without pay for one year. After
private respondent moved for reconsideration, respondent Ombudsman discovered that
the former's new counsel had been his "classmate and close associate" hence he inhibited
himself. The case was transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F.
Guerrero who, in the now challenged Joint Order of June 18, 1997, set aside the February
26, 1997 Order of respondent Ombudsman and exonerated private respondents from the
administrative charges.
II
In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989)[1] pertinently provides that -

Promat participated in the bidding for government construction project including

those under the FMED, and private respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his
official position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for
some time, in the course of which private respondents gifted PROMAT with public works
contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his office.

In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a
petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order,
directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)

Later, misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties

and when petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and
resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation
and threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case against him in a
letter-complaint dated July 24, 1995.

However, she points out that under Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No.
07 (Rules of Procedure of the office of the Ombudsman), [2] when a respondent is
absolved of the charges in an administrative proceedingdecision of the ombudsman is
final and unappealable. She accordingly submits that the office of the ombudsman has no
authority under the law to restrict, in the manner provided in its aforesaid Rules, the right
of appeal allowed by Republic Act No. 6770, nor to limit the power of review of this
Court. Because of the aforecited provision in those Rules of Procedure, she claims that
she found it "necessary to take an alternative recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, because of the doubt it creates on the availability of appeals under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.

The said complaint sought the dismissal of private respondent for violation of
Section 19, Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 36 of
Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree), with an ancillary prayer for his
preventive suspension. For purposes of this case, the charges referred to may be

Respondents filed their respective comments and rejoined that the Office of the
Ombudsman is empowered by the Constitution and the law to promulgate its own rules of
procedure. Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides, among others,
that the Office of the Ombudsman can "(p)romulgate its rules of procedure and exercise
such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law."
Republic Act No. 6770 duly implements the Constitutional mandate with these
relevant provisions:
Sec. 14. Restrictions. - x x x No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy
against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman except the Supreme Court on pure
question on law.
xxx
Sec. 18. Rules of Procedure. - (1) The Office of the Ombudsman shall promulgate its own
rules of procedure for the effective exercise or performance of its powers, functions, and
duties.
xxx
Sec. 23. Formal Investigation. - (1) Administrative investigations by the Office of the
Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent with the
due process. x x x
xxx
Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. - All provisionary orders at the Office of
the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice shall be
entertained only on any of the following grounds:
xxx
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by
substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty

of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month salary shall be
final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition
for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive
or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the
interest of justice may require.
Respondents consequently contend that, on the foregoing constitutional and
statutory authority, petitioner cannot assail the validity of the rules of procedure
formulated by the Office of the Ombudsman governing the conduct of proceeding before
it, including those with respect to the availabity or non-avalability of appeal in
administrative cases. Such as Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No.07.
Respondents also question the propriety of petitioner's proposition that, although
she definitely prefaced her petition by categorizing the same as "an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court," she makes the aforequoted ambivalent
statement which in effect asks that, should the remedy under Rule 45 be unavailable, her
petition be treated in the alternative as an original action for certiorari under Rule
65. The parties thereafter engage in a discussion of the differences between a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.
Ultimately, they also attempt to review and rationalize the decision of this Court
applying Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 vis--vis Section 7, Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 07. As correctly pointed out by public respondents, Ocampo IV
vs. Ombudsman, et al.[3] and Young vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al. [4] were original
actions for certiorari under Rule 65. Yabut vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al. [5] was
commenced by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Then came Cruz, Jr. vs.
People, et al.,[6] Olivas vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., [7] Olivarez vs.
Sandiganbayan, et al.,[8] and Jao, et al. vs. Vasquez, [9] which were for certiorari,
prohibition and/or mandamus under Rule 65. Alba vs. Nitorreda, et al. [10] was initiated by
a pleading unlikely denominated as an "Appeal/Petition for Certiorari and/or
Prohibition," with a prayer for ancillary remedies, and ultimately followed by
Constantino vs. Hon. Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, et al. [11] which was a special civil
action for certiorari.

Considering, however the view that this Court now takes of the case at bar and the
issues therein which will shortly be explained, it refrains from preemptively resolving the
controverted points raised by the parties on the nature and propriety of application of the
writ of certiorari when used as a mode of appeal or as the basis of a special original
action, and whether or not they may be resorted to concurrently or alternatively, obvious
though the answers thereto appear to be. Besides, some seemingly obiter statements in
Yabuts and Alba could bear reexamination and clarification. Hence, we will merely
observe and lay down the rule at this juncture that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is
involved only whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in
an administrative diciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account where an original
action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such
as from an incident in a criminal action.
III

Since the constitution is intended fort the observance of the judiciary and other
departments of the government and the judges are sworn to support its provisions, the
courts are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands or countenance evasions
thereof. When it is clear that a statute trangresses the authority vested in a legislative
body, it is the duty of the courts to declare that the constitution, and not the statute,
governs in a case before them for judgement.[12]
Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are
not raised in the pleadings, [13] the rule has been recognized to admit of certain
exceptions. It does not preclude a court from inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel
it to enter a judgement that it lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on which a court's
jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction in
the proceeding, and since it may determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it
necessarily follows that it may inquire into the constitutionality of the statute. [14]

After respondents' separate comments had been filed, the Court was intrigued by
the fact, which does appear to have been seriously considered before, that the
administrative liability of a public official could fall under the jurisdiction of both the
Civil Service Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, the offenses imputed
to herein private respondent were based on both Section 19 of Republic Act. No. 6770
and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807. Yet, pursuant to the amendment of section
9, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 by Republic Act No. 7902, all adjudications by Civil Service
Commission in administrative disciplinary cases were made appealable to the Court of
Appeals effective March 18, 1995, while those of the Office of the Ombudsman are
appealable to this Court.

Constitutional question, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial
are ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the
appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on the court's
own motion.[15] The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at
any point in the case where the fact is developed. [16] The court has a clearly recognized
right to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.[17]

It could thus be possible that in the same administrative case involving two
respondents, the proceedings against one could eventually have been elevated to the
Court of Appeals, while the other may have found its way to the Ombudsman from which
it is sought to be brought to this Court. Yet systematic and efficient case management
would dictate the consolidation of those cases in the Court of Appeals, both for
expediency and to avoid possible conflicting decisions.

The Court observes that the present petition, from the very allegations thereof, is
"an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the 'Joint Order (Re:
Motion for Reconsideration)' issued in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411, entitled 'Teresita
G. Fabian vs. Engr. Nestor V. Agustin, Asst. Regional Director, Region IV-A, EDSA,
Quezon City,' which absolved the latter from the administrative charges for grave
misconduct, among other."

Then there is the consideration that Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
provides that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing the appellate indiction of the Supreme
Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and consent," and that Republic
Act No. 6770, with its challenged Section 27, took effect on November 17, 1989,
obviously in spite of that constitutional grounds must be raised by a party to the case,
neither of whom did so in this case, but that is not an inflexible rule, as we shall explain.

It is further averred therein that the present appeal to this Court is allowed under Section
27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1987 (R.A. No. 6770) and, pursuant thereto, the Office of
the Ombudsman issued its Rules of Procedure, Section 7 whereof is assailed by petitioner
in this proceeding. It will be recalled that R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on November 17,
1989, with Section 27 thereof pertinently providing that all administrative diciplinary
cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to
this Court in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The foregoing authorities notwithstanding, the Court believed that the parties
hereto should be further heard on this constitutional question. Correspondingly, the
following resolution was issued on May 14, 1998, the material parts stating as follows:

The Court notes, however, that neither the petition nor the two comments thereon took
into account or discussed the validity of the aforestated Section 27 of R.A. No. 8770 in
light of the provisions of Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that "(n)o law
shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in
this Constitution without its advise and consent."
The Court also invites the attention of the parties to its relevant ruling in First Lepanto
Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals , et al. (G.R. No. 110571, October 7, 1994, 237
SCRA 519) and the provisions of its former Circular No. 1-95,as now substantially
reproduced in Rule 43 of the 1997 revision of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
In view of the fact that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court is invoked and involved and
in this case, and the foregoing legal consideration appear to impugn the
constitutionality and validity of the grant of said appellate jurisdiction to it, the Court
deems it necessary that the parties be heard thereon and the issue be first resolved before
conducting further proceedings in this appellate review.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to require the parties to Submit their position and
arguments on the matter subject of this resolution by filing their corresponding pleadings
within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
IV
The records do not show that the Office of the Solicitor General has complied with
such requirement, hence the Court dispenses with any submission it should have
presented. On the other hand, petitioner espouses the theory that the provision in Section
27 of Republic Act No. 6770 which authorizes an appeal by certiorari to this Court of the
aforementioned adjudications of the Ombudsman is not violative of Section 30, Article
VI of the Constitution.She claims that what is proscribed is the passage of law
"increasing" the appellate jurisdiction of this Court "as provided in this Constitution," and
such appellate jurisdiction includes "all cases in which only an error or question of law is
involved." Since Section 5(2)(e), Article VIII of the Constitution authorizes this Court to
review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari the aforesaid final
judgement or orders "as the law or the Rules of Court may provide," said Section 27 does
not increase this Court may provide," said section 27 does not increase this Court's
appellate jurisdiction since, by providing that the mode of appeal shall be by petition
for certiorari under Rule 45, then what may be raised therein are only questions of law of
which this Court already has of which this Court already has jurisdiction.

We are not impressed by this discourse. It overlooks the fact that by jurisprudential
developments over the years, this Court has allowed appeals by certiorari under Rule
45 in a substantial number of cases and instances even if questions of fact are directly
involved and have to be resolved by the appellate court. [18] Also, the very provision cited
by petitioner specifies that the appellate jurisdiction of this Court contemplated therein is
to be exercised over "final judgements and orders of lower courts," that is, the courts
composing the integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or
agencies, hence whenever the legislature intends that the decisions or resolutions of the
quasi-judicial agency shall be reviewable by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals,
a specific provision to that effect is included in the law creating that quasi-judicial agency
and, for that matter, any special statutory court. No such provision on appellate procedure
is required for the regular courts of the integrated judicial system because they are what
are referred to and already provided for in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Apropos to the foregoing, and as correctly observed by private respondent, the
revised Rules of Civil Procedure[19] preclude appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the
Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. In the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, Section 1 Rule 45, on "Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court,"
explicitly states:
SECTION 1 . Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A person desiring to appeal
by certiorari from a judgement or final order or Resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other court whenever authorized by law,
may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition
shall raise only question of law which must be distinctly set forth. (Italics ours).
This differs from the former Rule 45 of the 1964 Rules of Court which made
mention only of the Court of Appeals, and had to be adopted in statutes creating and
providing for appeals from certain administrative or quasi-judicial agencies, whenever
the purpose was to restrict the scope of the appeal to questions of law. That intended
limitation on appellate review, as we have just discussed, was not fully subserved by
recourse to the former Rule 45 but, then, at that time there was no uniform rule on
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies.
Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on
certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Section 1
thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies [20] are now
required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the
requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to
provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies . [21]

It is suggested, however, that the provisions of Rule 43 should apply only to

"ordinary" quasi-judicial agencies, but not to the Office of the Ombudsman which is a
"high constitutional body." We see no reason for this distinction for, if hierarchical rank
should be a criterion, that proposition thereby disregards the fact that Rule 43 even
includes the Office of the President and the Civil Service Commission, although the latter
is even an independent constitutional commission, unlike the Office of the Ombudsman
which is a constitutionally-mandated but statutorily created body.
Regarding the misgiving that the review of the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman by the Court of Appeals would cover questions of law, of fact or of both, we
do not perceive that as an objectionable feature. After all, factual controversies are
usually involved in administrative disciplinary actions, just like those coming from the
Civil Service, Commission, and the Court of Appeals as a trier of fact is better prepared
than this Court to resolve the same. On the other hand, we cannot have this situation
covered by Rule 45 since it now applies only to appeals from the regular courts. Neither
can we place it under Rule 65 since the review therein is limited to jurisdictional
questions.*
The submission that because this Court has taken cognizance of cases involving
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, that fact may be viewed as "acquiescence" or
"acceptance" by it of the appellate jurisdiction contemplated in said Section 27, is
unfortunately too tenuous. The jurisdiction of a court is not of acquiescence as a matter of
fact but an issue of conferment as a matter of law. Besides, we have already discussed the
cases referred to, including the inaccuracies of some statements therein, and we have
pointed out the instances when Rule 45 is involved, hence covered by Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 now under discussion, and when that provision would not apply if
it is a judicial review under Rule 65.
Private respondent invokes the rule that courts generally avoid having to decide a
constitutional question, especially when the case can be decided on other grounds. As a
general proposition that is correct. Here, however, there is an actual case susceptible of
judicial determination. Also, the constitutional question, at the instance of this Court, was
raised by the proper parties, although there was even no need for that because the Court
can rule on the mattersua sponte when its appellate jurisdiction is involved. The
constitutional question was timely raised, although it could even be raised any time
likewise by reason of the jurisdictional issue confronting the Court. Finally, the resolution
of the constitutional issue here is obviously necessary for the resolution of the present
case. [22]
It is, however, suggested that this case could also be decided on other grounds,
short of passing upon; the constitutional question. We appreciate the ratiocination of

private respondent but regret that we must reject the same. That private respondent could
be absolved of the charge because the decision exonerating him is final and unappealable
assumes that Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 is valid, but that is
precisely one of the issues here.The prevailing rule that the Court should not interfere
with the discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint is not
applicable in this administrative case, as earlier explained. That two decisions rendered
by this Court supposedly imply the validity of the aforementioned Section 7 of Rule III is
precisely under review here because of some statements therein somewhat at odds with
settled rules and the decisions of this Court on the same issues, hence to invoke the same
would be to beg the question.
V
Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects,
therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this
Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the
Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No
countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the
constitutional prohibition which, as correctly explained in First Leparto Ceramics, Inc.
vs. The Court of Appeals, el al. [23] was intended to give this Court a measure of control
over cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate
enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden
the Court [24]
We perforce have to likewise reject the supposed inconsistency of the ruling in First
Lepanto Ceramics and some statements in Yabut and Alba, not only because of the
difference in the factual settings, but also because those isolated cryptic statements in
Yabut and Alba should best be clarified in the adjudication on the merits of this case. By
way of anticipation, that will have to be undertaken by the proper court of competent
jurisdiction.
Furthermore in addition to our preceding discussion on whether Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 expanded the jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and
consent, private respondent's position paper correctly yields the legislative background of
Republic Act No. 6770. On September 26, 1989, the Conference Committee Report on
S.B. No. 453 and H.B. No. 13646, setting forth the new version of what would later be
Republic Act No. 6770, was approved on second reading by the House of
Representatives.[25] The Senate was informed of the approval of the final version of the
Act on October 2, 1989 [26] and the same was thereafter enacted into law by President
Aquino on November 17, 1989.

Submitted with said position paper is an excerpt showing that the Senate, in the
deliberations on the procedure for appeal from the Office of the Ombudsman to this
Court, was aware of the provisions of Section 30, Article III of the Constitution. It also
reveals that Senator Edgardo Angara, as a co-author and the principal sponsor of S.B. No.
543 admitted that the said provision will expand this Court's jurisdiction, and that the
Committee on Justice and Human Rights had not consulted this Court on the matter, thus:

It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes
which are procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's rule-making power, and
those which are substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context
and substantive in another.[29] It is admitted that what is procedural and what is
substantive is frequently a question of great difficulty. [30] It is not, however, an
insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic approach is taken within the context
of our own procedural and jurisdictional system.

INTERPELLATION OF SENATOR SHAHANI

xxx
Thereafter, with reference to Section 22(4) which provides that the decisions of the Office
of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court, in reply to Senator Shahani's
query whether the Supreme Court would agree to such provision in the light of Section
30, Article VI of the Constitution which requires its advice and concurrence in laws
increasing its appellate jurisdiction, Senator Angara informed that the Committee has not
yet consulted the Supreme Court regarding the matter. He agreed that the provision will
expand the Supreme Court's jurisdiction by allowing appeals through petitions for review,
adding that they should be appeals on certiorari.[27] There is no showing that even up to
its enactment, Republic Act No. 6770 was ever referred to this Court for its advice and
consent .[28]
VI
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy
adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule
43.
There is an intimation in the pleadings, however, that said Section 27 refers to
appellate jurisdiction which, being substantive in nature, cannot be disregarded by this
Court under its rule-making power, especially if it results in a diminution, increase or
modification of substantive rights. Obviously, however, where the law is procedural in
essence and purpose, the foregoing consideration would not pose a proscriptive issue
against the exercise of the rule-making power of this Court. This brings to fore the
question of whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is substantive or procedural.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and
procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the
test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. [31] If the rule takes away a vested
right, it is not procedural.If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be
classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means o implementing an existing
right then the rule deals merely with procedure. [32]
In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme Court, in the
exercise of its rule-making power, of pending cases involving a review of decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals
which shall now be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to
procedure only.[33] This is so because it is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved party
which is affected by the law.That right has been preserved. Only the procedure by which
the appeal is to be made or decided has been changed. The rationale for this is that
litigant has a vested right in a particular remedy, which may be changed by substitution
without impairing vested rights, hence he can have none in rules of procedure which
relate to the remedy.[34]
Furthermore, it cannot be said that transfer of appellate jurisdiction to the Court of
Appeals in this case is an act of creating a new right of appeal because such power of the
Supreme Court to transfer appeals to subordinate appellate courts is purely a procedural
and not a substantive power. Neither can we consider such transfer as impairing a vested
right because the parties have still a remedy and still a competent tribunal to administer
that remedy.[35]
Thus, it has been generally held that rules or statutes involving a transfer of cases
from one court to another, are procedural and remedial merely and that, as such, they are
applicable to actions pending at the time the statute went into effect [36] or, in the case at
bar, when its invalidity was declared. Accordingly, even from the standpoint of
jurisdiction ex hypothesi the validity of the transfer of appeals in said cases to the Court
of Appeals can be sustained.

WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989),

together with Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman), and any other provision of law or issuance implementing
the aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary
cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are hereby declared
INVALID and of no further force and effect.
The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to the Court of Appeals for
final disposition, with said petition to be considered by the Court of Appeals pro hac
vice as a petition for review under Rule 43, without prejudice to its requiring the parties
to submit such amended or supplemental pleadings and additional documents or records
as it may deem necessary and proper.

the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption
and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule."
The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the
integration of the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as
possible and practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar associations.
On August 16, 1962, arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the petition
were orally expounded before the Court. Written oppositions were admitted, 3 and
all parties were thereafter granted leave to file written memoranda. 4
Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant
developments relative to the matter of the integration of the Bar in this
jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

January 9, 1973
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration 1 submitted its Report
dated November 30, 1972, with the "earnest recommendation" on the basis of
the said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 526 2 of the
Court, and "consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the
Commission's] Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide
sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar" that "this Honorable Court ordain

In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong
nationwide sentiment in favor of Bar integration, the Court created the
Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of
unifying the Philippine Bar.
In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act
Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds
Therefor." The measure was signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on
September 17, 1971 and took effect on the same day as Rep. Act 6397. This law
provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the
Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the
integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it
shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable
the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby
appropriated, out of any funds in the National Treasury not
otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act.
Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the same
purpose shall be included in the annual appropriations for the
Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of

Bar integration and contains all necessary factual data bearing on the advisability
(practicability and necessity) of Bar integration. Also embodied therein are the
views, opinions, sentiments, comments and observations of the rank and file of
the Philippine lawyer population relative to Bar integration, as well as a proposed
integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission and presented to them by that
body in a national Bar plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well as ample
material upon which the Court may decide whether or not to integrate the
Philippine Bar at this time.

Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an

instrumentality of justice and the Rule of Law, integration
fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their
own organized action and participation, the promotion of the
objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of
maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and
regulation by the Supreme Court.

The following are the pertinent issues:

(1) Assist in the administration of justice;

(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine
Bar?

The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:

(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals
of integrity, learning, professional competence, public service
and conduct;

(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?

(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this
time?
A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of
Bar integration. It will suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the concept given by the
Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of its Report, thus:
Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of
the entire lawyer population of the Philippines. This
requires membership and financial support (in reasonable
amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the
practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose
names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or
Unified Bar) perforce must include all lawyers.
Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an
entity with power to do so: the State. Bar integration, therefore,
signifies the setting up by Government authority of a national
organization of the legal profession based on the recognition of
the lawyer as an officer of the court.

(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and

brotherhood;
(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence,
law reform, pleading, practice and procedure, and the relations
of the Bar to the Bench and to the public, and publish
information relating thereto;
(6) Encourage and foster legal education;
(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in
substantive and adjective law, and make reports and
recommendations thereon; and
(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility
effectively.
Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible
for the legal profession to:

(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of

Law;

(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal
research;

(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical

judges and prosecuting officers;

(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal

rights and obligations, on the importance of preventive legal
advice, and on the functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer;
and

(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the

disciplining and/or removal of incompetent and unworthy
judges and prosecuting officers;
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself
except within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and
self-interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity,
impartiality and independence;
(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and
prosecuting officers;
(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any
monopoly of local practice maintained through influence or
position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and
deceased lawyers;
(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices
and set up lawyer reference services throughout the country so
that the poor may not lack competent legal service;
(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are
difficult to obtain in many of our provinces;
(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal
education for practising attorneys in order to elevate the
standards of the profession throughout the country;
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum
fees schedules;

(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful countrywide involvement of the lawyer population in the solution of the
multifarious problems that afflict the nation.
Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine
Bar in the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and
the admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an
inherent part of the Court's constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that
"the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the
Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration of
the Bar will promote public interest or, more specifically, will "raise the standards
of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar
to discharge its public responsibility more effectively."
Resolution of the second issue whether the unification of the Bar would be
constitutional hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's
constitutional rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech, and on the
nature of the dues exacted from him.
The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the
Commission on Bar Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report:
Constitutionality of Bar Integration
Judicial Pronouncements.
In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has
been put in issue, the Courts have upheld their
constitutionality.

The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:

Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the
practice of law.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a
privilege, moreover, clothed with public interest, because a
lawyer owes duties not only to his client, but also to his
brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation; and
takes part in one of the most important functions of the State,
the administration of justice, as an officer of the court.
Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public
interest, it is far and just that the exercise of that privilege be
regulated to assure compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.
These public responsibilities can best be discharged
through collective action; but there can be no collective action
without an organized body; no organized body can operate
effectively without incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and
just that all attorneys be required to contribute to the support of
such organized body; and, given existing Bar conditions, the
most efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar
through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual
dues to the Integrated Bar.
1. Freedom of Association.

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with

anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections
as he chooses. The body compulsion to which he is subjected
is the payment of annual dues.
Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only
the duty to pay dues in reasonable amount. The issue
therefore, is a question of compelled financial support of group
activities, not involuntary membership in any other aspect.
The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of
elevating the educational and ethical standards of the Bar to
the end of improving the quality of the legal service available to
the people. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional
services, may require that the cost of improving the profession
in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of
the regulatory program the lawyers.
Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a
member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as
an exercise of the police power of the State. The legal
profession has long been regarded as a proper subject of
legislative regulation and control. Moreover, the inherent power
of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes the authority
to integrate the Bar.
2. Regulatory Fee.

To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not

violative of his constitutional freedom to associate (or the
corollary right not to associate).

For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members

does not mean that the Court levies a tax.

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of

which he is not already a member. He became a member of
the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that
integration actually does is to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.

A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for

regulation, while the purpose of a tax is revenue. If the Court
has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an
incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that
purpose. It would not be possible to push through an
Integrated Bar program without means to defray the

concomitant expenses. The doctrine of implied powers

necessarily includes the power to impose such an exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar
is that the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional
burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the
Bar far outweighs the inconsequential inconvenience to a
member that might result from his required payment of annual
dues.
3. Freedom of Speech.
A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on
any subject in any manner he wishes, even though such views
be opposed to positions taken by the Unified Bar.
For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote
measures to which said member is opposed, would not nullify
or adversely affect his freedom of speech.
Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to
practice law upon membership in the Integrated Bar, it is
difficult to understand why it should become unconstitutional
for the Bar to use the member's dues to fulfill the very
purposes for which it was established.
The objection would make every Governmental exaction the
material of a "free speech" issue. Even the income tax would
be suspect. The objection would carry us to lengths that have
never been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his
liberties were to be thus extended, might refuse to contribute
taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end condemned by
his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of private
judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers and
the compulsion of the agencies of Government.
4. Fair to All Lawyers.
Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising
because although the requirement to pay annual dues is a new

regulation, it will give the members of the Bar a new system

which they hitherto have not had and through which, by proper
work, they will receive benefits they have not heretofore
enjoyed, and discharge their public responsibilities in a more
effective manner than they have been able to do in the past.
Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of
regulatory power by the Court, because it will apply equally to
all lawyers, young and old, at the time Bar integration takes
effect, and because it is a new regulation in exchange for new
benefits, it is not retroactive, it is not unequal, it is not unfair.
To resolve the third and final issue whether the Court should ordain the
integration of the Bar at this time requires a careful overview of the
practicability and necessity as well as the advantages and disadvantages of Bar
integration.
In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United States,
Bar integration has yielded the following benefits: (1) improved discipline among
the members of the Bar; (2) greater influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3)
better and more meaningful participation of the individual lawyer in the activities
of the Integrated Bar; (4) greater Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination of
unauthorized practice; (6) avoidance of costly membership campaigns; (7)
establishment of an official status for the Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and
(9) better and more effective discharge by the Bar of its obligations and
responsibilities to its members, to the courts, and to the public. No less than
these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact expected from the
unification of the Philippine Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of integration,
Government authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be
weakened; cliquism will be the inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be
possible; the Bar will become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its
affairs.
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of
Bar integration have failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration
experience in England, Canada and the United States. In all the jurisdictions
where the Integrated Bar has been tried, none of the abuses or evils feared has
arisen; on the other hand, it has restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged
professional consciousness, energized the Bar's responsibilities to the public,
and vastly improved the administration of justice.

How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official
statistics compiled by the Commission on Bar integration show that in
the national poll recently conducted by the Commission in the matter of the
integration of the Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090 lawyers from all over the
archipelago who have turned in their individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per
cent) voted in favor of Bar integration, while only 378 (or 2.51 per cent) voted
against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are non-commital. In addition, a total of
eighty (80) local Bar association and lawyers' groups all over the Philippines
have submitted resolutions and other expressions of unqualified endorsement
and/or support for Bar integration, while not a single local Bar association or
lawyers' group has expressed opposed position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802
individual lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on the proposed integration
Court Rule drafted by the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in favor
thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per cent) vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are noncommittal. 5 All these clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide demand for
Bar integration at this time.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the
arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and
the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission
on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly
constitutional and legally unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary
conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and
enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of
Article VIII of the Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the
Philippines in accordance with the attached COURT RULE, effective on January
16, 1973.

Petitioners, Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
IBP COMMISSION ON BAR
DISCIPLINE and ATTY. JAIME Promulgated:
N. SORIANO,
Respondents. September 5, 2006

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:
This petition stemmed from a pending disbarment case before the Integrated

THIRD DIVISION

Bar of the Philippines.

TOMAS G. TAN & CST ENTER- G.R. No. 173940

PRISES INC., represented by (Formerly CBD Case No. 02-967)
NELSON G. TAN,

Sometime in January of 2002, petitioner Tomas G. Tan (petitioner

Tan), stockholder and director of co-petitioner CST Enterprises, Inc. (CST),

discovered that two parcels of land owned by the corporation were used to
obtain loans from Philippine Business Bank (PBB), with the real estate mortgage
annotated at the back of the titles covering the properties. Upon verification,
he learned that a certain John Dennis Chua, representing CST, mortgaged the
properties. Chua was purportedly authorized by the Board of Directors of the
corporation as shown by the Corporate Secretarys Certificate dated 04 April
2001 signed by Atty. Jaime N. Soriano (respondent).

In the course of the proceedings in the said civil case, petitioners

claim to have gathered more information and seen the extent of the plot or
machinations of respondent and the participation of other individuals, including
Atty. Taala who was the Assistant Vice President for Legal Services of PBB.
[4]

Atty. Taala had testified in Civil Case No. 02-299 that Felipe Chua personally

delivered to him CSTs titles to the mortgaged lots and that Felipe Chua assured

On 28 May 2002, petitioner Tan filed in his personal capacity and as

minority stockholder of CST under a derivative action, a letter-complaint with

him that respondent is the Corporate Secretary of CST.[5] Thus, CSTs loan
application was recommended for favorable consideration.

the IBP charging respondent of deceit, malpractice, falsification of public

documents, gross misconduct and violation of oath of office. [1] According to
petitioners, respondent has never been elected as corporate secretary nor
acted as such for CST, and in fact no board meeting was held on 30 March
2001 to so authorize John Dennis Chua because on the said date two of three
directors,

petitioner

Tan

and

Felipe

Chua,

were

out

of

the

country. Furthermore, John Dennis Chua has never been connected in any
capacity with CST, petitioners aver.[2]

On 16 June 2003, petitioners filed with the IBP, Commission on Bar

Discipline (Commission) a Motion to Amend/Supplement the Complaint with
Motion to Admit Amended/Supplemental Complaint,[6] claiming that respondent
and Atty. Taala had facilitated and recommended the approval of the allegedly
spurious loans and mortgage entered into by John Dennis Chua. The
Commission, however, denied the motion on 28 December 2003 on the ground
that the amendments/supplements involve proceedings pending before the
trial courts and that the determination of the matters presented belong to said

Petitioners also filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a

courts which have already acquired jurisdiction over them.[7]

civil case docketed as Civil Case No. 02-299 and captioned as one for
Declaration of Unenforceability of Promissory Notes and Mortgage, Nullity of
Secretarys Certificate, Injunction, Damages, etc. with Prayer for Issuance of
TRO/ Preliminary Injunction, against respondent, Atty. Stephen Z. Taala
and PBB, along with other persons.[3]

Petitioners sought reconsideration of the order, but the Commission

denied the motion, ruling that the Commission cannot make a premature
finding on and/or investigation of the alleged acts of Atty. Taala since the same
are the subject of a pending civil case. Anent the alleged untruthful statements

of respondent, the Commission ruled that there is no need to amend the

Makati. One such untruthful testimony is that of Atty. Taala to the effect that

complaint since the said statements may be refuted in the ensuing proceedings

Felipe Chua personally delivered the original titles of the Muntinlupa properties

in the case.[8]

to

PBB

in

compliance

with

the

loan

requirements. [12] According

to

petitioners, Atty. Taalas twin claims that he met with Felipe Chua on 05 April
Assailing

the

denial

of

the

motion

for

the

admission

of

the

Amended/Supplemental Complaint, petitioners filed before this Court a

petition for certiorari under Rule 65, wherein they impute grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Commission. Petitioners submit that respondent

2001 and that Felipe Chua submitted the Secretarys Certificate on the same
date are untruthful since Felipe was out of the country on the said
date. Likewise, Felipe Chua could not have attended the meeting with
respondent in January 2001 because he was also abroad at that time.[13]

and Atty. Taala through false testimonies intend to bind CST to the spurious
loans and real estate mortgage to its damage and prejudice. [9] They claim that

Finally, petitioners aver that the proceeds of the spurious loans

the denial to admit the Amended/Supplemental Complaint would have the

amounting to P91.1 Million Pesos covered by the real estate mortgage on CSTs

effect of preventing petitioners from filing a new complaint against respondent

real estate properties were funneled to the Mabuhay Sugar Central, Inc., a

along with Atty. Taala for their conspiratorial illegal acts involving the same

corporation where respondent is the incorporator, stockholder and President.[14]

loan transactions, as any judgment of the Commission on the original complaint

may serve as res judicata to bar judgment on the other acts complained of in
the Amended/Supplemental Complaint. [10] Likewise, limiting the facts and

Petitioners thus pray of this Court to set aside the Commissions order

issues to those defined in the original complaint would make respondent

denying admission of the Amended/Supplemental Complaint, or in the

answerable only for the less serious charges subject of the original complaint

alternative, allow petitioner to file a new complaint against respondent and

but not for the graver charges in the Amended/Supplemental Complaint

Atty. Taala based on the same loan transactions.[15]

regarding respondents untruthful allegations.[11]

In his Comment[16] before the Court, respondent claims that petitioners
In addition, petitioners claim that respondents allegations in his Verified

breached the rule that proceedings against attorneys should be kept private

Answer are untruthful and perjurious as he knowingly cited untruthful

and confidential, when the latter disclosed in Civil Case No. 02-299 the

testimonies and affidavits from the records of the civil case with the RTC of

contents of his Verified Answer filed before the Commission, quoting almost
verbatim said contents. This had the effect of announcing to the whole world

the pending disbarment case, respondent stresses, and is meant to harass and

public documents, docketed as Criminal Case No. 04-3776 of the RTC of Makati

vex him, as well as to damage his reputation even before a final verdict is

which appears to involve the same allegedly unauthorized mortgage.[17]

reached by the Commission. Respondent questions petitioners motive in not

filing a separate case before the IBP against Atty. Taala and accordingly having
him tried separately. Finally, respondent posits that the Commission did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to amend its
complaint since the nullity or regularity of the mortgage loan in CSTs name is
not an issue in the administrative case against him.

The Court notes that petitioners are seeking similar, if not identical,
reliefs from the regular courts and the Commission. Thus, in addition to the
prayer to disbar respondent and Atty. Taala, petitioners implore the
Commission to make a finding that respondent lawyers be found liable for using
untruthful statements under oath, conspiracy to commit estafa, employing
deceit and other manipulative acts as well as fraud, and falsification of public

The crux of the petition is whether the Commission committed grave abuse of

documents charges which are included in his allegations in the civil and

discretion when it denied petitioners Amended/Supplemental Complaint.

criminal cases.

The Commission did not. The petition must be dismissed.

Petitioners have filed Civil Case No. 02-299, seeking the declaration of
unenforceability of promissory notes and mortgage, nullity of secretarys
certificate, injunction, damages, and the issuance of a temporary restraining
order or preliminary injunction. In the said case, petitioners allege that the
loans contracted by CST from PBB were not sanctioned nor ratified by the CST
Board of Directors and/ or stockholders, but were only facilitated by
respondent and Atty. Taala, as well as by other persons through the use of the
spurious Secretarys Certificate. Likewise pending is another case against
respondent and John Dennis Chua, et al. for estafa through falsification of

Obviously, the Commission is not empowered to resolve matters which

are pending resolution by the regular courts to which jurisdiction properly
pertains. The IBP, particularly the Commission on Bar Discipline, is merely
tasked to investigate and make recommendations on complaints for
disbarment, suspension and discipline of lawyers. It is not a regular court and
thus is not endowed with the power to investigate and resolve judicial matters
pending before the regular courts.

To cite a specific vital aspect. In the proposed Amended/Supplemental

Respondent charges petitioners with divulging what is essentially confidential

Complaint, petitioners seek to hold respondent administratively liable for his

information, which is a violation of Section 18, [20] Rule 139-B of the Rules of

untruthful

the

Court. He alleges that petitioners even made the basis of his amended

administrative case. Precisely, however, the truth or falsity of said statements

complaint in the civil case the allegations contained in respondents Verified

are still to be litigated in the civil case.

Answer before the Commission.

and

perjurious

statements

in

his

Verified Answer

in

Disbarment proceedings are sui generis, they belong to a class of their

own, and are distinct from that of civil or criminal actions. [18] To be sure, a
finding of liability in a civil case or a conviction in a criminal case is not
necessary for finding a member of the bar guilty in an administrative
proceeding. However, in the instant case, the civil and criminal cases involving
the acts referred to in the proposed amended/supplemental complaint are still

A review of the records disclose that petitioners lifted and cited most
of the amendatory averments in respondents Verified Answer in the
administrative case as the core of their Amended Complaint in the civil case. In
fact, petitioners even identified the Verified Answer and the disbarment
proceedings itself as the sources of the averments in the Amended Complaint
before the trial court, thus:

pending adjudication before the regular courts. Prudence dictates that the
action of the Commission related to the proposed amended/supplemental
complaint in the administrative case be sustained in order to avoid

47.

On May 28, 2002, disbarment/disciplinary proceedings

were filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines against Defendant
Soriano for having executed such null and void
secretarys certificate, among others. This disbarment
case was docketed as CBD Case No. 02-967.

48.

The averments of Defendant Soriano in his Verified

Answer (Soriano Verified Answer for brevity) dated
September 27, 2002 filed in said disbarment case, as
well as the pertinent papers and earlier testimonies in
this
case
and the results
of
the
ongoing
investigation and inquiries of Plaintiff Tan, further
reveal: x x x.[21]

contradictory findings in that case and in the court cases.[19]

The call for judiciousness stems from the need to ensure the smooth
and orderly disposition of the related cases pending before the courts and the
Commission and avert conflict in the rulings in the bar discipline case and in
the judicial cases. Preemption of the regular courts by an administrative case is
a worrisome spectacle.
Now we turn to a significant sidelight.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

Disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer are private and confidential until its
final determination.[22] The confidential nature of the proceedings has a threefold purpose, to wit: (i) to enable the court and the investigator to make the
investigation free from any extraneous influence or interference; (ii) to protect
the personal and professional reputation of attorneys from baseless charges of
disgruntled, vindictive and irresponsible persons or clients by prohibiting the
publication of such charges pending their resolution; and (iii) to deter the press

EN BANC
G.R. No. 202242

April 16, 2013

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and
REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.,Respondents.

from publishing the charges or proceedings based thereon. [23]

RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:

Petitioners had in effect announced to the world the pending disbarment case
against respondent. Not only did they disclose the ongoing proceedings, they
also divulged most, if not all of the contents of respondents Verified

This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration1 filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) on behalf of the respondents, Senator Francis Joseph G.
Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents), duly opposed2 by
the petitioner, former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner).

Answer. Clearly, petitioners acts impinged on the confidential nature of the

disbarment proceedings against Atty. Soriano.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Petitioners are REMINDED to

preserve the confidentiality of the administrative proceedings. The IBP is
ordered to resume its hearings in CBD No. 02-267 consistently with this
resolution. Costs against petitioners.

By way of recapitulation, the present action stemmed from the unexpected

departure of former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona on May 29, 2012, and the
nomination of petitioner, as his potential successor. In his initiatory pleading,
petitioner asked the Court to determine 1] whether the first paragraph of Section
8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allows more than one (1) member of
Congress to sit in the JBC; and 2] if the practice of having two (2) representatives
from each House of Congress with one (1) vote each is sanctioned by the
Constitution.
On July 17, 2012, the Court handed down the assailed subject decision,
disposing the same in the following manner:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of
the Judicial and Bar Council is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and
Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member
of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

This disposition is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
On July 31, 2012, following respondents motion for reconsideration and with due
regard to Senate Resolution Nos. 111,3 112,4 113,5 and 114,6 the Court set the
subject motion for oral arguments on August 2, 2012.7 On August 3, 2012, the
Court discussed the merits of the arguments and agreed, in the meantime, to
suspend the effects of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the July
17, 2012 Decision which decreed that it was immediately executory. The decretal
portion of the August 3, 2012 Resolution8 reads:
WHEREFORE, the parties are hereby directed to submit their respective
MEMORANDA within ten (10) days from notice. Until further orders, the Court
hereby SUSPENDS the effect of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion
of the Courts July 17, 2012 Decision, which reads: "This disposition is
immediately executory."9
Pursuant to the same resolution, petitioner and respondents filed their respective
memoranda.10
Brief Statement of the Antecedents
In this disposition, it bears reiterating that from the birth of the Philippine
Republic, the exercise of appointing members of the Judiciary has always been
the exclusive prerogative of the executive and legislative branches of the
government. Like their progenitor of American origins, both the Malolos
Constitution11 and the 1935 Constitution12 vested the power to appoint the
members of the Judiciary in the President, subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. It was during these times that the country became
witness to the deplorable practice of aspirants seeking confirmation of their
appointment in the Judiciary to ingratiate themselves with the members of the
legislative body.13
Then, under the 1973 Constitution,14 with the fusion of the executive and
legislative powers in one body, the appointment of judges and justices ceased to
be subject of scrutiny by another body. The power became exclusive and
absolute to the Executive, subject only to the condition that the appointees must
have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.

Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary of the
evils of political pressure and partisan activities,15 the members of the
Constitutional Commission saw it wise to create a separate, competent and
independent body to recommend nominees to the President.
Thus, it conceived of a body, representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial
appointment process, and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). The
Framers carefully worded Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution in this
wise:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision
of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
From the moment of the creation of the JBC, Congress designated one (1)
representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex-officio
members.16 Pursuant to the constitutional provision that Congress is entitled to
one (1) representative, each House sent a representative to the JBC, not
together, but alternately or by rotation.
In 1994, the seven-member composition of the JBC was substantially
altered.1wphi1 An eighth member was added to the JBC as the two (2)
representatives from Congress began sitting simultaneously in the JBC, with
each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.17
In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives from the Senate
and the House of Representatives one full vote each.18 It has been the situation
since then.
Grounds relied upon by Respondents
Through the subject motion, respondents pray that the Court reconsider its
decision and dismiss the petition on the following grounds: 1] that allowing only
one representative from Congress in the JBC would lead to absurdity considering
its bicameral nature; 2] that the failure of the Framers to make the proper
adjustment when there was a shift from unilateralism to bicameralism was a plain
oversight; 3] that two representatives from Congress would not subvert the
intention of the Framers to insulate the JBC from political partisanship; and 4]

that the rationale of the Court in declaring a seven-member composition would

provide a solution should there be a stalemate is not exactly correct.
While the Court may find some sense in the reasoning in amplification of the third
and fourth grounds listed by respondents, still, it finds itself unable to reverse the
assailed decision on the principal issues covered by the first and second grounds
for lack of merit. Significantly, the conclusion arrived at, with respect to the first
and second grounds, carries greater bearing in the final resolution of this case.
As these two issues are interrelated, the Court shall discuss them jointly.
Ruling of the Court
The Constitution evinces the direct action of the Filipino people by which the
fundamental powers of government are established, limited and defined and by
which those powers are distributed among the several departments for their safe
and useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic.19 The Framers reposed
their wisdom and vision on one suprema lex to be the ultimate expression of the
principles and the framework upon which government and society were to
operate. Thus, in the interpretation of the constitutional provisions, the Court
firmly relies on the basic postulate that the Framers mean what they say. The
language used in the Constitution must be taken to have been deliberately
chosen for a definite purpose. Every word employed in the Constitution must be
interpreted to exude its deliberate intent which must be maintained inviolate
against disobedience and defiance. What the Constitution clearly says, according
to its text, compels acceptance and bars modification even by the branch tasked
to interpret it.
For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the argument of plain oversight in
order to justify constitutional construction. As stated in the July 17, 2012
Decision, in opting to use the singular letter "a" to describe "representative of
Congress," the Filipino people through the Framers intended that Congress be
entitled to only one (1) seat in the JBC. Had the intention been otherwise, the
Constitution could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided, as can be read in its
other provisions.
A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions were
indeed adjusted as to be in tune with the shift to bicameralism. One example is
Section 4, Article VII, which provides that a tie in the presidential election shall be
broken "by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting

separately."20Another is Section 8 thereof which requires the nominee to replace

the Vice-President to be confirmed "by a majority of all the Members of both
Houses of the Congress, voting separately."21 Similarly, under Section 18, the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus may be revoked or continued by the Congress, voting separately,
by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members."22 In all these provisions, the
bicameral nature of Congress was recognized and, clearly, the corresponding
adjustments were made as to how a matter would be handled and voted upon by
its two Houses.
Thus, to say that the Framers simply failed to adjust Section 8, Article VIII, by
sheer inadvertence, to their decision to shift to a bicameral form of the
legislature, is not persuasive enough. Respondents cannot just lean on plain
oversight to justify a conclusion favorable to them. It is very clear that the
Framers were not keen on adjusting the provision on congressional
representation in the JBC because it was not in the exercise of its primary
function to legislate. JBC was created to support the executive power to
appoint, and Congress, as one whole body, was merely assigned a contributory
non-legislative function.
The underlying reason for such a limited participation can easily be discerned.
Congress has two (2) Houses. The need to recognize the existence and the role
of each House is essential considering that the Constitution employs precise
language in laying down the functions which particular House plays, regardless
of whether the two Houses consummate an official act by voting jointly or
separately. Whether in the exercise of its legislative23 or its non-legislative
functions such as inter alia, the power of appropriation,24 the declaration of an
existence of a state of war,25 canvassing of electoral returns for the President and
Vice-President,26 and impeachment,27 the dichotomy of each House must be
acknowledged and recognized considering the interplay between these two
Houses. In all these instances, each House is constitutionally granted with
powers and functions peculiar to its nature and with keen consideration to 1) its
relationship with the other chamber; and 2) in consonance with the principle of
checks and balances, as to the other branches of government.
In checkered contrast, there is essentially no interaction between the two Houses
in their participation in the JBC. No mechanism is required between the Senate
and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial
officers. Rather, in the creation of the JBC, the Framers arrived at a unique
system by adding to the four (4) regular members, three (3) representatives from
the major branches of government - the Chief Justice as ex-officio Chairman

(representing the Judicial Department), the Secretary of Justice (representing the

Executive Department), and a representative of the Congress (representing the
Legislative Department). The total is seven (7), not eight. In so providing, the
Framers simply gave recognition to the Legislature, not because it was in the
interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence to it as a major branch of
government.

to voting deadlock by reason of even-numbered membership, and a clear

violation of 7 enumerated members in the Constitution. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

On this score, a Member of Congress, Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, from the

Second District of Maguindanao, submitted his well-considered position28 to then
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno:

As can be gleaned from the above constitutional provision, the JBC is composed
of seven (7) representatives coming from different sectors. From the enumeration
it is patent that each category of members pertained to a single individual only.
Thus, while we do not lose sight of the bicameral nature of our legislative
department, it is beyond dispute that Art. VIII, Section 8 (1) of the 1987
Constitution is explicit and specific that "Congress" shall have only "xxx a
representative." Thus, two (2) representatives from Congress would increase the
number of JBC members to eight (8), a number beyond what the Constitution
has contemplated. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

I humbly reiterate my position that there should be only one representative of

Congress in the JBC in accordance with Article VIII, Section 8 (1) of the 1987
Constitution x x x.
The aforesaid provision is clear and unambiguous and does not need any further
interpretation. Perhaps, it is apt to mention that the oft-repeated doctrine that
"construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that
application is impossible or inadequate without them."
Further, to allow Congress to have two representatives in the Council, with one
vote each, is to negate the principle of equality among the three branches of
government which is enshrined in the Constitution.
In view of the foregoing, I vote for the proposition that the Council should adopt
the rule of single representation of Congress in the JBC in order to respect and
give the right meaning to the above-quoted provision of the Constitution.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
On March 14, 2007, then Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, also a JBC
Consultant, submitted to the Chief Justice and ex-officio JBC Chairman his
opinion,29 which reads:
8. Two things can be gleaned from the excerpts and citations above: the creation
of the JBC is intended to curtail the influence of politics in Congress in the
appointment of judges, and the understanding is that seven (7) persons will
compose the JBC. As such, the interpretation of two votes for Congress runs
counter to the intendment of the framers. Such interpretation actually gives
Congress more influence in the appointment of judges. Also, two votes for
Congress would increase the number of JBC members to eight, which could lead

In an undated position paper,30 then Secretary of Justice Agnes VST Devanadera

opined:

In this regard, the scholarly dissection on the matter by retired Justice Consuelo
Ynares-Santiago, a former JBC consultant, is worth reiterating.31 Thus:
A perusal of the records of the Constitutional Commission reveals that the
composition of the JBC reflects the Commissions desire "to have in the Council
a representation for the major elements of the community." xxx The ex-officio
members of the Council consist of representatives from the three main branches
of government while the regular members are composed of various stakeholders
in the judiciary. The unmistakeable tenor of Article VIII, Section 8(1) was to treat
each ex-officio member as representing one co-equal branch of government. xxx
Thus, the JBC was designed to have seven voting members with the three exofficio members having equal say in the choice of judicial nominees.
xxx
No parallelism can be drawn between the representative of Congress in the JBC
and the exercise by Congress of its legislative powers under Article VI and
constituent powers under Article XVII of the Constitution. Congress, in relation to
the executive and judicial branches of government, is constitutionally treated as
another co-equal branch in the matter of its representative in the JBC. On the
other hand, the exercise of legislative and constituent powers requires the
Senate and the House of Representatives to coordinate and act as distinct
bodies in furtherance of Congress role under our constitutional scheme. While

the latter justifies and, in fact, necessitates the separateness of the two Houses
of Congress as they relate inter se, no such dichotomy need be made when
Congress interacts with the other two co-equal branches of government.
It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature of the three governmental branches
to assign the same weight to considerations that any of its representatives may
have regarding aspiring nominees to the judiciary. The representatives of the
Senate and the House of Representatives act as such for one branch and should
not have any more quantitative influence as the other branches in the exercise of
prerogatives evenly bestowed upon the three. Sound reason and principle of
equality among the three branches support this conclusion. [Emphases and
underscoring supplied]
The argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of
Representatives in the JBC and vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC, any
member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the House of Representatives,
is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire Congress. It may be a
constricted constitutional authority, but it is not an absurdity.
From this score stems the conclusion that the lone representative of Congress is
entitled to one full vote. This pronouncement effectively disallows the scheme of
splitting the said vote into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress.
Not only can this unsanctioned practice cause disorder in the voting process, it is
clearly against the essence of what the Constitution authorized. After all, basic
and reasonable is the rule that what cannot be legally done directly cannot be
done indirectly. To permit or tolerate the splitting of one vote into two or more is
clearly a constitutional circumvention that cannot be countenanced by the Court.
Succinctly put, when the Constitution envisioned one member of Congress sitting
in the JBC, it is sensible to presume that this representation carries with him one
full vote.

done in violation of the Constitution no matter how frequent, usual or notorious

cannot develop or gain acceptance under the doctrine of estoppel or laches,
because once an act is considered as an infringement of the Constitution it is
void from the very beginning and cannot be the source of any power or authority.
It would not be amiss to point out, however, that as a general rule, an
unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been
passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative
facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally
recognized. They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair play. To
reiterate the doctrine enunciated in Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil
Corporation:32
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies
as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law
by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality
will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it
was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put
the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a
municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.33
Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case
and holds that notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current
composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid.

It is also an error for respondents to argue that the President, in effect, has more
influence over the JBC simply because all of the regular members of the JBC are
his appointees. The principle of checks and balances is still safeguarded
because the appointment of all the regular members of the JBC is subject to a
stringent process of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, which is
composed of members of Congress.

Considering that the Court is duty bound to protect the Constitution which was
ratified by the direct action of the Filipino people, it cannot correct what
respondents perceive as a mistake in its mandate. Neither can the Court, in the
exercise of its power to interpret the spirit of the Constitution, read into the law
something that is contrary to its express provisions and justify the same as
correcting a perceived inadvertence. To do so would otherwise sanction the
Court action of making amendment to the Constitution through a judicial
pronouncement.

Respondents contention that the current irregular composition of the JBC should
be accepted, simply because it was only questioned for the first time through the
present action, deserves scant consideration. Well-settled is the rule that acts

In other words, the Court cannot supply the legislative omission. According to the
rule of casus omissus "a case omitted is to be held as intentionally
omitted."34 "The principle proceeds from a reasonable certainty that a particular

person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative

enumeration."35 Pursuant to this, "the Court cannot under its power of
interpretation supply the omission even though the omission may have resulted
from inadvertence or because the case in question was not foreseen or
contemplated."36 "The Court cannot supply what it thinks the legislature would
have supplied had its attention been called to the omission, as that would be
judicial legislation."37

G.R. No. 78780

July 23, 1987

DAVID G. NITAFAN, WENCESLAO M. POLO, and MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO,

JR., petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE FINANCIAL OFFICER,
SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Stated differently, the Court has no power to add another member by judicial
construction.
The call for judicial activism fails to stir the sensibilities of the Court tasked to
guard the Constitution against usurpation. The Court remains steadfast in
confining its powers in the sphere granted by the Constitution itself. Judicial
activism should never be allowed to become judicial exuberance.38 In cases like
this, no amount of practical logic or convenience can convince the Court to
perform either an excision or an insertion that will change the manifest intent of
the Framers. To broaden the scope of congressional representation in the JBC is
tantamount to the inclusion of a subject matter which was not included in the
provision as enacted. True to its constitutional mandate, the Court cannot craft
and tailor constitutional provisions in order to accommodate all of situations no
matter how ideal or reasonable the proposed solution may sound. To the
exercise of this intrusion, the Court declines.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents is hereby
DENIED.
The suspension of the effects of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion
of the July 17, 2012 Decision of the Court, which reads, "This disposition is
immediately executory," is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52,
19 and 53, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin
respondents, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of
the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their
salaries.
In a nutshell, they submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or
compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their
salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution mandating that "(d)uring their continuance in office, their salary shall
not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent
judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."
It may be pointed out that, early on, the Court had dealt with the matter
administratively in response to representations that the Court direct its Finance
Officer to discontinue the withholding of taxes from salaries of members of the
Bench. Thus, on June 4, 1987, the Court en banc had reaffirmed the Chief
Justice's directive as follows:
RE: Question of exemption from income taxation. The Court
REAFFIRMED the Chief Justice's previous and standing directive to the
Fiscal Management and Budget Office of this Court to continue with the
deduction of the withholding taxes from the salaries of the Justices of
the Supreme Court as well as from the salaries of all other members of
the judiciary.

That should have resolved the question. However, with the filing of this petition,
the Court has deemed it best to settle the legal issue raised through this judicial
pronouncement. As will be shown hereinafter, the clear intent of the
Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed express grant of
exemption from payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary, so as to
"give substance to equality among the three branches of Government" in the
words of Commissioner Rigos. In the course of the deliberations, it was further
expressly made clear, specially with regard to Commissioner Joaquin F. Bernas'
accepted amendment to the amendment of Commissioner Rigos, that the
salaries of members of the Judiciary would be subject to the general income tax
applied to all taxpayers.
This intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of
the Constitution as approved and ratified in February, 1987 (infra, pp. 7-8).
Although the intent may have been obscured by the failure to include in the
General Provisions a proscription against exemption of any public officer or
employee, including constitutional officers, from payment of income tax, the
Court since then has authorized the continuation of the deduction of the
withholding tax from the salaries of the members of the Supreme Court, as well
as from the salaries of all other members of the Judiciary. The Court hereby
makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and
Endencia vs. David, infra, that declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary
exempt from payment of the income tax and considered such payment as a
diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office. The Court hereby
reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are properly subject to a
general income tax law applicable to all income earners and that the payment of
such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitutional
protection against decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office.
A comparison of the Constitutional provisions involved is called for. The 1935
Constitution provided:
... (The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts)
shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not
be diminished during their continuance in office ... 1 (Emphasis
supplied).
Under the 1973 Constitution, the same provision read:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the
Supreme court, and of judges of inferior courts shall be fixed by law,

which shall not be decreased during their continuance in

office. ... 2 (Emphasis ours).
And in respect of income tax exemption, another provision in the same 1973
Constitution specifically stipulated:
No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee,
including constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment of
income tax. 3
The provision in the 1987 Constitution, which petitioners rely on, reads:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law.
During their continuance in office, their salary shall not
be decreased. 4(Emphasis supplied).
The 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision similar to Section 6, Article
XV of the 1973 Constitution, for which reason, petitioners claim that the intent of
the framers is to revert to the original concept of "non-diminution "of salaries of
judicial officers.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 10,
Article VIII, negate such contention.
The draft proposal of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution read:
Section 13. The salary of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court and of judges of the lower courts shall be fixed by
law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
diminished nor subjected to income tax. Until the National Assembly
shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice shall receive an annual salary
of _____________ and each Associate Justice ______________
pesos. 5 (Emphasis ours)
During the debates on the draft Article (Committee Report No. 18), two
Commissioners presented their objections to the provision on tax exemption,
thus:

MS. AQUINO. Finally, on the matter of exemption from tax of the salary
of justices, does this not violate the principle of the uniformity of taxation
and the principle of equal protection of the law? After all, tax is levied
not on the salary but on the combined income, such that when the judge
receives a salary and it is comingled with the other income, we tax the
income, not the salary. Why do we have to give special privileges to the
salary of justices?
MR. CONCEPCION. It is the independence of the judiciary. We prohibit
the increase or decrease of their salary during their term. This is an
indirect way of decreasing their salary and affecting the independence
of the judges.
MS. AQUINO. I appreciate that to be in the nature of a clause to respect
tenure, but the special privilege on taxation might, in effect, be a
violation of the principle of uniformity in taxation and the equal
protection clause. 6
xxx

xxx

xxx

MR. OPLE. x x x
Of course, we share deeply the concern expressed by the sponsor,
Commissioner Roberto Concepcion, for whom we have the highest
respect, to surround the Supreme Court and the judicial system as a
whole with the whole armor of defense against the executive and
legislative invasion of their independence. But in so doing, some of the
citizens outside, especially the humble government employees, might
say that in trying to erect a bastion of justice, we might end up with the
fortress of privileges, an island of extra territoriality under the Republic
of the Philippines, because a good number of powers and rights
accorded to the Judiciary here may not be enjoyed in the remotest
degree by other employees of the government.
An example is the exception from income tax, which is a kind of
economic immunity, which is, of course, denied to the entire executive
department and the legislative. 7
And during the period of amendments on the draft Article, on July 14, 1986,
Commissioner Cirilo A. Rigos proposed that the term "diminished" be changed to

"decreased" and that the words "nor subjected to income tax" be deleted so as to
"give substance to equality among the three branches in the government.
Commissioner Florenz D. Regalado, on behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary,
defended the original draft and referred to the ruling of this Court in Perfecto vs.
Meer 8 that "the independence of the judges is of far greater importance than any
revenue that could come from taxing their salaries." Commissioner Rigos then
moved that the matter be put to a vote. Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas stood
up "in support of an amendment to the amendment with the request for a
modification of the amendment," as follows:
FR. BERNAS. Yes. I am going to propose an amendment to the
amendment saying that it is not enough to drop the phrase "shall not be
subjected to income tax," because if that is all that the Gentleman will
do, then he will just fall back on the decision in Perfecto vs. Meer and
in Dencia vs. David [should be Endencia and Jugo vs. David, etc., 93
Phil. 696[ which excludes them from income tax, but rather I would
propose that the statement will read: "During their continuance in office,
their salary shall not be diminished BUT MAY BE SUBJECT TO
GENERAL INCOME TAX."IN support of this position, I would say that
the argument seems to be that the justice and judges should not be
subjected to income tax because they already gave up the income from
their practice. That is true also of Cabinet members and all other
employees. And I know right now, for instance, there are many people
who have accepted employment in the government involving a
reduction of income and yet are still subject to income tax. So, they are
not the only citizens whose income is reduced by accepting service in
government.
Commissioner Rigos accepted the proposed amendment to the amendment.
Commissioner Rustico F. de los Reyes, Jr. then moved for a suspension of the
session. Upon resumption, Commissioner Bernas announced:
During the suspension, we came to an understanding with the original
proponent, Commissioner Rigos, that his amendment on page 6,. line 4
would read: "During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
DECREASED."But this is on the understanding that there will be a
provision in the Constitution similar to Section 6 of Article XV, the
General Provisions of the 1973 Constitution, which says:

No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or

employee, including constitutional officers, shall be exempt
from payment of income tax.
So, we put a period (.) after "DECREASED" on the understanding that
the salary of justices is subject to tax.
When queried about the specific Article in the General Provisions on nonexemption from tax of salaries of public officers, Commissioner Bernas replied:
FR BERNAS. Yes, I do not know if such an article will be found in the
General Provisions. But at any rate, when we put a period (.) after
"DECREASED," it is on the understanding that the doctrine in Perfecto
vs. Meer and Dencia vs. David will not apply anymore.
The amendment to the original draft, as discussed and understood, was finally
approved without objection.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bengzon). The understanding,
therefore, is that there will be a provision under the Article on General
Provisions. Could Commissioner Rosario Braid kindly take note that the
salaries of officials of the government including constitutional officers
shall not be exempt from income tax? The amendment proposed herein
and accepted by the Committee now reads as follows: "During their
continuance in office, their salary shall not be DECREASED"; and the
phrase "nor subjected to income tax" is deleted.9
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional
provision in question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed
that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to
make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that
intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it should be given effect.10 The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of
the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution.11 it may also be
safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly
by the explanation offered by the framers.121avvphi1

Besides, construing Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, which, for
clarity, is again reproduced hereunder:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law.
During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.
(Emphasis supplied).
it is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another
rate of compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than
that which they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be
applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It would be a strained
construction to read into the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of
the discussion in the Constitutional Commission.
With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that "the
imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so
violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs. Meer,13 as affirmed inEndencia vs.
David 14 must be declared discarded. The framers of the fundamental law, as
the alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the
meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they
have adopted
Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the
discussions and deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens
should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government and
should share the burden of general income taxation equitably.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for Prohibition is hereby dismissed.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 81006 May 12, 1989

VICTORINO C. FRANCISCO, petitioner,

vs.
WINAI PERMSKUL and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
An important constitutional question has been injected in this case which started
out as an ordinary complaint for a sum of money. The question squarely
presented to the Court is the validity of the memorandum decision authorized
under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 in the light of Article VIII, Section 14 of the
Constitution.
On May 21, 1984, the petitioner leased his apartment in Makati to the private
respondent for a period of one year for the stipulated rental of P3,000.00 a
month. Pursuant to the lease contract, the private respondent deposited with the
petitioner the amount of P9,000.00 to answer for unpaid rentals or any damage
to the leased premises except when caused by reasonable wear and tear. On
May 31, 1985, the private respondent vacated the property. He thereafter
requested the refund of his deposit minus the sum of P1,000.00, representing the
rental for the additional ten days of his occupancy after the expiration of the
lease. The petitioner rejected this request. He said the lessee still owed him for
other charges, including the electricity and water bills and the sum of P2,500.00
for repainting of the leased premises to restore them to their original condition. 1
The private respondent sued in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati. After the
submission of position papers by the parties, a summary judgment was rendered
on October 11, 1985, sustaining the complainant and holding that the repainting
was not chargeable to him. The defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff the
amount of P7,750.00, representing the balance of the deposit after deducting the
water and electricity charges. The plaintiff was also awarded the sum of
P1,250.00 as attorney's fees, plus the Costs. 2
This decision was appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Makati and was
affirmed by Judge Jose C. de la Rama on January 14, 1987. This was done in a
memorandum decision reading in full as follows:
MEMORANDUM DECISION

After a careful and thorough perusal, evaluation and study of

the records of this case, this Court hereby adopts by reference
the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the
decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro
Manila, Branch 63 and finds that there is no cogent reason to
disturb the same.
WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in
toto. 3
When the defendant went to the Court of Appeals, his petition for review was
denied on September 29, 1987, as so too was his motion for reconsideration, on
December 1, 1987. 4 He is now before us to fault the respondent court, principally
for sustaining the memorandum decision of the regional trial court. His contention
is that it violates Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution.
This provision reads as follows:
Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a
decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied
without stating the legal basis therefor.
Except for the second paragraph, which was introduced only in the present
charter, Section 14 has been in force since the Constitution of 1935. The
provision was recast in affirmative terms in the 1973 Constitution but has been
virtually restored to its original form in the Constitution of 1987, to apply to all
courts, including the municipal courts. The purpose has always been the same,
viz., to inform the person reading the decision, and especially the parties, of how
it was reached by the court after consideration of the pertinent facts and
examination of the applicable laws.
The parties are entitled to no less than this explanation if only to assure them that
the court rendering the decision actually studied the case before pronouncing its
judgment. But there are more substantial reasons. For one thing, the losing party
must be given an opportunity to analyze the decision so that, if permitted, he may
elevate what he may consider its errors for review by a higher tribunal. For

another, the decision, if well-presented and reasoned, may convince the losing
party of its merits and persuade it to accept the verdict in good grace instead of
prolonging the litigation with a useless appeal. A third reason is that decisions
with a full exposition of the facts and the law on which they are based, especially
those coming from the Supreme Court, will constitute a valuable body of case
law that can serve as useful references and even as precedents in the resolution
of future controversies. As the Court said in Rosales v. Court of First Instance. 5
Precedents are helpful in deciding cases when they are on all
fours or at least substantially Identical with previous
litigations. Argumentum a simili valet in lege. Earlier decisions
are guideposts that can lead us in the right direction as we
tread the highways and byways of the law in the search for
truth and justice. These pronouncements represent the wisdom
of the past. They are the voice of vanished judges talking to
the future. Except where there is a need to reverse them
because of an emergent viewpoint or an altered situation, they
urge us strongly that, indeed, the trodden path is best.
According to the petitioner, the memorandum decision rendered by the regional
trial court should be revoked for non-compliance with the above-quoted
constitutional mandate. He asks that the case be remanded to the regional trial
court for a full blown hearing on the merits, to be followed by a decision stating
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. For his
part, the private respondent demurs. He justifies the memorandum decision as
authorized by B.P. Blg. 129 and invokes the ruling of this Court in Romero v.
Court of Appeals, 6 Which sustained the said law.
Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 reads as follows:
Sec. 40. Form of decision in appealed cases. Every
decision or final resolution of a court in appealed cases shall
clearly and distinctly state the findings of fact and the
conclusions of law on which it is based which may be
contained in the decision or final resolution itself, or adopted by
reference from those set forth in the decision, order or
resolution appealed from.
The above section was applied in the Romero case, together with a similar rule
embodied in Section 18 of P.D. No. 946, providing that:

All cases of the Court of Agrarian Relations now pending

before the Court of Appeals shall remain in the Division to
which they have been assigned, and shall be decided within
sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this Decree; Provided,
however, That if the decision or order be an affirmance in
toto of the dispositive conclusion of the judgment appealed
from, then the Court of Appeals may, instead of rendering an
extended opinion, indicate clearly the trial court's findings of
fact and pronouncements of law which have been adopted as
basis for the affirmance.
In the said case, Justice Jose Y. Feria, speaking for a unanimous Court,
declared:
As previously stated, the decision of the Court of Agrarian
Relations consisted of thirteen pages, single space. The
above-quoted decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
consists of four pages, three of which contains verbatim the
dispositive portion of the decision appealed from. The
remaining page is devoted to an explanation of why "for judicial
convenience and expediency, therefore, We hereby adopt, by
way of reference, the findings of facts and conclusions of the
court a quo spread in its decision, as integral part of this Our
decision." The said decision may be considered as substantial
compliance with the above-quoted provisions in Section 18 of
P.D. No. 946 and Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129.
Nevertheless, he was quick to add a tenable misgiving and to express the
following reservation:
The authority given the appellate court to adopt by reference
the findings of fact and conclusions of law from those set forth
in the appealed decisions should be exercised with caution and
prudence, because the tendency would be to follow the line of
least resistance by just adopting the findings and conclusions
of the lower court without thoroughly studying the appealed
case.
This caveat was necessary because, as he correctly observed:

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that just as important as

the intrinsic validity of a decision is the perception by the
parties-litigants that they have been accorded a fair opportunity
to be heard by a fair and responsible magistrate before
judgment is rendered. It is this perception, coupled with a clear
conscience, which enables the members of the judiciary to
discharge the awesome responsibility of sitting in judgment on
their fellowmen.
There is no question that the purpose of the law in authorizing the memorandum
decision is to expedite the termination of litigations for the benefit of the parties
as well as the courts themselves.
Concerned with the mounting problem of delay in the administration of justice,
the Constitution now contains a number of provisions aimed at correcting this
serious difficulty that has caused much disaffection among the people. Thus,
Section 16 of the Bill of Rights reiterates the original provision in the 1973
Constitution guaranteeing to all persons "the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies." Section 14(2) of
the same Article III retains the rule that the accused shall be entitled to a trial that
shall not only be public and impartial but also speedy. In Article VIII, Section 5(3),
the Supreme Court is expressly permitted to temporarily assign a judge from one
station to another when the public interest so requires, as when there is a
necessity for less occupied judge to help a busier colleague dispose of his cases.
In paragraph 5 of the same section, it is stressed that the rules of court to be
promulgated by the Supreme Court "shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases." In Section 15, of the same article,
maximum periods are prescribed for the decision or resolution of cases, to wit,
twenty-four months in the case of Supreme Court and, unless reduced by the
Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts and three months
for all other lower courts.
The courts of justice are really hard put at coping with the tremendous number of
cases in their dockets which, to make matters worse, continues to grow by the
day despite the efforts being taken to reduce it. In the Supreme Court alone, an
average of 400 cases is received every month as against the average of 300
cases disposed of during the same month, leaving a difference of 100 cases
monthly that is added to some 5,000 still unresolved cases that have
accumulated during the last two decades or so. At this rate, the backlog will
increase by 1,200 cases every year on top of the earlier balance, much of which,
despite its age, is still viable and have still to be resolved. Considering that the

Court spends four days of the week for studying and deliberating on these cases
in its en banc and division sessions, one can appreciate the limited time allowed
its members for the actual writing of its decisions. (This particular decision, while
extended, happens fortunately to be less complicated than many of the other
cases submitted to it, which require more time to write, not to mention the
antecedent research that may have to be made.)
Viewed in the light of these practical considerations, the memorandum decision
can be welcomed indeed as an acceptable method of dealing expeditiously with
the case load of the courts of justice, But expediency alone, no matter how
compelling, cannot excuse non-compliance with the Constitution; or to put it more
familiarly, the end does not justify the means. It is plain that if Section 40 of B.P.
Blg. 129 is unconstitutional, it must be struck down.
In the case at bar, we find that a judgment was made by the metropolitan trial
court in compliance with the rule on summary procedure. The decision consisted
of three typewritten pages, single space, and stated clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it was based. It was a concise and well-written
decision, and a correct one to boot, for which Judge Paciano B. Balita is to be
commended.
The problem, though, as the petitioner sees it, is that in affirming this judgment,
the regional trial court of Makati rendered a mere memorandum decision that
simply adopted by reference the findings of fact and law made by Judge Balita
and then concluded, without saying more, that "there was no cogent reason to
disturb the same." It is claimed that as Judge de la Rama did not make his own
statement of the facts and the law as required by the Constitution, his
memorandum decision was a total nullity. Worse, when the appeal was taken to
the respondent court, what it reviewed was not the memorandum decision of the
regional trial court but the decision rendered by the metropolitan trial court which,
legally speaking, was not before the appellate court.
It is not really correct to say that the Court of Appeals did not review the
memorandum decision of the regional trial court which was the subject of the
petition for review. A reading of its own decision will show that it dealt extensively
with the memorandum decision and discussed it at some length in the light of the
observations and reservations of this Court in the Romero case. Moreover,
in reviewing the decision of the metropolitan trial court, the Court of Appeals was
actually reviewing the decision of the regional trial court, which had incorporated
by reference the earlier decision rendered by Judge Balita.

The question, of course, is whether such incorporation by reference was a valid

act that effectively elevated the decision of the metropolitan trial court for
examination by the Court of Appeals.
To be fair, let it be said that when Judge dela Rama availed himself of the
convenience offered by Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129, he was only acting in
accordance with the ruling announced in Romero permitting the use of the
memorandum decision. It must also be observed that even if the respondent
court appeared to be partial to the reservation rather than the rule in the said
case, it nevertheless had the duty which it discharged to abide by the
doctrine announced therein by the highest tribunal of the land. The respondent
court could not have acted otherwise.
This Court is not hampered by such inhibitions. As we may re-examine our own
rulings and modify or reverse them whenever warranted, we take a second look
at the memorandum decision and the Romero case and test them on the
touchstone of the Constitution.
The law does not define the memorandum decision and simply suggests that the
court may adopt by reference the findings of fact and the conclusions of law
stated in the decision, order or resolution on appeal before it. No particular form
is prescribed; the conditions for its use are not indicated. In fact, B.P. Blg. 129
does not even employ the term "memorandum decision" in Section 40 or
elsewhere in the rest of the statute. This phrase appears to have been introduced
in this jurisdiction not by that law but by Section 24 of the Interim Rules and
Guidelines, reading as follows:
Sec. 24. Memorandum decisions. -The judgment or final
resolution of a court in appealed cases may adopt by reference
the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the
decision or final order appealed from.
It is clear that where the decision of the appellate court actually reproduces the
findings of fact or the conclusions of law of the court below, it is not a
memorandum decision as envisioned in the above provision. The distinctive
features of the memorandum decision are, first, it is rendered by an appellate
court, and second, it incorporates by reference the findings of fact or the
conclusions of law contained in the decision, order or ruling under review. Most
likely, the purpose is to affirm the decision, although it is not impossible that the
approval of the findings of fact by the lower court may lead to a different
conclusion of law by the higher court. At any rate, the reason for allowing the

incorporation by reference is evidently to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of

the decision of the lower court, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher
court. The Idea is to avoid having to repeat in the body of the latter decision the
findings or conclusions of the lower court since they are being approved or
adopted anyway.
Parenthetically, the memorandum decision is also allowed in the United States,
but its form (at least) differs from the one under consideration in this case. Such
a decision is rendered in that country upon a previous' determination by the
judge that there is no need for a published opinion and that it will have no
precedential effect. The judgment is usually limited to the dispositive portion but a
memorandum is attached containing a brief statement of the facts and the law
involved, mainly for the information of the parties to the case.
When a law is questioned before the Court, we employ the presumption in favor
of its constitutionality. As we said in Peralta v. Commission of Elections, "to justify
the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication." 7 Courts will bend
over backward to sustain that presumption. In case of doubt, it is the duty of the
judiciary to exert every effort to prevent the invalidation of the law and the
nullification of the will of the legislature that enacted it and the executive that
approved it. This norm is based on a becoming respect that the judiciary is
expected to accord the political departments of the government which, it must be
assumed in fairness, thoroughly studied the measure under challenge and
assured themselves of its constitutionality before agreeing to enact it.
The Court has deliberated extensively on the challenge posed against the
memorandum decision as now authorized by law. Taking into account the
salutary purpose for which it is allowed, and bearing in mind the above-discussed
restraint we must observe when a law is challenged before us, we have come to
the conclusion that Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129, as we shall interpret it here, is not
unconstitutional.
What is questioned about the law is the permission it gives for the appellate court
to merely adopt by reference in its own decision the judgment of the lower court
on appeal. It is easy to understand that this device may feed the suspicion feared
by Justice Feria that the court has not given the appeal the attention it deserved
and thus deprived the parties of due process. True or not, this impression is likely
to undermine popular faith in the judiciary as an impartial forum which hears
before it decides and bases its decision on the established facts and the
applicable law.

No less objectionable is the inconvenience involved in having to search for the

decision referred to, which, having been incorporated by reference only, does not
have to be attached to the memorandum decision. The Court had occasion
earlier to complain about this difficulty in the case of Gindoy v. Tapucar, 8 where
we said:
. . . True it is that the Court of First Instance may adopt in
toto either expressly or impliedly the findings and conclusions
of the inferior court, and as a rule, such adoption would amount
to a substantial compliance with the constitutional mandate
discussed herein, but where, as in this case, the specific
arguments presented against the decision of the inferior court
are of such nature that a blanket affirmance of said decision
does not in fact adequately dispose of the strictures against it,
it is but proper, if only to facilitate the action to be taken by the
appellate court on the petition for review, that the concrete
bases of the impugned decision should appear on its face,
instead of the appellate court having to dig into the records to
find out how the inferior court resolved the issues of the case.
As to this problem, the Solicitor General correctly points out that it does not exist
in the case at bar because the decision of the Court of Appeals extensively
quoted from the decision of the metropolitan trial court. Although only
incorporated by reference in the memorandum decision of the regional trial court,
Judge Balita's decision was nevertheless available to the Court of Appeals. It is
this circumstance, or even happenstance, if you will, that has validated the
memorandum decision challenged in this case and spared it from constitutional
infirmity.
That same circumstance is what will move us now to lay down the following
requirement, as a condition for the proper application of Section 40 of B.P. Blg.
129. The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of
fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote reference,
which is to say that the challenged decision is not easily and immediately
available to the person reading the memorandum decision. For the incorporation
by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the
law being adopted, which must be contained in a statement attached to the said
decision. In other words, the memorandum decision authorized under Section 40
of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of
law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of
the decision.

It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study was
made of the decision of the lower court and that its decision was merely affirmed
without a proper examination of the facts and the law on which it was based.
The proximity at least of the annexed statement should suggest that such an
examination has been undertaken. It is, of course, also understood that the
decision being adopted should, to begin with, comply with Article VIII, Section 14
as no amount of incorporation or adoption will rectify its violation.
The Court finds it necessary to emphasize that the memorandum decision should
be sparingly used lest it become an addictive excuse for judicial sloth. It is an
additional condition for its validity that this kind of decision may be resorted to
only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted by both parties or easily
determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that
will require an extended discussion of the laws involved. The memorandum
decision may be employed in simple litigations only, such as ordinary collection
cases, where the appeal is obviously groundless and deserves no more than the
time needed to dismiss it.
Despite the convenience afforded by the memorandum decision, it is still
desirable that the appellate judge exert some effort in restating in his own words
the findings of fact of the lower court and presenting his own interpretation of the
law instead of merely parroting the language of the court a quo as if he cannot do
any better. There must be less intellectual indolence and more pride of
authorship in the writing of a decision, especially if it comes from an appellate
court.
It ill becomes an appellate judge to write his rulings with a pair of scissors and a
pot of paste as if he were a mere researcher. He is an innovator, not an echo.
The case usually becomes progressively simpler as it passes through the various
levels of appeal and many issues become unimportant or moot and drop along
the way. The appellate judge should prune the cluttered record to make the
issues clearer. He cannot usually do this by simply mimicking the lower court. He
must use his own perceptiveness in unraveling the rollo and his own discernment
in discovering the law. No less importantly, he must use his own language in
laying down his judgment. And in doing so, he should also guard against torpidity
lest his pronouncements excite no more fascination than a technical tract on the
values of horse manure as a fertilizer. A little style will help liven the opinion
trapped in the tortuous lexicon of the law with all its whereases and wherefores. A
judicial decision does not have to be a bore.

The interpretation we make today will not apply retroactively to the memorandum
decision rendered by the regional trial court in the case at bar, or to the decision
of the respondent court such decision on the strength ofRomero v. Court of
Appeals. As earlier observed, there was substancial compliance with Section 40
because of the direct availability and actual review of the decision of Judge Balita
incorporated by reference in the memorandum decision of Judge de la Rama.
The memorandum decision as then understood under the Romero decision was
a valid act at the time it was rendered by Judge de la Rama and produced
binding legal effect. We also affirm the finding of the respondent court that the
summary judgment without a formal trial was in accord with the Rule on
Summary Procedure and that the award of attorney's fees is not improper.
Henceforth, all memorandum decisions shall comply with the requirements
herein set forth both as to the form prescribed and the occasions when they may
be rendered. Any deviation will summon the strict enforcement of Article VIII,
Section 14 of the Constitution and strike down the flawed judgment as a lawless
disobedience.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. This
decision is immediately executory. It is so ordered.

Velarde v SJS (2004)

Doctrine: Decision, more specifically a decision not conforming to the form and
substance required by the Constitution is void and deemed legally inexistent
(Panganiban)
Mike Velarde, Petitioner vs. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, respondent.
Date promulgated: April 28, 2004
Ponente: J. Panganiban
Facts:
-On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief before the
RTC-Manila against Velarde and his co-respondents Eminence, Jaime Cardinal
Sin, Executive Minister Erao Manalo, Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother
Eliseo F. Soriano.
-SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several
constitutional provisions, specifically on the separation of church and state; and a
declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders
endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the members
of their flock to vote for a specified candidate.

-The petitioner filed a Motion to dismiss before the trial court owing to the fact
that alleged that the questioned SJS Petition did not state a cause of action and
that there was no justiciable controversy.
-The trial courts junked the Velarde petitions under certain reasons:
1. It said that it had jurisdiction over the SJS petition, because in praying for a
determination as to whether the actions imputed to the respondents were
violative of Article II, Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, the petition has raised
only a question of law.
2. It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the Petition
the separation of church and state even tracing, to some extent, the historical
background of the principle. Through its discourse, the court quipped at some
point that the "endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public
office is a clear violation of the separation clause."
-The trial courts essay did not contain a statement of facts and a dispositive
portion, however. Due to this aberration, Velarde and Soriano filed separate
Motions for Reconsideration before the trial court owing to these facts.
-The lower court denied these Motions. Hence, this petition for review.
On April 13, 2004, the Court en banc conducted an Oral Argument.14
-In his Petition, Brother Mike Velarde submits the following issues for this
Courts resolution:
1. Whether or not the Decision dated 12 June 2003 rendered by the court a
quo was proper and valid;
2. Whether or not there exists justiciable controversy in herein respondents
Petition for declaratory relief;
3. Whether or not herein respondent has legal interest in filing the Petition for
declaratory relief;
4. Whether or not the constitutional question sought to be resolved by herein
respondent is ripe for judicial determination;
5. Whether or not there is adequate remedy other than the declaratory relief;
and,
6. Whether or not the court a quo has jurisdiction over the Petition for
declaratory relief of herein respondent.
Issues:
In its oral argument, the Supreme Court condensed Velardes issues and
divided it into 2 groups:
A. Procedural Issues
1. Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a justiciable controversy?
2. Did it state a cause of action?
3.Did respondent have any legal standing to file the Petition for Declaratory
Relief?
B. Substantive Issues
1. Did the RTC Decision conform to the form and substance required by the
Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court?

2.
May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, be
prohibited from endorsing candidates for public office? Corollarily, may they be
banned from campaigning against said candidates? (Not answered in the
affirmative)

urge their so-called flock to vote for, a particular candidate. It is a timehonored rule that sheer speculation does not give rise to an actionable
right.

Decision:
Petition for Review GRANTED. The assailed June 12, 2003 Decision and July
29, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila DECLARED NULL AND
VOID and thus SET ASIDE. The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief is
DISMISSED for failure to state a cause of action.

2.
NO. A cause of action is an act or an omission of one
party in violation of the legal right or rights of another, causing injury
to the latter. (Rebollido v. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 800)
Its essential elements are the following: (1) a right in favor of the
plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and (3) such defendants act or
omission that is violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a
breach of the obligation of the former to the latter.

Holding:
Procedural Issues:
1.
NO. A justiciable controversy to an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial
determination, not one that is conjectural or merely
anticipatory. A petition filed with the trial court should contain a
plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on
which the party pleading relies for his claim.
The SJS Petition fell short of the requirements to constitutue a
jusiciable controversy. Why?
a. It stated no ultimate facts. The petition simply theorized that the
people elected who were endorsed by these religious leaders might
become beholden to the latter.
b.
It did not sufficiently state a declaration of its rights and
duties, what specific legal right of the petitioner was violated by the
respondents therein, and what particular act or acts of the latter were
in breach of its rights, the law or the constitution,
c.
The petition did not pray for a stoppage of violated rights
(duh, wala ngang rights na sinabi eh). It merely sought an opinion of
the trial court. However, courts are proscribed from rendering an
advisory opinion. (tantamount to making laws, remember the
questionability of justice panganibans guidelines for article 36 of the
family code)
It must also be considered that even the religious leaders were
puzzled as to the breach of rights they were claimed to have
committed. As pointed out by Soriano, what exactly has he done that
merited the attention of SJS? Jaime Cardinal Sin adds that the election
season had not even started at the time SJS filed its Petition and that
he has not been actively involved in partisan politics. The Petition does
not even allege any indication or manifest intent on the part of any
of the respondents below to champion an electoral candidate, or to

The court held that the complaints failure to state a cause of action
became a ground for its outright dismissal. Why?
The Court found nothing in the SJS Petition to suggest that an explicit
allegation of fact that SJS had a legal right to protect. (trigger for
the cause of action)
In special civil actions for declaratory relief, the concept of cause of
action under ordinary civil actions does not strictly apply. The reason
for this exception is that an action for declaratory relief presupposes
that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of
rights arising thereunder. Nevertheless, a breach or violation should
be impending, imminent or at least threatened.
The justices could only infer that the interest from its allegation was
its mention of its (SJS) thousands of members who are citizenstaxpayers-registered voters and who are keenly interested. Aside from
the fact that this general averment did not constitute a legal right or
interest, the courts inferred interest too vague and speculative in
character. Rules require that the interest must be material to
the issue and affected by the questioned act or instrument.
To bolster its point, the SJS cited the Corpus Juris Secundum and
submitted that the plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action does not
seek to enforce a claim against the defendant, but sought a judicial
declaration of the rights of the parties for the purpose of guiding their
future conduct, and the essential distinction between a declaratory
judgment action and the usual action is that no actual wrong
need have been committed or loss have occurred in order to
sustain the declaratory judgment action, although there must

be no uncertainty that the loss will occur or that the asserted

rights will be invaded. (???)
During the Oral Argument, Velarde and co-respondents strongly
asserted that they had not in any way engaged or intended to
participate in partisan politics. Not even the alleged proximity of the
elections to the time the Petition was filed below would have provided
the certainty that it had a legal right that would be jeopardized or
violated by any of those respondents.
Even if the SJS petition asserted a legal right, there was
nevertheless no certainty that such right would be invaded by the said
respondents.
3.
NO. Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as
a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
the challenged act.
Interest means a material interest in issue that is affected by the
questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental
interest in the question involved.
SJS has no legal interest in the controversy and has failed to
establish how the resolution of the proffered question would benefit or
injure it.
Parties bringing suits challenging the constitutionality of a law, an act
or a statute must demonstrate that they have been, or are about
to be, denied some right or privilege to which they are lawfully
entitled, or that they are about to be subjected to some
burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of.
If the petition were to be valid, it should satisfy:
First, parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove that they have
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation, particularly that of Congress' taxing power.
Second, there was no showing in the Petition for Declaratory Relief that SJS
as a political party or its members as registered voters would be adversely
affected by the alleged acts of the respondents below, such as the deprivation of
votes or barring of suffrage to its constituents.

Finally, the allegedly keen interest of its "thousands of members who are
citizens-taxpayers-registered voters" is too general and beyond the
contemplation of the standards set by our jurisprudence. Not only is the
presumed interest impersonal in character; it is likewise too vague, highly
speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing.
In not a few cases, the Court has liberalized the locus
standi requirement when a petition raises an issue of
transcendental significance or importance to the people (IBP v
Zamora). The Court deemed the constitutional issue raised to be both
transcendental in importance and novel in nature. Nevertheless, the
barren allegations in the SJS Petition as well as the abbreviated
proceedings in the court would prevent the resolution of the
transcendental issue.
Substantive Issues
1.
NO. The Constitution commands that no decision shall
be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No
petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision
of the court shall be refused due course or denied without
stating the basis therefor.
Consistent with this are Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure,
Administrative Circular No. 1. which states that :
A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall
be rendered. The decision shall be in writing, personally and
directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly
the facts and law on which it is based, signed by the issuing
magistrate, and filed with the clerk of court.
The SC has reminded magistrates to heed the demand of Section `4,
Art VIII of the contsitution. This was evinced in Yao v. Court of
Appeals where Davide, CJ said that faithful adherence to the
requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is
indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair
play.
In People v. Bugarin, the court held that the requirement that the
decisions of courts must be in writing and that they must set forth
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based is

intended, among other things, to inform the parties of the reason or

reasons for the decision so that if any of them appeals, he can point
out to the appellate court the finding of facts or the rulings on
points of law with which he disagrees.
The assailed Decision contains no statement of facts (much
less an assessment or analysis thereof) or of the courts findings as to
the probable facts. The assailed Decision begins with a statement of
the nature of the action and the question or issue presented. Then
follows a brief explanation of the constitutional provisions involved,
and what the Petition sought to achieve. Thereafter, the ensuing
procedural incidents before the trial court are tracked. The Decision
proceeds to a full-length opinion on the nature and the extent of the
separation of church and state. Without expressly stating the final
conclusion she has reached or specifying the relief granted or denied,
the trial judge ends her Decision with the clause SO ORDERED.
A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts
and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark
as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the
losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of
the court for review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the
requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching
judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal
reasoning.
It was truly obvious that the RTCs Decision did not adhere to the
Bugarin precedent because of its failure to express clearly and
distinctly the facts on which it was based. The significance of factual
findings lies in the value of the decision as a precedent (how will the
ruling be applied in the future, if there is no point of factual
comparison?).
Respondent SJS insisted that the dispositive portion can be found in
the body (p. 10) of the assailed Decision. Stating Endorsement of
specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation
of the separation clause.

The Court held that the statement is merely an answer to a hypothetical legal
question and just a part of the opinion of the trial court. It does not conclusively
declare the rights (or obligations) of the parties to the Petition. Neither does it
grant any -- much less, the proper -- relief under the circumstances, as required
of a dispositive portion.
The standard for a dispositive was set in Manalang v. Tuason de
Rickards where the resolution of the Court on a given issue as
embodied in the dispositive part of the decision or order is
the investitive or controlling factor that determines and settles
the rights of the parties and the questions presented therein,
notwithstanding the existence of statements or declaration in the body
of said order that may be confusing.
In Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Caluag: The rule is settled that where
there is a conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion, the
former must prevail over the latter on the theory that the dispositive
portion is the final order while the opinion is merely a
statement ordering nothing.
The statement quoted by SJS does not conclusively declare the rights
(or obligations) of the parties to the Petition. Neither does it grant
proper relief under the circumstances, as required of a dispositive
portion.
Failure to comply with the constitutional injunction is a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Decisions or
orders issued in careless disregard of the constitutional mandate are a
patent nullity and must be struck down as void.
2.
It is not legally possible to take up, on the merits, the
paramount question involving a constitutional principle. It is a timehonored rule that the constitutionality of a statute or act will be passed
upon only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily
involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection
of the rights of the parties concerned. (So no answer)