UY KHEYTIN VS.

VILLAREAL (1920)
Facts:
Ramon Gayanilo, corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, presented to the
judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo an application for search
warrant; "That in the house of Chino Uy Kheytin, there is kept a certain
amount of opium."- Armed with that search warrant, the respondent Lt.
Torralba, on the same day (April 30th) searched the house of the petitioner
and found therein 60 small cans of opium. They wanted to search also the
bodega, but the ptr. positively denied that it was his. For this reason, Lt.
Torralba placed a guard in the premises to see that nothing was removed
therefrom, and then went away to find out who the owner of the bodega
was. The next morning he learned from the owner of the house,that the
ptr.was the one who was renting the bodega. Thereupon Lt. Torralba and
his subordinates resumed the search and there found and seized articles
which were all with connection to the using of opium.- A criminal complaint
was filed against ptr. charging violation of the Opium Law. They were duly
arrested.
-Defendants urged: (1) that the search warrant of April 30 was illegal and
because the judge who issued it did not determine the probable cause by
examining witnesses under oath (2) that the searches and seizures made
on May 1st had been made was illegal; and (3) that the seizure of
the defendants' books and letters was a violation of the provisions of
the Jones Law providing that no person shall be compelled to testify
against himself, and protecting him against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
Issue:
WON the defendants positions are with merit.
Ruling (s):
1. That although in the issuance of the search warrant in question the judge
did not comply with the requirements of section 98 of General Orders No.
58, the petitioners are not entitled to the return of the opium and
its paraphernalia which were found and seized under said warrant,
and much less are they entitled to be exonerated because of such omission
of the judge. 2. That the search made on May 1st was a continuation of
the search begun on the previous day, and, therefore, did not require
another search warrant. 3. That the seizure of the petitioner's books,
letters, telegrams, and other articles which have no inherent relation with
opium and the possession of which is not forbidden by law, was illegal and
in violation of the ptr.s' constitutional rights.
D. VALID SEARCH WITHOUT WARRANT
1. Incident to llawful arrest
Rule 126, Sec. 13

Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested

may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been
used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search
warrant. (12a)
PP VS. CHUA HO SAN (1999)
FACTS:
Chief of Police Jim Lagasca Cid of Bacnotan Police Station,
LaU n i o n p a t r o l l i n g t h e B a c n o t a n c o a s t l i n e w i t h h i s o f f i c e r
. W h i l e monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala, he intercepted a
radio
call
from Barangay Captain
A l m o i t e o f B a r a n g a y Tammocalao requesting for police
a s s i s t a n c e r e g a r d i n g a n u n f a m i l i a r speedboat the latter had
spotted. According to him, the vessel looked d i f fe r e n t f r o m t h e
b o a t s o r d i n a r i l y u s e d b y f i s h e r f o l k o f t h e a r e a an d wa s poised
to dock at Tammocalao shores. Cid and six of his men
, proceeded immediately to Tammocalao beach and there conferred
with Almoite. Cid then observed that the speedboat ferried a lonemale
passenger, who was later identified as Chua Ho San. When the
speedboat landed, the male passenger alighted, carrying a multicolored
strawbag,
a n d wa l k e d t o wa r d s t h e r o ad . U p o n s e e i n g t he p o l i c e o f fi c e r s ,
t h e m a n changed direction. Badua held Chuas right arm to prevent him
from fleeing. They then introduced themselves as police officers;
however, Chua did not understand what theyre saying. And by
resorting of sign language, Cid motioned with his hands for the
man to open his bag. The man acceded to the request. The said bag
was found to contain several transparent plastics containing yellowish
crystalline
substances,
which
was
identified
to
be
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Chua was the
n b r o u g h t t o Bacnotan Police Station, where he was provided with an
interpreter to inform him of his constitutional rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure
c o n s t i t u t e a v a l i d e x e m p t i o n f r o m t h e w a r r a n t requirement.
RULING: The Court held in the negative. The Court explains that the
Constitution bars State intrusions to a person'sbody, personal effects
or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid
of a v a l i d s e a r c h w a r r a n t i s s u e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e
R u l e s . H o w e v e r , warrantless searches may be permitted in the
following cases, to wit:(1)search of moving vehicles,(2)seizure in plain
view,(3)customs searches,(4)waiver or consent searches 5)stop and
frisk situations (Terry search), and(6)search incidental to a lawful arrest.It is
required in cases of
in flagrante delicto
that the arresting officer
musth a v e p e r so n a l k n o wl e d g e o f s u c h f a ct s o r c ir c u m s t a n ce s
c o n v i n c i n g l yi n d i c a t i v e o r c on s t i t u t i v e o f p r ob a b l e c au s e . P r o

b a b l e c a u s e m e a n s a reasonable ground of suspicion supported

by circumstances sufficientlystrong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man's belief that the personaccused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged. In the case at bar, there are no facts
on record reasonably suggestive or demonstrativeof CHUA's
participation in on going criminal enterprise that could havespurred
police officers from conducting the obtrusive search. CHUA was not
identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact thatthe
vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the
fishingb o a t s o f t h e a r e a d i d n o t a u t o m a t i c a l l y m a r k h i m as i n
t h e p r o c e s s o f p e r p e t r a t i n g an o f fe n s e . W it h t h e s e , t h e C o u r t
h e l d t h a t t h e r e wa s n o probable cause to justify a search incidental to
a lawful arrest. The Court likewise did not appreciate the contention
of the
Prosecutiont h a t t h e r e w a s a w a i v e r o r c o n s e n t e d s
e a r c h . I f C H U A c o u l d n o t understand what was orally
articulated to him, how could he
understandt h e p o l i c e ' s " s i g n l a n g u ag e ? " Mo r e i m p o r t an t l y, i t c
a n n o t l o g i ca l l y b e i n f e r r e d f r o m h i s a l l e g e d c o g n i z a n c e o f
t h e " s i g n l a n g u a g e " t h a t h e deliberately, intelligently, and
consciously waived his right against suchan intrusive search.Finally,
being a forbidden fruit, the subject regulated substance was heldto be
inadmissible in evidence.Hence, the accused was acquitted as the
evidence was not sufficient toestablish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

2. Plain View
Del Rosario v. PP
PP v. Musa
PP v. Salanguit
PP v. Macalaba
3. Consented search
PP v. Kagui
4. Terry Rule
Caballes v. CA
PP v. Chua
5. Checkpoints
Valmonte v. De Villa
Posadas v. CA

PP v. Exala
6. Moving vehicles
PP v. Del Mundo
PP v. Lapitaje
PP v. Libnao
7. Airport Search
PP v. Canton
E. REMEDY AGAINST IMPROPER ISSUANCE AND ENFORCEMENT
1. Motion to quash or suppress evidence
Rule 126, Sec. 14
Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress
evidence; where to file. A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to
suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by
the court where the action has been instituted. If no criminal action has been
instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued
the search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a
criminal case is subsequent filed in another court, the motion shall be
resolved by the latter court.
2. Exclusionary Rule (Fruit of the poisonous tree)
Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 3 (2)
Alih v. Castro
Pp v. Alicando
F. Rule on Search and Seizure in Civil Actions for Infringement of Intellectual
Property Rights

a.

Bache & Co. (Phil.) Inc. vs. Ruiz [GR L-32409, 27 February 1971] En Banc,
Villamor (J): 7 concur, 1 filed a separate concurring opinion to which 1
concurs, 1 concurs in result
Facts: On 24 February 1970, Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the
issuance of a search warrant against Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. and Frederick
E. Seggerman for violation of Section 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue
Code (NIRC), in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly
Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner
Rodolfo de Leon to make and file the application for search warrant which
was attached to the letter. In the afternoon of the following day, De Leon and
his witness, Arturo Logronio, went to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Rizal. They brought with them the following papers: Vera's letter-request; an
application for search warrant already filled up but still unsigned by De Leon;
an affidavit of Logronio subscribed before De Leon; a deposition in printed
form of Logronio already accomplished and signed by him but not yet
subscribed; and a search warrant already accomplished but still unsigned by
Judge. At that time the Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a
note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De
Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, the Judge was
informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer,
upon request of the Judge, read to him her stenographic notes; and

thereafter, the Judge asked Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if
his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be
charged for perjury. The Judge signed de Leon's application for search
warrant and Logronio's deposition. Search Warrant 2-M-70 was then signed
by Judge and accordingly issued. 3 days later (a Saturday), the BIR agents
served the search warrant to the corporation and Seggerman at the offices of
the corporation on Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal. The corporation's lawyers
protested the search on the ground that no formal complaint or transcript of
testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded
with their search which yielded 6 boxes of documents. On 3 March 1970, the
corporation and Seggerman filed a petition with the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Rizal praying that the search warrant be quashed, dissolved or
recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and mandatory writs of injunction be
issued, that the search warrant be declared null and void, and that Vera,
Logronio, de Leon, et. al., be ordered to pay the corporation and
Seggerman, jointly and severally, damages and attorney's fees. After hearing
and on 29 July 1970, the court issued an order dismissing the petition for
dissolution of the search warrant. In the meantime, or on 16 April 1970, the
Bureau of Internal Revenue made tax assessments on the corporation in the
total sum of P2,594,729.97, partly, if not entirely, based on the documents
thus seized. The corporation and Seggerman filed an action for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus.
Issue: Whether the corporation has the right to contest the legality of the
seizure of documents from its office
Held:
The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights
have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search
and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. In
Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno, et al. (GR L-19550, 19 June 1967; 20 SCRA 383)
the Supreme Court impliedly recognized the right of a corporation to object
against unreasonable searches and seizures; holding that the corporations
have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality
of the corporate officers, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or the
interest of each of them in said corporations, whatever, the offices they hold
therein may be; and that the corporate officers therefore may not validly
object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and
things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations, since the
right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs
exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may
not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their
individual capacity. The distinction between the Stonehill case and the
present case is that: in the former case, only the officers of the various
corporations in whose offices documents, papers and effects were searched
and seized were the petitioners; while in the latter, the corporation to whom
the seized documents belong, and whose rights have thereby been impaired,
is itself a petitioner. On that score, the corporation herein stands on a
different footing from the corporations in Stonehill. Moreover, herein, the
search warrant was void inasmuch as First, there was no personal
examination conducted by the Judge of the complainant (De Leon) and his
witness (Logronio). The Judge did not ask either of the two any question the
answer to which could possibly be the basis for determining whether or not

there was probable cause against Bache & Co. and Seggerman. The
participation of the Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of
Search Warrant 2-M-70 was thus limited to listening to the stenographer's
readings of her notes, to a few words of warning against the commission of
perjury, and to administering the oath to the complainant and his witness.
This cannot be consider a personal examination. Second, the search warrant
was issued for more than one specific offense. The search warrant was
issued for at least 4 distinct offenses under the Tax Code. The first is the
violation of Section 46(a), Section 72 and Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Section 73 (the filing of income tax returns),
which are interrelated. The second is the violation of Section 53 (withholding
of income taxes at source). The third is the violation of Section 208 (unlawful
pursuit of business or occupation); and the fourth is the violation of Section
209 (failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business or gross value of
output actually removed or to pay the tax due thereon). Even in their
classification the 6 provisions are embraced in 2 different titles: Sections
46(a), 53, 72 and 73 are under Title II (Income Tax); while Sections 208 and
209 are under Title V (Privilege Tax on Business and Occupation). Lastly, the
search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized. Search
Warrant No. 2-M-70 tends to defeat the major objective of the Bill of Rights,
i.e., the elimination of general warrants, for the language used therein is so
all-embracing as to include all conceivable records of the corporation, which,
if seized, could possibly render its business inoperative. Thus, Search
Warrant 2-M-70 is null and void.

Stonehill vs. Diokno [GR L-19550, 19 June 1967] En Banc, Concepcion

(CJ): 6 concur
Facts:
Upon application of the officers of the government, Special Prosecutors
Pedro D. Cenzon, Efren I. Plana and Manuel Villareal Jr. and Assistant Fiscal
Manases G. Reyes; Judge Amado Roan (Municipal Court of Manila), Judge
Roman Cansino (Municipal Court of Manila), Judge Hermogenes Caluag
(Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch), and Judge Damian
Jimenez (Municipal Court of Quezon City) issued, on different dates, a total
of 42 search warrants against Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, HJohn J.
Brooks, and Karl Beck, and/or the corporations of which they were officers,
directed to any peace officer, to search the said persons and/or the premises
of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take
possession of the following personal property to wit: "Books of accounts,
financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers

showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance

sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers)" as
"the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the
offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the
offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and the Revised Penal Code." Alleging that the search warrants are
null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court,
Stonehill, et. al. filed with the Supreme Court the original action for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and injunction. On 22 March 1962, the Supreme
Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition.
However, by resolution dated 29 June 1962, the writ was partially lifted or
dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the
offices of the corporations are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained
as regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the
residences of Stonehill, et. al.
Issue:
Whether Stonehill, et. al. can assail the legality of the contested warrants
that allowed seizure of documents, papers and other effects in the corporate
offices, and other places besides their residences.
Held:
Stonehill, et. al. maintained that the search warrants are in the nature of
general warrants and that, accordingly, the seizures effected upon the
authority thereof are null and void. No warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested
warrants. The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for
the contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein
made of the effects to be searched for and seized. The warrants authorized
the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions
of Stonehill, et. al., regardless of whether the transactions were legal or
illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the corporate
officers and the corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly
contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights that the things to
be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its major
objective: the elimination of general warrants. However, the documents,
papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and
seized in the offices of the corporations and (b) those found seized in the
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 4 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) residences of
Stonehill, et. al. As regards the first group, Stonehill, et. al. have no cause of
action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures
made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have
their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of
Stonehill, et. al., regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest
of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold
therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and
that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and

cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, Stonehill, et. al. may not
validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers
and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted
to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in
evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects
belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings
against them in their individual capacity. With respect to the documents,
papers and things seized in the residences of Stonehill, et. al., the 29 June
1962 Resolution of the Supreme Court, denying the lifting of the writ of
preliminary injunction previously issued by the Court on the documents,
papers and things seized in the residences, in effect, restrained the
prosecutors from using them in evidence against Stonehill, et. al. Thus, the
Court held that the warrants for the search of 3 residences are null and void;
that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents,
papers and other effects thus seized in said residences is made permanent,
that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and
other effects so seized in the residences are concerned; and that the petition
herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the
documents, papers and other effects seized in the 29 places, offices and
other premises.

People vs. Chua Ho San [GR 128222, 17 June 1999] En Banc, Davide Jr.
(CJ): 13 concur, 1 on leave
Facts:
In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other
contraband, Jim Lagasca Cid, as Chief of Police of the Bacnotan Police
Station, of La Union began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers.
While monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala on 29 March 1995, he
intercepted a radio call at around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan
Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao requesting police assistance regarding an
unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted, which looked different from the
boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was poised to dock at
Tammocalao shores. Cid and 6 of his men led by his Chief Investigator,
SPO1 Reynoso Badua, proceeded forthwith to Tammocalao beach,
conferred with Almoite, and observed that the speedboat ferried a lone male

passenger. When the speedboat landed, the male passenger alighted, and
using both hands, carried what appeared a multicolored strawbag, and
walked towards the road. By this time, Almoite, Cid and Badua, the latter two
conspicuous in their uniform and issued side-arms, became suspicious of the
man as he suddenly changed direction and broke into a run upon seeing the
approaching officers. Badua, prevented the man from fleeing by holding on
to his right arm. Although Cid introduced themselves as police officers, the
man appeared impassive. Speaking in English, then in Tagalog, and later in
Ilocano, Cid then requested the man to open his bag, but he seemed not to
understand. Cid then resorted to "sign language," motioning with his hands
for the man to open the bag. The man apparently understood and acceded
to the request. A search of the bag yielded several transparent plastic
packets containing yellowish crystalline substances. As Cid wished to
proceed to the police station, he signaled the man to follow, but the latter did
not comprehend. Hence, Cid placed his arm around the shoulders of the
man and escorted the latter to the police headquarters. At the police station,
Cid then "recited and informed the man of his constitutional rights" to remain
silent, to have the assistance of a counsel, etc. Eliciting no response from
the man, Cid ordered his men to find a resident of the area who spoke
Chinese to act as an interpreter. In the meantime, Badua opened the bag
and counted 29 plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline substances.
The interpreter, Mr. Go Ping Guan, finally arrived, through whom the man
was "apprised of his constitutional rights." When the policemen asked the
man several questions, he retreated to his obstinate reticence and merely
showed his ID with the name Chua Ho San printed thereon. Chua's bag and
its contents were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Diego Silang,
Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union for laboratory examination. In the
meantime, Chua was detained at the Bacnotan Police Station. Later, Police
Chief Inspector and Forensic Chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid (wife of
Cid), conducted a laboratory examination of 29 plastic packets, adn in her
Chemistry Report D-025-95, she stated that her qualitative examination
established the contents of the plastic packets, weighing 28.7 kilos, to be
positive of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.
Chua was initially charged with illegal possession of methamphetamine
hydrochloride before the RTC (Criminal Case 4037). However, pursuant to
the recommendation of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San
Fernando, La Union, the information was subsequently amended to allege
that Chua was in violation of Section 15, Article III of RA 6425 as amended
by RA 7659 (illegal transport of a regulated drug). At his arraignment on 31
July 1995, where the amended complaint was read to him by a Fukienspeaking interpreter, Chua entered a plea of not guilty. Trial finally ensued,
with interpreters assigned to Chua (upon the RTC's direct request to the
Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in the Philippines, after its failure to
acquire one from the Department of Foreign Affairs). Chua provided a
completely different story, claiming that the bags belong to his employer Cho
Chu Rong, who he accompanied in the speedboat; that they decided to dock

when they were low on fuel and telephone battery; that the police, with nary
any spoken word but only gestures and hand movements, escorted him to
the precinct where he was handcuffed and tied to a chair; that the police, led
by an officer, arrived with the motor engine of the speedboat and a bag,
which they presented to him; that the police inspected opened the bag,
weighed the contents, then proclaimed them as methamphetamine
hydrochloride. In a decision promulgated on 10 February 1997, the RTC
convicted Chua for transporting 28.7 kilos of methamphetamine
hydrochloride without legal authority to do so. Chua prays for the reversal of
the RTC decision and his acquittal before the Supreme Court. Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 10 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
Issue:
Whether persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other
contraband articles, Chua's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual
fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, Chuas illegal
entry into the Philippines, Chuas suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to
flee when he saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which
Chua can return to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch
towards the high seas, constitute "probable cause."
Held:
No. Enshrined in the Constitution is the inviolable right to privacy of home
and person. It explicitly ordains that people have the right to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. Inseparable, and not
merely corollary or incidental to said right and equally hallowed in and by the
Constitution, is the exclusionary principle which decrees that any evidence
obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. The Constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches
and seizures does not, of course, forestall reasonable searches and seizure.
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not
absolute and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been
deemed permissible by jurisprudence. The Rules of Court recognize
permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2)
arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of escaped prisoners. The
prosecution and the defense painted extremely divergent versions of the
incident, but the Court is certain that Chua was arrested and his bag
searched without the benefit of a warrant. There are no facts on record
reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of Chuas participation in an
ongoing criminal enterprise that could have spurred police

People vs. Chua Ho San

officers from conducting the obtrusive search. The RTC never took the pains
of pointing to such facts, but predicated mainly its decision on the finding that

"accused was caught red-handed carrying the bagful of shabu when

apprehended." In short, there is no probable cause. Persistent reports of
rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband articles, Chua's
watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats that
commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, Chuas illegal entry into the
Philippines, Chuas suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee when he
saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which Chua can return
to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high
seas, do not constitute "probable cause." None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag
or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited
drug, 20 confidential report and/or positive identification by informers of
courier(s) of prohibited drug and/or the time and place where they will
transport/deliver the same, suspicious demeanor or behavior and suspicious
bulge in the waist accepted by the Court as sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest exists in the case. There was no classified information that
a foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug
on the date in question. Chua was not identified as a drug courier by a police
informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no
resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him
as in the process of perpetrating an offense. The search cannot therefore be
denominated as incidental to an arrest. To reiterate, the search was not
incidental to an arrest. There was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless
arrest did not fall under the exemptions allowed by the Rules of Court as
already shown. From all indications, the search was nothing but a fishing
expedition. Casting aside the regulated substance as evidence, the same
being the fruit of a poisonous tree, the remaining evidence on record are
insufficient, feeble and ineffectual to sustain Chuas conviction.

People vs. Salanguit [GR 133254-55, 19 April 2001] Second Division,

Mendoza (J): 4 concur
Facts:
On 26 December 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariias, Cavite, to search the
residence of Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon
City. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that
as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from
Salanguit. The sale took place in Salunguit's room, and Badua saw that the
shabu was taken by Salunguit from a cabinet inside his room. The
application was granted, and a search warrant was later issued by Presiding
Judge Dolores L. Espaol. At about 10:30 p.m. of said day, a group of about
10 policemen, along with one civilian informer, went to the residence of
Salunguit to serve the warrant. The police operatives knocked on Salanguits
door, but nobody opened it. They heard people inside the house, apparently
panicking. The police operatives then forced the door open and entered the
house. After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt.
Cortes and his group started searching the house. They found 12 small heatsealed transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance, a

paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks
of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint having
a total weight of approximately 1,255 grams. A receipt of the items seized
was prepared, but Salanguit refused to sign it. After the search, the police
operatives took Salanguit with them to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning,
Quezon City, along with the items they had seized. PO3 Duazo requested a
laboratory examination of the confiscated evidence. The white crystalline
substance with a total weight of 2.77 grams and those contained in a small
box with a total weight of 8.37 grams were found to be positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the other hand, the two bricks of dried
leaves, one weighing 425 grams and the other 850 grams, were found to be
marijuana. Charges against Roberto Salanguit y Ko for violations of Republic
Act (RA) 6425, i.e. for possession of shabu and marijuana, (Criminal Cases
Q-95-64357 and Q- 95-64358, respectively) were filed on 28 December
1995. After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, convicting Salanguit
in Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358 for violation of Section 16
and 8, respectively, RA 6425, and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate
sentence with a minimum of 6 months of arresto mayor and a maximum of 4
years and 2 months of prision correccional, and reclusion perpetua and to
pay a fine of P700,000.00, respectively. Salanguit appealed; contesting his
conviction on the grounds that (1) the admissibility of the shabu allegedly
recovered from his residence as evidence against him on the ground that the
warrant used in obtaining it was invalid; (2) the admissibility in evidence of
the marijuana allegedly seized from Salanguit to the "plain view" doctrine;
and (3) the employment of unnecessary force by the police in the execution
of the warrant.
Issue: Whether the warrant was invalid for failure of providing evidence to
support the seizure of drug Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 14 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) paraphernalia, and whether the marijuana may be
included as evidence in light of the plain view doctrine.
Held: The warrant authorized the seizure of "undetermined quantity of
shabu and drug paraphernalia." Evidence was presented showing probable
cause of the existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The
fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the
seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the
search warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia
was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of
the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only
insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to
the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was
presented showing probable cause as to its existence. In sum, with respect
to the seizure of shabu from Salanguit's residence, Search Warrant 160 was
properly issued, such warrant being founded on probable cause personally
determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be

seized. With respect to, and in light of the "plain view doctrine," the police
failed to allege the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to,
or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it
was recovered on Salanguit's person or in an area within his immediate
control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted
after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by
SPO1 Badua in his deposition, was invalid. Thus, the Court affirmed the
decision as to Criminal Case Q-95-64357 only.

Yee Sue Koy vs. Almeda [GR 47021, 15 June 1940] Laurel (J): 3 concur, 1
concurs in result
Facts:
In response to a sworn application of Mariano G. Almeda, chief agent of the
Anti-Usury Board, dated 5 May 1938, the justice of the peace of Sagay,
Occidental Negros, after taking the testimony of applicant's witness, Jose
Estrada, special agent of the Anti-Usury Board, issued on the same date a
search warrant commanding any peace officer to search during day time the
store and premises occupied by Sam Sing & Co., situated at Sagay,
Occidental Negros, as well as the person of said Sam Sing & Co., and to
seize the documents, notebooks, lists, receipts and promissory notes being
used by said Sam Sing & Co. in connection with their activities of lending
money at usurious rates of interest in violation of law, or such as may be
found, and to bring them forthwith before the aforesaid justice of the peace
of Sagay. On the same date, at 10:30 a. m., search was accordingly made
by Mariano G. Almeda, Jose Estrada, 2 internal revenue agents and 2
members of the Philippine Army, who seized certain receipt books, vales or
promissory notes, chits, notebooks, journal book, and collection list
belonging to Sam Sing & Co. and enumerated in the inventory receipt issued
by Mariano G. Almeda to the owner of the documents, papers and articles

seized. Immediately after the search and seizure thus effected, Mariano G.
Almeda filed a return with the justice of the peace of Sagay together. With a
request that the office of the Anti-Usury Board be allowed to retain
possession of the articles seized for examination, pursuant to section 4 of
Act 4109, which request was granted. Under the date of 11 March 1939,
Godofredo P. Escalona, counsel for Sam Sing & Co. filed a motion with the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Occidental Negros praying that the search
warrant and the seizure effected thereunder be declared illegal and set aside
and that the articles in question be ordered returned to Sam Sing & Co.,
which motion was denied in the order dated 24 July 1939. A similar motion
was presented to the justice of the peace of Sagay on 27 October 1939 but
was denied the next day. Meanwhile, an information dated 30 September
1939 had been filed in the CFI Occidental Negros, charging Yee Fock alias
Yee Sue Koy, Y. Tip and A. Sing, managers of Sam Sing & Co., with a
violation of Act 2655. Before the criminal case could be tried, Yee Sue Koy
and Yee Tip filed the petition with the Supreme Court on 6 November 1939.
The petition is grounded on the propositions (1) that the search warrant
issued on 2 May 1938, by the justice of the peace of Sagay and the seizure
accomplished thereunder are illegal, because the warrant was issued three
days ahead of the application therefor and of the affidavit of the Jose Estrada
which is insufficient in itself to justify the issuance of a search warrant, and
because the issuance of said warrant manifestly contravenes the mandatory
provisions both of section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and
of section 97 of General Orders 58, and (2) that the seizure of the aforesaid
articles by means of a search warrant for the purpose of using them as
evidence in the criminal case against the accused, is unconstitutional
because the warrant thereby becomes unreasonable and amounts to a
violation of the constitutional prohibition against compelling the accused to
testify against themselves.
Issue: Whether the application of the search warrant is supported by the
personal knowledge of the witness, besides the applicant, for the judge to
determine probable cause in issuing the warrant.
Held:
Strict observance of the formalities under section 1, paragraph 3, of Article
III of the Constitution and of section 97 of General Orders 58 was followed.
The applicant Mariano G. Almeda, in his application, swore that "he made his
own personal investigation and ascertained that Sam Sing & Co. is lending
money without Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 23 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
license, charging usurious rate of interest and is keeping, utilizing and
concealing in the store and premises occupied by it situated at Sagay,
Occidental Negros, documents, notebooks, lists, receipts, promissory notes,
and book of accounts and records, all of which are being used by it in
connection with its activities of lending money at usurious rate of interest in
violation of the Usury Law." In turn, the witness Jose Estrada, in his
testimony before the justice of the peace of Sagay, swore that he knew that

Sam Sing & Co. was lending money without license and charging usurious
rate of interest, because he personally investigated the victims who had
secured loans from said Sam Sing & Co. and were charged usurious rate of
interest; that he knew that the said Sam Sing & Co. was keeping and using
books of accounts and records containing its transactions relative its
activities as money lender and the entries of the interest paid by its debtors,
because he saw the said Sam Sing & d make entries and records of their
debts and the interest paid thereon. As both Mariano G. Almeda and Jose
Estrada swore that they had personal knowledge, their affidavits were
sufficient for, thereunder, they could be held liable for perjury if the facts
would turn out to be not as their were stated under oath. That the existence
of probable cause had been determined by the justice of the peace of Sagay
before issuing the search warrant complained of, is shown by the following
statement in the warrant itself, to wit: "After examination under oath of the
complainant, Mariano G. Almeda, Chief Agent of the Anti-Usury Board,
Department of Justice and Special Agent of the Philippine Army, Manila, and
the witness he presented, . . . and this Court, finding that there is just and
probable cause to believe as it does believe, that the above described
articles, relating to the activities of said Sam Sing & Co. of lending money at
usurious rate of interest, are being utilized and kept and concealed at its
store and premises occupied by said Sam Sing & Co., all in violation of law."

Caballes vs. Court of Appeals [GR 136292, 15 January 2002] First

Division, Puno (J): 4 concur
Facts: About 9:15 p.m. of 28 June 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex
de Castro, while on a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan,
Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves.
Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police
officers flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by Rudy Caballes y
Taio. When asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer, but he
appeared pale and nervous. With Caballes' consent, the police officers
checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of 3.08 mm
aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power
Corporation (NAOCOR). The conductor wires weighed 700 kilos and valued
at P55,244.45. Noceja asked Caballes where the wires came from and
Caballes answered that they came from Cavinti, a town approximately 8
kilometers away from Sampalucan. Thereafter, Caballes and the vehicle with

the highvoltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo
Cabale took pictures of Caballes and the jeep loaded with the wires which
were turned over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna.
Caballes was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail. Caballes was
charged with the crime of theft in an information dated 16 October 1989.
During the arraignment, Caballes pleaded not guilty and hence, trial on the
merits ensued. On 27 April 1993, Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna
rendered judgment, finding Caballes, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of theft. In a resolution dated 9 November 1998, the trial court denied
Caballes' motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court decision on 15 September 1998. Caballes appealed the decision by
certiorari.
Issue:
Whether Caballes passive submission to the statement of Sgt. Noceja that
the latter "will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the
positive" be considered as waiver on Caballes part on warrantless search
and seizure.
Held:
Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be
secure in their persons and properties against unreasonable searches and
seizures, as defined under Section 2, Article III thereof. The exclusionary rule
under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the admission of
evidence obtained in violation of such right. The constitutional proscription
against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of
certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by
prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of
moving vehicles; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6)
stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (7) exigent and emergency
circumstances. In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by
the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be complied with.
In the exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid
search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without a
warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is
purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the
circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the
articles procured. It is not controverted that the search and seizure
conducted by the police officers was not authorized by a search warrant. The
mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers
unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if
made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause.
Herein, the police officers did not merely conduct a visual search or visual

inspection of Caballes' vehicle. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the
kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see the
cable wires. It thus cannot be considered a simple routine check. Also,
Caballes' vehicle was flagged down because the police officers who were on
routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle
was covered with kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual
and uncommon. The fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because
it is not common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not
constitute "probable cause" as would justify the conduct of a search without
a warrant. In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received
any confidential report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying
stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could otherwise have sustained their
suspicion. Philippine jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped
information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless
search and seizure. Unfortunately, Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 42 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) none exists in the present case. Further, the
evidence is lacking that Caballes intentionally surrendered his right against
unreasonable searches. The manner by which the two police officers
allegedly obtained the consent of Caballes for them to conduct the search
leaves much to be desired. When Caballes' vehicle was flagged down, Sgt.
Noceja approached Caballes and "told him I will look at the contents of his
vehicle and he answered in the positive." By uttering those words, it cannot
be said the police officers were asking or requesting for permission that they
be allowed to search the vehicle of Caballes. For all intents and purposes,
they were informing, nay, imposing upon Caballes that they will search his
vehicle. The "consent" given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is
no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty. In addition, in
cases where the Court upheld the validity of consented search, it will be
noted that the police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for
the consent of the accused to be searched. And the consent of the accused
was established by clear and positive proof. Neither can Caballes' passive
submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantless
search. Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence
on record are insufficient to sustain Caballes' conviction. His guilt can only
be established without violating the constitutional right of the accused
against unreasonable search and seizure.

People vs. Libnao

[GR 136860, 20 January 2003] Third Division, Puno (J): 4 concur Facts: On
August 1996, intelligence operatives of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
stationed in Tarlac, Tarlac began conducting surveillance operation on
suspected drug dealers in the area. They learned from their asset that a

certain woman from Tajiri, Tarlac and a companion from Baguio City were
transporting illegal drugs once a month in big bulks. On 19 October 1996, at
about 10 p.m., Chief Inspector Benjamin Arceo, Tarlac Police Chief, held a
briefing in connection with a tip which his office received that the two drug
pushers, riding in a tricycle, would be making a delivery that night. An hour
later, the Police Alert Team installed a checkpoint in Barangay Salapungan to
apprehend the suspects. Witness SPO1 Marlon Gamotea, PO3 Florante
Ferrer and SPO3 Roberto Aquino were assigned to man the checkpoint. At
about 1:00 a.m. of the following day, SPO1 Gamotea and PO3 Ferrer
flagged down a passing tricycle. It had two female passengers seated inside,
who were later identified as Agpanga Libnao and Rosita Nunga. In front of
them was a black bag. Suspicious of the black bag and the twos uneasy
behavior when asked about its ownership and content, the officers invited
them to Kabayan Center 2 located at the same barangay. They brought with
them the black bag. Upon reaching the center, PO3 Ferrer fetched Barangay
Captain Roy Pascual to witness the opening of the black bag. In the
meantime, the two women and the bag were turned over to the investigator
on duty, SPO3 Arthur Antonio. As soon as the barangay captain arrived, the
black bag was opened in the presence of Libnao, Nunga, and personnel of
the center. Found inside it were 8 bricks of leaves sealed in plastic bags and
covered with newspaper. The leaves were suspected to be marijuana. To
determine who owns the bag and its contents, SPO3 Antonio interrogated
the two. Nunga stated that it was owned by Libnao. The latter, in turn,
disputed this allegation. Thereafter, they were made to sign a confiscation
receipt without the assistance of any counsel, as they were not informed of
their right to have one. During the course of the investigation, not even close
relatives of theirs were present. The seized articles were later brought to the
PNP Crime Laboratory in San Fernando, Pampanga on 23 October 1996.
Forensic Chemist Daisy P. Babu conducted a laboratory examination on
them. She concluded that the articles were marijuana leaves weighing eight
kilos. Libnao and Nunga were charged for violation of Section 4, Article II of
RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended. On 19 November 1998, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65,
Tarlac City, found Libnao and Nunga guilty. For their conviction, each was
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine
of two million pesos. Libnao appealed.
Issue: Whether the warrantless search and seizure made upon Libnao and
Nunga was reasonable.
Held: The constitutional guarantee (in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution) is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as
it operates only against "unreasonable" searches and seizures. Searches
and seizures are as a rule unreasonable unless authorized by a validly
issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection
accorded by the search and seizure clause is that between Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 54 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) persons and police must

stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or

refuse to issue search warrants and warrants of arrest. Be that as it may, the
requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out
of a search and seizure is not absolute. There are certain familiar exceptions
to the rule, one of which relates to search of moving vehicles. Warrantless
search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the
impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant may be sought. Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to
routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual
inspection. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search,
such would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers made it upon
probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances
known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains as
item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction. The
warrantless search herein is not bereft of a probable cause. The Tarlac
Police Intelligence Division had been conducting surveillance operation for
three months in the area. The surveillance yielded the information that once
a month, Libnao and Nunga transport drugs in big bulks. At 10:00 pm of 19
October 1996, the police received a tip that the two will be transporting drugs
that night riding a tricycle. Surely, the two were intercepted three hours later,
riding a tricycle and carrying a suspicious-looking black bag, which possibly
contained the drugs in bulk. When they were asked who owned it and what
its content was, both became uneasy. Under these circumstances, the
warrantless search and seizure of Libnaos bag was not illegal. It is also
clear that at the time she was apprehended, she was committing a criminal
offense. She was making a delivery or transporting prohibited drugs in
violation of Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425. Under the Rules of Court,
one of the instances a police officer is permitted to carry out a warrantless
arrest is when the person to be arrested is caught committing a crime in
flagrante delicto.

People v. Musa [GR 96177, 27 January 1993] Third Division, Romero (J): 4
concur
Facts:
On 13 December 1989, the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) in Zamboanga
City conducted surveillance and test buy on a certain Mari Musa of
Suterville, Zamboanga City. Information received from civilian informer was
that this Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in said place. The
Narcom agent (Sgt. Ani) was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried
marijuana for P10.00, which was turned over to the Narcom office. The next
day, a buy-bust was planned with Sgt. Ani being the poseur-buyer. NARCOM
teams proceeded to the target site in 2 civilian vehicles. Ani gave Musa the
P20.00 marked money. Musa returned to his house and gave Ani 2
newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. The signal to apprehend
Musa was given. The NARCOM team rushed to the location of Ani, and a
NARCOM officer (Sgt. Belarga) frisked Musa but did not find the marked
money. The money was given to Musas wife who was able to slip away.
Later, Belarga found a plastic bag containing dried marijuana inside it
somewhere in the kitchen. Musa was placed under arrest and was brought to
the NARCOM office. One newspaper-wrapper marijuana and the plastic bag
containing more marijuana was sent to the PC Crime Laboratory, the test of
which gave positive results for the presence of marijuana. On the other hand,
Mari Musa alleged that the NARCOM agents, dressed in civilian clothes, got
inside his house without any search warrant, neither his permission to enter
the house. The NARCOM agents searched the house and allegedly found a
red plastic bag whose contents, Mari Musa said, he did not know. He also
did not know if the plastic bag belonged to his brother, Faisal, who was living
with him, or his father, who was living in another house about ten armslength away. Mari Musa was handcuffed and was taken to the NARCOM
office where he was joined by his wife. Musa claimed that he was subjected
to torture when he refused to sign the document containing details of the
investigation. The next day, he was taken to the fiscals office to which he
was allegedly made to answer to a single question: that if he owned the
marijuana. He allegedly was not able to tell the fiscal that he had been
maltreated by the NARCOM agents because he was afraid he might be
maltreated in the fiscal's office. Mari Musa was brought to the City Jail. Still,
an information against Musa was filed on 15 December 1989. Upon his
arraignment on 11 January 1990, Musa pleaded not guilty. After trial and on
31 August 1990, the RTC Zamboanga City (Branch XII) found him guilty of
selling marijuana in violation of Article II, Section 4 of RA 6425. Musa
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 55 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) appealed to
the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the contents of the red plastic bag found in the kitchen may be
admitted as evidence as evidence acquired incidental to a lawful arrest.

Held:
Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest authorizes the arresting
officer to make a search upon the person of the person arrested. An officer
making an arrest may take from the person arrested and money or property
found upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime or
was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the means
of committing violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in
the trial of the cause. Hence, in a buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a
drug-pusher, the law enforcement agents may seize the marked money
found on the person of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without
arrest and search warrants. The warrantless search and seizure, as an
incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the
one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate
control. Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence. When the discovery of the evidence did not constitute a search,
but where the officer merely saw what was placed before him in full view, the
warrantless seizure of the object was legal on the basis of the "plain view"
doctrine and upheld the admissibility of said evidence. The "plain view"
doctrine, however, may not be used to launch unbridled searches and
indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made
solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is
usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against
the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating
object. What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer
in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which
he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.
The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification whether it be a
warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or
some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search
directed against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure. Of
course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is
immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the
'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search
from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. The
"plain view" doctrine neither justify the seizure of the object where the
incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the "plain view" of the
object. Thus, the exclusion of the plastic bag containing marijuana does not,
however, diminish, in any way, the damaging effect of the other pieces of
evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that the appellant sold
marijuana, in violation of Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972. By virtue of the testimonies of Sgt. Ani and T/Sgt. Belarga and the two
wrappings of marijuana sold by Musa to Sgt. Ani, among other pieces of
evidence, the guilt of Musa of the crime charged has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt .

about 8:00 p.m. of G.R. No. 128222 June 17, 1999

PP vs. Chua Ho San
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.CHUA HO SAN @
TSAY HO SAN, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearm
s a n d o t h e r contraband, Chief of Police Jim Lagasca Cid of
Bacnotan
Police
Station,
LaU n i o n b e g a n p a t r o l l i n g t h e B a c n o t a n c o a s t l i n e w i t h h i s o f
f i c e r s . W h i l e monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala, he
intercepted
a
radio
call
at
around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite
o f B a r a n g a y Tammocalao requesting for police assistance
r e g a r d i n g a n u n f a m i l i a r speedboat
the
latter
had
spotted.
According to Almoite, the vessel lookeddifferent from the boats
ordinarily used b y fisherfolk of the area and was poised to dock at
Tammocalao shores. Cid and six of his men led by
SPO1Reynoso Badua, proceeded immediately to Tammocalao beach
and thereconferred with Almoite. Cid then observed that the speedboat
ferried a lonemale passenger, who was later identified as Chua Ho
San. When the speedboat landed, the male passenger alighted, carrying a
multicolored
strawbag,and walked towards the road. Upon seeing the police off
icers, the manchanged direction. Badua held Chuas right arm to prevent
him from fleeing. They then introduced themselves as police officers;
however, Chua did notunderstand what theyre saying. And by
resorting of sign language, Cidmotioned with his hands for the man
to open his bag. The man acceded tothe request. The said bag was
found to contain several transparent plastics containing yellowish
crystalline
substances,
which
was
later
identified
to
bem e t h a m p h e t a m i n e h y d r o c h l o r i d e o r s h a b u . C h u a w a s t h e
n b r o u g h t t o Bacnotan Police Station, where he was provided with an
interpreter to informhim of his constitutional rights.ISSUE: Whether or not the
warrantless
arrest,
search
and
seizure
conductedb y t h e P o l i c e O f f i c e r s c o n s t i t u t e a v a l i d e x e m p t i o n
f r o m t h e w a r r a n t requirement.RULING:
The
Court
held
in the
negative. The Court explains that the Constitution bars State
intrusions to a person'sbody, personal effects or residence except if
conducted
by
virtue
of
a
valid
of a v a l i d s e a r c h w a r r a n t i s s u e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e R u l
e s . H o w e v e r , warrantless searches may be permitted in the
following cases, to wit:(1)search of moving vehicles,(2)seizure in plain
view,(3)customs searches,(4)waiver or consent searches, 5)stop and

frisk situations (Terry search), and(6)search incidental to a lawful arrest.It is

required in cases of
in flagrante delicto
that
the
arresting
officer
musthave personal knowledge of such facts or circumstances co
nvincinglyindicative or constitutive of probable cause. Probable
cause means areasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficientlystrong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man's belief that the personaccused is guilty of the offense with which
he is charged. In the case atbar, there are no facts on record reasonably
suggestive or demonstrativeof CHUA's participation in on going criminal
enterprise that could havespurred police officers from conducting the
obtrusive search. CHUA wasnot identified as a drug courier by a police
informer or agent. The fact thatthe vessel that ferried him to shore bore
no resemblance to the fishingboats of the area did not
automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an
offense. With these, the Court held that there was no probable
cause to justify a search incidental to a lawful arrest. The Court likewise
did
not
appreciate
the
contention
of
the
Prosecutiont h a t t h e r e w a s a w a i v e r o r c o n s e n t e d s e a r
c h . I f C H U A c o u l d n o t understand what was orally articulated
to
him,
how
could
he
understandthe police's "sign language?" More importantly, it can
not logically bei n f e r r e d f r o m h i s a l l e g e d c o g n i z a n c e o f t h e "
s i g n l a n g u a g e " t h a t h e deliberately, intelligently, and consciously
waived his right against suchan intrusive search.Finally, being a forbidden
fruit, the subject regulated substance was heldto be inadmissible
in evidence.Hence, the accused was acquitted as the evidence was
not sufficient toestablish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

DEL ROSARIO y NICOLAS

vs.
PEOPLE, G.R. No. 142295, PARDO,
FACTS: Accused-appellant Vicente del Rosario was found guilty of violation
of P. D. No. 1866 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos. Allegedly,
sometime in May
1996, the police received
a report
that accusedappellant Vicente del Rosario was in possession of certain firearms without
the necessary licenses. Acting upon the report, the PNP Criminal
Investigation Group inquired from the PNPFirearms and Explosive Division
whether or not the report was true. The PNP Firearms and Explosives
Division issued a certificationstating that per records in his office, the
appellant is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and caliber.
Armed with thesaid certificationthe police applied for a search warrant to
enable them to search the house of appellant.Upon the issuance of the
warrant, a team led by P/Sr. Insp. Adique went to Norzagaray to serve the
warrant. Before proceeding tothe residence of the appellant, the police
officers requested Barangay Chairman Rogelio de Silva and Barangay
Councilman AurelioPanteleon to accompany them in the implementation of
the warrant. Upon arrival at the house of appellant, the police
officersintroduced themselves to the wife of appellant. When the appellant
came out, P/Sr. Insp. Adique informed him that they had asearch warrant
and that they were authorized to search his house. After appellant gave his
permission, the police officers conducteda search of the house. The search
yielded the following items: (a) a caliber .45 pistol with Serial No. 703792
with five magazines of caliber .45 (Exhibits B and H) found at the master's
bedroom; (b) five magazines of 5.56 M-16 rifle and two radios (Exhibits C to
C-4)found in the room of appellant's daughter; and (c) a caliber .22 revolver
with Serial No. 48673 (Exhibit F) containing 8 pieces of liveammunition
(Exhibit M) found in the kitchen of the house. When asked about his license
to possess the firearms, the appellant failedto produce any. This prompted
the police officers to seize the subject firearms.For his defense, appellant
contends that he had a license for the caliber .45 pistol recovered in his
bedroom and that the other itemsseized during the search including
the caliber .22 revolver, were merely planted by the police officers. Appellant
likewise assails themanner in which the search was carried out, claiming that
the police officers just barged into his house without asking
permission.Furthermore, he claimed that the barangay officials arrived only
after the police already had finished the search. However, after trialthe trial
court rendered a judgment of conviction which decision was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the seizure of items not mentioned in the search
warrant was illegal.
HELD:The Supreme Court
REVERSES
the decision of the Court of Appeals and
ACQUITS
petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas of thecharge of violation of P. D. No.
1866.Seizure is limited to those items particularly described in a valid search
warrant. Searching officers are without discretion regardingwhat articles they
shall seize. Evidence seized on the occasion of such an unreasonable
search and seizure is tainted and excludedfor being the proverbial "fruit of a
poisonous tree." In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceedingIn this case, the
firearm was not found inadvertently and in plain view. It was found as a result
of a meticulous search in the kitchenof petitioner's house. This firearm, to
emphasize, was not mentioned in the search warrant. Thus, the seizure is
illegal.True that as an exception, the police may seize without warrant
illegally possessed firearm or any contraband for that matter,inadvertently
found in plain view. However, "[t]he seizure of evidence in 'plain view' applies
only where the police officer is notsearching for evidence against the
accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object."
52
Specifically, seizure of evidence in "plain view" is justified when there is:(a) a
prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police
are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;(b) the evidence was
inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they
are.(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and(d) "plain view"
justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

G.R. Nos. 146284-86. January 20, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ABDUL MACALABA y
DIGAYON, appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Appellant Abdul Macalaba y Digayon (hereafter ABDUL) was charged before
the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, with violations of the
Presidential Decree No. 1866[1]; Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code [2]; and
Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act
No. 6425), as amended, in Criminal Cases Nos. 1236, 1237 and 1238,
respectively. The accusatory portions of the informations in these cases read
as follows:
Criminal Case No. 1236
That on or about April 12, 1999, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of
Laguna, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said
accused without the required permit/license from the proper authorities, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control one (1) caliber .45 pistol with Serial No. 909904, and
one (1) magazine with five (5) live ammunition thereof.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Criminal Case No. 1237
That on or about April 12, 1999, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of
Laguna, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control two (2) ONE THOUSAND PESOS bill with
Serial Numbers BG 021165 and BG 995998, knowing the same to be forged
or otherwise falsified with the manifest intention of using such falsified or
forged instruments.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Criminal Case No. 1238

That on or about April 12, 1999, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of
Laguna, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control one
(1) self-sealing transparent plastic bag of methamphetamine hydrochloride
shabu weighing 226.67 grams (3 medium sized transparent plastic bags and
1 big heat-sealed transparent plastic bag).
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
The three cases were consolidated and raffled to Branch 31 of said
court. Upon his arraignment, ABDUL entered in each case a plea of not
guilty.
At the trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses SPO1 Generoso
Pandez, PO3 Ernani Mendez, Police Inspector Anacleta Cultura and Police
Inspector Lorna Tria. ABDUL was the sole witness for the defense.
SPO1 Pandez, a PNP member of the Laguna Criminal Investigation
Detection Group (CIDG), testified that on 12 April 1999, at 5:15 p.m., Major R
Win Pagkalinawan ordered the search of ABDUL, alias Boy Muslim, based
on a verified information that the latter was driving a carnapped Mitsubishi
olive green car with Plate No. UPV 511 and was a drug-pusher in San Pedro,
Laguna. Two teams were formed for the search. The first was headed by
Major Pagkalinawan, with SPO4 Aberion and five others as members; and
the second was led by Capt. Percival Rumbaoa, with SPO1 Pandez and
PO3 Mendez as members.[6]
Between 6:30 p.m. and 7:00 p.m., the two groups proceeded to Barangay
Nueva, San Pedro, Laguna, on board a car and a van. They went to
ABDULs apartment where he was reportedly selling shabu, but they learned
that ABDUL had already left. While looking for ABDUL, they saw the
suspected carnapped car somewhere at Pacita Complex I, San Pedro,
Laguna, going towards the Poblacion. When it stopped due to the red traffic
light, the CIDG officers alighted from their vehicles. Capt. Rumbaoa
positioned himself at the passenger side of the suspected carnapped car,
while Major Pagkalinawan stood in front of the car. SPO1 Pandez, with PO3
Mendez beside him, went straight to the driver and knocked at the drivers
window. ABDUL, who was driving the car, lowered the glass window. SPO1
Pandez introduced himself as a member of the Laguna CIDG and asked
ABDUL to turn on the light and show them the cars certificate of registration.
[7]

When the light was already on, SPO1 Pandez saw a black Norinco .45
caliber gun[8] inside an open black clutch/belt bag placed on the right side of
the drivers seat near the gear. He asked ABDUL for the supporting papers of
the gun, apart from the cars certificate of registration, but the latter failed to
show them any.[9] When ABDUL opened the zipper of the clutch/belt bag, the

CIDG officers saw inside it four plastic sachets of what appeared to be

shabu. They likewise found a self-sealing plastic bag which contained the
following items: two fake P1,000 bills, a list of names of persons, a magazine
and five ammunitions for a .45 caliber gun. They confiscated the gun, the
shabu,

and the fake P1,000 bills and thereafter brought ABDUL to the CIDG office.
[10]

PO3 Mendez substantially corroborated the testimony of SPO1 Pandez. [11]

The two P1,000 bills were found to be counterfeit after an examination
conducted by Police Inspector Anacleta Cultura, [12] a document examiner at
Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna. The white crystalline substance
contained in the four small plastic bags was subjected to physical and
laboratory examination conducted by Police Inspector Lorna Tria, a Forensic
Chemist at the PNP Crime Laboratory, Region IV, Camp Vicente Lim. Her
findings[13] were as follows: (a) the three small plastic sachets weighed 29.46
grams, while the big plastic sachet weighed 197.21 grams, or a total weight
of 226.67 grams; (b) representative samples taken from the specimens
thereof were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a
regulated drug; and (c) the improvised tooter and the rolled aluminum foil
with residue found in the self-sealing plastic bag were also positive of the
presence for shabu residue.
As expected, ABDUL had a different story to tell. He testified that on 12 April
1999, between 6:50 and 7:00 p.m., he was driving a borrowed Mitsubishi
Galant Car with Plate No. UPV 501 somewhere in San Pedro, Laguna. With
him was Rose, his live-in partner, whom he fetched from Angeles City,
Pampanga. He had borrowed the car from his friend Ferdinand Navares,
who instructed him to return it in front of the latters store at San Pedro Public
Market.[14]
ABDUL was about to park the car when a man knocked hard on the glass
window on the drivers side of the car and pointed at the former a .45 caliber
pistol. Another one who was armed with an armalite rifle positioned himself
in front of the car, while the third one positioned himself near the window on
the passenger side and pointed a gun at his live-in partner Rose.ABDUL
then lowered the cars window. The man near him opened the door, held him,
and told him to alight. When the man asked him whether he was Boy
Muslim, he answered in the negative. The same man opened the back door
of the car and boarded at the back seat. Rose remained seated at the front
passenger seat. [15]

The other men likewise boarded the car, which was thereafter driven by one
of them. While inside the car, they saw a .45 caliber pistol at the edge of the
drivers seat. They asked him whether he had a license. He showed his gun
license and permit to carry. After taking his gun, license, and permit to carry,
they tried to remove his belt bag from his waist, but he did not allow them. [16]
Upon reaching the headquarters, ABDUL learned that these people were
C.I.S. agents. There, he was told to surrender the belt bag to the officer who
would issue a receipt for it. He did as he was told, and the money inside his
belt bag was counted and it amounted to P42,000. They then got his money
and the cellular phone, which was also inside the bag, together with some
other pieces of paper. They also took another cell phone from the car. He
was never issued a receipt for these items.[17]
Thereafter, a man entered the office with a white plastic bag allegedly taken
from the borrowed car. ABDUL denied ownership over the plastic bag. That
same man then told him that it contained shabu. ABDUL and Rose were
detained at the headquarters. The next morning, Rose was allowed to get
out; and in the afternoon, he was transferred to San Pedro Municipal Jail. [18]
After the trial, the trial court acquitted ABDUL in Criminal Cases Nos. 1236
and 1237 for violations of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and Article 168 of
the Revised Penal Code, respectively, due to insufficiency of
evidence. However, it convicted him in Criminal Case No. 1238 for violation
of Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act
No. 6425), as amended,[19] and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000, as well as the costs of
the suit.
Dissatisfied with the judgment, ABDUL interposed the present appeal,
alleging that the trial court erred in (1) convicting him for violation of Section
16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, despite
insufficiency of evidence; and (2) admitting the evidence presented by the
prosecution although it was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights.
In his first assigned error, ABDUL argues that the prosecution failed to prove
the material allegations in the information. The information charges him,
among other things, that without being authorized by law, [he] did then and
there willfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control
methamphetamine hydrochloride. However, the prosecution did not present
any certification from the concerned government agency, like the Dangerous
Drugs Board, to the effect that he was not authorized to possess shabu,
which is a regulated drug.Thus, his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
In his second assigned error, ABDUL asserts that he was not committing a
crime when the CIS agents boarded his car, searched the same and
ultimately arrested him. He was about to park his borrowed car per

instruction by the owner when he was harassed by the operatives at

gunpoint. The gun seen was properly documented; thus, there was no
reason for the CIS agents to bring him and his companion to the
headquarters. The shabu allegedly found in the car was brought in by
somebody at the time he was under interrogation. It was taken in violation of
his constitutional right against illegal search and seizure. Being a fruit of a
poisonous tree it should not have been admitted in evidence.
Moreover, the members of the CIDG merely relied on the information
received from an anonymous telephone caller who said that ABDUL was
driving a carnapped vehicle. They had no personal knowledge of the veracity
of the information. Consequently, there was no legal basis for his warrantless
arrest.
In the Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains
that ABDUL had the burden of proving that he was authorized to possess
shabu, but he failed to discharge such burden. Therefore, it is presumed that
he had no authority; consequently, he is liable for violation of Section 16,
Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The OSG
likewise refutes ABDULs argument that there was a violation of his right
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The general rule is that if a criminal charge is predicated on a negative
allegation, or that a negative averment is an essential element of a crime,
the prosecution has the burden of proving the charge. However, this rule is
not without an exception. Thus, we have held:
Where the negative of an issue does not permit of direct proof, or where the
facts are more immediately within the knowledge of the accused, the onus
probandi rests upon him. Stated otherwise, it is not incumbent upon the
prosecution to adduce positive evidence to support a negative averment the
truth of which is fairly indicated by established circumstances and which, if
untrue, could readily be disproved by the production of documents or other
evidence within the defendants knowledge or control. For example, where a
charge is made that a defendant carried on a certain business without a
license (as in the case at bar, where the accused is charged with the selling
of a

regulated drug without authority), the fact that he has a license is a matter
which is peculiarly within his knowledge and he must establish that fact or
suffer conviction.[20]
In the instant case, the negative averment that ABDUL had no license or
authority to possess methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated
drug, has been fairly indicated by the following facts proven by the
testimonies of the CIDG officers and the forensic chemist: (a) ABDUL was
driving the suspected carnapped vehicle when he was caught, and he
appeared to be healthy and not indisposed as to require the use of shabu as
medicine; (b) the contents of the sachets found in ABDULs open clutch bag
inside the car were prima facie determined by the CIDG officers to be shabu;
and (c) the said contents were conclusively found to be shabu by the
forensic chemist. With these established facts, the burden of evidence was
shifted to ABDUL. He could have easily disproved the damning
circumstances by presenting a doctors prescription for said drug or a copy of
his license or authority to possess the regulated drug. Yet, he offered
nothing.
And now on the second issue. The Constitution enshrines in its Bill of Rights
the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose.[21] To give full protection to it, the Bill of Rights also ordains
the exclusionary principle that any evidence obtained in violation of said right
is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. [22]
It is obvious from Section 2 of the Bill of Rights that reasonable searches and
seizures are not proscribed. If conducted by virtue of a valid search warrant
issued in compliance with the guidelines prescribed by the Constitution and
reiterated in the Rules of Court, the search and seizure is valid.
The interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute.
The recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence are (1) search of
moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs search; (4) waiver or
consented search; (5) stop and frisk situation (Terry search); and (6) search
incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless search and
seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule,
an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the
Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1)
arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests
of escaped prisoners.[23] Another exception is a search made pursuant to
routine airport security procedure, which is authorized under Section 9 of
R.A. No. 6235.[24]

The warrantless arrest of, or warrantless search and seizure conducted on,
ABDUL constitute a valid exemption from the warrant requirement. The
evidence clearly shows that on the basis of an intelligence information that a
carnapped vehicle was driven by ABDUL, who was also a suspect of drug
pushing, the members of the CIDG of Laguna went around looking for the
carnapped car.[25] They spotted the suspected carnapped car, which was
indeed driven by ABDUL. While ABDUL was fumbling about in his clutch bag
for the registration papers of the car the CIDG agents saw four transparent
sachets of shabu.[26] These sachets of shabu were therefore in plain view of
the law enforcers.
Under the plain view doctrine, unlawful objects within the plain view of an
officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to
seizure and may be presented in evidence. Nonetheless, the seizure of
evidence in plain view must comply with the following requirements: (a) a
prior valid intrusion in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of
their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the
police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent; and (d) the plain view justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search.[27]
We are convinced beyond any shadow of doubt under the circumstances
above discussed that all the elements of seizure in plain view exist in the
case at bar. Thus, the warrantless search and seizure conducted on ABDUL,
as well as his warrantless arrest, did not transgress his constitutional rights.
ABDULs sole defense of denial is unsubstantiated. We have time and again
ruled that mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a
witness. A mere denial, just like alibi, is a self-serving negative evidence
which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As between a
categorical testimony that rings of truth on one hand, and a bare denial on
the other, the former is generally held to prevail. [28]
On the issue of credibility between ABDULs testimony and the declarations
of the CIDG officers, we hold for the latter. As has been repeatedly held,
credence shall be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution
witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to
have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence to
the contrary; moreover in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute
such a serious crime against the accused, the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on
the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over accuseds self-serving and
uncorroborated claim of having been framed. [29] ABDUL miserably failed to
rebut this presumption and to prove any ulterior motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses.

Unauthorized possession of 200 grams or more of shabu or

methylamphetamine hydrochloride is punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death under Section 16 of Article III, in relation to Section 20 of Article IV, of
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended by
P.D. Nos. 44, 1675, 1683, and 1707; Batas Pambansa Blg. 179; and R.A.
No. 7659 (now further amended by R.A. No. 9165). These sections provide
as follows:
SEC.16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. -- The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten
million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use
any regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription, subject
to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the
Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. -- The penalties for offenses under
Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of
Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any
of the following quantities:
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride.

There is no doubt that the charge of illegal possession of shabu in Criminal

Case No. 1238 was proved beyond reasonable doubt since ABDUL
knowingly carried with him at the time he was caught 226.67 grams
of shabu without legal authority. There being no modifying circumstance
proven, the proper penalty pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal
Code isreclusion perpetua. The penalty imposed by the trial court, including
the fine, is, therefore, in order.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of San
Pedro, Laguna, in Criminal Case No. 1238 convicting appellant ABDUL
MACALABA y DIGAYON of the violation of Section 16 of Article III of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended, and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine ofP500,000
and the costs of the suit, is hereby affirmed in toto.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 142295. May 31, 2001]

VICENTE DEL ROSARIO y NICOLAS, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
Petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas appeals via certiorari from a decision
of the Court of Appeals [1] affirming with modification the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, Branch 20, Malolos, and finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P. D. No. 1866, as amended by
Republic Act No. 8294 (illegal possession of firearms), sentencing him to four
(4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as
minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.
On June 17, 1996, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Eufracio S. Marquez of
Bulacan filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, Malolos an Information
charging petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas with violation of P. D. No.
1866, as follows:

That on or about the 15th day of June 1996, in the municipality of

Norzagaray, Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession under his custody and
control, the following, to wit:
a) One (1) pc. Pistol Cal. 45 SN:70G23792 (w/o license)
b) One (1) pc. Revolver Cal. 22 SN:48673 (w/o license)
c) Twenty Seven (27) rds live ammos. For cal. .45
d) Five (5) pcs. Magazines for cal. .45
e) Eight (8) rds live ammunitions for cal. 22
f) Five (5) pcs. Magazines short for cal. 5.56 (M16)
g) Twenty (20) rds live ammunitions for cal 5.56
without first having obtained a proper license therefor.
Contrary to law.[2]
On June 25, 1996, the trial court arraigned the petitioner. He pleaded not
guilty.[3] Trial ensued.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Sometime in May 1996, the police received a report that accused-appellant
Vicente del Rosario was in possession of certain firearms without the
necessary licenses. Acting upon the report, P/Sr. Insp. Jerito Adique of the
PNP Criminal Investigation Group at Camp Olivas, Pampanga inquired from
the PNP Firearms and Explosive Division whether or not the report was true.
On May 10, 1996, P/Sr. Insp. Edwin C. Roque of the PNP Firearms and
Explosives Division issued a certification (Exhibit L) stating that per records
in his office, the appellant is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any
kind and caliber.Armed with the said certification, P/Sr. Insp. Adique applied
for a search warrant to enable his team to search the house of appellant.
On June 13, 1996, a search warrant (Exhibit A) was issued by Judge Gil
Fernandez, Sr. of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217,
authorizing the search of the residence of appellant at Barangay Tigbe,
Norzagaray, Bulacan.[4] On June 15, 1996, at about 7:00 oclock in the
morning, a team led by P/Sr. Insp. Adique went to Norzagaray to serve the
warrant. Before proceeding to the residence of the appellant, the police
officers requested Barangay Chairman Rogelio de Silva and Barangay
Councilman Aurelio Panteleon to accompany them in the implementation of
the warrant. Upon arrival at the house of appellant, the police officers

introduced themselves to the wife of appellant. When the appellant came

out, P/Sr. Insp. Adique informed him that they had a search warrant and that
they were authorized to search his house. After appellant gave his
permission, the police officers conducted a search of the house. The search
yielded the following items: (a) a caliber .45 pistol with Serial No. 703792
with five magazines of caliber .45 (Exhibits B and H) found at the masters
bedroom; (b) five magazines of 5.56 M-16 rifle and two radios (Exhibits C to
C-4) found in the room of appellants daughter; and (c) a caliber .22 revolver
with Serial No. 48673 (Exhibit F) containing 8 pieces of live ammunition
(Exhibit M) found in the kitchen of the house. When asked about his license
to possess the firearms, the appellant failed to produce any. This prompted
the police officers to seize the subject firearms.
SPO2 Marion Montezon, one of the searching officers, prepared three
separate inventories of the seized items (Exhibits H, M and N). The
inventories were signed by P/Sr. Insp. Adique, the appellant and the
barangay officials who witnessed the search. Thereafter SPO2 Montezon
prepared a certification of orderly search (Exhibit I) which was signed by the
appellant and the barangay officials attesting to the orderly conduct of the
search.
For his defense, appellant contends that he had a license for the caliber .45
pistol recovered in his bedroom and that
the other items seized during the search including the caliber .22 revolver,
were merely planted by the police officers. Appellant likewise assails the
manner in which the search was carried out, claiming that the police officers
just barged into his house without asking permission. Furthermore, he
claimed that the barangay officials arrived only after the police already had
finished the search.
After trial and on July 2, 1998, the trial court rendered a judgment of
conviction, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused VICENTE
DEL ROSARIO y NICOLAS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.
D. No. 1866 as charged under the Information dated June 17, 1996.
Conformably with the provisions of said law, as amended by Republic Act
No. 8294, and pursuant to the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer imprisonment of six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correctional,
as maximum, and to pay a fine of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00). [5]
On July 20, 1998, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, assailing the
decision for being contrary to facts and the law.[6]

On July 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming with
modification the decision of the trial court as set out in the opening
paragraph of this decision.[7]
On August 10, 1999, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
reconsideration and/or new trial.[8] He contended that the certification issued
by the Chief, Firearms and Explosives Division, Philippine National Police
stating that the person named therein had not been issued a firearm license
referred to a certain Vicente Vic del Rosario of barangay Bigte, Norzagaray,
Bulacan, not to him. He comes from barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan,
and that he has a valid firearm license.
On February 22, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.[9]
Hence, this appeal.[10]
Petitioner submits that the search conducted at his residence was illegal as
the search warrant was issued in violation of the Constitution [11] and
consequently, the evidence seized was inadmissible. He also submits that he
had a license for the .45 caliber firearm and ammunition seized in his
bedroom. The other firearm, a .22 caliber revolver seized in a drawer at the
kitchen of his house, a magazine for 5.56 mm. cal. Armalite rifle, and two 2way radios found in his daughters bedroom, were either planted by the police
or illegally seized, as they were not mentioned in the search warrant.
We find the petition impressed with merit.
We define the issues as follows:
First: whether petitioner had a license for the .45 caliber Colt pistol and
ammunition seized in his bedroom; and
Second: whether the .22 caliber revolver seized in a drawer at the kitchen of
his house, a magazine for 5.56 mm. cal. Armalite rifle and two 2-way radios
found in his daughters bedroom, were planted by the police or were illegally
seized.
We shall resolve the issues in seriatim.
First: The .45 cal. Colt pistol in question was duly licensed.
Normally, we do not review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and
the trial courts.[12] However, this case comes within the exceptions. [13] The
findings of fact by the Court of Appeals will not be disturbed by the Court
unless these findings are not supported by evidence. [14] In this case, the
findings of the lower courts even directly contradict the evidence. Hence, we
review the evidence. The trial court held that the copy of the license
presented was blurred, and that in any event, the court could rely on the

certification dated May 10, 1996, of P/Sr. Inspector Edwin C. Roque, Chief,
Records Branch, Firearms and Explosives Division, Philippine National
Police stating that Vicente Vic del Rosario of Barangay Bigte, Norzagaray,
Bulacan is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and caliber.
[15]
As against this, petitioner submitted that he was not the person referred to
in the said certification because he is Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas from
Barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan. The Court takes judicial notice of the
existence of both barangay Tigbe and barangay Bigte, in Norzagaray,
Bulacan.[16] In fact, the trial court erred grievously in not taking judicial notice
of the barangays within its territorial jurisdiction, believing the prosecutions
submission that there was only barangay Tigbe, and that barangay Bigte in
the certification was a typographical error.[17] Petitioner presented to the head
of the raiding team, Police Senior Inspector Jerito A. Adique, Chief,
Operations Branch, PNP Criminal Investigation Command, a valid firearm
license. The court is duty bound to examine the evidence assiduously to
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. It is true that the court may
rely on the certification of the Chief, Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP
on the absence of a firearm license. [18] However, such certification referred to
another individual and thus, cannot prevail over a valid firearm license duly
issued to petitioner. In this case, petitioner presented the printed
computerized copy of License No. RCL 1614021915 issued to him on July
13, 1993, expiring in January 1995, by the Chief, Firearms and Explosives
Division, PNP under the signature of Reynaldo V. Velasco, Sr.
Supt. (GSC) PNP, Chief, FEO.[19]On the dorsal side of the printed
computerized license, there is stamped the words Validity of computerized
license is extended until renewed license is printed dated January 17, 1995,
signed by Police Chief Inspector Franklin S. Alfabeto, Chief, Licence Branch,
FEO.[20] Coupled with this indefinite extension, petitioner paid the license
fees for the extension of the license for the next two-year period. [21]
Consequently, we find that petitioner was the holder of a valid firearm license
for the .45 caliber Colt pistol seized in the bedroom of his house on June 15,
1996.[22] As required, petitioner presented the license to the head of the
raiding team, Police Senior Inspector Jerito A. Adique of the Criminal
Investigation Division Group, PNP.[23] As a senior police officer, Senior
Inspector Adique could easily determine the genuineness and authenticity of
the computerized printed license presented. He must know the computerized
license printed form. The stamp is clearly

visible. He could decipher the words and the signature of the authorized
signing official of the Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP. He belonged to
the same national police organization.
Nevertheless, Senior Insp. Adique rejected the license presented because,
according to him, it was expired. However, assuming that the license

presented was expired during the period January 1995 to January 1997, still,
possession of the firearm in question, a .45 caliber Colt pistol with serial No.
70G23792, during that period was not illegal. The firearm was kept at home,
not carried outside residence. On June 15, 1996, at the time of the seizure of
the firearm in question, possession of firearm with an expired license
was not considered unlawful, provided that the license had not been
cancelled or revoked.Republic Act No. 8294, providing that possession of a
firearm with an expired license was unlawful took effect only on July 7, 1997.
[24]
It could not be given retroactive effect.[25]
According to firearm licensing regulations, the renewal of a firearm license
was automatically applied for upon payment of the license fees for the
renewal period. The expired license was not cancelled or revoked. It served
as temporary authority to possess the firearm until the renewed license was
issued. Meantime, the applicant may keep the gun at home pending renewal
of the firearm license and issuance of a printed computerized license. He
was not obliged to surrender the weapon. Printed at the dorsal side of the
computerized license is a notice reading:
IMPORTANT
1. This firearm license is valid for two (2) years. Exhibit this license
whenever demanded by proper authority.
2. Surrender your firearm/s to the nearest PNP Unit upon revocation or
termination of this license. Under any of the following instances, your
license shall be revoked for which reason your firearm/s is/are subject to
confiscation and its/their forfeiture in favor of the government.
a. Failure to notify the Chief of PNP in writing of your change of address,
and/or qualification.
b. Failure to renew this license by paying annual license, fees, within six
(6) months from your birth month. Renewal of your license can be
made within your birth month or month preceding your birth month. Late
renewal shall be penalized with 50% surcharge for the first month (from the
first day to the last day of this month) followed by an additional 25%
surcharge for all of the succeeding five (5) months compounded monthly.
c. Loss of firearm/s through negligence.
d. Carrying of firearm/s outside of residence without appropriate permit
and/or carrying firearm/s in prohibited places.
e. Conviction by competent court for a crime involving moral turpitude or for
any offense where the penalty carries an imprisonment of more than six (6)
months or fine of at least P1,000.00.
f. Dismissal for cause from the service.

g. Failure to sign license, or sign ID picture or affix right thumbmark.

3. Unauthorized loan of firearm/s to another person is punishable by
permanent disqualification and forfeiture of the firearm in favor of the
government.
4. If termination is due to death, your next of kin should surrender your
firearm/s to the nearest PNP Unit. For those within Metro Manila,
surrender should be made with FEO, Camp Crame.
5. When firearms become permanently unserviceable, they should be
deposited with the nearest PNP Unit and ownership should be
relinquished in writing so that firearms may be disposed of in accordance
with law.
6. Application for the purchase of ammunition should be made in case of
a resident of Metro Manila direct to the Chief, FEO and for residents of a
Province to secure recommendation letter to the nearest PNP Provincial
Command who will thereafter endorse same to CHIEF, FEO for issuance
of the permit. License must be presented before an authority to purchase
ammo could be obtained.[26]
Indeed, as heretofore stated, petitioner duly paid the license fees for the
automatic renewal of the firearm license for the next two years upon
expiration of the license in January 1995, as evidenced by official receipt No.
7615186, dated January 17, 1995. [27] The license would be renewed, as it
was,
because
petitioner
still
possessed
the
required
qualifications. Meantime, the validity of the license was extended until the
renewed computerized license was printed. In fact, a renewed license was
issued on January 17, 1997, for the succeeding two-year period. [28]
Aside from the clearly valid and subsisting license issued to petitioner, on
January 25, 1995, the Chief, Philippine National Police issued to him a
permit to carry firearm outside residence valid until January 25, 1996, for the
firearm in question.[29] The Chief, Philippine National Police would not issue a
permit to carry firearm outside residence unless petitioner had a valid and
subsisting firearm license.Although the permit to carry firearm outside
residence was valid for only one year, and expired on January 25, 1996,
such permit is proof that the regular firearm license was renewed and
subsisting within the two-year term up to January 1997. A Permit to Carry
Firearm Outside Residence presupposes that the party to whom it is issued
is duly licensed to possess the firearm in question. [30] Unquestionably, on
January 17, 1997, the Chief, Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP
renewed petitioners license for the .45 cal. Colt pistol in question. [31]
Clearly then, petitioner had a valid firearm license during the interregnum
between January 17, 1995, to the issuance of his renewed license on
January 17, 1997.

Finally, there is no rhyme or reason why the Court of Appeals and the trial
court did not accept with alacrity the
certification dated June 25, 1996, of P/Sr. Inspector Edwin C. Roque,
[32]
Chief, Records Branch, Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP that
Vicente N. del Rosario of Barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan is a
licensed/registered holder of Pistol, Colt caliber .45 with serial number
70G23792, covered by computerized license issued dated June 15, 1995,
with an expiry date January 1997.[33] Reinforcing the aforementioned
certification, petitioner submitted another certification dated August 27, 1999,
stating that Vicente N. del Rosario of Barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan,
was issued firearm license No. RL-C1614021915, for caliber .45 Pistol with
Serial Number 70G23792, for the years covering the period from July 13,
1993 to January 1995, and the extension appearing at the back thereof for
the years 1995 to 1997. [34] Had the lower courts given full probative value to
these official issuances, petitioner would have been correctly acquitted, thus
sparing this Court of valuable time and effort.
In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution has the
burden of proving the elements thereof, viz.: (a) the existence of the subject
firearm and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does
not have the license or permit to possess the same. [35] The essence of the
crime of illegal possession is the possession, whether actual or constructive,
of the subject firearm, without which there can be no conviction for illegal
possession. After possession is established by the prosecution, it would only
be a matter of course to determine whether the accused has a license to
possess the firearm.[36] Possession of any firearm becomes unlawful only if
the necessary permit or license therefor is not first obtained. The absence of
license and legal authority constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense
of illegal possession of firearm and every ingredient or essential element of
an offense must be shown by the prosecution by proof beyond reasonable
doubt. Stated otherwise, the negative fact of lack or absence of license
constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense which the prosecution has
the duty not only to allege but also to prove beyond reasonable doubt. [37] To
convict an accused for illegal possession of firearms and explosives under P.
D. 1866, as amended, two (2) essential elements must be indubitably
established, viz.: (a) the existence of the subject firearm or explosive which
may be proved by the presentation of the subject firearm or explosive or by
the testimony of witnesses who saw accused in possession of the same, and
(b) the negative fact that the accused had no license or permit to own or
possess the firearm or explosive which fact may be established by the
testimony or certification of a representative of the PNP Firearms and
Explosives Unit that the accused has no license or permit to possess the
subject firearm or explosive. x x x We stress that the essence of the crime
penalized under P. D. 1866 is primarily the accuseds lack of license or permit
to carry or possess the firearm, ammunition or explosive as possession by
itself is not prohibited by law.[38] Illegal possession of firearm is a crime

punished by special law, a malum prohibitum, and no malice or intent to

commit a crime need be proved. [39] To support a conviction, however, there
must be possession coupled with intent to possess (animus possidendi) the
firearm.[40]
In upholding the prosecution and giving credence to the testimony of police
officer Jerito A. Adigue, the trial court relied on the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duties by the police officers. [41] This is a flagrant
error because his testimony is directly contradictory to the official records of
the Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP, which must prevail. Morever, the
presumption of regularity can not prevail over the Constitutional presumption
of innocence.[42] Right from the start, P/Sr. Insp. Jerito A. Adigue was aware
that petitioner possessed a valid license for the caliber .45 Colt pistol in
question. Despite this fact, P/Sr. Insp. Adigue proceeded to detain petitioner
and charged him with illegal possession of firearms. We quote pertinent
portions of the testimony of petitioner:
Q: What else did Adigue tell you after showing to him the license of your
cal. .45 pistol and the alleged cal. .22 found in a drawer in your kitchen?
A: He told me that since my firearm is licensed, he will return my
firearm, give him ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) and for me to tell who
among the people in our barangay have unlicensed firearm, sir.
Q: How did he say about the ten thousand pesos?
A: He said palit kalabaw na lang tayo sir.
Q: And what did you answer him?
A: I told him my firearm is licensed and I do not have money, if I have, I will
not give him, sir, because he was just trying to squeeze something from me.
Q: How about the unlicensed firearms in your barangay which he asked from
you?
A: I said I do not know any unlicensed firearm in our barangay, sir.
Q: About the .22 cal. pistol, what was your answer to him?
A: I told him that it was not mine, they planted it, sir.
Q: What did he say next?
A: He said that it is your word against mine, the Court will believe me
because I am a police officer, sir.
Q: What was your comment to what he said?

A: I said my firearm is licensed and we have Courts of law who do not

conform with officials like you and then he laughed and laughed, sir.[43]
The trial court was obviously misguided when it held that it is a matter of
judicial notice that a caliber .45 firearm can not be licensed to a private
individual.[44] This ruling has no basis either in law or in jurisprudence. [45]
Second issue. The seizure of items not mentioned in the search warrant
was illegal.
With respect to the .22 caliber revolver with Serial No. 48673, that the police
raiding team found in a drawer at the kitchen of petitioners house, suffice it to
say that the firearm was not mentioned in the search warrant applied for and
issued for the search of petitioners house. Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be
carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant, absent which
such search and seizure becomes unreasonable within the meaning of said
constitutional provision.[46] Supporting jurisprudence thus outlined the
following requisites for a search warrants validity, the absence of even one
will cause its downright nullification: (1) it must be issued upon probable
cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and
not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable
cause, the judge must
examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as
the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe
the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. [47] Seizure is
limited to those items particularly described in a valid search warrant.
Searching officers are without discretion regarding what articles they shall
seize.[48] Evidence seized on the occasion of such an unreasonable search
and seizure is tainted and excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a
poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. [49]
In this case, the firearm was not found inadvertently and in plain view. It was
found as a result of a meticulous search in the kitchen of petitioners
house. This firearm, to emphasize, was not mentioned in the search warrant.
Hence, the seizure was illegal. [50] The seizure without the requisite search
warrant was in plain violation of the law and the Constitution. [51] True that as
an exception, the police may seize without warrant illegally possessed
firearm or any contraband for that matter, inadvertently found in plain
view. However, [t]he seizure of evidence in plain view applies only where the
police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. [52] Specifically, seizure of
evidence in plain view is justified when there is:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which
the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the
right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. [53]
Hence, the petitioner rightly rejected the firearm as planted and not
belonging to him. The prosecution was not able to prove that the firearm was
in the effective possession or control of the petitioner without a license. In
illegal possession of firearms, the possessor must know of the existence of
the subject firearm in his possession or control. In People v. de Gracia, [54] we
clarified the meaning of possession for the purpose of convicting a person
under P. D. No. 1866, thus: x x x In the present case, a distinction should be
made between criminal intent and intent to possess. While mere possession
without criminal intent is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession
of a firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus possidendi or an
intent to possess on the part of the accused. x x x x Hence, the kind of
possession punishable under P. D. No. 1866 is one where the accused
possessed a firearm either physically or constructively with animus
possidendi or intention to possess the same. [55]That is the meaning
of animus possidendi. In the absence of animus possidendi, the possessor
of a firearm incurs no criminal liability.
The same is true with respect to the 5.56 cal. magazine found in the
bedroom of petitioners daughter. The seizure was invalid and the seized
items were inadmissible in evidence. As explained in People v. Doria,[56] the
plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law
enforcement officer is in a position where he has a clear view of a particular
area or has prior justification for an intrusion; (2) said officer inadvertently
comes across (or sees in plain view) a piece of incriminating evidence; and
(3) it is immediately apparent to such officer that the item he sees may be
evidence of a crime or a contraband or is otherwise subject to seizure.
With particular reference to the two 2-way radios that the raiding policemen
also seized in the bedroom of petitioners daughter, there was absolutely no
reason for the seizure. The radios were not contraband per se. The National
Telecommunications Commission may license two-way radios at its
discretion.[57] The burden is on the prosecution to show that the two-way
radios were not licensed. The National Telecommunication Commission is
the sole agency authorized to seize unlicensed two-way radios. More
importantly, admittedly, the two-way radios were not mentioned in the search
warrant. We condemn the seizure as illegal and a plain violation of a citizens
right. Worse, the petitioner was not charged with illegal possession of the
two-way radios.
Consequently, the confiscation of the two 2-way radios was clearly
illegal. The possession of such radios is not even included in the charge of

illegal possession of firearms (violation of P. D. No. 1866, as amended)

alleged in the Information.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby REVERSES the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G. R. CR No. 22255, promulgated on July 09, 1999.
The Court ACQUITS petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas of the charge of
violation of P. D. No. 1866, as amended by R. A. No. 8294 (illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition), in Criminal Case No. 800-M-96,
Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, Branch 20, Malolos.
Costs de oficio.
The Chief, Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP shall return to petitioner
his caliber .45 Colt pistol, with Serial Number No. 70G23792, the five (5)
extra magazines and twenty seven (27) rounds of live ammunition, and the
two 2-way radios confiscated from him. The Chief, Philippine National Police,
or his duly authorized representative shall show to this Court proof of
compliance herewith within fifteen (15) days from notice. The .22 caliber
revolver with Serial No. 48673, and eight (8) live ammunition and the
magazine for 5.56 mm. caliber Armalite rifle are confiscated in favor of the
government.
SO ORDERED.

Del
G.R.
December

Rosario

vs
No.
22,

People
L-16806
1961

Facts:
Sergio del Rosario, Alfonso Araneta and Benedicto del Pilar were convicted
by the Court of First Instance of Davao of illegal possession of said forged
treasury notes and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 8

years and 1 day to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, and pay a fine of
P5,000, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, as well as a
proportionate part of the costs. On appeal, the judgment was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, except insofar as the maximum of said indeterminate
penalty which was increased to 10 years, 8 months and 1 day of prision
mayor.
Issue:
Whether the accused-appellants are liable for the crime of illegal possession
and use of false treasury or bank notes under Art. 168?
Held:
It is clear from the provisions Art 160 and 169 of the Revised Penal Code
that the possession of genuine treasury notes of the Philippines any of "the
figures, letters, words or signs contained" in which had been erased and or
altered, with knowledge of such notes, as they were used by petitioner
herein and his co-defendants in the manner adverted to above, is punishable
under said Article 168, in relation to Article 166, subdivision (1), of the
Revised Penal Code (U.S. vs. Gardner, 3 Phil., 398; U.S. vs. Solito, 36 Phil.,
785). Being in accordance with the facts and the law, the decision appealed
from is, accordingly, affirmed, with costs against petitioner Sergio del
Rosario.

PEOPLE VS. MUSA [217 SCRA 597; G.,R. NO. 96177; 27 JAN 1993]
Friday,
February
06,
2009
Posted
by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was engaged
in selling marijuana in Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was ordered by
NARCOM leader T/Sgt. Belarga, to conduct a surveillance and test buy
on Musa. The civilian informer guided Ani toMusas house and gave
the description of Musa. Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried
marijuana
for
P10.00.
The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his right hand if he
successfully buys marijuana from Musa. As Ani proceeded to the house, the
NARCOM team positioned themselves about 90 to 100 meters away. From
his position, Belarga could see what was going on.Musa came out of the
house and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted more marijuana
and gave Musa the P20.00 marked money.Musa went into the house and
came back, giving Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana.
Ani opened and inspected it. He raised his right hand as a signal to the other
NARCOM agents, and the latter moved in and arrested Musa inside the
house. Belarga friskedMusa in the living room but did not find the marked
money (gave it to his wife who slipped away). T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego
went to the kitchen and found a cellophane colored white and stripe hanging
at the corner of the kitchen. They asked Musa about its contents but failed to
get a response. So they opened it and found dried marijuana leaves
inside. Musa was
then
placed
under
arrest.

Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the plastic bag and the marijuana inside
it
is
unreasonable,
hence,
inadmissible
as
evidence.

Held: Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may not be
admitted as evidence. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to
a suspects lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested
to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects
in the plain view of an officerwho has the right to be in the position to have
that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The

plain view doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching
for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes
across an incriminating object. It will not justify the seizure of the object
where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the plain
view
of
the
object.
In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the plain view of the police.
They arrested the accused in the living room and moved into the kitchen
in search for other evidences where they found the plastic bag. Furthermore,
the marijuana inside the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the
plain
view
of
said
object.
Therefore, the plain view does not apply. The plastic bag was seized
illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III Section 3
(2) of the Constitution.
G.R. Nos. 146284-86. January 20, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ABDUL MACALABA y
DIGAYON, appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Appellant Abdul Macalaba y Digayon (hereafter ABDUL) was charged before
the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, with violations of the
Presidential Decree No. 1866[1]; Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code [2]; and
Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act
No. 6425), as amended, in Criminal Cases Nos. 1236, 1237 and 1238,
respectively. The accusatory portions of the informations in these cases read
as follows:
Criminal Case No. 1236
That on or about April 12, 1999, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of
Laguna, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said
accused without the required permit/license from the proper authorities, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control one (1) caliber .45 pistol with Serial No. 909904, and
one (1) magazine with five (5) live ammunition thereof.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Criminal Case No. 1237
That on or about April 12, 1999, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of
Laguna, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said

accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control two (2) ONE THOUSAND PESOS bill with
Serial Numbers BG 021165 and BG 995998, knowing the same to be forged
or otherwise falsified with the manifest intention of using such falsified or
forged instruments.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Criminal Case No. 1238
That on or about April 12, 1999, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of
Laguna, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control one
(1) self-sealing transparent plastic bag of methamphetamine hydrochloride
shabu weighing 226.67 grams (3 medium sized transparent plastic bags and
1 big heat-sealed transparent plastic bag).
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
The three cases were consolidated and raffled to Branch 31 of said
court. Upon his arraignment, ABDUL entered in each case a plea of not
guilty.
At the trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses SPO1 Generoso
Pandez, PO3 Ernani Mendez, Police Inspector Anacleta Cultura and Police
Inspector Lorna Tria. ABDUL was the sole witness for the defense.
SPO1 Pandez, a PNP member of the Laguna Criminal Investigation
Detection Group (CIDG), testified that on 12 April 1999, at 5:15 p.m., Major R
Win Pagkalinawan ordered the search of ABDUL, alias Boy Muslim, based
on a verified information that the latter was driving a carnapped Mitsubishi
olive green car with Plate No. UPV 511 and was a drug-pusher in San Pedro,
Laguna. Two teams were formed for the search. The first was headed by
Major Pagkalinawan, with SPO4 Aberion and five others as members; and
the second was led by Capt. Percival Rumbaoa, with SPO1 Pandez and
PO3 Mendez as members.[6]
Between 6:30 p.m. and 7:00 p.m., the two groups proceeded to Barangay
Nueva, San Pedro, Laguna, on board a car and a van. They went to
ABDULs apartment where he was reportedly selling shabu, but they learned
that ABDUL had already left. While looking for ABDUL, they saw the
suspected carnapped car somewhere at Pacita Complex I, San Pedro,
Laguna, going towards the Poblacion. When it stopped due to the red traffic
light, the CIDG officers alighted from their vehicles. Capt. Rumbaoa
positioned himself at the passenger side of the suspected carnapped car,
while Major Pagkalinawan stood in front of the car. SPO1 Pandez, with PO3
Mendez beside him, went straight to the driver and knocked at the drivers

window. ABDUL, who was driving the car, lowered the glass window. SPO1
Pandez introduced himself as a member of the Laguna CIDG and asked
ABDUL to turn on the light and show them the cars certificate of registration.
[7]

When the light was already on, SPO1 Pandez saw a black Norinco .45
caliber gun[8] inside an open black clutch/belt bag placed on the right side of
the drivers seat near the gear. He asked ABDUL for the supporting papers of
the gun, apart from the cars certificate of registration, but the latter failed to
show them any.[9] When ABDUL opened the zipper of the clutch/belt bag, the
CIDG officers saw inside it four plastic sachets of what appeared to be
shabu. They likewise found a self-sealing plastic bag which contained the
following items: two fake P1,000 bills, a list of names of persons, a magazine
and five ammunitions for a .45 caliber gun. They confiscated the gun, the
shabu, and the fake P1,000 bills and thereafter brought ABDUL to the CIDG
office.[10]
PO3 Mendez substantially corroborated the testimony of SPO1 Pandez. [11]
The two P1,000 bills were found to be counterfeit after an examination
conducted by Police Inspector Anacleta Cultura, [12] a document examiner at
Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna. The white crystalline substance
contained in the four small plastic bags was subjected to physical and
laboratory examination conducted by Police Inspector Lorna Tria, a Forensic
Chemist at the PNP Crime Laboratory, Region IV, Camp Vicente Lim. Her
findings[13] were as follows: (a) the three small plastic sachets weighed 29.46
grams, while the big plastic sachet weighed 197.21 grams, or a total weight
of 226.67 grams; (b) representative samples taken from the specimens
thereof were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a
regulated drug; and (c) the improvised tooter and the rolled aluminum foil
with residue found in the self-sealing plastic bag were also positive of the
presence for shabu residue.
As expected, ABDUL had a different story to tell. He testified that on 12 April
1999, between 6:50 and 7:00 p.m., he was driving a borrowed Mitsubishi
Galant Car with Plate No. UPV 501 somewhere in San Pedro, Laguna.With
him was Rose, his live-in partner, whom he fetched from Angeles City,
Pampanga. He had borrowed the car from his friend Ferdinand Navares,
who instructed him to return it in front of the latters store at San Pedro Public
Market.[14]
ABDUL was about to park the car when a man knocked hard on the glass
window on the drivers side of the car and pointed at the former a .45 caliber
pistol. Another one who was armed with an armalite rifle positioned himself
in front of the car, while the third one positioned himself near the window on
the passenger side and pointed a gun at his live-in partner Rose. ABDUL
then lowered the cars window. The man near him opened the door, held him,
and told him to alight. When the man asked him whether he was Boy

Muslim, he answered in the negative. The same man opened the back door
of the car and boarded at the back seat. Rose remained seated at the front
passenger seat. [15]
The other men likewise boarded the car, which was thereafter driven by one
of them. While inside the car, they saw a .45 caliber pistol at the edge of the
drivers seat. They asked him whether he had a license. He showed his gun
license and permit to carry. After taking his gun, license, and permit to carry,
they tried to remove his belt bag from his waist, but he did not allow them. [16]
Upon reaching the headquarters, ABDUL learned that these people were
C.I.S. agents. There, he was told to surrender the belt bag to the officer who
would issue a receipt for it. He did as he was told, and the money inside his
belt bag was counted and it amounted to P42,000. They then got his money
and the cellular phone, which was also inside the bag, together with some
other pieces of paper. They also took another cell phone from the car. He
was never issued a receipt for these items.[17]
Thereafter, a man entered the office with a white plastic bag allegedly taken
from the borrowed car. ABDUL denied ownership over the plastic bag. That
same man then told him that it contained shabu. ABDUL and Rose were
detained at the headquarters. The next morning, Rose was allowed to get
out; and in the afternoon, he was transferred to San Pedro Municipal Jail. [18]
After the trial, the trial court acquitted ABDUL in Criminal Cases Nos. 1236
and 1237 for violations of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and Article 168 of
the Revised Penal Code, respectively, due to insufficiency of
evidence.However, it convicted him in Criminal Case No. 1238 for violation of
Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No.
6425), as amended,[19] and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000, as well as the costs of the suit.
Dissatisfied with the judgment, ABDUL interposed the present appeal,
alleging that the trial court erred in (1) convicting him for violation of Section
16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, despite
insufficiency of evidence; and (2) admitting the evidence presented by the
prosecution although it was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights.
In his first assigned error, ABDUL argues that the prosecution failed to prove
the material allegations in the information. The information charges him,
among other things, that without being authorized by law, [he] did then and
there willfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control
methamphetamine hydrochloride. However, the prosecution did not present
any certification from the concerned government agency, like the Dangerous
Drugs Board, to the effect that he was not authorized to possess shabu,
which is a regulated drug. Thus, his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt.

In his second assigned error, ABDUL asserts that he was not committing a
crime when the CIS agents boarded his car, searched the same and
ultimately arrested him. He was about to park his borrowed car per
instruction by the owner when he was harassed by the operatives at
gunpoint. The gun seen was properly documented; thus, there was no
reason for the CIS agents to bring him and his companion to the
headquarters. The shabu allegedly found in the car was brought in by
somebody at the time he was under interrogation. It was taken in violation of
his constitutional right against illegal search and seizure. Being a fruit of a
poisonous tree it should not have been admitted in evidence.
Moreover, the members of the CIDG merely relied on the information
received from an anonymous telephone caller who said that ABDUL was
driving a carnapped vehicle. They had no personal knowledge of the veracity
of the information. Consequently, there was no legal basis for his warrantless
arrest.
In the Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains
that ABDUL had the burden of proving that he was authorized to possess
shabu, but he failed to discharge such burden. Therefore, it is presumed that
he had no authority; consequently, he is liable for violation of Section 16,
Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The OSG
likewise refutes ABDULs argument that there was a violation of his right
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The general rule is that if a criminal charge is predicated on a negative
allegation, or that a negative averment is an essential element of a crime,
the prosecution has the burden of proving the charge. However, this rule is
not without an exception. Thus, we have held:
Where the negative of an issue does not permit of direct proof, or where the
facts are more immediately within the knowledge of the accused, the onus
probandi rests upon him. Stated otherwise, it is not incumbent upon the
prosecution to adduce positive evidence to support a negative averment the
truth of which is fairly indicated by established circumstances and which, if
untrue, could readily be disproved by the production of documents or other
evidence within the defendants knowledge or control. For example, where a
charge is made that a defendant carried on a certain business without a
license (as in the case at bar, where the accused is charged with the selling
of a regulated drug without authority), the fact that he has a license is a
matter which is peculiarly within his knowledge and he must establish that
fact or suffer conviction.[20]
In the instant case, the negative averment that ABDUL had no license or
authority to possess methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated
drug, has been fairly indicated by the following facts proven by the
testimonies of the CIDG officers and the forensic chemist: (a) ABDUL was
driving the suspected carnapped vehicle when he was caught, and he

appeared to be healthy and not indisposed as to require the use of shabu as

medicine; (b) the contents of the sachets found in ABDULs open clutch bag
inside the car were prima facie determined by the CIDG officers to be shabu;
and (c) the said contents were conclusively found to be shabu by the
forensic chemist. With these established facts, the burden of evidence was
shifted to ABDUL. He could have easily disproved the damning
circumstances by presenting a doctors prescription for said drug or a copy of
his license or authority to possess the regulated drug. Yet, he offered
nothing.
And now on the second issue. The Constitution enshrines in its Bill of Rights
the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose.[21] To give full protection to it, the Bill of Rights also ordains
the exclusionary principle that any evidence obtained in violation of said right
is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. [22]
It is obvious from Section 2 of the Bill of Rights that reasonable searches and
seizures are not proscribed. If conducted by virtue of a valid search warrant
issued in compliance with the guidelines prescribed by the Constitution and
reiterated in the Rules of Court, the search and seizure is valid.
The interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute.
The recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence are (1) search of
moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs search; (4) waiver or
consented search; (5) stop and frisk situation (Terry search); and (6) search
incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless search and
seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule,
an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the
Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1)
arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests
of escaped prisoners.[23] Another exception is a search made pursuant to
routine airport security procedure, which is authorized under Section 9 of
R.A. No. 6235.[24]
The warrantless arrest of, or warrantless search and seizure conducted on,
ABDUL constitute a valid exemption from the warrant requirement. The
evidence clearly shows that on the basis of an intelligence information that a
carnapped vehicle was driven by ABDUL, who was also a suspect of drug
pushing, the members of the CIDG of Laguna went around looking for the
carnapped car.[25] They spotted the suspected carnapped car, which was
indeed driven by ABDUL. While ABDUL was fumbling about in his clutch bag
for the registration papers of the car the CIDG agents saw four transparent
sachets of shabu.[26] These sachets of shabu were therefore in plain viewof
the law enforcers.
Under the plain view doctrine, unlawful objects within the plain view of an
officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to

seizure and may be presented in evidence. Nonetheless, the seizure of

evidence in plain view must comply with the following requirements: (a) a
prior valid intrusion in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of
their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the
police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent; and (d) the plain view justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search.[27]
We are convinced beyond any shadow of doubt under the circumstances
above discussed that all the elements of seizure in plain view exist in the
case at bar. Thus, the warrantless search and seizure conducted on ABDUL,
as well as his warrantless arrest, did not transgress his constitutional rights.
ABDULs sole defense of denial is unsubstantiated. We have time and again
ruled that mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a
witness. A mere denial, just like alibi, is a self-serving negative evidence
which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As between a
categorical testimony that rings of truth on one hand, and a bare denial on
the other, the former is generally held to prevail. [28]
On the issue of credibility between ABDULs testimony and the declarations
of the CIDG officers, we hold for the latter. As has been repeatedly held,
credence shall be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution
witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to
have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence to
the contrary; moreover in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute
such a serious crime against the accused, the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on
the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over accuseds self-serving and
uncorroborated claim of having been framed. [29] ABDUL miserably failed to
rebut this presumption and to prove any ulterior motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses.
Unauthorized possession of 200 grams or more of shabu or
methylamphetamine hydrochloride is punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death under Section 16 of Article III, in relation to Section 20 of Article IV, of
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended by
P.D. Nos. 44, 1675, 1683, and 1707; Batas Pambansa Blg. 179; and R.A.
No. 7659 (now further amended by R.A. No. 9165). These sections provide
as follows:
SEC.16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. -- The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten
million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use
any regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription, subject
to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.

SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the

Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. -- The penalties for offenses under
Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of
Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any
of the following quantities:
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
There is no doubt that the charge of illegal possession of shabu in Criminal
Case No. 1238 was proved beyond reasonable doubt since ABDUL
knowingly carried with him at the time he was caught 226.67 grams
of shabuwithout legal authority. There being no modifying circumstance
proven, the proper penalty pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal
Code is reclusion perpetua. The penalty imposed by the trial court, including
the fine, is, therefore, in order.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of San
Pedro, Laguna, in Criminal Case No. 1238 convicting appellant ABDUL
MACALABA y DIGAYON of the violation of Section 16 of Article III of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended, and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000
and the costs of the suit, is hereby affirmed in toto.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
.R. No. L-44335

July 30, 1936

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE

vs.
KAGUI MALASUGUI, defendant-appellant.

ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

Manuel
Jose
for
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

appellant.

DIAZ, J.:
At about 5:30 o'clock in the morning of March 5, 1935, Tan Why, a Chinese
merchant, a resident of Cotabato, was found lying on the ground, with
several wounds in the head, on a path leading to the barrio of Carcar,
Cotabato, and situated within the property of another Chinese named Yu
Enching Sero. Tan Why received a wound on the upper part of his forehead,
which necessarily proved fatal because it fractured his skull. He died as a
result of this wound shortly afterward in the Cotabato Hospital where he had
been brought by an agent of authority with the aid of some laborers who had
gone to the scene of the crime.

The death of Tan Why was imputed to the herein accused who was charged
with the crime of robbery with homicide. He was convicted of said crime and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua, to return the sum of P150 to the Mindanao
Rice Industrial Company, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Tan
Why in the sum of P1,000, with costs. The accused appealed therefrom and
assigns five errors as committed by the lower court, which may be briefly
summarized as follows:
(1) In not having granted him a period of twenty-four hours to prepare his
defense;
(2) In having denied his petition for the return of the articles taken from him
during the search of his person, without the corresponding judicial warrant;
(3) In having admitted Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F, L and L-1, as evidence in the
case;
(4) In having denied his petition to dismiss for lack evidence, filed
immediately after the fiscal had finished presenting his evidence; and
(5) In having found him guilty of robbery with homicide, instead of acquitting
him.
When Tan Why was found on the morning in question, he was still alive and
able to answer laconically "Kagui", when Moro Alamada, was among the first
to approach him, asked who had attacked him. The appellant was known by
this name in Cotabato, whereupon Lieutenant A. Jacaria of the Constabulary
ordered his immediate arrest. The accused was arrested shortly after eight
o'clock in the morning of the same day, and after he had been brought to
Lieutenant Jacaria, who had already been informed, that he had just
redeemed two pairs of bracelets from some pawnshops of Cotabato and that
he carried money, said lieutenant asked him for the bracelets and he then
voluntarily and without protest produced what now appear in the record as
Exhibit A. He was later searched, without opposition or protest on his part,
and it was discovered that he also had the pocketbook (Exhibit B), containing
P92 in bills (Exhibit C), Tan Why's identification card and a memorandum of
amounts with some Chinese characters (Exhibit D). In one of the pockets of
his pants was found some change, making the total amount of money found
in his possession P92.68.
Tan Why, the deceased, carried the pocketbook, Exhibit B, as he did on
former occasions, a few hours before his body was found in the condition
and under the circumstances above stated. Before he left his home between
4.30 and 5 o'clock that morning, he had it full of bills because he was, as
usual, on his way to purchase palay in Carcar as part of his work. The
memorandum of amounts, Exhibit D, found in the pocketbook, Exhibit B, is in
Tan Why's handwriting; and in the afternoon before his death he was given
by Kaw Tin of the Mindanao Rice Industrial Company the sum of P150 to be

invested in the purchase of palay, in addition to the P80 that remained of the
amount previously delivered to him.
The appellant had to be searched after he had voluntarily produced the
bracelets Exhibit A and placed them on Lieutenant Jacaria's table, because,
upon being asked if he had any thing, he tremblingly answered in the
negative.
The foregoing facts are inferred from the testimony of the government
witnesses Alamada, Chua Sian, Kaw Tin, Yap Sea, Lieutenant Jacaria, and
Police Sergeant Urangut.
Alamada testified that the deceased, shortly before he died, Kagui as his
aggressor, and the appellant was known by this name in Cotabato. He also
testified that on the morning in question, he saw the appellant, with a club in
his hand, pass by the house where he and the deceased lived. The club,
Exhibit M, then with bloodstains, was found near the place where Tan Why
was wounded.
Chua Sian, an employee of the deceased, identified the pocketbook Exhibit
B saying that it was the same that the deceased used to carry whenever he
went to make purchases; that it was usually kept in a box at Tan Why's store;
that the deceased in truth carried it when he left his store on the morning of
March 5, 1935, to purchase palay, and that it was then full of bills.
Kaw Tin, cashier of the Mindanao Rice Industrial Company, in turn, testified
that on the night before the crime, he gave the deceased, at the latter's
request the sum of P150 to purchase palay, inasmuch as he was a buyer of
said commodity for the company in Cotabato.
About four meters from the place where Tan Why's body was found, there
was a coconut tree with two dangling leaves, as if they were so arranged
intentionally to hide anybody who might post himself near the trunk. At the
very place where the tips of the leaves touched the ground, there were
footprints presumably of somebody who had posted who had posted himself
there in ambush, without being seen: the fresh footprints exactly the same
size as the appellant's foot; and the said bloodstained club was found very
near the place. Such was the testimony of Lieutenant Jacaria and Sergeant
Eusebio de los Santos who inspected the scene of the crime, particularly the
latter who did so early in the morning and took said measurements with the
aid of Exhibit E which is a part of a reed-grass leaf.
The appellant testified at the trial that Lieutenant Jacaria and Sergeant
Urangut had forcibly and through intimidation taken from him the bracelets
(Exhibit A), the pocketbook (Exhibit B) and all the money which he carried
(Exhibit C); and that, but for the printing thereon, the identification card found
in the pocketbook then was blank and there was no memorandum of the
kind of Exhibit D, in Tan Why's handwriting, inside the pocketbook, thereby,

insinuating that it was Lieutenant Jacaria who typed or caused to be

typewritten on the card Tan Why's name and personal data and who placed
Exhibit D in the pocketbook. There is nothing of record to corroborate the
appellant's imputation to said two officers; and it is unbelievable that they so
acted because they were induced by no other motive than to comply with
their duties as agents of authority. The appellant permitted them to search
his person and to take from him the articles in question to be used as
evidence against him in due time; at least, he neither made any objection nor
even muttered a bit of protest. Consequently, his contention that he was
subjected to the rigor of an unreasonable search to dispossess him of his
effects without judicial warrant, and that the court should have ordered their
return to him when he so formally requested before the trial, is unfounded.
When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his
person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof. (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., vol. I page 631.) The right to be secure
from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver
may be made either expressly or impliedly. On the other hand, the appellant
was then charged with the crime, imputed to him by Tan Why before the
latter's death, of having assaulted the "deceased; that he was then also
known to be carrying much money; and that a few moments before he was
brought to Lieutenant Jacaria, and shortly after the assault on Tan Why, he
was able to redeem two pairs of bracelets from two persons to whom he had
pledge them several months before. These are circumstances which
undoubtedly warranted his arrest without a previous judicial warrant, only
upon a verbal order from said officer to Sergeant Urangut, or of the latter's
own will, inasmuch as he had direct knowledge of the aggression committed
on the person of Tan Why, his violent death, the revelation made by Tan Why
before his death naming the appellant as the author of the of the aggression,
and the other circumstances already stated. This is so because under the
law, members of Insular Police or Constabulary as well as those of the
municipal police and of chartered cities like Manila and Baguio, and even of
townships (secs. 848, 2463, 2564, 2165 and 2383 of the Revised
Administrative Code) may make arrests without judicial warrant, not only
when a crime is committed or about to be committed in their presence but
also when there is reason to believe or sufficient ground to suspect that one
has been committed and that it was committed by the person arrested by
them. (U. S. vs.Fortaleza, 12 Phil., 472; U. S. vs. Samonte, 16 Phil., 516; U.
S. vs. Batallones, 23 Phil., 46; U. S. vs. Santos, 36 Phil., 853.) An arrest
made under said circumstances is not unlawful but perfectly justified; and the
agent of authority who makes the arrest does not violate the provisions of
article 269 of the Revised Penal Code which defines and punishes unlawful
arrest, nor infringe the constitutional precept relative to the inviolability of
one's right to be secure in his person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable search and seizures; as either provision of law permits, like
the above cited sections of the Revised Administrative Code, the making of
arrests without judicial warrant, when there exist reasonable motives therefor

so that the person arrested may be brought to the corresponding authority. In

fact such was the appellant's state and circumstances when he was
searched and his alleged effects (Exhibits A, B, C and D with Tan Why's
identification card) were taken from him and, such being the case, it was
proper, perfectly lawful, prudent and even necessary, in order to avoid any
possible "surprise or aggression from the appellant, in the search to be made
and the effects in question seized by the persons concerned, to be
presented, as they were in truth presented to the competent authority.
Section 105 of General Orders, No. 58 reads:
A person charged with a crime may be marched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the crime.
Article III, section 1, paragraph (3), of our Constitution is identical in all
respects to the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States;
and said constitutional precept has been interpreted as not prohibiting
arrests, searches and seizures without judicial warrant, but only those that
are unreasonable.
In United States vs. Snyder (278 Fed., 650), it was said:
The Fourth Amendment, providing that "the right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable search
and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized," contains
no prohibition of arrest, search, or seizure without a warrant, but only against
"unreasonable" searches and seizures.
When the search of the person detained or arrested and the seizure of the
effects found in his possession are incidental to an arrest made in conformity
with the law, they cannot be considered unreasonable, much less unlawful.
(Weeks vs. United States, 232 U. S., 652, citing favorably 1 Bishop, Crim.
Proc., sec. 211; Wharton, Crim. Pl. & Pr., 8th ed., sec. 60; Dillon vs. O'Brien,
16 Cox, C. C., 245, Ir. L. R. 20 C. L., 300; Moreno vs. Ago Chi, 12 Phil., 439;
United States vs. Welsh, 247 Fed., 239; United States vs. Kraus, 270 Fed.,
578, 582, par. 7; Garske vs.United States, 1 Fed. [2d], 620; King vs. United
States, 1 Fed. [2d], 931.) In this last case it was said:
In these circumstances of search and seizure of defendant engaged in the
commission of a felony, and of which the officers had reliable information and
cause to believe, there is nothing unreasonable within the import of that term
in the Fourth Amendment. After the amendment, as before it, the law
necessarily sanctions arrest, search, and seizure of persons engaged in
commission of a crime, or reasonably believed to have committed a felony,
without any paper warrant. This case is so plain that it suffices to say so.

Anent an identical question, the Supreme Court of Virginia, in United

States vs. Snyder, supra, said:
To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the
evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave
society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert,
and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many
instances.
The appellant contends that the lower court did not grant him even twentyfour hours to prepare his defense, thereby denying him the right afforded to
every accused by section 30 of General Orders, No. 58. We have carefully
examined the record and found nothing to convince us that said court had in
truth refused to grant him time for said purpose. To be entitled to said time as
a matter of right, the interested party must expressly ask for it, inasmuch as
the law so prescribes. The truth, however, is that the appellant not only did
not ask for it but, after his petition for the return of his effects to him had been
denied, he forthwith asked, through his counsel, to be arraigned and to
proceed with the trial.
The appellant likewise contends that there was error in the admission of the
evidence Exhibits A, B, C, and D, alleging that they had been taken from him
through force and intimidation. The record shows that before proceeding with
the trial in the lower court, the appellant asked for the return of said effects
(Exhibits A, B, C, and D) to him on the ground that they were unlawfully
taken away from him. Leaving aside the foregoing considerations, his
testimony cannot prevail against nor is it sufficient to counteract that of the
government witnesses, Lieutenant Jacaria and Sergeant Urangut, who
testified that when Lieutenant Jacaria asked him what other things he
carried, after having voluntarily placed the two pairs of bracelets, Exhibit A,
on the table, and Sergeant Urangut felt his body, he did not show the least
opposition. It follows, therefore, that the lower court committed no error in
accepting as evidence Exhibits A, B, C and D, not only because the
appellant did not object to the taking thereof from him when searched, but
also because the effects found in his possession of a person detained or
arrested are perfectly admissible as evidence against him, if they constitute
the corpus delicti or are pertinent or relevant thereto. (Adams vs. New York,
192 U.S., 585; 24 Sup. Ct., 372; 48 Law. ed., 575; Weeks vs.United
States, supra; People vs. Mayen, 205 Pac., 435.) It is certainly repugnant to
maintain the opposite view because it would amount to authorizing the return
to the accused of the means of conviction seized from him, notwithstanding
their being eloquent proofs of crime, for him to conceal, destroy or otherwise
dispose of, in order to assure his impunity.
The appellant attempted to prove that the money found in his possession
had been given to him, on different occasions, by the witnesses who testified
in his favor, as Kagui Guialal, Kagui Patak, Kakim, Akun or Amay Indo. Kagui

Guialal, in truth, testified that he had given the accused P90, two days before
the latter's arrest; Kagui Patak, P45, on two occasions, one month, and two
weeks, respectively, also prior to his arrest; and Kakim and Akun or Amay
Indo, P22.50 and P20, seven and five days, respectively, before the day of
the crime. These four witnesses are all relatives of the appellant; and if it
were true that the latter had enough money several days prior to the
aggression and death of Tan Why, the natural thing to assume is that he
would have not redeemed the two bracelets Exhibit A, precisely on the very
morning in question. Furthermore, their testimony did not destroy the
unexplained finding in the appellant's possession, of the deceased Tan
Why's pocketbook, containing much money, and the latter's personal papers.
In the absence of an explanation of how one has come into the possession
of stolen effects belonging to a person wounded and treacherously killed, he
must necessarily be considered the author of the aggression and death of
said person and of the robbery committed on him (U.S. vs.Merin, 2 Phil., 88;
U.S. vs. Divino, 18 Phil., 425).
The facts which we consider as having been fully established in view of the
foregoing considerations, constitute the crime of robbery with homicide
defined and punished with reclusion perpetua to death in article 249,
subsection 1, of the Revised Penal Code. Inasmuch as no aggravating
circumstance had been proven and the penalty imposed by the lower court is
in accordance with law, taking into consideration the rules prescribed in
article 63 of said Code, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed, except
that part thereof containing a pronouncement in favor of the Mindanao Rice
Industrial Company, a strange party to the case, which should be entirely
eliminated; and it is ordered that Exhibits B (pocketbook), C (money), D
(memorandum of amounts) and Tan Why's identification card be delivered to
the latter's heirs, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, R
G.R. No. 136292

January 15, 2002

RUDY
CABALLES
y
TAIO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision1 of respondent Court of
Appeals dated September 15, 1998 which affirmed the judgment rendered
by the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna, finding herein petitioner,
Rudy Caballes y Taio, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft,
and the resolution2 dated November 9, 1998 which denied petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.

In an Information3 dated October 16, 1989, petitioner was charged with the
crime of theft committed as follows:
"That on or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the Municipality of
Pagsanjan, and/or elsewhere in the Province of Laguna, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of
gain, and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, the
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, steal and carry away about 630-kg of Aluminum Cable
Conductors, valued at P27, 450.00, belonging to and to the damage and
prejudice of said owner National Power Corp., in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
During the arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty and hence, trial on the
merits ensued.
The facts are summarized by the appellate court as follows:
"[At] about 9:15 p.m. of June 28, 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex
de Castro, while on a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan,
Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves.
Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police
officers flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by appellant. When
asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer; he appeared pale
and nervous.
With appellant's consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they
discovered bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires
exclusively owned by National Power Corporation (NPC). The conductor
wires weighed 700 kilos and valued at P55, 244.45. Noceja asked appellant
where the wires came from and appellant answered that they came from
Cavinti, a town approximately 8 kilometers away from Sampalucan.
Thereafter, appellant and the vehicle with the high-voltage wires were
brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of the
appellant and the jeep loaded with the wires which were turned over to the
Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Appellant was
incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail.
In defense, appellant interposed denial and alibi. He testified that he is a
driver and resident of Pagsanjan, Laguna; a NARCOM civilian agent since
January, 1988 although his identification card (ID) has already expired. In the
afternoon of June 28, 1989, while he was driving a passenger jeepney, he
was stopped by one Resty Fernandez who requested him to transport in his
jeepney conductor wires which were in Cavinti, Laguna. He told Resty to wait
until he had finished his last trip for the day from Santa Cruz, Laguna. On his
way to Santa Cruz, Laguna, he dropped by the NARCOM headquarters and

informed his superior, Sgt. Callos, that something unlawful was going to
happen. Sgt. Callos advised him to proceed with the loading of the wires and
that the former would act as back-up and intercept the vehicle at the Sambat
Patrol Base in Pagsanjan.
After receiving those instructions, he went back to see Resty. Although Resty
had his own vehicle, its tires were old so the cable wires were loaded in
appellant's jeep and covered with kakawati leaves. The loading was done by
about five (5) masked men. He was promised P1,000.00 for the job. Upon
crossing a bridge, the two vehicles separated but in his case, he was
intercepted by Sgt. Noceja and Pat. De Castro. When they discovered the
cables, he told the police officers that the cables were loaded in his jeep by
the owner, Resty Fernandez. But despite his explanation, he was ordered to
proceed to police headquarters where he was interrogated. The police
officers did not believe him and instead locked him up in jail for a week." 4
On April 27, 1993, the court a quo rendered judgment5 the dispositive portion
of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Theft of property worthP55,244.45, the Court hereby sentences him
to suffer imprisonment from TWO (2) [YEARS], FOUR (4) MONTHS, and
ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of
Prision Mayor, as maximum, to indemnify the complainant National Power
Corporation in the amount of P55, 244.45, and to pay the costs."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction but
deleted the award for damages on the ground that the stolen materials were
recovered and modified the penalty imposed, to wit:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that appellant RUDY CABALLES is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal in theft, defined and penalized under Articles
308 and 309, par. 1, Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying
circumstances, he is hereby meted an indeterminate penalty of Four (4)
years, Nine (9) months and Eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as
minimum term, to Eight (8) years, Eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum term. No civil indemnity and no costs." 6
Petitioner comes before us and raises the following issues:
"(a) Whether or not the constitutional right of petitioner was violated when
the police officers searched his vehicle and seized the wires found therein
without a search warrant and when samples of the wires and references to
them were admitted in evidence as basis for his conviction;

(b) Whether or not respondent Court erred in rejecting petitioner's defense

that he was engaged in an entrapment operation and in indulging in
speculation and conjecture in rejecting said defense; and
(c) Whether or not the evidence of the prosecution failed to establish the guilt
of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt and thus failed to overcome the
constitutional right of petitioner to presumption of innocence."
The conviction or acquittal of petitioner hinges primarily on the validity of the
warrantless search and seizure made by the police officers, and the
admissibility of the evidence obtained by virtue thereof.
In holding that the warrantless search and seizure is valid, the trial court
ruled that:
"As his last straw of argument, the accused questions the constitutionality of
the search and validity of his arrest on the ground that no warrant was issued
to that effect. The Court cannot again sustain such view. In the case of
People v. Lo Ho [Wing], G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991, it has been held
that 'considering that before a warrant can be obtained, the place, things and
persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing
judge - a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of
smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport
contraband from one place to another with impunity, a warrantless search of
a moving vehicle is justified on grounds of practicability.' The doctrine is not
of recent vintage. In the case of Valmonte vs. de Villa, G.R. No. 83988, May
24, 1990 (Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration, September 29, 1989), it
was ruled that 'automobiles because of their mobility may be searched
without a warrant upon facts not justifying warrantless search of a resident or
office. x x x To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and
searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would
be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most
expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many
instances' (Ibid.). In Umil v. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311, and People vs. Ortiz,
191 SCRA 836, the Supreme Court held that a search may be made even
without a warrant where the accused is caught in flagrante. Under the
circumstances, the police officers are not only authorized but are also under
obligation to arrest the accused even without a warrant." 7
Petitioner contends that the flagging down of his vehicle by police officers
who were on routine patrol, merely on "suspicion" that "it might contain
smuggled goods," does not constitute probable cause that will justify a
warrantless search and seizure. He insists that, contrary to the findings of
the trial court as adopted by the appellate court, he did not give any consent,
express or implied, to the search of the vehicle. Perforce, any evidence
obtained in violation of his right against unreasonable search and seizure
shall be deemed inadmissible.

Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure

in their persons and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures,
as defined under Section 2, Article III thereof, which reads:
"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars
the admission of evidence obtained in violation of such right.
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is
not absolute but admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; 8 (2) seizure of evidence in
plain view;9 (3) search of moving vehicles;10 (4) consented warrantless
search;11 (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search);12and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.13
In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the
Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be complied with. In
the exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid
search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without a
warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is
purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the
circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the
articles procured.14
It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted by the police
officers in the case at bar was not authorized by a search warrant. The main
issue is whether the evidence taken from the warrantless search is
admissible against the appellant. Without said evidence, the prosecution
cannot prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.1wphi1.nt
I. Search of moving vehicle
Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that
the occupant committed a criminal activity.15 Thus, the rules governing
search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a
moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is

so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and
persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing
judge a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of
smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport
contraband from one place to another with impunity. We might add that a
warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought.16 Searches without warrant of automobiles is also allowed for the
purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws, provided
such searches are made at borders or 'constructive borders' like checkpoints
near the boundary lines of the State.17
The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police
officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without
warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of
probable cause.18 Still and all, the important thing is that there was probable
cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such
a case.
Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause signifies a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of
such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to
seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. 19 The required
probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not
determined by a fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each
case.20
One such form of search of moving vehicles is the "stop-and-search" without
warrant at military or police checkpoints which has been declared to be not
illegal per se,21 for as long as it is warranted by the exigencies of public
order22 and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. 23 A checkpoint
may either be a mere routine inspection or it may involve an extensive
search.
Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's right
against unreasonable search. The search which is normally permissible in
this instance is limited to the following instances: (1) where the officer merely
draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds;24 (2) simply looks into a vehicle;25 (3) flashes a light therein without
opening the car's doors;26 (4) where the occupants are not subjected to a
physical or body search;27 (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited

to a visual search or visual inspection;28 and (6) where the routine check is
conducted in a fixed area.29
None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar. The
police officers did not merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of
herein petitioner's vehicle. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the
kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see the
cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple routine check.
In the case of United States vs. Pierre,30 the Court held that the physical
intrusion of a part of the body of an agent into the vehicle goes beyond the
area protected by the Fourth Amendment, to wit:
"The Agent . . . stuck his head through the driver's side window. The agent
thus effected a physical intrusion into the vehicle. . . [W]e are aware of no
case holding that an officer did not conduct a search when he physically
intruded part of his body into a space in which the suspect had a reasonable
expectation of privacy. [The] Agent['s] . . . physical intrusion allowed him to
see and to smell things he could not see or smell from outside the vehicle. . .
In doing so, his inspection went beyond that portion of the vehicle which may
be viewed from outside the vehicle by either inquisitive passersby or diligent
police officers, and into the area protected by the Fourth amendment, just as
much as if he had stuck his head inside the open window of a home."
On the other hand, when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive
search, such a warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only
if the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to
believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender or they
will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to
be searched.31
This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial
warrant an extensive search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there
had emanated from a package the distinctive smell of marijuana; (2) agents
of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the Philippine National Police
("PNP") had received a confidential report from informers that a sizeable
volume of marijuana would be transported along the route where the search
was conducted; (3) Narcom agents had received information that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his possession
prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents confronted the accused
Caucasian, because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to
present his passport and other identification papers when requested to do
so; (4) Narcom agents had received confidential information that a woman
having the same physical appearance as that of the accused would be
transporting marijuana;32 (5) the accused who were riding a jeepney were
stopped and searched by policemen who had earlier received confidential
reports that said accused would transport a large quantity of marijuana; and
(6) where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of

intelligence information and clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent

or spy - one who participated in the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate
to which the accused belonged - that said accused were bringing prohibited
drugs into the country.33
In the case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because
the police officers who were on routine patrol became suspicious when they
saw that the back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves which,
according to them, was unusual and uncommon.
Pat. Alex de Castro recounted the incident as follows:
"ATTY. SANTOS
Q
Now on said date and time do you remember of any unusual incident
while you were performing your duty?
A
Yes, sir, at that time and date myself and Police Sgt. Noceja were
conducting patrol in the said place when we spotted a suspicious jeepney so
we stopped the jeepney and searched the load of the jeepney and we found
out (sic) these conductor wires.
Q
You mentioned about the fact that when you saw the jeepney you
became suspicious, why did you become suspicious?
A

Because the cargo was covered with leaves and branches, sir.

Q
When you became suspicious upon seeing those leaves on top of the
load what did you do next, if any?
A

We stopped the jeepney and searched the contents thereof, sir." 34

The testimony of Victorino Noceja did not fare any better:

"ATTY SANTOS
Q

When you saw the accused driving the said vehicle, what did you do?

A
Because I saw that the vehicle being drawn by Caballes was covered
by kakawati leaves, I became suspicious since such vehicle should not be
covered by those and I flagged him, sir."35
We hold that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is
not common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute
"probable cause" as would justify the conduct of a search without a warrant.
In People vs. Chua Ho San,36 we held that the fact that the watercraft used
by the accused was different in appearance from the usual fishing boats that
commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas coupled with the suspicious

behavior of the accused when he attempted to flee from the police

authorities do not sufficiently establish probable cause. Thus:
"In the case at bar, the Solicitor General proposes that the following details
are suggestive of probable cause - persistent reports of rampant smuggling
of firearm and other contraband articles, CHUA's watercraft differing in
appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the
Bacnotan seas, CHUA's illegal entry into the Philippines x x x, CHUA's
suspicious behavior, i.e., he attempted to flee when he saw the police
authorities, and the apparent ease by which CHUA can return to and
navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas,
beyond the reach of Philippine laws.
This Court, however, finds that these do not constitute "probable cause."
None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent odor
of marijuana or other prohibited drug, confidential report and/or positive
identification by informers of courier of prohibited drug and/or the time and
place where they will transport/deliver the same, suspicious demeanor or
behavior, and suspicious bulge in the waist - accepted by this Court as
sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest exists in this case. There was no
classified information that a foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao
beach bearing prohibited drug on the date in question. CHUA was not
identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the
vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of
the area did not automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an
offense. x x x." (emphasis supplied)
In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any
confidential report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen
cable wires in his vehicle which could otherwise have sustained their
suspicion. Our jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped information
has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and
seizure.37 Unfortunately, none exists in this case.
II. Plain view doctrine
It cannot likewise be said that the cable wires found in petitioner's vehicle
were in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid.
Jurisprudence is to the effect that an object is in plain view if the object itself
is plainly exposed to sight. Where the object seized was inside a closed
package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized
without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether
by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious
to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. In
other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer
from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is
deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the

items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or

otherwise subject to seizure.38
It is clear from the records of this case that the cable wires were not exposed
to sight because they were placed in sacks 39 and covered with leaves. The
articles were neither transparent nor immediately apparent to the police
authorities. They had no clue as to what was hidden underneath the leaves
and branches. As a matter of fact, they had to ask petitioner what was
loaded in his vehicle. In such a case, it has been held that the object is not in
plain view which could have justified mere seizure of the articles without
further search.40
III. Consented search
Petitioner contends that the statement of Sgt. Victorino Noceja that he
checked the vehicle "with the consent of the accused" is too vague to prove
that petitioner consented to the search. He claims that there is no specific
statement as to how the consent was asked and how it was given, nor the
specific words spoken by petitioner indicating his alleged "consent." At most,
there was only an implied acquiescence, a mere passive conformity, which is
no "consent" at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and
seizures is a personal right which may be waived. The consent must be
voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e.,
the consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated
by any duress or coercion.41 Hence, consent to a search is not to be lightly
inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. 42 The
question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of
fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. 43 Relevant to
this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving
consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the
defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether
he objected to the search or passively looked on; 44 (4) the education and
intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures;
(6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; 45 (7)
the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the
questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the
person consenting.46 It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear
and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it
was freely and voluntarily given.47
In the case at bar, Sgt. Victorino Noceja testified on the manner in which the
search was conducted in this wise:
"WITNESS
Q

On June 28, 1989, where were you?

A
xxx

We were conducting patrol at the poblacion and some barangays, sir.

xxx

xxx

Q
After conducting the patrol operation, do you remember of any unusual
incident on said date and time?
A

Yes, sir.

What is that incident?

A
While I was conducting my patrol at barangay Sampalucan, I saw
Rudy Caballes driving a vehicle and the vehicle contained aluminum wires,
sir.
xxx
Q

xxx

xxx

When you saw the accused driving the said vehicle, what did you do?

A
Because I saw that the vehicle being driven by Caballes was covered
by kakawati leaves, I became suspicious since such vehicle should not be
covered by those and I flagged him, sir.
Q

Did the vehicle stop?

A
Yes, sir, and after said vehicle stop[ped], I removed the cover of said
vehicle and by so doing, I saw the aluminum wires.
Q

Before you saw the aluminum wires, did you talk to the accused?

Yes, sir, I asked him what his load was.

What was the answer of Caballes?

A
He did not answer and I observed him to be pale, "nagpapamutla"
(sic), so I told him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in
the positive.
Q
And after you saw for yourself the aluminum wires loaded on the jeep,
what did you do?
A
I asked him where those wires came from and he answered those
came from the Cavinti area, sir."48
This Court is not unmindful of cases upholding the validity of consented
warrantless searches and seizure. But in these cases, the police officers'
request to search personnel effects was orally articulated to the accused and
in such language that left no room for doubt that the latter fully understood
what was requested. In some instance, the accused even verbally replied to

the request demonstrating that he also understood the nature and

consequences of such request.49
In Asuncion vs. Court of Appeals,50 the apprehending officers sought the
permission of petitioner to search the car, to which the latter agreed.
Petitioner therein himself freely gave his consent to said search. In People
vs. Lacerna,51 the appellants who were riding in a taxi were stopped by two
policemen who asked permission to search the vehicle and the appellants
readily agreed. In upholding the validity of the consented search, the Court
held that appellant himself who was "urbanized in mannerism and speech"
expressly said that he was consenting to the search as he allegedly had
nothing to hide and had done nothing wrong. In People vs. Cuizon,52 the
accused admitted that they signed a written permission stating that they
freely consented to the search of their luggage by the NBI agents to
determine if they were carrying shabu. In People vs. Montilla,53 it was held
that the accused spontaneously performed affirmative acts of volition by
himself opening the bag without being forced or intimidated to do so, which
acts should properly be construed as a clear waiver of his right. In People vs.
Omaweng,54 the police officers asked the accused if they could see the
contents of his bag to which the accused said "you can see the contents but
those are only clothings." Then the policemen asked if they could open and
see it, and accused answered "you can see it." The Court said there was a
valid consented search.1wphi1.nt
In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee
against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it
must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved had
knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and
(3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. 55
In the case at bar, the evidence is lacking that the petitioner intentionally
surrendered his right against unreasonable searches. The manner by which
the two police officers allegedly obtained the consent of petitioner for them to
conduct the search leaves much to be desired. When petitioner's vehicle
was flagged down, Sgt. Noceja approached petitioner and "told him I will
look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive." We are
hard put to believe that by uttering those words, the police officers were
asking or requesting for permission that they be allowed to search the
vehicle of petitioner. For all intents and purposes, they were informing, nay,
imposing upon herein petitioner that they will search his vehicle. The
"consent" given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent
within the purview of the constitutional guaranty. In addition, in cases where
this Court upheld the validity of consented search, it will be noted that the
police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of
the accused to be searched. And the consent of the accused was
established by clear and positive proof. In the case of herein petitioner, the
statements of the police officers were not asking for his consent; they

were declaring to him that they will look inside his vehicle. Besides, it is
doubtful whether permission was actually requested and granted because
when Sgt. Noceja was asked during his direct examination what he did when
the vehicle of petitioner stopped, he answered that he removed the cover of
the vehicle and saw the aluminum wires. It was only after he was asked a
clarificatory question that he added that he told petitioner he will inspect the
vehicle. To our mind, this was more of an afterthought. Likewise, when Pat.
de Castro was asked twice in his direct examination what they did when they
stopped the jeepney, his consistent answer was that they searched the
vehicle. He never testified that he asked petitioner for permission to conduct
the search.56
Neither can petitioner's passive submission be construed as an implied
acquiescence to the warrantless search. InPeople vs. Barros,57 appellant
Barros, who was carrying a carton box, boarded a bus where two policemen
were riding. The policemen inspected the carton and found marijuana inside.
When asked who owned the box, appellant denied ownership of the box and
failed to object to the search. The Court there struck down the warrantless
search as illegal and held that the accused is not to be presumed to have
waived the unlawful search conducted simply because he failed to object,
citing the ruling in the case of People vs. Burgos,58 to wit:
"As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of
the citizen, the courts do not place the citizens in the position of either
contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights;
but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not
a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for
the supremacy of the law."
Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record
are insufficient to sustain petitioner's conviction. His guilt can only be
established without violating the constitutional right of the accused against
unreasonable search and seizure.
WHEREFORE, the impugned decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
accused Rudy Caballes is herebyACQUITTED of the crime charged. Cost de
oficio.
SO ORDERED.
123 Bache & Co. (Phil.) Inc. vs. Ruiz [GR L-32409, 27 February 1971] En
Banc, Villamor (J): 7 concur, 1 filed a separate concurring opinion to which 1
concurs, 1 concurs in result Facts: On 24 February 1970, Misael P. Vera,
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to Judge
Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against Bache
& Co. (Phil.), Inc. and Frederick E. Seggerman for violation of Section 46(a)
of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), in relation to all other
pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209,
and authorizing Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 2 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)

Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon to make and file the application for
search warrant which was attached to the letter. In the afternoon of the
following day, De Leon and his witness, Arturo Logronio, went to the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Rizal. They brought with them the following papers:
Vera's letter-request; an application for search warrant already filled up but
still unsigned by De Leon; an affidavit of Logronio subscribed before De
Leon; a deposition in printed form of Logronio already accomplished and
signed by him but not yet subscribed; and a search warrant already
accomplished but still unsigned by Judge. At that time the Judge was hearing
a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of
Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After the session had
adjourned, the Judge was informed that the depositions had already been
taken. The stenographer, upon request of the Judge, read to him her
stenographic notes; and thereafter, the Judge asked Logronio to take the
oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without
legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. The Judge signed de Leon's
application for search warrant and Logronio's deposition. Search Warrant 2M-70 was then signed by Judge and accordingly issued. 3 days later (a
Saturday), the BIR agents served the search warrant to the corporation and
Seggerman at the offices of the corporation on Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal.
The corporation's lawyers protested the search on the ground that no formal
complaint or transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents
nevertheless proceeded with their search which yielded 6 boxes of
documents. On 3 March 1970, the corporation and Seggerman filed a
petition with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal praying that the search
warrant be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory writs of injunction be issued, that the search warrant be declared
null and void, and that Vera, Logronio, de Leon, et. al., be ordered to pay the
corporation and Seggerman, jointly and severally, damages and attorney's
fees. After hearing and on 29 July 1970, the court issued an order dismissing
the petition for dissolution of the search warrant. In the meantime, or on 16
April 1970, the Bureau of Internal Revenue made tax assessments on the
corporation in the total sum of P2,594,729.97, partly, if not entirely, based on
the documents thus seized. The corporation and Seggerman filed an action
for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. Issue: Whether the corporation has
the right to contest the legality of the seizure of documents from its office.
Held: The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose
rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful
search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties. In Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno, et al. (GR L-19550, 19 June 1967; 20
SCRA 383) the Supreme Court impliedly recognized the right of a
corporation to object against unreasonable searches and seizures; holding
that the corporations have their respective personalities, separate and
distinct from the personality of the corporate officers, regardless of the
amount of shares of stock or the interest of each of them in said
corporations, whatever, the offices they hold therein may be; and that the
corporate officers therefore may not validly object to the use in evidence
against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices
and premises of the corporations, since the right to object to the admission of
said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the
seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity. The distinction
between the Stonehill case and the present case is that: in the former case,

only the officers of the various corporations in whose offices documents,

papers and effects were searched and seized were the petitioners; while in
the latter, the corporation to whom the seized documents belong, and whose
rights have thereby been impaired, is itself a petitioner. On that score, the
corporation herein stands on a different footing from the corporations in
Stonehill. Moreover, herein, the search warrant was void inasmuch as First,
there was no personal examination conducted by the Judge of the
complainant (De Leon) and his witness (Logronio). The Judge did not ask
either of the two any question the answer to which could possibly be the
basis for determining whether or not there was probable cause against
Bache & Co. and Seggerman. The participation of the Judge in the
proceedings which led to the issuance of Search Warrant 2-M-70 was thus
limited to listening to the stenographer's readings of her notes, to a few
words of warning against the commission of perjury, and to administering the
oath to the complainant and his witness. This cannot be consider a personal
examination. Second, the search warrant was issued for more than one
specific offense. The search warrant was issued for at least 4 distinct
offenses under the Tax Code. The first is the violation of Section 46(a),
Section 72 and Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
Section 73 (the filing of income tax returns), which are interrelated. The
second is the violation of Section 53 (withholding of income taxes at source).
The third is the violation of Section 208 (unlawful pursuit of business or
occupation); and the fourth is the violation of Section 209 (failure to make a
return of receipts, sales, business or gross value of output actually removed
or to pay the tax due thereon). Even in their classification the 6 provisions
are embraced in 2 different titles: Sections 46(a), 53, 72 and 73 are under
Title II (Income Tax); while Sections 208 and 209 are under Title V (Privilege
Tax on Business and Occupation). Lastly, the search warrant does not
particularly describe the things to be seized. Search Warrant No. 2-M-70
tends to defeat the major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the elimination of
general warrants, for the language used therein is so all-embracing as to
include all conceivable records of the corporation, which, if seized, could
possibly render its business inoperative. Thus, Search Warrant 2-M-70 is null
and void. 124 Stonehill vs. Diokno [GR L-19550, 19 June 1967] En Banc,
Concepcion (CJ): 6 concur Facts: Upon application of the officers of the
government, Special Prosecutors Pedro D. Cenzon, Efren I. Plana and
Manuel Villareal Jr. and Assistant Fiscal Manases G. Reyes; Judge Amado
Roan (Municipal Court of Manila), Judge Roman Cansino (Municipal Court of
Manila), Judge Hermogenes Caluag (Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon
City Branch), and Judge Damian Jimenez (Municipal Court of Quezon City)
issued, on different dates, a total of 42 search warrants against Harry S.
Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, HJohn J. Brooks, and Karl Beck, and/or the
corporations of which they were officers, directed to any peace officer, to
search the said persons and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses
and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following
personal property to wit: "Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and
loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers)" as "the subject of the
offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used
or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is
described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank

Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised
Penal Code." Alleging that the search warrants are null and void, as
contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court, Stonehill, et. al. filed
with the Supreme Court the original action for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus and injunction. On 22 March 1962, the Supreme Court issued
the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by
resolution dated 29 June 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved,
insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the
corporations are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards
the papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of
Stonehill, et. al. Issue: Whether Stonehill, et. al. can assail the legality of the
contested warrants that allowed seizure of documents, papers and other
effects in the corporate offices, and other places besides their residences.
Held: Stonehill, et. al. maintained that the search warrants are in the nature
of general warrants and that, accordingly, the seizures effected upon the
authority thereof are null and void. No warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested
warrants. The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for
the contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein
made of the effects to be searched for and seized. The warrants authorized
the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions
of Stonehill, et. al., regardless of whether the transactions were legal or
illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the corporate
officers and the corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly
contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights that the things to
be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its major
objective: the elimination of general warrants. However, the documents,
papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and
seized in the offices of the corporations and (b) those found seized in the
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 4 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) residences of
Stonehill, et. al. As regards the first group, Stonehill, et. al. have no cause of
action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures
made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have
their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of
Stonehill, et. al., regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest
of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold
therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and
that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, Stonehill, et. al. may not
validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers
and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted
to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in
evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects
belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings
against them in their individual capacity. With respect to the documents,
papers and things seized in the residences of Stonehill, et. al., the 29 June
1962 Resolution of the Supreme Court, denying the lifting of the writ of
preliminary injunction previously issued by the Court on the documents,
papers and things seized in the residences, in effect, restrained the

prosecutors from using them in evidence against Stonehill, et. al. Thus, the
Court held that the warrants for the search of 3 residences are null and void;
that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents,
papers and other effects thus seized in said residences is made permanent,
that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and
other effects so seized in the residences are concerned; and that the petition
herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the
documents, papers and other effects seized in the 29 places, offices and
other premises.
129 People vs. Chua Ho San [GR 128222, 17 June 1999] En Banc, Davide
Jr. (CJ): 13 concur, 1 on leave Facts: In response to reports of rampant
smuggling of firearms and other contraband, Jim Lagasca Cid, as Chief of
Police of the Bacnotan Police Station, of La Union began patrolling the
Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While monitoring the coastal area of
Barangay Bulala on 29 March 1995, he intercepted a radio call at around
12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao
requesting police assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter
had spotted, which looked different from the boats ordinarily used by
fisherfolk of the area and was poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. Cid
and 6 of his men led by his Chief Investigator, SPO1 Reynoso Badua,
proceeded forthwith to Tammocalao beach, conferred with Almoite, and
observed that the speedboat ferried a lone male passenger. When the
speedboat landed, the male passenger alighted, and using both hands,
carried what appeared a multicolored strawbag, and walked towards the
road. By this time, Almoite, Cid and Badua, the latter two conspicuous in
their uniform and issued side-arms, became suspicious of the man as he
suddenly changed direction and broke into a run upon seeing the
approaching officers. Badua, prevented the man from fleeing by holding on
to his right arm. Although Cid introduced themselves as police officers, the
man appeared impassive. Speaking in English, then in Tagalog, and later in
Ilocano, Cid then requested the man to open his bag, but he seemed not to
understand. Cid then resorted to "sign language," motioning with his hands
for the man to open the bag. The man apparently understood and acceded
to the request. A search of the bag yielded several transparent plastic
packets containing yellowish crystalline substances. As Cid wished to
proceed to the police station, he signaled the man to follow, but the latter did
not comprehend. Hence, Cid placed his arm around the shoulders of the
man and escorted the latter to the police headquarters. At the police station,
Cid then "recited and informed the man of his constitutional rights" to remain
silent, to have the assistance of a counsel, etc. Eliciting no response from
the man, Cid ordered his men to find a resident of the area who spoke
Chinese to act as an interpreter. In the meantime, Badua opened the bag
and counted 29 plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline substances.
The interpreter, Mr. Go Ping Guan, finally arrived, through whom the man
was "apprised of his constitutional rights." When the policemen asked the
man several questions, he retreated to his obstinate reticence and merely
showed his ID with the name Chua Ho San printed thereon. Chua's bag and
its contents were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Diego Silang,
Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union for laboratory examination. In the
meantime, Chua was detained at the Bacnotan Police Station. Later, Police
Chief Inspector and Forensic Chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid (wife of
Cid), conducted a laboratory examination of 29 plastic packets, adn in her

Chemistry Report D-025-95, she stated that her qualitative examination

established the contents of the plastic packets, weighing 28.7 kilos, to be
positive of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.
Chua was initially charged with illegal possession of methamphetamine
hydrochloride before the RTC (Criminal Case 4037). However, pursuant to
the recommendation of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San
Fernando, La Union, the information was subsequently amended to allege
that Chua was in violation of Section 15, Article III of RA 6425 as amended
by RA 7659 (illegal transport of a regulated drug). At his arraignment on 31
July 1995, where the amended complaint was read to him by a Fukienspeaking interpreter, Chua entered a plea of not guilty. Trial finally ensued,
with interpreters assigned to Chua (upon the RTC's direct request to the
Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in the Philippines, after its failure to
acquire one from the Department of Foreign Affairs). Chua provided a
completely different story, claiming that the bags belong to his employer Cho
Chu Rong, who he accompanied in the speedboat; that they decided to dock
when they were low on fuel and telephone battery; that the police, with nary
any spoken word but only gestures and hand movements, escorted him to
the precinct where he was handcuffed and tied to a chair; that the police, led
by an officer, arrived with the motor engine of the speedboat and a bag,
which they presented to him; that the police inspected opened the bag,
weighed the contents, then proclaimed them as methamphetamine
hydrochloride. In a decision promulgated on 10 February 1997, the RTC
convicted Chua for transporting 28.7 kilos of methamphetamine
hydrochloride without legal authority to do so. Chua prays for the reversal of
the RTC decision and his acquittal before the Supreme Court. Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 10 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Issue: Whether persistent
reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband articles,
Chua's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats that
commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, Chuas illegal entry into the
Philippines, Chuas suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee when he
saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which Chua can return
to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high
seas, constitute "probable cause." Held: No. Enshrined in the Constitution is
the inviolable right to privacy of home and person. It explicitly ordains that
people have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose. Inseparable, and not merely corollary or incidental to said
right and equally hallowed in and by the Constitution, is the exclusionary
principle which decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right is
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The Constitutional
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures does not, of
course, forestall reasonable searches and seizure. This interdiction against
warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such
warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by
jurisprudence. The Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests,
to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and
(3) arrests of escaped prisoners. The prosecution and the defense painted
extremely divergent versions of the incident, but the Court is certain that
Chua was arrested and his bag searched without the benefit of a warrant.
There are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of
Chuas participation in an ongoing criminal enterprise that could have
spurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive search. The RTC never

took the pains of pointing to such facts, but predicated mainly its decision on
the finding that "accused was caught red-handed carrying the bagful of
shabu when apprehended." In short, there is no probable cause. Persistent
reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband articles,
Chua's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats that
commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, Chuas illegal entry into the
Philippines, Chuas suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee when he
saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which Chua can return
to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high
seas, do not constitute "probable cause." None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag
or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited
drug, 20 confidential report and/or positive identification by informers of
courier(s) of prohibited drug and/or the time and place where they will
transport/deliver the same, suspicious demeanor or behavior and suspicious
bulge in the waist accepted by the Court as sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest exists in the case. There was no classified information that
a foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug
on the date in question. Chua was not identified as a drug courier by a police
informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no
resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him
as in the process of perpetrating an offense. The search cannot therefore be
denominated as incidental to an arrest. To reiterate, the search was not
incidental to an arrest. There was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless
arrest did not fall under the exemptions allowed by the Rules of Court as
already shown. From all indications, the search was nothing but a fishing
expedition. Casting aside the regulated substance as evidence, the same
being the fruit of a poisonous tree, the remaining evidence on record are
insufficient, feeble and ineffectual to sustain Chuas conviction. 130 People
vs. Molina [GR 133917, 19 February 2001] En Banc, Ynares-Santiago (J): 14
concur Facts: Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a
member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) detailed at Precinct No. 3,
Matina, Davao City, received an information regarding the presence of an
alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City. The first time he came to see the
said marijuana pusher in person was during the first week of July 1996.
SPO1 Paguidopon was then with his informer when a motorcycle passed by.
His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver, Gregorio Mula y Malagura
(@"Boboy"), as the pusher. As to Nasario Molina y Manamat (@ "Bobong"),
SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him prior to 8 August 1996. At
about 7:30 a.m. of 8 August 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an
information that the alleged pusher Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 11 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) will be passing at NHA, Maa, Davao City any
time that morning. Consequently, at around 8:00 a.m. he called for
assistance at the PNP, Precinct 3, Matina, Davao City, which immediately
dispatched the team of SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2
Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and SPO1 Pamplona, to
proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they would wait for
the alleged pusher to pass by. At around 9:30 a.m., while the team were
positioned in the house of SPO1 Paguidopon, a "trisikad" carrying Mula and
Molina passed by. At that instance, SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to Mula and
Molina as the pushers. Thereupon, the team boarded their vehicle and
overtook the "trisikad." SPO1 Paguidopon was left in his house, 30 meters
from where Mula and Molina were accosted. The police officers then ordered
the "trisikad" to stop. At that point, Mula, who was holding a black bag,

handed the same to Molina. Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona introduced

himself as a police officer and asked Molina to open the bag. Molina replied,
"Boss, if possible we will settle this." SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening
the bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, Mula and
Molina were handcuffed by the police officers. On 6 December 1996, the
accused Mula and Molina, through counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to
Evidence, contending that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is
inadmissible as evidence for having been obtained in violation of their
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
demurrer was denied by the trial court. A motion for reconsideration was filed
by the accused, but this was likewise denied. The accused waived
presentation of evidence and opted to file a joint memorandum. On 25 April
1997, the trial court rendered the decision, finding the accused guilty of the
offense charged, and sentenced both to suffer the penalty of death by lethal
injection. Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule 122,
Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the case was elevated to the Supreme
Court on automatic review. Issue: Whether Mula and Molina manifested
outward indication that would justify their arrest, and the seizure of prohibited
drugs that were in their possession. Held: The fundamental law of the land
mandates that searches and seizures be carried out in a reasonable fashion,
that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search warrant predicated upon the
existence of a probable cause. Complementary to the foregoing provision is
the exclusionary rule enshrined under Article III, Section 3, paragraph 2,
which bolsters and solidifies the protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures. The foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is not
without exceptions. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and
the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following
instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor
vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in
plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search). The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a
valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless
arrest which must precede the search. Still, the law requires that there be
first a lawful arrest before a search can be made the process cannot be
reversed. Herein, Mula and Molina manifested no outward indication that
would justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, they could not
be said to be committing, attempting to commit or have committed a crime. It
matters not that Molina responded "Boss, if possible we will settle this" to the
request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. Such response which allegedly
reinforced the "suspicion" of the arresting officers that Mula and Molina were
committing a crime, is an equivocal statement which standing alone will not
constitute probable cause to effect an in flagrante delicto arrest. Note that
were it not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, Mula and Molina could not be the
subject of any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise. Further, it would appear
that the names and addresses of Mula and Molina came to the knowledge of
SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were arrested, and such cannot lend a
semblance of validity on the arrest effected by the peace officers. Withal, the
Court holds that the arrest of Mula and Molina does not fall under the
exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their
person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the
peace officers could not be admitted as evidence against them.

Caballes vs Court of Appeals

(January 15, 2002)
Ponente:
Puno
Nature:
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
Facts:
While on a routine patrol in Brgy Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, Sgt.
Victorino Nocejo and Pat. Alex deCastro spotted a passenger jeep unusually
covered with
kakawati
leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was loaded withsmuggled goods, the
two officers flagged down the vehicle. Being the driver of the jeep, Caballes
was asked by theofficers as to what was loaded in the jeep, to which he did not
respond, appearing pale and nervous. The officerschecked the cargo and
discovered bundles of galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by
National PowerCorporation. Caballes and the vehicle with the high-voltage
wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station, wherehe was
imprisoned for 7 days. The trial court found Caballes guilty of the crime of
Theft of property. Upon appeal, the Court fo Aooeaksmaffirmed the trial
courts judgment of conviction.
I
ssue:
WON the evidence taken from the warrantless search is admissible against
Caballes
Held:
No; the evidence are not admissible in evidence.
Ratio:
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is
not absolute, but admits of certainexceptions. The situation in the case at bar
does not fall under any of the accepted exceptions.1.
Search of a moving vehicle
(
ito yung sense ng case talaga)
The rules governing searches and seizures of moving vehicles have been
liberalized for the purposes of practicality. Obtaining a warrant for a moving
vehicle is particularly difficult for want of a specific descriptionof the place,
things, and persons to be searches. Also, it is not practicable to secure a
warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the jurisdiction in
which the warrant must be sought. Still, however, theremust be probable
cause to conduct such warrantless search.One form of search of moving
vehicles is the stop-and-search without warrant at checkpoints, which
hasbeen declared as not illegal per se, for as long as it is warranted by the
exigencies of public order and conductedin a way least intrusive to motorists. A
checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it may involve anextensive
search.Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individuals
right against unreasonable search. Thecircumstances in this case, however,
do not constitute a routine inspection. They had to reach inside the vehicle,
lift the leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see the
cable wires. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive
search, such a search would be constitutionally permissible only if the
officers have probable cause to believe that either the motorist is a law-

offender or they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime

in the vehicle to be searched. In this case, theofficers flagged down the jeep
because they became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle
wascovered with kakawati leaves, which, to them, was unusual and uncommon. The
Court believes that the factthat the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not
common for such to be covered in kakawati leavesdoes not constitute probable
cause to justify a search without a warrant. In addition, there was no tip
orconfidential information that could have backed up their search,
as jurisprudence is replete with cases wheretipped information has become
sufficient to constitute probable cause.2.
Plain view doctrineIt is clear from the records that the cable wires were not exposed
to sight because they were placed in sacks andcovered with leaves. They had no
clue as to what was underneath the leaves. Object was not in plain
view which could have justified mere seizure without further search.3.
Consented search At most, there was only implied acquiescence, a mere
passive conformity, which is no consent at all within thepurview of the
constitutional guarantee. Evidence is lacking that Caballes intentionally
surrendered his rightagainst unreasonable searches
People vs. Chua [G.R. No. 149538. July 26, 2004]
Post under case digests, Criminal Law at Thursday, April 05, 2012 Posted
by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: Prior to this case the accused was confined in a drug
rehabilitation center for drug dependents. He escaped from said facility. The
trial court, thereafter, issued an Order recommitting him to the center but he
again escaped.

The accused appellant was charged with the murder of a 13 year old boy.
The accused was 17 at the time of commission.

The appellant, assisted by counsel, was duly arraigned and entered a plea of
not guilty.

After trial, the court rendered judgment convicting the appellant of the crime
charged. The court declared that the appellant was a minor when the crime
was committed; hence, was entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance
of minority under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming the judgment

of the trial court, but applied Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code and
increased the penalty to reclusion perpetua. The appellate court considered
the minority of the appellant merely as a generic mitigating circumstance,

and concluded that such minority could not be considered a generic and a
privileged mitigating circumstance at the same time.

Issue: Whether the appellate court was correct in appreciating the modifying
circumstances.

Held: The Supreme Court modified the decision. The trial court convicted the
appellant of murder without stating the qualifying circumstance attendant to
the crime. The trial court also appreciated in favor of the appellant the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and considered such minority
as a mere mitigating circumstance.

The crime was qualified by treachery. The victim, who was barely thirteen
years old, was helpless and unable to defend himself. His feet and hands
were tied while the appellant mauled and kicked him, and hit him with a
piece of wood. The appellant was so depraved that he even electrocuted the
victim by placing a live wire on the latters palms and burying him alive. By
his detestable acts, the appellant intended to exacerbate the suffering of the
victim. Hence, cruelty was attendant to the commission of the crime.
However, cruelty is absorbed by treachery.

The trial court and appellate court also erred in appreciating the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of the appellant. He was
arrested by the policemen not only for his involvement in the killing of the
victim but also because of the warrant for his arrest for robbery, and the
recommitment order issued by the RTC for escaping from the rehabilitation
center.

The appellate court erred, likewise, in appreciating the minority of the

appellant merely as a generic mitigating circumstance. While under Article
13, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, minority is a mitigating
circumstance, this provision must be construed in relation to Article 68
thereof, which provides that minority is a privileged mitigating circumstance
warranting the reduction of the imposable penalty by one or two degrees,
depending upon the age of the accused. The minority of the accused is not
merely a generic mitigating circumstance but is a privileged mitigating
circumstance. Furthermore, in determining the penalty to be meted on the
accused, the trial court must first consider any modifying circumstance
attendant to the crime.

In this case, the appellant was seventeen years old when he committed the
crime. Hence, the imposable penalty must be reduced by one degree,
conformably to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code. The imposable penalty
for murder is reclusion perpetua to death under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended byRepublic Act No. 7659. One degree lower than
reclusion perpetua to death is reclusion temporal, conformably to paragraph
2, Article 61, in relation to Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code.

To determine the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, reclusion temporal

should be reduced by one degree, prision mayor, which has a range of from
six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being no modifying
circumstances attendant to the crime, the maximum of the indeterminate
penalty should be imposed in its medium period. The minimum of the
indeterminate penalty should be taken from the full range of prision mayor.
Valmonte vs. De VillaFacts:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command
(NCRDC) wasactivated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the
Philippine General Headquarters,AFP, with the mission of conducting
security operations within its area of responsibility andperipheral areas, for
the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintainingpeace
and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic
andpolitical development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty
to maintain peaceand order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various
parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.Petitioners aver that, because of the
installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of
being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary,capricious
and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints,
consideringthat their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular
searches and check-ups, especiallyat night or at dawn, without the benefit of
a search warrant and/or court order. Their allegedfear for their safety
increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supplyofficer of
the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold
bloodby the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along
McArthur Highway at Malinta,Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to
submit himself to the checkpoint and forcontinuing to speed off inspire of
warning shots fired in the air.
Issue:
WON the installation of checkpoints violates the right of the people
againstunreasonable searches and seizures
Held:
Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by
themilitary manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the
checkpoints per se
, illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the
course of theirroutine checks, the military, indeed, committed specific

violations of petitioners'' rightsagainst unlawful search and seizure of

other rights. The constitutional right againstunreasonable searches and
seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rightshave been
infringed, or threatened to be infringed. Not all searches and seizures
areprohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. The
setting up of the questionedcheckpoints may be considered as a
security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of
establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for
thebenefit of the public. Checkpoints may not also be regarded as
measures to thwart plots todestabilize the govt, in the interest of public
security. Between the inherent right of thestate to protect its existence
and promote public welfare and an individual s right against
awarrantless search w/c is, however, reasonably conducted, the
former should prevail. True,the manning of checkpoints by the military is
susceptible of abuse by the military in thesame manner that all
governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost
of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the
checkpointsduring these abnormal times, when conducted w/in
reasonable limits, are part of the pricewe pay for an orderly society
and a peaceful community.
POSADAS VS. COURT OF APPEALS [188 SCRA 288; G.R. NO. 89139; 2
AUG 1990]
Friday,
February
06,
2009
Posted
by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao
Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, Pat. Ursicio Ungab
and Pat. Umbra Umpar conducted surveillance along Magallanes Street,
Davao City. While in the vicinity of Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted
petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting
suspiciously. They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as
members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away
was unsuccessful. They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where
they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial No.
770196, two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun, a smoke
(tear gas) grenade, and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. They
brought the petitioner to the police station for further investigation. In the
course of the same, the petitioner was asked to show the necessary license
or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions found in his possession
but he failed to do so. He was then taken to the Davao
Metrodiscomoffice and the prohibited articles recovered from him were
indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty. He was prosecuted for
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of
Davao
City.

Issue: Whether

or

Not

the

warantless search is

valid.

Held: In justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag then carried by the
petitioner, argues that under Section 12, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court a
person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything used as proof of a commission of an offense without
a search warrant. It is further alleged that the arrest without a warrant of the
petitioner
was
lawful
under
the
circumstances.
in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, it is reasonable
considering that it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The
probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted
to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing
something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police
officers to
inspect
the
same.
It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the
possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained
asearch warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless,
futile
and
much
too
late.
Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions
heretofore discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated.
People v. Rodelio C. Exala, et al., G.R. No. 76005, April 23, 1993
DECISION
(1st Division)

BELLOSILLO, J.:

I.

THE FACTS

A private jeep driven by accused-appellant Bocalan was stopped at a police

checkpoint in Cavite City for routine inspection. With Bocalan were his coaccused Fernandez and Exala. Pfc. Galang, a member of the inspection
team, went near the jeep and asked the occupants if there were firearms
inside. They answered in the negative. Pfc. Galang proceeded to inspect the
vehicle by beaming a flashlight inside. He then noticed a black leather bag
measuring about 1 foot wide and 2 feet long with its sides bulging. When he
asked what it contained, there was deadening silence from the 3 accused.
Nobody answered. Instead, they suddenly became fidgety. Suspicious, Pfc.
Galang ordered the bag opened, which was found out to contain marijuana.

The 3 accused were thereafter prosecuted and convicted of illegal

transportation of marijuana. Accused Bocalan appealed and questioned the
legality of the admission of the marijuana as evidence against him since it
was seized without a valid search warrant.

II.

THE ISSUE

Was the marijuana seized without warrant during the checkpoint admissible
in evidence against the accused?

III. THE RULING

[The 1st Division voted 3-1 to AFFIRM the conviction of the accused.
Justices Grio-Aquino and Quiason concurred with Justice Bellosillos
ponencia. Justice Cruz, by his lonesome, dissented from the majority.]

The Court held that Bocalan is deemed to have waived his objection to the
admission of the seized marijuana because he neither raised this issue
before the trial court nor objected to the admissibility of the marijuana when it
was offered in evidence.

And even assuming that there was no such waiver, the Court held that still
Bocalans contention deserves scant consideration because there are
instances where search and seizure can be made without necessarily being
preceded by an arrest. An illustration would be the stop-and-search without
a warrant at military or police checkpoints, the constitutionality of which has
already been upheld by this Court [inValmonte vs. De Villa]. Vehicles are
generally allowed to pass through these checkpoints after a routine
inspection and answering a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and
extensively searched it is because of some probable cause which justifies a
reasonable belief of those manning the checkpoints that either the motorist is
a law-offender or thecontents of the vehicle are or have been instruments in
the commission of an offense.

According to the Court, lest it be misunderstood, the foregoing doctrine is not

intended to do away with the general rule that no person shall be subjected
to search of his person, personal effects and belongings, or his residence
except of virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful

arrest. This case, however, is an incident to or an offshoot of a lawful stopand-search at a military or police checkpoint.

The checkpoint in the instant case was established in line with Operational
Bakal, the main object of which was to search for unlicensed firearms and
other prohibited items in the possession of unauthorized persons passing
through it. When the jeep carrying the contraband passed through the
checkpoint, it was flagged down and the occupants were asked routine
questions. In the course thereof, Pfc. Galang noticed a black leather bag the
sides of which were bulging. He asked what the contents of the bag were.
None of the accused answered. At that moment, the demeanor of the
accused changed; they became suspiciously quiet and nervous as if they
were concealing something from Pfc. Galang.The accused clearly appeared
to be in abject fear of being discovered. Such peculiar apprehensiveness if
not restrained reaction of the accused, which did not appear normal,
provided the probable cause justifying a more extensive search that led to
the opening of the bag and the discovery of the prohibited stuff.

[NOTE: Incidentally, one of the co-counsels for accused-appellant Bocalan in

his appeal to the Supreme Court was then-Atty. and now Supreme Court
Senior Associate Justice Presbitero Velasco Jr.]

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

Justice Cruz maintained the proposition in his dissent in Valmonte vs. De

Villathat checkpoints and the searches and seizures incident thereto are
unconstitutional. InPeople vs. Exala, he expounded on this thesis:

I am opposed to checkpoints as regular police measures aimed at reducing

criminality in general. I do not agree that in the interest of peace and order,
any or every vehicle may be stopped at any time by the authorities and
searched without warrant on the chance that it may be carrying prohibited
articles. That possibility is not the probable cause envisioned in the Bill of
Rights.

In the case of the ordinary checkpoint, there is not even any suspicion to
justify the search. The search is made as a matter of course, either of all
vehicles or at random. There is no showing that a crime is about to be

committed, is actually being committed, or has just been committed and the
searching officer has personal knowledge that the person being searched or
arrested is the culprit.

I will concede that checkpoints may be established at borders of states or at

constructive borders near the boundary for the purpose of preventing
violations of immigration and customs laws. But in the interior of the territory,
the requirements of a valid search and seizure must be strictly observed.
The only permissible exemption is where a crime like a bank robbery has just
been committed or a jailbreak has just occurred, and the authorities have to
seal off all possible avenues of escape in the area. In all other cases, I
submit that the checkpoint should not be allowed.

xxx. [W]e cannot retroactively validate an illegal search on the justification

that, after all, the articles seized are illegal. That is putting the cart before the
horse. I would rather see some criminals go unpunished now and then than
agree to the Bill of Rights being systematically ignored in the oppressive
checkpoint. Respect for the Constitution is more important than securing a
conviction based on a violation of the rights of the accused
G.R.
No.
169141
[Formerly G.R. Nos. 159854-56]

December

6,

2006

PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
ROMEO DEL MUNDO y STA. MARIA, appellant.

PHILIPPINES, appellee,

DECISION

TINGA, J.:
Romeo del Mundo y Sta. Maria (appellant) was charged before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 135, for violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 in two (2) Informations that read:
CRIMINAL CASE No. 02-3038
That on or about the 18 th of October 2002, in the City of Makati, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without the corresponding license or prescription, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, give away, distribute and

transport Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a regulated drug,

weighing ZERO POINT ZERO THREE GRAM (0.03 gram) contained in one
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
CRIMINAL CASE No. 02-3039
That on or about the 18th day of October 2002, in the City of Makati,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use
any dangerous drug and without corresponding license or prescription, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
direct custody and control zero point zero three (0.03) gram of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), which is a dangerous drug in
violation of the above cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges. 3 Trial ensued.
After trial, his co-accused Susan Pugal was acquitted from a separate
charge for violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. No. 9165. However, in a
Decision4 dated 8 September 2003, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The RTC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, it appearing that the guilt of the accused ROMEO DEL
MUNDO y STA. MARIA was proven beyond reasonable doubt for violation of
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. [No.] 9165, as principal, with no
mitigating or aggravating circumstances, accused is hereby sentenced:
1. In Criminal Case No. 02-3038, to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P500,000.00;
2. In Criminal Case No. 02-3039, to suffer imprisonment for a period of
twelve [12] years and one [1] day, as minimum, to twenty [20] years and a
fine of P300,000.00; and
3. To pay the costs.
It appearing that the guilt of accused SUSAN PUGAL y PINGOL in Criminal
Case No. 02-3040 was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, she is hereby
acquitted of the crime of violation of Section 11 of RA [No.] 9165.
Let the zero point zero nine [0.09] gram of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride be turned over to the PDEA for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.5

Culled from the records and decisions of the courts below, the antecedents
follow.
The office of Cluster 2 of the Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC)
received a report from a confidential informant that a certain Romy, later
identified as appellant, was engaged in the selling of prohibited drugs,
particularly shabu. Proceeding from this information, the head of MADAC
Cluster 2 formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation and designated
MADAC agent Norman A. Bilason (Bilason) as the poseur-buyer, to be
provided with two (2) marked P100 bills.67
On 18 October 2002, at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the informant
accompanied Bilason to the place where appellant was reported to be plying
his trade. Meantime, the rest of the MADAC and Drug Enforcement Unit
(DEU) operatives positioned themselves at a strategic place to monitor the
transaction.8
Bilason and the informant approached appellant who was then standing at
the corner of Pasong Tirad and Ponte Streets in Tejeros, Makati and talking
to his female companion, later identified as Pugal and allegedly a 'scorer'
according to the informant. The informant introduced Bilason to appellant as
a buyer of shabu. Appellant asked Bilason how much he intended to buy.
Bilason replied, "Dos lang, panggamit lang." Then, appellant received
theP200.00 marked money from Bilason while handing the latter one (1)
plastic sachet9 of shabu which came from the left pocket of his pants. Next,
Bilason gave the pre-arranged signal. The rest of the team closed in. Bilason
introduced himself as a member of MADAC and, with the team, placed
appellant and Pugal under arrest. Two (2) plastic sachets 10 and the marked
money were recovered from appellant while one (1) plastic sachet 11 was
confiscated from Pugal. Appellant and Pugal were duly apprised of the
nature of their arrest and their constitutional rights. 12
Afterwards, appellant and Pugal were brought to the DEU office for proper
disposition. Tests conducted on the plastic sachet yielded positive results for
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride.13
The parties stipulated that the physical science report 14 was duly
accomplished after the specimens of shabu had been subjected to
laboratory tests. Hence, the prosecution dispensed with the presentation of
the Forensic Chemist. The parties likewise stipulated that: (1) MADAC agent
Diomedes Camporaso confiscated from Pugal one [1] plastic sachet
suspected to contain shabu; and (2) SPO2 Wilmer Antonio was the team
leader of the buy-bust operation wherein he assisted in the arrest of
appellant.15
Appellant, a 63-year old jobless resident of Tejeros, Makati, interposed the
defense of denial. He claimed that there was never a time in his life that he
sold shabu. He alleged that in the afternoon of 18 October 2002, he was

inside his house lying down with his grandchild. He was awakened from
sleep when police officers kicked the door open and entered the house. The
police officers forced him to reveal the whereabouts of the shabu and the
money. Appellant replied that he does not sell shabu. Then, the police
officers searched the house but were not able to find anything.
Subsequently, appellant was asked to go out of the house and board the
police officers' service vehicle for allegedly selling shabu. Appellant entrusted
his grandchild to his wife's sibling.16
At the DEU office, appellant was told to escape but he did not as he claimed
not to have done anything wrong. Ten (10) minutes after, Pugal arrived.
Appellant came to know of the charges against him on the day he was
arrested. Allegedly, these are false charges but appellant failed to file any
complaint against the arresting officer for lack of money.17
Appellant was found guilty as charged and the judgment of conviction was
elevated to the Court for automatic review. In a Resolution 18 dated 6
September 2004 of the Court in G.R. Nos. 159854-56, 19 the cases were
transferred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to the Court's ruling in People v.
Mateo.20
Before the Court of Appeals, appellant argued that the trial court erred in: (1)
according greater weight to the evidence adduced by the prosecution and
disregarding the defense of denial interposed by appellant; and (2) finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged. 21
The Court of Appeals in a Decision 22 dated 27 June 2005, in CA-G.R. CR
No. 00232, affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial court. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Appellant Romeo del Mundo y Sta. Maria is hereby ACQUITTED in Crim.
Case No. 02-3039. His conviction in Crim. Case No. 02-3038 for violation of
Section 5, Article II of RA No. 9165 and all other aspects of the Decision are
maintained.
SO ORDERED.23
The Court of Appeals held that in Criminal Case No. 02-3038, the details of
the sale of shabu between appellant and the MADAC operatives have been
clearly and sufficiently shown. 24 However, the appellate court entertained
doubts with respect to appellant's culpability in Criminal Case No. 02-3039
resulting to his acquittal therein. The appellate court observed that the
prosecution did not produce evidence to show that appellant was actually in
possession of the second sachet supposedly containing 'shabu.' 25
Appellant is now before the Court submitting for resolution the same matters
argued before the Court of Appeals, though this time he questions only his

conviction in Criminal Case No. 02-3038, for the illegal sale of shabu, as he
was acquitted of the charge in Criminal Case No. 02-3039 by the appellate
court. Through his Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplemental Brief) 26 dated 14
November 2005, appellant stated that will not file a Supplemental Brief and
in lieu thereof, he will adopt the Appellant's Brief he had filed before the
appellate court. The Office of the Solicitor General likewise manifested that it
is no longer filing a supplemental brief.27
Appellant principally contends that the non-presentation before the trial court
of the informant and witnesses other than MADAC agents Bilason and
Camporaso militates against the trustworthiness of the prosecution's
theory.28
The Court is not persuaded.
The pertinent provision of Article II of R.A. 9165 29 reads as follows:
SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution
and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals.- The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million
Pesos (P10,000,000.000) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away
to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug,
including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and
purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
The elements necessary in every prosecution for the illegal sale of 'shabu'
are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor.30What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale transpired,
coupled with the presentation in court of thecorpus delicti. Corpus delicti is
the body or substance of the crime, and establishes the fact that a crime has
been actually committed. It has two elements, namely: (1) proof of the
occurrence of a certain event; and (2) some person's criminal responsibility
for the act.31
MADAC agent Bilason, the poseur-buyer, clearly established that an illegal
sale of shabu actually took place and that appellant was the author thereof.
He testified as follows:
Fiscal Moreno to witness:
Q: How did you come to know the accused in this case?
A: On October 18, 2002, we arrested both accused Romeo del Mundo and
Susan Pugal.
Q: For what particular offense?

A: For violation of Sections 5 and 11.

Q: Did you conduct a buy-bust operation against said accused?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Was the buy bust operation successful?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In connection with the buy-bust operation that you conducted against the
accused, do you recall having executed a Joint Affidavit of Arrest?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: If that affidavit will be shown to you, will you be able to identify the same?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: I am showing to you a Pinagsanib Na Sinumpaang Salaysay. Please go
over this and tell the Court if this is the same affidavit that you executed?
A: Yes, sir.
Fiscal Moreno:
This was previously marked as Exhibits A and A-1.
xxxx
Fiscal Moreno:
For purposes of expediency and to save the material time of the Honorable
Court, we propose for stipulation with the defense that this Pinagsanib na
Sinumpaang Salaylay (sic) will form part as the direct testimony of the
witness.
Atty. Quiambao:
We agree, your Honor.
x x x x32
In the Pinagsanib na Sinumpaang Salaysay,33 Bilason together with SPO2
Wilmer Antonio and MADAC Agent Camporaso narrated in detail the sale of
shabu made by appellant to Bilason. Based on a tip from a confidential
informant, a team composed of MADAC and DEU agents was formed to
conduct a buy-bust operation. The team proceeded to the place wherein,
according to the confidential informant, appellant allegedly conducted his
transactions. After introductions were made, Bilason handed the marked

money to appellant while the latter in turn handed him one (1) plastic sachet
containing shabu. Appellant was thereafter immediately arrested.34
The result of the laboratory examination conducted on the white crystalline
substance confiscated from appellant and forwarded to the crime laboratory
of the Philippine National Police confirms the testimony that indeed, what
was sold by appellant was shabu. The results of the examination states:
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimens gave
POSITIVE result to the tests for the presence of Methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drugs. x x x x
CONCLUSION:
Specimens A to C contains Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drugs. x x x x35
Moreover, Bilason was able to present and identify in court the confiscated
drugs and the marked money, which are corroborating pieces of evidence of
the corpus delicti, thus:
Fiscal Moreno:
Q: You likewise stated in your Affidavit that you were able to buy shabu from
the accused and confiscated another plastic sachets (sic) containing shabu.
If those items will be shown to you, will you be able to identify the same?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: I am showing to you a white envelope, do you know the contents of this
envelope?
A: Yes, sir. Three plastic sachets.
Q: Will you go over these plastic sachets and tell us which of these plastic
sachets you were able to buy from accused Del Mundo?
A: This one with marking "RDMS."
Fiscal Moreno:
We request that this white envelope be marked as Exhibit "E" and this plastic
sachet with marking "RDMS" be marked as E[x]hibit "E-1." 36
xxxx
Fiscal Moreno:

Q: You said in your Pinagsanib na Sinumpaang Salaysay that in conducting

the buy bust operation against the accused, you used buy bust money
consisting of two pieces of One Hundred Peso bills. If that two pieces of One
Hundred Peso bills will be shown to you, will you be able to identify the
same?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: I am showing to you two pieces of One Hundred Peso bills, will you
please tell us if these are the same buy bust money which you used in
conducting the buy bust operation against the accused?
A: This is the photocopy of the buy bust money we used in the operation.
x x x x37
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are
resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the
execution of their criminal plan.38 The delivery of the contraband to the
poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully
consummates the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping officers and
the accused.39 Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the
members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were
not properly performing their duty, their testimony on the operation deserves
full faith and credit.40
It is very clear from the testimony of Bilason and the other members of the
team bear that their narration of events was positive, probable and in accord
with human experience. It bears the badges of truth, such that it is difficult for
a rational mind not to find it credible. Thus, we find no reason to deviate from
the findings of the trial court and the appellate court.
In addition, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties
has not been controverted; hence, the Court is bound to uphold it. Appellant
failed to prove that in testifying against him, Bilason and the other members
of the team were motivated by reasons other than the duty to curb the sale
of dangerous drugs. There is no proof of any ill motive or odious intent on the
part of the police authorities to impute falsely such a serious crime to
appellant.41
On the non-presentation of the informant, the rule is that his presentation in
an illegal drugs case is not essential for the conviction nor is it indispensable
for a successful prosecution because his testimony would merely be
corroborative and cumulative. Informants are generally not presented in
court because of the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable
service to the police. Here, the agents directly testified regarding the
entrapment, and the testimony of the informant would merely have been
corroborative.

Appellant's defenses of denial and alibi are unavailing. It bears emphasis

that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto in a legitimate entrapment
operation conducted by the MADAC and DEU agents. Hence, his identity as
the person who sold the dangerous drug to Bilason cannot be doubted
anymore. Such positive identification prevails over his weak defenses of
denial and alibi.
In People v. Isnani,42 we ruled that:
The defenses of denial and alibi have been invariably viewed by us with
disfavor for it can easily be concocted but difficult to prove, and they are
common and standard defense ploys in most prosecutions arising from
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.43
Appellant's contention that the police authorities intruded his house and that
he only failed to file charges against them due to lack of money could neither
be believed. Appellant did not bother to present any evidence to support this
contention. It likewise bears stressing that the police authorities are
presumed to have performed their duty in a regular manner.44
In fine, the trial court and the appellate court correctly held that appellant is
guilty of the crime of illegal sale ofshabu.'
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 27 June 2005 of the Eighth Division of
the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR No. 00232 finding appellant Romeo del
Mundo y Sta. Maria guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in
Criminal Case No. 02-3038 for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No.
9165 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 132042. February 19, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARNOLD BACLA-AN
LAPITAJE, MARIO REYES, WENDEL ARELLANO y TANIO and ROMY
BALUYOS y Pingki-an,accused-appellants.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us for automatic review is a decision dated September 22, 1997,
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Danao City (Branch 25), the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Arnold B. Lapitaje, Mario Reyes,
Wendel Arellano, and Romy Baluyos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide as charged and defined

by the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences each to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
Accused are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally the sum
of P1,210.00, the remaining unrecovered stolen money, unto private
complainant Domingo Colonia.
No other damages are proved in court.
SO ORDERED.[1] (Emphasis supplied)
On January 13, 1994, an Information was filed before the trial court against
Arnold Bacla-an Lapitaje, Mario Reyes, Wendell Arellano y Tanio and Romy
Baluyos y Pingki-an for Robbery with Frustrated Homicide [2] to which they all
pleaded not guilty. Despite timely medical attention, victim Nelson Saavedra
died by reason of which the Information was amended to Robbery with
Homicide. The Amended Information reads as follows:
That on or about October 31, 1993 at around 7:30 oclock in the evening, at
Barangay Catmondaan, Municipality of Catmon, Province of Cebu,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating together with others whose real
names and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and
by means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit: by entering the store of
Domingo Colonia, and once inside held up the owner at gun point and
thereafter take, steal and carry away cash money worth P2,000.00
belonging to the said Domingo Colonia against his will, to the damage and
prejudice of said owner in the sum of P1,210.00 (as the amount of P790.00
was recovered) and shot one NELSON SAAVEDRA in their escape, thereby
inflicting wounds and despite timely medical intervention the said wounds
caused his death at the Chong Hua Hospital in Cebu City on February 8,
1994 where he was medically treated for several months.
Contrary to law.[3]
All accused pleaded not guilty to the Amended Information. Trial ensued.
The prosecution presented oral, documentary and real evidence.
Offended party Domingo Colonia testified as follows: On October 31, 1993,
at about 7:30 oclock in the evening, three unmasked armed men barged
inside his store. Two of the men pointed firearms at him, one at his forehead,
the other at his nape. They introduced themselves as members of the New
Peoples Army (NPA) asking for aid. He recognized accused Arnold Bacla-an
Lapitaje who used to deliver edible oil to his store and was a customer in his
tailoring shop. He saw Arnold go to the kitchen and point a firearm at his
wife. The man who pointed a firearm at his nape opened the drawer of the
table, took the coins amounting to P1,000.00, and took the contents of his

wallet which amounted to around P1,000.00. When his wife shouted for help,
neighbors came rushing to their aid, prompting the men to leave hastily. After
the three men left, they heard gunfires. He learned that the fleeing robbers
shot one of his neighbors, Nelson Saavedra, who was rushed by other
bystanders to the nearest hospital. The following morning, a dead person
was discovered at Sitio Bakhaw in Barangay Catmondaan, Municipality of
Catmon, Cebu. Found in the dead mans belongings were assorted coins and
bills amounting to P790.00 wrapped in a small towel, a .38 caliber firearm
with two live ammunitions and an empty shell. He recognized the deceased
as the person who poked a firearm at his forehead the night before. When
asked to identify the persons apprehended and detained in jail in Catmon, he
recognized accused Arnold Lapitaje.[4]
Rizalina Ares testified as follows: At around 7:30 oclock in the evening of
October 31, 1993, she met three persons coming from the store of Domingo
Colonia. One was wearing a colored short sleeve polo, another was wearing
a long sleeve fatigue shirt and the last one wore a green shirt. Shortly
thereafter, she heard gunfires. She found a neighbor, Nelson Saavedra, who
was wounded. She and a brother of the victim rushed the victim to the
hospital. The next morning, she learned from Domingo that he was
robbed. Later, Rizalina went to the municipal hall. She was able to identify
accused Mario Reyes and Arnold Lapitaje, as the two men she met the night
before through the t-shirts worn by them. Rizalina said that the person who
was found dead the morning after the robbery was the one wearing a green
shirt whom she also met that night while she was walking towards Domingos
store.[5]
Fred Ares testified: On the night in question, he heard a womans voice
coming from the highway. When he proceeded towards the highway, he met
some of his neighbors who told him about the fleeing robbers. As he directed
his gaze towards the direction pointed by his neighbors, he saw a parked taxi
marked Aaron. A speeding Hi-Ace van then arrived. Military men donning
firearms alighted from the van and approached the taxi. The military men
held the driver of the taxi, a man seated in the first seat and another man
about to enter the taxi. The three men who were held by the military were
recognized by Fred in the courtroom as the accused Romy Baluyos, Wendel
Arellano and Arnold Lapitaje.[6]
Cesar Roldan testified as follows: On the night of October 31, 1993, he was
in the house of his uncle located 50 meters away from the place of Domingo
when he heard explosions. He ran towards the road where he saw three
persons with pistols, two of whom he identified in the courtroom as accused
Mario Reyes and Arnold Lapitaje. The third man happened to be the person
found dead the morning after the robbery. He recognized the three men that
night because of the illumination coming from the fluorescent lamp along the
road. Mario Reyes wore a fatigue shirt, Arnold Lapitaje donned an ordinary
shirt the color of which Cesar could no longer recall and the third man was

wearing a green shirt. Cesar was more than an arms length from the three
men with pistols who proceeded towards the direction of Sitio Bakhaw in
Catmondaan coming from the house of Domingo Colonia. As Cesar made
his way towards the place of Domingo, he saw Nelson Saavedra lying
prostrate on the ground.[7]
SPO2 Calixto Nueza testified that: he proceeded to the national highway on
his motorcycle upon hearing cries for help from his neighbors, at a distance
of around 10 meters, he saw a Hi-Ace van with Air Force men as passengers
blocking a taxi marked Aaron; when he introduced himself as a person in
authority, Mauro Oarga who identified himself as a colonel, turned over to
him the persons of accused Romy Baluyos, Arnold Lapitaje and Wendel
Arellano; Oarga and his men likewise turned over to him a .22 caliber
revolver magnum, five live ammunitions, one empty shell and a hand
grenade which was allegedly recovered under the front seat of the taxi much
later; he recognized accused Arnold Lapitaje since the latter used to deliver
edible oil in their place; he also recognized Wendel Arellano who used
crutches, and, Romy Baluyos, as the driver of the taxi; with the help of some
barangay tanods, he brought the three men to the police station for proper
investigation; early in the morning of the following day, a dead person,
recognized by Domingo Colonia as one of the robbers, was found dead; said
person may have been killed by the civilian volunteers; in the meantime, the
articles recovered by Oarga and his men were submitted to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Central Visayas Regional Office at Cebu City
for ballistic examination.[8]
A chemical analysis of the paraffin casts taken from the hands of accused
Arnold Lapitaje and Mario Reyes yielded the following results:
1 result for the presence of gunpowder residue on both hand POSITIVE
result for the presence of gunpowder residues on both hand casts taken
from MARIO REYES.
2 NEGATIVE casts taken from ARNOLD LAPITAJE.[9]
Bonifacio Ayag, a ballistic expert of the NBI, testified that he had conducted a
ballistic examination on the specimens submitted to their office upon letter
request of the PNP, Catmon, Cebu and that his findings, contained in his
ballistic report, are as follows:
Comparative examinations made between the evidence empty shells
marked AS, AS-1, AS-2 and the test shells fired from PALTIK (COLT)
REVOLVER caliber .38 without serial number, marked EF (X on the trigger
guard) and paltik (S&W) revolver caliber .22 magnum, SN_11155 (X on the
trigger guard) revealed the following results:
a) Evidence empty shells marked AS-A1 and AS-2 and the test shells fired
from PALTIK (COLT) REVOLVER CALIBER .38 without serial number,

marked EF (X on the trigger guard) gave POSITIVE results; said evidence

shells were fired from this particular firearm.
b) Evidence empty shells marked AS and the test shells fired from PALTIK
(S&W) REVOLVER CALIBER .22 MAGNUM, SN 11155 (X on the trigger
guard) gave positive results; said evidence shell was fired from this
particular firearm.[10]
Dr. Wayben Briones testified: He treated Nelson Saavedra who was admitted
at the Chong Hua Hospital in Cebu City for multiple injuries on November 1,
1993. Nelson had a gunshot wound located at the right neck injuring the
thyroid gland. The wound penetrated the scapular area and also injured the
spinal cord which caused Nelson to be paralyzed from the neck to the lower
part of his body. Nelson became bedridden in the hospital and developed
bedsores but due to financial constraints, he went home on December 7,
1993. He returned to the hospital on January 27, 1994 but died on February
8, 1994 from multiple organ failures caused primarily by the gunshot wound
on the neck.[11]
Lt. Col. Mauro Oarga, an officer of the Philippine Air Force, testified: On
October 31, 1993, he and his companions had a beach activity at
Catmondaan, Catmon, Cebu. On their way to Catmon, they saw four
persons running towards a waiting taxi. Finding the actuations of the men to
be suspicious, he instructed his driver to overtake the taxi and asked his men
to disembark for the purpose of conducting a search on the taxi as well as on
the four persons who had already boarded the taxi. [12] Accused driver Romy
Baluyos and Wendel Arellano were among the persons on board the
taxicab. Their body search on the four persons as well as on the driver of the
taxi failed to yield anything but a search conducted on the taxi produced a .
22 caliber revolver with five ammunitions and one empty shell found under
the front seat of the taxi. A hand grenade was also discovered at the back
portion of the vehicle. Although it was already dark at the time, the group
was aided in their search by the headlights of the van which were switched
on. Upon arrival of PNP operatives, he turned over the five persons as well
as the articles recovered from the taxi.[13]
Sgt. Rogelio Castro testified that: while they were on their way home from
Catmondaan their commanding officer, Lt. Col. Oarga ordered the driver of
the vehicle to block a certain taxi; they disembarked from their vehicle upon
instructions of Lt. Col. Oarga who told them to conduct a search on the taxi;
they found the driver, who he could not recognize because it was dark, and,
a person with an amputated leg seated in front of the taxi; during his search,
Castro saw a .22 caliber firearm under the front seat of the taxi where the
man with amputated leg was seated; he gave the firearm to Lt. Col Oarga
who handed it over to SPO2 Nueza, a member of the PNP of Catmon, who
arrived at the scene.[14]

The accused refuted the evidence of the prosecution through the testimonies
of their witnesses Arnold Lapitaje testified: He was a hired helper tasked to collect payments
from customers of edible oil supplied by his employer. On October 31, 1993
at around 8:30 oclock in the evening, he was at Catmondaan supposedly to
collect payments from his regular customers, Domingo Colonia and a certain
Fredo. He was not able to meet either of the two because Domingos store
was already closed at the time and Fredo was not around. Arnold thought of
waiting for Fredo but since he was already hungry, he took his supper at the
market place near the seashore. Suddenly, an explosion was heard coming
from the highway causing the people to scamper away. Fearing for his
safety, he went to one of the houses near the marketplace and continued
eating his supper after which he proceeded to the highway to wait for a
passenger vehicle bound for Cebu City. It was while waiting for a passenger
vehicle that he learned from a group of women about some intruders who
barged inside the house of Domingo Colonia and introduced themselves as
members of the NPA. When he boarded an Isuzu elf vehicle, a member of
the CAFGU (Civilian Armed Forced Geographical Unit) saw him and ordered
him to alight from the vehicle. A policeman named Ceniza later arrived and
brought him to the municipal hall where he was mauled so as to force him to
reveal the identity of the persons involved in the robbery. He had nothing to
reveal since he did not know the robbers. As a result of the mauling, he
sustained injuries which caused him to have difficulties in standing up and
walking. Inside the jail, he met accused Romy Baluyos and Wendel
Arellano. Accused Mario Reyes was brought to the jail much later. The
policemen told him (Arnold) that Mario identified him as one of the robbers
but when confronted, Mario denied having implicated Arnold. The following
day, the policemen brought him to Km. 47 where he was again asked to
reveal the names of the persons who robbed the house of Domingo
Colonia. When he denied any participation in the robbery, he was mauled
and tied to an ipil-ipil tree by the policemen, some of whom he recognized as
Calixto Nuneza, Bravio and Ares. Although bribed with P5,000.00 to reveal
the names of the robbers, he insisted that he did not know the robbers. Much
later, he and Mario were brought to the police headquarters at Gorordo
Avenue, Cebu City for examination where the policemen poured warm water
into their hands.[15]
Arnold further testified that Domingo might have implicated him as one of the
robbers because of an incident wherein he accidentally spilled some of the
edible oil that he was delivering in Domingos store which caused some
sacks of rice to get wet; that Domingo asked him to replace the spilled edible
oil but he refused which angered Domingo. [16]
Accused Wendel Arellano testified: On October 31, 1993, at around 2:30
oclock in the afternoon, after he had just bought a towel from the White Gold
Store in Cebu City, he chanced upon his cousin Mario Albarena. After a brief

conversation, he acceded to his cousins invitation to go to Hagnaya so that

the latter can catch a boat heading for Bantayan, Cebu. His cousin hired a
taxi and upon reaching Hagnaya, the taxi driver was made to wait while they
had some snacks. Afterwards, his cousin boarded the boat bound for
Bantayan while he went back to the waiting taxi which was to take him back
to Cebu City. The taxi left Hagnaya at around 5:45 oclock in the
afternoon.When they reached Catmondaan at around 7:30 in the evening,
the taxi driver stopped the taxi near a lighted post to fill the overheated
engine with water. While the driver opened the hood of the car, three persons
suddenly boarded the taxi and told him (Wendel), Do not be afraid, Bay,
because we have here a wounded person and we wanted only this wounded
person to board this taxi. We are NPAs.[17] Upon returning to the taxi, the
driver was startled to find three other persons on board and he moved
backward. Nevertheless, the driver went back to his seat after the man told
him that they wanted to load a wounded person. Before the driver could
even start moving the taxi, a Hi-Ace van stopped in front of the taxi. Armed
persons alighted from the van. One of the supposed NPAs told the driver to
start the taxi but in his confusion, the driver maneuvered the taxi towards the
rear end of the van. The three men jumped off the taxi and ran away leaving
him and the taxi driver behind. The men from the van who identified
themselves as members of the Air Force, arrested him and the taxi driver
whose name he later came to know as Romy Baluyos. A search conducted
on the taxi failed to yield anything. Later, an armed person named Nueza
arrived to whom the Air Force men entrusted him and Romy. Nueza then
brought them to the police station and locked them inside the jail. Two other
persons arrived in jail whose names he later came to know as Arnold
Lapitaje and Mario Reyes. They were implicated in the robbery at
Catmondaan although they were not among the persons who jumped off the
taxi. At around 2:00 oclock in the morning of November 1, 1993, Arnold was
fetched by policemen. When Arnold returned, he saw some bruises on
Arnold. On the same day, Domingo Colonia happened to be in the municipal
hall. Domingo was surprised to see Arnold and asked the latter what he was
doing there. Arnold asked for help from Domingo saying that he was being
implicated in the robbery but a policeman pulled Domingo away.[18]
Wendel further testified that he could not have been seen running towards
the taxi because his leg had been amputated in an accident prior to the
incident in question; that the case which he had filed in relation to the
accident causing his leg to be amputated is still pending in Regional Trial
Court, Branch 8, Cebu.[19]
Accused Romy Pingkian Baluyos testified: He had been a taxi driver for
more than twenty years. On October 31, 1993, at around 2:30 oclock in the
afternoon, a man boarded the taxi together with another man whose leg was
amputated. They arrived at Hagnaya, Cebu at around 5:30 oclock in the
afternoon. His passengers made him wait while they had a merienda. After
thirty minutes, the man with the amputated leg returned and informed him

that they were to proceed back to Cebu City. Before reaching Bogo, Cebu,
the taxi had a flat tire. He had the tire vulcanized after which they proceeded
on their way. Sometime later, the engine of the taxi overheated, prompting
him to park the taxi at a well lit portion of the road. He refilled the radiator
with water which he got from the baggage compartment. When he returned
to the drivers seat, there were already three men inside. He was told not to
worry, that they were good persons and that they are NPAs with a wounded
companion. As Romy started the engine of the taxi, a Hi-Ace van, with
armed men on board, stopped in front of the taxi around 25 meters away,
prompting the three men who had just boarded the taxi to jump off. The
armed men who turned out to be members of the military, alighted from the
van, arrested him and his passenger with the amputated leg, identified later
as Wendel Arellano. The armed men searched the taxi but their search
proved to be fruitless. When a policeman arrived, they turned him and
Wendel over to the policeman. The policeman brought him and Wendel to
the Municipal Hall of Catmon, Cebu where they were detained. Another man
whose name they later came to know as Arnold Lapitaje was brought in
jail. Arnold said that he was a suspect in a robbery which occurred in
Catmondaan. Later, another person by the name of Mario Reyes was
brought inside the jail. Mario had bruises and contusions all over his
face. Arnold and Mario were not among the persons who jumped off from the
taxi he was driving on the night of his arrest. He came to know Domingo
Colonia only on November 1, 1993 when the latter, upon seeing them all in
jail said to Arnold, Nold, you are here?[20]
Accused Mario Reyes testified that: on October 29, 1993, he was at
Medellin, Cebu in the company of his employer, Bernardino Sabal, who is
engaged in the business of rattan poles; Sabal returned to Cebu City ahead
of him instructing him to collect payments from debtors in Mandaue City; on
October 31, 1993, he headed for Cebu City on board a passenger jeepney;
at around 8:00 oclock in the evening, the jeepney stopped at a check point in
Catmondaan and all the passengers were made to alight by the members of
the PNP and the CAFGU; they were bodily searched and asked to produce a
cedula; he was held by the PNP despite his protestations and was brought to
the police station in Catmon, Cebu after being harmed by angry
apprehenders; there were already four persons in jail whose names he later
came to know as Jose Jumao-as, Wendel Arellano, Romy Baluyos and
Arnold Lapitaje; while he was in jail, he met Domingo Colonia who was
surprised to see Arnold in detention; he had fired a gun a number of times,
the last of which was on October 15, 1993 when he fired a gun owned by the
military in the mountains of Sagaboy, Mati, Davao Oriental. [21]
Bernardino Sabal corroborated the testimony of accused Mario Reyes on
certain matters. He testified that: he hired Mario as a worker in his rattan
business in Davao Oriental; on October 15, 1993, he and Mario went to
Cebu City to sell rattan poles; after a week, they received an invitation from
Pablo Inot to go to Medellin, Bogo, Cebu where the latter was engaged in

selling rattan and fishing business; he and Mario arrived at Medellin at

around 2:00 oclock in the afternoon; he had to leave the following day for
Davao; since Mario was still enjoying himself, he allowed Mario to stay
behind but with the instruction that Mario should collect payments without
delay from debtors in Mandaue City; unfortunately, Mario was imprisoned
and never got to follow him to Davao; he learned from Mario when he visited
him in jail that when Mario was on his way to Cebu on board a passenger
jeepney, he was told to alight from the vehicle and produce an identification
card as well as a community tax receipt at a check point in Catmon, Cebu;
although Mario was able to show his community tax receipt, he was ordered
to stay and forced to accompany the apprehending officer.[22]
The trial court held:
By the evidence so presented by the prosecution, the Court finds that all
accused acted in concert in committing the act. The Court is convinced that
Arnold B. Lapitaje who is familiar with complainant Domingo Colonia at
Catmon Daan, Cebu, was the lead man. The Court portrays a situation that it
was the two accused Mario Reyes and Arnold Lapitaje who barged into the
house and pointed the gun to complainant and wife. That the two accused
Wendel Arellano and Romy Baluyos were watchmen outside and that after
the robbery and upon fear of reprisals from neighbors who responded to the
shout for help of the wife of complainant, the four accused went hurriedly to
the waiting taxi on the highway. Such fact of the four running towards the taxi
was duly testified by prosecution witness Col. Oarga who, seeing the four
rushing to the waiting taxi in suspicious manner, caused their Hi-Ace Van to
block the taxi. Thus, the arrest of the four accused and the search on the
taxi.
Both evidence considered, the Court finds overwhelmingly that the four
accused acted in concert to commit the act of robbery with homicide, and
should be responsible therefore (sic).
xxx xxx xxx.
The Court finds no merit the defense of alibi and general denials of
accused. The positive identification by prosecution witnesses upon the
persons of the accused as perpetrator of the crime negates all allegations
that accused were at some other place at the time of the commission of the
offense or that they did not commit the offense as charged. [23]
and found all accused guilty of Robbery with Homicide and imposing a
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. The imposition of said penalty is
erroneous and inappropriate.[24] But because of the possibility that death
could be the correct imposable penalty, the Court en banc entertained the
automatic review of the decision of the trial court. Hence, herein automatic
review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

In their Brief, appellants raise the following Assignment of Errors:

I. The trial court erred in finding that appellants Wendel Arellano and Romy
Baluyos were in cahoots with the other appellant Arnold Lapitaje and Mario
Reyes in the perpetration of the crime despite the existence of exculpatory
evidence warranting the acquittal of the first duo.
II. The trial court erred in relying on the vulnerability of the defense evidence
rather than on the strength of the prosecution evidence.
III. The trial court erred in not finding that the arrest of all appellants were
illegal and the subsequent alleged recovery of incriminatory evidence
presented against the latter was a product of a poisonous tree, hence
inadmissible in evidence.[25]
The Solicitor General filed the Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee with Manifestation
and Motion recommending that the judgment convicting Wendel Arellano and
Romy Baluyos be reversed and set aside, their guilt not having been proven
beyond reasonable doubt; and, that the judgment convicting Arnold Lapitaje
and Mario Reyes be affirmed with the modification that the penalty
of reclusion perpetua should be imposed upon them in the absence of any
aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime charged.
We uphold appellees recommendations insofar as appellants Wendel
Arellano and Romy Baluyos are concerned, the same being in accordance
with the evidence presented by the prosecution and the
defense. Both should be absolved from liability.
The well-settled rule is that the trial courts findings on the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are accorded great weight and respect, in
the absence of any clear showing that some facts or circumstances of weight
or substance which could have affected the result of the case have been
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied.[26]
After a painstaking review of the prosecution evidence, the Court found
certain facts and circumstances of such great weight that the trial court
overlooked and misappreciated or misapplied, as follows:
1. The trial court had erroneously given credence to the testimony of Lt. Col.
Oarga who testified that he had seen four men running towards a waiting
taxicab; and that the four who boarded the taxi were apprehended together
with the driver. On this basis, the trial court hastily concluded that Wendel
and Romy acted as lookouts while Arnold and Mario robbed Domingos
house and that after the robbery, the four ran towards the waiting taxi. The
other prosecution witnesses consistently and unequivocably belied the
testimony of Lt. Col. Oarga.
Prosecution witness Fred Ares categorically testified that Oargas men held
only three persons: the driver of the taxi, the man with crutches and another

who was still about to enter the taxi.[27] Fred Ares further clarified that Wendel
was just inside the taxi and was not one of the persons who were running
towards the taxi.[28] The testimony of Fred Ares is corroborated by Rizalina
Ares who testified that she met three persons coming from the store of
Domingo Colonia.[29] Another prosecution witness, SPO2 Nueza testified that
Oarga turned over to him only three persons, namely, the driver Romy
Baluyos, Wendel Arellano and Arnold Lapitaje.
2. The trial court miserably failed to consider that appellant Wendel had a
physical disability. Wendel could not have ran together with the other robbers
because he had an amputated leg and walked on crutches.
3. The firearm and live ammunitions allegedly found under the front seat of
the taxi cannot be used as evidence against Wendel and Romy for they were
taken as a result of an illegal search and seizure which will be discussed
forthwith.
Thus, Oargas testimony of the event leading to the arrest of appellants is not
accurate and could not be a valid basis for the conviction of appellants
Wendel and Romy.
Even if the defense of general denial posited by Wendel and Romy is
uncorroborated, the trial court committed an error in disregarding said
defense considering that the evidence of the prosecution failed to establish
the participation of both accused Wendel and Romy in the commission of the
crime charged. As the Court has enunciated in People vs. Ladrillo:
xxx. The rule that this Court should refrain from disturbing the conclusions of
the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, does not apply where, as in the
instant case, the trial court overlooked certain facts of substance or value
which if considered would affect the outcome of the case; or where the
disputed decision is based on misapprehension of facts.
Denial and alibi may be weak but courts should not at once look at them with
disfavor. There are situations where an accused may really have no other
defenses but denial and alibi which, if established to be the truth, may tilt the
scales of justice in his favor, especially when the prosecution evidence itself
is weak.[30]
and in People vs. Albao:
xxx denial and alibi, while inherently weak, assume relevance when the
evidence of the prosecution linking the accused to the crime is inconclusive.
[31]

With respect to appellant Arnold: By the testimonies of prosecution witnesses

Fred Ares and SPO2 Nueza, it is established that Arnold was arrested by Lt.
Col. Oarga. However, it must be stated that the warrantless arrest of
appellant Arnold together with Wendel and Romy was not lawful. Oarga

testified that he caused the arrest of four men running towards the taxi since
they were acting suspiciously. However, Oarga did not elaborate why he
thought said men were acting suspiciously.
Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful --- A peace office or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
A) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
B) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
C) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
None of the aforesaid circumstances were attendant in the case at bar. The
four men were not prisoners who had just escaped from a penal
establishment. Oarga did not testify that the four men he had seen running
towards the taxi have earlier committed or were actually committing or
attempting to commit an offense in his presence.
Nevertheless, considering that appellant Arnold, had entered his plea and
actively participated in the trial of the case, he submitted to the jurisdiction of
the trial court thereby curing any defect in his arrest. [32] Legality of an arrest
affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his person. [33]
In spite of said waiver, the firearm and live ammunition taken from the taxi
during the search, cannot be admitted in evidence against appellants
because they were seized during a warrantless search which was not lawful.
[34]

A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. The
following searches and seizures are deemed permissible by jurisprudence:
(1) search of moving vehicles (2) seizure in plain view (3) customs searches
(4) waiver or consent searches (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry Search)
and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid
warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless
arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a
valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless
arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot
pursuit, and, (3) arrests of escaped prisoners. [35]

Thus, the search cannot be justified on the ground that it involves search of a
moving vehicle. Warrantless search of a moving vehicle is allowed only when
it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle carrying the
prohibited drugs can be quickly moved out of the area or jurisdiction in which
the warrant must be sought. We have already clarified in a number of cases
that this exception in no way gives the police officers unlimited discretion to
conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable
cause. [36] When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search,
such warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before
search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a
crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
As we have earlier found, Oarga and his men did not have personal
knowledge of the crime that had just been committed and therefore had no
probable cause to believe that they will find the instruments or evidence
pertaining to the crime. Consequently, the firearms, empty shell and live
ammunitions as well as the hand grenade allegedly found during the search
cannot be admitted as evidence.
The above notwithstanding, the trial court did not err in finding both
appellants Arnold Lapitaje and Mario Reyes to be the perpetrators of the
crime of robbery. Despite the inadmissibility of the guns and ammunitions,
both appellants were positively identified by the prosecution witnesses. At
the time of the incident, Domingo instantly recognized Arnold who pointed a
firearm at his wife. He recognized Arnold although the robbery happened at
nighttime because the place was lit by a fluorescent bulb and all three men
who entered the store were not wearing masks. Aside from Domingo
Colonia, Cesar Roldan positively identified appellants Arnold and Mario as
two of the three men, armed with pistols, who he saw fleeing from the
store. Cesar had no motive to testify against appellants. He categorically
testified that he saw Mario with a pistol in one hand while running towards
the direction of Sitio Bakhaw, Domingo Colonias place. This is corroborated
by the result of the Chemistry Report conducted on appellant Mario which
showed the presence of gunpowder residue on both of his hands.
The fact that appellant Arnold did not have any gunpowder residue on both
of his hands does not demolish the fact that prosecution witness Domingo
Colonia had positively identified Arnold as one of those who robbed his store
and the one who pointed a gun at his wife. It simply means that Arnold had
not fired the gun he was holding.
However, although appellant Mario may have fired the gun he was holding at
the time of robbery, there is no direct or sufficient circumstantial evidence to
prove that he or anyone of the appellants had shot deceased Nelson
Saavedra or that the latter was shot on the occasion of the robbery. The trial
court itself was ambivalent on the matter, to wit:

While prosecution evidence pointed to deceased Nelson Saavedra as one

among the three who came from the house of complainant Domingo
Colonia, no convincing evidence is shown that the deceased is one among
the perpetrators of the robbery as charged.Possibility may rise that said
deceased Nelson Saavedra may have responded to the shout for help by the
wife of complainant or being one of the perpetrators of the crime. At any rate,
no such intervention, criminally or civilly, was ever interposed by relatives of
the deceased. But the evidence on record showed that deceased Nelson
Saavedra died during the occasion of robbery.[37]
While Saavedra was indeed shot on the date of the incident, the only
evidence connecting appellants Arnold and Mario to the gunshot wound
sustained by Saavedra were the facts that they were seen by prosecution
witnesses Rizalina Ares and Cesar Roldan running away from Domingos
store with guns; that gunshots were heard and right after that, Rizalina Ares
saw a wounded Saavedra. Rizalina did not actually see the shooting. Neither
did any of the other prosecution witnesses testify that they saw any of the
appellants shoot Saavedra, or that he was shot while the robbers were
fleeing from the store. Notwithstanding the presence of the neighbors who
rushed to their aid after hearing the cries for help of the wife of Domingo, the
prosecution failed to present any one who might have actually seen how the
shooting of Saavedra took place. There was no proof that the gunshot
wound which caused the subsequent death of Saavedra came from any of
the guns used by the robbers. The prosecution failed to connect the results
of the ballistic examination of the guns confiscated by Lt. Col. Oarga to the
gunshot wound sustained by the victim. Also, the guns were not admissible
in evidence. Thus, there is not enough circumstantial evidence to support the
finding that appellants Arnold and Mario should be held responsible for the
death of Saavedra. The prosecution evidence failed to prove circumstances
that constitute an unbroken chain that led to one fair and reasonable
conclusion that points to said appellants, to the exclusion of all others, as the
persons guilty of homicide perpetuated on the occasion of, before, during, or
after the commission of the crime of robbery.[38]
Consequently, appellants Arnold Lapitaje and Mario Reyes should have been
found guilty only of the simple crime of Robbery under paragraph 5, Article
294 of the Revised Penal Code which prescribes a penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period
ranging from four years, two months and 1 day up to ten years.
That the robbery was committed with the aid of armed men is established by
the positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses Domingo Colonia, Rizalina
Ares and Cesar Roldan that qppellants Arnold and Mario used firearms. It is
a generic circumstance under paragraph 8, Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code.

However, the Amended Information did not specifically allege said

aggravating circumstance. Although in the narration of how the crime was
committed, it is alleged that appellants held up the owner at gunpoint, the
same is not a substantial compliance of Sections 8 & 9, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit.
SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state
the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or
omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be
made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances
must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the
language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce
judgment.
In People vs. Costales, the Court held that aggravating or qualifying
circumstance must be expressly and specifically alleged in the complaint or
information; otherwise, it cannot be considered by the trial court, even if
proved during the trial.[39] The above-quoted Rules took effect on December
1, 2000, or after the subject crime of Robbery has been committed. In
consonance with Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, the said Rules are
given retroactive effect because they are beneficial to the appellants. Thus,
the Court will not take into consideration the aggravating circumstance that
the crime was committed with the aid of armed men.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, one degree lower is arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period or
four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. With
no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the imposable penalty may be
taken from the period of one (1) year, seven (7) months and eleven (11) days
to two (2) years, ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of prision
correccional, for the minimum period, and from six (6) years, one (1) month
and eleven (11) days to eight (8) years and twenty (20) days of prision
mayor, for the maximum period.
Furthermore, appellant Arnold Bacla-an Lapitaje and Mario Reyes should be
ordered to pay jointly and severally, to Domingo Colonia, the amount
of P1,210.00, representing the unrecovered stolen money.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Danao City
(Branch 25) is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS:

Accused-appellants Arnold Bacla-an Lapitaje and Mario Reyes are found

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the simple crime of Robbery and applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, without any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, they are sentenced to suffer the penalty of two (2) years and
ten (10) months of prision correccional, as the minimum to eight (8) years
and twenty (20) days of prision mayor, as the maximum. They are also held
jointly and severally liable to pay the sum of P1,210.00 to Domingo Colonia.
Accused-appellants Romy Baluyos and Wendel Arellano are ACQUITTED,
their guilt not having been proven beyond reasonable doubt. The Director of
the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this Decision forthwith
and to INFORM the Court within five (5) days from receipt hereof, the date
when appellants were actually released from confinement.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 136860

January 20, 2003

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AGPANGA LIBNAO y KITTEN and ROSITA NUNGA y VALENCIA, accused.
AGPANGA LIBNAO y KITTEN, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
Before us is an appeal from the Decision dated November 19, 1998 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Tarlac City, finding appellant Agpanga
Libnao and her co-accused Rosita Nunga guilty of violating Article II, Section
4 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972.1 For their conviction, each was sentenced to suffer an imprisonment
of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of two million pesos.
Appellant and her co-accused were charged under the following Information:
"That on or about October 20, 1996 at around 1:00 oclock dawn, in the
Municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and helping with one another, without being lawfully
authorized, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make
delivery/transport with intent to sell marijuana leaves wrapped in a
transparent plastic weighing approximately eight (8) kilos, which is in
violation of Section 4, Article II of RA 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
CONTRARY TO LAW."2

During their arraignment, both entered a plea of Not Guilty. Trial on the
merits ensued.
It appears from the evidence adduced by the prosecution that in August of
1996, intelligence operatives of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
stationed in Tarlac, Tarlac began conducting surveillance operation on
suspected drug dealers in the area. They learned from their asset that a
certain woman from Tajiri, Tarlac and a companion from Baguio City were
transporting illegal drugs once a month in big bulks.
On October 19, 1996, at about 10 oclock in the evening, Chief Inspector
Benjamin Arceo, Tarlac Police Chief, held a briefing in connection with a tip
which his office received that the two drug pushers, riding in a tricycle, would
be making a delivery that night. An hour later, the Police Alert Team installed
a checkpoint in Barangay Salapungan to apprehend the suspects. Witness
SPO1 Marlon Gamotea, PO3 Florante Ferrer and SPO3 Roberto Aquino
were assigned to man the checkpoint.
At about 1:00 oclock in the morning of the following day, SPO1 Gamotea
and PO3 Ferrer flagged down a passing tricycle. It had two female
passengers seated inside, who were later identified as the appellant
Agpanga Libnao and her co-accused Rosita Nunga. 3 In front of them was a
black bag. Suspicious of the black bag and the twos uneasy behavior when
asked about its ownership and content, the officers invited them to Kabayan
Center No.2 located at the same barangay. They brought with them the black
bag.
Upon reaching the center, PO3 Ferrer fetched Barangay Captain Roy
Pascual to witness the opening of the black bag. In the meantime, the two
women and the bag were turned over to the investigator on duty, SPO3
Arthur Antonio. As soon as the barangay captain arrived, the black bag was
opened in the presence of the appellant, her co-accused and personnel of
the center. Found inside it were eight bricks of leaves sealed in plastic bags
and covered with newspaper. The leaves were suspected to be marijuana.
To determine who owns the bag and its contents, SPO3 Antonio interrogated
the two. Rosita Nunga stated that it was owned by the appellant. The latter,
in turn, disputed this allegation. Thereafter, they were made to sign a
confiscation receipt without the assistance of any counsel, as they were not
informed of their right to have one. During the course of the investigation, not
even close relatives of theirs were present.
The seized articles were later brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory in San
Fernando, Pampanga on October 23, 1996. Forensic Chemist Daisy P. Babu
conducted a laboratory examination on them. She concluded that the articles
were marijuana leaves weighing eight kilos. 4

For their part, both accused denied the accusation against them. Rosita
Nunga testified that in the evening of October 19,1996, she went to buy
medicine for her ailing child at a pharmacy near the Tarlac Provincial
Hospital. The child was suffering from diarrhea, occasioned by abdominal
pain. To return to their house, she boarded a tricycle bound for Barangay
Tariji, where she resides. Along the way, the tricycle she was riding was
flagged down by a policeman at a checkpoint in Barangay Salapungan. She
was taken aback when the officer invited her to the Kabayan Center. It was
there that she was confronted with the black bag allegedly containing eight
bricks of marijuana leaves. She disputed owning the bag and knowing its
contents. She also denied sitting beside the appellant in the passengers
seat inside the tricycle, although she admitted noticing a male passenger
behind the driver.
Remarkably, appellant did not appear in court and was only represented by
her lawyer. The latter marked and submitted in evidence an affidavit
executed by one Efren Gannod, a security guard of Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines in Tarlac, Tarlac. The sworn statement declared that at about 0220H on
October 20, 1996, SPO2 Antonio arrived at their terminal and arrested a
certain woman who boarded their Bus No. 983. The incident was recorded in
the companys logbook. Gannod, however, was not presented in court to
attest that the woman referred in his affidavit was the appellant.
After trial, the court convicted appellant and her co-accused Rosita Nunga,
thus:
"WHEREFORE, finding both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of violation of Article II, Section 4 of RA 6425 in relation to RA 7659,
they are hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua
and to pay a fine of two million pesos.
SO ORDERED."5
Aggrieved by the verdict, appellant interposed the present appeal. In her
brief, she assigned the following errors:
"1. The Honorable Regional Trial Court failed to appreciate the contention of
the defense that the right of accused against illegal and unwarranted arrest
and search was violated by the police officers who arrested both accused.
2. The Honorable Court failed to appreciate the contention of the defense
that the right of the accused to custodial investigation was deliberately
violated by the peace officers who apprehended and investigated the
accused.
3. The Honorable Court miserably failed to evaluate the material
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecutions witnesses which

inconsistencies cast doubt and make incredible the contention and version of
the prosecution.
4. The Honorable Court gravely abused its discretion when it appreciated
and considered the documentary and object evidence of the prosecution not
formally offered amounting to ignorance of the law." 6
We are not persuaded by these contentions; hence, the appeal must be
dismissed.
In arguing that her arrest was unlawful, appellant capitalizes on the absence
of a warrant for her arrest. She contends that at the time she was
apprehended by the police officers, she was not committing any offense but
was merely riding a tricycle. In the same manner, she impugns the search
made on her belongings as illegal as it was done without a valid warrant or
under circumstances when warrantless search is permissible. Consequently,
any evidence obtained therein is inadmissible against her.
These arguments fail to impress. The general rule is that a search may be
conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a search warrant validly
issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution, thus:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant and warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized." 7
The constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches
and seizures as it operates only against "unreasonable" searches and
seizures. Searches and seizures are as a rule unreasonable unless
authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the
fundamental protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that
between persons and police must stand the protective authority of a
magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants
and warrants of arrest.8
Be that as it may, the requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained
prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure is not absolute. There are
certain familiar exceptions to the rule, one of which relates to search of
moving vehicles.9 Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are
allowed in recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said
circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. 10 Peace officers in such
cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the examination of the

vehicle is limited to visual inspection.11 When a vehicle is stopped and

subjected to an extensive search, such would be constitutionally permissible
only if the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief,
reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an
automobile or other vehicle contains as item, article or object which by law is
subject to seizure and destruction.12
In earlier decisions, we held that there was probable cause in the following
instances: (a) where the distinctive odor of marijuana emanated from the
plastic bag carried by the accused; 13 (b) where an informer positively
identified the accused who was observed to be acting suspiciously; 14 (c)
where the accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched
by policemen who had earlier received confidential reports that said accused
would transport a quantity of marijuana; 15 (d) where Narcom agents had
received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain
Province had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom
agents confronted the accused Caucasian because of a conspicuous bulge
in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other identification
papers when requested to do so;16 (f) where the moving vehicle was stopped
and searched on the basis of intelligence information and clandestine reports
by a deep penetration agent or spy -- one who participated in the drug
smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the accused belong -- that said
accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the country; 17 (g) where the
arresting officers had received a confidential information that the accused,
whose identity as a drug distributor was established in a previous test-buy
operation, would be boarding MV Dona Virginia and probably carrying shabu
with him;18 (h) where police officers received an information that the accused,
who was carrying a suspicious-looking gray luggage bag, would transport
marijuana in a bag to Manila;19 and (i) where the appearance of the accused
and the color of the bag he was carrying fitted the description given by a
civilian asset.20
The warrantless search in the case at bench is not bereft of a probable
cause. The Tarlac Police Intelligence Division had been conducting
surveillance operation for three months in the area. The surveillance yielded
the information that once a month, appellant and her co-accused Rosita
Nunga transport drugs in big bulks. At 10:00 pm of October 19, 1996, the
police received a tip that the two will be transporting drugs that night riding a
tricycle. Surely, the two were intercepted three hours later, riding a tricycle
and carrying a suspicious-looking black bag, which possibly contained the
drugs in bulk. When they were asked who owned it and what its content was,
both became uneasy. Under these circumstances, the warrantless search
and seizure of appellants bag was not illegal.
It is also clear that at the time she was apprehended, she was committing a
criminal offense. She was making a delivery or transporting prohibited drugs
in violation of Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425. Under the Rules of Court,

one of the instances a police officer is permitted to carry out a warrantless

arrest is when the person to be arrested is caught committing a crime in
flagrante delicto, thus:
"Section 5. Arrest without Warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private
person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
x x x."21 (emphasis supplied)
Appellant also takes issue of the fact that she was not assisted by a lawyer
when police officers interrogated her. She claimed that she was not duly
informed of her right to remain silent and to have competent counsel of her
choice. Hence, she argues that the confession or admission obtained therein
should be considered inadmissible in evidence against her.
These contentions deserve scant attention. Appellant did not make any
confession during her custodial investigation. In determining the guilt of the
appellant and her co-accused, the trial court based its decision on the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses and on the existence of the confiscated
marijuana. We quote the relevant portion of its decision:
"Earlier in the course of the proceedings, the court then presided by Judge
Angel Parazo, granted bail to accused Agpanga Libnao, ruling that the
confiscation receipt signed by both accused (Exhibit "C") is inadmissible
because they were not assisted by a counsel. Confronted with this same
issue, this court finds the postulate to rest on good authority and will
therefore reiterate its inadmissibility.
Since the prosecution had not presented any extrajudicial confession
extracted from both accused as evidence of their guilt, the court finds it
needless to discuss any answer given by both accused as a result of the
police interrogation while in their custody. By force of necessity, therefore,
the only issue to be resolved by the court is whether or not, based on the
prosecutions evidence, both accused can be convicted."22 (emphasis
supplied)

Appellant then faults the trial court for appreciating and taking into account
the object and documentary evidence of the prosecution despite the latters
failure to formally offer them. Absent any formal offer, she argues that they
again must be deemed inadmissible.
The contention is untenable. Evidence not formally offered can be
considered by the court as long as they have been properly identified by
testimony duly recorded and they have themselves been incorporated in the
records of the case.23 All the documentary and object evidence in this case
were properly identified, presented and marked as exhibits in court, including
the bricks of marijuana.24 Even without their formal offer, therefore, the
prosecution can still establish the case because witnesses properly identified
those exhibits, and their testimonies are recorded. 25 Furthermore, appellants
counsel had cross-examined the prosecution witnesses who testified on the
exhibits.26
Appellant also assails the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. She first cites the inconsistency between the testimony of SPO1
Marlon Gamotea, who said that it was SPO2 Antonio who opened the black
bag containing the marijuana; and that of SPO2 Antonio, who declared that
the bag was already open when he arrived at the Kabayan Center. She then
focuses on the police officers failure to remember the family name of the
driver of the tricycle where she allegedly rode, claiming that this is
improbable and contrary to human experience.
Again, appellants arguments lack merit. The alleged inconsistencies she
mentions refer only to minor details and not to material points regarding the
basic elements of the crime. They are inconsequential that they do not affect
the credibility of the witnesses nor detract from the established fact that
appellant and her co-accused were transporting marijuana. Testimonies of
witnesses need only corroborate each other on important and relevant
details concerning the principal occurrence. 27 The identity of the person who
opened the bag is clearly immaterial to the guilt of the appellant. Besides, it
is to be expected that the testimony of witnesses regarding the same
incident may be inconsistent in some aspects because different persons may
have different recollections of the same incident. 28
Likewise, we find nothing improbable in the failure of the police officers to
note and remember the name of the tricycle driver for the reason that it was
unnecessary for them to do so. It was not shown that the driver was in
complicity with the appellant and her co-accused in the commission of the
crime.
To be sure, credence was properly accorded to the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses, who are law enforcers. When police officers have no
motive to testify falsely against the accused, courts are inclined to uphold
this presumption.29 In this case, no evidence has been presented to suggest

any improper motive on the part of the police enforcers in arresting the
appellant.
Against the credible positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
appellants defense of denial and alibi cannot stand. The defense of denial
and alibi has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just
as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most
cases involving violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 30 It has to be
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. 31 The sole proof presented
in the lower court by the appellant to support her claim of denial and alibi
was a sworn statement, which was not even affirmed on the witness stand
by the affiant. Hence, we reject her defense.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DENIED. The decision of the trial
court finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
violation of Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425 in relation to R.A. No. 7659,
and sentencing her to an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay a
fine of two million pesos is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
.R. No. 148825. December 27, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. SUSAN CANTON, appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Appellant Susan Canton (hereafter SUSAN) was charged before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City with the violation of Section 16 of Article III
of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended,
under an Information[1] whose accusatory portion reads as follows:
That on February 12, 1998 at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously has in her possession
NINE HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT POINT TWO EIGHT HUNDRED ZERO
NINE (998.2809) GRAMS of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated
drug, without the corresponding prescription or license.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-0189 and raffled to Branch
110 of said court.
SUSAN entered a plea of not guilty upon her arraignment.

At the trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses Forensic Chemist Julieta

Flores, lady frisker Mylene Cabunoc, and SPO4 Victorio de los Reyes.
For its part, the defense presented SPO2 Jerome Cause as its witness and
had prosecution witness Mylene Cabunoc recalled to be presented as hostile
witness. It opted not to let SUSAN take the witness stand.
The evidence for the prosecution established that on 12 February 1998, at
about 1:30 p.m., SUSAN was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA), being a departing passenger bound for Saigon, Vietnam. [2] When she
passed through the metal detector booth, a beeping sound was
emitted. Consequently, Mylene Cabunoc, a civilian employee of the National
Action Committee on Hijacking and Terrorism (NACHT) and the frisker on
duty at that time, called her attention, saying Excuse me maam, can I search
you?[3] Upon frisking SUSAN, Mylene felt something bulging at her
abdominal area. Mylene inserted her hand under the skirt of SUSAN,
pinched the package several times and noticed that the package contained
what felt like rice granules.[4] When Mylene passed her hand, she felt similar
packages in front of SUSANs genital area and thighs. She asked SUSAN to
bring out the packages, but the latter refused and said: Money, money only.
Mylene forthwith reported the matter to SPO4 Victorio de los Reyes, her
supervisor on duty.[5]
SPO4 De los Reyes instructed Mylene to call Customs Examiner Lorna Jalac
and bring SUSAN to a comfort room for a thorough physical
examination. Upon further frisking in the ladies room, Mylene touched
something in front of SUSANs sex organ. She directed SUSAN to remove
her skirt, girdles and panty. SUSAN obliged. Mylene and Lorna discovered
three packages individually wrapped and sealed in gray colored packing
tape, which SUSAN voluntarily handed to them. [6] The first was taken from
SUSANs abdominal area; the second, from in front of her genital area; and
the third, from her right thigh. [7] Mylene turned over the packages to SPO4
De los Reyes.[8]The latter forthwith informed his superior officer Police
Superintendent Daniel Santos about the incident. Together with SUSAN,
they brought the gray plastic packs to the customs examination table,
opened the same and found that they contained white crystalline
substances[9] which, when submitted for laboratory examination, yielded
positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated
drug.[10]
For the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, an investigator of the First Regional
Aviation Office, testified that no investigation was ever conducted on
SUSAN.[11] However, SUSAN signed a receipt of the following articles seized
from her: (1) three bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu approximately 1,100 grams; (2) one American passport bearing
Number 700389994; (3) one Continental Micronesia plane ticket with stock
control number 0414381077; and (4) two panty girdles. [12] He said that he

informed SUSAN of her constitutional rights but admitted that she did not
have a counsel when she signed the receipt. [13] Yet he told her that she had
the option to sign or not to sign the receipt. [14]
When recalled as witness for the defense, Mylene merely reiterated the
circumstances surrounding the arrest and search of SUSAN and the seizure
of the prohibited items found on her person. [15]
After consideration of the evidence presented, the trial court rendered a
decision[16] finding SUSAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
violation of Section 16 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a
fine of P1 million.
SUSAN filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial, [17] alleging
therein that the trial judge erred in (1) giving weight to the medical certificate
executed by a certain Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena because it was not
presented in court nor marked or admitted, and is therefore hearsay
evidence; (2) upholding the presumption of regularity in the performance of
duty of police officers, since lady frisker Mylene Cabunoc is not even a police
officer; (3) making statements which gave the impression that the burden of
proof was shifted to the accused; and (4) deliberately ignoring the decisive
issue of how the evidence was secured. SUSAN also assailed the propriety
of the search and seizure without warrant on the ground that the seized
items were not in plain view. Furthermore, alleging bias and prejudice on the
part of the trial judge, SUSAN filed a motion to inhibit Judge Porfirio G.
Macaraeg from resolving the Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial. [18]
After conducting a hearing on 24 November 2000 to resolve appellants
Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial, as well as the Motion to Inhibit
the Judge, the trial court issued an order [19] on 26 November 2001 denying
the motions. According to the trial judge (1) he explained to SUSANs counsel
the effects of the filing of a motion for reconsideration, but the latter chose to
magnify the judges statement which was uttered in jest; (2) SUSANs
conviction was not based on the medical report which was not presented in
court; (3) there was no violation of SUSANs constitutional rights because she
was never interrogated during her detention without counsel; and (4) the
specimens seized from her were found after a routine frisk at the airport and
were therefore acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.
Unsatisfied with the decision of the trial court, SUSAN seasonably appealed
to us, imputing to the trial court the following errors: (1) in justifying the
warrantless search against her based on the alleged existence of probable
cause; (2) in holding that she was caught flagrante delicto and that the
warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest; (3) in not ruling that the
frisker went beyond the limits of the Terry search doctrine; (4) in not ruling
that SUSAN was under custodial investigation without counsel; (5) in
admitting to the records of the case the report of Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena,

which was not testified on or offered in evidence, and using the same in
determining her guilt; (6) in justifying under the rule on judicial notice its
cognizance of the medical report that has not been offered in evidence; and
(7) in applying the ruling in People v. Johnson.[20]
For assigned errors nos. 1 and 2, SUSAN asserts that the strip search
conducted on her in the ladies room was constitutionally infirmed because it
was not incidental to an arrest. The arrest could not be said to have been
made before the search because at the time of the strip search, the arresting
officers could not have known what was inside the plastic containers hidden
on her body, which were wrapped and sealed with gray tape. At that point
then, they could not have determined whether SUSAN was actually
committing a crime. The strip search was therefore nothing but a fishing
expedition. Verily, it is erroneous to say that she was caught flagrante
delicto and that the warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest.
For assigned error no. 3, SUSAN maintains that, following the doctrine
enunciated in Terry v. Ohio,[21] such stop and frisk search should have been
limited to the patting of her outer garments in order to determine whether she
was armed or dangerous and therefore a threat to the security of the aircraft.
For assigned error no. 4, SUSAN alleges that from the moment frisker
Mylene felt a package at her abdominal area, started inquiring about the
contents thereof, detained her, and decided to submit her to a strip search in
the ladies room, she was under custodial investigation without counsel,
which was violative of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution.
For assigned errors nos. 5 and 6, SUSAN assails the propriety of the
admission of the medical report executed by Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena on
the ground that it was neither testified on nor offered in evidence.
Lastly, SUSAN questions the application of People v. Johnson[22] because of
its sweeping statement allowing searches and seizures of departing
passengers in airports in view of the gravity of the safety interests
involved.She stresses that the pertinent case should have been Katz v.
United States,[23] which upholds the Fourth Amendment of the United States
of America that protects people and not places.
In its Appellants Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) declares that
SUSAN was found flagrante delicto in possession of a regulated drug without
being authorized by law. Thus, the case falls squarely within the exception,
being a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. Moreover, SUSAN
voluntarily submitted herself to the search and seizure when she allowed
herself to be frisked and brought to the comfort room for further inspection by
airport security personnel. It likewise maintains that the methamphetamine
hydrochloride seized from SUSAN during the routine frisk at the airport was
acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.

Anent the admission of the medical certificate issued by Dr. Ma. Bernadette
Arcena, the OSG argues that SUSANs conviction was not solely based on
the questioned document but also on the fact that she was caughtflagrante
delicto in possession of a regulated drug without being authorized by
law. Consequently, it supports SUSANs conviction but recommends the
reduction of the fine from P1 million to P100,000.
We affirm SUSANs conviction.
We do not agree that the warrantless search and subsequent seizure of the
regulated drugs, as well as the arrest of SUSAN, were violative of her
constitutional rights.
Sections 2 and 3(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search in any particular case
is a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances
involved. The rule is that the Constitution bars State intrusions to a person's
body, personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid
search warrant issued in compliance with the procedure outlined in the
Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court. [24]
The interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is not
absolute. The recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence are (1)
search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs searches;
(4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search);
and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. [25]
I. The search conducted on SUSAN was not incidental to a lawful arrest.
We do not agree with the trial court and the OSG that the search and seizure
conducted in this case were incidental to a lawful arrest. SUSANs arrest did
not precede the search. When the metal detector alarmed while SUSAN was
passing through it, the lady frisker on duty forthwith made a pat down search
on the former. In the process, the latter felt a bulge on SUSANs
abdomen. The strip search that followed was for the purpose of ascertaining

what were the packages concealed on SUSANs body. If ever at the time
SUSAN was deprived of her will and liberty, such restraint did not amount to
an arrest. Under Section 1 of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order
that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.
As pointed out by the appellant, prior to the strip search in the ladies room,
the airport security personnel had no knowledge yet of what were hidden on
SUSANs body; hence, they did not know yet whether a crime was being
committed. It was only after the strip search upon the discovery by the police
officers of the white crystalline substances inside the packages, which they
believed to be shabu, that SUSAN was arrested. The search cannot,
therefore, be said to have been done incidental to a lawful arrest. In a search
incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest
before a search can be made; the process cannot be reversed. [26]
II. The scope of a search pursuant to airport security procedure is not
confined only to search for weapons under the Terry search doctrine.
The Terry search or the stop and frisk situation refers to a case where a
police officer approaches a person who is acting suspiciously, for purposes
of investigating possibly criminal behavior in line with the general interest of
effective crime prevention and detection. To assure himself that the person
with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly
and fatally be used against him, he could validly conduct a carefully limited
search of the outer clothing of such person to discover weapons which might
be used to assault him.[27]
In the present case, the search was made pursuant to routine airport security
procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235
reading as follows:
SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier
concerned shall contain among others the following condition printed
thereon: Holder hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search
for , and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances. Holder refusing to be
searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft, which shall constitute a
part of the contract between the passenger and the air carrier.
This constitutes another exception to the proscription against warrantless
searches and seizures. As admitted by SUSAN and shown in Annex D of her
Brief, the afore-quoted provision is stated in the Notice to All Passengers
located at the final security checkpoint at the departure lounge. From the
said provision, it is clear that the search, unlike in the Terry search, is not
limited to weapons. Passengers are also subject to search for prohibited
materials or substances.

In this case, after the metal detector alarmed SUSAN consented to be

frisked, which resulted in the discovery of packages on her body. It was too
late in the day for her to refuse to be further searched because the discovery
of the packages whose contents felt like rice granules, coupled by her
apprehensiveness and her obviously false statement that the packages
contained only money, aroused the suspicion of the frisker that SUSAN was
hiding something illegal. It must be repeated that R.A. No. 6235 authorizes
search for prohibited materials or substances. To limit the action of the
airport security personnel to simply refusing her entry into the aircraft and
sending her home (as suggested by appellant), and thereby depriving them
of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including to further search without
warrant, in light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and
ineffectivity in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.[28] Thus, the strip
search in the ladies room was justified under the circumstances.
III. The ruling in People v. Johnson is applicable to the instant case.
The case of People v. Johnson, which involves similar facts and issues, finds
application to the present case. That case involves accused-appellant Leila
Johnson, who was also a departing passenger bound for the United States
via Continental Airlines CS-912. Olivia Ramirez was then the frisker on duty,
whose task was to frisk departing passengers, employees and crew to check
for weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband goods and
explosives. When Olivia frisked Leila, the former felt something hard on the
latters abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Leila explained that she needed to
wear two panty girdles, as she had just undergone an operation as a result
of an ectopic pregnancy. Not satisfied with the explanation, Olivia reported
the matter to her superior, who then directed her to take Leila to the nearest
womens room for inspection. In the comfort room, Leila was asked to bring
out the thing under her girdle. She acceded and brought out three plastic
packs which contained a total of 580.2 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. This Court ruled that the packs of methamphetamine
hydrochloride seized during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired
legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures and are therefore
admissible in evidence against Leila. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest,
although likewise without warrant, was justified, since it was effected upon
the discovery and recovery of shabu in her person flagrante delicto. The
Court held in this wise:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by
exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a
lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport
security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and
terrorism has come increased security at the nations airports. Passengers
attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their
carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-

ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious

objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects
are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their
minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the
reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers
are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices
in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited
materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These
announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional
protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to
routine airport procedures.
SUSANs reliance on Katz v. U.S.[29] is misplaced. The facts and
circumstances of that case are entirely different from the case at bar. In that
case, the accused was convicted in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of California of transmitting wagering information by
telephone. During the trial, the government was permitted, over the
accuseds objection, to introduce evidence of accuseds end of telephone
conversations, which was overheard by FBI agents who had attached an
electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public
telephone booth from which he placed his calls. The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction. On certiorari, however, the Supreme
Court of the United States of America reversed the decision, ruling that
antecedent judicial authorization, which was not given in the instant case,
was a constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance
involved. It ruled that what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in
his own house or office, is not a subject the Fourth Amendment protection,
but what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected.
The maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere invokes adherence to
precedents and mandates not to unsettle things which are
established. When the court has once laid down a principle of law as
applicable to a certain state of facts, it must adhere to that principle and
apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same.
[30]
There being a disparity in the factual milieu of Katz v. U.S. and the instant
case, we cannot apply to this case the ruling in Katz.
IV. The appellant, having been caught flagrante delicto, was lawfully arrested
without a warrant.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or
jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
The present case falls under paragraph (a) of the afore-quoted Section. The
search conducted on SUSAN resulted in the discovery and recovery of three
packages containing white crystalline substances, which upon examination
yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. As
discussed earlier, such warrantless search and seizure were legal. Armed
with the knowledge that SUSAN was committing a crime, the airport security
personnel and police authorities were duty-bound to arrest her. As held in
People v. Johnson, her subsequent arrest without a warrant was justified,
since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in her
person flagrante delicto.
V. The constitutional right to counsel afforded an accused under custodial
investigation was not violated.
Entrenched is the rule that the rights provided in Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution may be invoked only when a person is under custodial
investigation or is in custody interrogation. [31] Custodial investigation refers to
the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.[32] This presupposes that he is suspected of having
committed a crime and that the investigator is trying to elicit information or a
confession from him.[33] And the right to counsel attaches upon the start of
such
investigation.[34] The
objective
is
to
prohibit incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated
atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without full warnings of
constitutional rights.[35]
In this case, as testified to by the lone witness for the defense, SPO2 Jerome
Cause, no custodial investigation was conducted after SUSANs arrest. She
affixed her signature to the receipt of the articles seized from her, but before
she did so, she was told that she had the option to sign or not to sign it. In
any event, her signature to the packages was not relied upon by the
prosecution to prove its case. Moreover, no statement was taken from her
during her detention and used in evidence against her. [36] Hence, her claim of
violation of her right to counsel has no leg to stand on.

VI. The admission of the medical report was erroneous.

SUSAN assails, on the ground of violation of the hearsay rule, the admission
of the medical report on the physical and medical examination conducted
upon appellants request, which contained the following:
On subsequent examinations, she was seen behaved and cooperative. She
related that she was an illegitimate daughter, married, but divorced in
1995. She verbalized, I gamble like an addict. I gambled since I was young
and I lost control of myself when I played cards. When I lost control, I want
my money back. I owe other people lots of money. I lost all the cash of my
husband. This is the first time I carried shabu. I need the money. She denied
having any morbid thoughts and perceptual disturbances. (Emphasis
supplied).
This argument is meritorious. The admission of the questioned document
was erroneous because it was not properly identified. Nevertheless, even
without the medical report, appellants conviction will stand, as the courts
finding of guilt was not based on that document.
VII. SUSANs conviction and the penalty imposed on her are correct.
Having found the warrantless search and seizure conducted in this case to
be valid, we do not hesitate to rule that that the three packages
of shabu recovered from SUSAN are admissible in evidence against
her. Supported by this evidence and the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, her conviction must inevitably be sustained.
Sections 16 and 20 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
(Republic Act No. 6425), as amended, provides:
SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs.--The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to
ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or
use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription,
subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, confiscation and Forfeiture of the
Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime.--The penalties for offenses under
Section 3,4,7, 8, and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of
Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved [are] in
any of the following quantities:
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
There being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the proper penalty
is reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code.

As regards the fine, courts may fix any amount within the limits established
by law. For possession of regulated drugs, the law fixes the range of the fine
from P500,000 to P10 million. In view of the net weight of methamphetamine
hydrochloride found in the possession of SUSAN, the trial courts imposition
of fine in the amount of P1 million is well within the range prescribed by law.
VIII. The other items seized from the appellant should be returned to her.
Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes
the confiscation of the following:
SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for
the search and seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
Clearly, the seizure of SUSANs passport, plane tickets, and girdles
exceeded the limits of the afore-quoted provision. They, therefore, have to be
returned to her.[37]
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, Branch 110, in Criminal Case No. 98-0189 finding
appellant SUSAN CANTON guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violation
of Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Act of 1972 (Republic Act No.
6425), as amended, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000) and the costs
is herebyAFFIRMED. The appellants passport, plane tickets, and girdles are
hereby ordered to be returned to her.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
lih
GL.

vs

Castro
69401

This case was in explaining Sec 3 of Art 2 of the 1987 Constitution regarding
the
supremacy
of
the
civilians.
Facts;
Zona was conducted by the men of Maj. Gen Castro in a compoud where
petioners reside and conducted illegal search and thereafter seized guns
from them. The order was carried on by his Castro's men with the contention
that the petitioners are involved in the latest killing of the town's mayor Cesar
Climaco.

Issue;
Is

the

warrantless

search

and

seizure

legal?

Held;
The Supreme Court declared those seized in custodia legis and declared
that the operation conducted by Maj. Gen. Castro was ILLEGAL. The
respondents have all the time to obtain a search warrant granted that they
have about 10 trial courts. The SC also held the protection of the petitioner's
human rights as stated in Art IV Sec 3 and 4 of the 1973 Constitution
regarding illegal search and seizure. The presumption of innocence of the
petitioners should be observed and that they cannot be subjected to selfincriminating instances like paraffin tests, photographing and finger printing.
As penned by J. Cruz in this case, "The Constitution is a law for rulers and
people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its
protection all classes of men, at all times and under all circumstances. No
doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the
wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the
great exigencies of government."
G.R. No. L-69401 June 23, 1987
RIZAL ALIH, NASIM ALIH, AISAN ALIH, MIJAL ALIH, OMAR ALIH, EDRIS
MUKSAN, MULSIDI WARADIL, BILLY ASMAD RAMSID ASALI, BANDING
USMAN, ANGGANG HADANI, WARMIKHAN HAPA, GABRAL JIKIRI,
ALLAN TAN, MUJAHIRIN MARAJUKI, KENNEDY GONZALES, URDUJA
ALIH, MERLA ALIH, and NURAISA ALIH VDA DE FEROLINO, petitioners,
vs.
MAJOR GENERAL DELFIN C. CASTRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
COMMANDER SOUTHCOM AND REGIONAL UNIFIED COMMAND,
REGION IX, ZAMBOANGA CITY, COLONEL ERNESTO CALUPIG, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE SPECIAL FORCES
GROUP (AIRBORNE) AND INTERNAL DEFENSE COMMAND,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS IdC MAJOR ARNOLD BLANCO IN HIS
CAPACITY AS COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES
AND 1ST LIEUTENANT DARWIN GUERRA IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTS
SUPERVISOR, INTERNAL DEFENSE COMMAND, ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
On November 25, 1984, a contingent of more than two hundred Philippine
marines and elements of the home defense forces raided the compound
occupied by the petitioners at Gov. Alvarez street, Zamboanga City, in
search of loose firearms, ammunition and other explosives. 1

The military operation was commonly known and dreaded as a "zona," which
was not unlike the feared practice of the kempeitai during the Japanese
Occupation of rounding up the people in a locality, arresting the persons
fingered by a hooded informer, and executing them outright (although the
last part is not included in the modern refinement).
The initial reaction of the people inside the compound was to resist the
invasion with a burst of gunfire. No one was hurt as presumably the purpose
was merely to warn the intruders and deter them from entering.
Unfortunately, as might be expected in incidents like this, the situation
aggravated soon enough. The soldiers returned fire and a bloody shoot-out
ensued, resulting in a number of casualties. 2
The besieged compound surrendered the following morning, and sixteen
male occupants were arrested, later to be finger-printed, paraffin-tested and
photographed over their objection. The military also inventoried and
confiscated nine M16 rifles, one M14 rifle, nine rifle grenades, and several
rounds of ammunition found in the premises. 3
On December 21, 1984, the petitioners came to this Court in a petition for
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction and restraining order.
Their purpose was to recover the articles seized from them, to prevent these
from being used as evidence against them, and to challenge their fingerprinting, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of their right against
self-incrimination. 4
The Court, treating the petition as an injunction suit with a prayer for the
return of the articles alleged to have been illegally seized, referred it for
hearing to Judge Omar U. Amin of the regional trial court, Zamboanga
City. 5After receiving the testimonial and documentary evidence of the
parties, he submitted the report and recommendations on which this opinion
is based. 6
The petitioners demand the return of the arms and ammunition on the
ground that they were taken without a search warrant as required by the Bill
of Rights. This is confirmed by the said report and in fact admitted by the
respondents, "but with avoidance. 7
Article IV, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, which was in force at the time
of the incident in question, provided as follows:
Sec. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses

he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and

the persons or things to be seized.
It was also declared in Article IV, Section 4(2) thatSec. 4(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The respondents, while admitting the absence of the required such warrant,
sought to justify their act on the ground that they were acting under superior
orders. 8 There was also the suggestion that the measure was necessary
because of the aggravation of the peace and order problem generated by
the assassination of Mayor Cesar Climaco. 9
Superior orders" cannot, of course, countermand the Constitution. The fact
that the petitioners were suspected of the Climaco killing did not excuse the
constitutional short-cuts the respondents took. As eloquently affirmed by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Ex parte Milligan: 10
The Constitution is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace,
and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times and
under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious
consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its
provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of
government.
The precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga City at the time in
question certainly did not excuse the non-observance of the constitutional
guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures. There was no state
of hostilities in the area to justify, assuming it could, the repressions
committed therein against the petitioners.
It is so easy to say that the petitioners were outlaws and deserved the
arbitrary treatment they received to take them into custody; but that is a
criminal argument. It is also fallacious. Its obvious flaw lies in the conclusion
that the petitioners were unquestionably guilty on the strength alone of
unsubstantiated reports that they were stockpiling weapons.
The record does not disclose that the petitioners were wanted criminals or
fugitives from justice. At the time of the "zona," they were merely suspected
of the mayor's slaying and had not in fact even been investigated for it. As
mere suspects, they were presumed innocent and not guilty as summarily
pronounced by the military.
Indeed, even if were assumed for the sake of argument that they were guilty,
they would not have been any less entitled to the protection of the
Constitution, which covers both the innocent and the guilty. This is not to say,
of course, that the Constitution coddles criminals. What it does simply signify
is that, lacking the shield of innocence, the guilty need the armor of the

Constitution, to protect them, not from a deserved sentence, but from

arbitrary punishment. Every person is entitled to due process. It is no
exaggeration that the basest criminal, ranged against the rest of the people
who would condemn him outright, is still, under the Bill of Rights, a majority
of one.
If the respondents did not actually disdain the Constitution when they made
their illegal raid, they certainly gave every appearance of doing so. This is
truly regrettable for it was incumbent on them, especially during those tense
and tindery times, to encourage rather than undermine respect for the law,
which it was their duty to uphold.
In acting as they did, they also defied the precept that "civilian authority is at
all times supreme over the military" so clearly proclaimed in the 1973
Constitution. 11 In the instant case, the respondents simply by-passed the
civil courts, which had the authority to determine whether or not there was
probable cause to search the petitioner's premises. Instead, they proceeded
to make the raid without a search warrant on their own unauthorized
determination of the petitioner's guilt.
The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it was
in fact not urgent. They knew where the petitioners were. They had every
opportunity to get a search warrant before making the raid. If they were
worried that the weapons inside the compound would be spirited away, they
could have surrounded the premises in the meantime, as a preventive
measure. There was absolutely no reason at all why they should disregard
the orderly processes required by the Constitution and instead insist on
arbitrarily forcing their way into the petitioner's premises with all the menace
of a military invasion.
Conceding that the search was truly warrantless, might not the search and
seizure be nonetheless considered valid because it was incidental to a legal
arrest? Surely not. If all the law enforcement authorities have to do is force
their way into any house and then pick up anything they see there on the
ground that the occupants are resisting arrest, then we might as well delete
the Bill of Rights as a fussy redundancy.
When the respondents could have easily obtained a search warrant from any
of the TEN civil courts then open and functioning in Zamboanga City, 12 they
instead simply barged into the beleaguered premises on the verbal order of
their superior officers. One cannot just force his way into any man's house
on the illegal orders of a superior, however lofty his rank. Indeed, even the
humblest hovel is protected from official intrusion because of the ancient
rule, revered in all free regimes, that a man's house is his castle.
It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may enter; the rain may enter.
But the King of England may not enter. All the forces of the Crown dare not
cross the threshold of the ruined tenement. 13

If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in
connection with a crime about to be committed, being committed, or just
committed, what was that crime? There is no allegation in the record of such
a justification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that under the Revised
Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must
have personal knowledge of the ground therefor as stressed in the recent
case of People v. Burgos. 14
If follows that as the search of the petitioners' premises was violative of the
Constitution, all the firearms and ammunition taken from the raided
compound are inadmissible in evidence in any of the proceedings against
the petitioners. These articles are "fruits of the poisonous tree. 15 As Judge
Learned Hand observed, "Only in case the prosecution which itself controls
the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong
be repressed. 16 Pending determination of the legality of such articles,
however, they shall remain in custodia legis, subject to such appropriate
disposition as the corresponding courts may decide. 17
The objection to the photographing, fingerprinting and paraffin-testing of the
petitioners deserves slight comment. The prohibition against selfincrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it
in Holt v. United States, 18 "The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal
court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his
body as evidence when it may be material."
The fearful days of hamleting salvaging, "zona" and other dreaded
operations should remain in the past, banished with the secret marshals and
their covert license to kill without trial. We must be done with lawlessness in
the name of law enforcement. Those who are supposed to uphold the law
must not be the first to violate it. As Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee
stressed in his concurring opinion in Lacanilao v. De Leon, 19 "It is time that
the martial law regime's legacy of the law of force be discarded and that
there be a return to the force and rule of law."
All of us must exert efforts to make our country truly free and democratic,
where every individual is entitled to the full protection of the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights can stand as a stolid sentinel for all, the innocent as well as
the guilty, including the basest of criminals.
WHEREFORE, the search of the petitioners' premises on November 25,
1984, is hereby declared ILLEGAL and all the articles seized as a result
thereof are inadmissible in evidence against the petitioners in any
proceedings. However, the said articles shall remain in custodia
legis pending the outcome of the criminal cases that have been or may later
be filed against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

People Vs. Alicando Case Digest

People Vs. Alicando
251 SCRA 293
G.R. No. 117487
December 2, 1995

Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of rape with homicide of Khazie
Mae Penecilla, a minor, four years of age, choking her with his right hand.
The incident happened after appellant drank liquor. A neighbor, Leopoldo
Santiago found the victims body and the parents and police were informed.
Appellant was living in his uncle's house some five arm's length from
Penecilla's house. Appellant was arrested and interrogated by PO3 Danilo
Tan. He verbally confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On
the basis of his uncounselled verbal confession and follow up interrogations,
the police came to know and recovered from appellant's house, Khazie
Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and
a stained T-shirt all of which were presented as evidence for the prosecution.
He was arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the PAO.
Appellant pleaded guilty. The RTC convicted him. Hence an automatic
review for the imposition of death penalty.

Issue: Whether or Not the death penalty proper.

Held: No. The records do not reveal that the Information against the
appellant was read in the language or dialect known to him. The Information
against the appellant is written in the English language. It is unknown
whether the appellant knows the English language. Neither is it known what
dialect is understood by the appellant. Nor is there any showing that the
Information couched in English was translated to the appellant in his own
dialect before his plea of guilt. The RTC violated section 1(a) of Rule 116, the
rule implementing the constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. It also denied appellant
his constitutional right to due process of law. It is urged that we must
presume that the arraignment of the appellant was regularly conducted.
When life is at stake, we cannot lean on this rebuttable presumption. There
could be no presumption. The court must be sure.

The trial court violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of
guilt of the appellant. Said section requires that the court shall conduct a
searching inquiry the voluntariness and full comprehension of the

consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and
the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in
his behalf. The trial court simply inquired if appellant had physical marks of
maltreatment. It did not ask the appellant when he was arrested, who
arrested him, how and where he was interrogated, whether he was medically
examined before and after his interrogation, etc. It limited its efforts trying to
discover late body marks of maltreatment as if involuntariness is caused by
physical abuse alone.

Further, there are physical evidence to prove Khazie was raped. These
consists of a pillow with bloodstains in its center 14 and the T-shirt 15 of the
accused colored white with bloodstains on its bottom. These physical
evidence are evidence of the highest order. They strongly corroborate the
testimony of Luisa Rebada that the victim was raped.These are inadmissible
evidence for they were gathered by PO3 Danilo Tan of the Iloilo City PNP as
a result of custodial interrogation where appellant verbally confessed to the
crime without the benefit of counsel.
RULE ON SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN CIVIL ACTIONS FOR
INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
A.M. No. 02-1-06-SC (January 22, 2002)
RE: PROPOSED RULE ON SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN CIVIL ACTIONS
FOR INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
RESOLUTION
Acting on the letter of the Chairman of the Committee on Revision of the
Rules of Court submitting for this Courts consideration and approval the
Proposed Rule in Search and Seizure on Civil Actions for Infringement of
Intellectual Property Rights, the Court resolved to APPROVE the same.
The Rule shall take effect on February 15, 2002 following its publication in
two (2) newspapers of general circulation on or before January 30, 2002.
January 22, 2002.
(SGD.)
Chief Justice

HILARIO

(SGD.) JOSUE

N.

Associate Justice

G.

DAVIDE,

BELLOSILLO(SGD.) JOSE

A.

JR.
R.

MELO

Associate Justice

RULE ON SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN CIVIL ACTIONS FOR

INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
SECTION 1. Coverage. This Rule shall govern the provisional seizure and
impounding of documents and articles in pending and intended civil actions
for the purpose of preventing infringement and preserving relevant evidence
in regard to alleged infringement under Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise
known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, Article 50 of the
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,

otherwise known as TRIPS and other related laws and international

conventions.
SECTION 2. The writ of search and seizure. Where any delay is likely to
cause irreparable harm to the intellectual property right holder or where there
is demonstrable risk of evidence being destroyed, the intellectual property
right holder or his duly authorized representative in a pending civil action for
infringement or who intends to commence such an action may apply ex parte
for the issuance of a writ of search and seizure directing the alleged
infringing defendant or expected adverse party to admit into his premises the
persons named in the order and to allow the search, inspection, copying,
photographing, audio and audiovisual recording or seizure of any document
and article specified in the order.
SECTION 3. Where application filed. The application shall be filed with any
of the Regional Trial Courts of the judicial region designated to try violations
of intellectual property rights stationed at the place where the alleged
violation occurred or is to occur, or the place to be searched, at the election
of the applicant. Provided, however, that where the complaint for
infringement has already been filed, the application shall be made in the
court where the case is pending.
SECTION 4. Verified application and affidavits. The applicant shall file a
certified application alleging the ground upon which it is based and the
specific description and location of the documents and articles to be
searched, inspected, copied or seized and their value. It shall also state the
names of the applicant, his representative, witnesses and counsel who will
attend the search in the event that the application is granted. The application
shall be supported by affidavits of witnesses who personally know the facts
and by authenticated or certified documents.
The application shall contain a certification against forum shopping as
prescribed by Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The applicant shall undertake in his application that he will not use any of the
documents, articles or information obtained by reason of the search and
seizure for any purpose other than in the action in which the writ is issued.
SECTION 5. Examination of applicant; record; confidentiality of proceedings.
The application shall be acted upon within twenty-four (24) hours from its
filing. The judge must, before issuing the writ, examine in the form of
searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath or affirmation,
the applicant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known
to them. The examination of the applicant and his witnesses shall be
recorded. Their sworn statements and their affidavits shall form part of the
record of the case.
The hearing on the application for the writ shall be held in the chambers of
the judge. Court personnel shall maintain the confidentiality of the application
proceeding. The court may require the applicant to give other information
necessary for the identification of the articles and documents to be searched,
inspected, copied or seized and the premises to be searched. Where

feasible, it may direct the applicant to submit copies and photographs of the
documents or articles to be seized and impounded.
SECTION 6. Grounds for the issuance of the order. Before the Order can
be issued, the evidence proffered by the applicant and personally evaluated
by the judge must show that:
(a) the applicant is the right holder or his duly authorized representative;
(b) there is probable cause to believe that the applicants right is being
infringed or that such infringement is imminent and there is a prima facie
case for final relief against the alleged infringing defendant or expected
adverse party;
(c) damage, potential or actual, likely to be caused to the applicant is
irreparable;
(d) there is demonstrable risk of evidence that the alleged infringing
defendant or expected adverse party may destroy, hide or remove the
documents or articles before any application inter partes can be made; and
(e) the documents and articles to be seized constitute evidence of the
alleged infringing defendants or expected adverse partys infringing activity
or that they infringe upon the intellectual property right of the applicant or that
they are used or intended to be used as means of infringing the applicants
intellectual property right.
SECTION 7. When writ may issue. If the judge is satisfied with the proof of
facts upon which the application is based, he shall issue the writ requiring
the search, inspection or copying of the subject documents or articles or
commanding the sheriff to take them into his custody subject to the control of
the court. The enforcement of the writ shall be supervised by an Independent
commissioner to be appointed by the court.
SECTION 8. Contents of the writ. The writ shall contain the following:
(a) an order to the alleged infringing defendant, expected adverse party or to
the person who appears to be in charge or in control of the premises or
residing or working therein to permit the persons named in the writ to enter
into the premises for the purpose of searching, inspecting, copying, or
removing from the premises and transferring to the custody of the sheriff and
subject to the control of the court the subject documents and articles;
(b) an order to the alleged infringing defendant, expected adverse party or to
the person in charge or in control of the premises to disclose to the sheriff
serving the writ the location of the documents and articles subject of the writ;
(c) the period when the writ shall be enforced which in no case shall be more
than ten (10) days from the date of issuance by the court;
(d) the names of the applicant or his agent or representative and the
Commissioner who shall supervise the enforcement of the writ; and

(e) other terms and conditions that will insure the proper execution of the writ
with due regard to the rights of the alleged infringing defendant or expected
adverse party.
It shall also contain a warning that violation of any of the terms and
conditions of the writ shall constitute contempt of court.
SECTION 9. Bond and its conditions. The applicant shall be required to
post a cash bond, surety bond or other equivalent security executed in favor
of the defendant or expected adverse party in a reasonable amount to be
fixed by the court in its order granting the issuance of a writ of search and
seizure. The bond shall be conditioned on the undertaking of the applicant
that he will pay all the costs which may be adjudged to defendant or
expected adverse party and all damages which the latter may sustain by
reason of the issuance of the writ.
SECTION 10. When writ shall be served. The writ shall be served only on
weekdays and from 8 oclock in the morning to 5 oclock in the afternoon.
However, the court may direct that the writ be served on any day and any
time or compelling reasons stated in the application and duly proved.
SECTION 11. To whom writ shall be served. The writ shall be served on
the alleged infringing defendant or expected adverse party in the place to be
searched. If the alleged infringing defendant or expected adverse party
cannot be and in the premises, the writ shall be served on his agent or
representative. In the absence of an agent or representative, it shall be
served on the person in charge or in control of the premises, or residing or
working therein who is of sufficient age and discretion, if such person is
absent, the sheriff or proper officer shall post the papers on the premises
and proceed with the enforcement of the writ.
SECTION 12. Commissioner, duties, qualifications and fees. The
enforcement of the writ shall be supervised by the independent
Commissioner appointed by the court. In the performance of his duty, the
Commissioner shall:
(a) give impartial advice to the alleged infringing defendant, expected
adverse party or to the person in charge of the premises to be searched as
to the meaning and coverage of the writ;
(b) attempt to achieve agreement on a suitable search procedure;
(c) assess what documents or articles come within the terms of the writ;
(d) ensure the accuracy of the list of documents and articles searched,
inspected, copied or seized by the sheriff;
(e) prepare his own report on the search and seizure and verify and sign the
return prepared by the sheriff; and
(f) generally, assist in the proper execution of the writ.

The Commissioner shall be a member of the Philippine Bar and of proven

competence, integrity and probity. He shall receive such reasonable
compensation as may be determined by the court which can be charged as
cost of suit.
SECTION 13. Search to be conducted in the presence of defendant, his
representative, person in charge of the premises, or witnesses. The
premises may not be searched except in the presence of the alleged
infringing defendant, expected adverse party or his representative or the
person in charge or in control of the premises or residing or working therein
who shall be given the opportunity to read the writ before its enforcement
and seek its interpretation from the Commissioner. In the absence of the
latter, two persons of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same
locality shall be allowed to witness the search or in the absence of the latter,
two persons of sufficient age and discretion residing in the nearest locality.
SECTION 14. Manner of search and seizure; duties of the sheriff. Upon
service of the writ in accordance with section 11 hereof, the sheriff, under the
supervision of the Commissioner, shall search for the documents and articles
specified in the writ, and take them in his custody subject to the control of the
court. If the subject articles are not capable of manual delivery, the sheriff
shall attach to them a tag or label stating the fact of seizure and warning all
persons from tampering with them.
The sheriff shall, in the presence of the applicant or his representative, and
under the supervision of the Commissioner, prepare a detailed list of the
sized documents and articles. He shall give an accurate copy of the same to
the alleged infringing defendant, expected adverse party, his agent or
representative, to the person in charge or in control of the premises or
residing or working therein in whose presence the search and seizure were
made. In the absence of the person in charge or in control of the premises or
residing or working therein, the sheriff must, in the presence of at least two
witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality, leave
a copy of the receipt in the place in which he found the seized property.
Where no witnesses are available in the same locality, the copy of the receipt
shall be left by the sheriff in the presence of two witnesses residing in the
nearest locality. The applicant or his representative and the Commissioner
shall also be given a copy of the receipt.
After the sheriff has taken possession of the documents and articles, he shall
deliver them to a bonded warehouse or government warehouse for
safekeeping. The applicant or his representative shall be allowed access to
said materials for the purpose of examining them.
The applicant shall be responsible for the necessary expenses incurred in
the seizure and safekeeping of the documents and articles in a bonded
warehouse or government warehouse.

SECTION 15. Use of reasonable force to effect writ. The sheriff, if refused
admittance to the premises after giving notice of his purpose and authority or
in the absence of the alleged infringing defendant or expected adverse party,
his agent or representative, or person in charge or in control of the premises
or residing or working therein who is of sufficient age and discretion, may
use reasonable force to gain entry to the premises or any part of the building
or anything therein, to enforce the writ or to liberate himself or any person
lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.
SECTION 16. Seizure of computer disks or other storage devices. The
seizure of a computer disk or any storage device may be executed in any of
the following manner;
(a) by the physical taking thereof;
(b) by copying its contents in a suitable device or disk provided by the
applicant; or
(c) by printing out the contents of the disk or device with the use of a printer.
When the computer disks or storage devices cannot be readily removed from
the computer to which they are fitted, the sheriff may take the subject
computer from the custody of the alleged infringing defendant, expected
adverse party or person in charge or in control of the premises or residing or
working therein.
SECTION 17. Sheriffs return. The sheriff who executed the writ shall,
within three (3) days from its enforcement, make a verified return to the court
which issued the writ. The return shall contain a full statement of the
proceedings under the writ and a complete inventory of the documents and
articles searched, inspected or copied or seized and impounded, with copies
served on the applicant, the defendant or expected adverse party and the
Commissioner.
If not all of the documents and articles enumerated in the order and writ were
seized, the sheriff shall so report to the court and state the reasons therefor.
All objections of the defendant, expected adverse party or person in charge
of the premises on the manner and regularity of the service of the writ shall
be included by the sheriff in his return.
SECTION 18. Discharge of writ by the defendant or expected adverse party.
Without waiting for the return to be filed by the sheriff, the defendant,
expected adverse party or the party whose property has been searched,
inspected, copied or seized may file a motion with the court which issued the
writ for its discharge with prayer for the return of the documents and articles
seized.
The writ may be discharged on any of the following grounds:
(a) that the writ was improperly or irregularly issued, or excessively enforced;
(b) that the bond is insufficient;

(c) that the safeguards provided in the writ have been violated by the
applicant or the sheriff; or
(d) that the documents and articles seized are not infringing copies or means
for making the materials alleged to infringe the intellectual property right of
the applicant.
The writ may be discharged in a summary hearing by the court after notice to
the applicant, the sheriff and the Commissioner.
If the court finds that the bond is insufficient, it shall order a new bond to be
filed by the applicant within a reasonable time. The discharge of the writ
based on the insufficiency of the bond may only be made if the applicant fails
to post the new bond within the period fixed by the court.
SECTION 19. Proceedings on return. Five (5) days after issuance of the
writ, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the writ has not been served or the
return has been made by the sheriff. If the writ was not served or no return
was made, it shall summon the sheriff and the applicant to whom the writ
was issued and require them to explain why the writ was not served or why
no return has been filed as the case may be. If the return has been made,
the judge shall, after notice to the applicant, the alleged infringing defendant
or expected adverse party, the sheriff and the Commissioner, ascertain
whether the provisions of this Rule and applicable laws have been complied
with.
SECTION 20. Failure to file complaint. The writ shall also, upon motion of
the expected adverse party, be set aside and the seized documents and
articles returned to the expected adverse party if no case is filed with the
appropriate court or authority within thirty-one (31) calendar days from the
date of issuance of the writ.
SECTION 21. Claim for damages. Where the writ is discharged on any of
the grounds provided in this Rule, or where it is found after trial that there
has been no infringement or threat of infringement of an intellectual property
right, the court, upon motion of the alleged infringing defendant or expected
adverse party and after due hearing, shall order the applicant to compensate
the defendant or expected adverse party upon the cash bond, surety bond or
other equivalent security for any injury or damage the latter suffered by the
issuance and enforcement of the writ. Should the damages exceed the
amount of the bond, the applicant shall be liable for the payment of the
excess.
When a complaint is already filed in court, the motion shall be filed with the
same court during the trial or before appeal is perfected or before judgment
becomes executory, with due notice to the applicant, setting forth the facts
showing the defendants right to damages and the amount thereof. The
award of damages shall be included in the judgment in the main case.
Where no complaint is filed against the expected adverse party, the motion
shall be filed with the court which issued the writ. In such a case, the court

shall set the motion for summary hearing and immediately determine the
expected adverse partys right to damages.
A judgment in favor of the applicant in its principal claim should not
necessarily bar the alleged infringing defendant from recovering damages
where he suffered losses by reason of the wrongful issuance or enforcement
of the writ.
The damages provided for in this section shall be independent from the
damages claimed by the defendant in his counterclaim.
SECTION 22. Judgment. If it appears after trial that the seized documents
and articles are found to infringe the intellectual property right of the
applicant or that they constitute the means for the production of infringing
goods, the court shall order their destruction or donation to charitable,
educational or religious institutions with the prohibition against bringing the
same into the channels of commerce. In the latter case, infringing
trademarks or trade names found on labels, tags and other portions of the
infringing materials shall be removed or defaced before the donation. In no
case shall the infringing materials be returned to the defendant.
If the court finds no infringement, the seized materials shall be immediately
returned to the defendant.
SECTION 23. Direct filing, provisional docketing and deposit of prescribed
filing fee. The Regional Trial Courts specially designated to try violations
of !intellectual property rights shall keep a distinct and separate logbook for
writs of search and seizure. The application for a writ of search and seizure
filed directly with the said courts shall be given a provisional docket number.
The prescribed filing fee shall be deposited with the branch clerk of court and
properly receipted for and transmitted to the Clerk of Court within twenty-four
(24) hours from issuance of the order granting or denying the application for
said writ. If a formal complaint is filed thereafter, the Clerk of Court may
make a reassessment of the filing fee.
SECTION 24. Separate logbook. In every court, there shall be a logbook
under the custody of the Clerk of Court wherein shall be docketed and
entered within twenty-four (24) hours after the issuance or denial of the writ
of search and seizure, the filing of such application and other particulars
thereof. All the subsequent proceedings concerning the writ of search and
seizure shall be faithfully recorded in the separate logbook.
SECTION 25. Effect of violation. A violation of any of the terms and
conditions of the order and the writ of search and seizure or any provision of
this Rule shall constitute contempt of court.
SECTION 26. Writ not a bar to other measures. The availment of the writ
of search and seizure under this Rule shall not prevent the applicant from
resorting to other provisional measures or remedies provided in existing laws
and procedural rules.

SECTION 27. Effectivity. This Rule shall take effect on February 15, 2002
after its publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation not later than
January 30, 2002.