Emmanuel Pelaez vs.

The Auditor General

FACTS:From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines issued
executive orders to create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code. Public funds thereby stood to be disbursed in the implementation of said
executive orders.
Suing as a private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a petition for
prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Auditor General. It seeks to restrain from the
respondent or any person acting in his behalf, from passing in audit any expenditure of public
funds in implementation of the executive orders aforementioned.
ISSUE:Whether the executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that the President does
not have the authority to create municipalities as this power has been vested in the legislative
department.
RULING:
Section 10(1) of Article VII of the fundamental law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices, exercise
general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that
the laws be faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the
exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments,
bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power
is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. Such
control does not include the authority to either abolish an executive department or bureau, or to
create a new one. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply
with the constitutional mandate above quoted, it also gives the President more power than what
was vested in him by the Constitution.
The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent
permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation
of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities referred to.

Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro

Constitutional Law : Article VI, Sec. 1(Legislative Power; Non-Delegation)
G.R. No. L-14078; March 7, 1919; 39 Phil 660

FACTS:
The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the
Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty

by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the
reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held
under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the
reservation.
The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes in
question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the
provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance
with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary
of the Interior as required by said action.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites selected by provincial governor. With
the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which
non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the
interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial board.
Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code.
ISSUE:
Does section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 constitute an unlawful delegation of
legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to a provincial official and a department head,
therefore making it unconstitutional?
HELD:
No. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be
exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.
In determining whether the delegation of legislative power is valid or not, the distinction is
between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to
what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can be
made. Discretion may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official.
The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to
whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. The growing
tendency in the decision is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
In enacting the said provision of the Administrative Code, the Legislature merely conferred upon
the provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the Department Head,
discretionary authority as to the execution of the law. This is necessary since the provincial
governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province, are better
qualified to judge when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order. As
officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants,
they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the
people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state.

Hence, Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of
legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS VERA

G.R. No. L-45685 November 16 1937 En Banc [Non Delegation of Legislative Powers]
FACTS:
Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the trial court of Manila. He filed a motion for
reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the
Supreme Court of United States for review, which was also denied. The SC denied the petition
subsequently filed by Cu-Unjieng for a motion for new trial and thereafter remanded the case to
the court of origin for execution of the judgment. CFI of Manila referred the application for
probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same. Later, 7th
branch of CFI Manila set the petition for hearing. The Fiscal filed an opposition to the granting
of probation to Cu Unjieng, alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has
not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of
section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the
laws. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition, elaborating on the alleged
unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the
provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution).
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.
RULING:
Yes. SC conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful
delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional
and void.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: "This Act shall
apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the
salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals.
Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the
direction of the Probation Office."
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the
Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the
Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board
does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to
appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.
The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the whole context,
is to make the application of the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative action of the
different provincial boards through appropriation of the salaries for probation officers at rates not
lower than those provided for provincial fiscals. Without such action on the part of the various
boards, no probation officers would be appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in the

provinces. The Philippines is divided or subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument to
show that if not one of the provinces and this is the actual situation now appropriate the
necessary fund for the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be
illusory. There can be no probation without a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation
officer without the probation system.
TUPAS VS OPLE
137 SCRA 117 Political Law Delegation of Power Administrative Bodies Manner of
Election and Selection of Representatives
The Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) and the National Federation of
Labor Unions (NFLU) are unions representing the agricultural and industrial sectors. They alleged
they represent over a million workers all over the country. On the other hand, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 697 is the implementing law of the constitutional provision which states that 3 sectors are to
be represented (youth, agricultural labor, industrial labor).
Each sector must have four representatives, 2 from Luzon, one each from Visayas and Mindanao
respectively. These sectors can submit their nominees to the President for approval/appointment
through the Minister of Labor. TUPAS however questions the constitutionality of the said BP
because it allegedly lacks duly published rules on accreditation, nomination and appointment of
industrial labor representatives. Being so, TUPAS questioned the acts of BlasOple, then Minister
of Labor, in accrediting certain nominations provided by other industrial labor groups. TUPAS
claims that since there are no rules clearly stated in the BP on how the nominations must be
handled, the said law has provided undue delegation to the Minister of Labor and has left him with
absolute discretion in carrying out the duty of accrediting such nominations. TUPAS did
not submit their nomination within the given 20 day period of nominating their representation;
they instead proceeded to question the constitutionality of the said BP and the legality of the acts
of Ople. Because of their failure to submit their nominees, Ople did not accredit them.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power to the Minister of Labor by BP 697.
HELD: No. The lack of merit of the contention that there is an unlawful delegation of legislative
power is quite obvious. Appointment to office is intrinsically an executive act involving the
exercise of discretion. What is involved then is not a legislative power but the exercise of
competence intrinsically executive. What is more, the official who could make the
recommendation is the Minister of Labor, an alter ego of the President. The argument, therefore,
that there is an unlawful delegation of legislative power is bereft of any persuasive force.
To further test the validity of the said BP, and to avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must
be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of
principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be
hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries

and specifies the public agency to apply it. The standard does not even have to be spelled out. It
could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. Such standard is
set forth with clarity in Article III, Section 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 which provides in full
the limits and scope of the functions of the Minister of Labor in carrying out the said provisions.
TUPAS and NFLU were free to submit their nominations to the President by merely writing a
letter coursed through respondent, and their nominees should have been submitted to the President.
They did not do so. In fact, as of May 30, 1984, which was still within the 20-day period, they
wrote a letter to Ople which in effect stated that they were not submitting any nomination and
informing him that they were questioning the validity of Sections 4, 5, and 6 of BP 697. Hence, if
petitioners were not able to submit any nominee they had no one to blame but themselves. And the
law cannot be declared unconstitutional on such ground.

US VS. Ang Tang Ho

43 Phil. 1 Political Law Delegation of Power Administrative Bodies
In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868
entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act,
under extraordinary circumstances, authorizes the Governor General (GG) to issue the necessary
Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act,
in August 1919, the GG issued Executive Order No. 53 which was published on August 20, 1919.
The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice
dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was
way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On
August 8, 1919, he was charged for violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and
was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering
that there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.
HELD: First of, Ang Tang Hos conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior
to the publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one
cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the
law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt.
Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly
what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required
to take the place of all others without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect
to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without
which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and
provisions when it leaves the legislativebranch of the government and nothing must be left to the

judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and
substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if
necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Commission (G.R. No. 75697)

Facts: The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely affected
by Presidential Decree No. 1987, An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board with broad
powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry.

A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the National Internal
Revenue Code provided that:
SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready
for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured
or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax.
Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. Notwithstanding any provision
of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price
or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a
reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program.
Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other
fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That
in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the
Metropolitan Manila Commission.

The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated circulation of
videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or
variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of movie houses and theaters. Such
unregulated circulation have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent

(40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractors specific, amusement and other
taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government
revenues.

Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales
and disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby
depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year.

The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the
movie industry.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power.

(2) Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional.

Held: Taxation has been made the implement of the states police power. The levy of the 30% tax
is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video
industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual
property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an
objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.

We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential
Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is
to protect the moribund movie industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its
enactment, considering the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the
moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed
video tapes containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in

government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the
activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayors permit and
municipal license fees are required to engage in business.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ

180 SCRA 218; GR NO 84818 18 DEC 1989 CASE DIGEST
Facts: The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent
Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission
Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging
rates for certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose
AlcuazCommissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered
to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC
the power to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and hearing.
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the
then Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order
No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control and
regulation of respondent NTC

Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.

Held: In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission the Supreme Court said
that although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or
rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake
of a legislative character. Respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasijudicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to
no other
The respondent admits that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial
functions. It, however, insists that notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is
merely incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature but the supreme
court said that While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the
application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from
the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing
The Supreme Court Said that it is clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no
authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be

temporary or permanent. In the Case at bar the NTC didnt scheduled hearing nor it did give any
notice to the petitioner