Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 192828

November 28, 2011

RAMON S. CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC., Petitioners,

vs.
HON. JANSEN R. RODRIGUEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6,
JOSEPH CHENG, JAIME CHENG, MERCEDES IGNE AND LUCINA SANTOS, substituted by her son, EDUARDO S.
BALAJADIA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the December 14, 2009
Decision2 and July 8, 2010 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 99856. The dispositive portion of the
assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the petition filed in this
case and AFFIRMING the assailed Orders dated March 15, 2007 and May 16, 2007 issued by the respondent Judge of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, in Manila in Civil Case No. 02-105251. 4
The assailed Resolution denied the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
The Factual Antecedents
Sometime between November 25, 2002 and December 3, 2002, 5 the respondents filed a Complaint6 against the petitioners
and Stronghold Insurance Company, Global Business Bank, Inc. (formerly PhilBank), Elena Tiu Del Pilar, Asia Atlantic
Resources Ventures, Inc., Registers of Deeds of Manila and Malabon, and all persons claiming rights or titles from Ramon
Ching (Ramon) and his successors-in-interest.
The Complaint, captioned as one for "Disinheritance, Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of ExtraJudicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for [the] Issuance of [a] Temporary
Restraining Order and [a] Writ of Preliminary Injunction," was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-105251 and raffled to Branch 8
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC).
In the Complaint, the respondents alleged the following as causes of action:
First Cause of Action. They are the heirs of Lim San, also known as Antonio Ching / Tiong Cheng / Ching Cheng
Suy (Antonio). Respondents Joseph Cheng (Joseph) and Jaime Cheng (Jaime) are allegedly the children of
Antonio with his common-law wife, respondent Mercedes Igne (Mercedes). Respondent Lucina Santos (Lucina)
claimed that she was also a common-law wife of Antonio. The respondents averred that Ramon misrepresented
himself as Antonio's and Lucina's son when in truth and in fact, he was adopted and his birth certificate was merely
simulated. On July 18, 1996, Antonio died of a stab wound. Police investigators identified Ramon as the prime
suspect and he now stands as the lone accused in a criminal case for murder filed against him. Warrants of arrest
issued against him have remained unserved as he is at large. From the foregoing circumstances and upon the
authority of Article 9197 of the New Civil Code (NCC), the respondents concluded that Ramon can be legally
disinherited, hence, prohibited from receiving any share from the estate of Antonio.
Second Cause of Action. On August 26, 1996, prior to the conclusion of the police investigations tagging Ramon
as the prime suspect in the murder of Antonio, the former made an inventory of the latter's estate. Ramon
misrepresented that there were only six real estate properties left by Antonio. The respondents alleged that Ramon
had illegally transferred to his name the titles to the said properties. Further, there are two other parcels of land,
cash and jewelries, plus properties in Hongkong, which were in Ramon's possession.
Third Cause of Action. Mercedes, being of low educational attainment, was sweet-talked by Ramon into
surrendering to him a Global Business Bank, Inc. (Global Bank) Certificate of Time Deposit ofP4,000,000.00 in the
name of Antonio, and the certificates of title covering two condominium units in Binondo which were purchased by
Antonio using his own money but which were registered in Ramon's name. Ramon also fraudulently
misrepresented to Joseph, Jaime and Mercedes that they will promptly receive their complete shares, exclusive of

the stocks in Po Wing Properties, Inc. (Po Wing), from the estate of Antonio. Exerting undue influence, Ramon had
convinced them to execute an Agreement8 and a Waiver9 on August 20, 1996. The terms and conditions stipulated
in the Agreement and Waiver, specifically, on the payment by Ramon to Joseph, Jaime and Mercedes of the
amount of P22,000,000.00, were not complied with. Further, Lucina was not informed of the execution of the said
instruments and had not received any amount from Ramon. Hence, the instruments are null and void.
Fourth Cause of Action. Antonio's 40,000 shares in Po Wing, which constitute 60% of the latter's total capital
stock, were illegally transferred by Ramon to his own name through a forged document of sale executed after
Antonio died. Po Wing owns a ten-storey building in Binondo. Ramon's claim that he bought the stocks from
Antonio before the latter died is baseless. Further, Lucina's shares in Po Wing had also banished into thin air
through Ramon's machinations.
Fifth Cause of Action. On October 29, 1996, Ramon executed an Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement of
Estate10 adjudicating solely to himself Antonio's entire estate to the prejudice of the respondents. By virtue of the
said instrument, new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) covering eight real properties owned by Antonio were
issued in Ramon's name. Relative to the Po Wing shares, the Register of Deeds of Manila had required Ramon to
post a Surety Bond conditioned to answer for whatever claims which may eventually surface in connection with the
said stocks. Co-defendant Stronghold Insurance Company issued the bond in Ramon's behalf.
Sixth Cause of Action. Ramon sold Antonio's two parcels of land in Navotas to co-defendant Asia Atlantic
Business Ventures, Inc. Another parcel of land, which was part of Antonio's estate, was sold by Ramon to codefendant Elena Tiu Del Pilar at an unreasonably low price. By reason of Ramon's lack of authority to dispose of
any part of Antonio's estate, the conveyances are null and void ab initio.
Since Ramon is at large, his wife, Belen Dy Tan Ching, now manages Antonio's estate. She has no intent to convey to the
respondents their shares in the estate of Antonio.
The respondents thus prayed for the following in their Complaint:
1. x x x a temporary restraining order be issued restraining the defendant RAMON CHING and/or his attorney-in-fact Belen
Dy Tan Ching from disposing, selling or alienating any property that belongs to the estate of the deceased ANTONIO
CHING;
xxx
4. x x x
a.) Declaring that the defendant RAMON CHING who murdered his father ANTONIO CHING disqualified as heir
and from inheriting to (sic) the estate of his father;
b.) Declaring the nullity of the defendant RAMON CHING transfer (sic) of the six [6] parcels of land from the name
of his father ANTONIO CHING to his name covered by TCT No. x x x;
c.) Declaring the nullity of the AGREEMENT and WAIVER executed by plaintiffs x x x in favor of x x x RAMON
CHING for being patently immoral, invalid, illegal, simulated and (sic) sham;
d.) Declaring the nullity of the transfer of the shares of stocks at (sic) PO WING from the names of ANTONIO
CHING and LUCINA SANTOS to the defendant ANTONIO CHING's name for having been illegally procured
through the falsification of their signatures in the document purporting the transfer thereof;
e.) Declaring the nullity and to have no force and effect the AFFIDAVIT OF SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE executed
by x x x RAMON CHING for being contrary to law and existing jurisprudence;
f.) Declaring the nullity of the DEED OF SALES (sic) executed by x x x RAMON CHING (i) over two (2) parcels of
land x x x to defendant ASIA ATLANTIC BUSINESS VENTURES, Inc.; and (ii) one (1) parcel of land x x x sold to x
x x ELENA TIU DEL PILAR for having illegally procured the ownership and titles of the above properties;
x x x.11
The petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss12 alleging forum shopping, litis pendentia, res judicata and the
respondents as not being the real parties in interest.
On July 30, 2004, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order13 denying the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss.
The respondents filed an Amended Complaint14 dated April 7, 2005 impleading Metrobank as the successor-in-interest of codefendant Global Bank. The Amended Complaint also added a seventh cause of action relative to the existence of a

Certificate of Premium Plus Acquisition (CPPA) in the amount of P4,000,000.00 originally issued by PhilBank to Antonio. The
respondents prayed that they be declared as the rightful owners of the CPPA and that it be immediately released to them.
Alternatively, the respondents prayed for the issuance of a hold order relative to the CPPA to preserve it during the pendency
of the case.
On April 22, 2005, the petitioners filed their Consolidated Answer with Counterclaim. 15
On October 28, 2005, the RTC issued an Order16 admitting the respondents' Amended Complaint. The RTC stressed that
Metrobank had already filed Manifestations admitting that as successor-in-interest of Global Bank, it now possesses custody
of Antonio's deposits. Metrobank expressed willingness to abide by any court order as regards the disposition of Antonio's
deposits. The petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration filed to assail the aforecited Order was denied by the RTC on May 3,
2006.
On May 29, 2006, the petitioners filed their Consolidated Answer with Counterclaim to the respondents' Amended Complaint.
On August 11, 2006, the RTC issued a pre-trial order.17
On January 18, 2007, the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss 18 the respondents' Amended Complaint on the alleged ground
of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Complaint. The petitioners argued that since the
Amended Complaint sought the release of the CPPA to the respondents, the latter's declaration as heirs of Antonio, and the
propriety of Ramon's disinheritance, the suit partakes of the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action for
declaration of nullity. Hence, jurisdiction pertains to a probate or intestate court and not to the RTC acting as an ordinary
court.
On March 15, 2007, the RTC issued an Order19 denying the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss on grounds:
In the case at bar, an examination of the Complaint would disclose that the action delves mainly on the question of
ownership of the properties described in the Complaint which can be properly settled in an ordinary civil action. And as
pointed out by the defendants, the action seeks to declare the nullity of the Agreement, Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial
Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title, which were all allegedly executed by defendant Ramon
Ching to defraud the plaintiffs. The relief of establishing the status of the plaintiffs which could have translated this
action into a special proceeding was nowhere stated in the Amended Complaint. With regard [to] the prayer to
declare the plaintiffs as the rightful owner[s] of the CPPA and that the same be immediately released to them, in
itself poses an issue of ownership which must be proved by plaintiffs by substantial evidence. And as emphasized
by the plaintiffs, the Amended Complaint was intended to implead Metrobank as a co-defendant.
As regards the issue of disinheritance, the court notes that during the Pre-trial of this case, one of the issues raised by the
defendants Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties is: Whether or not there can be disinheritance in intestate succession?
Whether or not defendant Ramon Ching can be legally disinherited from the estate of his father? To the mind of the Court,
the issue of disinheritance, which is one of the causes of action in the Complaint, can be fully settled after a trial on the
merits. And at this stage, it has not been sufficiently established whether or not there is a will. 20 (Emphasis supplied.)
The above Order, and a subsequent Order dated May 16, 2007 denying the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, became
the subjects of a petition for certiorari filed with the CA. The petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 99856, raised the issue of
whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss despite the fact that
the Amended Complaint sought to establish the status or rights of the respondents which subjects are within the ambit of a
special proceeding.
On December 14, 2009, the CA rendered the now assailed Decision 21 denying the petition for certiorari on grounds:
Our in-depth assessment of the condensed allegations supporting the causes of action of the amended complaint induced
us to infer that nothing in the said complaint shows that the action of the private respondents should be threshed
out in a special proceeding, it appearing that their allegations were substantially for the enforcement of their rights
against the alleged fraudulent acts committed by the petitioner Ramon Ching. The private respondents also
instituted the said amended complaint in order to protect them from the consequence of the fraudulent acts of
Ramon Ching by seeking to disqualify Ramon Ching from inheriting from Antonio Ching as well as to enjoin him
from disposing or alienating the subject properties, including the P4 Million deposit with Metrobank. The intestate or
probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such issues, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction as a regional trial court. Furthermore, we agree with the trial court that the probate court could not take
cognizance of the prayer to disinherit Ramon Ching, given the undisputed fact that there was no will to be contested in a
probate court.
The petition at bench apparently cavils the subject amended complaint and complicates the issue of jurisdiction by
reiterating the grounds or defenses set up in the petitioners' earlier pleadings. Notwithstanding, the jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint without regard to whether or not the private
respondents (plaintiffs) are entitled to recover upon all or some of the causes of action asserted therein. In this regard, the
jurisdiction of the court does not depend upon the defenses pleaded in the answer or in the motion to dismiss, lest the

question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the petitioners (defendants). 22 Hence, we focus our resolution on
the issue of jurisdiction on the allegations in the amended complaint and not on the defenses pleaded in the motion to
dismiss or in the subsequent pleadings of the petitioners.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject the action of the
petitioners in a special proceeding since the nullification of the subject documents could be achieved in the civil
case, the lower court should proceed to evaluate the evidence of the parties and render a decision thereon upon the issues
that it defined during the pre-trial in Civil Case No. 02-105251.23 (emphasis supplied)
The petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA through a Resolution 24 issued on July 8, 2010.
The Issue
The instant Petition for Review on Certiorari25 is anchored on the issue of:
Whether or not the RTC should have granted the Motion to Dismiss filed by the PETITIONERS on the alleged ground of the
RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Amended Complaint, to wit, (a) filiations with Antonio of Ramon,
Jaime and Joseph; (b) rights of common-law wives, Lucina and Mercedes, to be considered as heirs of Antonio; (c)
determination of the extent of Antonio's estate; and (d) other matters which can only be resolved in a special proceeding and
not in an ordinary civil action.
The petitioners argue that only a probate court has the authority to determine (a) who are the heirs of a decedent; (b) the
validity of a waiver of hereditary rights; (c) the status of each heir; and (d) whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or
the exclusive property of the deceased spouse.26 Further, the extent of Antonio's estate, the status of the contending parties
and the respondents' alleged entitlement as heirs to receive the proceeds of Antonio's CPPA now in Metrobank's custody are
matters which are more appropriately the subjects of a special proceeding and not of an ordinary civil action.
The respondents opposed27 the instant petition claiming that the petitioners are engaged in forum shopping. Specifically,
G.R. Nos. 17550728 and 183840,29 both involving the contending parties in the instant petition were filed by the petitioners
and are currently pending before this Court. Further, in Mendoza v. Hon. Teh,30 the SC declared that whether a particular
matter should be resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction, is not a
jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. Besides, the petitioners, having validly submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the RTC and having actively participated in the trial of the case, are already estopped from challenging the
RTC's jurisdiction over the respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint. 31
The Court's Ruling
We resolve to deny the instant petition.
The petitioners failed to comply with a lawful order of this Court directing them to file their reply to the respondents'
Comment/Opposition to the instant Petition. While the prescribed period to comply expired on March 15, 2011, the
petitioners filed their Manifestation that they will no longer file a reply only on October 10, 2011 or after the lapse of almost
seven months.
Further, no reversible errors were committed by the RTC and the CA when they both ruled that the denial of the petitioners'
second motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 02-105251 was proper.
Even without delving into the procedural allegations of the respondents that the petitioners engaged in forum shopping and
are already estopped from questioning the RTC's jurisdiction after having validly submitted to it when the latter participated
in the proceedings, the denial of the instant Petition is still in order. Although the respondents' Complaint and Amended
Complaint sought, among others, the disinheritance of Ramon and the release in favor of the respondents of the CPPA now
under Metrobank's custody, Civil Case No. 02-105251 remains to be an ordinary civil action, and not a special proceeding
pertaining to a settlement court.
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of
the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special
proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. 32 A special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. 33 It is distinguished from an
ordinary civil action where a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong.34 To initiate a special proceeding, a petition and not a complaint should be filed.
Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be effected only through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be
specified. This Court agrees with the RTC and the CA that while the respondents in their Complaint and Amended Complaint
sought the disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any instrument supposedly effecting the disposition of Antonio's estate was
ever mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer for Ramon's disinheritance, Civil Case No. 02-105251 does not partake of the
nature of a special proceeding and does not call for the probate court's exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

The petitioners also argue that the prayers in the Amended Complaint, seeking the release in favor of the respondents of the
CPPA under Metrobank's custody and the nullification of the instruments subject of the complaint, necessarily require the
determination of the respondents' status as Antonio's heirs.
It bears stressing that what the respondents prayed for was that they be declared as the rightful owners of the CPPA which
was in Mercedes' possession prior to the execution of the Agreement and Waiver. The respondents also prayed for the
alternative relief of securing the issuance by the RTC of a hold order relative to the CPPA to preserve Antonio's deposits with
Metrobank during the pendency of the case. It can thus be said that the respondents' prayer relative to the CPPA was
premised on Mercedes' prior possession of and their alleged collective ownership of the same, and not on the declaration of
their status as Antonio's heirs. Further, it also has to be emphasized that the respondents were parties to the execution of
the Agreement35 and Waiver36 prayed to be nullified. Hence, even without the necessity of being declared as heirs of Antonio,
the respondents have the standing to seek for the nullification of the instruments in the light of their claims that there was no
consideration for their execution, and that Ramon exercised undue influence and committed fraud against them.
Consequently, the respondents then claimed that the Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Antonios estate executed by
Ramon, and the TCTs issued upon the authority of the said affidavit, are null and void as well. Ramon's averment that a
resolution of the issues raised shall first require a declaration of the respondents' status as heirs is a mere defense which is
not determinative of which court shall properly exercise jurisdiction.
In Marjorie Cadimas v. Marites Carrion and Gemma Hugo,37 the Court declared:
It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations
of the complaint irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein. As a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in
the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the
defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations
in the complaint. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the matters to be consulted.
1wphi1

In sum, this Court agrees with the CA that the nullification of the documents subject of Civil Case No. 02-105251 could be
achieved in an ordinary civil action, which in this specific case was instituted to protect the respondents from the supposedly
fraudulent acts of Ramon. In the event that the RTC will find grounds to grant the reliefs prayed for by the respondents, the
only consequence will be the reversion of the properties subject of the dispute to the estate of Antonio. Civil Case No. 02105251 was not instituted to conclusively resolve the issues relating to the administration, liquidation and distribution of
Antonio's estate, hence, not the proper subject of a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person
under Rules 73-91 of the Rules of Court.
The respondents' resort to an ordinary civil action before the RTC may not be strategically sound, because a settlement
proceeding should thereafter still follow, if their intent is to recover from Ramon the properties alleged to have been illegally
transferred in his name. Be that as it may, the RTC, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, cannot be restrained from
taking cognizance of respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint as the issues raised and the prayers indicated therein
are matters which need not be threshed out in a special proceeding.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The petitioners' (a) Opposition to the respondents' Motion to Admit
Substitution of Party;38 and (b) Manifestation39 through counsel that they will no longer file a reply to the respondents'
Comment/Opposition to the instant petition are NOTED.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18799

March 31, 1964

HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance, Negros Occidental,
ASUNCION MARAVILLA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HERMINIO MARAVILLA, respondent.
Jose Gutierrez David, A. Aveto, A. Mirasol and P. C. Ramos for petitioners.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for respondent.
BARRERA, J.:
Petitioners herein appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals (in CA-G.R. No. 27200-R) wherein, over
their objection, raising the question of jurisdiction petition, the appellate court took cognizance of the petition
for certiorari and prohibition filed by Herminio Maravilla and, in consequence thereof, set aside the appointment of petitioner
Eliezar Lopez as a special co-administrator of the estate of the deceased Digna Maravilla. The pertinent antecedent facts
are as follows:
On August 25, 1958, respondent Herminio Maravilla filed with he Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for
probate of the will (Spec. Proc. No. 4977) of his deceased wife Digna Maravilla who died on August 12 of that same year. In
the will the surviving spouse was named as the universal heir and executor.
On September 30, 1958, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla (brother and sisters of the deceased Digna Maravilla) filed
an opposition to the probate of the will, on the ground, inter alia, that the will was not signed on each page by the testatrix in
the presence of the attesting witnesses and of one another.
On March 16, 1959, on motion of respondent Herminio, which was opposed by Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, the
court issued an order appointing him special administrator of the estate of the deceased, for the reason that:
... all the properties subject of the will are conjugal properties of the petitioner and his late wife, Digna Maravilla,
and before any partition of the conjugal property is done, the Court cannot pinpoint which of the property subject of
the Will belongs to Digna Maravilla, exclusively, that shall be administered by the special administrator. Hence,
although it is true that the petitioner Herminio Maravilla has an adverse interest in the property subject of the Will,

the Court finds it impossible for the present time to appoint any person other than the petitioner as special
administrator of the property until after the partition is ordered, for the reason that the properties mentioned in the
Will are in the name of the petitioner who is the surviving spouse of the deceased.
On February 8, 1960, the court rendered a decision denying probate of the will, as it was not duly signed on each page by
the testatrix in the presence of the attesting witnesses and of one another.
On February 17, 1960, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed with the court a petition for appointment of Eliezar
Lopez (son of Asuncion Maravilla) as special co-administrator to protect their interests, on the ground that the will, having
been denied probate, they are the legal heirs of the decedent. Said petition was heard on February 20, at which hearing,
respondent's counsel orally moved for postponement, because respondent's principal counsel (Salonga) had not been
notified and was not present. The court ordered presentation of oral evidence, consisting of the testimonies of Eliezar Lopez,
and Regina and Francisco Maravilla.
On February 26, 1960, respondent filed with the court his notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal, from the
decision denying probate of the will. Some devisees under the will, likewise, appealed from said decision.
On February 25, 1960, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed with the court a petition for the removal of respondent
as special administrator, as he failed to file an inventory within 3 months from his appointment and qualification as special
administrator, as provided for in Section 1, Rule 84, of the Rules of Court. To this petition, respondent filed an opposition, on
the ground that said provision of the Rules of Court does not apply to a special administrator, and an inventory had already
been submitted by him, before said petition for his removal was filed.1wph1.t
On February 27, 1960, the devisees Conchita and Rose Marie Kohlhaas filed with the court a petition for appointment of
Conchita as special co-administratrix. Devisee Adelina Sajo, likewise, filed a similar petition February 29.
On March 5, 1960, the court held a joint hearing the (1) petition to appoint Eliezar Lopez as special administrator, (2)
approval of respondent's record appeal and appeal bond, (3) petition to remove respondent as special administrator, (4)
petition to appoint Conchita Kohlhaas as special co-administratrix, and (5) petition to appoint Adelina Sajo as special coadministrator. At said hearing, respondent objected to the appointment of Eliezar Lopez was special co-administratrix, on
grounds that (a) the law allows only one special co-administrator (b) the order of March 16, 1959 estops the court from
appointing Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator (c) such appointment is unfair to respondent, because owns at least 3/4
of the whole property, conjugal nature, which would be subjected to the administrate of a stranger, and (d) a deadlock
between two special administrators would ruin the management of the property, including those of respondent. On crossexamination of Eliezar Lopez, respondent's counsel elicited the facts that (1) Lopez was employed full time in the PCAPE,
with office in Manila. and could not discharge the functions of a co-administrator, and (2) there was merely intention on
Lopez part to resign from office.
After said joint hearing, the court appointed Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator in an order dictated open court, to
protect the interests of Pedro, Asuncion and Regina Maravilla.
From this order, respondent, on March 7, 1960, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition (with
prayer for preliminary injunction) to annul the order appointing Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator, and to prohibit the
probate court from further proceeding with the petition for the removal of respondent as special administrator. The Court of
Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction on March 9, 1960 which was amended on March 11, 1960 to make it more
specific.
On October 6, 1960, petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to certify the case to the
Supreme Court, on the grounds that the principal amount in controversy in this case exceeds P200,000.00, and the writs
(of certiorari and prohibition) prayed for are not in aid of appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, since the probate case
is not on appeal before it. To this petition, respondent filed an opposition. on the grounds that the amount in controversy is
less than P200,000.00 and the decision of the probate court (of February 8, 1960) is now on appeal before the Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R); hence, the writ prayed for is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, and the present case does
not involve title to or possession of real estate exceeding in value P200,000.00. 1
On May 16, 1961, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the writs (certiorari and prohibition) prayed for by
respondent, and declaring null and void the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator.
Petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision, but it was denied by the Court of
Appeals. Hence, this appeal.
Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to issue the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by
respondent, the same not being in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
We agree with petitioners. The Court of Appeals, in the decision appealed from, assumed jurisdiction over the present case
on the theory that "the amount in controversy relative to the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator to
protect the interests of respondents (herein petitioners) is only P90,000.00 more or less, i.e., one fourth of the conjugal

property" (of respondent and the deceased Digna Maravilla) which, is per inventory submitted by respondent as special
administrator is valued at P362,424.90. This theory is untenable. Note that the proceedings had on the appointment of
Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator are merely incidental to the probate or testate proceedings of the deceased Digna
Maravilla presently on appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) where petitioners' motion to elevate the
same to the Supreme Court, on the ground that the amount herein involved is within the latter's exclusive jurisdiction, is still
pending, resolution. That the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over said testate proceedings cannot be
doubted, considering that the properties therein involved are valued at P362,424,90, as per inventory of the special
administrator.
Under Section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of Court, the property to be administered and liquidated in testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse is, not only that part of the conjugal estate pertaining to the deceased spouse, but the
entire conjugal estate. This Court has already held that even if the deceased had left no debts, upon the dissolution of the
marriage by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated in
the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse (Vda. de Roxas v. Pecson, et al., L-2211, December 20, 1948;
82 Phil. 407; see also Vda. de Chantengco v. Chantengco, et al., L-10663, October 31, 1958). In a number of cases where
appeal was taken from an order of a probate court disallowing a will, this Court, in effect, recognized that the amount or
value involved or in controversy therein is that of the entire estate (Suntay v. Suntay, L-3087, July 31, 1954, 50 O.G. 5321;
Vano v. Vda. de Garces, et al., L-6303, June 30, 1954, 50 O.G. 3045). Not having appellate jurisdiction over the proceedings
in probate (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R), considering that the amount involved therein is more than P200,000.00, the Court of
Appeals cannot also have original jurisdiction to grant the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by respondent in the
instant case, which are merely incidental thereto.
In the United States, the rule is that "proceedings in probate are appealable where the amount or value involved is reducible
to a pecuniary standard, the amount involved being either the appellant's interest or the value of the entire estate according
as the issues on appeal involve only the appellant's rights or the entire administration of the estate. ... In a contest for
administration of an estate the amount or value of the assets of the estate is the amount in controversy for purposes of
appeal." (4 C.J.S. 204). In line with this ruling, it is to be observed that respondent's interest as appellant in the probate
proceedings (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) is, according to his theory, the whole estate amounting to P362,424.90, or, at least
more than 3/4 thereof, or approximately P270,000.00. Such interest, reduced to a pecuniary standard on the basis of the
inventory, is the amount or value of the matter in controversy, and such amount being more than P200,000.00, it follows that
the appeal taken in said proceedings falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and should, therefore, be
certified to it pursuant to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.
Note also that the present proceedings under review were for the annulment of the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special
co-administrator and to restrain the probate court from removing respondent as special administrator. It is therefore, a
contest for the administration of the estate and, consequently, the amount or value of the assets of the whole estate is the
value in controversy (4 C.J.S. 204). It appearing that the value of the estate in dispute is much more than P200,000.00, the
Court of Appeals clearly had no original jurisdiction to issue the writs in question.
The Court of Appeals, in the decision appealed from, arrived at the amount of "P90,000.00 more or less", as the amount
involved in the case, upon authority of the case of Vistan v. Archbishop (73 Phil. 20). But this case is inapplicable, as it does
not refer to the question of administration of the estate, nor to an order denying probate of a will, but only to the recovery of a
particular legacy consisting of the rentals of a fishpond belonging to the estate. In an analogous case involving the
administration of a trust fund, the United States Supreme Court held:
Where the trust fund administered and ordered to be distributed by the circuit court, in a suit to compel the
stockholders of a corporation to pay their subscriptions to stock to realize the fund, amounts to more than
$5,000.00, this court has jurisdiction of the appeal, which is not affected by the fact that the amounts decreed to
some of the creditors are less than that sum (Handly et al. vs. Stutz, et al., 34 Law Ed. 706).
Respondent also contends that appeals in special proceedings, as distinguished from ordinary civil cases, are within the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, since they are not enumerated in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act, as
amended. Granting, arguendo, that a special proceeding is not a civil action, it has never been decided that a special
proceeding is not a "civil case" (Carpenter v. Jones, 121 Cal. 362; 58 p. 842). On the other hand, it has been held that the
term "civil case" includes special proceedings (Herkimer v. Keeler, 100 Iowa 680, N.W. 178). Moreover, Section 2, Rule 73,
of the Rules of Court provides that the rules on ordinary civil actions are applicable in special proceedings where they are
not inconsistent with, or when they may serve to supplement the provisions relating to special proceedings. Consequently,
the procedure of appeal is the same in civil actions as in special proceedings. (See Moran's Comments on the Rules of
Court, Vol. II, 1957 Ed., p. 326.)
The cases cited by respondent where this Court ruled that the separate total claim of the parties and not the combined
claims against each other determine the appellate jurisdictional amount, are not applicable to, the instant case, because
Section 2, Rule 75 of the Rules of Court is explicit that the amount or value involved or in controversy in probate
proceedings is that of the entire estate. Assuming, arguendo, that the rule in the cases cited by respondent is here
applicable, it should be noted that respondent claims the whole estate of at least more than 3/4 thereof. Said claim, reduced
to a pecuniary standard, on the basis of the inventory, would amount to more than P200,000.00 and, consequently, within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

The case of Ledesma v. Natividad (L-6115, May 10, 1954) cited by respondent in his brief, is also inapplicable, because
unlike the instant case, it did not involve a contest in the administration of the estate.
While it is true that questions of fact have been raised in the probate proceedings (Spec. Proc. No. 4977, CFI of Negros
Occidental) which was appealed by respondent to the Court of Appeals, it becomes immaterial, in view of Sections 17 and
31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, providing that the Supreme Court shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over "all cases in which the value in controversy exceeds two hundred thousand pesos, exclusive of interests and costs",
and that "all cases which may be erroneously brought to the Supreme Court, or to the Court of Appeals shall be sent to the
proper court, which shall hear the same as if it had originally been brought before it".
On the question of the appointment of petitioner Eliezar Lopez as special administrator, we agree with respondent that there
was no need for it. Note that the Rules of Court contain no provision on special co-administrator, the reason being, that the
appointment of such special administrator is merely temporary and subsists only until a regular executor or administrator is
duly appointed. Thus, it would not only be unnecessary but also impractical, if for the temporary duration of the need for a
special administrator, another one is appointed aside from the husband, in this case, upon whom the duty to liquidate the
community property devolves merely to protect the interests of petitioners who, in the event that the disputed will is allowed
to probate, would even have no right to participate in the proceedings at all. (Roxas v. Pecson, 82 Phil. 407.)
In view of the conclusion herein reached, in connection with the amount involved in the controversy, it is suggested that
appropriate steps be taken on the appeal pending in the Court of Appeals involving the probate of the will (CA-G.R. No.
27478-R) to comply with the provisions of the Judiciary Act on the matter.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals of May 16, 1961 is set aside and another one entered also setting aside
the order of the trial court of March 5, 1960, appointing Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator. Without costs. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 124715

January 24, 2000

RUFINA LUY LIM, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AUTO TRUCK TBA CORPORATION, SPEED DISTRIBUTING, INC., ACTIVE DISTRIBUTORS, ALLIANCE
MARKETING CORPORATION, ACTION COMPANY, INC. respondents.
BUENA, J.:
May a corporation, in its universality, be the proper subject of and be included in the inventory of the estate of a deceased person?
Petitioner disputes before us through the instant petition for review on certiorari, the decision1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 18
April 1996, in CA-GR SP No. 38617, which nullified and set aside the orders dated 04 July 1995 2, 12 September 19953 and 15 September
19954 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93, sitting as a probate court.

Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of late Pastor Y. Lim whose estate is the subject of probate proceedings in Special
Proceedings Q-95-23334, entitled, "In Re: Intestate Estate of Pastor Y. Lim Rufina Luy Lim, represented by George Luy, Petitioner".

1wphi1.nt

Private respondents Auto Truck Corporation, Alliance Marketing Corporation, Speed Distributing, Inc., Active Distributing, Inc. and Action
Company are corporations formed, organized and existing under Philippine laws and which owned real properties covered under the Torrens
system.
On 11 June 1994, Pastor Y. Lim died intestate. Herein petitioner, as surviving spouse and duly represented by her nephew George Luy, fried
on 17 March 1995, a joint petition5 for the administration of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Private respondent corporations, whose properties were included in the inventory of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, then filed a motion 6 for the
lifting of lis pendens and motion7 for exclusion of certain properties from the estate of the decedent.
In an order8 dated 08 June 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93, sitting as a probate court, granted the private
respondents' twin motions, in this wise:
Wherefore, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ordered to lift, expunge or delete the annotation of lis pendens on
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 116716, 116717, 116718, 116719 and 5182 and it is hereby further ordered that the properties
covered by the same titles as well as those properties by (sic) Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 613494, 363123, 236236 and
263236 are excluded from these proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Subsequently, Rufina Luy Lim filed a verified amended petition 9 which contained the following averments:
3. The late Pastor Y. Lim personally owned during his lifetime the following business entities, to wit:
Business
Entity

Address:

xxx
Alliance
Marketing, Inc.

xxx

xxx

Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca BF

Homes, Paraaque, Metro
Manila.

xxx
Speed
Distributing Inc.

xxx

xxx

910 Barrio Niog, Aguinaldo

Highway, Bacoor, Cavite.

xxx
Auto Truck
TBA Corp.

xxx

xxx

2251 Roosevelt Avenue,

Quezon City.
xxx

Active
Distributors,
Inc.

xxx

xxx

Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca BF

Homes, Paraaque, Metro
Manila.
xxx

Action
Company

xxx

xxx

100 20th Avenue Murphy,

Quezon City or 92-D Mc-Arthur
Highway Valenzuela Bulacan.

3.1 Although the above business entities dealt and engaged in business with the public as corporations, all their capital,
assets and equity were however, personally owned by the late Pastor Y Lim. Hence the alleged stockholders and
officers appearing in the respective articles of incorporation of the above business entities were mere dummies of
Pastor Y. Lim, and they were listed therein only for purposes of registration with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
4. Pastor Lim, likewise, had Time, Savings and Current Deposits with the following banks: (a) Metrobank, Grace Park, Caloocan
City and Quezon Avenue, Quezon City Branches and (b) First Intestate Bank (formerly Producers Bank), Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation and in other banks whose identities are yet to be determined.
5. That the following real properties, although registered in the name of the above entities, were actually acquired by Pastor Y. Lim
during his marriage with petitioner, to wit:
Corporation

Title
xxx

Location
xxx

xxx

k. Auto Truck

TCT No. 617726

Sto. Domingo TBA

Corporation Cainta, Rizal

q. Alliance Marketing

TCT No. 27896

Prance, Metro Manila

Copies of the above-mentioned Transfer Certificate of Title and/or Tax Declarations are hereto attached as Annexes "C" to "W".
xxx

xxx

xxx

7. The aforementioned properties and/or real interests left by the late Pastor Y. Lim, are all conjugal in nature, having been
acquired by him during the existence of his marriage with petitioner.
8. There are other real and personal properties owned by Pastor Y. Lim which petitioner could not as yet identify. Petitioner,
however will submit to this Honorable Court the identities thereof and the necessary documents covering the same as soon as
possible.
On 04 July 1995, the Regional Trial Court acting on petitioner's motion issued an order 10, thus:
Wherefore, the order dated 08 June 1995 is hereby set aside and the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to
reinstate the annotation of lis pendens in case said annotation had already been deleted and/or cancelled said TCT Nos. 116716,
116717, 116718, 116719 and 51282.
Further more (sic), said properties covered by TCT Nos. 613494, 365123, 236256 and 236237 by virtue of the petitioner are
included in the instant petition.
SO ORDERED.
On 04 September 1995, the probate court appointed Rufina Lim as special administrator 11 and Miguel Lim and Lawyer Donald Lee, as cospecial administrators of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, after which letters of administration were accordingly issued.
In an order12 dated 12 September 1995, the probate court denied anew private respondents' motion for exclusion, in this wise:
The issue precisely raised by the petitioner in her petition is whether the corporations are the mere alter egos or instrumentalities
of Pastor Lim, Otherwise (sic) stated, the issue involves the piercing of the corporate veil, a matter that is clearly within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court and not the Securities and Exchange Commission. Thus, in the case of Cease vs. Court of
Appeals, 93 SCRA 483, the crucial issue decided by the regular court was whether the corporation involved therein was the mere
extension of the decedent. After finding in the affirmative, the Court ruled that the assets of the corporation are also assets of the
estate.
A reading of P.D. 902, the law relied upon by oppositors, shows that the SEC's exclusive (sic) applies only to intra-corporate
controversy. It is simply a suit to settle the intestate estate of a deceased person who, during his lifetime, acquired several
properties and put up corporations as his instrumentalities.
SO ORDERED.
On 15 September 1995, the probate court acting on an ex parte motion filed by petitioner, issued an order13 the dispositive portion of which
reads:
Wherefore, the parties and the following banks concerned herein under enumerated are hereby ordered to comply strictly with this
order and to produce and submit to the special administrators, through this Honorable Court within (5) five days from receipt of
this order their respective records of the savings/current accounts/time deposits and other deposits in the names of Pastor Lim
and/or corporations above-mentioned, showing all the transactions made or done concerning savings/current accounts from
January 1994 up to their receipt of this court order.
xxx

xxx

xxx

SO ORDERED.
Private respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari14, with an urgent prayer for a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction,
before the Court of Appeals questioning the orders of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a probate court.
On 18 April 1996, the Court of Appeals, finding in favor of herein private respondents, rendered the assailed decision 15, the decretal portion of
which declares:
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant special civil action for certiorari is hereby granted, The impugned orders issued by
respondent court on July 4, 1995 and September 12, 1995 are hereby nullified and set aside. The impugned order issued by
respondent on September 15, 1995 is nullified insofar as petitioner corporations" bank accounts and records are concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Through the expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, herein petitioner Rufina Luy Lim now comes before us with a lone assignment of
error16:
The respondent Court of Appeals erred in reversing the orders of the lower court which merely allowed the preliminary or
provisional inclusion of the private respondents as part of the estate of the late deceased (sic) Pastor Y. Lim with the respondent
Court of Appeals arrogating unto itself the power to repeal, to disobey or to ignore the clear and explicit provisions of Rules
81,83,84 and 87 of the Rules of Court and thereby preventing the petitioner, from performing her duty as special administrator of
the estate as expressly provided in the said Rules.
Petitioner's contentions tread on perilous grounds.
In the instant petition for review, petitioner prays that we affirm the orders issued by the probate court which were subsequently set aside by
the Court of Appeals.
Yet, before we delve into the merits of the case, a review of the rules on jurisdiction over probate proceedings is indeed in order.

The provisions of Republic Act 769117, which introduced amendments to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, are pertinent:
Sec. 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby
amended to read as follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila, where such gross value exceeds Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000);
xxx

xxx

xxx

Sec. 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil
Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of
provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the personal property, estate or amount of the demand does
not exceed One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) or, in Metro Manila where such personal property, estate or
amount of the demand does not exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000), exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs, the amount of which must be specifically
alleged, Provided, that interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's, litigation expenses and costs shall be included in
the determination of the filing fees, Provided further, that where there are several claims or causes of actions between
the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the
claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different
transactions;
xxx

xxx

xxx

Simply put, the determination of which court exercises jurisdiction over matters of probate depends upon the gross value of the estate of the
decedent.
As to the power and authority of the probate court, petitioner relies heavily on the principle that a probate court may pass upon title to certain
properties, albeit provisionally, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory.
In a litany of cases, We defined the parameters by which the court may extend its probing arms in the determination of the question of title in
probate proceedings.
This Court, in PASTOR, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS,18 held:
. . . As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the
purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the
Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final
decision in a separate action to resolve title.
We reiterated the rule in PEREIRA vs. COURT OF APPEALS19:
. . . The function of resolving whether or not a certain property should be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator is one clearly within the competence of the probate court. However, the court's determination is
only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action which may be instituted by the
parties.
Further, in MORALES vs. CFI OF CAVITE20 citing CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE21, We made an exposition on the probate court's limited
jurisdiction:
It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that
the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory
or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties,
the administrator and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of
title because the probate court cannot do so.
Again, in VALERA vs. INSERTO22, We had occasion to elucidate, through Mr. Justice Andres Narvasa 23:
Settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court), acting as a probate court, exercises but limited
jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person
adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or
impliedly, to the submission of the question to the probate court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby
prejudiced, the reason for the exception being that the question of whether or not a particular matter should be resolved by the
court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (e.g. probate, land registration, etc.), is
in reality not a jurisdictional but in essence of procedural one, involving a mode of practice which may be waived. . . .
. . . . These considerations assume greater cogency where, as here, the Torrens title is not in the decedent's name but in others, a
situation on which this Court has already had occasion to rule . . . . (emphasis Ours)

Petitioner, in the present case, argues that the parcels of land covered under the Torrens system and registered in the name of private
respondent corporations should be included in the inventory of the estate of the decedent Pastor Y. Lim, alleging that after all the
determination by the probate court of whether these properties should be included or not is merely provisional in nature, thus, not conclusive
and subject to a final determination in a separate action brought for the purpose of adjudging once and for all the issue of title.
Yet, under the peculiar circumstances, where the parcels of land are registered in the name of private respondent corporations, the
jurisprudence pronounced in BOLISAY vs., ALCID 24 is of great essence and finds applicability, thus:
It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to support her claim of ownership, for, on the other
hand, petitioners have a Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is endowed with incontestability until after it has been set
aside in the manner indicated in the law itself, which of course, does not include, bringing up the matter as a mere incident in
special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. . . .
. . . . In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property covered by Torrens title is involved, the
presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the
contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in
an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons named in
the title. . . .
A perusal of the records would reveal that no strong compelling evidence was ever presented by petitioner to bolster her bare assertions as
to the title of the deceased Pastor Y. Lim over the properties. Even so, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, "The Property Registration Decree",
proscribes collateral attack on Torrens Title, hence:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be
altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
In CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE, where similarly as in the case at bar, the property subject of the controversy was duly registered under the
Torrens system, We categorically stated:
. . . Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the possession of third parties and more important,
covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent court should have denied the
motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the property in question from the inventory of the property of the estate. It
had no authority to deprive such third persons of their possession and ownership of the property. . . .
Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the estate of the Late Pastor Y. Lim are in the possession of and are registered in
the name of private respondent corporations, which under the law possess a personality separate and distinct from their stockholders, and in
the absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of private
respondents should stand undisturbed.
Accordingly, the probate court was remiss in denying private respondents' motion for exclusion. While it may be true that the Regional Trial
Court, acting in a restricted capacity and exercising limited jurisdiction as a probate court, is competent to issue orders involving inclusion or
exclusion of certain properties in the inventory of the estate of the decedent, and to adjudge, albeit, provisionally the question of title over
properties, it is no less true that such authority conferred upon by law and reinforced by jurisprudence, should be exercised judiciously, with
due regard and caution to the peculiar circumstances of each individual case.
Notwithstanding that the real properties were duly registered under the Torrens system in the name of private respondents, and as such were
to be afforded the presumptive conclusiveness of title, the probate court obviously opted to shut its eyes to this gleamy fact and still
proceeded to issue the impugned orders.
By its denial of the motion for exclusion, the probate court in effect acted in utter disregard of the presumption of conclusiveness of title in
favor of private respondents. Certainly, the probate court through such brazen act transgressed the clear provisions of law and infringed
settled jurisprudence on this matter.
Moreover, petitioner urges that not only the properties of private respondent corporations are properly part of the decedent's estate but also
the private respondent corporations themselves. To rivet such flimsy contention, petitioner cited that the late Pastor Y. Lim during his lifetime,
organized and wholly-owned the five corporations, which are the private respondents in the instant case. 25 Petitioner thus attached as
Annexes "F"26 and "G"27 of the petition for review affidavits executed by Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao which among others, contained
averments that the incorporators of Uniwide Distributing, Inc. included on the list had no actual and participation in the organization and
incorporation of the said corporation. The affiants added that the persons whose names appeared on the articles of incorporation of Uniwide
Distributing, Inc., as incorporators thereof, are mere dummies since they have not actually contributed any amount to the capital stock of the
corporation and have been merely asked by the late Pastor Y. Lim to affix their respective signatures thereon.
It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality separate and distinct from that of the persons composing it. It may not generally be
held liable for that of the persons composing it. It may not be held liable for the personal indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the
entities connected with it.28
Rudimentary is the rule that a corporation is invested by law with a personality distinct and separate from its stockholders or members. In the
same vein, a corporation by legal fiction and convenience is an entity shielded by a protective mantle and imbued by law with a character
alien to the persons comprising it.
Nonetheless, the shield is not at all times invincible. Thus, in FIRST PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL BANK vs.COURT OF APPEALS29, We
enunciated:
. . . When the fiction is urged as a means of perpetrating a fraud or an illegal act or as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing
obligation, the circumvention of statutes, the achievement or perfection of a monopoly or generally the perpetration of knavery or
crime, the veil with which the law covers and isolates the corporation from the members or stockholders who compose it will be
lifted to allow for its consideration merely as an aggregation of individuals. . . .

Piercing the veil of corporate entity requires the court to see through the protective shroud which exempts its stockholders from liabilities that
ordinarily, they could be subject to, or distinguishes one corporation from a seemingly separate one, were it not for the existing corporate
fiction.30
The corporate mask may be lifted and the corporate veil may be pierced when a corporation is just but the alter ego of a person or of another
corporation. Where badges of fraud exist, where public convenience is defeated; where a wrong is sought to be justified thereby, the
corporate fiction or the notion of legal entity should come to naught. 31
Further, the test in determining the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction is as follows: 1) Control, not mere
majority or complete stock control, but complete domination, not only of finances but of policy and business practice in respect to the
transaction attacked so that the corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its own; (2) Such
control must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty,
or dishonest and unjust act in contravention of plaintiffs legal right; and (3) The aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause
the injury or unjust loss complained of. The absence of any of these elements prevent "piercing the corporate veil". 32
Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself a
sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of separate corporate personalities. 33
Moreover, to disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the wrong-doing must be clearly and convincingly established. It
cannot be presumed.34
Granting arguendo that the Regional Trial Court in this case was not merely acting in a limited capacity as a probate court, petitioner
nonetheless failed to adduce competent evidence that would have justified the court to impale the veil of corporate fiction. Truly, the reliance
reposed by petitioner on the affidavits executed by Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao is unavailing considering that the aforementioned
documents possess no weighty probative value pursuant to the hearsay rule. Besides it is imperative for us to stress that such affidavits are
inadmissible in evidence inasmuch as the affiants were not at all presented during the course of the proceedings in the lower court. To put it
differently, for this Court to uphold the admissibility of said documents would be to relegate from Our duty to apply such basic rule of
evidence in a manner consistent with the law and jurisprudence.
Our pronouncement in PEOPLE BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. LEONIDAS35 finds pertinence:
Affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own
language in writing the affiant's statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.
Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants. For this reason, affidavits are generally
rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiant themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.
As to the order36 of the lower court, dated 15 September 1995, the Court of Appeals correctly observed that the Regional Trial Court, Branch
93 acted without jurisdiction in issuing said order; The probate court had no authority to demand the production of bank accounts in the name
of the private respondent corporations.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court
of Appeals which nullified and set aside the orders issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, acting as a probate court, dated 04 July
1995 and 12 September 1995 is AFFIRMED.
1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 133743

February 6, 2007

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029

February 6, 2007

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647,
which reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of
Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which
were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971,
Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of
America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of
the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18
years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17,
1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which
was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street,
New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedents surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first
marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00
more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and
that letters of administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the
grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have
been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent
has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still
legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal 10 of the petition. On
February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary
evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New
Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued
by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved.
Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the
doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their
motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate
respondents bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E.
Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the
decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was
deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the
resolution of said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a motion for
reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it was
based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order
by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

21

granting the motion for inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided

On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers on the twin issues of venue and legal
capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in
his previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14, 24 and June
20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was
the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not
in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage
with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee
was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family
Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimos legitimate children.

Respondent moved for reconsideration

26

and for the disqualification

27

of Judge Arcangel but said motions were denied.

28

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated
February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated
February 28 and October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

29

The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a
person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna,
he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code
and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was
validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under
paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus
With the well-known rule express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn,
Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view
sweeping statement of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state against
divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to
the express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992,32 the Filipino divorcee,
"shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the deceased and petitioner should not
be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement
of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration

34

which were denied by the Court of Appeals.

On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari.
to adopt the said petition which was granted. 36

35

Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion

In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition for letters of administration was
improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in
Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38 "residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given time. Since
Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondents marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence
of the latters marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested
rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no
legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for
letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the
Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid
down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence as contradistinguished from domicile of the decedent for purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the
terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence
rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and
not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of residence is
required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is
synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases.
Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of
actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when
absent, one has the intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is
his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or

domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one
place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also
maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of
Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing
statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address
of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the
Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceaseds children to
him at his Alabang address, and the deceaseds calling cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang
Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his
estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial
jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality
and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were
then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of
whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidads marriage
to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need
not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis
allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently
dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse
alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of
the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or
domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to
bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty,
that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case
below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own countrys Court,
which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before
said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse.
Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not
be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be
one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served. 54 (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the
said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the
severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect
or cast obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van
Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions
were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling
has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a
necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino
cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family
Code were discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which
took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending
Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized,
and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia
Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to
the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. TheVan Dorn case involved a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien
spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine
law. 63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the
enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial
precedent.
1awphi1.net

Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible
good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties,
cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains
bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are
concerned. However, in light of this Courts rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in
his own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in
seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep
them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its
peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in
slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as
the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal
command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are
warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish
continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential
ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the
intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the
records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and
proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity
and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal
of his office. 71

With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage
Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance
with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and
the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal
personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the
properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent.
However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and
must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the
estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their
cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to
remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a
co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both
of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not
necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal,
unless the contrary is proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the
Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living
together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the
acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the property regime under
this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who
nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective
contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the
extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to
a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property
is essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an
affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the partys own evidence
and not upon the weakness of the opponents defense. x x x 81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her
status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the
Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners motion for
reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-55509 April 27, 1984
ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE TOMAS R. LEONIDAS, Branch 38, Court of First Instance of Manila; MAXINE TATE-GRIMM, EDWARD MILLER GRIMM II and
LINDA GRIMM, respondents.
N. J. Quisumbing and Associates for petitioners.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for respondents.

AQUINO, J.:

+.wph!1

The question in this case is whether a petition for allowance of wills and to annul a partition, approved in anintestate proceeding by Branch
20 of the Manila Court of First Instance, can be entertained by its Branch 38 (after a probate in the Utah district court).
Antecedents. Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila, died at 78 in the Makati Medical Center on November 27, 1977. He was
survived by his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm and their two children, named Edward Miller Grimm II (Pete) and Linda Grimm and by
Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts (McFadden), his two children by a first marriage which ended in divorce (Sub-Annexes A and
B. pp. 36-47, Rollo).
He executed on January 23, 1959 two wills in San Francisco, California. One will disposed of his Philippine estate which he described as
conjugal property of himself and his second wife. The second win disposed of his estate outside the Philippines.
In both wills, the second wife and two children were favored. The two children of the first marriage were given their legitimes in the will
disposing of the estate situated in this country. In the will dealing with his property outside this country, the testator said:
t.hqw

I purposely have made no provision in this will for my daughter, Juanita Grimm Morris, or my daughter, Elsa Grimm
McFadden (Ethel Grimm Roberts), because I have provided for each of them in a separate will disposing of my
Philippine property. (First clause, pp. 43-47, Rollo).
The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine Tate Grimm and E. LaVar Tate on March 7, 1978 in Probate No. 3720 of the
Third Judicial District Court of Tooele County, Utah. Juanita Grimm Morris of Cupertino, California and Mrs. Roberts of 15 C. Benitez Street,
Horseshoe Village, Quezon City were notified of the probate proceeding (Sub-Annex C, pp. 48-55, Rollo).
Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel in January, 1978 (p. 53, Rollo). In its order dated
April 10, 1978, the Third Judicial District Court admitted to probate the two wills and the codicil It was issued upon consideration of
the stipulation dated April 4, 1978 "by and between the attorneys for Maxine Tate Grimm, Linda Grimm, Edward Miller Grimm II, E. LaVar
Tate, Juanita Kegley Grimm (first wife), Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts" (Annex C, pp. 48-51, Rollo).
Two weeks later, or on April 25, 1978, Maxine and her two children Linda and Pete, as the first parties, and Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and
their mother Juanita Kegley Grimm as the second parties, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into a compromise
agreement in Utah regarding the estate. It was signed by David E. Salisbury and Donald B. Holbrook, as lawyers of the parties, by Pete and
Linda and the attorney-in-fact of Maxine and by the attorney-in-fact of Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and Juanita Kegley Grimm.
In that agreement, it was stipulated that Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be designated as personal representatives (administrators) of
Grimm's Philippine estate (par. 2). It was also stipulated that Maxine's one-half conjugal share in the estate should be reserved for her and
that would not be less than $1,500,000 plus the homes in Utah and Santa Mesa, Manila (par. 4). The agreement indicated the computation of
the "net distributable estate". It recognized that the estate was liable to pay the fees of the Angara law firm (par. 5).
It was stipulated in paragraph 6 that the decedent's four children "shall share equally in the Net Distributable Estate" and that Ethel and
Juanita Morris should each receive at least 12-1/2% of the total of the net distributable estate and marital share. A supplemental
memorandum also dated April 25, 1978 was executed by the parties (Sub-Annex F, pp. 49-61, Annex, F-1, pp. 75-76, Testate case).

Intestate proceeding No. 113024.-At this juncture, it should be stated that forty- three days after Grimm's death, or January 9, 1978, his
daughter of the first marriage, Ethel, 49, through lawyers Deogracias T. Reyes and. Gerardo B. Macaraeg, filed with Branch 20 of the Manila
Court of First Instance intestate proceeding No. 113024for the settlement of his estate. She was named special administratrix.
On March 11, the second wife, Maxine, through the Angara law office, filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding on
the ground of the pendency of Utah of a proceeding for the probate of Grimm's will. She also moved that she be appointed special
administratrix, She submitted to the court a copy of Grimm's will disposing of his Philippine estate. It is found in pages 58 to 64 of the record.
The intestate court in its orders of May 23 and June 2 noted that Maxine, through a new lawyer, William C. Limqueco (partner of Gerardo B.
Macaraeg, p. 78, testate case withdrew that opposition and motion to dismiss and, at the behest of Maxine, Ethel and Pete, appointed them
joint administrators. Apparently, this was done pursuant to the aforementioned Utah compromise agreement. The court ignored the will
already found in the record.
The three administrators submitted an inventory. With the authority and approval of the court, they sold for P75,000 on March 21, 1979 the
so-called Palawan Pearl Project, a business owned by the deceased. Linda and Juanita allegedly conformed with the sale (pp. 120-129,
Record). It turned out that the buyer, Makiling Management Co., Inc., was incorporated by Ethel and her husband, Rex Roberts, and by
lawyer Limqueco (Annex L, p. 90, testate case).
Also with the court's approval and the consent of Linda and Juanita, they sold for P1,546,136 to Joseph Server and others 193,267 shares of
RFM Corporation (p. 135, Record).
Acting on the declaration of heirs and project of partition signed and filed by lawyers Limqueco and Macaraeg (not signed by Maxine and her
two children), Judge Conrado M. Molina in his order of July 27, 1979 adjudicated to Maxine onehalf (4/8) of the decedent's Philippine estate
and one-eighth (1/8) each to his four children or 12-1/2% (pp. 140-142, Record). No mention at all was made of the will in that order.
Six days later, or on August 2, Maxine and her two children replaced Limqueco with Octavio del Callar as their lawyer who on August 9,
moved to defer approval of the project of partition. The court considered the motion moot considering that it had already approved the
declaration of heirs and project of partition (p. 149, Record).
Lawyer Limqueco in a letter to Maxine dated August 2, 1979 alleged that he was no longer connected with Makiling Management Co., Inc.
when the Palawan Pearl Project was sold: that it was Maxine's son Pete who negotiated the sale with Rex Roberts and that he (Limqueco)
was going to sue Maxine for the lies she imputed to him (Annex H, p. 78, testate case).
Ethel submitted to the court a certification of the Assistant Commissioner of Internal Revenue dated October 2, 1979. It was stated therein
that Maxine paid P1,992,233.69 as estate tax and penalties and that he interposed no objection to the transfer of the estate to Grimm's heirs
(p. 153, Record). The court noted the certification as in conformity with its order of July 27, 1979.
After November, 1979 or for a period of more than five months, there was no movement or activity in the intestate case. On April 18, 1980
Juanita Grimm Morris, through Ethel's lawyers, filed a motion for accounting "so that the Estate properties can be partitioned among the heirs
and the present intestate estate be closed." Del Callar, Maxine's lawyer was notified of that motion.
Before that motion could be heard, or on June 10, 1980, the Angara law firm filed again its appearance in collaboration with Del Callar as
counsel for Maxine and her two children, Linda and Pete. It should be recalled that the firm had previously appeared in the case as Maxine's
counsel on March 11, 1978, when it filed a motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding and furnished the court with a copy of Grimm's will. As
already noted, the firm was then superseded by lawyer Limqueco.
Petition to annul partition and testate proceeding No. 134559. On September 8, 1980, Rogelio A. Vinluan of the Angara law firm in behalf
of Maxine, Pete and Linda, filed in Branch 38 of the lower court a petition praying for the probate of Grimm's two wills (already probated in
Utah), that the 1979 partition approved by the intestate court be set aside and the letters of administration revoked, that Maxine be appointed
executrix and that Ethel and Juanita Morris be ordered to account for the properties received by them and to return the same to Maxine (pp.
25-35, Rollo).
Grimm's second wife and two children alleged that they were defraud due to the machinations of the Roberts spouses, that the 1978 Utah
compromise agreement was illegal, that the intestate proceeding is void because Grimm died testate and that the partition was contrary to
the decedent's wills.
Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it for lack of merit in his order of October 27, 1980. Ethel then filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court, praying that the testate proceeding be dismissed, or. alternatively that the two proceedings
be consolidated and heard in Branch 20 and that the matter of the annulment of the Utah compromise agreement be heard prior to the
petition for probate (pp. 22-23, Rollo).
Ruling. We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's
motion to dismiss.
A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it
is proved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).
The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Baluyot vs. Panio, L-42088, May 7, 1976, 71
SCRA 86). It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate
case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two
cases.

Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an opposition and answer to the petition unless she considers her
motion to dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the intestate case, should be served
with copies of orders, notices and other papers in the testate case.
WHEREFORE the petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order is dissolved. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

1wph1.t

Makasiar (Chairman), Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Escolin, J., concur in the result.
Concepcion, Jr. and Abad Santos, JJ., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973

ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO, LOURDES CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO
MANGUERRA, CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO REYES, and TERESITA CUENCO GONZALEZ, respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla Law Office for petitioner.
Jalandoni and Jamir for respondents.

TEEHANKEE, J.:
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34104-R, promulgated 21 November 1964, and
its subsequent Resolution promulgated 8 July 1964 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The pertinent facts which gave rise to the herein petition follow:
On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila Doctors' Hospital, Manila. He was survived by his widow, the herein
petitioner, and their two (2) minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus Salvador, both surnamed Cuenco, all residing at 69 Pi y Margal St.,
Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and by his children of the first marriage, respondents herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco,
Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in
Cebu.

respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for Letters

of Administration with the court of first instance of Cebu (Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R), alleging among other
things, that the late senator died intestate in Manila on 25 February 1964; that he was a resident of Cebu
at the time of his death; and that he left real and personal properties in Cebu and Quezon City. On the
same date, the Cebu court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on 10 April 1964, directing that
due notice be given to all the heirs and interested persons, and ordering the requisite publication thereof
at LA PRENSA, a newspaper of general circulation in the City and Province of Cebu.
On 5 March 1964, (the 9th day after the death of the late Senator) 1

The aforesaid order, however, was later suspended and cancelled and a new and modified one released on 13 March 1964, in view of the
fact that the petition was to be heard at Branch II instead of Branch I of the said Cebu court. On the same date, a third order was further
issued stating that respondent Lourdes Cuenco's petition for the appointment of a special administrator dated 4 March 1964 was not yet
ready for the consideration of the said court, giving as reasons the following:

It will be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding,
the requisite publication of the notice of hearing not yet having been complied with. Moreover, copies of the petition
have not been served on all of the heirs specified in the basic petition for the issuance of letters of administration. 2
In the meantime, or specifically on 12 March 1964, (a week after the filing of the Cebu petition) herein petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed
a petition with the court of first instance of Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the deceased's last will and testament and for the issuance
of letters testamentary in her favor, as the surviving widow and executrix in the said last will and testament. The said proceeding was
docketed as Special Proceeding No. Q-7898.
Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed in said Cebu court an Opposition and
Motion to Dismiss, dated 30 March 1964, as well as an Opposition to Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator, dated 8 April 1964.
On 10 April 1964, the Cebu court issued an order holding in abeyance its resolution on petitioner's motion to dismiss "until after the Court of
First Instance of Quezon City shall have acted on the petition for probate of that document purporting to be the last will and testament of the

Such order of the Cebu court deferring to the probateproceedings in the

Quezon City court was neither excepted to nor sought by respondents to be reconsidered or set aside by
the Cebu court nor did they challenge the same by certiorari or prohibition proceedings in the appellate
courts.
deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco." 3

Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, dated 10 April 1964,opposing probate of the will
and assailing the jurisdiction of the said Quezon City court to entertain petitioner's petition for probate and for appointment as executrix in Sp.
Proc. No. Q-7898 in view of the alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by her petition in the Cebu court in Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R. Said
respondent prayed that Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue.
In its order of 11 April 1964, the Quezon City court denied the motion to dismiss, giving as a principal reason the "precedence of probate

The said court further found in said order that theresidence of the late
senator at the time of his death was at No. 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City. The pertinent
portion of said order follows:
proceeding over an intestate proceeding." 4

On the question of residence of the decedent, paragraph 5 of the opposition and motion to dismiss reads as follows:
"that since the decedent Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco was a resident of the City of Cebu at the time of his death, the
aforesaid petition filed by Rosa Cayetano Cuenco on 12 March 1964 was not filed with the proper Court (wrong venue)
in view of the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 73 of the New Rules of Court ...". From the aforequoted allegation, the
Court is made to understand that the oppositors do not mean to say that the decedent being a resident of Cebu City
when he died, the intestate proceedings in Cebu City should prevail over the probate proceedings in Quezon City,
because as stated above the probate of the will should take precedence, but that the probate proceedings should be
filed in the Cebu City Court of First Instance. If the last proposition is the desire of the oppositors as understood by this
Court, that could not also be entertained as proper because paragraph 1 of the petition for the probate of the will
indicates that Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco at the time of his death was a resident of Quezon City at 69 Pi y Margal.
Annex A (Last Will and Testament of Mariano Jesus Cuenco) of the petition for probate of the will shows that the
decedent at the time when he executed his Last Will clearly stated that he is a resident of 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa
Heights, Quezon City, and also of the City of Cebu. He made the former as his first choice and the latter as his second
choice of residence." If a party has two residences, the one will be deemed or presumed to his domicile which he
himself selects or considers to be his home or which appears to be the center of his affairs. The petitioner, in thus filing
the instant petition before this Court, follows the first choice of residence of the decedent and once this court acquires
jurisdiction of the probate proceeding it is to the exclusion of all others. 5
Respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion for reconsideration of the Quezon City court's said order of 11 April 1964 asserting its exclusive
jurisdiction over the probate proceeding as deferred to by the Cebu court was denied on 27 April 1964 and a second motion for
reconsideration dated 20 May 1964 was likewise denied.
On 11 May 1964, pursuant to its earlier order of 11 April 1964, the hearing for probate of the last will of the decedent was called three times
at half-hour intervals, but notwithstanding due notification none of the oppositors appeared and the Quezon City court proceeded at 9:00
a.m. with the hearing in their absence.
As per the order issued by it subsequently on 15 May 1964, the Quezon City court noted that respondents-oppositors had opposed probate
under their opposition and motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
(a) That the will was not executed and attested as required by law;
(b) That the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary or some
other persons for his benefit;
(c) That the testator's signature was procured by fraud and/or that the testator acted by mistake and did not intend that
the instrument he signed should be his will at the time he affixed his signature thereto. 6
The Quezon City court further noted that the requisite publication of the notice of the hearing had been duly complied with and that all the
heirs had been duly notified of the hearing, and after receiving the testimony of the three instrumental witnesses to the decedent's last will,
namely Atty. Florencio Albino, Dr. Guillermo A. Picache and Dr. Jose P. Ojeda, and of the notary public, Atty. Braulio A. Arriola, Jr., who
ratified the said last will, and the documentary evidence (such as the decedent's residence certificates, income tax return, diplomatic
passport, deed of donation) all indicating that the decedent was a resident of 69 Pi y Margal St., Quezon City, as also affirmed by him in his
last will, the Quezon City court in its said order of 15 May 1964 admitted to probate the late senator's last will and testament as having been

"freely and voluntarily executed by the testator" and "with all formalities of the law" and appointed petitioner-widow as executrix of his estate
without bond "following the desire of the testator" in his will as probated.
Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's said order admitting the will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof,
respondents filed a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as
case CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) to bar the Rizal court from proceeding with case No. Q-7898.
On 21 November 1964, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of respondents (petitioners therein) and against the herein
petitioner, holding that:
Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person,
covers both testate and intestate proceedings. Sp. Proc. 2433-R of the Cebu CFI having been filed ahead, it is that
court whose jurisdiction was first invoked and which first attached. It is that court which can properly and exclusively
pass upon the factual issues of (1) whether the decedent left or did not leave a valid will, and (2) whether or not the
decedent was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death.
Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted in the Cebu CFI (Special Proceeding 2433-R), it follows
that the said court must exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the Rizal CFI, in which the petition for probate was filed
by the respondent Rosa Cayetano Cuenco (Special Proceeding Q-7898). The said respondent should assert her rights
within the framework of the proceeding in the Cebu CFI, instead of invoking the jurisdiction of another court.
The respondents try to make capital of the fact that on March 13, 1964, Judge Amador Gomez of the Cebu CFI, acting
in Sp. Proc. 2433-R, stated that the petition for appointment of special administrator was "not yet ready for the
consideration of the Court today. It would be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired
jurisdiction to try this proceeding ... . " It is sufficient to state in this connection that the said judge was certainly not
referring to the court's jurisdiction over the res, not to jurisdiction itself which is acquired from the moment a petition is
filed, but only to theexercise of jurisdiction in relation to the stage of the proceedings. At all events, jurisdiction is
conferred and determined by law and does not depend on the pronouncements of a trial judge.
The dispositive part of respondent appellate court's judgment provided as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the writ of prohibition will issue, commanding and directing the respondent Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, and the respondent Judge Damaso B. Tengco to refrain perpetually from proceeding
and taking any action in Special Proceeding Q-7898 pending before the said respondent court. All orders heretofore
issued and actions heretofore taken by said respondent court and respondent Judge, therein and connected therewith,
are hereby annulled. The writ of injunction heretofore issued is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to
costs.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, dated 8 July 1965; hence the herein
petition for review on certiorari.
The principal and decisive issue at bar is, theretofore, whether the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the
Quezon City court ordering it to refrain perpetually from proceeding with the testateproceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders
and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the decedent's last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix
thereof without bond in compliance with the testator's express wish in his testament. This issue is tied up with the issue submitted to the
appellate court, to wit, whether the Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and
assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings filed with it, in pursuance of the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964
expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings that it (the Quezon City court) should first act "on
the petition for probate of the document purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco" - which
order of the Cebu court respondents never questioned nor challenged by prohibition or certiorari proceedings and thus enabled the Quezon
City court to proceed without any impediment or obstruction, once it denied respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion to dismiss the probate
proceeding for alleged lack of jurisdiction or improper venue, toproceed with the hearing of the petition and to admit the will to probate upon
having been satisfied as to its due execution and authenticity.
The Court finds under the above-cited facts that the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City
court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to
probate of the deceased's last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the
deceased testator's express wish, for the following considerations:

concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts of First Instance over "all matter of
probate, both of testate and intestate estates." On the other hand, Rule 73, section of the Rules of Court
lays down the rule of venue, as the very caption of the Rule indicates, and in order to prevent conflict
among the different courts which otherwise may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule
specifies that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." The cited Rule provides:
1. The Judiciary Act 7

Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of
his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance in the Province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of the province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence, of the decedent, or of the location

of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or
when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73) 8
It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter
but merely of venue. This was lucidly stated by the late Chief Justice Moran inSy Oa vs. Co Ho 9

as follows:

We are not unaware of existing decisions to the effect that in probate cases the place of residence of the deceased is
regarded as a question of jurisdiction over the subject-matter. But we decline to follow this view because of its
mischievous consequences. For instance, a probate case has been submitted in good faith to the Court of First
Instance of a province where the deceased had not resided. All the parties, however, including all the creditors, have
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and the case is therein completely finished except for a claim of a
creditor who also voluntarily filed it with said court but on appeal from an adverse decision raises for the first time in this
Court the question of jurisdiction of the trial court for lack of residence of the deceased in the province. If we consider
such question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-matter, the effect shall be
that the whole proceedings including all decisions on the different incidents which have arisen in court will have to
be annulled and the same case will have to be commenced anew before another court of the same rank in another
province. That this is ofmischievous effect in the prompt administration of justice is too obvious to require comment.
(Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio & Co., G.R. No. 48206, December 31, 1942) Furthermore, section 600 of Act No.

providing that the estate of a deceased person shall be settled in the province
where he had last resided, could not have been intended as defining the jurisdiction of
the probate court over the subject-matter, because such legal provision is contained in a
law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters, and, as we have said time and
again, procedure is one thing and jurisdiction over the subject matter is another.
(Attorney-General vs. Manila Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The law of jurisdiction
Act No. 136, Section 56, No. 5 confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over
all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Since,
however, there are many courts of First Instance in the Philippines, the Law of Procedure,
Act No. 190, section 600, fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought.
Thus, the place of residence of the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction over the
subject-matter but merely of venue. And it is upon this ground that in the new Rules of
Court the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled is properly
called "venue".
190, 10

11

It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom the estate or intestate petition is first filed acquires
exclusive jurisdiction.
The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estateof a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
A fair reading of the Rule since it deals with venue and comity between courts of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction indicates that the
court with whom the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it
to the exclusion of all other courts.
Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has been presented in another court where
the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of
the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition
and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the
decedent's alleged last will.
2. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's filing with it a motion to dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order
holding in abeyance its action on the dismissal motion and deferred to the Quezon City court, awaiting its action on the petition
for probate before that court. Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly admitted to probate, by the Quezon City court,
then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition which would thereby be shown to be false and improper, and
leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to the exclusion of all other courts. Likewise by its act of deference, the Cebu court
left it to the Quezon City court to resolve the question between the parties whether the decedent's residence at the time of his death was in
Quezon City where he had his conjugal domicile rather than in Cebu City as claimed by respondents. The Cebu court thus indicated that it
would decline to take cognizance of the intestate petition before it and instead defer to the Quezon City court, unless the latter would make a
negative finding as to the probate petition and the residence of the decedent within its territory and venue.
3. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to
take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court.
Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting on the
probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must exercise
jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule
of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.
Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it and assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent
and deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction
to the exclusion of all other courts.

Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon City court their opposition to probate of the will, but failed to
appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice, the Quezon City court cannot be declared, as the appellate court did, to have acted
without jurisdiction in admitting to probate the decedent's will and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof in accordance with the
testator's testamentary disposition.

with facts analogous to the present

case is authority against respondent appellate court's questioned decision.
4. The relatively recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental

12

13

In said case, the Court upheld the doctrine of precedence of probate proceedings over intestate proceedings in this wise:
It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a deceased person,
whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a
proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in
this jurisdiction, testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over
intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate
proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the
probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that state an administrator had already been
appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the executor
subsequently appointed. This however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be
rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear
indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. 14
The Court likewise therein upheld the jurisdiction of the second court, (in this case, the Quezon City court) although opining that certain
considerations therein "would seem to support the view that [therein respondent] should have submitted said will for probate to the Negros
Court, [in this case, the Cebu court] either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said purpose filed in the already
pending Special Proceeding No. 6344,"

15

thus:

But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for
the purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention in this regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider
said petition, albeit we say that it was not the proper venue therefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waivable procedural defect, and, in the light of the
circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived the right to
raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to consider in this connection that petitioner
knew of the existence of a will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his
opposition to the initial petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served with notice of
the existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the petition for its probate with the
Manila Court since August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal of Special
Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in
Special Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and annulment of
all the proceedings had therein up to that date; thus enabling the Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator with
the will annexed but also to admit said will to probate more than five months earlier, or more specifically, on October 31,
1962. To allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the Manila Court and the
validity of all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a premium on his negligence. Moreover,
it must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the
latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some
other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the objection against said proceedings is
raised too late. 16
5. Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on the basis of the will duly
presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that Quezon City was the firstchoice of residence of the decedent, who had his
conjugal home and domicile therein with the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu court could not be contested except by appeal
from said court in the original case. The last paragraph of said Rule expressly provides:
... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location
of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or
when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73)
The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record" could probably be properly invoked, had
such deference in comity of the Cebu court to the Quezon City court not appeared in the record, or had the record otherwise shown that the
Cebu court had taken cognizance of the petition before it and assumed jurisdiction.
6. On the question that Quezon City established to be the residence of the late senator, the appellate court while recognizing that "the issue
is a legitimate one" held in reliance on Borja vs. Tan 17

that.

... The issue of residence comes within the competence of whichever court is considered to prevail in the exercise
jurisdiction - in this case, the Court of First Instance of Cebu as held by this Court. Parenthetically, we note that the
question of the residence of the deceased is a serious one, requiring both factual and legal resolution on the basis of
ample evidence to be submitted in the ordinary course of procedure in the first instance, particularly in view of the fact
that the deceased was better known as the Senator from Cebu and the will purporting to be his also gives Cebu,
besides Quezon City, as his residence. We reiterate that this matter requires airing in the proper court, as so indicated
in the leading and controlling case of Borja vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan, et al., G.R. L-7792, July 27, 1955.

In the case at bar, however, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance of the intestate petition first filed with it and deferred to
the testate proceedings filed with the Quezon City court and in effect asked the Quezon City court to determine the residence of the
decedent and whether he did leave a last will and testament upon which would depend the proper venue of the estate proceedings, Cebu or
Quezon City. The Quezon City court having thus determined in effect for both courts at the behest and with the deference and consent of
the Cebu court thatQuezon City was the actual residence of the decedent who died testate and therefore the proper venue, the Borja
ruling would seem to have no applicability. It would not serve the practical ends of justice to still require the Cebu court, if the Borja ruling is to
be held applicable and as indicated in the decision under review, to determine for itself the actual residence of the decedent (when the
Quezon City court had already so determined Quezon City as the actual residence at the Cebu court's behest and respondents have not
seriously questioned this factual finding based on documentary evidence) and if the Cebu court should likewise determine Quezon City as
the actual residence, or its contrary finding reversed on appeal, only then to allow petitioner-widow after years of waiting and inaction to
institute the corresponding proceedings in Quezon City.
7. With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings be upheld when it is taken into consideration that Rule 76, section 2 requires that
the petition for allowance of a will must show: "(a) the jurisdictional facts." Such "jurisdictional facts" in probate proceedings, as held by the

" are the death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the
province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his
estate in such province."
Court in Fernando vs. Crisostomo

18

This tallies with the established legal concept as restated by Moran that "(T)he probate of a will is a proceeding in rem. The notice by
publication as a pre-requisite to the allowance of a will, is a constructive notice to the whole world, and when probate is granted, the
judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even against the State.The probate of a will by a court having jurisdiction thereof is

The Quezon City court acted regularly within its jurisdiction (even if
it were to be conceded that Quezon City was not the proper venue notwithstanding the Cebu court's
giving way and deferring to it,) in admitting the decedent's last will to probate and naming petitioner-widow
as executrix thereof. Hence, the Quezon city court's action should not be set aside by a writ of prohibition
for supposed lack of jurisdiction as per the appellate court's appealed decision, and should instead be
sustained in line with Uriarte, supra, where the Court, in dismissing the certiorari petition challenging the
Manila court's action admitting the decedent's will to probate and distributing the estate in accordance
therewith in the second proceeding, held that "it must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to
annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the
net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction." As
stressed by Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa, supra, "the mischievous effect in the administration of justice"
of considering the question of residence as affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court and annulling the
whole proceedings only to start all over again the same proceedings before another court of the same
rank in another province "is too obvious to require comment."
conclusive as to its due execution and validity." 19

8. If the question of jurisdiction were to be made to depend only on who of the decedent's relatives gets first to file a petition for settlement of
the decedent's estate, then the established jurisprudence of the Court that Rule 73, section 1 provides only a rule of venue in order to
preclude different courts which may properly assumejurisdiction from doing so and creating conflicts between them to the detriment of the
administration of justice, and that venue is waivable, would be set at naught. As between relatives who unfortunately do not see eye to eye, it
would be converted into a race as to who can file the petition faster in the court of his/her choice regardless of whether the decedent is still
in cuerpo presente and in disregard of the decedent's actual last domicile, the fact that he left a last will and testament and the right of his
surviving widow named as executrix thereof. Such dire consequences were certainly not intended by the Rule nor would they be in
consonance with public policy and the orderly administration of justice.
9. It would finally be unjust and inequitable that petitioner-widow, who under all the applicable rules of venue, and despite the fact that the
Cebu court (where respondent Lourdes Cuenco had filed an intestate petition in the Cebu court earlier by a week's time on 5 March
1964) deferred to the Quezon City court where petitioner had within fifteen days (on March 12, 1964) after the decedent's death (on February
25, 1964) timely filed the decedent's last will and petitioned for letters testamentary and is admittedly entitled to preference in the

would be compelled under the appealed decision to have to go all the way
to Cebu and submit anew the decedent's will there for probate either in a new proceeding or by asking
that the intestate proceedings be converted into a testate proceeding when under the Rules, the
proper venue for the testate proceedings, as per the facts of record and as already affirmed by the
Quezon City court is Quezon City, where the decedent and petitioner-widow had their conjugal domicile.
administration of her husband's estate,

20

It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and entitled to be executrix of the decedent's last will and settle his estate
in accordance therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue and the law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more
time, money and effort to have to go from Quezon City to the Cebu court everytime she has an important matter of the estate to take up with
the probate court.

since petitioner's marriage has

been dissolved with the death of her husband, their community property and conjugal estate have to
beadministered and liquidated in the estate proceedings of the deceased spouse. Under the appealed
decision, notwithstanding that petitioner resides in Quezon City, and the proper venue of
the testate proceeding was in Quezon City and the Quezon City court properly took cognizance and
exercised exclusive jurisdiction with the deference in comity and consent of the Cebu court, such proper
exercise of jurisdiction would be nullified and petitioner would have to continually leave her residence in
It would doubly be an unfair imposition when it is considered that under Rule 73, section 2,

21

Quezon City and go to Cebu to settle and liquidate even her own community property and conjugal
estate with the decedent.
10. The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court did not act without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of
discretion in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and instead deferring to thetestate proceedings filed just a week later by
petitioner as surviving widow and designated executrix of the decedent's last will, since the record before it (the petitioner's opposition and
motion to dismiss) showed the falsityof the allegation in the intestate petition that the decedent had died without a will. It is noteworthy that
respondents never challenged by certiorari or prohibition proceedings the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964 deferring to the probate
proceedings before the Quezon City court, thus leaving the latter free (pursuant to the Cebu court's order of deference) to exercise
jurisdiction and admit the decedent's will to probate.
For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in
admitting the decedent's will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix in accordance with its testamentary disposition, in the light of
the settled doctrine that the provisions of Rule 73, section 1 lay down only a rule of venue, not of jurisdiction.
Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the Quezon City court's order of May 15, 1964 admitting the will to probate and
appointing petitioner as executrix thereof, and said court concededly has jurisdiction to issue said order, the said order of probate has long
since become final and can not be overturned in a special civic action of prohibition.

it may properly
determine, as it has done in the case at bar, that venue was properly assumed by and transferredto
the Quezon City court and that it is the interest of justice and in avoidance of needless delay that the
Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the testate estate of the decedent (with the due
deference and consent of the Cebu court) and its admission to probate of his last will and testament and
appointment of petitioner-widow as administratrix without bond in pursuance of the decedent's express
will and all its orders and actions taken in the testate proceedings before it be approved and authorized
rather than to annul all such proceedings regularly had and to repeat and duplicate the same proceedings
before the Cebu court only to revert once more to the Quezon City court should the Cebu court find that
indeed and in fact, as already determined by the Quezon City court on the strength of incontrovertible
documentary evidence of record, Quezon City was the conjugal residence of the decedent.
11. Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory authority over all inferior courts,

22

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals and the petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction originally filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) is
ordered dismissed. No costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Fernando and Castro, JJ., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990

CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCORDIA JAVELLANA VILLANUEVA, respondents.
Rex Suiza Castillon for petitioner.
Salas & Villareal for private respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 26, 1988 of the Court of Appeals in CA GR CV No. 09010 (Concordia Villanueva v.
Celedonia Solivio) affirming the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 13207 for partition, reconveyance of ownership and possession
and damages, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and against defendant:
a) Ordering that the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. be divided into two (2) shares: one-half for the plaintiff and
one-half for defendant. From both shares shall be equally deducted the expenses for the burial, mausoleum and
related expenditures. Against the share of defendants shall be charged the expenses for scholarship, awards,
donations and the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Memorial Foundation;'
b) Directing the defendant to submit an inventory of the entire estate property, including but not limited to, specific items
already mentioned in this decision and to render an accounting of the property of the estate, within thirty (30) days from
receipt of this judgment; one-half (1/2) of this produce shall belong to plaintiff;
c) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation; P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees plus
costs.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 42-43, Rollo)
This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the first post-war Filipino novel "Without Seeing the Dawn,"
who died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his
maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia
Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.
He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after his marriage in December, 1916 to Salustia Solivio and four months
before Esteban, Jr. was born.
Salustia and her sister, Celedonia (daughter of Engracio Solivio and his second wife Josefa Fernandez), a teacher in the Iloilo Provincial
High School, brought up Esteban, Jr.
Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of land in Calinog, Iloilo covered by 24 titles) which she had
inherited from her mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first wife (p. 325, Record), but no conjugal property was acquired during her
short-lived marriage to Esteban, Sr.
On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr., including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City,
where she, her son, and her sister lived. In due time, the titles of all these properties were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some close friends his plan to place his estate in
a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack
on February 26,1977 without having set up the foundation.
Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with Esteban's properties. Celedonia told Concordia about
Esteban's desire to place his estate in a foundation to be named after his mother, from whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping
indigent students in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased. This fact was admitted by her in her "Motion to
Reopen and/or Reconsider the Order dated April 3, 1978" which she filed on July 27, 1978 in Special Proceeding No. 2540, where she
stated:
4. That petitioner knew all along the narrated facts in the immediately preceding paragraph [that herein movant is also
the relative of the deceased within the third degree, she being the younger sister of the late Esteban Javellana, father
of the decedent herein], because prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant
Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they have closely known
each other due to their filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each other's house which are not far away
for (sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis supplied.)

Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings leading to the formation of the foundation, Celedonia in good
faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed on March 8, 1977 Spl. Proceeding No. 2540 for her appointment as special administratrix of
the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. (Exh. 2). Later, she filed an amended petition (Exh. 5) praying that letters of administration be issued to
her; that she be declared sole heir of the deceased; and that after payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting, the estate
be adjudicated to her (p. 115, Rollo).
After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her amended petition, she was declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban
Javellana, Jr. She explained that this was done for three reasons: (1) because the properties of the estate had come from her sister, Salustia
Solivio; (2) that she is the decedent's nearest relative on his mother's side; and (3) with her as sole heir, the disposition of the properties of
the estate to fund the foundation would be facilitated.
On April 3, 1978, the court (Branch II, CFI, now Branch 23, RTC) declared her the sole heir of Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold properties of
the estate to pay the taxes and other obligations of the deceased and proceeded to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA
FOUNDATION" which she caused to be registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 17,1981 under Reg. No. 0100027 (p.
98, Rollo).
Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order declaring
Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the deceased. On October 27, 1978, her motion was denied by the
court for tardiness (pp. 80-81, Record). Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia filed on January 7, 1980 (or one year and two months
later), Civil Case No. 13207 in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 26, entitled "Concordia Javellana- Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio" for
partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages.
On September 3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 13207, in favor of Concordia Javellana-Villanueva.
On Concordia's motion, the trial court ordered the execution of its judgment pending appeal and required Celedonia to submit an inventory
and accounting of the estate. In her motions for reconsideration of those orders, Celedonia averred that the properties of the deceased had
already been transferred to, and were in the possession of, the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation." The trial court denied her
motions for reconsideration.
In the meantime, Celedonia perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA GR CV No. 09010). On January 26, 1988, the Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Division, rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court in toto.Hence, this petition for review wherein she raised the
following legal issues:
1. whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 13207 for partition and recovery of
Concordia Villanueva's share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. even while the probate proceedings (Spl. Proc. No.
2540) were still pending in Branch 23 of the same court;
2. whether Concordia Villanueva was prevented from intervening in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 through extrinsic fraud;
3. whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva troncal in favor of Celedonia, his relative within the third
degree on his mother's side from whom he had inherited them; and
4. whether Concordia may recover her share of the estate after she had agreed to place the same in the Salustia
Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation, and notwithstanding the fact that conformably with said agreement, the
Foundation has been formed and properties of the estate have already been transferred to it.
I. The question of jurisdiction
After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to
entertain Concordia Villanueva's action for partition and recovery of her share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate
proceedings (Spl, Proc. No. 2540) for the settlement of said estate are still pending in Branch 23 of the same court, there being as yet no
orders for the submission and approval of the administratix's inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and
terminating the proceedings (p. 31, Record).
It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the
intestate proceedings, puts an end to the administration and thus far relieves the administrator from his duties (Santiesteban v. Santiesteban,
68 Phil. 367, Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, et al., L-27860, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 266).
The assailed order of Judge Adil in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 declaring Celedonia as the sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. did not toll
the end of the proceedings. As a matter of fact, the last paragraph of the order directed the administratrix to "hurry up the settlement of the
estate." The pertinent portions of the order are quoted below:
2. As regards the second incident [Motion for Declaration of Miss Celedonia Solivio as Sole Heir, dated March 7, 1978],
it appears from the record that despite the notices posted and the publication of these proceedings as required by law,
no other heirs came out to interpose any opposition to the instant proceeding. It further appears that herein
Administratrix is the only claimant-heir to the estate of the late Esteban Javellana who died on February 26, 1977.
During the hearing of the motion for declaration as heir on March 17, 1978, it was established that the late Esteban
Javellana died single, without any known issue, and without any surviving parents. His nearest relative is the herein
Administratrix, an elder [sic] sister of his late mother who reared him and with whom he had always been living with
[sic] during his lifetime.
xxxxxxxxx

2. Miss Celedonia Solivio, Administratrix of this estate, is hereby declared as the sole and legal heir of the late Esteban
S. Javellana, who died intestate on February 26, 1977 at La Paz, Iloilo City.
The Administratrix is hereby instructed to hurry up with the settlement of this estate so that it can be terminated. (pp,
14-16, Record)
In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Branch 11 of the Court of First Instance (now RTC, Branch 23), Concordia's motion to
set aside the order declaring Celedonia as sole heir of Esteban, and to have herself (Concordia) declared as co-heir and recover her share
of the properties of the deceased, was properly filed by her in Spl. Proc. No. 2540. Her remedy when the court denied her motion, was to
elevate the denial to the Court of Appeals for review on certiorari. However, instead of availing of that remedy, she filed more than one year
later, a separate action for the same purpose in Branch 26 of the court. We hold that the separate action was improperly filed for it is the
probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate.
In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedent's estate, a court should not interfere with
probate proceedings pending in a co-equal court. Thus, did we rule in Guilas v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, L-26695,
January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 111, 117, where a daughter filed a separate action to annul a project of partition executed between her and her
father in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of her mother:
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts and the
remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the approval of the project of The
probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to make distribution, has power to determine the proportion or parts to
which each distributed is entitled. ... The power to determine the legality or illegality of the testamentary provision is
inherent in the jurisdiction of the court making a just and legal distribution of the inheritance. ... To hold that a separate
and independent action is necessary to that effect, would be contrary to the general tendency of the jurisprudence of
avoiding multiplicity of suits; and is further, expensive, dilatory, and impractical. (Marcelino v. Antonio, 70 Phil. 388)
A judicial declaration that a certain person is the only heir of the decedent is exclusively within the range of the
administratrix proceedings and can not properly be made an independent action. (Litam v. Espiritu, 100 Phil. 364)
A separate action for the declaration of heirs is not proper. (Pimentel v. Palanca, 5 Phil. 436)
partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding (Timbol v. Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276, L-15445, April
29, 1961; Siguiong v. Tecson, 89 Phil. pp. 28, 30). As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been
complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated Siguiong v. Tecson, supra); because
a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heirs from bringing an action to obtain his share,
provided the prescriptive period therefore has not elapsed (Mari v. Bonilia, 83 Phil. 137). The better practice, however,
for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or
administration proceedings, or for reopening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed,
and not through an independent action,which would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a
decision or order of the probate or intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago
distributed and disposed of. (Ramos v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol v. Cano, supra; Jingco v. Daluz, L-5107,
April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic v. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil. 455, 460-461;
Emphasis supplied)
In Litam et al., v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of
the deceased Rafael Litam the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which they claimed that they were the children by a previous
marriage of the deceased to a Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal properties acquired during his
marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not children of the deceased, that the
properties in question were paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this Court,
we ruled that "such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within
the exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue
until the presentation of the project of partition. (p. 378).
However, in the Guilas case, supra, since the estate proceedings had been closed and terminated for over three years, the action for
annulment of the project of partition was allowed to continue. Considering that in the instant case, the estate proceedings are still pending,
but nonetheless, Concordia had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in said proceedings, We have opted likewise to proceed to
discuss the merits of her claim in the interest of justice.
The orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. 13207 setting aside the probate proceedings in Branch 23 (formerly
Branch 11) on the ground of extrinsic fraud, and declaring Concordia Villanueva to be a co-heir of Celedonia to the estate of Esteban, Jr.,
ordering the partition of the estate, and requiring the administratrix, Celedonia, to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate, were
improper and officious, to say the least, for these matters he within the exclusive competence of the probate court.
II. The question of extrinsic fraud
Was Concordia prevented from intervening in the intestate proceedings by extrinsic fraud employed by Celedonia? It is noteworthy that
extrinsic fraud was not alleged in Concordia's original complaint in Civil Case No. 13207. It was only in her amended complaint of March 6,
1980, that extrinsic fraud was alleged for the first time.
Extrinsic fraud, as a ground for annulment of judgment, is any act or conduct of the prevailing party which prevented a
fair submission of the controversy (Francisco v. David, 38 O.G. 714). A fraud 'which prevents a party from having a trial
or presenting all of his case to the court, or one which operates upon matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but
to the manner by which such judgment was procured so much so that there was no fair submission of the controversy.
For instance, if through fraudulent machination by one [his adversary], a litigant was induced to withdraw his defense or

was prevented from presenting an available defense or cause of action in the case wherein the judgment was obtained,
such that the aggrieved party was deprived of his day in court through no fault of his own, the equitable relief against
such judgment may be availed of. (Yatco v. Sumagui, 44623-R, July 31, 1971). (cited in Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972
Ed. by Moreno; Varela v. Villanueva, et al., 96 Phil. 248)
A judgment may be annulled on the ground of extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, which
connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing litigant 'outside the trial of a case against the defeated party,
or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side
of the case. ... The overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party
from having his day in court or from presenting his case. The fraud, therefore, is one that affects and goes into the
jurisdiction of the court. (Libudan v. Gil, L-21163, May 17, 1972, 45 SCRA 17, 27-29; Sterling Investment Corp. v. Ruiz,
L-30694, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 318, 323)
The charge of extrinsic fraud is, however, unwarranted for the following reasons:
1. Concordia was not unaware of the special proceeding intended to be filed by Celedonia. She admitted in her
complaint that she and Celedonia had agreed that the latter would "initiate the necessary proceeding" and pay the
taxes and obligations of the estate. Thus paragraph 6 of her complaint alleged:
6. ... for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. at the lowest possible
cost and the least effort, the plaintiff and the defendant agreed that the defendant shall initiate the necessary
proceeding, cause the payment of taxes and other obligations, and to do everything else required by law, and
thereafter, secure the partition of the estate between her and the plaintiff, [although Celedonia denied that they agreed
to partition the estate, for their agreement was to place the estate in a foundation.] (p. 2, Record; emphasis supplied)
Evidently, Concordia was not prevented from intervening in the proceedings. She stayed away by choice.Besides, she knew that the estate
came exclusively from Esteban's mother, Salustia Solivio, and she had agreed with Celedonia to place it in a foundation as the deceased
had planned to do.
2. The probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice of the time and place of hearing of the petition is required to
be published (Sec. 3, Rule 76 in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 79, Rules of Court). Notice of the hearing of Celedonia's
original petition was published in the "Visayan Tribune" on April 25, May 2 and 9, 1977 (Exh 4, p. 197, Record).
Similarly, notice of the hearing of her amended petition of May 26, 1977 for the settlement of the estate was, by order of
the court, published in "Bagong Kasanag" (New Light) issues of May 27, June 3 and 10, 1977 (pp. 182-305, Record).
The publication of the notice of the proceedings was constructive notice to the whole world. Concordia was not
deprived of her right to intervene in the proceedings for she had actual, as well as constructive notice of the same. As
pointed out by the probate court in its order of October 27, 1978:
... . The move of Concordia Javellana, however, was filed about five months after Celedonia Solivio was declared as
the sole heir. ... .
Considering that this proceeding is one in rem and had been duly published as required by law, despite which the
present movant only came to court now, then she is guilty of laches for sleeping on her alleged right. (p. 22, Record)
The court noted that Concordia's motion did not comply with the requisites of a petition for relief from judgment nor a motion for new trial.
The rule is stated in 49 Corpus Juris Secundum 8030 as follows:
Where petition was sufficient to invoke statutory jurisdiction of probate court and proceeding was in rem no subsequent
errors or irregularities are available on collateral attack. (Bedwell v. Dean 132 So. 20)
Celedonia's allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir of Esteban within the third degree on his mother's side was not false.
Moreover, it was made in good faith and in the honest belief that because the properties of Esteban had come from his mother, not his father,
she, as Esteban's nearest surviving relative on his mother's side, is the rightful heir to them. It would have been self-defeating and
inconsistent with her claim of sole heirshipif she stated in her petition that Concordia was her co-heir. Her omission to so state did not
constitute extrinsic fraud.
Failure to disclose to the adversary, or to the court, matters which would defeat one's own claim or defense is not such
extrinsic fraud as will justify or require vacation of the judgment. (49 C.J.S. 489, citing Young v. Young, 2 SE 2d 622;
First National Bank & Trust Co. of King City v. Bowman, 15 SW 2d 842; Price v. Smith, 109 SW 2d 1144, 1149)
It should be remembered that a petition for administration of a decedent's estate may be filed by any "interested person" (Sec. 2, Rule 79,
Rules of Court). The filing of Celedonia's petition did not preclude Concordia from filing her own.
III. On the question of reserva troncal
We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased was subject to reserva troncal and that it pertains to her as his
only relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncalprovision of the Civil Code is found in Article 891 which reads as
follows:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by
gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have

acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from
which said property came.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)the ascendant who inherits by operation of law property
from his descendants.
2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees (reservatarios)relatives within the third degree
counted from the descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line from which the property came.
3. The propositusthe descendant who received by gratuitous title and died without issue, making his other ascendant
inherit by operation of law. (p. 692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the
descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance
subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva
troncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or 9 brother or sister. It
does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Article 891.
Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters,
nephews or nieces, what should apply in the distribution of his estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code which provide:
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives
shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives
shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole
blood.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that:
Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives of the decedent within the third degree in the collateral
line, each, therefore, shall succeed to the subject estate 'without distinction of line or preference among them by reason
of relationship by the whole blood,' and is entitled one-half (1/2) share and share alike of the estate. (p. 57, Rollo)
IV. The question of Concordia's one-half share
However, inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the estate of the deceased to the foundation in honor of his mother, Salustia Solivio
Vda. de Javellana (from whom the estate came), an agreement which she ratified and confirmed in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider
Order dated April 3, 1978" which she filed in Spl. Proceeding No. 2540:
4. That ... prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have
agreed to make the estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they have closely known each other due to their
filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each other's house which are not far away for (sic) each other. (p.
234, Record; Emphasis supplied)
she is bound by that agreement. It is true that by that agreement, she did not waive her inheritance in favor of Celedonia, but she did agree
to place all of Esteban's estate in the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" which Esteban, Jr., during his lifetime, planned to set
up to honor his mother and to finance the education of indigent but deserving students as well.
Her admission may not be taken lightly as the lower court did. Being a judicial admission, it is conclusive and no evidence need be presented
to prove the agreement (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Granada v. Philippine National Bank, L-20745, Sept. 2, 1966, 18 SCRA 1; Sta.
Ana v. Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018; People v. Encipido, G.R.70091, Dec. 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 478; and Rodillas v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. 58652, May 20, 1988, 161 SCRA 347).
The admission was never withdrawn or impugned by Concordia who, significantly, did not even testify in the case, although she could have
done so by deposition if she were supposedly indisposed to attend the trial. Only her husband, Narciso, and son-in-law, Juanito Domin,
actively participated in the trial. Her husband confirmed the agreement between his wife and Celedonia, but he endeavored to dilute it by
alleging that his wife did not intend to give all, but only one-half, of her share to the foundation (p. 323, Record).
The records show that the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" was established and duly registered in the Securities and
Exchange Commission under Reg. No. 0100027 for the following principal purposes:
1. To provide for the establishment and/or setting up of scholarships for such deserving students as the Board of
Trustees of the Foundation may decide of at least one scholar each to study at West Visayas State College, and the
University of the Philippines in the Visayas both located in Iloilo City.

2. To provide a scholarship for at least one scholar for St. Clements Redemptorist Community for a deserving student
who has the religious vocation to become a priest.
3. To foster, develop, and encourage activities that will promote the advancement and enrichment of the various fields
of educational endeavors, especially in literary arts. Scholarships provided for by this foundation may be named after
its benevolent benefactors as a token of gratitude for their contributions.
4. To direct or undertake surveys and studies in the community to determine community needs and be able to alleviate
partially or totally said needs.
5. To maintain and provide the necessary activities for the proper care of the Solivio-Javellana mausoleum at Christ the
King Memorial Park, Jaro, Iloilo City, and the Javellana Memorial at the West Visayas State College, as a token of
appreciation for the contribution of the estate of the late Esteban S. Javellana which has made this foundation possible.
Also, in perpetuation of his Roman Catholic beliefs and those of his mother, Gregorian masses or their equivalents will
be offered every February and October, and Requiem masses every February 25th and October llth, their death
anniversaries, as part of this provision.
6. To receive gifts, legacies, donations, contributions, endowments and financial aids or loans from whatever source, to
invest and reinvest the funds, collect the income thereof and pay or apply only the income or such part thereof as shall
be determined by the Trustees for such endeavors as may be necessary to carry out the objectives of the Foundation.
7. To acquire, purchase, own, hold, operate, develop, lease, mortgage, pledge, exchange, sell, transfer, or otherwise,
invest, trade, or deal, in any manner permitted by law, in real and personal property of every kind and description or
any interest herein.
8. To do and perform all acts and things necessary, suitable or proper for the accomplishments of any of the purposes
herein enumerated or which shall at any time appear conducive to the protection or benefit of the corporation, including
the exercise of the powers, authorities and attributes concerned upon the corporation organized under the laws of the
Philippines in general, and upon domestic corporation of like nature in particular. (pp. 9-10, Rollo)
As alleged without contradiction in the petition' for review:
The Foundation began to function in June, 1982, and three (3) of its eight Esteban Javellana scholars graduated in
1986, one (1) from UPV graduated Cum Laude and two (2) from WVSU graduated with honors; one was a Cum Laude
and the other was a recipient of Lagos Lopez award for teaching for being the most outstanding student teacher.
The Foundation has four (4) high school scholars in Guiso Barangay High School, the site of which was donated by the
Foundation. The School has been selected as the Pilot Barangay High School for Region VI.
The Foundation has a special scholar, Fr. Elbert Vasquez, who would be ordained this year. He studied at St. Francis
Xavier Major Regional Seminary at Davao City. The Foundation likewise is a member of the Redemptorist Association
that gives yearly donations to help poor students who want to become Redemptorist priests or brothers. It gives yearly
awards for Creative writing known as the Esteban Javellana Award.
Further, the Foundation had constructed the Esteban S. Javellana Multi-purpose Center at the West Visayas State
University for teachers' and students' use, and has likewise contributed to religious civic and cultural fund-raising
drives, amongst other's. (p. 10, Rollo)
Having agreed to contribute her share of the decedent's estate to the Foundation, Concordia is obligated to honor her commitment as
Celedonia has honored hers.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. Concordia
J. Villanueva is declared an heir of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. entitled to one-half of his estate. However, comformably with the
agreement between her and her co-heir, Celedonia Solivio, the entire estate of the deceased should be conveyed to the "Salustia Solivio
Vda. de Javallana Foundation," of which both the petitioner and the private respondent shall be trustees, and each shall be entitled to
nominate an equal number of trustees to constitute the Board of Trustees of the Foundation which shall administer the same for the
purposes set forth in its charter. The petitioner, as administratrix of the estate, shall submit to the probate court an inventory and accounting
of the estate of the deceased preparatory to terminating the proceedings therein.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 45904

September 30, 1938

Intestate estate of the deceased Luz Garcia. PABLO G. UTULO, applicant-appellee,

vs.
LEONA PASION VIUDA DE GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
Feliciano B. Gardiner for appellant.
Gerardo S. Limlingan for appellee.
IMPERIAL, J.:
This is an appeal taken by the oppositor from the order of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tarlac appointing the applicant as judicial
administrator of the property left by the deceased Luz Garcia.
Juan Garcia Sanchez died intestate, and in the proceedings instituted in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac for the administration of his property
(special proceedings No. 3475), Leona Pasion Vda. de Garcia, the surviving spouse and the herein oppositor, was appointed judicial administratrix.
The said deceased left legitimate children, named Juan Garcia, jr., Patrocinio Garcia and Luz Garcia who, with the widow, are the presumptive forced
heirs. Luz Garcia married the applicant Pablo G. Utulo and during the pendency of the administration proceedings of the said deceased, she died in the
province without any legitimate descendants, her only forced heirs being her mother and her husband. The latter commenced in the same court the
judicial administration of the property of his deceased wife (special proceedings No. 4188), stating in his petition that her only heirs were he himself and
his mother-in-law, the oppositor, and that the only property left by the deceased consisted in the share due her from the intestate of her father, Juan
Garcia Sanchez, and asking that he be named administrator of the property of said deceased. The oppositor objected to the petition, opposing the
judicial administration of the property of her daughter and the appointment of the applicant as administrator. She alleged that inasmuch as the said
deceased left no indebtedness, there was no occasion for the said judicial administration; but she stated that should the court grant the administration
of the property, she should be appointed the administratrix thereof inasmuch as she had a better right than the applicant. After the required
publications, trial was had and the court, on August 28, 1936, finally issued the appealed order to which the oppositor excepted and thereafter filed the
record on appeal which was certified and approved.
The oppositor-appellant assigns five errors allegedly committed by the trial court, but these assigned errors raise only two questions for resolution,
namely: whether upon the admitted facts the judicial administration of the property left by the deceased Luz Garcia lies, with the consequent
appointment of an administrator, and whether the appellant has a better right to the said office than the appellee.
1. As to the first question, we have section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure providing in part that "if no executor is named in the will, or if a person
dies intestate, administration shall be granted" etc. This provision enunciates the general rule that when a person dies living property in the Philippine
Islands, his property should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in the

section, in case the deceased left no will, or in case he had left one should he fail to name an executor therein. This rule, however, is subject to the
exceptions established by sections 596 and 597 of the same Code, as finally amended. According to the first, when all the heirs are of lawful age and
there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for
the appointment of an administrator. According to the second, if the property left does not exceed six thousand pesos, the heirs may apply to the
competent court, after the required publications, to proceed with the summary partition and, after paying all the known obligations, to partition all the
property constituting the inheritance among themselves pursuant to law, without instituting the judicial administration and the appointment of an
administrator.
Construing the scope of section 596, this court repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs,
whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and
unnecessary proceedings (Ilustre vs.Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434; Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232;
Baldemorvs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367; Fule vs. Fule, 46 Phil., 317).
In enunciating the aforesaid doctrine, this court relied on the provisions of articles 657, 659 and 661 of the Civil Code under which the heirs succeed to
all the property left by the deceased from the time of his death. In the case of Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, supra, it was said:
Under the provisions of the Civil Code (arts. 657 to 661), the rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his
death; in other words, the heirs succeeded immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at
the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before
his death. In the absence of debts existing against the estate, the heirs may enter upon the administration of the said property immediately.
If they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to partition it among themselves and can do this by mutual agreement,
they also have that privilege. The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be divided by a petition for partition in
case they can not mutually agree in the division. When there are no debts existing against the estate, there is certainly no occasion for the
intervention of an administrator in the settlement and partition of the estate among the heirs. When the heirs are all of lawful age and there
are no debts, there is no reason why the estate should be burdened with the costs and expenses of an administrator. The property
belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the absence of existing debts against the estate, the administrator has no right to intervene in any way
whatever in the division of the estate among the heirs. They are co-owners of an undivided estate and the law offers them a remedy for the
division of the same among themselves. There is nothing in the present case to show that the heirs requested the appointment of the
administrator, or that they intervened in any way whatever in the present actions. If there are any heirs of the estate who have not received
their participation, they have their remedy by petition for partition of the said estate.
In the cases of Malahacan vs. Ignacio, supra, Bondad vs. Bondad, supra, and Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, supra, the same doctrine was reiterated. And
in the case of Fule vs. Fule, supra, this court amplified and ratified the same doctrine in the following language:
Upon the second question Did the court a quo commit an error in refusing to appoint an administrator for the estate of Saturnino Fule?
it may be said (a) that it is admitted by all of the parties to the present action, that at the time of his death no debts existed against his
estate and (b) that all of the heirs of Saturnino Fule were of age.
In this jurisdiction and by virtue of the provisions of articles 657, 659 and 661 of the Civil Code, all of the property, real and personal, of a
deceased person who dies intestate, is transmitted immediately to his heirs. (To Guioc-Co vs. Del Rosario, 8 Phil., 546; Ilustre vs. Alaras
Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Marin vs.Nacianceno, 19 Phil., 238; Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434; Nable Jose vs. Uson, 27 Phil., 73;
Bondadvs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367.)
If then the property of the deceased, who dies intestate, passes immediately to his heirs, as owners, and there are no debts, what reason
can there be for the appointment of a judicial administrator to administer the estate for them and to deprive the real owners of their
possession to which they are immediately entitled? In the case of Bondad vs. Bondad (34 Phil., 232), Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano,
discussing this question, said: Under the provisions of the Civil Code (articles 657 to 661), the rights to the succession of a person are
transmitted from the moment of his death; in other words, the heirs succeed immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor.
The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered
to them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of debts existing against the estate, the heirs may enter upon the
administration of the said property immediately. If they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to partition it among
themselves and can do this by mutual agreement, they also have that privilege. The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an
estate may be divided by a petition for partition in case they cannot mutually agree in the division. (Sections 182-184, 196, and 596 of Act
No. 190.)
When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts there is no reason why the estate should be burdened with the cost and
expenses of an administrator. The administrator has no right to intervene in any way whatsoever in the division of the estate among the
heirs when they are adults and when there are no debts against the estate. (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, supra; Bondad vs. Bondad, supra;
Baldemor vs.Malangyaon, supra.)
When there are no debts and the heirs are all adults, their relation to the property left by their ancestor is the same as that of any other
coowners or owners in common, and they may recover their individual rights, the same as any other coowners of undivided property.
(Succession of Story, 3 La. Ann., 502; Mcintyre vs.Chappell, 4 Tex., 187; Wood et ux. vs. Ford, 29 Miss., 57.)
xxx

xxx

xxx

The right of the heirs in cases like the one we are discussing, also exist in the divisions of personal as well as the real property. If they
cannot agree as to the division, then a suit for partition of such personal property among the heirs of the deceased owner is maintenable
where the estate is not in debts, the heirs are all of age, and there is no administration upon the estate and no necessity thereof.
(Jordan vs. Jordan, 4 Tex. Civ. App. Rep., 559.)
It is difficult to conceive of any class or item of property susceptible of being held in common which may not be divided by the coowners. It
may be of personal property as well as of real estate; of several parcels as well as of a single parcel, and of non-contiguous as well as of
adjacent tracts; or of part only of the lands of the coowners as well as of the whole. (Pickering vs. Moore, 67 N. H., 533; 31 L. R. A., 698;
Pipes vs.Buckner, 51 Miss., 848; Tewksbury vs. Provizzo, 12 Cal., 20.)
We conceive of no powerful reason which counsels the abandonment of a doctrine so uniformly applied. We are convinced that if the courts had
followed it in all cases to which it has application, their files would not have been replete with unnecessary administration proceedings as they are now.
There is no weight in the argument adduced by the appellee to the effect that his appointment as judicial administrator is necessary so that he may

have legal capacity to appear in the intestate of the deceased Juan Garcia Sanchez. As he would appear in the said intestate by the right of the
representation, it would suffice for him to allege in proof of his interest that he is a usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife who, in turn, would be a
forced heir and an interested and necessary party if she were living . In order to intervene in said intestate and to take part in the distribution of the
property it is not necessary that the administration of the property of his deceased wife be instituted an administration which will take up time and
occasion inconvenience and unnecessary expenses.
2. In view of the foregoing, there is no need to determine which of the parties has preferential right to the office of administrator.
The appealed order should be reversed, with the costs of this instance to the applicant-appellee. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Diaz, Laurel and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 92436 July 26, 1991
MARIA VDA. DE REYES, EFREN REYES, ELVIRA REYES-TIMBOL, ERLINDA REYES-VALERIO, ERNESTO REYES, ELIZABETH
REYES, ALEX, RAFAEL II, EMELINA and EVELYN, all surnamed REYES, represented by their mother, MARIA VDA. DE
REYES, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES DALMACIO GARDIOLA and ROSARIO MARTILLANOrespondents.
De Lara, De Lunas & Rosales for petitioners.
Santos, Pilapil & Associates for private respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p

Assailed before Us in this appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-

reversing the decision of 1 October 1986 of Branch 21 (Imus,

Cavite) of the Regional Trial Court of the Fourth Judicial Region in Civil Case No. RTC-BCV-83-17
entitled Maria vda. de Reyes, et al. vs. Spouses Dalmacio Gardiola and Rosario Martillano, and Spouses
G.R. CV No. 11934, promulgated on 20 October 1989,

Ricardo M. Gardiola and Emelita Gardiola, and the resolution of 1 March 1990 denying the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
2

As culled from both decisions and the pleadings of the parties, the following facts have been preponderantly established:
During his lifetime, one Gavino Reyes owned a parcel of land of approximately 70 hectares, more or less, located at Sangayad, Ulong-Tubig,
Carmona, Cavite. He sought to bring said land under the operation of the Torrens System of registration of property. Unfortunately, he died in
1921 without the title having been issued to him. The application was prosecuted by his son, Marcelo Reyes, who was the administrator of
his property.
In 1936 the above property was surveyed and subdivided by Gavino's heirs (Exh. "6"). In the subdivision plan, each resultant lot was
earmarked, indicated for and assigned to a specific heir. It appears therein that two lots, one of which is Lot No. I A-14 (Exh. "6-A"), were
allotted to Rafael Reyes, Sr., one of Gavino's children. Per testimony of Juan Poblete, the children thereafter secured tax declarations for
their respective shares.
In 1941, or about twenty (20) years after the death of Gavino, the original certificate of title for the whole property OCT No. 255 was
issued. It was, however, kept by Juan Poblete, son-in-law of Marcelo Reyes, who was by then already deceased. The heirs of Gavino were
not aware of this fact.
On 3 December 1943, Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold a parcel of land with an area of 23,431 square meters, more or less, to private respondent
Dalmacio Gardiola (Exh. "5"). According to the vendee, this parcel corresponds to Lot No. 1-A-14 of the subdivision plan aforestated. The
deed of sale, however, did not specifically mention Lot No. 1-A-14. The vendee immediately took possession of the property and started
paying the land taxes therein.
In 1945 or thereabouts, Juan Poblete "revalidated" the original Certificate of Title. As reconstituted, the new title isOCT (0-4358) RO255 (Exhs. "4" to "4-A").
On 21 October 1967, when the heirs of Gavino Reyes executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Exh. "D") based on the
aforestated subdivision plan (Exh. "6"), the lot that was intended for Rafael Reyes, Sr., who was already deceased, was instead adjudicated
to his only son and heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr. (the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners herein). Private respondent Rosario Martillano
signed the deed in representation of her mother, Marta Reyes, one of the children of Gavino Reyes.
As a result of the Extrajudicial Settlement, OCT RO-255 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, several transfer certificates of title covering the
subdivided lots were issued in the names of the respective adjudicatees. One of them is TCT No. 27257 in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr.
covering Lot No. 1-A-14. The Transfer Certificates of Title were, however, kept by one Candido Hebron. On 10 January 1969, some of the
heirs of Gavino Reyes filed a case of Annulment of Partition and Recovery of Possession before the Court of First Instance of Cavite City,
which was docketed therein as Civil Case No. 1267. One of the defendants in said case is herein private respondent Rosario Martillano. The
case was dismissed on 18 September 1969, but Candido Hebron was ordered by the trial court to deliver to the heirs concerned all the
transfer certificates of title in his possession. 3
After obtaining the Transfer Certificate of Title for Lot No. 1-A-14 from Hebron, pursuant to the aforesaid order in Civil Case No. 1267,
petitioners herein, as successors-in-interest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., filed on 14 March 1983 with the Regional Trial Court the above-mentioned
Civil Case No. RTC-BCV-83-17 against private respondents (defendants therein) for recovery of possession or, in the alternative, for
indemnification, accounting and damages. They allege therein that after "having definitely discovered that they are the lawful owners of the
property," (Lot No. 1-A-14), they, "including Rafael Reyes, Jr., during his lifetime, made repeated demands to (sic) defendants to surrender
the possession of and vacate the parcel of land belonging to the former, but defendants refused to vacate and surrender the possession of
the said land to herein plaintiffs;" the last of the demands was allegedly made on 8 October 1982. They further allege that they have been
deprived by said defendants of the rightful possession and enjoyment of the property since September 1969 which coincides with the date
of the order in Civil Case No. 1267. 4
In their answer, private respondents deny the material averments in the complaint and assert that they are the owners of the lot in question,
having bought the same from Rafael Reyes, Sr., that the issuance of TCT No. 27257 is null and void, for such sale was known to Rafael
Reyes, Jr.; that they have been in possession of the property and have been paying the land taxes thereon; and that petitioners are barred
by prescription and/or laches. 5
Petitioners amended their complaint on 21 March 1985 to implead as additional defendants the spouses Ricardo M. Gardiola and Emerita
Gardiola, on the basis of the following claims:
xxx xxx xxx
9. Meanwhile, during the presentation of the defendants spouses Dalmacio Gardiola and Rosario Martillano's evidence
the former testified that they mortgaged the subject land to the Rural Bank of Carmona Inc. For their failure to redeem
the mortgage the same was foreclosed by the bank.
10. However, within the period of one(1) year from such foreclosure the questioned land was redeemed by the original
defendants' son in the person of Ricardo M. Gardiola, who was knowledgeable/aware of the pendency of the above
captioned case. The corresponding redemption was effected through a deed of conveyance, . . . . 6
The prayer of the amended complaint now contains the alternative relief for indemnification for the reasonable value of the property "in the
event restitution of the property is no longer possible." 7

the trial court concluded that petitioners' "title over the subject property is valid
and regular and thus they are entitled to its possession and enjoyment," and accordingly decided thus:
In its decision of 1 October 1986,

WHEREFORE, the defendants or anyone acting for and in their behalf are hereby ordered to relinguish possession or
vacate the property in question which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27257 in favor of the plaintiffs.
All other claims and/or counterclaims of the parties relative to this case are dismissed for lack of proper substantiation.
The conclusion of the trial court is based on its finding that (a) there is no evidence that the heirs of Gavino Reyes entered into any written
agreement of partition in 1936 based on the subdivision plan; (b) there is no identity between Lot No. 1-14-A and the land sold to private
respondents by Rafael Reyes, Sr., or otherwise stated, the description of the latter as indicated in the deed of sale (Exh. "5") does not tally
with the description of the former; and (c) moreover:
Granting, arguendo, that the sale made by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to the defendants covered the land in question Lot No.
1-A-14 and that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27257 was obtained by means of fraud, the claim of the
defendants over the said property is already barred. Action for reconveyance prescribes in four (4) years from the
discovery thereof. If there was fraud, the defendant could have discovered the same in 1967 when the partition was
made in as much as defendant Rosario Martillano was a party to that partition. Let us grant further that the issuance of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27257 to Rafael Reyes, Jr. created a constructive or implied trust in favor of the
defendants, again, the claim of the defendants is also barred. From 1967 to the filing of their answer (let us consider
this as an action for reconveyance) to this case sometime in July, 1983, a period of about sixteen (16) years had
already elapsed. Prescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust is ten (10) years.
The trial court further held that the continued possession by private respondents, which it found to have started in 1943, did not ripen into
ownership because at that time, the property was already registered, hence it cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. 9
Private respondents appealed the said decision to the Court of Appeals which docketed the appeal as C.A.-G.R. CV No. 11934. In its
decision of 20 October 1989, the respondent Court of Appeals formulated the issues before it as follows:
I
Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring that the property of the late Gavino Reyes consisting of 70 hectares
was partitioned only in 1967 by his grandchildren after discovery of the existence of OCT No. 255 and that no actual
partition was made in 1936 by the decedent's children.
II
Whether or not the lower court erred in concluding that the parcel of land sold by the appellees' predecessor-in-interest,
the late Rafael Reyes, Sr. to appellant Dalmacio Gardiola was not the same parcel of land under litigation. 10
and resolved such issues, thus:
On the first issue, We believe that the lower court committed a reversible error when it declared that the landed estate
of the late Gavino Reyes was partitioned only in 1967 by the latter's grandchildren; and that no actual partition was
made in 1936 by the decedents' (sic) children. The evidence on record bears out the existence of a subdivision plan
(Exh. 6) which was not controverted nor denied by the appellees. In like manner, the lower court itself recognized the
fact that the property of the late Gavino Reyes consisting of 70 hectares was surveyed and subdivided in 1936 as
evidenced by the said subdivision plan (Exh. 6). With the existence of a subdivision plan, and from the uncontroverted
testimony of appellants' witness, We can only infer that at least an oral partition, which under the law is valid and
binding, was entered into by the heirs of Gavino Reyes regarding his properties in 1936. As held in a long line of
decisions, extrajudicial partition can be done orally, and the same would be valid if freely entered into (Belen v. Belen,
49 O.G. 997, March 1953). The reason for this is because a partition is not exactly a conveyance for the reason that it
does not involve transfer of property from one to the other but rather a confirmation by them of their ownership of the
property. It must also be remembered that when Gavino Reyes died on March 7, 1921, his property was admittedly not
yet covered by a torrens title, as it was only in 1941 when said properties were brought into the application of the
torrens system. With this factual milieu, it can also be concluded that his heirs have indeed settled, subdivided and
partitioned Gavino Reyes' landed estate without formal requirements of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court when a parcel of
land is covered by a torrens title. As told earlier, the Subdivision Plan (Exh. 6) undisputedly showed on its face that the
70 hectares of land belonging to the late Gavino Reyes was subdivided and partitioned by his children in 1936. On this
score, the partition of the said property even without the formal requirements under the rule is valid as held in the case
of Hernandez vs. Andal, 78 Phil. 176, which states:
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, in the Deed of Sale dated December 3, 1943 (Exh. 5) executed by Rafael Reyes, Sr. in favor of appellant
Dalmacio Gardiola, the land sold therein was described as "na aking minana sa aking ama." This alone would confirm
the contention of the appellants that there was already an actual partition (at least an oral partition) of the property of
Gavino Reyes in 1936. As aforestated, the presence of the Subdivision Plan (Exh. 6) is an (sic) evidence of such
partition which appellees failed to controvert not to mention the fact that the lower court itself recognized the existence
of said plan, in the same manner that it concluded that the property was already surveyed and actually subdivided in
1936 (page 3, pars. 3 and 4, Decision).

From the foregoing considerations it is evident that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Exh. D) executed by
the grandchildren of the late Gavino Reyes in 1967 is of no moment considering that the property subject of the
partition in the deed was already partitioned in 1936 by the children of Gavino Reyes. It is for this reason that the lots
supposedly inherited by the grandchildren named in the deed of 1967 were the same lots inherited and given to their
respective fathers or mothers in 1936 while the land was not yet covered by the torrens system. Hence, in the case of
Rafael Reyes, Sr., the land inherited by him was two (2) parcels of land known as Lots Nos. 1-A-3 and 1-A-14
described in the Subdivision plan of 1936 (Exh. 6), which were the same parcels of land allegedly inherited by Rafael
Reyes, Jr. from Gavino Reyes in representation of his father, pursuant to the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
for which TCT No. 27257 was issued.
Coming to the second issue, the lower court likewise erred when it concluded that the parcel of land sold by appellee's
predecessor-in-interest to appellant Dalmacio Gardiola was not the same parcel of land under litigation. It must be
pointed out that the identity of the parcel of land which the appellees sought to recover from the appellants was never
an issue in the lower court, because the litigants had already conceded that the parcel identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in
TCT No. 27257 was the same parcel of land identified as Cadastral Lot No. 1228 and 1235 described in Tax
Declaration No. 4766. Despite this admission, however, the lower court declared that "as described in the deed of sale
(Exh. 5), the land's description does not tally with the description of Lot No. 1-A-14, the land in litigation." As correctly
pointed out by the appellants however, the discrepancy in the description was due to the fact that the description of the
land sold in the Deed of Sale was expressed in layman's language whereas the description of Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT
No. 27257 was done in technical terms. This was so because, when Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold the property in dispute to
appellant Dalmacio Gardiola on December 3, 1943, the only evidence of title to the land then available in so far as
Rafael Reyes, Sr. was concerned was Tax Declaration No. 4766, because at that time, neither he nor appellant
Dalmacio Gardiola was aware of the existence of OCT No. 255 as in fact TCT No. 27257 was issued only in 1967.
Consequently, the land subject of the Deed of Sale was described by the vendor in the manner as described in Tax
Declaration No. 4766. However, the description of the land appearing in the Deed of Sale (Exh. 5) was exactly the
same land identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in the Subdivision Plan (Exh. 6) of 1936. Accordingly, the assumption of the
lower court that "if the land sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. was the one now in litigation, he could have easily indicated Lot
No. 1-A-14" is bereft of merit under the foregoing circumstances. Interestingly enough, the appellees never denied the
identity of the subject lot during the hearing at the lower court. What they were denying only was the sale made by
Rafael Reyes, Sr. to appellant Dalmacio Gardiola which does not hold true because of the document denominated as
Deed of Sale (Exh. 5). 11
It concluded that the trial court erred when it ordered the private respondents or anyone acting in their behalf to relinquish the possession or
vacate the property in question. It thus decreed:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment is ordered REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is rendered declaring
appellants to be the lawful owners of the lot identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT No. 27257. No
costs. 12

petitioners
filed the instant petition on 6 April 1990 after having obtained an extension of time within which to file it.
Their motion to reconsider the above decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of 1 March 1990,

13

The petition does not implead original new defendants Ricardo Gardiola and Emelita Gardiola.
As ground for their plea for the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioners allege that said court has decided questions of
substance in a way not in accord with law or applicable jurisprudence when it held that "the deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate (Exh.
"D") executed by the grandchildren of the late Gavino Reyes in 1967 is of no moment considering that the property subject of the partition
was already partitioned in 1936 by the children of Gavino Reyes." In support thereof, they claim that (a) TCT No. 27257 covers two parcels of
land; the lot described in paragraph 1 thereof is owned by petitioners and that ownership was confirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 79882,
hence, the Court of Appeals should have affirmed the decision of the trial court; (b) private respondent Rosario Martillano was a party to the
extrajudicial settlement of estate which was duly registered in the Registry of Deeds in 1967; said registration is the operative act that gives
validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land and also constituted constructive notice to the whole world. The court cannot disregard
the binding effect thereof Finally, the pronouncement of the Court of Appeals that private respondents are the lawful owners of the lot in

and allows reconveyance which is

not tenable since the action therefor had already prescribed, as stated in the decision of the trial court.
question "militates against the indefeasible and incontrovertible character of the torrens title," 14

In the resolution of 7 May 1990, We required respondents to comment on the petition. But even before it could do so, petitioner, without
obtaining prior leave of the Court, filed on 29 May 1990 a so-called Supplemental Arguments in Support of The Petition For Review

wherein they assert, among others, that: (a) the findings of facts of respondent Court are
contrary to those of the trial court and appear to be contradicted by the evidence on record thus calling for
the review by this Court; (b) it also committed misapprehension of the facts in this case and its findings
are based on speculation, conjecture and surmises; (c) private respondents' attack on petitioners' title is a
collateral attack which is not allowed; even if it is allowed, the same had already prescribed and is now
barred.
On certiorari 15

16

We required petitioners to reply thereto, which

A rejoinder was filed by private respondents on 29 August 1990.

It was only on 15 June 1990 that private respondents filed their Comment.

they complied with on 8 August 1990.

18

17

We gave due course to the petition on 19 September 1990 and required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda
which they complied with.

Attached as Annex "A" to private respondent's Memorandum, which was filed on 10 December 1990, is the Resolution of this Court (Third
Division) of 20 August 1990 in G.R. No. 92811 entitled Spouses Artemio Durumpili and Angustia Reyes vs. The Court of Appeals and
Spouses Dalmacio Gardiola and Rosario Martillano, which also involves the property of Gavino Reyes, the partition thereof among his
children in 1936, and the extrajudicial settlement in 1967.
In said resolution, this Court held:
. . . The partition made in 1936, although oral, was valid. The requirement in Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts
which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable
property must appear in a public instrument is only for convenience and not for validity or enforceability as between the
parties themselves. [Thunga Hui vs. Que Bentec, 2 Phil. 561 (1903)] The subsequent execution by the heirs of the
Extrajudicial Partition in 1967 did not alter the oral partition as in fact the share pertaining to Angustia Reyes
corresponded to that previously assigned to her father. Considering that Angel Reyes sold this property to Basilio de
Ocampo who, in turn, sold the same to respondents, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the latter lawfully acquired
the property and are entitled to ownership and possession thereof.
In answer to the charge of private respondents that petitioners deliberately failed to cite this resolution, the latter, in their reply-memorandum
dated 15 March 1991 and filed three days thereafter, allege:
Our failure to mention the aforementioned resolution before this Honorable Court is not deliberate nor with malice
aforethought. The reason is that to date, we have not yet received any resolution to our Motion For Leave of Court To
Refer Case To The Honorable Supreme Court En Banc. Moreover, we honestly feel that the resolution that will be
issued therein will not be applicable to the case before this Honorable Court's Second Division. It should be mentioned
that in the Durumpili case before the Third Division, the Court of Appeals relied on the alleged confirmation of the sale
executed by Angustia Reyes, while in the Reyes case before this Second Division, there was no sale that was
executed by the petitioners Reyes' predecessor-in-interest, Rafael Reyes, Jr.
The foregoing claim is not supported by the rollo of G.R. No. 92811, which reveals the following: (a) On 18 September 1990, petitioners
therein, represented by De Lara, De Lunas and Rosales, who are the lawyers of petitioners in the instant case, filed a motion for the

b) This motion was denied in the resolution of 1 October

1990. c) On 17 November 1990, petitioners therein, through the same lawyers, filed a Motion For Leave
Of Court To Refer Case To The Honorable Supreme Court En Banc And/Or Motion For
Reconsideration wherein they specifically admit that said case and the instant petition have "identity
and/or similarity of the parties, the facts, the issues raised," even going to the extent of "graphically"
illustrating where such similarities lie. d) This motion was denied in the resolution of 28 November 1990.
Copy thereof was furnished the attorneys for petitioners. e) Entry of judgment had already been made
therein and a copy thereof was sent to petitioner's counsel per Letter of Transmittal of the Deputy Court
and Chief of the Judicial Records Office dated 20 December 1990.
reconsideration of the resolution of 20 August 1990.

19

20

21

22

23

What comes out prominently from the disquisitions of the parties is this simple issue: whether or not respondent Court of Appeals committed
any reversible error in setting aside the decision of the trial court.
We find none. The reversal of the trial court's decision is inevitable and unavoidable because the legal and factual conclusions made by the
trial court are unfounded and clearly erroneous. The Court of Appeals was not bound to agree to such conclusions. The trial court erred in
holding that: (a) there was no partition among the children of Gavino Reyes in 1936 since there is no written evidence in support thereof; yet,
it admits that there was a survey and subdivision of the property and the adjudication of specific subdivision lots to each of the children of
Gavino; (b) the land sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondents is not identical to Lot No. 1-A-14, the lot specified for and adjudicated
to Rafael Reyes, Jr. in the partition agreement; and (c) if the land sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola is
indeed Lot No. 1-A-14 and that TCT No. T-27257 was obtained through fraud, the remedy open to the vendee was an action for
reconveyance, which should have been brought within four (4) years from the discovery thereof in 1967 when the Extrajudicial Settlement
was executed since private respondent Rosario Martillano, wife of Dalmacio, was a party thereto.
The Court of Appeals correctly held that the partition made by the children of Gavino Reyes in 1936, although oral, was valid and binding.

InHernandez vs. Andal, supra, this Court,

interpreting Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, held that the requirement that a partition be put in
a public document and registered has for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the
protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as
constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the
prescribed formalities does not come into play when there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are
not affected. Where no such rights are involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an
agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by law. There is
nothing in said section from which it can be inferred that a writing or other formality is an essential
requisite to the validity of the partition. Accordingly, an oral partition is valid.
There is no law that requires partition among heirs to be in writing to be valid.

24

Barcelona, et al. vs. Barcelona, et al., supra, provides the reason why oral partition is valid and why it is not covered by the Statute of
Frauds: partition among heirs or renunciation of an inheritance by some of them is not exactly a conveyance of real property for the reason
that it does not involve transfer of property from one to the other, but rather a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property by the heir
renouncing in favor of another heir accepting and receiving the inheritance.

Additionally, the validity of such oral partition in 1936 has been expressly sustained by this Court in the Resolution of 20 August 1990 in G.R.
No. 92811. 25
But even if We are to assume arguendo that the oral partition executed in 1936 was not valid for some reason or another, We would still
arrive at the same conclusion for upon the death of Gavino Reyes in 1921, his heirs automatically became co-owners of his 70-hectare

The estate of the decedent

would then be held in co-ownership by the heirs. The co-heir or co-owner may validly dispose of his share
or interest in the property subject to the condition that the portion disposed of is eventually allotted to him
in the division upon termination of the co-ownership. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:
parcel of land. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.

26

Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or
the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership.

this Court held that every co-heir has the absolute ownership of his share in the
community property and may alienate, assign, or mortgage the same, except as to purely personal rights,
but the effect of any such transfer is limited to the portion which may be awarded to him upon the partition
of the property.
In Ramirez vs. Bautista, 27

In the case at bar, the lot sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola is his share in the estate of his deceased father,
Gavino Reyes. It is the same property which was eventually adjudicated to his son and heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr., represented in turn by his
heirs-petitioners herein-in the extrajudicial settlement of 1967.
In respect to the issue as to whether the property sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. is identical to Lot No. 1-14-A, the trial court based its conclusion
that it is not, on his observation that the description of the former does not tally with that of the latter, moreover, if Rafael did intend to sell Lot
No. 1-14-A, he should have specifically stated it in the deed since at that time, the property had already been partitioned and said lot was
adjudicated to him. In addition to the contrary findings and conclusion of the respondent Court on this issue to which We fully agree, it is to
be stressed that Rafael had this property declared for taxation purposes and the tax declaration issued was made the basis for the
description of the property in the deed of sale. Upon the execution of the deed of sale, vendee herein private respondent Dalmacio
Gardiola immediately took possession of the property. This is the very same property which is the subject matter of this case and which
petitioners seek to recover from the private respondents. The main evidence adduced for their claim of ownership and possession over it is
TCT No. T-27257, the certificate of title covering Lot No. 1-14-A. They therefore admit and concede that the property claimed by private
respondent, which was acquired by sale from Rafael Reyes, Sr., is none other than Lot No. 1-14-A.
The participation of private respondent Rosario Gardiola in the Extrajudicial Settlement did not place private respondents in estoppel to
question the issuance of TCT No. T-27257. As correctly maintained by private respondents, she signed it in representation of her deceased
mother, Marta Reyes, a daughter and an heir of Gavino Reyes. She did not sign for and in behalf of her husband, Dalmacio Gardiola, vendee
of the share of Rafael Reyes, Sr.
The same did not operate to divest the vendee of the share of Rafael Reyes, Sr. in the estate of Gavino. Petitioners, as mere successors-ininterest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., son of Rafael Reyes, Sr., can only acquire that which Rafael, Jr. could transmit to them upon his death. The
latter never became the owner of Lot No. 1-A-14 because it was sold by his father in 1943. The issuance of TCT No. T-27257 in the name of
Rafael Reyes, Jr., in so far as Lot No. 1-14-A is concerned, was clearly erroneous because he never became its owner. An extrajudicial

it is but a confirmation or
ratification of title or right to property. Thus, since he never had any title or right to Lot No. 1-14-A, the
mere execution of the settlement did not improve his condition, and the subsequent registration of the
deed did not create any right or vest any title over the property in favor of the petitioners as heirs of Rafael
Reyes, Jr. The latter cannot give them what he never had before. Nemo dare potest quod non habet.
settlement does not create a light in favor of an heir. As this Court stated in the Barcelona case, 28

There is one more point that should be stressed here. Petitioners' immediate predecessor-in-interest, Rafael Reyes, Jr., never took any
action against private respondents from the time his father sold the lot to the latter. Neither did petitioners bring any action to recover from
private respondents the ownership and possession of the lot from the time Rafael Reyes, Jr. died. As categorically admitted by petitioners in
their complaint and amended complaint, it was only in or about September 1969 when, after the delivery of TCT No. 27257 by Candido
Hebron to them, that they definitely discovered that they were the owners of the property in question. And yet, despite full knowledge that
private respondents were in actual physical possession of the property, it was only about thirteen and one-half (13 1/2) years later that they
decided to file an action for recovery of possession. As stated earlier, the original complaint was filed in the trial court on 14 March 1983.
There was then absolutely no basis for the trial court to place the burden on private respondents to bring an action for reconveyance within
four (4) years from their discovery of the issuance of the transfer certificate of title in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr.
The instant petition then is without merit.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the petition with costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10474

February 28, 1958

BENNY SAMPILO and HONORATO SALACUP, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and FELISA SINOPERA respondent.
Clodualdo P. Surio for petitioners.
Moises B. Ramos for respondents.
LABRADOR, J.:
Certiorari against decision of the Court of Appeals, Third Division, affirming with slight modification a judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan, declaring plaintiffs owners of one-half portion of four parcels of land described in the complaint, with costs. The judgment was
rendered in an action instituted by Felisa Sinopera, administrative of the estate of Teodoro Tolete, to recover from defendants one-half share
of the aforesaid parcels of land, which, it is alleged belong to the deceased Teodoro Tolete.
According, to the facts found by the Court of Appeals, Teodoro Tolete died intestate in January, 1945. He left for parcels of land, lots Nos.
12006, 119967, 14352 and 12176 of the cadastral survey of San Manuel, Pangasinan He left as heirs his widow, Leoncia de Leon, and
several nephews and nieces, children of deceased brothers and sisters. On July 25, 1946, without any judicial proceedings, his widow
executed an affidavit stating that "the deceased Teodoro Tolete left no children or respondent neither ascendants or acknowledged natural
children neither brother, sisters, nephews or nieces, but the, widow Leoncia de Leon, the legitimate wife of the deceased, the one and only
person to inherit the above properties" (Record on Appeal, p. 9). This affidavit was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan. On the same day, she executed a deed of sale of all the above parcels of land in favor of Benny Sampilo for the sum of
P10,000. This sale was also registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. On June 17, 1950, Benny Sampilo, in turn, sold
the said parcels of land to Honorato Salacup for P50,000 and this sale was also registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan (See Annexes "A", "B", "C", attached to the complaint).
In March, 1950, Felisa Sinopera instituted proceedings for the administration of the estate of Teodoro Tolete (Special Proceeding No. 3694,
Pangasinan), and having secured her appointment as administratrix, brought the present action on June 20, 1950. Notice of lis pendens was
filed in the Office of the Register of Deeds and said notice was recorded on certificates of title covering the said properties on June 26, 1950.
This notice, however, was subsequent to the registration of the deed of sale, in favor of Honorato Salacup, which took place on June 17,
1950.
The complaint alleges that the widow Leoncia de Leon, had no right to execute the affidavit of adjudication and that Honorato Salacup
acquired no rights to the lands sold to him, and that neither had Benny Sampilo acquired any right to the said properties. Sampilo and
Salacup filed an amended answer alleging that the complaint states no cause of action; that if such a cause exists the same is barred by the
statute of limitations; that defendants are innocent purchasers for value; and that the complaint is malicious, frivolous and spurious, intended
to harass and inconvenience the defendants.
After trial the Court of First Instance rendered judgment for the plaintiff, Felisa Sinopera, declaring that the affidavit of adjudication Exhibit
"A", the deed of sale Exhibit "B", and the deed of sale Exhibit "C", are all null and void; declaring plaintiff owner of one-half portion of the four
parcels of land in question, and finally declaring that the usufructuary rights of Leoncia de Leon to said properties are terminated. The case
was appealed to the Court of Appeals. This court held that the annulment of the affidavit of adjudication, Exhibit "A", by the trial court was
correct but that the annulment of the deeds Exhibits "B" and "C", insofar as one-half of the properties, conveyed is concerned, and in
adjudicating one-half of the same to the heirs of the deceased, is premature. Hence, it modified the judgment, declaring that Exhibits "B" and
"C" are null and void only insofar as the properties thereby conveyed exceed the portion that the responds to Leoncia de Leon. Therefore, it
ordered the defendants to deliver to the plaintiff, in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of Teodoro Tolete, for disposition according to
the law, one-half of the lands described in the complaint, but reserved to Honorato Salacup the right to claim and secure adjudication in his
favor of whatever portion of said properties may correspond to Leoncia de Leon and also his right to bring an action for the damages that he
may have suffered against Leoncia de Leon and Benny Sampilo.
Benny Sampilo and Honorato Salacup have appealed to this Court by certiorari and have assigned the following errors in their brief:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming that respondent Felisa Sinopera's right of action to recover her and her co-heirs'
participation to the lands in question had not prescribed at the time the action to recover was filed.

II
The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the petitioners are innocent purchasers for value.
III
The Court of Appeals erred in aiming the lower court's denial of petitioner's motion for new trial.
In support of the first assignment of error, it is argued that as the action was instituted almost four years after the affidavit of adjudication,
Exhibit "A", was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds Of Pangasinan, the right of action of the administratrix has prescribed and
lapsed because the same was not brought within the period of two years as Prescribed in Section 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, and as
decided in the cases of McMickingvs. Sy Conbieng, 21 Phil., 211 and Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855 869.
Section 4 of Rule 74 provides, in part, as follows:
SEC. 4. Liability of distributees and estate. If it shall appear at any time within two years after the settlement and distribution of
an estate in accordance with the provisions of either of the first two sections of this rule, that an heir or other has been unduly
deprived of his lawful participation of the such heir or such other person may compel the settlement estate in the courts in the
manner hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation. . . .
Section 1, which is mentioned in Section 4, reads as follows:
SEC. 1. Extrajudcial settlement by agreement between the heirs. If the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are
all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters of administration,
divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and
should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir or one legatee, he may adjudicate
to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. It shall be presumed that the
decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two years after the death of the decedent.
It will be noted that the provision next above-quoted contains two parts, the first referring to a case in which there are two or more heirs
interested in the estate of a deceased person, and the second in which there is only one heir. The section was taken from Section 596 of the
old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190, as amended by Act No. 2331). Said Section 596 as amended, was as follows:
SEC. 596. Settlement of Certain Intestates Without Legal Proceedings. Whenever all the heirs of a person who died intestate
are of lawful age and legal capacity and there are no debts due from the estate, or all the debts have been paid the heirs may, by
agreement duly executed in writing by all of them, and not otherwise, apportion and divide the estate among themselves, as they
may see fit, without proceedings in court.
We notice two significant provisions in Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 74. In Section 1, it is required that if there are two or more heirs, both or all of
them should take part in the extrajudicial settlement. This requirement is made more imperative in the old law (Section 596, Act No. 190) by
the addition of the clause "and not otherwise." By the title of Section 4, the "distributees and estate" are indicates the persons to answer for
rights violated by the extrajudicial settlement. On the other hand, it is also significant that no mention is made expressly of the effect of the
extrajudicial settlement on persons who did not take part therein or had no notice or knowledge thereof. There cannot be any doubt that
those who took part or had knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement are bound thereby. As to them the law is clear that if they claim to have
been in any manner deprived of their lawful right or share in the estate by the extrajudicial settlement, they may demand their rights or
interest within the period of two years, and both the distributes and estate would be liable to them for such rights or interest. Evidently, they
are the persons in accordance with the provision, may seek to remedy, the prejudice to their rights within the two-year period. But as to those
who did not take part in the settlement or had no notice of the death of the decedent or of the settlement, there is no direct or express
provision is unreasonable and unjust that they also be required to assert their claims within the period of two years. To extend the effects of
the settlement to them, to those who did not take part or had no knowledge thereof, without any express legal provision to that effect, would
be violative of the fundamental right to due process of law. In the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra, cited by the appellants in this case, we
held:
It will be noted that while the law (see. 754) provides that the order of distribution may be had upon the application of the executor
or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, no provision is made for notice, by publication or otherwise, of such
application. The proceeding, therefore, is to all intents and purposes ex parte. As will be seen our law is very vague and
incomplete; and certainly it cannot be held that a purely ex parte proceeding, had without notice by personal service or by
publication, by which the court undertakes to distribute the property of deceased persons, can be conclusive upon minor heirs
who are not represented therein.
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of extrajudicial settlement, or by affidavit, is an ex parteproceeding. It cannot by any reason or
logic be contended that such settlement or distribution would affect third persons who had no knowledge either of the death of the decedent
or of the extrajudicial settlement or affidavit, especially as no mention of such effect is made, either directly or by implication. We have
examined the two cases cited by appellants and there is no similarity at all between the circumstances on which the ruling therein had been
predicated and those of the case at bar.
Following the above-quoted decision of this Court in the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra, we are of the opinion and so hold that the
provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs from objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two years
from such extrajudicial partition, is applicable only (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial
partition, and, in addition, (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of
the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians. The case at bar fails to
comply with both requirements because not all the heirs interested have participated in the extrajudicial settlement, the Court of Appeals
having found that the decedent left aside from his widow, nephews and nieces living at the time of his death.

The next contention of appellants is that plaintiff's action is barred by the statute of limitations. The origin of the Provision (Section 4, Rule
74), upon which this contention is predicated, which is Section 596 of Act No. 190, fails to support the contention. In the first Place, there is
nothing therein, or in its source which shows clearly a statute of limitations and a bar of action against third person's. It is only a bar against
the parties who had taken part in the extrajudicial proceedings but not against third persons not Parties thereto. In the second place, the
statute of limitations is contained in a different chapter of Act No. 190, Chapter XL, and if Section 596 of the Act had been meant to be a
statute of limitations, it would naturally have been included in the chapter which defines the statute.
But even if Section 4 of Rule 74 is a statute of limitations, it is still unavailing to the defendants. The action is one based on fraud, as the
widow of the deceased owner of the lands had declared in her affidavit of partition that the deceased left no nephews or niece, or other heirs
except herself. Plaintiff's right which is based on fraud and which has a period of four years (Section 43, par. 3, Act no. 190; Article 1146, Civil
Code), does not appear to have lapsed the action was instituted. Judicial proceedings where instituted in March, 1950 and these
proceedings must have been instituted soon after the discovery of fraud. In any case, the defendants have the burden of proof as to their
claim of the statute of limitations, which is their defense, and they have not proved that when the action was instituted, four years had already
elapsed from the date that the interested parties had actual knowledge of the fraud.
The second assignment of error, i.e., that the defendants-appellants are innocent purchasers for value was rejected as unfounded by the
court of Appeals. Said court said.
The claim that defendants-appellants did not have sufficient knowledge or notice of the claim of the heirs of Teodoro Tolete,
deceased, over the land in question does not find support in the evidence of record. As regards defendant Benny Sampilo, it is an
admitted fact that he is a nephew of Leoncia de Leon and he had been living with the latter. Both Benny Sampilo and the heirs of
the deceased who are claiming the property are residents of San Manuel, Pangasinan. It is hard, therefore, to believe that Benny
Sampilo did not know the existence of said heirs, and that he was not aware that they were nephews and nieces, children of the
deceased brothers, of the deceased Teodoro Tolete. The fact furthermore that Benny Sampilo accompanied his aunt Leoncia de
Leon to Sison, Pangasinan, when the later saw Notary Public Ladislao Villamil, who was the former's uncle, to have him prepare
the affidavit of adjudication Exhibit "A", and the deed of conveyance Exhibit "B" by which on the same date she conveyed to
Sampilo all the property which she had adjudicated to herself, both of which she acknowledged before said notary public, coupled
with the fact that there is no sufficient showing that the consideration for the conveyance of P10,000 had in fact been paid,
strengthens our belief that said Benny Sampilo knew that the deceased Teodoro Tolete had other heirs who may claim the
property, and that the immediate conveyance thereof to him was a strategem concocted to defeat the former's rights. And as
regards Honorato Salacup, while the claim that no notice of lis pendens appeared annotated in the certificates of title issued to
Benny Sampilo when he acquired the property might be true, for he purchased the property on June 17, 1950, and the notice
of lis pendens was noted on said certificates of title on June 26, 1950, nevertheless, he cannot claim that he was a purchaser in
good faith for value of the property. It is well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that a purchaser of registered lands who has knowledge
of facts which should put him upon inquiry and investigate as to the possible defects of the title of the vendor and fails to make
such inquiry and investigation cannot claim that he as a purchaser in good faith for value and he had acquired a valid title thereto.
Leung Yee vs. Strong Machinery Co., 37 Phil., 644; Dayao vs. Diaz, G.R. L-4106, May 29, 1952.
Finding no error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, we hereby affirm it in toto, with costs against the petitioners. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 156536

October 31, 2006

JOSEPH CUA, petitioner,

vs.
GLORIA A. VARGAS, AURORA VARGAS, RAMON VARGAS, MARITES VARGAS, EDELINA VARGAS AND GEMMA
VARGAS, respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the decision 1 dated March 26, 2002, and the
resolution2 dated December 17, 2002, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59869 entitled "Gloria A. Vargas, Aurora Vargas, Ramon
Vargas, Marites Vargas, Edelina Vargas and Gemma Vargas v. Joseph Cua."
The facts are as follows:
A parcel of residential land with an area of 99 square meters located in San Juan, Virac, Catanduanes was left behind by the late Paulina
Vargas. On February 4, 1994, a notarized Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was executed by and among Paulina Vargas' heirs, namely
Ester Vargas, Visitacion Vargas, Juan Vargas, Zenaida V. Matienzo, Rosario V. Forteza, Andres Vargas, Gloria Vargas, Antonina Vargas and
Florentino Vargas, partitioning and adjudicating unto themselves the lot in question, each one of them getting a share of 11 square meters.
Florentino, Andres, Antonina and Gloria, however, did not sign the document. Only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed it.
The Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was published in the Catanduanes Tribune for three consecutive weeks. 3
On November 15, 1994, an Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale 4 was again executed by and among the same heirs over the
same property and also with the same sharings. Once more, only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed the document and
their respective shares totaling 55 square meters were sold to Joseph Cua, petitioner herein.
According to Gloria Vargas, the widow of Santiago Vargas and one of respondents herein, she came to know of the Extra Judicial Settlement
Among Heirs with Sale dated November 16, 1994 only when the original house built on the lot was being demolished sometime in May
1995.5 She likewise claimed she was unaware that an earlier Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs dated February 4, 1994 involving the
same property had been published in the Catanduanes Tribune. 6
After knowing of the sale of the 55 square meters to petitioner, Gloria Vargas tried to redeem the property, with the following letter 7 sent to
petitioner on her behalf:
29th June 1995

Mr. Joseph Cua

Capilihan, Virac, Catanduanes
Sir:
This is in behalf of my client, Ms. Aurora Vargas, 8 (c/o Atty. Prospero V. Tablizo) one of the lawful heirs of the late Paulina Vargas,
original owner of Lot No. 214 of Virac, Poblacion covered by ARP No. 031-0031 in her name.
I understand that a document "Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale" was executed by some of my client's co-heirs
and alleged representatives of other co-heirs, by virtue of which document you acquired by purchase from the signatories to the
said document, five (5) shares with a total area of fifty-five square meters of the above-described land.
This is to serve you notice that my client shall exercise her right of legal redemption of said five (5) shares as well as other shares
which you may likewise have acquired by purchase. And you are hereby given an option to agree to legal redemption within a
period of fifteen (15) days from your receipt hereof.
Should you fail to convey to me your agreement within said 15-day-period, proper legal action shall be taken by my client to
redeem said shares.
Thank you.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)
JUAN G. ATENCIA
When the offer to redeem was refused and after having failed to reach an amicable settlement at the barangay level, 9 Gloria Vargas filed a
case for annulment of Extra Judicial Settlement and Legal Redemption of the lot with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Virac, Catanduanes
against petitioner and consigned the amount of P100,000 which is the amount of the purchase with the Clerk of Court on May 20,
1996.10 Joining her in the action were her children with Santiago, namely, Aurora, Ramon, Marites, Edelina and Gemma, all surnamed
Vargas.
Subsequently, Carlos Gianan, Jr. and Gloria Arcilla, heirs of the alleged primitive owner of the lot in question, Pedro Lakandula, intervened in
the case.11
Respondents claimed that as co-owners of the property, they may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him the price
of the sale. They likewise alleged that the 30-day period following a written notice by the vendors to their co-owners for them to exercise the
right of redemption of the property had not yet set in as no written notice was sent to them. In effect, they claimed that the Extra Judicial
Settlement Among Heirs and the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale were null and void and had no legal and binding effect on
them.12
After trial on the merits, the MTC rendered a decision 13 in favor of petitioner, dismissing the complaint as well as the complaint-in-intervention
for lack of merit, and declaring the Deed of Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale valid and binding. The MTC upheld the sale to
petitioner because the transaction purportedly occurred after the partition of the property among the co-owner heirs. The MTC opined that
the other heirs could validly dispose of their respective shares. Moreover, the MTC found that although there was a failure to strictly comply
with the requirements under Article 1088 of the Civil Code 14 for a written notice of sale to be served upon respondents by the vendors prior to
the exercise of the former's right of redemption, this deficiency was cured by respondents' actual knowledge of the sale, which was more
than 30 days before the filing of their complaint, and their consignation of the purchase price with the Clerk of Court, so that the latter action
came too late. Finally, the MTC ruled that respondents failed to establish by competent proof petitioner's bad faith in purchasing the portion
of the property owned by respondents' co-heirs. 15
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 42, of Virac, Catanduanes affirmed the MTC decision in a judgment dated November 25,
1999. The matter was thereafter raised to the Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA reversed the ruling of both lower courts in the assailed decision dated March 26, 2002, declaring that the Extra Judicial Settlement
Among Heirs and the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale, dated February 4, 1994 and November 15, 1994, respectively, were
void and without any legal effect. The CA held that, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, 16 the extrajudicial settlement made
by the other co-heirs is not binding upon respondents considering the latter never participated in it nor did they ever signify their consent to
the same.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present petition for review.
The issues are:
Whether heirs are deemed constructively notified and bound, regardless of their failure to participate therein, by an extrajudicial
settlement and partition of estate when the extrajudicial settlement and partition has been duly published; and,
Assuming a published extrajudicial settlement and partition does not bind persons who did not participate therein, whether the
written notice required to be served by an heir to his co-heirs in connection with the sale of hereditary rights to a stranger before
partition under Article 1088 of the Civil Code17 can be dispensed with when such co-heirs have actual knowledge of the sale such
that the 30-day period within which a co-heir can exercise the right to be subrogated to the rights of a purchaser shall commence
from the date of actual knowledge of the sale.
Petitioner argues, as follows:
Firstly, the acquisition by petitioner of the subject property subsequent to the extrajudicial partition was valid because the partition was duly
published. The publication of the same constitutes due notice to respondents and signifies their implied acquiescence thereon. Respondents
are therefore estopped from denying the validity of the partition and sale at this late stage. Considering that the partition was valid,
respondents no longer have the right to redeem the property.

Secondly, petitioner is a possessor and builder in good faith.

Thirdly, the MTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint because its subject matter was incapable of pecuniary estimation. The complaint
should have been filed with the RTC.
Fourthly, there was a non-joinder of indispensable parties, the co-heirs who sold their interest in the subject property not having been
impleaded by respondents.
Fifthly, the appeal to the CA should have been dismissed as it was not properly verified by respondents. Gloria Vargas failed to indicate that
she was authorized to represent the other respondents (petitioners therein) to initiate the petition. Moreover, the verification was inadequate
because it did not state the basis of the alleged truth and/or correctness of the material allegations in the petition.
The petition lacks merit.
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that persons who do not
participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby.18 It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or
issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed
of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed 19 as what happened in the instant case
with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because
the same was notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never
intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In this connection, the records of the present case confirm that
respondents never signed either of the settlement documents, having discovered their existence only shortly before the filing of the present
complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge and
consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned.
This is not to say, though, that respondents' co-heirs cannot validly sell their hereditary rights to third persons even before the partition of the
estate. The heirs who actually participated in the execution of the extrajudicial settlements, which included the sale to petitioner of their pro
indiviso shares in the subject property, are bound by the same. Nevertheless, respondents are given the right to redeem these shares
pursuant to Article 1088 of the Civil Code. The right to redeem was never lost because respondents were never notified in writing of the
actual sale by their co-heirs. Based on the provision, there is a need for written notice to start the period of redemption, thus:
Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to
the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month
from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor. (Emphasis supplied.)
It bears emphasis that the period of one month shall be reckoned from the time that a co-heir is notified in writing by the vendor of the actual
sale. Written notice is indispensable and mandatory,20 actual knowledge of the sale acquired in some other manner by the redemptioner
notwithstanding. It cannot be counted from the time advance notice is given of an impending or contemplated sale. The law gives the co-heir
thirty days from the time written notice of the actual sale within which to make up his or her mind and decide to repurchase or effect the
redemption.21
Though the Code does not prescribe any particular form of written notice nor any distinctive method for written notification of redemption, the
method of notification remains exclusive, there being no alternative provided by law. 22 This proceeds from the very purpose of Article 1088,
which is to keep strangers to the family out of a joint ownership, if, as is often the case, the presence of outsiders be undesirable and the
other heir or heirs be willing and in a position to repurchase the share sold. 23
It should be kept in mind that the obligation to serve written notice devolves upon the vendor co-heirs because the latter are in the best
position to know the other co-owners who, under the law, must be notified of the sale. 24 This will remove all uncertainty as to the fact of the
sale, its terms and its perfection and validity, and quiet any doubt that the alienation is not definitive. 25 As a result, the party notified need not
entertain doubt that the seller may still contest the alienation. 26
Considering, therefore, that respondents' co-heirs failed to comply with this requirement, there is no legal impediment to allowing
respondents to redeem the shares sold to petitioner given the former's obvious willingness and capacity to do so.
Likewise untenable is petitioner's contention that he is a builder in good faith. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land the
latter is building on is one's own without knowledge of any defect or flaw in one's title. 27 Petitioner derived his title from the Extra Judicial
Settlement Among Heirs With Sale dated November 15, 1994. He was very much aware that not all of the heirs participated therein as it was
evident on the face of the document itself. Because the property had not yet been partitioned in accordance with the Rules of Court, no
particular portion of the property could have been identified as yet and delineated as the object of the sale. This is because the alienation
made by respondents' co-heirs was limited to the portion which may be allotted to them in the division upon the termination of the coownership. Despite this glaring fact, and over the protests of respondents, petitioner still constructed improvements on the property. For this
reason, his claim of good faith lacks credence.
As to the issue of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner is estopped from raising the same for the first time on appeal. Petitioner actively participated
in the proceedings below and sought affirmative ruling from the lower courts to uphold the validity of the sale to him of a portion of the subject
property embodied in the extrajudicial settlement among heirs. Having failed to seasonably raise this defense, he cannot, under the peculiar
circumstances of this case, be permitted to challenge the jurisdiction of the lower court at this late stage. While it is a rule that a jurisdictional
question may be raised at any time, an exception arises where estoppel has already supervened.
Estoppel sets in when a party participates in all stages of a case before challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court. One cannot belatedly
reject or repudiate its decision after voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, just to secure affirmative relief against one's opponent or after
failing to obtain such relief. The Court has, time and again, frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting a case for decision
and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse. 28
Petitioner's fourth argument, that there is a non-joinder of indispensable parties, similarly lacks merit. An indispensable party is a party-ininterest without whom there can be no final determination of an action and who is required to be joined as either plaintiff or defendant. 29 The
party's interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought is so inextricably intertwined with the other parties that the former's
legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. Hence, an indispensable party is one whose interest will be directly

affected by the court's action in the litigation. In the absence of such indispensable party, there cannot be a resolution of the controversy
before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. 30
In relation to this, it must be kept in mind that the complaint filed by respondents ultimately prayed that they be allowed to redeem the shares
in the property sold by their co-heirs. Significantly, the right of the other heirs to sell their undivided share in the property to petitioner is not in
dispute. Respondents concede that the other heirs acted within their hereditary rights in doing so to the effect that the latter completely and
effectively relinquished their interests in the property in favor of petitioner. Petitioner thus stepped into the shoes of the other heirs to become
a co-owner of the property with respondents. As a result, only petitioner's presence is absolutely required for a complete and final
determination of the controversy because what respondents seek is to be subrogated to his rights as a purchaser.
Finally, petitioner contends that the petition filed by respondents with the CA should have been dismissed because the verification and
certificate of non-forum shopping appended to it were defective, citing specifically the failure of respondent Gloria Vargas to: (1) indicate that
she was authorized to represent her co-respondents in the petition, and (2) state the basis of the alleged truth of the allegations.
The general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case and the signature of
only one of them is insufficient.31 Nevertheless, the rules on forum shopping, which were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert their own ultimate and legitimate objective.
Strict compliance with the provisions regarding the certificate of non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the
certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded. 32 Under justifiable circumstances, the Court has
relaxed the rule requiring the submission of such certification considering that although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional. 33
Thus, when all the petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them
in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the rules. 34The co-respondents of respondent Gloria Vargas in this case
were her children. In order not to defeat the ends of justice, the Court deems it sufficient that she signed the petition on their behalf and as
their representative.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED. Puno, J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 161220

July 30, 2008

SPOUSES GORGONIO BENATIRO and COLUMBA CUYOS-BENATIRO substituted by their heirs, namely: Isabelita, Renato,
Rosadelia and Gorgonio, Jr., surnamed Benatiro, and SPOUSES RENATO C. BENATIRO and ROSIE M. BENATIRO, Respondents,
vs.
HEIRS OF EVARISTO CUYOS, namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian, Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, Numeriano Cuyos, and Enrique Cuyos,
represented by their attorney-in-fact, Salud Cuyos, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners seeking to annul the Decision 1 dated
July 18, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its Resolution 2 dated November 13, 2003 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration
issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 65630.3
Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos were blessed with nine children, namely: Francisco, Victoria, Columba, Lope, Salud,
Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano, and Enrique. On August 28, 1966, Evaristo died leaving six parcels of land located in Tapilon, Daanbantayan,
Cebu covered by Tax Declaration (TD) Nos. 000725, 000728, 000729, 000730, 000731, 000732, all under the name of Agatona Arrogante.
On July 13, 1971, one of the heirs, Gloria Cuyos-Talian (respondent Gloria) represented by Atty. Victor Elliot Lepiten (Atty. Lepiten), filed
before the Court of First Instance (CFI) now Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu, Branch XI, a petition 4 for Letters of Administration, docketed
as Special Proceeding (SP) No. 24-BN entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Evaristo Cuyos, Gloria Cuyos-Talian, petitioner." The
petition was opposed by Glorias brother, Francisco, who was represented by Atty. Jesus Yray (Atty. Yray).
In the hearing held on January 30, 1973, both parties together with their respective counsels appeared. Both counsels manifested that the
parties had come to an agreement to settle their case. The trial court on even date issued an Order 5 appointing Gloria as administratrix of the
estate. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, letters of administration of the estate of the late Evaristo Cuyos and including the undivided half accruing to his spouse
Agatona Arrogante who recently died is hereby issued in favor of Mrs. Gloria Cuyos Talian who may qualify as such administratrix after
posting a nominal bond of P1,000.00.6
Subsequently, in the Order7 dated December 12, 1975, the CFI stated that when the Intestate Estate hearing was called on that date,
respondent Gloria and her brother, oppositor Francisco, together with their respective counsels, appeared; that Atty. Yray, Franciscos
counsel, manifested that the parties had come to an agreement to settle the case amicably; that both counsels suggested that the Clerk of
Court, Atty. Andres C. Taneo (Atty. Taneo), be appointed to act as Commissioner to effect the agreement of the parties and to prepare the
project of partition for the approval of the court. In the same Order, the Court of First Instance (CFI) appointed Atty. Taneo and ordered him to
make a project of partition within 30 days from December 12, 1975 for submission and approval of the court.

In his Commissioner's Report8 dated July 29, 1976, Atty. Taneo stated that he issued subpoenae supplemented by telegrams to all the heirs
to cause their appearance on February 28 and 29, 1976 in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu, where the properties are located, for a conference
or meeting to arrive at an agreement; that out of the nine heirs, only respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique Cuyos failed to attend; that per
return of the service, these three heirs could not be located in their respective given addresses; that since some of the heirs present resided
outside the province of Cebu, they decided to go ahead with the scheduled meeting.
Atty. Taneo declared in his Report that the heirs who were present:
1. Agreed to consider all income of the properties of the estate during the time that Francisco Cuyos, one of the heirs, was
administering the properties of the estate (without appointment from the Court) as having been properly and duly accounted for.
2. Agreed to consider all income of the properties of the estate during the administration of Gloria Cuyos Talian, (duly appointed by
the Court) also one of the heirs as having been properly and duly accounted for.
3. Agreed to consider all motions filed in this proceedings demanding an accounting from Francisco Cuyos and Gloria Cuyos
Talian, as having been withdrawn.
4. Agreed not to partition the properties of the estate but instead agreed to first sell it for the sum ofP40,000.00 subject to the
condition that should any of the heirs would be in a position to buy the properties of the estate, the rest of the eight (8) heirs will
just receive only Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) each.
5. Agreed to equally divide the administration expenses to be deducted from their respective share ofP4,000.00.9
The Report further stated that Columba Cuyos-Benatiro (Columba), one of the heirs, informed all those present in the conference of her
desire to buy the properties of the estate, to which everybody present agreed, and considered her the buyer. Atty. Taneo explained that the
delay in the submission of the Report was due to the request of respondent Gloria that she be given enough time to make some
consultations on what was already agreed upon by the majority of the heirs; that it was only on July 11, 1976 that the letter of respondent
Gloria was handed to Atty. Taneo, with the information that respondent Gloria was amenable to what had been agreed upon, provided she be
given the sum of P5,570.00 as her share of the estate, since one of properties of the estate was mortgaged to her in order to defray their
father's hospitalization.
Quoting the Commissioners Report, the CFI issued the assailed Order 10 dated December 16, 1976, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the terms and conditions agreed upon by the heirs to be in order, the same being not contrary to law, said
compromise agreement as embodied in the report of the commissioner is hereby approved. The Court hereby orders the Administratrix to
execute the deed of sale covering all the properties of the estate in favor of Columba Cuyos Benatiro after the payment to her of the sum
of P36,000.00. The said sum of money shall remain in custodia legis, but after all the claims and administration expenses and the estate
taxes shall have been paid for, the remainder shall, upon order of the Court, be divided equally among the heirs. 11
The CFI disapproved the claim of respondent Gloria for the sum of P5,570.00, as the same had been allegedly disregarded by the heirs
present during the conference.
In an Order12 dated January 11, 1978, the CFI appointed Lope Cuyos (Cuyos) as the new administrator of the estate, purportedly on the
basis of the motion to relieve respondent Gloria, as it appeared that she was already residing in Central Luzon and her absence was
detrimental to the early termination of the proceedings.
On May 25, 1979, administrator Cuyos executed a Deed of Absolute Sale 13 over the six parcels of land constituting the intestate estate of the
late Evaristo Cuyos in favor of Columba for a consideration of the sum ofP36,000.00.
Sometime in February 1998, the heirs of Evaristo Cuyos, namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian, Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, Numeriano Cuyos and
Enrique Cuyos, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Salud Cuyos (respondents), allegedly learned that Tax Declaration Nos. 000725,
000728, 000729, 000730, 000731 and 000732, which were all in the name of their late mother Agatona Arrogante, were canceled and new
Tax Declaration Nos., namely, 20-14129, 20-14130, 20-141131, 20-14132, 2014133 and 20-14134, were issued in Columbas name; and that
later on, Original Certificates of Titles covering the estate of Evaristo Cuyos were issued in favor of Columba; that some of these parcels of
land were subsequently transferred to the names of spouses Renato C. Benatiro and Rosie M. Benatiro, son and daughter-in-law,
respectively, of petitioners Gorgonio and Columba, for which transfer certificates of title were subsequently issued; that they subsequently
discovered the existence of the assailed CFI Order dated December 16, 1976 and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 25, 1979.
Respondents filed a complaint against petitioner Gorgonio Benatiro before the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP)
of the Department of Justice, which on June 13, 2000 dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. 14
Salud Cuyos brought the matter for conciliation and mediation at the barangay level, but was unsuccessful.15
On July 16, 2001, Salud Cuyos, for herself and in representation 16 of the other heirs of Evaristo Cuyos, namely: Gloria, Patrocenia,
Numeriano,17 and Enrique, filed with the CA a petition for annulment of the Order dated December 16, 1976 of the CFI of Cebu, Branch XI, in
SP No. 24-BN under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. They alleged that the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976 was null and void and of no
effect, the same being based on a Commissioner's Report, which was patently false and irregular; that such report practically deprived them
of due process in claiming their share of their father's estate; that Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares executed an affidavit, as well as the unnotarized
statement of Gloria stating that no meeting ever took place for the purpose of discussing how to dispose of the estate of their parents and
that they never received any payment from the supposed sale of their share in the inheritance; that the report was done in close confederacy
with their co-heir Columba, who stood to be benefited by the Commissioner's recommendation, should the same be approved by the probate
court; that since the report was a falsity, any order proceeding therefrom was invalid; that the issuance of the certificates of titles in favor of

respondents were tainted with fraud and irregularity, since the CFI which issued the assailed order did not appear to have been furnished a
copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale; that the CFI was not incustodia legis of the consideration of the sale, as directed in its Order so that it
could divide the remainder of the consideration equally among the heirs after paying all the administration expenses and estate taxes; that
the intestate case had not yet been terminated as the last order found relative to the case was the appointment of Lope as administrator vice
Gloria; that they never received their corresponding share in the inheritance; and that the act of petitioners in manifest connivance with
administrator Lope amounted to a denial of their right to the property without due process of law, thus, clearly showing that extrinsic fraud
caused them to be deprived of their property.
Herein petitioners contend that respondents' allegation that they discovered the assailed order dated December 16, 1976 only in February
1998 was preposterous, as respondents were represented by counsel in the intestate proceedings; thus, notice of Order to counsel was
notice to client; that this was only a ploy so that they could claim that they filed the petition for annulment within the statutory period of four
(4) years; that they have been in possession of the six parcels of land since May 25, 1979 when the same was sold to them pursuant to the
assailed Order in the intestate proceedings; that no extrinsic fraud attended the issuance of the assailed order; that Numeriano executed an
affidavit in which he attested to having received his share of the sale proceeds on May 18, 1988; that respondents were estopped from
assailing the Order dated December 16, 1976, as it had already attained the status of finality.
On July 18, 2003, the CA granted the petition and annulled the CFI order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING REASONS, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Order issued by the Court of First
Instance of Cebu Branch XI dated December 16, 1976 as well as the Certificates of Title issued in the name of Columba Cuyos-Benatiro and
the subsequent transfer of these Titles in the name of spouses Renato and Rosie Benatiro are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Further,
SP Proc. Case No. 24-BN is hereby ordered reopened and proceedings thereon be continued. 18
The CA declared that the ultimate fact that was needed to be established was the veracity and truthfulness of the Commissioners Report,
which was used by the trial court as its basis for issuing the assailed Order. The CA held that to arrive at an agreement, there was a need for
all the concerned parties to be present in the conference; however, such was not the scenario since in their separate sworn statements, the
compulsory heirs of the decedent attested to the fact that no meeting or conference ever happened among them; that although under
Section 3(m), Rule 133 on the Rules of Evidence, there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of an official duty, the same may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence to prove the contrary.
The CA noted some particulars that led it to conclude that the conference was not held accordingly, to wit: (1) the Commissioners Report
never mentioned the names of the heirs who were present in the alleged conference but only the names of those who were absent, when the
names of those who were present were equally essential, if not even more important, than the names of those who were absent; (2) the
Report also failed to include any proof of conformity to the agreement from the attendees, such as letting them sign the report to signify their
consent as regards the agreed mechanisms for the estates settlement; (3) there was lack or absence of physical evidence attached to the
report indicating that the respondents were indeed properly notified about the scheduled conference. The CA then concluded that due to the
absence of the respondents' consent, the legal existence of the compromise agreement did not stand on a firm ground.
The CA further observed that although it appeared that notice of the report was given to Atty. Lepiten and Atty. Yray, lawyers of Gloria and
Francisco Cuyos, respectively, the same cannot be taken as notice to the other heirs of Evaristo Cuyos; that a lawyers authority to
compromise cannot be simply presumed, since what was required was the special authority to compromise on behalf of his client; that a
compromise agreement entered into by a person not duly authorized to do so by the principal is void and has no legal effect, citing Quiban v.
Butalid;19 that being a void compromise agreement, the assailed Order had no legal effect.
Thus, the CA ruled that the Certificates of Titles obtained by herein petitioners were procured fraudulently; that the initial transfer of the
properties to Columba Cuyos-Benatiro by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Lope Cuyos was clearly defective, since the
compromise agreement which served as the basis of the Deed of Absolute Sale was void and had no legal effect.
The CA elaborated that there was no showing that Columba paid the sum of P36,000.00 to the administrator as consideration for the sale,
except for the testimony of Numeriano Cuyos admitting that he received his share of the proceeds but without indicating the exact amount
that he received; that even so, such alleged payment was incomplete and was not in compliance with the trial courts order for the
administratix to execute the deed of sale covering all properties of the estate in favor of Columba Cuyos-Benatiro after the payment to the
administratrix of the sum of P36,000.00; that said sum of money shall remain in custodia legis, but after all the claims and administration
expenses and the estate taxes shall have been paid for, the remainder shall, upon order of the Court, be divided equally among the heirs.
Moreover, the CA found that the copy of the Deed of Sale was not even furnished the trial court nor was said money placed under custodia
legis as agreed upon; that the Certification dated December 9, 1998 issued by the Clerk of Court of Cebu indicated that the case had not yet
been terminated and that the last Order in the special proceeding was the appointment of Lope Cuyos as the new administrator of the estate;
thus, the transfer of the parcels of land, which included the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, cancellation of Tax Declarations and the
issuance of new Tax Declarations and Transfer Certificates of Title, all in favor of petitioners, were tainted with fraud. Consequently, the CA
concluded that the compromise agreement, the certificates of title and the transfers made by petitioners through fraud cannot be made a
legal basis of their ownership over the properties, since to do so would result in enriching them at the expense of the respondents; and that it
was also evident that the fraud attendant in this case was one of extrinsic fraud, since respondents were denied the opportunity to fully
litigate their case because of the scheme utilized by petitioners to assert their claim.
Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:
Whether or not annulment of order under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court was a proper remedy where the aggrieved party had other
appropriate remedies, such as new trial, appeal, or petition for relief, which they failed to take through their own fault.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals misapprehended the facts when it annulled the 24 year old Commissioner's Report of the Clerk of Court
- an official act which enjoys a strong presumption of regularity - based merely on belated allegations of irregularities in the performance of
said official act.

Whether or not upon the facts as found by the Court of Appeals in this case, extrinsic fraud existed which is a sufficient ground to annul the
lower court's order under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. 20
Subsequent to the filing of their petition, petitioners filed a Manifestation that they were in possession of affidavits of waiver and desistance
executed by the heirs of Lope Cuyos21 and respondent Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares22 on February 17, 2004 and December 17, 2004,
respectively. In both affidavits, the affiants stated that they had no more interest in prosecuting/defending the case involving the settlement of
the estate, since the subject estate properties had been bought by their late sister Columba, and they had already received their share of the
purchase price. Another heir, respondent Numeriano Cuyos, had also earlier executed an Affidavit 23 dated December 13, 2001, stating that
the subject estate was sold to Columba and that she had already received her share of the purchase price on May 18, 1988. In addition,
Numeriano had issued a certification24 dated May 18, 1988, which was not refuted by any of the parties, that he had already
received P4,000.00 in payment of his share, which could be the reason why he refused to sign the Special Power of Attorney supposedly in
favor of Salud Cuyos for the filing of the petition with the CA.
The issue for resolution is whether the CA committed a reversible error in annulling the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976, which
approved the Commissioners Report embodying the alleged compromise agreement entered into by the heirs of Evaristo and Agatona
Arrogante Cuyos.
We rule in the negative.
The remedy of annulment of judgment is extraordinary in character 25 and will not so easily and readily lend itself to abuse by parties
aggrieved by final judgments. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 47 impose strict conditions for recourse to it, viz.:
Section 1. Coverage. This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil
actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
Section 2. Grounds for annulment. The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.
Although Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that annulment of a final judgment or order of an RTC may be based "only on
the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction," jurisprudence recognizes denial of due process as additional .ground therefor. 26
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud will lie only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character. 27 Extrinsic fraud exists
when there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented
from presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing party. 28 Fraud is regarded as extrinsic
where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not
to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the
fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court. 29
While we find that the CA correctly annulled the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976, we find that it should be annulled not on the ground of
extrinsic fraud, as there is no sufficient evidence to hold Atty. Taneo or any of the heirs guilty of fraud, but on the ground that the assailed
order is void for lack of due process.
Clerk of Court Taneo was appointed to act as Commissioner to effect the agreement of the heirs and to prepare the project of partition for
submission and approval of the court. Thus, it was incumbent upon Atty. Taneo to set a time and place for the first meeting of the heirs. In his
Commissioners Report, Atty. Taneo stated that he caused the appearance of all the heirs of Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos in
the place, where the subject properties were located for settlement, by sending them subpoenae supplemented by telegrams for them to
attend the conference scheduled on February 28 to 29, 1976. It was also alleged that out of the nine heirs, only six attended the conference;
however, as the CA aptly found, the Commissioner did not state the names of those present, but only those heirs who failed to attend the
conference, namely: respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique who, as stated in the Report, based on the return of service, could not be
located in their respective given addresses.
However, there is nothing in the records that would establish that the alleged subpoenae, supplemented by telegrams, for the heirs to appear
in the scheduled conference were indeed sent to the heirs. In fact, respondent Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, one of the heirs, who was
presumably present in the conference, as she was not mentioned as among those absent, had executed an affidavit 30 dated December 8,
1998 attesting, to the fact that she was not called to a meeting nor was there any telegram or notice of any meeting received by her. While
Patrocenia had executed on December 17, 2004 an Affidavit of Waiver and Desistance 31 regarding this case, it was only for the reason that
the subject estate properties had been bought by their late sister Columba, and that she had already received her corresponding share of the
purchase price, but there was nothing in the affidavit that retracted her previous statement that she was not called to a meeting. Respondent
Gloria also made an unnotarized statement32 that there was no meeting held. Thus, the veracity of Atty. Taneos holding of a conference with
the heirs was doubtful.
Moreover, there was no evidence showing that the heirs indeed convened for the purpose of arriving at an agreement regarding the estate
properties, since they were not even required to sign anything to show their attendance of the alleged meeting. In fact, the Commissioner's
Report, which embodied the alleged agreement of the heirs, did not bear the signatures of the alleged attendees to show their consent and
conformity thereto.
It bears stressing that the purpose of the conference was for the heirs to arrive at a compromise agreement over the estate of Evaristo
Cuyos. Thus, it was imperative that all the heirs must be present in the conference and be heard to afford them the opportunity to protect
their interests. Considering that no separate instrument of conveyance was executed among the heirs embodying their alleged agreement, it
was necessary that the Report be signed by the heirs to prove that a conference among the heirs was indeed held, and that they conformed
to the agreement stated in the Report.

Petitioners point out that the Commissioner was an officer of the court and a disinterested party and that, under Rule 133, Section 3(m) of the
Rules on Evidence, there is a presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
While, under the general rule, it is to be presumed that everything done by an officer in connection with the performance of an official act in
the line of his duty was legally done, such presumption may be overcome by evidence to the contrary. We find the instances mentioned by
the CA, such as absence of the names of the persons present in the conference, absence of the signatures of the heirs in the
Commissioner's Report, as well as absence of evidence showing that respondents were notified of the conference, to be competent proofs of
irregularity that rebut the presumption.
Thus, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in ruling that the conference was not held accordingly and in annulling the assailed
order of the CFI.
Petitioners attached a Certification33 dated August 7, 2003 issued by the Officer In Charge (OIC), Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC, Branch
11, to show that copies of the Commissioners Report were sent to all the heirs, except Salud and Enrique, as well as to Attys. Lepiten and
Yray as enumerated in the Notice found at the lower portion of the Report with the accompanying registry receipts. 34
In Cua v. Vargas,35 in which the issue was whether heirs were deemed constructively notified of and bound by an extra-judicial settlement
and partition of the estate, regardless of their failure to participate therein, when the extra-judicial settlement and partition has been duly
published, we held:
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that persons who do not
participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out
or issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in
the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed as what
happened in the instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because
the same was notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never
intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In this connection, the records of the present case confirm that
respondents never signed either of the settlement documents, having discovered their existence only shortly before the filing of the present
complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge and
consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned 36 (Emphasis supplied)
Applying the above-mentioned case by analogy, what matters is whether the heirs were indeed notified before the compromise agreement
was arrived at, which was not established, and not whether they were notified of the Commissioner's Report embodying the alleged
agreement afterwards.
We also find nothing in the records that would show that the heirs were called to a hearing to validate the Report. The CFI adopted and
approved the Report despite the absence of the signatures of all the heirs showing conformity thereto. The CFI adopted the Report despite
the statement therein that only six out of the nine heirs attended the conference, thus, effectively depriving the other heirs of their chance to
be heard. The CFI's action was tantamount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without
due process of law. We find that the assailed Order dated December 16, 1976, which approved a void Commissioner's Report, is a void
judgment for lack of due process.
We are not persuaded by petitioners contentions that all the parties in the intestate estate proceedings in the trial court were duly
represented by respective counsels, namely, Atty. Lepiten for petitioners-heirs and Atty. Yray for the oppositors-heirs; that when the heirs
agreed to settle the case amicably, they manifested such intention through their lawyers, as stated in the Order dated January 30, 1973; that
an heir in the settlement of the estate of a deceased person need not hire his own lawyer, because his interest in the estate is represented
by the judicial administrator who retains the services of a counsel; that a judicial administrator is the legal representative not only of the
estate but also of the heirs, legatees, and creditors whose interest he represents; that when the trial court issued the assailed Order dated
December 16, 1976 approving the Commissioner's Report, the parties lawyers were duly served said copies of the Order on December 21,
1976 as shown by the Certification37 dated August 7, 2003 of the RTC OIC, Clerk of Court; that notices to lawyers should be considered
notices to the clients, since, if a party is represented by counsel, service of notices of orders and pleadings shall be made upon the lawyer;
that upon receipt of such order by counsels, any one of the respondents could have taken the appropriate remedy such as a motion for
reconsideration, a motion for new trial or a petition for relief under Rule 38 at the proper time, but they failed to do so without giving any
cogent reason for such failure.
While the trial court's order approving the Commissioners Report was received by Attys. Yray and Lepiten, they were the lawyers of Gloria
and Francisco, respectively, but not the lawyers of the other heirs. As can be seen from the pleadings filed before the probate court, Atty.
Lepiten was Glorias counsel when she filed her Petition for letters of administration, while Atty. Yray was Franciscos lawyer when he filed his
opposition to the petition for letters of administration and his Motion to Order administrarix Gloria to render an accounting and for the partition
of the estate. Thus, the other heirs who were not represented by counsel were not given any notice of the judgment approving the
compromise. It was only sometime in February 1998 that respondents learned that the tax declarations covering the parcels of land, which
were all in the name of their late mother Agatona Arrogante, were canceled; and new Tax Declarations were issued in Columbas name, and
Original Certificates of Titles were subsequently issued in favor of Columba. Thus, they could not have taken an appeal or other remedies.
Considering that the assailed Order is a void judgment for lack of due process of law, it is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any
right or of any obligation.38
In Nazareno v. Court of Appeals,39 we stated the consequences of a void judgment, thus:
A void judgment never acquires finality. Hence, while admittedly, the petitioner in the case at bar failed to appeal timely the
aforementioned decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, it cannot be deemed to have become final and executory. In

contemplation of law, that void decision is deemed non-existent. Thus, there was no effective or operative judgment to appeal from. In
Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System vs. Sison, this Court held that:
x x x [A] void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment, but may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by
any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It is attended by none of the consequences of a valid adjudication. It has no legal or
binding effect or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It cannot affect, impair or create rights. It is not entitled to enforcement and is,
ordinarily, no protection to those who seek to enforce. All proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid. In
other words, a void judgment is regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be if there were no judgment. It, accordingly,
leaves the parties litigants in the same position they were in before the trial.
Thus, a void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all
claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void: "x x x it may be
said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its
head."40 (Emphasis supplied)
The CFI's order being null and void, it may be assailed anytime, collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in
any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches. 41Consequently, the compromise agreement and the Order
approving it must be declared null and void and set aside.
We find no merit in petitioners' claim that respondents are barred from assailing the judgment after the lapse of 24 years from its finality on
ground of laches and estoppel.
Section 3, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that an action for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud must be filed within four
years from its discovery and, if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel.
The principle of laches or "stale demands" ordains that the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier, or the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 42
There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular
circumstances.43 The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and, being an equitable doctrine, its application is
controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice. It is the better rule that courts,
under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to be so, a
manifest wrong or injustice would result.44
In this case, respondents learned of the assailed order only sometime in February 1998 and filed the petition for annulment of judgment in
2001. Moreover, we find that respondents' right to due process is the paramount consideration in annulling the assailed order. It bears
stressing that an action to declare the nullity of a void judgment does not prescribe. 45
Finally, considering that the assailed CFI judgment is void, it has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In
contemplation of law, it is non-existent. Hence, the execution of the Deed of Sale by Lope in favor of Columba pursuant to said void
judgment, the issuance of titles pursuant to said Deed of Sale, and the subsequent transfers are void ab initio. No reversible error was thus
committed by the CA in annulling the judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated July 18, 2003 and Resolution dated November 13, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch XI, Cebu and the Heirs of Evaristo Cuyos are DIRECTED to proceed with SP
Proceedings Case No. 24-BN for the settlement of the Estate of Evaristo Cuyos.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 118680

March 5, 2001

MARIA ELENA RODRIGUEZ PEDROSA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE, CARMEN, MERCEDES & RAMON, all surnamed RODRIGUEZ, ROSALINA RODRIGUEZ,
CHAN LUNG FAI, MATEO TAN TE, TE ENG SUY, LORETA TE, VICTORIO S. DETALIA, JEROME DEIPARINE, PETRONILO S. DETALIA,
HUBERT CHIU YULO, PATERIO N. LAO, LORENSITA M. PADILLA, IMMACULATE CONCEPCION COLLEGE AND LILIAN EXPRESS,
INC. and TIO TUAN, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition assails the decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 23, 1994 which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
15, of Ozamiz City in Civil Case No. OZ-1397.
The facts of this case are as follows:
On April 8, 1946, the spouses Miguel Rodriguez and Rosalina J. de Rodriguez initiated proceedings before the CFI of Ozamiz City for the
legal adoption of herein petitioner, Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa. On August 1, 1946, the CFI granted the petition and declared petitioner
Pedrosa the adopted child of Miguel and Rosalina.
On April 29, 1972, Miguel died intestate. Thereafter, petitioner and Rosalina entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Miguel's estate,
adjudicating between themselves in equal proportion the estate of Miguel.
On November 21, 1972, private respondents filed an action to annul the adoption of petitioner before the CFI of Ozamiz City, with petitioner
and herein respondent Rosalina as defendants docketed as OZ 349.
On August 28, 1974, the CFI denied the petition and upheld the validity of the adoption. Thereafter, the private respondents appealed said
decision to the Court of Appeals.
On March 11, 1983, while said appeal was pending, the Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial settlement with respondent Rosalina for
the partition of the estate of Miguel and of another sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez. Pilar
had no heirs except his brothers and sisters.
The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition covered fourteen parcels of land covering a total area of 224,883 square meters. These
properties were divided among Jose, Carmen, Mercedes, Ramon and the heirs of Miguel, represented solely by Rosalina. The heirs of
Miguel were given 226 square meters of parcel 2, and 9,567 square meters and 24,457 square meters of parcels 7 and 9, respectively. 1 The
total land area allocated to the heirs of Miguel was 34,250 square meters.
Armed with the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition, respondents Rodriguezes were able to secure new Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCTs) and were able to transfer some parcels to the other respondents herein. 2
Lots 504-A-6, 504-B-3 and 504-C-4, portions of Parcel 3, designated as Lot 504, were transferred to respondents Chuan Lung Fai, 3 but not
included in the Deed of Settlement and Partition, were transferred to respondent Lilian Express, Inc. and are now registered under TCT No.
T-11337. Parcel 6, Lot 560, was subdivided among Ramon, Jose, Carmen and Mercedes and was designated as Lots 560-A, 560-B, 560-C,
560-D and 560-E. Lot 560-A covering 500 square meters was transferred to respondent Victorino Detall 4 and was subsequently transferred to
Jerome Deiparine who registered it under his name under TCT No. T-10706. Lot 560-B with 500 square meters was transferred to
respondent Petronilo Detalla5 and was later transferred to respondent Hubert Chiu Yulo who registered it under his name under TCT No. T11305. Lot 560-C was transferred and registered under the name of respondent Paterio Lao with TCT No. T-10206. Lot 560-D was sold to
and subsequently registered in the name of Lorensita M. Padilla under TCT No. T-10207. The remaining portion, Lot 560-E consisting of
43,608 square meters was bought by respondent Immaculate Concepcion College and was registered in its name under TCT No. T-10208. 6
On June 19, 1986, the parties in the appeal which sought to annul the adoption of petitioner Pedrosa filed a joint Motion to Dismiss. On June
25, 1986, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal but upheld the validity of the adoption of petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn, to claim their share of the properties from the Rodriguezes. The latter refused saying
that Maria Elena and Loreto were not heirs since they were not their blood relatives.
Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to annul the 1983 partition. The said complaint was filed on January 28, 1987. Said complaint was later
amended on March 25, 1987 to include the allegation "that earnest efforts toward a compromise were made between the plaintiffs and the
defendants, but the same failed."7
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Its ruling was premised on the
following grounds:8
1) that the participation of Rosalina has already estopped her from questioning the validity of the partition, and since she is
already estopped, it naturally follows that Maria Elena, her successor-in-interest, is likewise estopped, applying Article 1439 of the
Civil Code;
2) that the appeal of Maria Elena and her claim that the partition is null and void is weakened by her inconsistent claim that the
partition would have been alright had she been given a more equitable share;

3) the action is essentially an action for rescission and had been filed late considering that it was filed beyond the 4 year period
provided for in Article 1100 of the Civil Code; 9
4) that fraud and/or bad faith was never established.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated December 20, 1994. 10
Hence, this petition wherein the petitioner asserts that the following errors were allegedly committed by the Court of Appeals in I. FINDING THAT THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND PARTITION ENTERED INTO BY DEFENDANT JUREDINI AND
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS RODRIGUEZES WAS VALID AND BINDING UPON THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT WHO DID NOT
PARTICIPATE IN SAID TRANSACTION
II. CONCLUDING THAT THE CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAVE ALREADY PRESCRIBED TWO (2) YEARS AFTER
PUBLICATION OF THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND PARTITION IN THE NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION
III. ...CONCLUDING THAT THE CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT IS BARRED OR ESTOPPED IN FILING THIS CASE (sic) IN VIEW
OF THE DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. OZ 349 INTERPOSED BY HEREIN DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES WHO WERE
THEN PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS IN AC [C]-G.R. NO. SP-00208
IV. SUSTAINING THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEES' CLAIM THAT AS THEY HAVE NOT AS YET RECOGNIZED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
AS AN ADOPTED DAUGHTER OF MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ IT WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR THEM TO HAVE HER PARTICIPATE IN THE
EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT, EXHIBITS "S" AND "I"
V. CONCLUDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAD NOT CONCLUSIVELY SHOWN THAT MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ WAS A COOWNER OF THE LANDS SOLD AND HENCE IT FOLLOWS THAT SHE HAS NO RIGHT OF REDEMPTION OF THOSE LANDS
VI. FINDING THAT PORTION OF LOTS NOS. 504 AND 560 SOLD TO THE OTHER DEFENDANTSAPPELLEES WERE CLEAN AND
FREE FROM ENCUMBRANCES OR ANY FLAWS HENCE WERE VALID
VII. FINDING THAT THE PLANTIFFAPPELLANT NEVER APPEARED IN COURT TO TESTIFY OR REBUT THE ASSERTIONS OF
THE DEFENDANTSAPPELLANTS THAT THERE WAS A VALID PARTITION
VIII. AWARDING PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DAMAGES FOR THE INCOME OF HER SHARE IN THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION 11
In sum, the issues to be resolved in our view are (1) whether or not the complaint for annulment of the "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and
Partition" had already prescribed; (2) whether or not said deed is valid; and (3) whether or not the petitioner is entitled to recover the lots
which had already been transferred to the respondent buyers.
Petitioner argues that the complaint for annulment of the extrajudicial partition has not yet prescribed since the prescriptive period which
should be applied is four years following the case of Beltran vs. Ayson, 4 SCRA 69 (1962). She also avers that Sec. 4, Rule 74 which
provides for a two-year prescriptive period needs two requirements. One, the party assailing the partition must have been given notice, and
two, the party assailing the partition must have participated therein. Petitioner insists these requirements are not present in her case, 12 since
she did not participate in the "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition." She cites Villaluz vs. Neme, 7 SCRA 27, 30 (1963), where we
held that a deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge and consent to the same, is
fraudulent. She asserts that she is an adoptive daughter and thus an heir of Miguel. 13
Petitioner also contends that the respondent buyers were buyers in bad faith since they failed to exercise the necessary due diligence
required before purchasing the lots in question. 14 In the alternative, petitioner wants to redeem the said lots as a co-owner of respondent
Rodriguezes under the provisions of Article 1620 of the New Civil Code. 15
Lastly, petitioner asserts that she will suffer lesion if the partition would be allowed. She asks for the rescission of the said partitioning under
Articles 165-175 of the Civil Code.16
Respondents, in response, claim that the action of petitioner had already prescribed. In addition, they argue that petitioner, Maria Elena, and
Rosalina already have their shares in the estate of Miguel Rodriguez reflected in the compromise agreement they entered into with the
respondent Rodriguezes in AC- G.R. SP 00208. Finally, respondents aver that the non-participation of Maria Elena in the extrajudicial
partition was understandable since her status as an adopted child was then under litigation. In any case, they assert that the shares of
Miguel's heirs were adequately protected in the said partition. 17
Section 4, Rule 7418 provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the
extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when the provisions of Section 1 19 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the
persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians.20
Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial partition. Patently then, the two-year prescriptive period is not
applicable in her case.
The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as provided in Gerona vs. De Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964), which held that:

[The action to annul] a deed of "extrajudicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud...may be filed within four years from the
discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds
and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively.21
Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed on January 28, 1987, or three years and ten months after the questioned
extrajudicial settlement dated March 11, 1983, was executed, we hold that her action against the respondents on the basis of fraud has not
yet prescribed.
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule on publication of extrajudicial settlement. It states:
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner
provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated
therein or had no notice thereof.22
Under said provision, without the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement cannot be binding on
said persons. The rule contemplates a notice which must be sent out or issuedbefore the Deed of Settlement and/or Partition is agreed
upon, i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition, not after, which was
when publication was done in the instant case. Following Rule 74 and the ruling in Beltran vs. Ayson, since Maria Elena did not participate in
the said partition, the settlement is not binding on her.
The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed of extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on the ground of fraud.
A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is
fraudulent and vicious.23 Maria Elena is an heir of Miguel together with her adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the lone descendant of Miguel,
she excludes the collateral relatives of Miguel from participating in his estate, following the provisions of Article 1003 of the Civil Code. 24 The
private respondent Rodriguezes cannot claim that they were not aware of Maria Elena's adoption since they even filed an action to annul the
decree of adoption. Neither can they claim that their actions were valid since the adoption of Maria Elena was still being questioned at the
time they executed the deed of partition. The complaint seeking to annul the adoption was filed only twenty six (26) years after the decree of
adoption, patently a much delayed response to prevent Maria Elena from inheriting from her adoptive parents. The decree of adoption was
valid and existing. With this factual setting, it is patent that private respondents executed the deed of partition in bad faith with intent to
defraud Maria Elena.
In the case of Segura vs. Segura, the Court held:
This section [referring to section 4, Rule 74] provides in gist that a person who has been deprived of his lawful participation in the
estate of the decedent, whether as heir or as creditor, must assert his claim within two years after the extrajudicial or summary
settlement of such estate under Sections 1 and 2 respectively of the same Rule 74. Thereafter, he will be precluded from doing so
as the right will have prescribed.
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were
concerned. The rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine
heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule, "no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding
upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect
the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two
years from its execution in 1941.25
To say that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina in the partitioning is imprecise. Maria Elena, the adopted child, was no longer a minor
at the time Miguel died. Rosalina, only represented her own interests and not those of Maria Elena. Since Miguel predeceased Pilar, a sister,
his estate automatically vested to his child and widow, in equal shares. Respondent Rodriguezes' interests did not include Miguel's estate but
only Pilar's estate.
Could petitioner still redeem the properties from buyers? Given the circumstances in this case, we are constrained to hold that this is not the
proper forum to decide this issue. The properties sought to be recovered by the petitioner are now all registered under the name of third
parties. Well settled is the doctrine that a Torrens Title cannot be collaterally attacked. The validity of the title can only be raised in an action
expressly instituted for such purpose.26
Petitioner asks for the award of damages. No receipts, agreements or any other documentary evidence was presented to justify such claim
for damages. Actual damages, to be recoverable, must be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on
speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. 27 The same is true for moral damages. These cannot
be awarded in the absence of any factual basis. 28 The unsubstantiated testimony of Loreto Jocelyn Pedrosa is hearsay and has no probative
value. It is settled in jurisprudence that damages may not be awarded on the basis of hearsay evidence. 29 Nonetheless, the failure of the
petitioner to substantiate her claims for damages does not mean that she will be totally deprived of any damages. Under the law, nominal
damages are awarded, so that a plaintiff's right, which has been invaded or violated by defendants may be vindicated and recognized. 30
Considering that (1) technically, petitioner sustained injury but which, unfortunately, was not adequately and properly proved, (2) petitioner
was unlawfully deprived of her legal participation in the partition of the estate of Miguel, her adoptive father, (3) respondents had transferred
portions of the properties involved to third parties, and (4) this case has dragged on for more than a decade, we find it reasonable to grant in
petitioner's favor nominal damages in recognition of the existence of a technical injury.31 The amount to be awarded as such damages should
at least commensurate to the injury sustained by the petitioner considering the concept and purpose of said damages. 32 Such award is given
in view of the peculiar circumstances cited and the special reasons extant in this case. 33 Thus, the grant of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P100,000.00) PESOS to petitioner as damages is proper in view of the technical injury she has suffered.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The "Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition" executed by private respondents on March 11, 1983 is declared invalid. The amount of P100,000.00
is hereby awarded to petitioner as damages to be paid by private respondents, who are also ordered to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 155733

January 27, 2006

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA
DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA and other HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF CONCHA VDA. DE AREVALO, HEIRS OF
LUISA DELGADO VDA. DE DANAO, ANGELA DELGADO ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO PERLAS, CAROLINA DELGADOARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO DELGADO, BENJAMIN DELGADO, GLICERIA DELGADO and CLEOFAS DELGADO; and HEIRS OF
GORGONIO DELGADO, namely, RAMON DELGADO CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO CAMPO, CLARITA DELGADO CAMPO-REIZA,
YOLANDA DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA DELGADO CAMPO-ENCINAS and MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-MADARANG, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, namely, GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN and JOSE R. DAMIAN; HEIRS OF HORTENCIA
RUSTIA CRUZ, namely, TERESITA CRUZ-SISON, HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL
R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN RUSTIA, SR., namely, JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIA RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA,
JR., SERGIO RUSTIA, FRANCISCO RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA; and GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as Oppositors; 1 and
GUILLERMA RUSTIA, as Intervenor,2 Respondents.3
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 55,4 in SP Case No. 97668, which was reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals in its decision 5 dated October 24, 2002.
FACTS OF THE CASE
This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. 6 The main issue in this case is relatively
simple: who, between petitioners and respondents, are the lawful heirs of the decedents. However, it is attended by several collateral issues
that complicate its resolution.
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa
Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs
of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters, 7 his nephews and nieces,8 his illegitimate child,9 and the de facto adopted child10 (ampunampunan) of the decedents.
The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado
The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa 11 Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to
the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio
Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado.
However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgados life. Before him was Ramon Osorio 12with whom Felisa had a son,
Luis Delgado. But, unlike her relationship with Lucio Campo which was admittedly one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status of
Ramon Osorios and Felisa Delgados union is in dispute.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to the claimants because the answer will determine
whether their successional rights fall within the ambit of the rule against reciprocal intestate succession between legitimate and illegitimate
relatives.13 If Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been validly married, then their only child Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood
brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded from the latters intestate estate. He and his heirs would be barred by the principle of
absolute separation between the legitimate and illegitimate families. Conversely, if the couple were never married, Luis Delgado and his heirs
would be entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgados intestate estate, as they would all be within the illegitimate line.

Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. In support thereof, they assert that no evidence was ever
presented to establish it, not even so much as an allegation of the date or place of the alleged marriage. What is clear, however, is that
Felisa retained the surname Delgado. So did Luis, her son with Ramon Osorio. Later on, when Luis got married, his Partida de
Casamiento14 stated that he was "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado),15 significantly omitting any mention of
the name and other circumstances of his father.16 Nevertheless, oppositors (now respondents) insist that the absence of a record of the
alleged marriage did not necessarily mean that no marriage ever took place.
Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived by Guillermo Rustia and some collateral relatives, the
petitioners herein. Several months later, on June 15, 1973, Guillermo Rustia executed an affidavit of selfadjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado 17 but whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed. According
to petitioners, the two eventually lived together as husband and wife but were never married. To prove their assertion, petitioners point out
that no record of the contested marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the
sponsors referred to her as "Seorita" or unmarried woman.
The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of a marriage certificate did not of necessity mean that no
marriage transpired. They maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived together
as husband and wife until the death of Josefa on September 8, 1972. During this period spanning more than half a century, they were known
among their relatives and friends to have in fact been married. To support their proposition, oppositors presented the following pieces of
evidence:
1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued to Mrs. Guillermo J. Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo, then
Resident Commissioner to the United States of the Commonwealth of the Philippines;
2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947;
3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability Resulting from Service in the Active Military or Naval Forces of
the United States- Claim No. C-4, 004, 503 (VA Form 526) filed with the Veterans Administration of the United States of America
by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself [swore] to his marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June
1919;18
4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was married to Josefa Delgado.
The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children of their own, they took into their home the youngsters
Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local dialect
as ampun-ampunan.
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate child, 19 the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia,
with one Amparo Sagarbarria. According to Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as his daughter, his own flesh and blood, and she
enjoyed open and continuous possession of that status from her birth in 1920 until her fathers demise. In fact, Josefa Delgados obituary
which was prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named the intervenor-respondent as one of their children. Also, her report card from the University
of Santo Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia as her parent/guardian. 20
Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has no interest in the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was
never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate child. They contend that her right to compulsory acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo
died in 1974 and that she cannot claim voluntary acknowledgement since the documents she presented were not the authentic writings
prescribed by the new Civil Code.21
On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a petition for the adoption 22 of their ampunampunan Guillermina Rustia. He stated under oath "[t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or natural
children by legal fiction."23 The petition was overtaken by his death on February 28, 1974.
Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by his sisters Marciana Rustia vda. deDamian and Hortencia
Rustia-Cruz, and by the children of his predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso,
Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia Miranda. 24
ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original petition for letters of administration of the
intestate estates of the "spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of Manila, Branch 55. 25 This petition was opposed by
the following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia, namely, Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz; 26 (2) the heirs of
Guillermo Rustias late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3) the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia. The opposition was grounded on
the theory that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the other claimants were barred under the law from inheriting from their illegitimate halfblood relative Josefa Delgado.

In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings, claiming she was the only surviving descendant in the
direct line of Guillermo Rustia. Despite the objections of the oppositors (respondents herein), the motion was granted.
On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was amended to state that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia
were never married but had merely lived together as husband and wife.
On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismiss the petition in the RTC insofar as the estate of Guillermo
Rustia was concerned. The motion was denied on the ground that the interests of the petitioners and the other claimants remained in issue
and should be properly threshed out upon submission of evidence.
On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her sister, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18,
1987.
On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as administratrix of both estates.27The dispositive portion of the
decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-claimants to the estate of the late Josefa Delgado listed in the Petitions, and
enumerated elsewhere in this Decision, are hereby declared as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado who died intestate in the City
of Manila on September 8, 1972, and entitled to partition the same among themselves in accordance with the proportions referred to in this
Decision.
Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and only surviving heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus,
entitled to the entire estate of the said decedent, to the exclusion of the oppositors and the other parties hereto.
The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado executed by the late Guillermo J. Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby SET
ASIDE and declared of no force and effect.
As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled, and their settlement [is] considered consolidated in this proceeding in
accordance with law, a single administrator therefor is both proper and necessary, and, as the petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa
has established her right to the appointment as administratrix of the estates, the Court hereby APPOINTS her as the ADMINISTRATRIX of
the intestate estate of the decedent JOSEFA DELGADO in relation to the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.
Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue to the petitioner CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA
upon her filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of administration of the subject
estates, and is likewise ordered to turn over to the appointed administratix all her collections of the rentals and income due on the assets of
the estates in question, including all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to the petitioner and appointed
administratix CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA, immediately upon receipt of this Decision. The same oppositor is hereby
required to render an accounting of her actual administration of the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt
hereof.
SO ORDERED.28
On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground that the record on appeal was not filed on time. 29 They then
filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus 30 which was dismissed by the Court of Appeals.31 However, on motion for reconsideration and
after hearing the parties oral arguments, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and gave due course to oppositors appeal in the interest of
substantial justice.32
In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution of the Court of Appeals, on the ground that oppositors failure to file
the record on appeal within the reglementary period was a jurisdictional defect which nullified the appeal. On October 10, 1997, this Court
allowed the continuance of the appeal. The pertinent portion of our decision 33 read:
As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed. However, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an
appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial courts pronouncements as to certain matters of substance, relating to the determination of
the heirs of the decedents and the party entitled to the administration of their estate, which were to be raised in the appeal, but were barred
absolutely by the denial of the record on appeal upon too technical ground of late filing.
xxx xxx xxx
In this instance, private respondents intention to raise valid issues in the appeal is apparent and should not have been construed as an
attempt to delay or prolong the administration proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
A review of the trial courts decision is needed.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the Resolution dated November 27, 1991 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for the APPROVAL of the private respondents Record on Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the appeal
from the Manila, Branch LV Regional Trial Courts May 11, 1990 decision.
SO ORDERED.
Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals 34 partially set aside the trial courts decision. Upon motion for reconsideration, 35 the Court of
Appeals amended its earlier decision.36 The dispositive portion of the amended decision read:
With the further modification, our assailed decision is RECONSIDERED and VACATED. Consequently, the decision of the trial court
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have
been legally married; 2.) the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado
(Campo) entitled to partition among themselves the intestate estate of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion referred to in this
decision; 3.) the oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia and thereby entitled to partition his estate in
accordance with the proportion referred to herein; and 4.) the intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as ineligible to inherit from the late Dr.
Guillermo Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as administratrix of his estate.
The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in relation to the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado shall issue to
the nominee of the oppositors-appellants upon his or her qualification and filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of administration of the subject estates
and to turn over to the appointed administrator all her collections of the rentals and incomes due on the assets of the estates in question,
including all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to the appointed administrator, immediately upon notice of his
qualification and posting of the requisite bond, and to render an accounting of her (Guillermina Rustia Rustia) actual administration of the
estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from notice of the administrators qualification and posting of the bond.
The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Dr. Guillermo Rustia on June 15, 1973 isREMANDED to the trial
court for further proceedings to determine the extent of the shares of Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado
(Campo) affected by the said adjudication.
Hence, this recourse.
The issues for our resolution are:
1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado;
2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado are;
3. who should be issued letters of administration.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are permitted to draw from proof of other facts.
Presumptions are classified into presumptions of law and presumptions of fact. Presumptions of law are, in turn, either conclusive or
disputable.37
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by
other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.
Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as
husband and wife was such that even the original petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred
to them as "spouses."
Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage. They make much of the absence of a record of the contested marriage, the testimony of a witness 38 attesting that they were not
married, and a baptismal certificate which referred to Josefa Delgado as "Seorita" or unmarried woman.39
We are not persuaded.

First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took
place.40 Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or
directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued
to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, 41 the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia, 42 the declaration under oath of no less than
Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado 43 and the titles to the properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa
Delgado," more than adequately support the presumption of marriage. These are public documents which are prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein.44 No clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the recitals therein was
presented by petitioners.
Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners own witness whose testimony they primarily relied upon to support their position, confirmed that
Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and that eventually, the two had "lived together as husband and wife." This again
could not but strengthen the presumption of marriage.
Third, the baptismal certificate45 was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered by the priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of
the veracity of the declarations and statements contained therein, 46 such as the alleged single or unmarried ("Seorita") civil status of Josefa
Delgado who had no hand in its preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the
law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the
usual order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation of the
common rules of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.47
The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado
To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status of the cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon
Osorio must first be addressed.
As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law makes
so peremptory that no contrary proof, no matter how strong, may overturn them. 48 On the other hand, disputable presumptions, one of which
is the presumption of marriage, can be relied on only in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.
Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The oppositors (now respondents) chose merely
to rely on the disputable presumption of marriage even in the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and
Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgados and Caridad Concepcions Partida de
Casamiento49 identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado).50
All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon
Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely,
Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado, 51 were her
natural children.52
Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:
Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C; then X and Y would be natural brothers and sisters, but of halfblood relationship. Can they succeed each other reciprocally?
The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate children of the same parent, even though there is
unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It seems that to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from) another illegitimate
child begotten with a parent different from that of the former, would be allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a legitimate child.
Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that
succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition
on reciprocal successions between legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to the case under consideration. That prohibition has
for its basis the difference in category between illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no such difference when all the children are
illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten with different persons. They all stand on the same footing before the law, just like
legitimate children of half-blood relation. We submit, therefore, that the rules regarding succession of legitimate brothers and sisters should
be applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and sisters should receive double the portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and if
all are either of the full blood or of the half-blood, they shall share equally.53
Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless,
since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.
We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under
Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and
sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. 54 Therefore, the only collateral
relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still
alive at the time of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance. 55 The records not being clear
on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the
time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia, 56 they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the
new Civil Code:57
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other one-half.

Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have validly adjudicated Josefas estate all to himself. Rule
74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the decedents entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is
allowed only if he is the sole heir to the estate:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or
the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters
of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of
deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself
the estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)
The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia
Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child 58 of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to successional
rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition of paternity.59 She, however, claimed the status of an acknowledged illegitimate child of
Guillermo Rustia only after the death of the latter on February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new Civil Code that was in effect.
Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate children absolutely had no hereditary rights. This draconian
edict was, however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code which granted certain successional rights to illegitimate children but only on condition
that they were first recognized or acknowledged by the parent.
Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary.60 Recognition is compulsory in any of the following cases:
(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more or less with that of the conception;
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father (or mother) 61 by the direct acts of the latter
or of his family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father;
(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.

62

On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic
writing.63
Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory recognition through the open and continuous possession of the
status of an illegitimate child and second, voluntary recognition through authentic writing.
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from her birth until the death of her putative father
Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have compelled acknowledgment
through the courts.64 Furthermore, any (judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the
lifetime of the putative parent.65 On the death of either, the action for compulsory recognition can no longer be filed. 66 In this case, intervenor
Guillermas right to claim compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillermas second ground) must likewise fail. An authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition,
is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public instrument or a private
writing admitted by the father to be his.67 Did intervenors report card from the University of Santo Tomas and Josefa Delgados obituary
prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic writings under the new Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card of intervenor
Guillerma did not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as intervenors parent/guardian holds no
weight since he had no participation in its preparation. Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the
notice of death of Josefa Delgado which was published in the Sunday Times on September 10, 1972, that published obituary was not the
authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could have been admitted as an authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice,
in the handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the obituary. The failure to present the
original signed manuscript was fatal to intervenors claim.
The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was never adopted in accordance with law. Although a
petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came to fruition and was dismissed upon the latters death. We affirm the
ruling of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to
inherit from them ab intestato. We quote:
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created] between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from
legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the
Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory
requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be
affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming its existence. 68
Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo Rustia, namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia and
the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs of the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no
descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters, 69 nieces and nephews.70
Entitlement To Letters Of Administration

An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of
Court prescribes an order of preference in the appointment of an administrator:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as
such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or
unwilling, or if the husband or widow or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that the administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. 71 The order of
preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates, 72a situation which obtains
here.
It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the
nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia,
respectively.
WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The
assailed October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
1. Guillermo Rustias June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is hereby ANNULLED.
2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall
pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgados full- or
half-siblings who may have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her death. Josefa Delgados grandnephews and
grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In this connection, the trial court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the
relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate.
3. Guillermo Rustias estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgados estate) shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda.
de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall be per capita) and the children of the late Roman Rustia,
Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall be per stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia vda.
de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their respective shares shall pertain to their estates.
4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota
Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a nominee from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their
qualification and filing of the requisite bond in such amount as may be determined by the trial court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 125715 December 29, 1998

RICARDO F. MARQUEZ, AUREA M. CABEZAS, EXEQUIEL F. MARQUEZ, SALVADOR F. MARQUEZ, ANTONIO F. MARQUEZ, and
RAFAEL F. MARQUEZ, JR., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ALFREDO F. MARQUEZ and BELEN F. MARQUEZ, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
In our society, tradition and law enshrine the family as a basic social institution. In prose, poetry and song, it is lyrically extolled. What a
person becomes in adulthood, for good or ill, is attributed to the influence of the home and family during his formative years. In the family one
imbibes desirable values and personality traits. No matter how far one roams, he invariably turns to his family for security, approbation and
love. Against the whole world, members of the family stand solid as Gibraltar. It is thus heartrending to find members of the same family at
odds with each other, each playing one against the other.
The facts of the instant case illustrate the inglorious and unedifying spectacle of a "family feud." all because of a property dispute.
During their lifetime, the spouses Rafael Marquez, Sr. and Felicidad Marquez begot twelve children, namely: (1) Natividad; (2) Aurea; (3)
Herminigildo; (4) Filomena; (5) Exequel; (6) Salvador; (7) Guadencio; (8) Rafael, Jr., (9) Belen; (10) Alfredo; (11) Ricardo; and (12) Antonio.
Sometime in 1945, the spouses acquired a parcel of land with a lot area of 161 square meters in San Juan Del Monte, Rizal, more
particularly described in TCT No. 47572, 1wherein

the constructed their conjugal home.

In 1952, Felicidad Marquez died intestate. Thirty years later or in 1982, Rafael Marquez, Sr. executed an "Affidavit of Adjudication" vesting
unto himself sole ownership to the property described in TCT No. 47572. Consequently, TCT No. 47572 was cancelled and TCT No.
33350 2

was issued in his name on June 16, 1982.

covering the land described in

TCT No. 33350, as well as the house constructed thereon to three of this children, namely: (1) petitioner
Rafael, Jr.; (2) Alfredo; and (3) Belen, both private respondents herein, to the exclusion of his other
children, petitioners herein. As a result of the donation, TCT No. 33350 was cancelled and TCT No. 47572
was issued in private respondents' name.
Thereafter, on December 29, 1983 Rafael Marquez, Sr. executed a "Deed of Donation Inter Vivos" 3

From 1983 to 1991, private respondents were in actual possession of the land. However, when petitioners learned about the existence of
TCT No. 47572, they immediately demanded that since they are also children of Rafael Marquez, Sr., they are entitled to their respective
shares over the land in question. Unfortunately, efforts to settle the dispute proved unavailing since private respondents ignored petitioners'
demands.
In view of the private respondents' indifference, petitioners, now joined by Rafael Jr., filed a complaint on May 31, 1991 for "Reconveyance

alleging that both the "Affidavit of Adjudication" and "Deed of

Donation Inter Vivos" were fraudulent since the private respondents took advantage of the advanced age
of their father in making him execute the said documents.
and Partition with Damages" before the trial court

In their Answer, private respondents argued that petitioner's action was already barred by the statute of limitations since the same should
have been filed within four years from the date of discovery of the alleged fraud. 5
After due proceedings, the trial court, on April 29, 1993, rendered its decision 6

in favor of the petitioners, in this wise:

Prescription cannot set in because an action to set aside a document which is void ab initio does not prescribe. Both
the "Affidavit of Adjudication" and the "Donation Inter Vivos" did not produce any legal effect and did not confer any
right whatsoever. Equally, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 33350 and 46461 issued pursuant thereto, are likewise null
and void ab initio. Therefore, the inexistence of these documents and certificates of title is permanent and cannot be
the subject of prescription.
Private respondents, dissatisfied with the trial court's ruling, sought recourse before the Court of Appeals. On April 29, 1996, the said court
reversed the trial court's finding, thus: 7
In line with the decision of the Supreme Court in Gerona v. de Guzman, 11 SCRA 143, 157, the action therefor may be
filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place in the case at
bar on June 16, 1982, when the affidavit of self-adjudication was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificate of
title (No. 33350) was issued in the name of Rafael Marquez, Sr. (Exhibits E and 5, page 16, record). Considering that
the period from June 16, 1982, when TCT No. 33350 was issued in the name of Rafael Marquez Sr., to May 31, 1991,
when appellees' complaint was filed in court, is eight (8) years, eleven (11) months and fifteen (15) days, appellants'
action to annul the deed of self-adjudication is definitely barred by the statute of limitation.

Hence, they are now before this Court to raise the issue of
whether their action for reconveyance had prescribed.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration proved unavailing. 8

Petitioners, in contending that the action had not yet prescribed, assert that by virtue of the fraudulent "Affidavit of Adjudication" and "Deed of

Forthwith,
they maintain that an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10)
years.
Donation" wherein they were allegedly deprived of their just share over the parcel of land, a constructive trust was created. 9

It must be noted that Felicidad Marquez died in 1952; thus, succession to her estate is governed by the present Civil Code. Under Article 887
thereof, her compulsory heirs are her legitimate children, petitioners and private respondent therein, and her spouse, Rafael Marquez, Sr.

Now, in 1982, Rafael Marquez, Sr. decided to adjudicate the entire property by executing an "Affidavit of Adjudication" claiming that he is the
sole surviving heir of his deceased wife Felicidad F. Marquez. 10
As such, when Rafael Marquez Sr., for one reason or another, misrepresented in his unilateral affidavit that he was the only heir of his wife
when in fact their children were still alive, and managed to secure a transfer of certificate of title under his name, a constructive trust under

Constructive trusts are created in equity in order to prevent unjust enrichment.

They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or
holds the legal, right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold. Prescinding
from the foregoing discussion, did the action for reconveyance filed by the petitioners prescribe, as held
by the Court of Appeals?
Article 1456 was established. 11

12

In this regard, it is settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the isuance

For the purpose of this case, the prescriptive period shall start to run when
TCT No. 33350 was issued, which was on June 16, 1982. Thus, considering that the action for
reconveyance was filed on May 31, 1991, or approximately nine years later, it is evident that prescription
had not yet barred the action.
of the Torrens title over the property. 13

is misplaced. InAmerol v.
Bagumbaran, we ruled that the doctrine laid down in the earlier Gerona case was based on the old
Code of Civil Procedure which provided that an action based on fraud prescribes within four years from
the date of discovery. However, with the effectivity of the present Civil Code on August 30, 1950, the
provisions on prescriptive periods are now governed by Articles 1139 to 1155. Since implied or
constructive trusts are obligations created by law then the prescriptive period to enforce the same
prescribes in ten years.
To bolster the foregoing position, the Court of Appeal's reliance on Gerona v. de Guzman, 14
15

16

17

Cognizant of the fact that the disputed land was conjugal property of the spouses Rafael, Sr. and Felicidad, ownership of the same is to be
equally divided between both of them.
Prescinding therefrom, can Rafael Marquez Sr., as trustee of his wife's share, validly donate this portion to the respondents? Obviously, he
cannot, as expressly provided in Art. 736 of the Civil Code, thus:
Art. 736. Guardians and trustees cannot donate the property entrusted to them.
Moreover, nobody can dispose of that which does not belong to
him. 18
Be that as it may, the next question is whether he can validly donate the other half of the property which he owns? Again, the query need not
detain us at length for the Civil Code itself recognizes that one of the inherent rights of an owner is the right to dispose of his property. 19
Whether this donation was inofficious or not is another matter which is not within the province of this Court to determine inasmuch as it
necessitates the production of evidence not before it.

since they have not

satisfactorily shown that they have suffered "mental anguish" as provided in Article 2219 and Article 2290
of the Civil Code.
Finally, while we rule in favor of petitioners, we cannot grant their plea for moral damages and attorney's fees

20

Similarly, the plea for attorney's fees must likewise be denied because no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.

21

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41214 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Except as to the award of attorney's fees which is hereby DELETED, the judgment of the trial court in Civil Case No. 60887 is REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Kapunan, Purisima and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 160530

November 20, 2007

CYNTHIA V. NITTSCHER, petitioner,

vs.
DR. WERNER KARL JOHANN NITTSCHER (Deceased), ATTY. ROGELIO P. NOGALES and THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MAKATI (Branch 59), respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari are the Decision1 dated July 31, 2003 and Resolution2 dated October 21, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 55330, which affirmed the Order3 dated September 29, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 59, Makati City, in SP Proc. No.
M-2330 for the probate of a will.
The facts are as follows.
On January 31, 1990, Dr. Werner Karl Johann Nittscher filed with the RTC of Makati City a petition for the probate of his holographic will and
for the issuance of letters testamentary to herein respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales.
On September 19, 1991, after hearing and with due notice to the compulsory heirs, the probate court issued an order allowing the said
holographic will, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Holographic Will of the petitioner-testator Dr. Werner J. Nittscher executed pursuant to
the provision of the second paragraph of Article 838 of the Civil Code of the Philippines on January 25, 1990 in Manila,
Philippines, and proved in accordance with the provision of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court is hereby allowed.
SO ORDERED.4
On September 26, 1994, Dr. Nittscher died. Hence, Atty. Nogales filed a petition for letters testamentary for the administration of the estate of
the deceased. Dr. Nittschers surviving spouse, herein petitioner Cynthia V. Nittscher, moved for the dismissal of the said petition. However,
the court in its September 29, 1995 Order denied petitioners motion to dismiss, and granted respondents petition for the issuance of letters
testamentary, to wit:
In view of all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is DENIED. The petition for the issuance of Letters Testamentary, being in order,
is GRANTED.
Section 4, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides "when a will has been proved and allowed, the court shall issue letters
testamentary thereon to the person named as executor therein, if he is competent, accepts the trust and gives a bond as required
by these rules." In the case at bar, petitioner Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales of the R.P. Nogales Law Offices has been named executor
under the Holographic Will of Dr. Werner J. Nittscher. As prayed for, let Letters Testamentary be issued to Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales,
the executor named in the Will, without a bond.
SO ORDERED.5
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied for lack of merit. On May 9, 1996, Atty. Nogales was issued letters
testamentary and was sworn in as executor.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that respondents petition for the issuance of letters testamentary should have been
dismissed outright as the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and that she was denied due process.
The appellate court dismissed the appeal, thus:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Order isAFFIRMED in toto. The
court a quo is ordered to proceed with dispatch in the proceedings below.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision was denied for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition anchored on the
following grounds:
I.
BOTH THE CA AND THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING OUTRIGHT THE PETITION FOR LETTERS
TESTAMENTARY FILED BY ATTY. NOGALES WHEN, OBVIOUSLY, IT WAS FILED IN VIOLATION OF REVISED CIRCULAR
NO. 28-91 AND ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 04-94 OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.
II.

THE CA ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE LOWER COURT [HAS] NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
OF THE PRESENT SUIT.
III.
THE CA ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT SUMMONS WERE PROPERLY ISSUED TO THE PARTIES AND ALL PERSONS
INTERESTED IN THE PROBATE OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF DR. NITTSCHER.
IV.
THE CA ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONER WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY THE
LOWER COURT.7
Petitioner contends that respondents petition for the issuance of letters testamentary lacked a certification against forum-shopping. She adds
that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case because Dr. Nittscher was allegedly not a resident of the Philippines;
neither did he leave real properties in the country. Petitioner claims that the properties listed for disposition in her husbands will actually
belong to her. She insists she was denied due process of law because she did not receive by personal service the notices of the
proceedings.
Respondent Atty. Nogales, however, counters that Dr. Nittscher did reside and own real properties in Las Pias, Metro Manila. He stresses
that petitioner was duly notified of the probate proceedings. Respondent points out that petitioner even appeared in court to oppose the
petition for the issuance of letters testamentary and that she also filed a motion to dismiss the said petition. Respondent maintains that the
petition for the issuance of letters testamentary need not contain a certification against forum-shopping as it is merely a continuation of the
original proceeding for the probate of the will.
We resolve to deny the petition.
As to the first issue, Revised Circular No. 28-918 and Administrative Circular No. 04-949 of the Court require a certification against forumshopping for all initiatory pleadings filed in court. However, in this case, the petition for the issuance of letters testamentary is not an initiatory
pleading, but a mere continuation of the original petition for the probate of Dr. Nittschers will. Hence, respondents failure to include a
certification against forum-shopping in his petition for the issuance of letters testamentary is not a ground for outright dismissal of the said
petition.
Anent the second issue, Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in
the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if
he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of any province in which he had
estate. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the RTC and the Court of Appeals are one in their finding that Dr. Nittscher was a resident of Las Pias, Metro Manila at the time
of his death. Such factual finding, which we find supported by evidence on record, should no longer be disturbed. Time and again we have
said that reviews on certiorari are limited to errors of law. Unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of
support or are glaringly erroneous, this Court will not analyze or weigh evidence all over again. 10
Hence, applying the aforequoted rule, Dr. Nittscher correctly filed in the RTC of Makati City, which then covered Las Pias, Metro Manila, the
petition for the probate of his will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent.
Regarding the third and fourth issues, we note that Dr. Nittscher asked for the allowance of his own will. In this connection, Section 4, Rule
76 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally.
If the testator asks for the allowance of his own will, notice shall be sent only to his compulsory heirs.
In this case, records show that petitioner, with whom Dr. Nittscher had no child, and Dr. Nittschers children from his previous marriage were
all duly notified, by registered mail, of the probate proceedings. Petitioner even appeared in court to oppose respondents petition for the
issuance of letters testamentary and she also filed a motion to dismiss the said petition. She likewise filed a motion for reconsideration of the
issuance of the letters testamentary and of the denial of her motion to dismiss. We are convinced petitioner was accorded every opportunity
to defend her cause. Therefore, petitioners allegation that she was denied due process in the probate proceedings is without basis.
As a final word, petitioner should realize that the allowance of her husbands will is conclusive only as to its due execution. 11 The authority of
the probate court is limited to ascertaining whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law.12 Thus, petitioners claim of title to the properties forming part of her husbands estate should be settled in an
ordinary action before the regular courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated July 31, 2003 and Resolution dated October 21, 2003 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55330, which affirmed the Order dated September 29, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59,
Makati City, in SP Proc. No. M-2330 are AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Tinga, Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-57848 June 19, 1982
RAFAEL E. MANINANG and SOLEDAD L. MANINANG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and BERNARDO S.
ASENETA, respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
A Petition to Review the Decision of April 28, 1981 of respondent Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. 12032-R entitled "Rafael E. Maninang and
Soledad L. Maninang vs. Hon. Ricardo Pronove, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig, Branch XI, and Bernardo S. Aseneta".
Pertinent to the controversy are the following antecedental facts:
On May 21, 1977, Clemencia Aseneta, single, died at the Manila Sanitarium Hospital at age 81. She left a holographic will, the pertinent
portions of which are quoted hereunder:
xxx xxx xxx
It is my will that all my real properties located in Manila, Makati, Quezon City, Albay and Legaspi City and all my
personal properties shagllbe inherited upon my death by Dra. Soledad L. Maninang with whose family I have lived
continuously for around the last 30 years now. Dra. Maninang and her husband Pamping have been kind to me. ... I
have found peace and happiness with them even during the time when my sisters were still alive and especially now
when I am now being troubled by my nephew Bernardo and niece Salvacion. I am not incompetent as Nonoy would like
me to appear. I know what is right and wrong. I can decide for myself. I do not consider Nonoy as my adopted son. He
has made me do things against my will.
xxx xxx xxx
On June 9, 1977, petitioner Soledad Maninang filed a Petition for probate of the Will of the decedent with the Court of First Instance-Branch
IV, Quezon City (Sp. Proc. No. Q-23304, hereinafter referred to as the Testate Case).
On July 25, 1977, herein respondent Bernardo Aseneta, who, as the adopted son, claims to be the sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta,
instituted intestate proceedings with the Court of First Instance-Branch XI, Pasig, Rizal (Sp. Proc. No. 8569, called hereinafter the Intestate
Case" for brevity).
On December 23, 1977, the Testate and Intestate Cases were ordered consolidated before Branch XI, presided by respondent Judge.
Respondent Bernardo then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on the ground that the holographic will was null and void because he,
as the only compulsory heir, was preterited and, therefore, intestacy should ensue. In support of said Motion to Dismiss, respondent
Bernardo cited the cases of Neri vs. Akutin (72 Phil. 322); Nuguid vs. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449), and Ramos vs. Baldovino (2 CA Rep. 2nd,
878). 1
In her Opposition to said Motion to Dismiss, petitioner Soledad averred that it is still the rule that in a case for probate of a Will, the Court's
area of inquiry is limited to an examination of and resolution on the extrinsic validity of the will; and that respondent Bernardo was effectively
disinherited by the decedent. 2
On September 8, 1980, the lower Court ordered the dismissal of the Testate Case in this wise:
For reasons stated in the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Bernardo S. Aseneta which the Court finds meritorious,
the petition for probate of will filed by Soledad L. Maninang and which was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-23304 is
DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
On December 19, 1980, the lower Court denied reconsideration for lack of merit and in the same Order appointed Bernardo as the
administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased Clemencia Aseneta "considering that he is a forced heir of said deceased while
oppositor Soledad Maninang is not, and considering further that Bernardo Aseneta has not been shown to be unfit to perform the duties of
the trust. "

Petitioners Maninang resorted to a certiorari Petition before respondent Court of Appeals alleging that the lower Court exceeded its
jurisdiction in issuing the Orders of dismissal of the Testate Case (September 8, 1980) and denial of reconsideration (December 19, 1980).

denied certiorari and ruled that the trial Judge's Order of dismissal was final
in nature as it finally disposed of the Testate Case and, therefore, appeal was the proper remedy, which
petitioners failed to avail of. Continuing, it said that even granting that the lower Court committed errors in
issuing the questioned Orders, those are errors of judgment reviewable only by appeal and not by
Certiorari. 'Thus, this Petition before us.
On April 28, 1981, respondent Court

We find that the Court a quo a quo acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the Testate Case. Generally, the probate of a Will is
mandatory.
No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of
Court. 4
The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public policy requires it, because unless the Will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole
world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by Will may be rendered nugatory. 5
Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity.
... The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the
compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not determine
nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency (sic) of the provisions, these may be impugned as being
vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The que0stions relating to these points remain entirely unaffected,
and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated .... 6
Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in Probate proceeding
because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of
the law. 7
Respondent Bernardo, however, relies on the pronouncement in Nuguid vs. Nuguid 8,

reading:

In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the Court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and resolution on,
the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with
the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has
declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic
validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the Court should meet that issue. (Emphasis supplied)
Our ruling in Balanay vs. Hon. Martinez 9

had a similar thrust:

The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been
established. The probate of a will might become an Idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where
practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the
court should meet the issue.
The Nuguid and the Balanay cases provide the exception rather than the rule. The intrinsic validity of the Wills in those cases was passed
upon even before probate because "practical considerations" so demanded. Moreover, for the parties in the Nuguid case, the "meat of the
controversy" was the intrinsic validity of the Will; in fact, the parties in that case "shunted aside the question of whether or not the Will should
be allowed probate." Not so in the case before us now where the probate of the Will is insisted on by petitioners and a resolution on the
extrinsic validity of the Will demanded.
Moreover, in the Nuguid case, this Court ruled that the Will was intrinsically invalid as it completely preterited the parents of the testator. In
the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under the terms of the decedent's Will, private respondent had been
preterited or disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance. Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts.
... Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they
are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited."
(Neri vs. Akutin, 72 Phil. 325). Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heirs of
his share in the legitimate for a cause authorized by law." (Justice J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, "An Outline of
Philippine Civil Law", 1956 ed., Vol. III, p. 8, citing cases) Disinheritance is always "voluntary", preterition upon the
other hand, is presumed to be "involuntary" (Sanchez Roman, Estudios de Derecho Civil 2nd edition, Volume 2.o p.
1131). 10
The effects of preterition and disinheritance are also totally different.
... The effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of disinheritance. Pretention under Article 854 of
the New Civil Code shall annul the institution of heir. This annulment is in toto, unless in the wail there are, in addition,
testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same
Code, such disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs", but only "insofar as it may prejudice the person
disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition (III Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1961

Edition, p. 172). Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the
disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. 11
By virtue of the dismissal of the Testate Case, the determination of that controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered. We gather
from the assailed Order of the trial Court that its conclusion was that respondent Bernardo has been preterited We are of opinion, however,
that from the face of the Will, that conclusion is not indubitable.
As held in the case of Vda. de Precilla vs. Narciso

12

... it is as important a matter of public interest that a purported will is not denied legalization on dubious grounds.
Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary succession will be shaken to its foundation, ...
Coming now to the procedural aspect, suffice it to state that in view of our finding that respondent Judge had acted in excess of his
jurisdiction in dismissing the Testate Case, certiorari is a proper remedy. An act done by a Probate Court in excess of its jurisdiction may be

And even assuming the existence of the remedy of appeal, we harken to the rule that
in the broader interests of justice, a petition for certiorari may be entertained, particularly where appeal
would not afford speedy and adequate relief.
corrected by Certiorari. 13

WHEREFORE, the Decision in question is set aside and the Orders of the Court of First Instance-Branch XI, Rizal, dated September 8, 1980
and December 19, 1980, are nullified. Special Proceeding No. Q-23304 is hereby remanded to said Court of First Instance-Branch XI. Rizal,
therein to be reinstated and consolidated with Special Proceeding No. 8569 for further proceedings.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Plana and Relova JJ., concur.
Vasquez, J., took no part.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., I concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. L-63253-54 April 27, 1989
PABLO RALLA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROMULO P. UNTALAN, HON. DOMINGO CORONEL REYES, AND LEONIE RALLA, PETER RALLA AND MARINELLA
RALLA, respondents.
Rafael Triunfante for the Heirs of Pablo Ralla.
Ruben R. Basa for respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:
This petition seeks the nullification of the Order of respondent Judge Romulo P. Untalan, 1 dated July 16,1981, excluding from the probate
proceedings sixty-three parcels of land, as well as the Orders issued by respondent Judge Domingo Coronel Reyes, 2 denying the
petitioner's motions for reconsideration of the same Order of Judge Untalan dated July 16, 1981.
The petition's beginnings are traced to January 27, 1959, when Rosendo Ralla, a widower, filed a petition for the probate of his own will in
the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Albay, which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 564. In his will he left
his entire estate to his son, Pablo (the petitioner herein who, upon his death during the pendency of this petition, was substituted by his
heirs), leaving nothing to his other son, Pedro.
In the same year, Pedro Ralla filed an action for the partition of the estate of their mother, Paz Escarella; this was docketed as Civil Case No.
2023.
In the course of the hearing of the probate case (Special Proceedings No. 564), Pablo Ralla filed a motion to dismiss the petition for probate
on the ground that he was no longer interested in the allowance of the will of his late father, Rosendo Ralla, for its probate would no longer
be beneficial and advantageous to him. This motion was denied, and the denial was denied by the Court of Appeals. (The latter court agreed
with the lower court's conclusion that, indeed, the petitioner stood to gain if the testate proceedings were to be dismissed because then he
would not be compelled to submit for inclusion in the inventory of the estate of Rosendo Ralla 149 parcels of land from which he alone had
been collecting rentals and receiving income, to the exclusion and prejudice of his brother, Pedro Ralla, who was being deprived of his
successional rights over the said properties.) The denial of this motion to dismiss was likewise affirmed by this Court (in G.R. No. L26253). 3 On the scheduled hearing on November 3, 1966, the petitioner reiterated his lack of interest in the probate of the subject will.
Consequently, the court, through Judge Perfecto Quicho, declared Pedro and Pablo Ralla the only heirs of Rosendo Ralla who should share
equally upon the division of the latter's estate, and thereupon converted the testate proceedings into one of intestacy.
Meanwhile, the brothers agreed to compromise in the partition case (Civil Case No. 2023). On December 18, 1967, they entered into a
project of partition whereby sixty-three parcels of land, apparently forming the estate of their deceased mother, Paz Escarella, were amicably
divided between the two of them. This project of partition was approved on December 19,1967 by Judge Ezekiel Grageda.
Eleven years later, or on February 28, 1978, Joaquin Chancoco, brother-in- law of the petitioner (Pablo) filed a petition, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 1106, for the probate of the same will of Rosendo Ralla on the ground that the decedent owed him P5,000.00. Pablo Ralla
then filed a manifestation stating that he had no objections to the probate; thereafter, he filed a "Motion to Intervene as Petitioner for the
Probate of the Will." This motion was heard ex parte and granted despite the written opposition of the heirs of Pedro Ralla. Likewise, the
petition for probate was granted; Teodorico Almine, son-in-law of the petitioner, was appointed special administrator, over and above the
objection of the heirs of Pedro Ralla. However, in taking possession of the properties belonging to the estate of Rosendo Ralla, Teodorico

Almine also took possession of the sixty-three parcels of land covered by the project of partition mentioned earlier. Consequently, the heirs of
Pedro Ralla (the private respondents herein) moved to exclude from the estate of Rosendo Ralla the aforesaid parcels of land.
In an Omnibus order dated August 3, 1979, 4 respondent Judge Romulo P. Untalan ruled, inter alia, that the sixty-three parcels of land
should be included in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Rosendo Ralla and that said proceedings (both Special Proceedings
No. 564 and Special Proceedings No. 1106, which were ordered consolidated by this Court) should proceed as probate proceedings.
About two years later, or on June 11, 1981, the private respondents filed a "Petition To Submit Anew For Consideration Of The Court The
Exclusion Of 67 (sic) Parcels of Land Subject Of The Project Of Partition In Civil Case No. 2023." 5 In his Order of July 16,1981, Judge
Untalan reconsidered his earlier Order, to wit:
Premises considered, Order is hereby issued reconsidering the Omnibus Order of this Court dated August 3,1979,
more particularly paragraph 3 of the dispositive portion thereof. The Project of Partition should, therefore, be respected
and upheld. Hence, the sixty-three (63) parcels referred to therein should be excluded from the probate proceedings
and, likewise from the administration of Special Administrator Teodorico Almine, Jr.
SO ORDERED. 6
Thereafter, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing order but the same was denied 7 by respondent Judge Domingo
Coronel Reyes, to whose sala Special Proceedings No. 564 and No. 1 1 06 were apparently transferred. Still, a second motion for
reconsideration was filed; the same, however, was also denied. 8
In assailing the aforesaid Order of July 16, 1981, the following arguments are raised in the present special civil action for certiorari.
The first argument is stated as follows:
... The extrajudicial partition of the 63 parcels made after the filing of the petition for the probate of the Will, and before
said Will was probated, is a NULLITY, considering that as already decided by this Court in the case of Ernesto M.
Guevara, vs. Rosario Guevara et al., Vol. 74 Phil. Reports, there can be no valid partition among the heirs till after the
Will had been probated. ... 9
The above argument is obviously flawed and misleading for the simple reason that the aforementioned partition was made in the civil case
for partition of the estate of Paz Escarella, which is distinct from, and independent of, the special proceedings for the probate of the will of
Rosendo Ralla.
Verily, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs till after the will has been probated. This, of course, presupposes that
the properties to be partitioned are the same properties embraced in the win. Thus the rule invoked is inapplicable in this instance where
there are two separate cases (Civil Case No. 2023 for partition, and Special Proceedings No. 564 originally for the probate of a will), each
involving the estate of a different person (Paz Escarella and Rosendo Ralla, respectively) comprising dissimilar properties.
In his second and third arguments, 10 the petitioner claims that the Order of August 3, 1979 mentioned earlier could no longer be validly
reversed by the court two years after it was issued. Thus, it is alleged that by flip-flopping, Judge Untalan committed a grave abuse of
discretion.
An examination of the August 3, 1979 Order would reveal that the same resolved a number of divergent issues (ten as
enumerated) 11 springing from four separate special proceedings,12 all of which were pending in Branch I of the then Court of First Instance
of Albay; accordingly, there are at least nine 13 specific directives contained therein. However, a distinction must be made between those
directives that partake of final orders and the other directives that are in the nature of inter-locutory orders.
Two closely related orders are the following quoted portions of the said August 3, 1979 Order of respondent Judge Untalan:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The 149 parcels referred to in our elucidation on issue No. 2 as well as the 63 lots also mentioned therein all of
which may be summed up to 212 parcels, except those already validly disposed, conveyed, or transferred to third
persons, should be submitted, at least provisionally, to the probate or testate proceedings. Hence, the Motion to
exclusion the 149 parcels filed on June 2, 1979, by petitioner intervenor Pablo Ralla thru counsel in Special Proceeding
1106 and the motion for exclusion filed by the heirs of Pedro Ralla thru counsel in Special Proceedings 564 and 1106
are hereby Denied; (Emphasis supplied.)
3. The Project of partition, for purposes of these proceedings, is hereby stripped of its judicial recognition; 14

xxx xxx xxx

As regards the abovequoted paragraph 2, this Court finds that the same is interlocutory in character because it did not decide the action with
finality and left substantial proceedings still to be had.15 The foregoing order of inclusion of the subject parcels of land was a mere incident
that arose in the settlement of the estate of Rosendo Ralla. It is elementary that interlocutory orders, prior to the rendition of the final
judgment, are, at any time, subject to such corrections or amendments as the court may deem proper. Thus, in issuing the questioned Order
dated July 16,1981, which reversed the aforementioned interlocutory order and upheld the project of partition, respondent Judge Untalan
acted well within his jurisdiction and without grave abuse of discretion.

There is, however, a more important reason why we do not find any grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the questioned Order dated
July 16,1981. Consider the following undisputed facts: the properties involved in the present petition were the subject of the project of
partition signed by both the petitioner, Pablo Ralla, and Pedro Ralla in Civil Case No. 2023; the lower court approved the said project of
partition on December 19, 1967; subsequently, Pablo and Pedro Ralla jointly manifested that they had already received "the ownership and
possession of the respective parcels of land adjudicated to them in the said project of partition," 16 and upon their motion Judge Ezekiel
Grageda declared the partition case closed and terminated in its Order of December 29, 1967; there was no appeal made from this decision
within the reglementary period to do so, consequently, it attained finality.
Furthermore, the Court had occasion to rule that
Where a partition had not only been approved and thus become a judgment of the court, but distribution of the estate in
pursuance of such partition had fully been carried out, and the heirs had received the property assigned to them, they
are precluded from subsequently attacking its validity or any part of it. 17
Likewise:
Where a piece of land has been included in a partition, and there is no allegation that the inclusion was effected
through improper means or without the petitioners' knowledge, the partition barred any further litigation on said title and
operated to bring the property under the control and jurisdiction of the court for proper disposition according to the tenor
of the partition . . . They can not attack the partition collaterally, as they are trying to do in this case. 18 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Based on the foregoing pronouncements, the Order of August 3, 1979 setting aside the project of Partition was clearly erroneous. Realizing
this and the fact that it was not yet too late for him to correct his mistake, respondent Judge Untalan issued the questioned Order of July 16,
1981.
In fine, the partition in Civil Case No. 2023 is valid and binding upon the petitioner and Pedro Ralla, as well as upon their heirs, especially as
this was accompanied by delivery of possession to them of their respective shares in the inheritance from their mother, the late Paz
Escarella. They are duty bound to respect the division agreed upon by them and embodied in the document of partition.
Thus, the petitioner could no longer question the exclusion of the lands subject of the partition from the proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of Rosendo Ralla. Could it be that the petitioner's keen interest in including these lands in the estate proceedings is directly related to
the fact that his son-in-law is the administrator of the said estate of Rosendo Ralla?
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23638

October 12, 1967

DIONISIO FERNANDEZ, EUSEBIO REYES and LUISA REYES, petitioners,

vs.
ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.
---------------------------------------G.R. No. L-23662

October 12, 1967

MARIANO REYES, CESAR REYES, LEONOR REYES and PACIENCIA REYES, petitioners,
vs.
ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.
Jose D. Villena for petitioners.
Antonio Barredo and Exequiel M. Zaballero for respondent.
REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:
The heirs intestate of the late Benedicta de los Reyes have petitioned for a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals (in CA-G. R. No.
31221-R) affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, in Special Proceeding No. 831 of said Court, admitting to probate the
alleged last will and testament of the deceased, and overruling the opposition to the probate.
It appears from the record that on January 19, 1955, Ismaela Dimagiba, now respondent, submitted to the Court of First Instance a petition
for the probate of the purported will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes, executed on October 22, 1930, and annexed to the petition. The will
instituted the petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased. The petition was set for hearing, and in due time, Dionisio Fernandez,
Eusebio Reyes and Luisa Reyes and one month later, Mariano, Cesar, Leonor and Paciencia, all surnamed Reyes, all claiming to be heirs
intestate of the decedent, filed oppositions to the probate asked. Grounds advanced for the opposition were forgery, vices of consent of the
testatrix, estoppel by laches of the proponent and revocation of the will by two deeds of conveyance of the major portion of the estate made
by the testatrix in favor of the proponent in 1943 and 1944, but which conveyances were finally set aside by this Supreme Court in a decision
promulgated on August 3, 1954, in cases G.R. Nos. L-5618 and L-5620 (unpublished).
After trial on the formulated issues, the Court of First Instance, by decision of June 20, 1958, found that the will was genuine and properly
executed; but deferred resolution on the questions of estoppel and revocation "until such time when we shall pass upon the intrinsic validity
of the provisions of the will or when the question of adjudication of the properties is opportunely presented."

Oppositors Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for reconsideration, and/or new trial, insisting that the issues of estoppel and revocation be
considered and resolved; whereupon, on July 27, 1959, the Court overruled the claim that proponent was in estoppel to ask for the probate
of the will, but "reserving unto the parties the right to raise the issue of implied revocation at the opportune time."
On January 11, 1960, the Court of First Instance appointed Ricardo Cruz as administrator for the sole purpose of submitting an inventory of
the estate, and this was done on February 9, 1960.
On February 27, 1962, after receiving further evidence on the issue whether the execution by the testatrix of deeds of sale of the larger
portion of her estate in favor of the testamentary heir, made in 1943 and 1944, subsequent to the execution of her 1930 testament, had
revoked the latter under Article 957(2) of the 1950 Civil Code (Art. 869 of the Civil Code of 1889), the trial Court resolved against the
oppositors and held the will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes "unaffected and unrevoked by the deeds of sale." Whereupon, the oppositors
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
The appellate Court held that the decree of June 20, 1958, admitting the will to probate, had become final for lack of opportune appeal; that
the same was appealable independently of the issue of implied revocation; that contrary to the claim of oppositors-appellants, there had
been no legal revocation by the execution of the 1943 and 1944 deeds of sale, because the latter had been made in favor of the legatee
herself, and affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance.
Oppositors then appealed to this Court.
In this instance, both sets of oppositors-appellants pose three main issues: (a) whether or not the decree of the Court of First Instance
allowing the will to probate had become final for lack of appeal; (b) whether or not the order of the Court of origin dated July 27, 1959,
overruling the estoppel invoked by oppositors-appellants had likewise become final; and (c) whether or not the 1930 will of Benedicta de los
Reyes had been impliedly revoked by her execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of the proponent on March 26, 1943 and April 3, 1944.
As to the first point, oppositors-appellants contend that the order allowing the will to probate should be considered interlocutory, because it
fails to resolve the issues of estoppel and revocation propounded in their opposition. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the appellant's
stand is untenable. It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and
the proper execution and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or
otherwise. (Montaano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676; Mercado vs. Santos, 66 Phil. 215; Trillana vs. Crisostomo, 89 Phil. 710). As such, the
probate order is final and appealable; and it is so recognized by express provisions of Section 1 of Rule 109, that specifically prescribes that
"any interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment . . . where such order or judgment: (a) allows or
disallows a will."
Appellants argue that they were entitled to await the trial Court's resolution on the other grounds of their opposition before taking an appeal,
as otherwise there would be a multiplicity of recourses to the higher Courts. This contention is without weight, since Rule 109, section 1,
expressly enumerates six different instances when appeal may be taken in special proceedings.
There being no controversy that the probate decree of the Court below was not appealed on time, the same had become final and
conclusive. Hence, the appellate courts may no longer revoke said decree nor review the evidence upon which it is made to rest. Thus, the
appeal belatedly lodged against the decree was correctly dismissed.
The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of conveyance in favor of the testamentary heir is plainly irrelevant to and
separate from the question of whether the testament was duly executed. For one, if the will is not entitled to probate, or its probate is denied,
all questions of revocation become superfluous in law, there is no such will and hence there would be nothing to revoke. Then, again, the
revocation invoked by the oppositors-appellants is not an express one, but merely implied from subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly
evidencing an abandonment of the original intention to bequeath or devise the properties concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect
the will itself, but merely the particular devise or legacy. Only the total and absoluterevocation can preclude probate of the revoked testament
(Trillana vs. Crisostomo, supra.).
As to the issue of estoppel, we have already ruled in Guevara vs. Guevara, 98 Phil. 249, that the presentation and probate of a will are
requirements of public policy, being primarily designed to protect the testator's, expressed wishes, which are entitled to respect as a
consequence of the decedent's ownership and right of disposition within legal limits. Evidence of it is the duty imposed on a custodian of a
will to deliver the same to the Court, and the fine and imprisonment prescribed for its violation (Revised Rule 75). It would be a non
sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel. Whether or not the order overruling the allegation of estoppel is still
appealable or not, the defense is patently unmeritorious and the Court of Appeals correctly so ruled.
The last issue, that of revocation, is predicated on paragraph 2 of Article 957 of the Civil Code of 1950 (Art. 869 of the Code of 1889), which
recites:
Art. 957. The legacy or devise shall be without effect:
(1) . . . .
(2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thing bequeathed or any part thereof, it being understood that in the
latter case the legacy or devise shall be without effect only with respect to the part thus alienated. If after the alienation the thing
should again belong to the testator, even if it be by reason of nullity of the contract, the legacy or devise shall not thereafter be
valid, unless the reacquisition shall have been effected by virtue of the exercise of the right of repurchase;
xxx

xxx

xxx

It is well to note that, unlike in the French and Italian Codes, the basis of the quoted provision is a presumed change of intention on the part
of the testator. As pointed out by Manresa in his Commentaries on Article 869 of the Civil Code (Vol. 6, 7th Ed., p. 743)

Este caso se funda en la presunta voluntad del testador. Si este, despues de legar, se desprende de la cosa por titulo lucrativo u
oneroso, hace desaparecer su derecho sobra ella, dando lugar a la presuncion de que ha cambiado de voluntad, y no quiere que
el legado se cumpla. Mas para que pueda presumirse esa voluntad, es necesario que medien actos del testador que la indiquen.
Si la perdida del derecho sobre la cosa ha sido independiente de la voluntad del testador, el legado podraquedar sin efecto, mas
no en virtud del numero 2 del articulo 869, que exige siempre actos voluntarios de enajenacion por parte del mismo testador.
As observed by the Court of Appeals, the existence of any such change or departure from the original intent of the testatrix, expressed in her
1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that the subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in favor of the
legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba. In fact, as found by the Court of Appeals in its decision annulling these conveyances (affirmed in that
point by this Supreme Court in Reyes vs. Court of Appeals and Dimagiba, L-5618 and L-5620, promulgated on July 31, 1954), "no
consideration whatever was paid by respondent Dimagiba" on account of the transfers, thereby rendering it even more doubtful whether in
conveying the property to her legatee, the testatrix merely intended to comply in advance with what she had ordained in her testament,
rather than an alteration or departure therefrom. 1Revocation being an exception, we believe, with the Courts below, that in the circumstances
of the particular case, Article 957 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, does not apply to the case at bar.
Not only that, but even if it were applicable, the annulment of the conveyances would not necessarily result in the revocation of the legacies,
if we bear in mind that the findings made in the decision decreeing the annulment of the subsequent 1943 and 1944 deeds of sale were also
that
it was the moral influence, originating from their confidential relationship, which was the only cause for the execution of Exhs. A
and B (the 1943 and 1944 conveyances). (Decision, L-5618 and L-5620).
If the annulment was due to undue influence, as the quoted passage implies, then the transferor was not expressing her own free will and
intent in making the conveyances. Hence, it can not be concluded, either, that such conveyances established a decision on her part to
abandon the original legacy.
True it is that the legal provision quoted prescribes that the recovery of the alienated property "even if it be by reason of the nullity of the
contract" does not revive the legacy; but as pointed out by Scaevola (Codigo Civil, Vol. XV, 4th Ed., pp. 324-325) the "nullity of the contract"
can not be taken in an absolute sense.2 Certainly, it could not be maintained, for example, that if a testator's subsequent alienation were
avoided because the testator was mentally deranged at the time, the revocatory effect ordained by the article should still ensue. And the
same thing could be said if the alienation (posterior to the will) were avoided on account of physical or mental duress. Yet, an alienation
through undue influence in no way differs from one made through violence or intimidation. In either case, the transferor is not expressing his
real intent,3 and it can not be held that there was in fact an alienation that could produce a revocation of the anterior bequest.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed. Costs against appellants Reyes
and Fernandez. So ordered.
Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Bengzon, J.P., J., are on leave, took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23445

June 23, 1966

REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant,

vs.
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.
Custodio O. Partade for petitioner and appellant.
Beltran, Beltran and Beltran for oppositors and appellees.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single, without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her
were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios,
Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.
On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario
Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of
administration with the will annexed be issued to her.
On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid,
entered their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as

universal heir of the deceased, oppositors who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line were illegally
preterited and that in consequence the institution is void.
On August 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for probate and objection thereto, oppositors moved to dismiss on the ground
of absolute preterition.
On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to the motion to dismiss.

1wph1.t

The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of
the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition without costs.
A motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitioner came to this Court on appeal.
1. Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our attention. The case is for the probate of a will. The court's area of inquiry is
limited to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary
capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be presented, and to be acted
upon, by the court. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions
of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein. 1
A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside the question of whether or not the will should be allowed probate. For
them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated.2 But petitioner and oppositors, in the court below and here on appeal, travelled on the issue of law, to wit: Is the will
intrinsically a nullity?
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be
protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will
come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus
added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of
the provisions of the will in question.3 After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.
2. Petitioner's sole assignment of error challenges the correctness of the conclusion below that the will is a complete nullity. This exacts from
us a study of the disputed will and the applicable statute.
Reproduced hereunder is the will:
Nov. 17, 1951
I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having amassed a certain amount of property, do hereby give,
devise, and bequeath all of the property which I may have when I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my name this seventh day of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one.
(Sgd.) Illegible
T/ ROSARIO NUGUID
The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part, provides:
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be
valid insofar as they are not inofficious. ...
Except for inconsequential variation in terms, the foregoing is a reproduction of Article 814 of the Civil Code of Spain of 1889, which is
similarly herein copied, thus
Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or
born after the death of the testator, shall void the institution of heir; but the legacies and betterments 4 shall be valid, in so far as
they are not inofficious. ...
A comprehensive understanding of the term preterition employed in the law becomes a necessity. On this point Manresa comments:
La pretericion consiste en omitar al heredero en el testamento. O no se le nombra siquiera o aun nombrandole como padre, hijo,
etc., no se le instituya heredero ni se le deshereda expresamente ni se le asigna parte alguna de los bienes, resultando privado
de un modo tacito de su derecho a legitima.
Para que exista pretericion, con arreglo al articulo 814, basta que en el testamento omita el testador a uno cualquiera de aquellos
a quienes por su muerte corresponda la herencia forzosa.
Se necesita, pues, a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero forzoso. b) Que la omision sea completa; que el heredero forzoso
nada reciba en el testamento.

It may now appear trite bat nonetheless helpful in giving us a clear perspective of the problem before us, to have on hand a clear-cut
definition of the word annul:
To "annul" means to abrogate, to make void ... In re Morrow's Estate, 54 A. 342, 343, 204 Pa. 484.6
The word "annul" as used in statute requiring court to annul alimony provisions of divorce decree upon wife's remarriage means to
reduce to nothing; to annihilate; obliterate; blot out; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish. N.J.S.A. 2:50 38 (now
N.J.S. 2A:34-35). Madden vs. Madden, 40 A. 2d 611, 614, 136 N..J Eq. 132. 7
ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with. Ex
parte Mitchell, 123 W. Va. 283, 14 S.E. 2d. 771, 774. 8
And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs
in the direct ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will completely omits both of them:
They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a
clear case of preterition. Such preterition in the words of Manresa "anulara siempre la institucion de heredero, dando caracter absoluto a
este ordenamiento referring to the mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code. 9 The one-sentence will here institutes petitioner as the
sole, universal heir nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity
is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate. Says Manresa:
En cuanto a la institucion de heredero, se anula. Lo que se anula deja de existir, en todo o en parte? No se aade limitacion
alguna, como en el articulo 851, en el que se expresa que se anulara la institucion de heredero en cuanto prejudique a la legitima
del deseheredado Debe, pues, entenderse que la anulacion es completa o total, y que este articulo como especial en el caso que
le motiva rige con preferencia al 817. 10
The same view is expressed by Sanchez Roman:
La consecuencia de la anulacion o nulidad de la institucion de heredero por pretericion de uno, varios o todos los forzosos en
linea recta, es la apertura de la sucesion intestada total o parcial. Sera total, cuando el testador que comete la pretericion,
hubiese dispuesto de todos los bienes por titulo universal de herencia en favor de los herederos instituidos, cuya institucion se
anula, porque asi lo exige la generalidad del precepto legal del art. 814, al determinar, como efecto de la pretericion, el de que
"anulara la institucion de heredero." ... 11
Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there is no escaping the conclusion that the universal institution of petitioner to
the entire inheritance results in totally abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of such institution of universal heir without any other
testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article
854 offers no leeway for inferential interpretation. Giving it an expansive meaning will tear up by the roots the fabric of the statute. On this
point, Sanchez Roman cites the "Memoria annual del Tribunal Supreme, correspondiente a 1908", which in our opinion expresses the rule of
interpretation, viz:
... El art. 814, que preceptua en tales casos de pretericion la nulidad de la institucion de heredero, no consiente interpretacion
alguna favorable a la persona instituida en el sentido antes expuesto aun cuando parezca, y en algun caso pudiera ser, mas o
menos equitativa, porque una nulidad no significa en Derecho sino la suposicion de que el hecho o el acto no se ha realizado,
debiendo por lo tanto procederse sobre tal base o supuesto, y consiguientemente, en un testamento donde falte la institucion, es
obligado llamar a los herederos forzosos en todo caso, como habria que llamar a los de otra clase, cuando el testador no hubiese
distribudo todos sus bienes en legados, siendo tanto mas obligada esta consecuencia legal cuanto que, en materia de
testamentos, sabido es, segun tiene declarado la jurisprudencia, con repeticion, que no basta que sea conocida la voluntad de
quien testa si esta voluntad no aparece en la forma y en las condiciones que la ley ha exigido para que sea valido y eficaz, por lo
que constituiria una interpretacion arbitraria, dentro del derecho positivo, reputar como legatario a un heredero cuya institucion
fuese anulada con pretexto de que esto se acomodaba mejor a la voluntad del testador, pues aun cuando asi fuese, sera esto
razon para modificar la ley, pero no autoriza a una interpretacion contraria a sus terminos y a los principios que informan la
testamentifaccion, pues no porque parezca mejor una cosa en el terreno del Derecho constituyente, hay razon para convereste
juicio en regla de interpretacion, desvirtuando y anulando por este procedimiento lo que el legislador quiere establecer. 12
3. We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that, annullment notwithstanding, "the devises and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious". Legacies and devises merit consideration only when they are so expressly given as such in a will. Nothing
in Article 854 suggests that the mere institution of a universal heir in a will void because of preterition would give the heir so instituted a
share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent. There must be, in addition to such institution, a testamentary disposition granting him
bequests or legacies apart and separate from the nullified institution of heir. Sanchez Roman, speaking of the two component parts of Article
814, now 854, states that preterition annuls the institution of the heir "totalmente por la pretericion"; but added (in reference to legacies and
bequests) "pero subsistiendo ... todas aquellas otras disposiciones que no se refieren a la institucion de heredero ... . 13 As Manresa puts it,
annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtud de
legado, mejora o donacion. 14
As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the institution of petitioner as universal heir. That institution, by itself, is
null and void. And, intestate succession ensues.
4. Petitioner's mainstay is that the present is "a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of preterition". 15From this, petitioner draws
the conclusion that Article 854 "does not apply to the case at bar". This argument fails to appreciate the distinction between pretention and
disinheritance.
Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein,
or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited." 16 Disinheritance, in turn, "is
a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. " 17 In Manresa's own

words: "La privacion expresa de la legitima constituye la desheredacion. La privacion tacita de la misma se
denomina pretericion." 18 Sanchez Roman emphasizes the distinction by stating that disinheritance "es siempre voluntaria"; preterition, upon
the other hand, is presumed to be "involuntaria". 19 Express as disinheritance should be, the same must be supported by a legal cause
specified in the will itself. 20
The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than
be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition.
On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854
of the Civil Code, we repeat, "shall annul the institution of heir". This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition,
testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such
disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs", put only "insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited", which last phrase was
omitted in the case of preterition. 21 Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the
disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. Manresa's expressive language, in commenting on the rights of the preterited heirs in the
case of preterition on the one hand and legal disinheritance on the other, runs thus: "Preteridos, adquiren el derecho a todo; desheredados,
solo les corresponde un tercio o dos tercios, 22 el caso.23
5. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are entitled to receive their legitimes, but that the institution of heir "is
not invalidated," although the inheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes. 24
This is best answered by a reference to the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Moran in the Neri case heretofore cited,viz:
But the theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal title in favor of the children by the second marriage should be
treated as legado and mejora and, accordingly, it must not be entirely annulled but merely reduced. This theory, if adopted, will
result in a complete abrogation of Articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code. If every case of institution of heirs may be made to fall
into the concept of legacies and betterments reducing the bequest accordingly, then the provisions of Articles 814 and 851
regarding total or partial nullity of the institution, would. be absolutely meaningless and will never have any application at all. And
the remaining provisions contained in said article concerning the reduction of inofficious legacies or betterments would be a
surplusage because they would be absorbed by Article 817. Thus, instead of construing, we would be destroying integral
provisions of the Civil Code.
The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a failure to distinguish institution of heirs from legacies and
betterments, and a general from a special provision. With reference to article 814, which is the only provision material to the
disposition of this case, it must be observed that the institution of heirs is therein dealt with as a thing separate and distinct from
legacies or betterments. And they are separate and distinct not only because they are distinctly and separately treated in said
article but because they are in themselves different. Institution of heirs is a bequest by universal title of property that is
undetermined. Legacy refers to specific property bequeathed by a particular or special title. ... But again an institution of heirs
cannot be taken as a legacy. 25
The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete nullity". Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies "the
institution of heir". Considering, however, that the will before us solely provides for the institution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing
more, the result is the same. The entire will is null.
Upon the view we take of this case, the order of November 8, 1963 under review is hereby affirmed. No costs allowed. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994

SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND, respondents.
Miguel D. Larida for petitioners.
Montilla Law Office for private respondent.

PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the Decision of the Court of
Appeals 1

in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads;
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision of November 19, 1988 of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and the petition for probate is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.

in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, and the

instrument submitted for probate is the holographic will of the late Annie Sand, who died on
November 25, 1982.
The earlier Decision was rendered by the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94,

In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto and Thelma Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S.
Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their children.
On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, for allowance of decedent's holographic will. They alleged that at the time
of its execution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect
capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.
Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the signature therein was in decedent's
handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners
through improper pressure and undue influence. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the disposition in the will
of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety,
as she was not its sole owner.
Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedent's holographic will to probate. It found, inter alia:
Considering then that the probate proceedings herein must decide only the question of identity of the will, its due
execution and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix, this probate court finds no reason at all for the disallowance of
the will for its failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of testamentary capacity of the
testatrix.
For one, no evidence was presented to show that the will in question is different from the will actually executed by the
testatrix. The only objections raised by the oppositors . . . are that the will was not written in the handwriting of the
testatrix which properly refers to the question of its due execution, and not to the question of identity of will. No other
will was alleged to have been executed by the testatrix other than the will herein presented. Hence, in the light of the
evidence adduced, the identity of the will presented for probate must be accepted, i.e., the will submitted in Court must
be deemed to be the will actually executed by the testatrix.
xxx xxx xxx
While the fact that it was entirely written, dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix has been disputed, the
petitioners, however, have satisfactorily shown in Court that the holographic will in question was indeed written entirely,
dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix. Three (3) witnesses who have convincingly shown knowledge of
the handwriting of the testatrix have been presented and have explicitly and categorically identified the handwriting with
which the holographic will in question was written to be the genuine handwriting and signature of the testatrix. Given
then the aforesaid evidence, the requirement of the law that the holographic will be entirely written, dated and signed in
the handwriting of the testatrix has been complied with.
xxx xxx xxx
As to the question of the testamentary capacity of the testratix, (private respondent) Clemente Sand himself has
testified in Court that the testatrix was completely in her sound mind when he visited her during her birthday celebration
in 1981, at or around which time the holographic will in question was executed by the testatrix. To be of sound mind, it
is sufficient that the testatrix, at the time of making the will, knew the value of the estate to be disposed of, the
proper object of her bounty, and thecharacter of the testamentary act . . . The will itself shows that the testatrix even
had detailed knowledge of the nature of her estate. She even identified the lot number and square meters of the lots
she had conveyed by will. The objects of her bounty were likewise identified explicitly. And considering that she had

even written a nursing book which contained the law and jurisprudence on will and succession, there is more than
sufficient showing that she knows the character of the testamentary act.
In this wise, the question of identity of the will, its due execution and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix has to be
resolved in favor of the allowance of probate of the will submitted herein.
Likewise, no evidence was presented to show sufficient reason for the disallowance of herein holographic will. While it
was alleged that the said will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the
beneficiary or of some other person, the evidence adduced have not shown any instance where improper pressure or
influence was exerted on the testatrix. (Private respondent) Clemente Sand has testified that the testatrix was still alert
at the time of the execution of the will, i.e., at or around the time of her birth anniversary celebration in 1981. It was also
established that she is a very intelligent person and has a mind of her own. Her independence of character and to
some extent, her sense of superiority, which has been testified to in Court, all show the unlikelihood of her being unduly
influenced or improperly pressured to make the aforesaid will. It must be noted that the undue influence or improper
pressure in question herein only refer to the making of a will and not as to the specific testamentary provisions therein
which is the proper subject of another proceeding. Hence, under the circumstances, this Court cannot find convincing
reason for the disallowance of the will herein.
Considering then that it is a well-established doctrine in the law on succession that in case of doubt, testate succession
should be preferred over intestate succession, and the fact that no convincing grounds were presented and proven for
the disallowance of the holographic will of the late Annie Sand, the aforesaid will submitted herein must be admitted to
probate. 3

(Citations omitted.)

On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of decedent's will was dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that, "the

It held that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813
and 814 of the New Civil Code, which read, as follows:
holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its validity."

Art. 813: When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic will are signed without being dated, and the last
disposition has a signature and date, such date validates the dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time of prior
dispositions.
Art. 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will, the testator must authenticate the
same by his full signature.
It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated, or signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures,
alterations and cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated by decedent.
Thus, this appeal which is impressed with merit.
Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
(a) If not executed and attested as required by law;
(b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the time of its execution;
(c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary, or of some other
person for his benefit;
(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the instrument should be his
will at the time of fixing his signature thereto.
In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code reads:
Art. 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases;
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its
execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the
beneficiary or of some other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;

(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his
will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.

Thus, in a petition to admit a holographic will to

probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the
decedent's last will and testament; (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will
was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the
decedent.
These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will.

In the case at bench, respondent court held that the holographic will of Anne Sand was not executed in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law. It held that Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code, ante, were not complied with, hence, it disallowed the probate of
said will. This is erroneous.
We reiterate what we held in Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil. 476, 479 (1919), that:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid
substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject
should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose
sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when
an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands
more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.
For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these formal solemnities include the subscription, attestation, and acknowledgment
requirements under Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code.
In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally autographic or
handwritten by the testator himself,

as provided under Article 810 of the New Civil Code, thus:

A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator
himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably
handwritten by the testator.
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic
will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be
effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814. In the case
of Kalaw vs. Relova 132 SCRA 237 242 (1984), this Court held:
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will have
not been noted under his signature, . . . the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the
particular words erased, corrected or interlined. Manresa gave an identical commentary when he said "la omission de
la salvedad no anula el testamento, segun la regla de jurisprudencia establecida en la sentencia de 4 de Abril de
1985." 8

(Citations omitted.)

Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on testator's

their presence does not invalidate the will itself.

disallowance of such changes.
signature, 9

10

The lack of authentication will only result in

It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes and signing and dating of dispositions appear in provisions
(Articles 813 and 814) separate from that which provides for the necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article 810). The
distinction can be traced to Articles 678 and 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which the present provisions covering holographic wills are
taken. They read as follows:
Art. 678: A will is called holographic when the testator writes it himself in the form and with the requisites required in
Article 688.
Art. 688: Holographic wills may be executed only by persons of full age.
In order that the will be valid it must be drawn on stamped paper corresponding to the year of its execution, written in
its entirety by the testator and signed by him, and must contain a statement of the year, month and day of its execution.
If it should contain any erased, corrected, or interlined words, the testator must identify them over his signature.
Foreigners may execute holographic wills in their own language.

This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only the requirements of Article 810 of the New Civil Code and not
those found in Articles 813 and 814 of the same Code are essential to the probate of a holographic will.
The Court of Appeals further held that decedent Annie Sand could not validly dispose of the house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan
del Norte, in its entirety. This is correct and must be affirmed.
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated.
However, in exceptional instances, courts are not powerless to do what the situation constrains them to do, and pass upon certain provisions

In the case at bench, decedent herself indubitably stated in her holographic will that the
Cabadbaran property is in the name of her late father, John H. Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero
to question her conveyance of the same in its entirety). Thus, as correctly held by respondent court, she
cannot validly dispose of the whole property, which she shares with her father's other heirs.
of the will. 11

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30,
1992, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, except with respect to the invalidity of the disposition of the entire house and lot in Cabadbaran,
Agusan del Norte. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, dated November 19, 1988,
admitting to probate the holographic will of decedent Annie Sand, is hereby REINSTATED, with the above qualification as regards the
Cabadbaran property. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 77047 May 28, 1988
JOAQUINA R-INFANTE DE ARANZ, ANTONIO R-INFANTE, CARLOS R. INFANTE, MERCEDES R-INFANTE DE LEDNICKY, ALFREDO
R-INFANTE, TERESITA R-INFANTE, RAMON R-INFANTE, FLORENCIA R-INFANTE DE DIAS, MARTIN R-INFANTE, JOSE R-INFANTE
LINK and JOAQUIN R-INFANTE CAMPBELL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. NICOLAS GALING, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH
NO. 166, PASIG, METRO MANILA AND JOAQUIN R-INFANTE, respondents.
Belo, Abiera and Associates for petitioners.
Miguel J. Lagman for respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

of the Court of Appeals, dated 13 January 1987, in CA-G.R. SP

No. 09622, entitled "Joaquina R-Infante de Aranz, et al., petitioners vs. Hon. Nicolas Galing, etc., et al.,
respondents," dismissing petitioners' petition for certiorari and prohibition as-, sailing the orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, dated 12 May 1986 and 30 May 1986, respectively, in Sp.
Proc. No. 9995, entitled, "In the Matter of Petition for Approval of the Last Will and Testament of
Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola Joaquin R. Infante, Petitioner."
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision

On 3 March 1986, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, a petition for the probate and allowance of the
last will and testament of the late Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola The petition specified the names and ad- dresses of herein petitioners as
legatees and devisees, as follows:
Joaquina R-Infante Roxas de Aranz residing at No. 86 10th St., New Manila, Quezon City, Metro Manila;
Antonio R-Infante Roxas residing at #91 Cambridge, North Forbes, Makati, Metro Manila;
Carlos R-Infante Roxas residing at #46 Washington St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila;
Mercedes R-Infante Roxas de Lednicky residing at #386 P. Guevarra St., San Juan, Metro Manila;
Alfredo R-Infante Roxas residing at #27 A Scout Tobias St., Quezon City, Metro Manila;
Teresita R-Infante Roxas residing at #121 9th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, Metro Manila;
Ramon R-Infante Roxas residing at #27 B Scout Tobias St., Quezon City, Metro Manila;
Florencia R-Infante Roxas de Diaz residing at Calle Sancho Davila, 13-19-D, Madrid, 28028 Spain;
Martin R-Infante Roxas residing at #2 Bongavilla St., Cubao, Quezon City, Metro Manila;
Jose R-Infante Link residing at 174R-Pascual St., San Juan, Metro Manila;
Joaquin R-Infante Campbell C/O Pilar Campbell, 15 Briones, Makati, Metro Marta.

On 12 March 1986, the probate court issued an order selling the petition for hearing on 5 May 1986 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. Said order
was published in the "Nueva Era" A newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks. On the
date of the hearing, no oppositor appeared. The hearing was then reset to 12 May 1986, on which date, the probate court issued the
following order:
There being no opposition to this instant case, as prayed for, the oner to-receive Branch Clerk of Court is hereby
designated Co evidence ex-parte of the petitioner.
SO ORDERED. 4
On the same day (12 May 1986), private respondent presented his evidence ex-parte and placed Arturo Arceo one of the testamentary
witnesses, on the witness stand. During the proceedings, private respondent was appointed executor.
On 14 May 1986, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of 12 May 1986 alleging that, as named legatees, no notices were
sent to them as required by Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and they prayed that they be given a period of ten (10) days within which to
file their opposition to the probate of the will.
On 30 May 1986, the probate court, acting on the opposition of private respondent and the reply thereto of petitioners, issued an order
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Thereafter, petitioners filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition which was, however, referred to the Court of Appeals. On 13
January 1987, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision dismissing the petition.

Hence, the instant petition.

It is the view of petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that personal notice of probate proceedings to the known legatees and
devisees is not a jurisdictional requirement in the probate of a will. Contrary to the holding of the Court of Appeals that the requirement of
notice on individual heirs, legatees and devisees is merely a matter of procedural convenience to better satisfy in some instances the
requirements of due process, petitioners allege that under Sec. 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court, said requirement of the law is mandatory
and its omission constitutes a reversible error for being constitutive of grave abuse of discretion. 6
We grant the petition:
Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Cof reads:
SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally. The court shag also cause
copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known
heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines at their places of residence, and deposited in
the post office with the postage thereon prepaid at least twenty (20) days before the hearing, if such places of
residence be known. A copy of the notice must in like manner be mailed to the person named as executor, if he be not,
the petitioner; also, to any person named as co-executor not petitioning, if their places of residence be known. Personal
service of copies of the notice at least ten (10) days before the day of hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.
It is clear from the aforecited rule that notice of the time and place of the hearing for the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees residing in the Philippines at their places of residence, if such places of residence
be known. There is no question that the residences of herein petitioners legatees and devisees were known to the probate court. The petition

But despite such

knowledge, the probate court did not cause copies of the notice to be sent to petitioners. The requirement
of the law for the allowance of the will was not satisfied by mere publication of the notice of hearing for
three (3) weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
for the allowance of the wig itself indicated the names and addresses of the legatees and devisees of the testator.

cited by the Court of Appeals in its assailed decision to support its theory is not
applicable in the present case. In that case, petitioners Purificacion Joson and Erotica Joson failed to
contest the will of Tomas Joson because they had not been notified of the hearing of the petition for
probate. he the petition included the residence of petitioners as Dagupan Street No. 83, Manila,
petitioners claimed that their residence was not Dagupan Street No. 83, Manila. There the Court said:
The case of Joson vs. Nable 8

Petitioners maintain that no notice was received by them partly because their residence was not Dagupan Street No.
83 as alleged in the petition for probate. If the allegation of the petition was wrong and the true residence of petitioners
was not known, then notice upon them individually was not necessary. Under the provision abovequoted, individual
notice upon heirs, legatees and devisees is necessary only when they are known or when their places of residence are
known. In other instances, such notice is not necessary and the court may acquire and exercise jurisdiction simply
upon the publication of the notice in a newspaper of general circulation. ... 9
In Re: Testate Estate of Suntay, 10

the Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla, said:

... It is a proceedings in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal notice or by publication or both to all
interested parties must be made. The interested parties in the case were known to reside in the Philippines. The
evidence shows that no such notice was received by the interested parties residing in the Philippines (pp. 474, 476,
481, 503-4, t.s.n., hearing of 24 February 1948). The proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy, China,
may be likened to a deposition or to a perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so it does not measure or come up

to the standard of such proceedings in the Philippines for lack of notice to all interested parties and the proceedings
were held at the back of such interested parties.
xxx xxx xxx
... In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in accordance with the
accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently,
the authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and
accepted as proceedings leading to the probate or allowance of a will and, therefore, the will referred to therein cannot
be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of court. 11
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 13 January 1987 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby
ordered remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig for further proceedings in accordance with this decision. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 166520

March 14, 2008

VILMA C. TAN, GERARDO "JAKE" TAN and GERALDINE TAN, REPRESENTED BY EDUARDO NIERRAS,Petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 12,
ORMOC CITY, ROGELIO LIM SUGA and HELEN TAN RACOMA, REPRESENTED BY ROMUALDO LIM, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision 1 dated 29 July 2004 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79335. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed the Order 2 dated 17 July 2003 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City in SP. PROC. No. 4014-0 denying reconsideration of its Order dated 12 June 2003 whereby it
appointed Romualdo D. Lim as special administrator to the estate of the late Gerardo Tan.
The factual and procedural antecedents of this case are as follows:
Gerardo Tan (Gerardo) died on 14 October 2000, leaving no will. On 31 October 2001, private respondents, who are claiming to be the
children of Gerardo Tan, filed with the RTC a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration. The Petition was docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 4014-0 and was raffled to Branch 12. Petitioners, claiming to be legitimate heirs of Gerardo Tan, filed an Opposition to the
Petition.
Private respondents then moved for the appointment of a special administrator, asserting the need for a special administrator to take
possession and charge of Gerardos estate until the Petition can be resolved by the RTC or until the appointment of a regular administrator.
They prayed that their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo D. Lim (Romualdo), be appointed as the special administrator. Petitioners filed an
Opposition to private respondents Motion for Appointment, arguing that none of the private respondents can be appointed as the special
administrator since they are not residing in the country. Petitioners contend further that Romualdo does not have the same familiarity,
experience or competence as that of their co-petitioner Vilma C. Tan (Vilma) who was already acting as de facto administratrix of his estate
since his death.
On 18 March 2002, Atty. Clinton Nuevo (Nuevo), as court-appointed commissioner, issued directives to Vilma, in her capacity as de facto
administratrix, to wit:
b.1.) requiring the de facto administratrix Ms. Vilma Tan to deposit in the fiduciary account of the Court all money and or cash at
hand or deposited in the bank(s) which rightfully belong to the estate of the decedent within five (5) days from receipt hereof;
b.2.) requiring the same administratrix to deposit in the same account the proceeds of all sugarcane harvest or any crop harvest, if
any, done in the past or is presently harvesting or about to undertake, which belong to the estate of the decedent;

b.3.) relative to the foregoing, the same de facto administratrix is also required to submit a financial report to the Commission as
regards the background of the cash at hand or deposited in bank(s), if any, the expenses incurred in course of her administration
and other relevant facts including that of the proceeds of the sugarcane/crop harvest, which submission will be done upon deposit
of the foregoing with the court as above-required. 3
More than a year later or on 23 May 2003, the RTC, acting on the private respondents Urgent Ex-parte Motion to resolve pending incident,
gave Vilma another 10 days to comply with the directive of Atty. Nuevo. Again, no compliance has been made.
Consequently, on 12 June 2003, RTC Judge Eric F. Menchavez issued an Order 4 appointing Romualdo as special administrator of Gerardos
Estate, the fallo of which states:
Foregoing considered, the motion for the appointment of a special administrator is hereby GRANTED. Mr. Romualdo D. Lim is hereby
appointed as Special Administrator and shall immediately take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits and estate of the
deceased and preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed, upon his filing of a bond in the amount
of P50,000.00 and upon approval of the same by this Court. 5
Petitioners filed on 19 June 2003 a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order, claiming that petitioner Vilma should be the one
appointed as special administratix as she was allegedly next of kin of the deceased.
On 17 July 2003, respondent Judge Francisco Gedorio (Gedorio), in his capacity as RTC Executive Judge, issued an Order 6 denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
1avvphi1

Petitioners instituted with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition assailing the 17 July 2003 Order, again insisting on
petitioner Vilmas right to be appointed as special administratix. Petitioners likewise prayed for the issuance of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin Romualdo from entering the estate and acting as special administrator thereof.
On 29 July 2004, the Court of Appeals issued a Decision denying petitioners Petition. On 6 December 2004, the Court of Appeals similarly
denied the ensuing Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING and DISMISSING the petition filed in this
case and AFFIRMING the assailed order in Special Proceeding No. 4014-0. 7
On 22 January 2005, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assigning the following errors:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE COURT A QUO BOTH GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS PLEA TO BE
GIVEN PRIMACY IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THEIR FATHERS ESTATE.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS PLEA FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND
THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT.8
On 14 February 2005, this Court issued a Resolution 9 denying the Petition on the ground of late filing, failure to submit an affidavit of service
of a copy of the Petition on the Court of Appeals and proof of such service, failure to properly verify the Petition, and failure to pay the deposit
for the Salary Adjustment for the Judiciary (SAJ) fund and sheriffs fee. Upon Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners, however, this
Court issued on 18 July 2005 a Resolution10 reinstating the Petition.
Petitioners contend11 that they should be given priority in the administration of the estate since they are allegedly the legitimate heirs of the
late Gerardo, as opposed to private respondents, who are purportedly Gerardos illegitimate children. Petitioners rely on the doctrine that
generally, it is the nearest of kin, whose interest is more preponderant, who is preferred in the choice of administrator of the decedents
estate.
Petitioners also claim that they are more competent than private respondents or their attorney-in-fact to administer Gerardos estate.
Petitioners Vilma and Gerardo "Jake" Tan (Jake) claim to have lived for a long time and continue to reside on Gerardos estate, while
respondents are not even in the Philippines, having long established residence abroad.
Petitioners additionally claim that petitioner Vilma has been acting as the administratrix of the estate since Gerardos death on 14 October
2000 and is thus "well steeped in the actual management and operation of the estate (which essentially consists of agricultural
landholdings)."12
As regards the denial of petitioners plea for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or TRO, petitioners argue that such denial
would leave Romualdo, private respondents attorney-in-fact, free to enter Gerardos estate and proceed to act as administrator thereof to the
prejudice of petitioners.
The appeal is devoid of merit.
The order of preference petitioners speak of is found in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as
such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or
unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal
creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.
However, this Court has consistently ruled that the order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator as provided in the aforequoted provision does not apply to the selection of a special administrator.13 The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court
for the next of kin refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special administrator, as the appointment of the latter
lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not appealable.14
Not being appealable, the only remedy against the appointment of a special administrator is Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
which was what petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals. Certiorari, however, requires nothing less than grave abuse of discretion, a term
which implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or
to act at all in contemplation of law.15
We agree with the Court of Appeals that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge Gedorio in affirming Judge
Menchavezs appointment of Romualdo as special administrator. Judge Menchavez clearly considered petitioner Vilma for the position of
special administratrix of Gerardos estate, but decided against her appointment for the following reasons:
Atty. Clinton C. Nuevo, in his capacity as court appointed commissioner, directed oppositor Vilma Tan in the latters capacity as de fact[o]
administratrix, to deposit in the fiduciary account of the court all money and cash at hand or deposited in the banks which rightfully belong to
the estate within five days from receipt of the directive. Oppositor Vilma Tan was likewise directed to deposit in the same account the
proceeds of all sugarcane harvest or any crop from the estate of the decedent. She was likewise directed to submit a financial report as
regards the background of the cash on hand, if any, the expenses incurred in the course of her administration. The directive was issued by
Atty. Nuevo on March 18, 2002 or more than a year ago. On May 23, 2003, this Court, acting on the urgent ex parte motion to resolve
pending incident, gave Vilma Tan another ten days to comply with the directive of Atty. Nuevo. Again, no compliance has been made.
This Court is called upon to preserve the estate of the late Gerardo Tan for the benefit of all heirs be that heir is (sic) the nearest kin or the
farthest kin. The actuation of oppositor Vilma Tan does not satisfy the requirement of a special administrator who can effectively and
impartially administer the estate of Gerardo Tan for the best interest of all the heirs. 16 (Emphases supplied.)
Assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner Vilma is indeed better suited for the job as special administratrix, as opposed to Romualdo,
who was actually appointed by the court as special administrator of Gerardos estate, the latters appointment, at best, would constitute a
mere error of judgment and would certainly not be grave abuse of discretion. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one in which the act
complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
which is tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 17 The Court of Appeals could not have reversed a mere error of judgment in a Certiorari
petition.
Furthermore, petitioners were not able to sufficiently substantiate their claim that their co-petitioner Vilma would have been the more
competent and capable choice to serve as the special administratrix of Gerardos estate. Contrary to petitioners bare assertions, both the
RTC and the Court of Appeals found that the documented failure of petitioner Vilma to comply with the reportorial requirements after the
lapse of a considerable length of time certainly militates against her appointment.
We find immaterial the fact that private respondents reside abroad, for the same cannot be said as regards their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo,
who is, after all, the person appointed by the RTC as special administrator. It is undisputed that Romualdo resides in the country and can,
thus, personally administer Gerardos estate.
If petitioners really desire to avail themselves of the order of preference provided in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, so that
petitioner Vilma as the supposed next of kin of the late Gerardo may take over administration of Gerardos estate, they should already pursue
the appointment of a regular administrator and put to an end the delay which necessitated the appointment of a special administrator. The
appointment of a special administrator is justified only when there is delay in granting letters, testamentary (in case the decedent leaves
behind a will) or administrative (in the event that the decedent leaves behind no will, as in the Petition at bar) occasioned by any cause. 18 The
principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass into the hands of a person fully
authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs. 19
In the case at bar, private respondents were constrained to move for the appointment of a special administrator due to the delay caused by
the failure of petitioner Vilma to comply with the directives of the court-appointed commissioner. It would certainly be unjust if petitioner Vilma
were still appointed special administratix, when the necessity of appointing one has been brought about by her defiance of the lawful orders
of the RTC or its appointed officials. Petitioners submit the defense that petitioner Vilma was unable to comply with the directives of the RTC
to deposit with the court the income of Gerardos estate and to provide an accounting thereof because of the fact that Gerardos estate had
no income. This defense is clearly specious and insufficient justification for petitioner Vilmas non-compliance. If the estate truly did not have
any income, petitioners should have simply filed a manifestation to that effect, instead of continuing to disregard the courts orders.

Finally, as we are now resolving the case in favor of private respondents, there is no longer any need to discuss petitioners arguments
regarding the denial by the appellate court of their prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated 29 July 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 79335 affirming the Order dated 17 July 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City, in SP. PROC. No. 4014-0 denying
reconsideration of its Order dated 12 June 2003, whereby it appointed Romualdo D. Lim as special administrator of the estate of Gerardo
Tan, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice