__GLOBAL POLITICS IN EURASIA-CENTRAL ASI/AFH/PAK NEXUS

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
BOARD OF EDITORS
PREFACE
PROLOGUE
CHAPTER ISLAM IN RUSSIA
CHAPTER 1.RUSSIA' CONQUEST OF CENTRAL ASIA
CHAPTER GREAT GAME -19TH CENTURY
CHAPTER MACKINDR GEOPOLITICAL THEORY
WHO CONTROLS EURASIA CONTROLS THE WORLD
WILL OF PETER THE GREAT
AMIR DOST MOHAMMAD KHAN MEMOIRES
RUSSIAN QUEST FOR WARM WATERS
BRITISH POLICY OF MAKING AFGHANISTAN AS BUFFER AFTER 3 AFGHAN WARS
CHAPTER KING AMANULLAH KHAN REFORM REGIME.
CHAPTER SECOND WW II.
CHAPTER HITLER'S ADVANCE FOR CONQUEST OF EAST EUROPE AND RUSSIA
CHAPTER SIR OLAF CAIRO;POST WWII U.S. TO REPLACE BRITAIN
CHAPTER POST WWII KING ZAHIR SHAH,HIS OVERTHROW,DAUD KHAN CHAPTER
SOCIALIST REGIME,
SOCIALIST REGIMES OF BABRAK KARMAL
CHAPTER BRZENSKY GEOPOLITICAL GAME-AND SUPPORT OF MUJAHIDEEN
CHAPTER IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND KHOMEINI
CHAPTER RUSSIAN INVASION AND OCCUPATION 1979-89
CHAPTER THE U.S.INTERVENTION,PAKISTAN AS PROXY,ROLE OF CHARLES
WILSON,PAKISTAN CHAIR IN HIS NAME AT THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
CHAPTER DEVElOPMENTS POST US WITHDRAWAL-RISE OF TALIBEN,9/11,US INVASION
(2001-NOW)
CHAPTER `CHARLES PETERS,BLOOD BORDERS,JULY 2006
CHAPTER MAHDI DARIUS KARIOVA,REDRWAING MAP OF MIDDLE EAST AND CENTRAL
ASIA
CHAPTER GLOBAL RESEARCH,CANADA,DESTABIZATION OF PAKISTAN
CHAPTER USMAN KHALID,REFORM PARTY,THE FUTURE OF PAKSITAN
CHAPTER ARTICLES IN PAKISTAN DEFENCE FORUM,DALY TIMES,
CHAPTER GEOPOLITCS IN EURASIA,CENTRAL ASIA LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
CHAPTER PAKISTAN AND EURASIA/CENTRAL ASIA.
CHAPTER ROLE OF NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES-RUSSIA,CHINA,INDIA,AFGHANISTAN
CHAPTER ROLE NATO AND THE U.S.A.
EPLOGUE.
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
REFERENCES
GLOSSARY
INDEX

__________________________________________________________Prologue
Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan)2 to the Secretary of State and
the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)
When Mr. Acheson3 first spoke to me about the Planning Staff, he said that he thought its most
important function would be to try to trace the lines of development of our foreign policy as they
emerged from our actions in the past, and to project them into the future, so that we could see
where we were going.
During the first months of the operation of the Staff, I hesitated to undertake any such effort,
because I did not feel that any of us had a broad enough view of the problems involved to lend
real value to our estimate.
I have now made an effort toward a general view of the main problems of our foreign policy, and I
enclose it as a Staff paper. It is far from comprehensive and doubtless contains many defects; but
it is a first step toward the unified concept of foreign policy which I hope this Staff can some day
help to evolve.
The paper is submitted merely for information, and does not call for approval. I made no effort to
clear it around the Department, since this would have changed its whole character. For this
reason, I feel that if any of the views expressed should be made the basis for action in the
Department, the views of the offices concerned should first be consulted.
This document should properly have included a chapter on Latin America. I have not included
such a chapter because I am not familiar with the problems of the area, and the Staff has not yet
studied them. Butler,4 who is taking over for me in my absence,5 has had long experience with
these problems and I hope that while I am away he and the Staff will be able to work up some
recommendations for basic policy objectives with regard to the Latin American countries.
GEORGE F. KENNAN

[Annex]
Report by the Policy Planning Staff
TOP SECRET
PPS/23
[Washington,] February 24, 1948.
Review of Current Trends
U.S. Foreign Policy
I. United States, Britain, and Europe
On the assumption that Western Europe will be rescued from communist control, the
relationships between Great Britain and the continental countries, on the one hand, and between
Great Britain and the United States and Canada on the other, will become for us a long term
policy problem of major significance. The scope of this problem is so immense and its
complexities so numerous that there can be no simple and easy answer. The solutions will have
to be evolved step by step over a long period of time. But it is not too early today for us to begin
to think out the broad outlines of the pattern which would best suit our national interests.
In my opinion, the following facts are basic to a consideration of the problem.
1. Some form of political, military and economic union in Western Europe will be necessary if the
free nations of Europe are to hold their own against the people of the east united under Moscow
rule.
2. It is questionable whether this union could be strong enough to serve its designed purpose
unless it had the participation and support of Great Britain.
3. Britain's long term economic problem, on the other hand, can scarcely be solved just by closer
association with the other Western European countries, since these countries do not have, by
and large, the food and raw material surpluses she needs; this problem could be far better met by
closer association with Canada and the United States.
4. The only way in which a European union, embracing Britain but excluding eastern Europe,
could become economically healthy would be develop the closest sort of trading relationships
either with this hemisphere or with Africa.
It will be seen from the above that we stand before something of a dilemma. If we were to take
Britain into our own U.S.-Canadian orbit, according to some formula of “Union now”, this would
probably solve Britain's long term economic problem and create a natural political entity of great
strength. But this would tend to cut Britain off from the close political association she is seeking
with continental nations and might therefore have the ultimate effect of rendering the continental
nations more vulnerable to Russian pressure. If, on the other hand, the British are encouraged to
seek salvation only in closer association with their continental neighbors, then there is no visible
solution of the long term economic problem of either Britain or Germany, and we would be faced,
at the termination of ERP, with another crises of demand on this country for European aid.6
To me there seem only two lines of emergence from this dilemma. They are not mutually
exclusive and might, in fact, supplement each, other very well.
In the first place, Britain could be encouraged to proceed vigorously with her plans for
participation in a European union, and we could try to bring that entire union, rather than just
Britain alone, into a closer economic association with this country and Canada. We must
remember, however, that if this is to be really effective, the economic association must be so
intimate as to bring about a substantial degree of currency and customs union, plus relative
freedom of migration of individuals as between Europe and this continent. Only in this way can
the free movement of private capital and labor be achieved which will be necessary if we are to
find a real cure for the abnormal dependence of these areas on governmental aid from this
country. But we should also note carefully the possible implications of such a program from the
standpoint of the ITO Charter.7 As I see it, the draft charter, as well as the whole theory behind
our trade agreements program, would make it difficult for us to extend to the countries of western
Europe special facilities which we did not extend in like measure to all other ITO members and
trade agreement partners.
A second possible solution would lie in arrangements whereby a union of Western European
nations would undertake jointly the economic development and exploitation of the colonial and
dependent areas of the African Continent. The realization of such a program admittedly presents
demands which are probably well above the vision and strengths and leadership capacity of
present governments in Western Europe. It would take considerable prodding from outside and
much patience. But the idea itself has much to recommend it. The African Continent is relatively
little exposed to communist pressures: and most of it is not today a subject of great power
rivalries. It lies easily accessible to the maritime nations of Western Europe, and politically they
control or influence most of it. Its resources are still relatively undeveloped. It could absorb great
numbers of people and a great deal of Europe's surplus technical and administrative energy.
Finally, it would lend to the idea of Western European union that tangible objective for which
everyone has been rather unsuccessfully groping in recent months.
However this may be, one thing is clear: if we wish to carry through with the main purpose of the
ERP we must cordially and loyally support the British effort toward a Western European union.
And this support should consist not only of occasional public expressions of approval. The matter
should be carefully and sympathetically discussed with the British themselves and with the other
governments of Western Europe. Much could be accomplished in such discussions, both from the
standpoint of the clarification of our own policy and ir the way of the exertion of a healthy and
helpful influence on the Europeans themselves. In particular, we will have accomplished an
immense amount if we can help to persuade the Western Europeans of the necessity of treating
the Germans as citizens of Europe.
With this in mind, I think it might be well to ask each of our missions in Western Europe to make a
special study of the problem of Western European union, both in general and with particular
reference to the particular country concerned, and to take occasion, in the course of preparation
of this study, to consult the views of the wisest and most experienced people they know in their
respective capitals. These studies should be accompanied by their own recommendations as to
how the basic problem could best be approached. A digest of such studies in this Department
should yield a pretty sound cross-section of informed and balanced opinion on the problem in
question.
II. European Recovery Program
The course of the debates in Congress now makes it possible for us to distinguish with some
degree of probability the outlines of the action toward which this Government is moving in the
question of aid to Europe.
1. The administration of the program.
The most significant feature of the emerging recovery program is that it is to be conducted by this
Government as a technical business operation and not as a political matter. We must face
realistically the fact that this will reduce drastically the program's potential political effect and open
up the road to a considerable degree of confusion, contradiction and ineffectiveness in this
Government's policies toward Europe. The conduct of relations with the European governments
by a separate agency of this Government on matters of such great importance, over so long a
period of time, cannot fail to cut deeply into the operations of the Department of State in
European affairs and to reduce the prestige, the competence, and the effectiveness of its
Missions in Europe.
In these circumstances, the possibilities for the exertion of influence by this Department over the
course of our relations with European countries will become predominantly a matter of the extent
to which it can influence national policy through the White House. This means that greatly
increased importance must he attached to the means of liaison between the Department and the
White House, and particularly to the National Security Council.
But we should not deceive ourselves into hoping that national policy conducted through channels
as round about as this, and involving the use of a new and separate organization such as the
ERP administration, can be as clear cut or as efficacious as that which could be conducted if
policy-making functions continued to rest clearly with the regular agencies of government. No
policy can become really effective unless it commands the understanding of those who carry it
out. The understanding of governmental policies in the field of foreign affairs cannot be readily
acquired by people who are new to that field, even when they are animated by the best will in the
world. This is not a manner of briefing, or instructing, which could be done in a short time. It is a
matter of educating and training, for which years are required.
Our experience with ad hoc wartime and post-hostilities agencies operating in the foreign field lias
demonstrated that not only are new agencies of little value in executing policies whicn go beyond
the vision and the educational horizon of their own personnel, but that they actually develop a
momentum of their own which, in the final analysis, tends to shape—rather than to serve—the
national policy.
I do not think that the manner in which this aid program is to be undertaken is necessarily going
to mean that its basic purpose will not be served. While we will hardly be able to use U.S. aid
tactically, as a flexible political instrument, the funds and goods will nevertheless themselves
constitute an important factor on the European scene. The mere availability of this amount of
economic assistance will create, so to speak, a new topographic feature against which the
peoples of Western Europe will be able to brace themselves in their own struggle to preserve
political independence.
But we must recognize that, once the bill has been passed, the matter will be largely out of our
hands. The operation of the ERP administration will make it difficult for this Department itself to
conduct any incisive and vigorous policy with relation to Europe during the period in question.
This does not relieve us, of course, of the duty of continuing to study carefully the development of
the European scene and of contributing as best we can to the formulation of national policy
relating to the European area. But it thrusts this Department back—with respect to one great area
of the world's surface—into the position it occupied in many instances during the recent war:—the
position of an advisory, rather than an executive, agency.
2. The time factor and the question of amount.
The dilatoriness of the Congress in acting on this matter presents a definite danger to the
success of the program. A gap between the date on which the aid becomes available and the
point to which European reserves can hold out could nullify a great part of the effect of the
program.
There is probably not much that we can do, by pleading or urging, to expedite Congressional
action. But I think we should state very plainly to Congress the time limits involved (which our own
economic analysts must determine) and the possible consequences of delay. Furthermore, we
should make clear that aid granted subsequent to the specified time limits cannot be considered
as a response to the recommendations of the Executive branch of the Government, and that the
latter cannot take responsibility for the desirability or effectiveness of the program in these
circumstances.
The same principle applies in case the program is cut in amount below what we consider to be
the minimum necessary for the recovery purpose.
In either case, there will be charges we are trying to “dictate” to the Congress. But there is a
serious question of responsibility involved here; and the Executive branch of the Government will
find itself embarrassed in its future position if it allows itself to be forced now into accepting a
share of responsibility for a program of aid which it knows will be too little, too late, or both.
3. The question of European Union.
The original reaction to the Harvard speech,8 both in Europe and here, demonstrated how vitally
important to the success of an aid program is the concept of European unity. Unless the program
actually operates to bring closer together the countries participating in it, it will certainly fail in its
major purpose, and it will not take on, in the eyes of the world public, the dignity and significance
which would set it apart from the previous efforts at foreign economy aid.
There is real danger that this basic fact be lost sight of at this stage in the deliberations, not only
in the Congress, but also in the Department.
We should therefore make it a point to lose no opportunity to stress this element in the concept of
the aid program, and to insist that the principle of collaboration and joint responsibility among the
16 nations be emphasized throughout in our handling of the operation.
III. Germany9
The coming changes with respect to the responsibility for military government in Germany provide
a suitable occasion for us to evolve new long-term concepts of our objectives with respect to that
country. We cannot rely on the concepts of the existing policy directives. Not only were these
designed to meet another situation, but it is questionable, in many instances, whether they were
sound in themselves.
The planning to be done in this connection will necessarily have to be many-sided and
voluminous. But it is possible to see today the main outlines of the problem we will face and, I
think, of the solutions we must seek.
In the long run there can be only three possibilities for the future of western and central Europe.
One is German domination. Another is Russian domination. The third is a federated Europe, into
which the parts of Germany are absorbed but in which the influence of the other countries is
sufficient to hold Germany in her place.
If there is no real European federation and if Germany is restored as a strong and independent
country, we must expect another attempt at German domination. If there is no real European
federation and if Germany is not restored as a strong and independent country, we invite Russian
domination, for an unorganized Western Europe cannot indefinitely oppose an organized Eastern
Europe. The only reasonably hopeful possibility for avoiding one of these two evils is some form
of federation in western and central Europe.
Our dilemma today lies in the fact that whereas a European federation would be by all odds the
best solution from the standpoint of U.S. interests, the Germans are poorly prepared for it. To
achieve such a federation would be much easier if Germany were partitioned, or drastically
decentralized, and if the component parts could be brought separately into the European union.
To bring a unified Germany, or even a unified western Germany, into such a union would be
much more difficult: for it would still over-weigh the other components, in many respects.
Now a partition of the Reich might have been possible if it had been carried out resolutely and
promptly in the immediate aftermath of defeat. But that moment is now past, and we have today
another situation to deal with. As things stand today, the Germans are psychologically not only
unprepared for any breakup of the Reich but in a frame of mind which is distinctly unfavorable
thereto.
In any planning we now do for the future of Germany we will have to take account of the
unpleasant fact that our occupation up to this time has been unfortunate from the standpoint of
the psychology of the German people. They are emerging from this phase of the post-hostilities
period in a state of mind which can only be described as sullen, bitter, unregenerate, and
pathologically attached to the old chimera of German unity. Our moral and political influence over
them has not made headway since the surrender. They have been impressed neither by our
precepts nor by our example. They are not going to look to us for leadership. Their political life is
probably going to proceed along the lines of a polarization inro extreme right and extreme left,
both of which elements will be, from our standpoint, unfriendly, ugly to deal with, and
contemptuous of the things we value.
We cannot rely on any such Germany to fit constructively into a pattern of European union of its
own volition. Yet without the Germans, no real European federation is thinkable. And without
federation, the other countries of Europe ran have no protection against a new attempt at foreign
domination.
If we did not have the Russians and the German communists prepared to take advantage
politically of any movement on our part toward partition we could proceed to partition Germany
regardless of the will of the inhabitants, and to force the respective segments to take their place in
a federated Europe. But in the circumstances prevailing today, we cannot do this without throwing
the German people politically into the arms of the communists. And if that happens, the fruits of
our victory in Europe will have been substantially destroyed.
Our possibilities are therefore reduced, bv the process of exclusion, to a policy which, without
pressing the question of partition in Germany, would attempt to bring Germany, or western
Germany, into a European federation, but do it in such a wav as not. to permit her to dominate
that federation or jeopardize the security interests of the other western European countries. And
this would have to be accomplished in the face of the fact that we cannot rely on the German
people to exercise any self-restraint of their own volition, to feel any adequate sense of
responsibility vis-a-vis the other western nations, or to concern themselves for the preservation of
western values in their own country and elsewhere in Europe.
I have no confidence in any of the old-fashioned concepts of collective security as a means of
meeting this problem. European history has shown only too clearly the weakness of multilateral
defensive alliances between complete sovereign nations as a means of opposing desperate and
determined bids for domination of the European scene. Some mutual defense arrangements will
no doubt be necessary as a concession to the prejudices of the other Western European peoples,
whose thinking is still old fashioned and unrealistic on this subject. But we can place no reliance
on them as a deterrent to renewed troublemaking on the part of the Germans.
This being the case, it is evident that the relationship of Germany to the other countries of
western Europe must be so arranged as to provide mechanical and automatic safeguards against
any unscrupulous exploitation of Germany's preeminence in population and in military-industrial
potential.
The first task of our planning will be to find such safeguards.
In this connection, primary consideration must be given to the problem of the Ruhr. Some form of
international ownership or control of the Ruhr industries would indeed be one of the best means
of automatic protection against the future misuse of Germany's industrial resources for
aggressive purposes. There may be otner devices which would also be worth exploring.
A second line of our planning will have to be in the direction of the maximum interweaving of
German economy with that of the remainder of Europe. This may mean that we will nave to
reverse our present policies, in certain respects. One of the most grievous mistakes, in my
opinion, of our post-hostilities policy was the renewed extreme segregation of the Gennans and
their compression into an even smaller territory than before, in virtual isolation from the remaining
peoples of Europe. This sort of segregation and compression invariably arouses precisely the
worst reactions in the German character. What the Germans need is not to be thrust violently in
upon themselves, which only heightens their congenital irrealism and self-pity and defiant
nationalism, but to be led out of their collective egocentrism and encouraged to see things in
larger terms, to have interests elsewhere in Europe and elsewhere in the world, and to learn to
think of themselves as world citizens and not just as Germans.
Next, we must recognize the bankruptcy of our moral influence on the Germans, and we must
make plans for the earliest possible termination of those actions and policies on our part which
have been psychologically unfortunate. First of all, we must reduce as far as possible our
establishment in Germany; for the residence of large numbers of representatives of a victor
nation in a devastated conquered area is never a helpful factor, particularly when their living
standards are as conspicuously different as are those of Americans in Germany. Secondly, we
must terminate as rapidly as possible those forms of activity (denazification, re-education, and
above all the Nuremberg Trials) which tend to set up as mentors and judges over internal
German problems. Thirdly, we must have the courage to dispense with military government as
soon as possible and to force the Germans to accept responsibility once more for their own
affairs. They will never begin to do this as long as we will accept that responsibility for them.
The military occupation of western Germany may have to go on for a long time. We may even
have to be prepared to see it become a quasi-permanent feature of the European scene. But
military government is a different thing. Until it is removed, we cannot really make progress in the
direction of a more stable Europe.
Finally, we must do everything possible from now on to coordinate our policy toward Germany
with the views of Germany's immediate western neighbors. This applies particularly to the
Benelux countries, who could probably easily be induced to render valuable collaboration in the
implementation of our own views. It is these neighboring countries who in the long run must live
with any solution we may evolve; and it is absolutely essential to any successful ordering of
western Europe that they make their full contribution and bear their full measure of responsibility.
It would be better for us in many instances to temper our own policies in order to win their support
than to try to act unilaterally in defiance of their feelings.
With these tasks and problems before us it is important that we should do nothing in this
intervening period which would prejudice our later policies. The appropriate offices of the
Department of State should be instructed to bear this in mind in their own work. We should also
see to it that it is borne in mind by our military authorities in the prosecution of their policies in
Germany. These considerations should be observed in any discussions we hold with
representatives of other governments. This applies particularly to the forthcoming discussions
with the French and the British.
IV. Mediterranean
As the situation has developed in the past year, the Soviet chances for disrupting the unity of
western Europe and forcing a political entry into that area have been deteriorating in northern
Europe, where the greater political maturity of the peoples is gradually asserting itself, but holding
their own, if not actually increasing, in the south along the shores of the Mediterranean. Here the
Russians have as assets not only the violent chauvinism of their Balkan satellites but also the
desperate weakness and weariness of the Greek and Italian peoples.10 Conditions in Greece
and Italy today are peculiarly favorable to the use of fear as a weapon for political action, and
hence to the tactics which are basic and familiar to the communist movement.
It cannot be too often reiterated that this Government does not possess the weapons which would
be needed to enable it to meet head-on the threat to national independence presented by the
communist elements in foreign countries. This poses an extremely difficult problem as to the
measures which our Government can take to prevent the communists from achieving success in
the countries where resistance is lowest.
The Planning Staff has given more attention to this than to any single problem which has come
under its examination. Its conclusions may be summed up as follows:
(1) The use of U S. regular armed force to oppose the efforts of indigenous communist elements
within foreign countries must generally be considered as a risky and profitless undertaking, apt to
do more harm than good.
(2) If, however, it can be shown that the continuation of communist activities has a tendency to
attract U.S. armed power to the vicinity of the affected areas, and if these areas are ones from
which the Kremlin would definitely wish U.S. power excluded, there is a possibility that this may
bring into play the defensive security interests of the Soviet Union and cause the Russians to
exert a restraining influence on local communist forces.
The Staff has therefore felt that the wisest policy for us to follow would be to make it evident to
the Russians by our actions that the further the communists go in Greece and Italy the more
surely will this Government be forced to extend the deployment of its peacetime military
establishment in the Mediterranean area.
There is no doubt in our minds but thnt if the Russians knew that the establishment of a
communist government in Greece would mean the establishment of U.S. air bases in Libya and
Crete, or that a communist uprising in northern Italy would lead to the renewed occupation by this
country of the Foggia field, a conflict would be produced in the Kremlin councils between the
interests of the Third Internationale, on the one hand, and those of the sheer military security of
the Soviet Union, on the other. In conflicts of this sort, the interests of narrow Soviet nationalism
usually win. If they were to win in this instance, a restraining hand would certainly be placed on
the Greek and Italian communists.
This has already been, to some extent, the case. I think there is little doubt that the activity of our
naval forces in the Mediterranean (including the stationing of further Marines with those forces),
plus the talk of the possibility of our sending U.S. forces to Greece, has had something to do with
the failure of the satellites, up to this time, to recognize the Markos Government, and possibly
also with the Kremlin's reprimand to Dimitrov. Similarly, I think the statement we made at the time
of the final departure of our troops from Italy was probably the decisive factor in bringing about
the abandonment of the plans which evidently existed for a communist uprising in Italy prior to the
spring elections.
For this reason, I think that our policy with respect to Greece ar Italy, and the Mediterranean area
in general, should be based upon the objective of demonstration to the Russians that:
(a) the reduction of the communist threat will lead to our military withdrawal from the area; but
that
(b) further communist pressure will only have the effect of involving us more deeply in a military
sense.

V. Palestine and the Middle East

The Staff views on Palestine have been made known in a separate paper.11 I do not intend to
recapitulate them here. But there are two background considerations of determining importance,
both for the Palestine question and for our whole position in the Middle East, which I should like
to emphasize at this time.
1. The British strategic position in the Middle East.
We have decided in this Government that the security of the Middle East is vital to our own
security. We have also decided that it would not be desirable or advantageous for us to attempt to
duplicate or take over the strategic facilities now held by the British in that area. We have
recognized that these facilities would be at our effective disposal anyway, in the event of war, and
that to attempt to get them transferred, in the formal sense, from the British to ourselves would
only raise a host of new and unnecessary problems, and would probably be generally
unsuccessful.
This means that we must do what we can to support the maintenance of the British of their
strategic position in that area. This does not mean that we must support them in every individual
instance. It does not mean that we must back them up in cases where they have gotten
themselves into a false position or where we would thereby be undertaking extravagant political
commitments. It does mean that any policy on our part which tends to strain British relations with
the Arab world and to whittle down the British position in the Arab countries is only a policy
directed against ourselves and against the immediate strategic interests of our country.
2. The direction of our own policy.
The pressures to which this Government is now subjected are ones which impel us toward a
position where we would shoulder major responsibility for the maintenance, and even the
expansion, of a Jewish state in Palestine. To the extent that we move in this direction we will be
operating directly counter to our major security interests in that area. For this reason, our policy in
the Palestine issue should be dominated by the determination to avoid being impelled along this
path.
We are now heavily and unfortunately involved in this Palestine question. We will apparently have
to make certain further concessions to our past commitments and to domestic pressures.
These concessions will be dangerous ones; but they will not necessarily be catastrophic if we are
thoroughly conscious of what we are doing, and if we lay our general course toward the
avoidance of the possibility of the responsibility I have referred to. If we do not lay our course in
that direction but drift along the lines of least resistance in the existing vortex of cross currents,
our entire policy in the Middle Eastern area will unquestionably be carried in the direction of
confusion, ineffectiveness, and grievous involvement in a situation to which there cannot be—
from our standpoint—any happy ending.
I think it should be stated that if this Government is carried to a point in the Palestine controversy
where it is required to send U.S. forces to Palestine in anv manner whatsoever, or to agree either
to the international recruitment of volunteers or the sending of small nation forces which would
include those of Soviet satellites, then in my opinion, the whole structure of strategic and political
planning which we have been building up for the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern areas would
have to be re-examined and probably modified or replaced by something else. For this would
then mean that we had consented to be guided, in a highly important question affecting those
areas, not by national interest but by other considerations. If we tried, in the face of this fact, to
continue with policy in adjacent areas motivated solely bv national interest, we would be faced
with a duality of purpose which would surely lead in the end to a dissipation and confusion of
effort. We cannot operate with one objective in one area, and with a conflicting one next door.
If, therefore, we decide that we are obliged by past commitments or UN decision or anv other
consideration to take a leading part in the enforcement of Palestine of any arrangement opposed
by the great majority of the inhabitants of the Middle Eastern area, we must be prepared to face
the implications of this act by revising our general policy in that part of the world. And since the
Middle East is vital to the present security concepts on which this Government is basing itself in
its worldwide military and political planning, this would further mean a review of our entire military
and political policy.
VI. U.S.S.R.
If the Russians have further success in the coming months in their efforts at penetration and
seizure of political control of the key countries outside the iron curtain (Germany, France, Italy,
and Greece), they will continue, in my opinion, to be impossible to deal with at the council table.
For they will see no reason to settle with us at this time over Germany when they hope that their
bargaining position will soon be improved.
If, on the other hand, their situation outside the iron curtain does not improve—if the ERP aid
arrives in time and in a form to do some good and if there is a general revival of confidence in
western Europe, then a new situation will arise and the Russians will be prepared, for the first
time since the surrender, to do business seriously with us about Germany and about Europe in
general. They are conscious of this and are making allowance for this possibility in their plans. I
think, in fact, that they regard it as the more probable of the two contingencies.
When that day comes, i.e. when the Russians will be prepared to talk realistically with us, we will
be faced with a reat test of American statesmanship, nnd it will not be easy to find the right
solution. For what the Russians will want us to do will be to conclude with them a sphere-of-
influence agreement similar to the one they concluded with the Germans in 1939. It will be our job
to explain to them that we cannot do this and why. But we must also be able to demonstrate to
them that it will still be worth their while:
(a) to reduce communist pressures elsewhere in Europe and the Middle East to a point where we
ran afford to withdraw all our armed forces from the continent and the Mediterranean; and
(b) to acquiesce thereafter in a prolonged period of stability in Europe.
I doubt that this task will be successfully accomplished if we try to tackle it head-on in the CFM or
at any other public meeting. Our public dealings with the Russians can hardly lead to any clear
and satisfactory results unless they are preceded by preparatory discussions of the most secret
and delicate nature with Stalin.12 I think that those discussions can be successfully conducted
only by someone who:
(a) has absolutely no personal axe to grind in the discussions, even along the lines of getting
public credit for their success, and is prepared to observe strictest silence about the whole
proceeding; and
(b) is thoroughly acquainted not only with the background of our policies but with Soviet
philosophy and strategy and with the dialectics used by Soviet statesmen in such discussions.
(It would be highly desirable that this person be able to conduct conversations in the Russians'
language. In my opinion, this is important with Stalin.)
These discussions should not be directed toward arriving at any sort of secret protocol or any
other written understanding. They should be designed to clarify the background of any written
understanding that we may hope to reach at the CFM table or elsewhere. For we know now that
the words of international agreements mean different things to the Russians than they mean to
us; and it is desirable that in this instance we should thresh out some common understanding of
what would really be meant by any further written agreements we might arrive at.
The Russians will probably not be prepared to “talk turkey” with us until after the elections. But it
would be much easier to talk to them at that time if the discussions did not have to be inaugurated
too abruptly and if the ground had been prepared beforehand.
The Russians recently made an interesting approach to Murphy in Berlin, obviously with a view to
drawing us out and to testing our interest in talking with tbom frankly and realistically on the
informal plane. I do not think Berlin a desirable place for the pursuit of further discussions of this
sort. On the other hand, I do not think that we should give them a complete cold shoulder. We
must always be careful not to give discouragement to people in the Kremlin who may urge the
desirability of better understanding with us.
I think, in the light of the above, we should give careful attention to the personnel arrangements
which we make with relation to the Russian field in the next few months, and that we should play
our cards throughout with a view to the possibility of arriving eventually at some sort of a
background understanding with the Kremlin. But we must bear in mind that this understanding
would necessarily have to be limited and coldly realistic, could not be reduced to paper, and could
not be expected to outlast the general international situation which had given rise to it.
I mav add that I think such an understanding would have to be restricted pretty much to the
European and western Mediterranean area. I doubt that it could be extended to apply to the
Middle East and Far East. The situation in these latter areas is too unsettled, the prospects for
the future too confusing, the possibilities of one sort or another too vast and unforeseeable, to
admit of such discussions. The economic exchanges between Japan and Manchuria might be
revived in a guarded and modified form, by some sort of barter arrangement. This is an objective
well worth holding in mind, from our standpoint. Rut we should meanwhile have to frame our
policies in Japan with a view to creating better bargaining power for such discussions than we
now possess.
VII. Far East
My main impression with regard to the position of this Government with regard to the Far East is
that we are greatly over-extended in our whole thinking about what we can accomplish, and
should try to accomplish, in that area. This applies, unfortunately, to the people in our country as
well as to the Government.
It is urgently necessary that we recognize our own limitations as a moral and ideological force
among the Asiatic peoples.
Our political philosophy and our patterns for living have very little applicability to masses of
people in Asia. They may be all right for us, with our highly developed political traditions running
back into the centuries and with our peculiarly favorable geographic position; but they are simply
not practical or helpful, today, for most of the people in Asia.
This being the case, we must be very careful when we speak of exercising “leadership” in Asia.
We are deceiving ourselves and others when we pretend to have the answers to the problems
which agitate many of these Asiatic peoples.
Furthermore, we have about 50% of the world's wealth but only 6.3% of its population. This
disparity is particularly great as between ourselves and the peoples of Asia. In this situation, we
cannot fail to be the object of envy and resentment. Our real task in the coming period is to
devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity without
positive detriment to our national security. To do so, we will have to dispense with all
sentimentality and day-dreaming; and our attention will have to be concentrated everywhere on
our immediate national objectives. We need not deceive ourselves that we can afford today the
luxury of altruism and world-benefaction.
For these reasons, we must observe great restraint in our attitude toward the Far Eastern areas.
The peoples of Asia and of the Pacific area are going to go ahead, whatever we do, with the
development of their political forms and mutual interrelationships in their own way. This process
cannot be a liberal or peaceful one. The greatest of the Asiatic peoples—the Chinese and the
Indians—have not yet even made a beginning at the solution of the basic demographic problem
involved in the relationship between their food supply and their birth rate. Until they find some
solution to this problem, further hunger, distress, and violence are inevitable. All of the Asiatic
peoples are faced with the necessity for evolving new forms of life to conform to the impact of
modern technology. This process of adaptation will also be long and violent. It is not only
possible, but probable, that in the course of this process many peoples will fall, for varying
periods, under the influence of Moscow, whose ideology has a greater lure for such peoples, and
probably greater reality, than anything we could oppose to it. All this, too, is probably
unavoidable; and we could not hope to combat it without the diversion of a far greater portion of
our national effort than our people would ever willingly concede to such a purpose.
In the face of this situation we would be better off to dispense now with a number of the concepts
which have underlined our thinking with regard to the Far East. We should dispense with the
aspiration to “be liked” or to be regarded as the repository of a high-minded international altruism.
We should stop putting ourselves in the position of being our brothers' keeper and refrain from
offering moral and ideological advice. We should cease to talk about vague and—for the Far East
—unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of the living standards, and
democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power
concepts. The less we are then hampered by idealistic slogans, the better.
We should recognize that our influence in the Far Eastern area in the coming period is going to
be primarily military and economic. We should make a careful study to see what parts of the
Pacific and Far Eastern world are absolutely vital to our security, and we should concentrate our
policy on seeing to it that those areas remain in hands which we can control or rely on. It is my
own guess, on the basis of such study as we have given the problem so far, that Japan and the
Philippines will be found to be the corner-stones of such a Pacific security system and if we can
contrive to retain effective control over these areas there can be no serious threat to our security
from the East within our time.
Only when we have assured this first objective, can we allow ourselves the luxury of going farther
afield in our thinking and our planning.
If these basic concepts are accepted, then our objectives for the immediate coming period should
be:
(a) to liquidate as rapidly as possible our unsound commitments in China and to recover, vis-à-vis
that country, a position of detachment and freedom of action;
(b) to devise policies with respect to Japan which assure the security of those islands from
communist penetration and domination as well as from Soviet military attack, and which will
permit the economic potential of that country to become again an important force in the Far East,
responsive to the interests of peace and stability in the Pacific area; and
(c) to shape our relationship to the Philippines in such a way as to permit the Philippine
Government a continued independence in all internal affairs but to preserve the archipelago as a
bulwark of U.S. security in that area.
Of these three objectives, the one relating to Japan is the one where there is the greatest need
for immediate attention on the part of our Government and the greatest possibility for immediate
action. It should therefore be made the focal point of our policy for the Far East in the coming
period.
VIII. International Organization
A broad conflict runs through U.S. policy today between what may be called the universalistic and
the particularized approaches to the solution of international problems.
The universalistic approach looks to the solution of international problems by providing a
universalistic pattern of rules and procedures which would be applicable to all countries, or at
least all countries prepared to join, in an identical way. This approach has the tendency to rule out
political solutions (that is, solutions related to the peculiarities in the positions anil attitudes of the
individual peoples). It favors legalistic and mechanical solutions, applicable to all countries alike.
It has already been embodied in the United Nations, in the proposed ITO Charter, in UNESCO, in
the PICAO, and in similar efforts at universal world collaboration in given spheres of foreign
policy.
This universalistic approach has a strong appeal to U.S. public opinion: for it appears to obviate
the necessity of dealing with the national peculiarities and diverging political philosophies of
foreign peoples; which many of our people find confusing and irritating. In this sense, it contains a
strong vein of escapism. To the extent that it could be made to apply, it would relieve us of the
necessity of dealing with the world as it is. It assumes that if all countries could be induced to
subscribe to certain standard rules of behavior, the ugly realities—the power aspirations, the
national prejudices, the irrational hatreds and jealousies—would be forced to recede behind the
protecting curtain of accepted legal restraint, and that the problems of our foreign policy could
thus be reduced to the familiar terms of parliamentary procedure and majority decision. The
outward form established for international dealings would then cover and conceal the inner
content. And instead of being compelled to make the sordid and involved political choices
inherent in traditional diplomacy, we could make decisions on the lofty but simple plane of moral
principle and under the protecting cover of majority decision.
The particularized approach is one which is skeptical of any scheme for compressing
international affairs into legalistic concepts. It holds that the content is more important than the
form, and will force its way through any formal structure which is placed upon it. It considers that
the thirst for power is still dominant among so many peoples that it cannot be assuaged or
controlled by anything but counter-force. It does not reject entirely the idea of alliance as a
suitable form of counter-force; but it considers that if alliance is to be effective it must be based
upon real community of interest and outlook, which is to be found only among limited groups of
governments, and not upon the abstract formalism of universal international law or international
organization. It places no credence in the readiness of most peoples to wage war or to make
national sacrifices in the interests of an abstraction called “peace”. On the contrary, it sees in
universal undertakings a series of obligations which might, in view of the short-sightedness and
timidity of other governments, prevent this country from taking vigorous and incisive measures for
its own defense and for the defense of concepts of international relations which might be of vital
importance to world stability as a whole. It sees effective and determined U.S. policy being
caught, at decisive moments, in the meshes of a sterile and cumbersome international
parliamentarianism, if the univeralistic concepts are applied.
Finally, the particularized approach to foreign policy problems distrusts the theory of national
sovereignty as it expresses itself today in international organization. The modern techniques of
aggressive expansion lend themselves too well to the pouring of new wine. into old vessels—to
the infusion of a foreign political will into the personality of an ostensibly independent nation. In
these circumstances, the parliamentary principle in world affairs can easily become distorted and
abused as it has been in the case of White Russia, the Ukraine and the Russian satellites. This is
not to mention the problem of the distinction between large and small states, and the voice that
they should have, respectively, in world affairs.
This Government is now conducting a dual policy, which combines elements of both of these
approaches. This finds its reflection in the Department of State, where the functional (or
universalistic) concept vies with the geographic (or particularized) in the framing and conduct of
policy, as well as in the principles of Departmental organization.
This duality is something to which we are now deeply committed. I do not mean to recommend
that we should make any sudden changes. We cannot today abruptly renounce aspirations which
have become for many people here and abroad a symbol of our belief in the possibility of a
peaceful world.
But it is my own belief that in our pursuance of a workable world order we have started from the
wrong end. Instead of beginning at the center, which is our own immediate neighborhood—the
area of our own political and economic tradition—and working outward, we have started on the
periphery of the entire circle, i.e., on the universalistic principle of the UN, and have attempted to
work inward. This has meant a great dispersal of our effort, and has brought perilously close to
discredit those very concepts of a universal world order to which we were so attached. If we wish
to preserve those concepts for the future we must hasten to remove some of the strain we have
placed upon them and to build a solid structure, proceeding from a central foundation, which can
be thrust up to meet them before they collapse of their own weight.
This is the significance of the ERP, the idea of European union, and the cultivation of a closer
association with the U.K. and Canada. For a truly stable world order can proceed, within our
lifetime, only from the older, mellower and more advanced nations of the world—nations for which
the concept of order, as opposed to power, has value and meaning. If these nations do not have
the strength to seize and hold real leadership in world affairs today, through that combination of
political greatness and wise restraint which goes only with a ripe and settled civilization, then, as
Plato once remarked: “. . . cities will never have rest from their evils,—no, nor the human race, as
I believe.”
[Here follows Part IX, “Department and Foreign Service.”]
X. Conclusions
An attempt to survey the whole panorama of U.S. policy and to sketch the lines of direction along
which this country is moving in its relations with the rest of the world yields little cause for
complacency.
We are still faced with an extremely serious threat to our whole security in the form of the men in
the Kremlin. These men are an able, shrewd and utterly ruthless group, absolutely devoid of
respect for us or our institutions. They wish for nothing more than the destruction of our national
strength. They operate through a political organization of unparalleled flexibility, discipline,
cynicism and toughness. They command the resources of one of the world's greatest industrial
and agricultural nations. Natural force, independent of our policies, may go far to absorb and
eventually defeat the efforts of this group. But we cannot depend on this. Our own diplomacy has
a decisive part to play in this connection. The problems involved are new to us, and we are only
beginning to adjust ourselves to them. We have made some progress; but we are not yet nearly
far enough advanced. Our operations in foreign affairs must attain a far higher degree of
purposefulness, of economy of effort, and of disciplined co-ordination if we are to be sure of
accomplishing our purposes.
In the western European area communism has suffered a momentary check; but the issue is still
in the balance. This Government has as yet evolved no firm plans for helping Britain meet her
basic long-term economic problem, or for fitting Germany into western Europe in a way that gives
permanence of assuring the continued independence and prosperity of the other nations of
western Europe.
In the Mediterranean and Middle East, we have a situation where a vigorous and collective
national effort, utilizing both our political and military resources, could probably prevent the area
from falling under Soviet influence and preserve it as a highly important factor in our world
strategic position. But we are deeply involved, in that same area, in a situation which has no
direct relation to our national security, and where the motives our involvement lie solely in past
commitments of dubious wisdom and in our attachment to the UN itself. If we do not effect a fairly
radical reversal of the trend of our policy to date, we will end up either in the position of being
ourselves militarily responsible for the protection of the Jewish population in Palestine against the
declared hostility of the Arab world, or of sharing that responsibility with the Russians and thus
assisting at their installation as one of the military powers of the area. In either case, the clarity
and efficiency of a sound national policy for that area will be shattered.
In the Far East, our position is not bad; and we still have a reasonably firm grip on most of what is
strategically essential to us. But our present controls are temporary ones which cannot long
endure, and we have not yet worked out realistic plans for replacing them with a permanent
structure. Meanwhile, our own public has been grievously misled by the sentimentalists on the
significance of the area to ourselves; and we are only beginning with the long and contentious
process of re-education which will be necessary before a realistic Far Eastern policy can receive
the popular understanding it deserves.
In all areas of the world, we still find ourselves the victims of many of the romantic and
universalistic concepts with which we emerged from the recent war. The initial build-up of the UN
in U.S. public opinion was so tremendous that it is possibly true, as is frequently alleged, that we
have no choice but to make it the cornerstone of our policy in this post-hostilities period.
Occasionally, it has served a useful purpose. But by and large it has created more problems than
it has solved, and has led to a considerable dispersal of our diplomatic effort. And in our efforts to
use the UN majority for major political purposes we are playing with a dangerous weapon which
may some day turn against us. This is a situation which warrants most careful study and foresight
on our part.
Policy Planning Staff Files1
PPS/23
[Washington,] February 24, 1948.

1 Lot 64D563, files of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, 1947-1953.
2 The Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State was established on May 7, 1947, to
consider the development of long range policy and to draw together the views of the geographic
and functional offices of the Department. With the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947,
the Policy Planning Staf undertook responsibility for the preparation of the position of the
Department of State on matters before the National Security Council. For additional information
on the activities of the Policy Planning Staff and its Director, see George F. Kennan, Memoirs
1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), pp. 313-500.
3 Dean Acheson, Under Secretary of State, August 1945-June 1947.
4 George H. Butler, Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff.
5 On February 26, Kennan departed for Japan to consult with United States officials. Subsequent
illness prevented him from returning to the Department of State until April 19.
6 For documentation on United States policy with respect to the economic situation in Europe,
see vol. III, pp. 352.
7 For documentation on United States policy with respect to the proposed International Trade
Organization, see pp. 802 ff.
8 For text of Secretary Marshall's address at commencement exercises at Harvard University,
June 5, 1947, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. III, p. 237, or Department of State Bulletin, June
15, 1947, p. 1159.
9 For documentation on United States policy with respect to the occupation and control of
Germany, see vol. II, pp. 1285 ff.
10 For documentation on United States efforts in support of democratic forces in Italy, see vol. III,
pp. 816 ff. Regarding United States economic and military support for Greece, see vol. IV, pp. 1
ff.
11 For the views of thp Policy Planning Staff on this subject, see PPS 19, January 20, 1948, and
PPS 21, February 11, 1948, in vol. V, Part 2, pp. 545 and 656 respectively.
12 Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union.

A War in the Planning for Four Years

HOW STUPID DO THEY THINK WE ARE?
Zbigniew Brzezinski and the CFR Put War Plans In a 1997 Book -
It Is "A Blueprint for World Dictatorship," Says a Former German Defense and NATO Official Who
Warned of Global Domination in 1984,
in an Exclusive Interview With FTW
by
Michael C. Ruppert
[© Copyright 2001. All Rights Reserved, Michael C. Ruppert and From The Wilderness
Publications, www.copvcia.com.] May be copied or distributed for non-profit purposes only.
Posting on any ".com" web site is prohibited without express written consent from the author.]
Summary
"THE GRAND CHESSBOARD - American Primacy And It's Geostrategic Imperatives," Zbigniew
Brzezinski, Basic Books, 1997.
These are the very first words in the book: "Ever since the continents started interacting
politically, some five hundred years ago, Eurasia has been the center of world power."- p. xiii.
Eurasia is all of the territory east of Germany and Poland, stretching all the way through Russia
and China to the Pacific Ocean. It includes the Middle East and most of the Indian subcontinent.
The key to controlling Eurasia, says Brzezinski, is controlling the Central Asian Republics. And
the key to controlling the Central Asian republics is Uzbekistan. Thus, it comes as no surprise that
Uzbekistan was forcefully mentioned by President George W. Bush in his address to a joint
session of Congress, just days after the attacks of September 11, as the very first place that the
U.S. military would be deployed.
As FTW has documented in previous stories, major deployments of U.S. and British forces had
taken place before the attacks. And the U.S. Army and the CIA had been active in Uzbekistan for
several years. There is now evidence that what the world is witnessing is a cold and calculated
war plan - at least four years in the making - and that, from reading Brzezinski's own words about
Pearl Harbor, the World Trade Center attacks were just the trigger needed to set the final
conquest in motion.
----------
FTW, November 7, 2001, 1200 PST (Revised Jan. 21,2002) - There's a quote often attributed to
Allen Dulles after it was noted that the final 1964 report of the Warren Commission on the
assassination of JFK contained dramatic inconsistencies. Those inconsistencies, in effect,
disproved the Commission's own final conclusion that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone on
November 22, 1963. Dulles, a career spy, Wall Street lawyer, the CIA director whom JFK had
fired after the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco - and the Warren Commission member who took charge of
the investigation and final report - is reported to have said, "The American people don't read."
Some Americans do read. So do Europeans and Asians and Africans and Latin Americans.
World events since the attacks of September 11, 2001 have not only been predicted, but also
planned, orchestrated and - as their architects would like to believe - controlled. The current
Central Asian war is not a response to terrorism, nor is it a reaction to Islamic fundamentalism. It
is in fact, in the words of one of the most powerful men on the planet, the beginning of a final
conflict before total world domination by the United States leads to the dissolution of all national
governments. This, says Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) member and former Carter National
Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, will lead to nation states being incorporated into a new
world order, controlled solely by economic interests as dictated by banks, corporations and ruling
elites concerned with the maintenance (by manipulation and war) of their power. As a means of
intimidation for the unenlightened reader who happens upon this frightening plan - the plan of the
CFR - Brzezinski offers the alternative of a world in chaos unless the U.S. controls the planet by
whatever means are necessary and likely to succeed.
This position is corroborated by Dr. Johannes B. Koeppl, Ph.D. a former German defense
ministry official and advisor to former NATO Secretary General Manfred Werner. On November 6,
he told FTW, "The interests behind the Bush Administration, such as the CFR, The Trilateral
Commission - founded by Brzezinski for David Rockefeller - and the Bilderberger Group, have
prepared for and are now moving to implement open world dictatorship within the next five years.
They are not fighting against terrorists. They are fighting against citizens."
Brzezinski's own words - laid against the current official line that the United States is waging a
war to end terrorism - are self-incriminating. In an ongoing series of articles, FTW has
consistently established that the U.S. government had foreknowledge of the World Trade Center
attacks and chose not to stop them because it needed to secure public approval for a war that is
now in progress. It is a war, as described by Vice President Dick Cheney, "that may not end in
our lifetimes." What that means is that it will not end until all armed groups, anywhere in the
world, which possess the political, economic or military ability to resist the imposition of this
dictatorship, have been destroyed.
These are the "terrorists" the U.S. now fights in Afghanistan and plans to soon fight all over the
globe.
Before exposing Brzezinski (and those he represents) with his own words, or hearing more from
Dr. Koeppl, it is worthwhile to take a look at Brzezinski's background.
According to his resume Brzezinski, holding a 1953 Ph.D. from Harvard, lists the following
achievements:
Counselor, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Professor of American Foreign Policy, Johns Hopkins University
National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter (1977-81)
Trustee and founder of the Trilateral Commission
International advisor of several major US/Global corporations
Associate of Henry Kissinger
Under Ronald Reagan - member of NSC-Defense Department Commission on Integrated Long-
Term Strategy
Under Ronald Reagan - member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
Past member, Board of Directors, The Council on Foreign Relations
1988 - Co-chairman of the Bush National Security Advisory Task Force.
Brzezinski is also a past attendee and presenter at several conferences of the Bilderberger group
- a non-partisan affiliation of the wealthiest and most powerful families and corporations on the
planet.
The Grand Chessboard
Brzezinski sets the tone for his strategy by describing Russia and China as the two most
important countries - almost but not quite superpowers - whose interests that might threaten the
U.S. in Central Asia. Of the two, Brzezinski considers Russia to be the more serious threat. Both
nations border Central Asia. In a lesser context he describes the Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Iran and
Kazakhstan as essential "lesser" nations that must be managed by the U.S. as buffers or
counterweights to Russian and Chinese moves to control the oil, gas and minerals of the Central
Asian Republics (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan).
He also notes, quite clearly (p. 53) that any nation that might become predominant in Central Asia
would directly threaten the current U.S. control of oil resources in the Persian Gulf. In reading the
book it becomes clear why the U.S. had a direct motive for the looting of some $300 billion in
Russian assets during the 1990s, destabilizing Russia's currency (1998) and ensuring that a
weakened Russia would have to look westward to Europe for economic and political survival,
rather than southward to Central Asia. A dependent Russia would lack the military, economic and
political clout to exert influence in the region and this weakening of Russia would explain why
Russian President Vladimir Putin has been such a willing ally of U.S. efforts to date. (See FTW
Vol. IV, No. 1 - March 31, 2001)
An examination of selected quotes from "The Grand Chessboard," in the context of current
events reveals the darker agenda behind military operations that were planned long before
September 11th, 2001.
"...The last decade of the twentieth century has witnessed a tectonic shift in world affairs. For the
first time ever, a non-Eurasian power has emerged not only as a key arbiter of Eurasian power
relations but also as the world's paramount power. The defeat and collapse of the Soviet Union
was the final step in the rapid ascendance of a Western Hemisphere power, the United States, as
the sole and, indeed, the first truly global power... (p. xiii)
"... But in the meantime, it is imperative that no Eurasian challenger emerges, capable of
dominating Eurasia and thus of also challenging America. The formulation of a comprehensive
and integrated Eurasian geostrategy is therefore the purpose of this book. (p. xiv)
"The attitude of the American public toward the external projection of American power has been
much more ambivalent. The public supported America's engagement in World War II largely
because of the shock effect of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. (pp 24-5)
"For America, the chief geopolitical prize is Eurasia... Now a non-Eurasian power is preeminent in
Eurasia - and America's global primacy is directly dependent on how long and how effectively its
preponderance on the Eurasian continent is sustained. (p.30)
"America's withdrawal from the world or because of the sudden emergence of a successful rival -
would produce massive international instability. It would prompt global anarchy." (p. 30)
"In that context, how America 'manages' Eurasia is critical. Eurasia is the globe's largest continent
and is geopolitically axial. A power that dominates Eurasia would control two of the world's three
most advanced and economically productive regions. A mere glance at the map also suggests
that control over Eurasia would almost automatically entail Africa's subordination, rendering the
Western Hemisphere and Oceania geopolitically peripheral to the world's central continent. About
75 per cent of the world's people live in Eurasia, and most of the world's physical wealth is there
as well, both in its enterprises and underneath its soil. Eurasia accounts for 60 per cent of the
world's GNP and about three-fourths of the world's known energy resources." (p.31)
It is also a fact that America is too democratic at home to be autocratic abroad. This limits the use
of America's power, especially its capacity for military intimidation. Never before has a populist
democracy attained international supremacy. But the pursuit of power is not a goal that
commands popular passion, except in conditions of a sudden threat or challenge to the public's
sense of domestic well-being. The economic self-denial (that is, defense spending) and the
human sacrifice (casualties, even among professional soldiers) required in the effort are
uncongenial to democratic instincts. Democracy is inimical to imperial mobilization." (p.35)
"Two basic steps are thus required: first, to identify the geostrategically dynamic Eurasian states
that have the power to cause a potentially important shift in the international distribution of power
and to decipher the central external goals of their respective political elites and the likely
consequences of their seeking to attain them;... second, to formulate specific U.S. policies to
offset, co-opt, and/or control the above..." (p. 40)
"...To put it in a terminology that harkens back to the more brutal age of ancient empires, the
three grand imperatives of imperial geostrategy are to prevent collusion and maintain security
dependence among the vassals, to keep tributaries pliant and protected, and to keep the
barbarians from coming together." (p.40)
"Henceforth, the United States may have to determine how to cope with regional coalitions that
seek to push America out of Eurasia, thereby threatening America's status as a global power."
(p.55)
"Uzbekistan, nationally the most vital and the most populous of the central Asian states,
represents the major obstacle to any renewed Russian control over the region. Its independence
is critical to the survival of the other Central Asian states, and it is the least vulnerable to Russian
pressures." (p. 121)
Referring to an area he calls the "Eurasian Balkans" and a 1997 map in which he has circled the
exact location of the current conflict - describing it as the central region of pending conflict for
world dominance - Brzezinski writes: "Moreover, they [the Central Asian Republics] are of
importance from the standpoint of security and historical ambitions to at least three of their most
immediate and more powerful neighbors, namely Russia, Turkey and Iran, with China also
signaling an increasing political interest in the region. But the Eurasian Balkans are infinitely more
important as a potential economic prize: an enormous concentration of natural gas and oil
reserves is located in the region, in addition to important minerals, including gold." (p.124)
[Emphasis added]
"The world's energy consumption is bound to vastly increase over the next two or three decades.
Estimates by the U.S. Department of energy anticipate that world demand will rise by more than
50 percent between 1993 and 2015, with the most significant increase in consumption occurring
in the Far East. The momentum of Asia's economic development is already generating massive
pressures for the exploration and exploitation of new sources of energy and the Central Asian
region and the Caspian Sea basin are known to contain reserves of natural gas and oil that dwarf
those of Kuwait, the Gulf of Mexico, or the North Sea." (p.125)
"Uzbekistan is, in fact, the prime candidate for regional leadership in Central Asia." (p.130)
"Once pipelines to the area have been developed, Turkmenistan's truly vast natural gas reserves
augur a prosperous future for the country's people. (p.132)
"In fact, an Islamic revival - already abetted from the outside not only by Iran but also by Saudi
Arabia - is likely to become the mobilizing impulse for the increasingly pervasive new
nationalisms, determined to oppose any reintegration under Russian - and hence infidel - control."
(p. 133).
"For Pakistan, the primary interest is to gain Geostrategic depth through political influence in
Afghanistan - and to deny to Iran the exercise of such influence in Afghanistan and Tajikistan -
and to benefit eventually from any pipeline construction linking Central Asia with the Arabian
Sea." (p.139)
"Turkmenistan... has been actively exploring the construction of a new pipeline through
Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Arabian Sea..." (p.145)
"It follows that America's primary interest is to help ensure that no single power comes to control
this geopolitical space and that the global community has unhindered financial and economic
access to it." (p148)
"China's growing economic presence in the region and its political stake in the area's
independence are also congruent with America's interests." (p.149)
"America is now the only global superpower, and Eurasia is the globe's central arena. Hence,
what happens to the distribution of power on the Eurasian continent will be of decisive importance
to America's global primacy and to America's historical legacy." (p.194)
"Without sustained and directed American involvement, before long the forces of global disorder
could come to dominate the world scene. And the possibility of such a fragmentation is inherent in
the geopolitical tensions not only of today's Eurasia but of the world more generally." (p.194)
"With warning signs on the horizon across Europe and Asia, any successful American policy must
focus on Eurasia as a whole and be guided by a Geostrategic design." (p.197)
"That puts a premium on maneuver and manipulation in order to prevent the emergence of a
hostile coalition that could eventually seek to challenge America's primacy..." (p. 198)
"The most immediate task is to make certain that no state or combination of states gains the
capacity to expel the United States from Eurasia or even to diminish significantly its decisive
arbitration role." (p. 198)
"In the long run, global politics are bound to become increasingly uncongenial to the
concentration of hegemonic power in the hands of a single state. Hence, America is not only the
first, as well as the only, truly global superpower, but it is also likely to be the very last." (p.209)
"Moreover, as America becomes an increasingly multi-cultural society, it may find it more difficult
to fashion a consensus on foreign policy issues, except in the circumstance of a truly massive
and widely perceived direct external threat." (p. 211)
The Horror - And Comments From Someone Who Worked With Brzezinski
Brzezinski's book is sublimely arrogant. While singing the praises of the IMF and the World Bank,
which have economically terrorized nations on every continent, and while totally ignoring the
worldwide terrorist actions of the U.S. government that have led to genocide; cluster bombings of
civilian populations from Kosovo, to Laos, to Iraq, to Afghanistan; the development and battlefield
use of both biological and chemical agents such as Sarin gas; and the financial rape of entire
cultures, it would leave the reader believing that such actions are for the good of mankind.
While seconded from the German defense ministry to NATO in the late 1970s, Dr. Johannes
Koeppl traveled to Washington on more than one occasion. He also met with Brzezinski in the
White House on more than one occasion. His other Washington contacts included Steve Larabee
from the CFR, John J. McCloy, former CIA Director, economist Milton Friedman, and officials
from Carter's Office of Management and Budget. He is the first person I have ever interviewed
who has made a direct presentation at a Bilderberger conference and he has also made
numerous presentations to sub-groups of the Trilateral Commission. That was before he spoke
out against them.
His fall was rapid after he realized that Brzezinski was part of a group intending to impose a world
dictatorship. "In 1983/4 I warned of a take-over of world governments being orchestrated by these
people. There was an obvious plan to subvert true democracies and selected leaders were not
being chosen based upon character but upon their loyalty to an economic system run by the
elites and dedicated to preserving their power.
"All we have now are pseudo-democracies."
Koeppl recalls meeting U.S. Congressman Larry McDonald in Nuremburg in the early 80s.
McDonald, who was then contemplating a run for the Presidency, was a severe critic of these
elites. He was killed in the Russian shootdown of Korean Air flight 007 in 1985. Koeppl believes
that it might have been an assassination. Over the years many writers have made these
allegations about 007 and the fact that someone with Koeppl's credentials believes that an entire
plane full of passengers would be destroyed to eliminate one man offers a chilling opinion of the
value placed on human life by the powers that be.
In 1983, Koeppl warned, through Op-Ed pieces published in NEWSWEEK and elsewhere, that
Brzezinski and the CFR were part of an effort to impose a global dictatorship. His fall from grace
was swift. "It was a criminal society that I was dealing with. It was not possible to publish anymore
in the so-called respected publications. My 30 year career in politics ended.
"The people of the western world have been trained to be good consumers; to focus on money,
sports cars, beauty, consumer goods. They have not been trained to look for character in people.
Therefore what we need is education for politicians, a form of training that instills in them a higher
sense of ethics than service to money. There is no training now for world leaders. This is a shame
because of the responsibility that leaders hold to benefit all mankind rather than to blindly pursue
destructive paths.
"We also need education for citizens to be more efficient in their democracies, in addition to
education for politicians that will create a new network of elites based upon character and social
intelligence."
Koeppl, who wrote his 1989 doctoral thesis on NATO management, also authored a 1989 book -
largely ignored because of its controversial revelations - entitled "The Most Important Secrets in
the World." He maintains a German language web site at www.antaris.com and he can be
reached by email at jbk@antaris.com.
As to the present conflict Koeppl expressed the gravest concerns, "This is more than a war
against terrorism. This is a war against the citizens of all countries. The current elites are creating
so much fear that people don't know how to respond. But they must remember. This is a move to
implement a world dictatorship within the next five years. There may not be another chance."
end
-____________________________________________________________History of Central
Asia

Map of Central Asia showing three sets of possible boundaries for the regionThe history of
Central Asia has been determined primarily by the area's climate and geography. The aridity of
the region makes agriculture difficult, and its distance from the sea cut it off from much trade.
Thus, few major cities developed in the region. Nomadic horse peoples of the steppe dominated
the area for millennia.

Relations between the steppe nomads and the settled people in and around Central Asia were
marked by conflict. The nomadic lifestyle was well suited to warfare, and the steppe horse riders
became some of the most militarily potent people in the world, due to the devastating techniques
and ability of their horse archers.[1] Periodically, tribal leaders or changing conditions would
organize several tribes into a single military force. A few of these tribal coalitions included the
Huns' invasion of Europe, Turkic migrations into Transoxiana, the Wu Hu attacks on China and
most notably the Mongol conquest of much of Eurasia.
The dominance of the nomads ended in the 16th century as firearms allowed settled people to
gain control of the region. The Russian Empire, the Qing Dynasty of China, and other powers
expanded into the area and seized the bulk of Central Asia by the end of the 19th century. After
the Russian Revolution of 1917, the Soviet Union incorporated most of Central Asia; only
Mongolia and Afghanistan remained nominally independent, although Mongolia existed as a
Soviet satellite state and Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in the late 20th century. The Soviet
areas of Central Asia saw much industrialisation and construction of infrastructure, but also the
suppression of local cultures and a lasting legacy of ethnic tensions and environmental
problems.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, five Central Asian countries gained independence.
In all of the new states, former Communist party officials retained power as local strongmen.

Contents [hide]
1 Prehistory
2 External influences
3 Return of indigenous rule
4 Conquest of the steppes
5 Foreign control of Turkestan
5.1 Russia's campaigns
5.2 Chinese influence
5.3 Revolution and revolt
6 Soviet and PRC domination
7 Since 1991
8 See also
9 Notes
10 References
11 Further reading

[edit] Prehistory
Recent genetic studies have concluded that humans arrived in the region 40,000 to 50,000 years
ago, making the region one of the oldest known sites of human habitation. The archaeological
evidence of population in this region is sparse, whereas evidence of human habitation in Africa
and Australia prior to that of Central Asia is well-known. Some studies have also identified this
region as the likeliest source of the populations who later inhabited Europe, Siberia, and North
America.[2] According to the Kurgan hypothesis, the northwest of the region is also considered to
be the source of the root of the Indo- European languages.

As early as 4500 BCE, small communities had developed permanent settlements and began to
engage in agricultural practices as well as herding. Around this time, some of these communities
began the domestication of the horse. Initially, the horses were bred solely for their meat, as a
source of food. However, by 4000 BCE it is believed that they were used for transportation
purposes; wheeled wagons began making an appearance during this time. Once the utility of the
horse as a means of transportation became clear the horses (actually ponies) began being bred
for strength, and by the 3rd millennium BCE they were strong enough to pull chariots. By 2000
BCE, war chariots had spoked wheels, thus being made more maneuverable, and dominated the
battlefields. The growing use of the horse, combined with the failure, roughly around 2000 BCE,
of the always precarious irrigation systems that had allowed for extensive agriculture in the
region, gave rise and dominance of pastoral nomadism by 1000 BCE, a way of life that would
dominate the region for the next several millennia.

Przewalski's Horse (Equus przewalskii), also known as the Mongolian Wild Horse, or Takhi, was
probably an ancestor of the first domestic horses.Scattered nomadic groups maintained herds of
sheep, goats, horses, and camels, and conducted annual migrations to find new pastures (a
practice known as transhumance). The people lived in yurts (or gers) - tents made of hides and
wood that could be disassembled and transported. Each group had several yurts, each
accommodating about five people.

While the semi-arid plains were dominated by the nomads, small city-states and sedentary
agrarian societies arose in the more humid areas of Central Asia. The Bactria-Margiana
Archaeological Complex of the early 2nd millennium BCE was the first sedentary civilization of
the region, practicing irrigation farming of wheat and barley and possibly a form of writing.
Bactria-Margiana probably interacted with the contemporary Bronze Age nomads of the
Andronovo culture, the originators of the spoke-wheeled chariot, who lived to their north in
western Siberia, Russia, and parts of Kazakhstan, and survived as a culture until the 1st
millennium BCE. These cultures, particularly Bactria-Margiana, have been posited as possible
representatives of the hypothetical Aryan culture ancestral to the speakers of the Indo-Iranian
languages (see Indo-Iranians), and possibly the Uralic and Altaic cultures as well.

Later the strongest of Sogdian city states of the Fergana Valley rose to prominence. After the 1st
century BCE, these cities became home to the traders of the Silk Road and grew wealthy from
this trade. The steppe nomads were dependent on these settled people for a wide array of goods
that were impossible for transient populations to produce. The nomads traded for these when
they could, but because they generally did not produce goods of interest to sedentary people, the
popular alternative was to carry out raids.

A wide variety of people came to populate the steppes. Nomadic groups in Central Asia included
the Huns and other Turks, the Tocharians, Persians, Scythians and other Indo- Europeans, and a
number of Mongol groups. Despite these ethnic and linguistic differences, the steppe lifestyle led
to the adoption of very similar culture across the region.

[edit] External influences

In the 2nd and 1st millennia BCE, a series of large and powerful states developed on the
southern periphery of Central Asia (the Ancient Near East). These empires launched several
attempts to conquer the steppe people, but met with only mixed success.[citation needed] The
Median Empire and Achaemenid Empire both ruled parts of Central Asia. Xiongnu Empire
maybe seen as the first central Asian empire which set an example for later Tujue and Mongol
empire. Following the success of Sino-Xiongnu War, Chinese states would also regularly strive
to extend their power westwards. Despite their military might, these states found it difficult to
conquer the whole region. When faced by a stronger force, the nomads could simply retreat
deep into the steppe and wait for the invaders to leave. With no cities and little wealth other than
the herds they brought with them the nomads had nothing they could be forced to defend. An
example of this is given by Herodotus's detailed account of the futile Persian campaigns against
the Scythians. The Scythians, like most nomad empires, had permanent settlements of various
sizes, representing various degrees of civilization.[3] The vast fortified settlement of Kamenka on
the Dnieper River, settled since the end of the 5th century BC, became the centre of the Scythian
kingdom ruled by Ateas, who lost his life in a battle against Philip II of Macedon in 339 BC.[4]

Tetradrachm of the Greco-Bactrian King Eucratides (171-145 BCE)Some empires, such as the
Persian and Macedonian empires, did make deep inroads into Central Asia by founding cities
and gaining control of the trading centres. Alexander the Great's conquests spread Hellenistic
civilization all the way to Alexandria Eschate (Lit. “Alexandria the Furthest”), established in 329
BCE in modern Tajikistan. After Alexander's death in 323 BCE, his Central Asian territory fell to
the Seleucid Empire during the Wars of the Diadochi. In 250 BCE, the Central Asian portion of
the empire (Bactria) seceded as the Greco-Bactrian Kingdom, which had extensive contacts with
India and China till its end in 125 BCE. The Indo-Greek Kingdom, mostly based in the Punjab but
controlling a fair part of Afghanistan, pioneered the development of Greco-Buddhism. The
Kushan Kingdom thrived across a wide swath of the region from the Second Century BCE to the
Fourth Century AD, and continued Hellenistic and Buddhist traditions. These states prospered
from their position on the Silk Road linking China and Europe. Later, external powers such as
Sassanid Empire would come to dominate this trade.

One of those powers, the Parthian Empire was of Central Asian origin, but adopted Persian
cultural traditions. This is an early example of a recurring theme of Central Asian history:
occasionally nomads of Central Asian origin would conquer the kingdoms and empires
surrounding the region, but quickly merge into the culture of their conquered peoples.

At this time Central Asia was a heterogeneous region with a mixture of cultures and religions.
Buddhism remained the largest religion, but was concentrated in the east. Around Persia,
Zoroastrianism became important. Nestorian Christianity entered the area, but was never more
than a minority faith. More successful was Manichaeism, which became the third largest faith.
Many Central Asians practiced more than one faith, and almost all of the local religions were
infused with local shamanistic traditions.

Turkic expansion began in the 6th century, and following the Göktürk emipre, Turkic tribes
quickly spread westward across all of Central Asia. The Turkic speaking Uyghurs were one of
many distinct cultural groups brought together by the trade of the Silk Route at Turfan in Chinese
Central Asia. The Uyghurs, primarily pastoral nomads, observed a number of religions including
Manichaeism, Buddhism, and Nestorian Christianity. Many of the artifacts from this period were
found in the 19th century in this remote desert region of China.

In the eighth century, Islam began to penetrate the region and soon became the sole faith of
most of the population, though Buddhism remained strong in the east. The desert nomads of
Arabia could militarily match the nomads of the steppe, and the early Arab Empire gained control
over parts of Central Asia. The Arab invasion also saw Chinese influence expelled from western
Central Asia. At the Battle of Talas an Arab army decisively defeated a Tang Dynasty force and
for the next several centuries Middle Eastern influences would dominate the region.

[edit] Return of indigenous rule

A map showing the major trade routes of Central Asia in the thirteenth centuryOver time, as new
technologies were introduced, the nomadic horsemen grew in power. The Scythians developed
the saddle, and by the time of the Alans the use of the stirrup had begun. Horses continued to
grow larger and sturdier so that chariots were no longer needed as the horses could carry men
with ease. This greatly increased the mobility of the nomads; it also freed their hands, allowing
them to use the bow from horseback. Using small but powerful composite bows, the steppe
people gradually became the most powerful military force in the world. From a young age, almost
the entire male population was trained in riding and archery, both of which were necessary skills
for survival on the steppe. By adulthood, these activities were second nature. These mounted
archers were more mobile than any other force at the time, being able to travel forty miles a day
with ease.

The steppe peoples quickly came to dominate Central Asia, forcing the scattered city states and
kingdoms to pay them tribute or face annihilation. The martial ability of the steppe peoples was
limited, however, by the lack of political structure within the tribes. Confederations of various
groups would sometimes form under a ruler known as a khan. When large numbers of nomads
acted in unison they could be devastating, as when the Huns arrived in Western Europe.
However, tradition dictated that any dominion conquered in such wars should be divided among
all of the khan's sons, so these empires often declined as quickly as they formed.

Once the foreign powers were expelled, several indigenous empires formed in Central Asia. The
Hephthalites were the most powerful of these nomad groups in the sixth and seventh century
and controlled much of the region. In the tenth and eleventh centuries the region was divided
between several powerful states including the Samanid dynasty, that of the Seljuk Turks, and the
Khwarezmid Empire.

The most spectacular power to rise out of Central Asia developed when Genghis Khan united the
tribes of Mongolia. Using superior military techniques, the Mongol Empire spread to comprise all
of Central Asia and China as well as large parts Russia, and the Middle East. After Genghis
Khan died in 1227, most of Central Asia continued to be dominated by the successor Chagatai
Khanate. This state proved to be short lived, as in 1369 Timur, a Turkic leader in the Mongol
military tradition, conquered most of the region.

Even harder than keeping a steppe empire together was governing conquered lands outside the
region. While the steppe peoples of Central Asia found conquest of these areas easy, they found
governing almost impossible. The diffuse political structure of the steppe confederacies was
maladapted to the complex states of the settled peoples. Moreover, the armies of the nomads
were based upon large numbers of horses, generally three or four for each warrior. Maintaining
these forces required large stretches of grazing land, not present outside the steppe. Any
extended time away from the homeland would thus cause the steppe armies to gradually
disintegrate. To govern settled peoples the steppe peoples were forced to rely on the local
bureaucracy, a factor that would lead to the rapid assimilation of the nomads into the culture of
those they had conquered. Another important limit was that the armies, for the most part, were
unable to penetrate the forested regions to the north; thus, such states as Novgorod and
Muscovy began to grow in power.

In the fourteenth century much of Central Asia, and many areas beyond it, were conquered by
Timur (1336-1405) who is known in the west as Tamerlane. It was during Timur’s reign that the
nomadic steppe culture of Central Asia fused with the settled culture of Iran. One of its
consequences was an entirely new visual language that glorified Timur and subsequent Timurid
rulers. This visual language was also used to articulate their commitment to Islam.[5] Timur's
large empire collapsed soon after his death, however. The region then became divided among a
series of smaller Khanates, including the Khanate of Khiva, the Khanate of Bukhara, the Khanate
of Kokand, and the Khanate of Kashgar.

[edit] Conquest of the steppes

The lifestyle that had existed largely unchanged since 500 BCE began to disappear after 1500.
An important change in the world economy in the fourteenth and fifteenth century was brought
about by the development of nautical technology. Ocean trade routes were pioneered by the
Europeans, who were cut off from the Silk Road by the Muslim states that controlled its western
termini. The trade between East Asia, India, Europe, and the Middle East began to move over
the seas and not through Central Asia. The disunity of the region after the end of the Mongol
Empire also made trade and travel far more difficult and the Silk Road went into steep decline.

A native Turkmen man in traditional dress with his dromedary camel in Turkmenistan, circa
1915.An even more important development was the introduction of gunpowder-based weapons.
The gunpowder revolution allowed settled peoples to defeat the steppe horsemen in open battle
for the first time. Construction of these weapons required the infrastructure and economies of
large societies and were thus impractical for nomadic peoples to produce. The domain of the
nomads began to shrink as, beginning in the fifteenth century, the settled powers gradually
began to conquer Central Asia.

The last steppe empire to emerge was that of the Dzungars who conquered much of East
Turkestan and Mongolia. However in a sign of the changed times they proved unable to match
the Chinese and were decisively defeated by the forces of Qing Dynasty. In the eighteenth
century the Qing emperors, themselves originally from the far eastern edge of the steppe,
campaigned in the west and in Mongolia with the Qianlong Emperor taking control of Xinjiang in
1758. The Mongol threat was overcome and much of Inner Mongolia was annexed to China. The
Chinese dominions stretched into the heart of Central Asia and included the Khanate of Kokand,
which paid tribute to Peking. Outer Mongolia and Xinjiang did not become provinces of the
Chinese empire, but rather were directly administered by the Qing dynasty. The fact that there
was no provincial governor meant that the local rulers retained most of their powers and this
special status also prevented emigration from the rest of China into the region. Persia also began
to expand north, especially under the rule of Nadir Shah who extended Persian dominion far past
the Oxus. After his death, however, the Persian empire slowly crumbled and was annexed by
Britain and Russia.

The Russians also expanded south, first with the transformation of the Ukrainian steppe into an
agricultural heartland, and subsequently onto the fringe of the Kazakh steppes, beginning with
the foundation of the fortress of Orenburg. The slow Russian conquest of the heart of Central
Asia began in the early nineteenth century, although Peter the Great had sent a failed expedition
under Prince Bekovitch-Cherkassky against Khiva as early as the 1720s. By the 1800s, the
locals could do little to resist the Russian advance, although the Kazakhs of the Great Horde
under Kenesary Kasimov rose in rebellion from 1837 - 46. Until the 1870s, for the most part,
Russian interference was minimal, leaving native ways of life intact and local government
structures in place. With the conquest of Turkestan after 1865 and the consequent securing of
the frontier, the Russians gradually expropriated large parts of the steppe and gave these lands
to Russian farmers, who began to arrive in large numbers. This process was initially limited to
the northern fringes of the steppe and it was only in the 1890s that significant numbers of
Russians began to settle farther south, especially in Zhetysu (Semirechye).

[edit] Foreign control of Turkestan

Prisoners in a zindan, a traditional Central Asian prison, in the Bukharan Protectorate under
Imperial Russia, ca. 1910[edit] Russia's campaigns
The forces of the khanates were poorly equipped and could do little to resist Russia's advances,
although the Kokandian commander Alimqul led a quixotic campaign before being killed outside
Chimkent. The main opposition to Russian expansion into Turkestan came from the British, who
felt that Russia was growing too powerful and threatening the northwest frontiers of British India.
This rivalry came to be known as The Great Game, where both powers competed to advance
their own interests in the region. It did little to slow the pace of conquest north of the Oxus, but
did ensure that Afghanistan remained independent as a buffer state between the two Empires.

After the fall of Tashkent to General Cherniaev in 1865, Khodjend, Djizak, and Samarkand fell to
the Russians in quick succession over the next three years as the Khanate of Kokand and the
Emirate of Bukhara were repeatedly defeated. In 1867 the Governor-Generalship of Russian
Turkestan was established under General Konstantin Petrovich Von Kaufman, with its
headquarters at Tashkent. In 1881-85 the Transcaspian region was annexed in the course of a
campaign led by Generals Mikhail Annenkov and Mikhail Skobelev, and Ashkhabad, Merv and
Pendjeh all came under Russian control. Russian expansion was halted in 1887 when Russia
and Great Britain delineated the northern border of Afghanistan. Bukhara and the Khanate of
Khiva remained quasi-independent, but were essentially protectorates along the lines of the
Princely States of British India. Although the conquest was prompted by almost purely military
concerns, in the 1870s and 1880s Turkestan came to play a reasonably important economic role
within the Russian Empire. Because of the American Civil War, cotton shot up in price in the
1860s, becoming an increasingly important commodity in the region, although its cultivation was
on a much lesser scale than during the Soviet period. The cotton trade led to improvements: the
Transcaspian Railway from Krasnovodsk to Samarkand and Tashkent, and the Trans-Aral
Railway from Orenburg to Tashkent were constructed. In the long term the development of a
cotton monoculture would render Turkestan dependent on food imports from Western Siberia,
and the Turkestan-Siberia Railway was already planned when the First World War broke out.
Russian rule still remained distant from the local populace, mostly concerning itself with the small
minority of Russian inhabitants of the region. The local Muslims were not considered full Russian
citizens. They did not have the full privileges of Russians, but nor did they have the same
obligations, such as military service. The Tsarist regime left substantial elements of the previous
regimes (such as Muslim religious courts) intact, and local self-government at the village level
was quite extensive.

[edit] Chinese influence

During the 17th and 18th Centuries the Qing Dynasty made several campaigns to conquer
Dzungars Mongols. In the meantime,they incorporated parts of central Asia into the Chinese
Empire. Internal turmoil largely halted Chinese expansion in the nineteenth century. In 1867
Yakub Beg led a rebellion that saw Xinjiang regain its independence as the Taiping and Nian
Rebellions in the heartland of the Empire prevented the Chinese from reasserting their control.
Instead the Russians expanded, annexing the Chu and Ili Valleys and the city of Kuldja from the
Chinese Empire. After Yakub Beg's death at Korla in 1877 his state collapsed as the area was
reconquered by China. After lengthy negotiations Kuldja was returned to Peking by Russia in
1884.

[edit] Revolution and revolt

During the First World War the Muslim exemption from conscription was removed by the
Russians, sparking the Central Asian Revolt of 1916. When the Russian Revolution of 1917
occurred, a provisional Government of Jadid Reformers, also known as the Turkestan Muslim
Council met in Kokand and declared Turkestan's autonomy. This new government was quickly
crushed by the forces of the Tashkent Soviet, and the semi-autonomous states of Bukhara and
Khiva were also invaded. The main independence forces were rapidly crushed, but guerrillas
known as basmachi continued to fight the Communists until 1924. Mongolia was also swept up
by the Russian Revolution and, though it never became a Soviet republic, it became a
communist People's Republic in 1924.

There was some threat of a Red Army invasion of Chinese Turkestan, but instead the governor
agreed to cooperate with the Soviets. The creation of the Republic of China in 1911 and the
general turmoil in China affected its holdings in Central Asia. Kuomintang control of the region
was weak and there was a dual threat from Islamic separatists and communists. Eventually the
region became largely independent under the control of the provincial governor. Rather than
invade, the Soviet Union established a network of consulates in the region and sent aid and
technical advisors. By the 1930s, the governor of Xinjiang's relationship with Moscow was far
more important than that with Nanking. The Chinese Civil War further destabilized the region and
saw Turkic nationalists make attempts at independence. In 1933, the First East Turkistan
Republic was declared, but it was destroyed soon after with the aid of the Soviet troops. After the
German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, Governor Sheng Shicai of Xinjiang gambled and
broke his links to Moscow, moving to ally himself with the Kuomintang. This led to a civil war
within the region. Sheng was eventually forced to flee and the Soviet backed Second East
Turkistan Republic was formed. This state was annexed by the People's Republic of China in
1949.

[edit] Soviet and PRC domination

After being conquered by Bolshevik forces, Soviet Central Asia experienced a flurry of
administrative reorganization. In 1918 the Bolsheviks set up the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet
Socialist Republic, and Bukhara and Khiva also became SSRs. In 1919 the Conciliatory
Commission for Turkestan Affairs was established, to try to improve relations between the locals
and the Communists. New policies were introduced, respecting local customs and religion. In
1920, the Kirghiz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, covering modern Kazakhstan, was set
up. It was renamed the Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1925. In 1924, the
Soviets created the Uzbek SSR and the Turkmen SSR. In 1929 the Tajik SSR was split from the
Uzbek SSR. The Kyrgyz Autonomous Oblast became an SSR in 1936.

These borders had little to do with ethnic makeup, but the Soviets felt it important to divide the
region. They saw both Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism as threats, which dividing Turkestan
would limit. Under the Soviets, the local languages and cultures were systematized and codified,
and their differences clearly demarcated and encouraged. New Cyrillic writing systems were
introduced, to break links with Turkey and Iran. Under the Soviets the southern border was
almost completely closed and all travel and trade was directed north through Russia.

Under Stalin at least a million persons died, mostly in the Kazakh SSR, during the period of
forced collectivization. Islam, as well as other religions, were also attacked. In the Second World
War several million refugees and hundreds of factories were moved to the relative security of
Central Asia; and the region permanently became an important part of the Soviet industrial
complex. Several important military facilities were also located in the region, including nuclear
testing facilities and the Baikonur Cosmodrome. The Virgin Lands Campaign, starting in 1954,
was a massive Soviet agricultural resettlement program that brought more than 300,000
individuals, mostly from the Ukraine, to the northern Kazakh SSR and the Altai region of the
Russian SFSR. This was a major change in the ethnicity of the region.

Similar processes occurred in Xinjiang and the rest of Western China where the PRC quickly
established absolute control. The area was subject to a number of development schemes and,
like West Turkestan, one focus was on the growing of the cotton cash crop. These efforts were
overseen by the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. The XPCC also encouraged Han
Chinese migration to Xinjiang leading to a major demographic shift and by the year 2000 some
40% of the population of Xinjiang were Han.[6] As with the Soviet Union local languages and
cultures were mostly encouraged and Xinjiang was granted autonomous status. However, Islam
was much persecuted, especially during the Cultural Revolution. Similar to the Soviet Union,
many in Xinjiang died due to the failed agricultural policies of the Great Leap Forward.

[edit] Since 1991

From 1988 to 1992, a free press and multiparty system developed in the Central Asian republics
as perestroika pressured the local Communist parties to open up. What Svat Soucek calls the
"Central Asian Spring" was very short-lived, as soon after independence former Communist
Party officials recast themselves as local strongmen,[7] Political stability in the region has mostly
been maintained, with the major exception of the Tajik Civil War that lasted from 1992 to 1997.
2005 also saw the largely peaceful ousting of Kyrgyz president Askar Akayev in the Tulip
Revolution and an outbreak of violence in Andijan, Uzbekistan.

The independent states of Central Asia with their Soviet-drawn bordersMuch of the population of
Soviet Central Asia was indifferent to the collapse of the Soviet Union, even the large Russian
populations in Kazakhstan (roughly 40% of the total) and Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Aid from the
Kremlin had also been central to the economies of Central Asia, each of the republics receiving
massive transfers of funds from Moscow. Independence largely resulted from the efforts of the
small groups of nationalistic, mostly local intellectuals, and from little interest in Moscow for
retaining the expensive region. While never a part of the Soviet Union, Mongolia followed a
somewhat similar path. Often acting as the unofficial sixteenth Soviet republic, it shed the
communist system only in 1996, but quickly ran into economic problems. See: History of
independent Mongolia.

The economic performance of the region since independence has been mixed. It contains some
of the largest reserves of natural resources in the world, but there are important difficulties in
transporting them. Since it lies farther from the ocean than anywhere else in the world, and its
southern borders lay closed for decades, the main trade routes and pipelines run through
Russia. As a result, Russia still exerts more influence over the region than in any other former
Soviet republics. Nevertheless, the rising energy importance of the Caspian Sea entails a great
involvement in the region by the US. The former Soviet republics of the Caucasus now have their
own US Special Envoy and inter- agency working groups. Former US Secretary of Energy Bill
Richardson had claimed that "the Caspian region will hopefully save us [the US] from total
dependence on Middle East oil". [8] Some analysts, such as Myers Jaffe and Robert A. Manning,
estimate however that US' entry into the region (with initiatives such us the US-favored Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline) as a major actor may complicate Moscow's chances of making a
decisive break with its past economic mistakes and geopolitical excesses in Central Asia. They
also regard as a myth the assertion that Caspian oil and gas will be a cheaper and more secure
alternative to supplies from the Persian Gulf.[9]

Despite these reservations and fears, since the late 1980s, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and
Turkmenistan have gradually moved to centre stage in the global energy markets and are now
regarded as key factors of the international energy security. Azerbaijan and Kzakhstan in
particular have succeeded in attracting massive foreign investment to their oil and gas sectors.
According to Gawdat Bahgat, the investment flow suggests that the geological potential of the
Caspian region as a major source of oil and gas in not in doubt.[10] Russia and Kazakhstan
started a closer energy co-operation in 1998, which was further consolidated in May 2002, when
Presidents Vladimir Putin and Nursultan Nazarbayev signed a protocol dividing three gas fields -
Kurmangazy, Tsentralnoye, and Khvalynskoye - on an equal basis. Following the ratification of
bilateral treaties, Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan declared that the norther Caspian was
open for business and investment as they had reached a consensus on the legal status of the
basin. Iran and Turkmenistan refused however to recognize the validity of these bilateral
agreements; Iran is rejecting any bilateral agreement to divide the Caspian. On the other hand,
US' choices in the region (within the framework of the so-called "pipeline diplomacy"), such as
the strong support of the Baky pipeline (the project was eventually approved and was completed
in 2005), reflect a political desire to avoid both Russia and Iran.[11]

Increasingly, other powers have begun to involve themselves in Central Asia. Soon after the
Central Asian states won their independence Turkey began to look east, and a number of
organizations are attempting to build links between the western and eastern Turks. Iran, which
for millennia had close links with the region, has also been working to build ties and the Central
Asian states now have good relations with the Islamic Republic. One important player in the new
Central Asia has been Saudi Arabia, which has been funding the Islamic revival in the region.
Olcott notes that soon after independence Saudi money paid for massive shipments of Qur'ans
to the region and for the construction and repair of a large number of mosques. In Tajikistan
alone an estimated 500 mosques per year have been erected with Saudi money.[12] The
formerly atheistic Communist Party leaders have mostly converted to Islam. Small Islamist
groups have formed in several of the countries, but radical Islam has little history in the region;
the Central Asian societies have remained largely secular and all five states enjoy good relations
with Israel. Central Asia is still home to a large Jewish population, the largest group being the
Bukharan Jews, and important trade and business links have developed between those that left
for Israel after independence and those remaining.

The People's Republic of China sees the region as an essential future source of raw materials;
most Central Asian countries are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. This has
affected Xinjiang and other parts of western China that have seen infrastructure programs
building new links and also new military facilities. Chinese Central Asia has been far from the
centre of that country's economic boom and the area has remained considerably poorer than the
coast. China also sees a threat in the potential of the new states to support separatist
movements among its own Turkic minorities.

One important Soviet legacy that has only gradually been appreciated is the vast ecological
destruction. Most notable is the gradual drying of the Aral Sea. During the Soviet era, it was
decided that the traditional crops of melons and vegetables would be replaced by water -intensive
growing of cotton for Soviet textile mills. Massive irrigation efforts were launched that diverted a
considerable percentage of the annual inflow to the sea, causing it to shrink steadily.
Furthermore, vast tracts of Kazakhstan were used for nuclear testing, and there exists a plethora
of decrepit factories and mines.

In the first part of 2008 Central Asia experienced a severe energy crisis, a shortage of both
electricity and fuel, aggravated by abnormally cold temperatures, failing infrastructure, and a
shortage of food.
[edit] See also
Nomadic empires
History of Kazakhstan
History of Kyrgyzstan
History of Tajikistan
History of Turkmenistan
History of Uzbekistan
History of Afghanistan
History of Mongolia
History of Xinjiang
History of Pakistan
History of Kashmir

Ancient India and Central Asia

[edit] Notes
^ O'Connell, Robert L.: "Soul of the Sword.", page 51. The Free Press, New York, 2002.
^ The report on the genetic study of Central Asians, A BBC article summarizing these findings.
^ Herodotus, IV, 83-144
^ "Central Asia, history of". Encyclopaedia Britannica. 2002.
^ [1] A Journey of a Thousand Years
^ Includes only citizens of the PRC. Does not include members of the People's Liberation Army
in active service. Source: 2000年人口普查中国民族人口资料，民族出版社，2003/9 (ISBN 7-
105-05425-5)
^ Svat Soucek A History of Inner Asia.
^ M. Jaffe-R.A. Manning, The Real Geopolitics of Energy, 112
^ M. Jaffe-R.A. Manning, The Real Geopolitics of Energy, 113
^ G. Bahgat, Central Asia and Energy Security, 3
^ G. Bahgat, Central Asia and Energy Security, 8
^ Martha Brill Olcott. Central Asia's New States
[edit] References
Bahgat, Gawdat (March 2006). "Central Asia and Energy Security". Asian Affairs
(Routledge - Taylor and Francis Group) 37 (No.1): 1–16.
doi:10.1080/03068370500456819.
"Central Asia, history of". Encyclopaedia Britannica. 2002.
Herodotus, Histories, IV. See original text in perseus project.
Mayers Jaffe, Manning Robert A. (Winter 1998-1999). "The Myth of the Caspian "Great
Game": The Real Geopolitics of Energy". Survival (International Institute for Strategic
Studies) 40 (No.4): 112–129. http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/
(bofh5h551nevqfadmwvfby55)/app/home/contribution.asp?
referrer=parent&backto=issue,7,12;journal,33,36;linkingpublicationresults,1:111409,
1.
[edit] Further reading
S. Frederick Starr, Rediscovering Central Asia [2]
V.V. Barthold, Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion (London) 1968 (Third Edition)
Brower, Daniel Turkestan and the Fate of the Russian Empire (London) 2003. ISBN 0-
415- 29744-3
Dani, A.H. and V.M. Masson eds. UNESCO History of Civilizations of Central Asia
(Paris: UNESCO) 1992-
Hildinger, Erik. Warriors of the Steppe: A Military History of Central Asia, 500 B.C. to
1700 A.D. (Cambridge: Da Capo) 2001. ISBN 0-306-81065-4
O'Brien, Patrick K. (General Editor). Oxford Atlas of World History. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2005.
Olcott, Martha Brill. Central Asia's New States: Independence, Foreign policy, and
Regional security. (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press) 1996.
ISBN 1-878379- 51-8
Sinor, Denis The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia (Cambridge) 1990 (2nd
Edition). ISBN 0-521-24304-1
Soucek, Svat A History of Inner Asia. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 2000.
ISBN 0 -521-65169-7
В.В. Бартольд История Культурной Жизни Туркестана
("Istoriya Kul'turnoy zhizni Turkestana") (Москва) 1927

Н.А. Халфин; Россия и Ханства Средней Азии ("Rossiya i Hanstva Sredney Azii")
(Москва) 1974
Encyclopaedia Iranica: Central Asia in pre-Islamic Times (R. Fryer)
Encyclopaedia Iranica: Central Asia from the Islamic Period to the Mongol Conquest
(C. Bosworth)
Encyclopaedia Iranica: Central Asia in the Mongol and Timurid Periods (B. Spuler)
Encyclopaedia Iranica: Central Asia from the 16th to the 18th centuries (R.D.
McChesney)
Encyclopaedia Iranica: Central Asia in the 18th-19th centuries (Yuri Bregel)
Center for the Study of Eurasian Nomads
_____________________________________________________________Descent into
Appeasement
Pakistan's dangerous deals with terrorists.
Global Geopolitics Net
Friday, June 06, 2008
© Copyright 2008 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Bill Roggio. All rights reserved.
by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Bill Roggio
This article is being republished with permission. It appears in The Weekly Standard 06/09/2008,
Volume 013, Issue 37
The good news is that some politicians apparently do keep their promises. Immediately after
being appointed Pakistan's prime minister earlier this year, Yousaf Raza Gilani promised
negotiations with the Taliban, saying that his government was "ready to talk to all those who give
up arms and adopt the path of peace." Regional officials echoed his sentiment. He has delivered.
The bad news is that such negotiations are eroding Pakistan's security and creating an
increasingly dangerous situation for Americans.
The trouncing of Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf's PML-Q party in the country's February
elections signaled a repudiation of his internal policies and his alliance with the United States.
Musharraf's approach to Pakistan's largely lawless tribal regions--havens for the Taliban and al
Qaeda--swung clumsily erratically between mobilizing his forces and entering into unenforceable
agreements that eroded his military credibility. Neither tactic did much good, but negotiating with
terrorists was the more popular of the two failed policies.
It is not surprising then that Pakistan's new government launched a round of negotiations with the
country's Islamic extremists. What was unexpected, though, was the scale of the negotiations.
Talks have been opened and agreements entered with virtually every militant outfit in the country.
But the government has done nothing to answer the problem of the past accords and is again
accepting promises that it has no means of enforcing.
The Taliban violated each of the conditions of the now-infamous September 2006 Waziristan
accords. It used the ceasefire as an opportunity to erect a parallel system of government
complete with sharia courts, taxation, recruiting offices, and its own police force. Al Qaeda in turn
benefited from the Taliban's expansion, building what U.S. intelligence estimates as 29 training
camps in North and South Waziristan alone. And, while even the Waziristan accords paid lip
service to stopping cross-border attacks against Coalition forces in Afghanistan, the new
negotiations often leave this consideration aside. As North-West Frontier Province (NWFP)
governor Owari Ghani recently told the New York Times, "Pakistan will take care of its own
problems, you take care of Afghanistan on your side."
The first in this new round of agreements was struck with the NWFP's Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-
Mohammadi (the TNSM or Movement for the Implementation of Mohammad's Sharia Law) on
April 20 in the Malakand Division. The TNSM is led by Maulana Sufi Mohammed, who was
imprisoned in 2002 for providing fighters to the Taliban in Afghanistan (as the TNSM continues to
do to this day). The Pakistani government and the TNSM entered into a six-point deal in which
the TNSM renounced attacks on Pakistan's government in exchange for the promise that sharia
law would be imposed in Malakand. The government also freed Sufi Mohammed.
A month later, Pakistan inked a deal with the Taliban in the Swat district. Led by Mullah Fazlullah
(Sufi Mohammed's son-in-law), they have been waging a brutal insurgency in the once-peaceful
vacation spot. (More than 200 Pakistani soldiers and police have been killed since January 2007.)
The 15-point agreement between the Pakistani government and the Swat Taliban stipulates that
the military will withdraw its forces, and the government will allow the imposition of sharia law,
permit Fazlullah to broadcast on his radio channel--which was previously banned--and help turn
Fazlullah's madrassa into an "Islamic University."
Though the government extracted some concessions from the Taliban, they are so difficult to
enforce that Pakistan will likely gain little more than the reintroduction of vaccination programs.
(Fazlullah has campaigned against vaccinations in the past, describing them as a Western plot to
make Pakistani men impotent.) The promise to close down training camps is certainly suspect.
This week, Pakistan negotiated a peace agreement with a Tehrik-i-Taliban leader in the
Mohmand agency. Its terms are similar to the new accords signed with the TNSM and Swat
Taliban.
In South Waziristan, the Pakistani government is in the process of negotiating an agreement with
Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Tehrik-i-Taliban. He is a longtime adherent of the Taliban's
ideology, frequently visiting Afghanistan in the mid-1990s and appointed by Mullah Omar as
governor of the Mehsud tribe. Baitullah Mehsud's forces are responsible for killing and kidnapping
hundreds of Pakistani soldiers, and he has masterminded a suicide-bombing campaign
throughout Pakistan. He established the Tehrik-i-Taliban in December 2007 to unite local Taliban
movements throughout the tribal areas and the NWFP and is thought to be responsible for
Benazir Bhutto's assassination that month.
While the agreement has yet to be signed, Pakistan's Daily Times published a draft copy. The
draft states that the Tehrik-i-Taliban must eject foreign terrorists (a concession they have ignored
in the past) and prohibits them from attacking government and military personnel or impeding the
movement of aid workers. In exchange, Pakistan will free Taliban prisoners and withdraw its army
from the region. The deal is to be signed any day.
Pakistan has also started negotiations with the Taliban in the settled district of Kohat. The leaked
terms of the proposed agreement are nearly identical to those negotiated with other groups.
This strategy of accelerated appeasement only empowers groups with a history of violence who
are devoted to undermining Pakistan's sovereignty. In addition to creating breathing space for
extremists (since it is the militants who determine when an agreement is broken), the accords
allow a greater flow of recruits to the training camps and further violence. At best, the politicians
are shunting the problems down the road--and these problems will be larger by the time Pakistan
is forced to confront them.
The new accords are also a threat to the United States. Baitullah Mehsud has told journalists that
"jihad in Afghanistan will continue" regardless of negotiations, a sentiment echoed by other
Taliban leaders. As U.S. forces in Afghanistan face increased cross-border attacks, Americans at
home should be concerned about the increase in the risk of another catastrophic terrorist attack.
The 9/11 Commission Report warned that a terrorist organization requires "time, space, and the
ability to perform competent planning and staff work" in order to carry out a 9/11-like attack.
Pakistan's new accords provide al Qaeda and its allies with the requisite time and space.
If another major act of terror hits the United States, it will almost certainly be traced back to the al
Qaeda network in Pakistan. Far from addressing the situation, Pakistan's government is only
increasing the dangers that we face.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross is the vice president of research at the Foundation for Defense of
Democracies and the author of My Year Inside Radical Islam. Bill Roggio, an adjunct fellow at the
Foundation for Defense of Democracies, analyzes military developments in Pakistan at
longwarjournal.org.
a-----------------------------------------------------------
Geopolitics
Geopolitics is the art and practice of using political power over a given territory. Traditionally, the
term has applied primarily to the impact of geography on politics, but its usage has evolved over
the past century to encompass a wider connotation.
In academic circles, the study of geopolitics involves the analysis of geography, history and social
science with reference to spatial politics and patterns at various scales (ranging from the level of
the state to international).
The term was coined by Rudolf Kjellén, a Swedish political scientist, at the beginning of the 20th
century. Kjellén was inspired by the German geographer Friedrich Ratzel, who published his book
Politische Geographie (political geography) in 1897, popularized in English by American diplomat
Robert Strausz-Hupé, a faculty member of the University of Pennsylvania. Halford Mackinder also
greatly pioneered the field, though he did not use the term geopolitics [1].
_________________________________________________________
TENSIONS ACROSS DURAND LINE
M RAMA RAO
The irony is difficult to miss. President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan is threatening Pakistan with
hot pursuit. This means, the day when Afghan soldiers would cross the Durand Line to smoke out
Taliban warriors is not far. This is partly in tune with the Pukhtoon tradition of not recognising the
Durand line. Neither the Taliban militants who have safe sanctuaries in South Waziristan, Swat
Valley and other pockets of Pakistan's tribal belt, nor Mr Karzai recognise the Durand Line as the
border.
Hot pursuit and smoking out from the holes are some of the favourite Bushisms tested and
perfected after 9/11. Yet, commentators in Washington and Islamabad view the Karzai threat as
outlandish. President George Bush has even volunteered to help to cool the tensions between
the two neighbours.
Evidently President Karzai is frustrated. On the one hand, his patrons refuse to read the ground
signals properly and take effective steps to check the menace at his doorstep. On the other hand,
they shower him with homilies on good governance, the importance of rooting out corruption and
installing a sound legal and security environment. He has no quarrel with this wish list except that
in the present circumstances prevailing in the landlocked country most of it looks like wishful
thinking
He is, however, irked at the donors increasingly questioning his governance skills as they did at
the June 12 conference of Aid Afghan Consortium in Paris, and then openly expressing worries
over the sweep of the Taliban over much of the country. In so far the aid is concerned, he may
not have been too disappointed at the aid pledges amounting to $ 20 billion. These fall short of
his projection of $50 billion. Because he knows from experience all the pledges do not translate
into aid flows. Since 2002, his country received aid pledges totalling $ 25 billion. Only $15 billion
—60 per cent—have actually flowed into the country.
Undoubtedly, people in Afghanistan are in dire need of better health care, clean drinking water,
electricity, good sanitation, schools and lately food security. The donors’ money is expected to go
into these fields. But increasing terror strikes across the country have slowed down what is
probably already a languorous pace of reconstruction work in the country.
The fact of the matter is that the whole world knows how and why these terror attacks have
accelerated but there is an apparent reluctance to strike hard at that root of the problem. Taliban
has been able to recharge and regroup itself because of the safe havens available inside South
Waziristan and Swat Valley, where the presence of Pak army is very minimal.
If one goes by the version of a group of journalists who were recently (mid-May 2008) conducted
to the ‘hide out’ of Baitullah Mehsud, who, according to Karzai, posed danger to Afghanistan and
Pakistan alike, there is practically no sign of army’s presence and all the check posts vacated by
the Pak army are under the control of the local Taliban. No surprise, therefore, in recent days
Afghanistan has been facing up to 100 terrorist attacks in a week, up from about 60 a year ago.
And these are becoming daring by the day.
The June 13 raid on the Kandahar prison, for instance, led to the escape of over 400 Taliban
insurgents and commanders besides some 600 prisoners. The 30-minute- operation with military
precision conclusively nails the theory that the Taliban have been weakened and it was for this
reason they had been taking recourse to suicide bombings and the use of IEDs in recent months.
At the last count there are 14 groups that have been targetting Afghan security forces from their
safe havens East of Durand Line. There are also the likes of Maulvi Haqqani who run a network
of madarsas and training bases to lend a helping hand to foreign fighters lured to the area by the
call of Al Qaeda. The recent (April) assassination attempt on Karzai is said to be the work of
Haqqani and his associates.
Pakistan has been brazenly misleading the world that it can tackle the problem of terrorist
sanctuaries entirely on its own. Being next door neighbour, Karzai knows one home truth. And
that is that the ‘elected’ Federal Government in Islamabad is simply following the anti-terror policy
as laid down by President Musharraf and his army long days ago.
For Musharraf and his army commanders, ‘peace talks’ with militant tribal leaders like Mehsud
were a means to divert attention of the people from pressing economic woes and to lull the Big
Brother to believing that some thing was being done to buy peace east of the Durand Line. There
is also another reason for not deploying the army.
More than a year ago, the army suffered a bloody nose at the hands of tribal militants. It is
unwilling to suffer any more humiliation lest the fighting capability of an already demoralised force
will be undermined. This realisation prompted Musharraf and his field commander Gen Ashfaq
Kiyani (who has since become the army chief) to adopt the talks route ignoring the advisories
from Kabul and Washington.
The result is Afghanistan is fighting a war whose very source is based in Pakistan. As long as the
Taliban has that base, it won’t be able to win the war against terrorists. President Karzai has no
doubt that the terrorists are able to step up their war in Afghanistan because they believe he
cannot do much. And the US led NATO forces also do no more than sending an occasional drone
or a predator.
Frustrated and dismayed he may be but Karzai may not translate his threat of hot pursuit into
real-life action. He knows his limitations. As the News International said (July 17, 2008), it is,
however, time Pakistan stared truth in the face. And it is an ugly truth that elements in powerful
places within the state's forces and institutions, ‘do not wish to see’ an end to terrorism. Perhaps,
they see militants as the means to retain control in Kabul and weaken the US-backed
government.
This is a revised version of Zia policy which used ‘jihad’ as a state creed first in Kashmir and then
in Afghanistan. How strong these elements are in present day Pak establishment is difficult to
say.
The daily rhetoric of Asif Zardari, the back seat driver of Gilani government, and his unwillingness
to dump President Musharraf do not hold much hope for a real meaningful turn around in the
situation. That is bad news for Kabul, New Delhi and Washington not withstanding the warnings
being sounded to Islamabad by home grown analysts against its ambiguous approach to
militancy. The ‘bosses’ in the Pakistan capital and the adjoining garrison town will do well to take
note of what Sunday Observer describes as ‘box loads’ about reports of Musharraf-Kiyani troops
joining militants in the attacks and clashes on Pakistan-Afghan border.
About the Author
Malladi Rama Rao is an analyst and writer on the Indian political scene and geo-political and
security issues of South Asia. He directs a Weekly Feature Service in English, Syndicate
Features, in colloboration with his wife Vaniram. He is also the India Editor of Asian Tribune.
SYNDICATE FEATURES
B-308, Puneet Apts. B-10, Vasundhara Enclave, Delhi; Ph -22617660 E-mail:
syndicatefeatures@rediffmail.com

____________________________________________________________-The Great Game

The Great Game (Russian: Большая игра, Bol'sháya igrá) is a term used for the strategic
rivalry and conflict between the British Empire and the Russian Empire for supremacy in Central
Asia. The classic Great Game period is generally regarded as running approximately from the
Russo-Persian Treaty of 1813 to the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. A second, less intensive
phase followed the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 .
The term "The Great Game" is usually attributed to Arthur Conolly (1807–1842), an intelligence
officer of the British East India Company's Sixth Bengal Light Cavalry.[1] It was introduced into
mainstream consciousness by British novelist Rudyard Kipling in his novel Kim (1901).
Contents
[hide]
• 1 British-Russian rivalry in Afghanistan
• 2 Anglo-Russian Alliance
• 3 Criticism
• 4 British-Soviet rivalry in Afghanistan
• 5 The New Great Game
• 6 In popular culture
• 7 See also
• 8 Footnotes
• 9 References
• 10 External links

[edit] British-Russian rivalry in Afghanistan

Main article: European influence in Afghanistan
/wiki/File:Great_Game_cartoon_from_1878.jpg /wiki/File:Great_Game_cartoon_from_1878.jpg
/wiki/File:Great_Game_cartoon_from_1878.jpg
/wiki/File:Great_Game_cartoon_from_1878.jpgPolitical cartoon depicting the Afghan Emir Sher
Ali with his "friends" the Russian Bear & British Lion (1878).
From the British perspective, the Russian Empire's expansion into Central Asia threatened to
destroy the "jewel in the crown" of the British Empire, India. As the Tsar's troops began to subdue
one khanate after another, the British feared that Afghanistan would become a staging post for a
Russian invasion of India.
It was with these thoughts in mind that in 1838 the British launched the First Anglo-Afghan War
and attempted to impose a puppet regime under Shuja Shah. The regime was short lived, and
unsustainable without British military support. By 1842, mobs were attacking the British on the
streets of Kabul and the British garrison was forced to abandon Kabul due to constant civilian
attacks.
The retreating British army consisted of approximately 4,500 troops (of which 690 were
European) and 12,000 camp followers. During a series of attacks by Afghan warriors, all but one,
Dr. William Brydon, were killed on the march back to India.[2]
The British curbed their ambitions in Afghanistan following the humiliating retreat from Kabul.
After the Indian rebellion of 1857, successive British governments saw Afghanistan as a buffer
state. The Russians, led by Konstantin Kaufman, Mikhail Skobelev, and Mikhail Chernyayev,
continued to advance steadily southward toward Afghanistan and by 1865 Tashkent had been
formally annexed.
Samarkand became part of the Russian Empire three years later and the independence of
Bukhara was virtually stripped away in a peace treaty the same year. Russian control now
extended as far as the northern bank of the Amu Darya river.
In a letter to Queen Victoria, Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli proposed "to clear Central Asia of
Muscovites and drive them into the Caspian".[3] He introduced the Royal Titles Act, which added
to Victoria's titles that of Empress of India, putting her at the same level as the Russian Emperor.
After the Great Eastern Crisis broke out and the Russians sent an uninvited diplomatic mission to
Kabul in 1878, Britain demanded that the ruler of Afghanistan (Sher Ali) accept a British
diplomatic mission. The mission was turned back and in retaliation a force of 40,000 men was
sent across the border, launching the Second Anglo-Afghan War.
The war's conclusion left Abdur Rahman Khan on the throne, and he agreed to let the British
maintain Afghanistan's foreign policy while he consolidated his position on the throne. He
managed to suppress internal rebellions with ruthless efficiency and brought much of the country
under central control.
Russian expansion brought about another crisis — the Panjdeh Incident — when they seized the
oasis of Merv in 1884. The Russians claimed all of the former ruler's territory and fought with
Afghan troops over the oasis of Panjdeh. On the brink of war between the two great powers, the
British decided to accept the Russian possession as a fait accompli.
Without any Afghan say in the matter, the Joint Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission agreed the
Russians would relinquish the farthest territory captured in their advance, but retain Panjdeh. The
agreement delineated a permanent northern Afghan frontier at the Amu Darya, with the loss of a
large amount of territory, especially around Panjdeh; however, Britain continued to have troubles
in the region towards the end of the 1800s.
In 1890–91 the British suspected Russian involvement "with the Rulers of the petty States on the
northern boundary of Kashmir".[4] This was the reason for Hunza-Naga Campaign after which the
British established control over Hunza and Nagar.
[edit] Anglo-Russian Alliance
Main article: Anglo-Russian Entente
In the run-up to World War I, both empires were alarmed by Germany's increasing activity in the
Middle East, notably the German project of the Baghdad Railway, which would open up Iraq and
Iran to German trade and technology. The ministers Alexander Izvolsky and Edward Grey agreed
to resolve their long-standing conflicts in Asia in order to make an effective stand against the
German advance into the region. The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 brought a close to the
classic period of the Great Game.
The Russians accepted that the politics of Afghanistan were solely under British control as long
as the British guaranteed not to change the regime. Russia agreed to conduct all political
relations with Afghanistan through the British. The British agreed that they would maintain the
current borders and actively discourage any attempt by Afghanistan to encroach on Russian
territory. Persia was divided into three zones: a British zone in the south, a Russian zone in the
north, and a narrow neutral zone serving as buffer in between.
In regards to Tibet, both powers agreed to maintain territorial integrity of this buffer state and "to
deal with Lhasa only through China, the suzerain power".[5]
[edit] Criticism
Gerald Morgan’s “Myth and Reality in the Great Game” approached the subject by examining
various departments of the Raj to determine if there ever existed a British intelligence network in
Central Asia. Morgan writes that evidence of such a network does not exist. At best, efforts to
obtain information on Russian moves in Central Asia were rare, ad hoc adventures. At worst,
intrigues resembling the adventures in Kim were baseless rumours and Morgan writes such
rumors “were always common currency in Central Asia and they applied as much to Russia as to
Britain.”[6]
In his lecture “The Legend of the Great Game”, Malcolm Yapp says that Britons had used the
term “The Great Game” in the late 1800s to describe several different things in relation to its
interests in Asia. Yapp believes that the primary concern of British authorities in India was control
of the indigenous population, not preventing a Russian invasion. [7]
According to Yapp, “reading the history of the British Empire in India and the Middle East one is
struck by both the prominence and the unreality of strategic debates.” [7]
[edit] British-Soviet rivalry in Afghanistan
/wiki/File:IranUSSRBritain.jpg /wiki/File:IranUSSRBritain.jpg
/wiki/File:IranUSSRBritain.jpg /wiki/File:IranUSSRBritain.jpgCaption from a 1911 English satirical
magazine reads: "If we hadn't a thorough understanding, I (British lion) might almost be tempted
to ask what you (Russian bear) are doing there with our little playfellow (Persian cat)."
The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 nullified existing treaties and a second phase of the Great
Game began. The Third Anglo-Afghan War of 1919 was precipitated by the assassination of the
then ruler Habibullah Khan. His son and successor Amanullah declared full independence and
attacked British India's northern frontier. Although little was gained militarily, the stalemate was
resolved with the Rawalpindi Agreement of 1919. Afghanistan re-established its self-
determination in foreign affairs.
In May 1921, Afghanistan and the Russian Soviet Republic signed a Treaty of Friendship. The
Soviets provided Amanullah with aid in the form of cash, technology, and military equipment.
British influence in Afghanistan waned, but relations between Afghanistan and the Russians
remained equivocal, with many Afghanis desiring to regain control of Merv and Panjdeh. The
Soviets, for their part, desired to extract more from the friendship treaty than Amanullah was
willing to give.
The United Kingdom imposed minor sanctions and diplomatic slights as a response to the treaty,
fearing that Amanullah was slipping out of their sphere of influence and realising that the policy of
the Afghanistan government was to have control of all of the Pashtun speaking groups on both
sides of the Durand Line. In 1923, Amanullah responded by taking the title padshah — "king",
and by offering refuge for Muslims who fled the Soviet Union, and Indian nationalists in exile from
the Raj.
Amanullah's program of reform was, however, insufficient to strengthen the army quickly enough
— in 1928 he abdicated under pressure. The individual who most benefited from the crisis was
Mohammed Nadir Shah, who reigned from 1929 to 1933. Both the Soviets and the British played
the circumstances to their advantage: the Soviets getting aid in dealing with Uzbek rebellion in
1930 and 1931, while the British aided Afghanistan in creating a 40,000 man professional army.
With the advent of World War II came the temporary alignment of British and Soviet interests: In
1940, both governments pressured Afghanistan for the expulsion of a large German non-
diplomatic contingent, which both governments believed to be engaging in espionage.
Afghanistan complied in 1941. With this period of cooperation between the USSR and the UK, the
Great Game between the two powers came to an end.
[edit] The New Great Game
Main article: The New Great Game
Recently there has been some recognition of the fact that the Great Game continues as a conflict
between the United States, the United Kingdom and other NATO countries and the Russia, the
People's Republic of China and other Shanghai Cooperation Organisation countries over the
Central Asian oil pipelines.[8][9][10]
[edit] In popular culture
Lists of miscellaneous information should be avoided. Please relocate any relevant
information into appropriate sections or articles. (June 2009)
• Kim by Rudyard Kipling
• The Lotus and the Wind by John Masters
• Flashman by George MacDonald Fraser
• Flashman at the Charge by George MacDonald Fraser
• Flashman in the Great Game by George MacDonald Fraser (1999) ISBN 0-00-651299-2
• The Game by Laurie R. King (2004), a Sherlock Holmes pastiche, one of the Mary
Russell series. ISBN 0-553-80194-5
• The song "Pink India" from musician Stephen Malkmus' self-titled album.
• The documentary The Devil's Wind by Iqbal Malhotra.[11