Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant
vs.
ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989, respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the
Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision
of the Court of Appeals dated 17 October 1988 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093.
On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry, with a
total stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis, with the condition that the respondent
would turn over the sales proceeds and return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or before 14 February
1984. Sometime in February 1984, respondent, instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which then
amounted to approximately P26,250.00, issued three checks: (a) a check dated 16 February 1984 for the
amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated 23 February 1984 also for the amount of P5,400.00; and (c) a check
dated 25 February 1984 for the amount of P15,450.00. Upon presentment for payment within ninety (90)
days after their issuance, all three (3) checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for
insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, respondent made no arrangements
with the bank concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced and made no effort to settle her
obligations to Ms. Marquez.
Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Manila: (a)
one for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-38358; and (b) three (3) for violation of B.P. Blg. 22,
docketed respectively as Criminal Cases Nos. 85-38359, 85-38360 and 85-38361. In due time, after trial, the
trial court rendered a decision dated 25 August 1987 which:
(a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and
(b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all three (3) cases, and sentenced
respondent to pay a fine of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00 in Criminal Case No. 8538359;
to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to
indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38360; and
to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
indemnify the complainant in the amount of P15,450.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38361, and
to pay the costs in all three (3) cases.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093 affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court but,
in addition, suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law. The pertinent portion of the decision
read as follows:
For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction, the
judgment is hereby AFFIRMED subject to this modification.
It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a member of the Bar, and the
offense for (sic) which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude, she is hereby ordered
suspended from the practice of law and shall not practice her profession until further action
from the Supreme Court, in accordance with Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. A copy of this decision must be forwarded to the Supreme Court as required by Section
29 of the same Rule.
SO ORDERED. 1
On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals,
in a Resolution dated 9 January 1989, noted respondent's Notice of Appeal and advised her "to address her
Notice of Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court, the proper forum." On 1 February 1989, respondent filed
with this Court a Notice of Appeal.
In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court noted without action respondent's Notice of Appeal
and declared that the Court of Appeals' decision of 17 October 1988 had become final and executory upon
expiration of the period for filing a petition for review on certiorari on 16 December 1988. In that Resolution,
the Court found that respondent had lost her right to appeal by certiorari when she posted with this Court a
Notice of Appeal instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court within the reglementary period.
In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent states:
that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful penalty
aggravating the lower court's penalty of fine considering that accused-appellant's action on
the case during the trial on the merits at the lower court has always been motivated purely
by sincere belief that she is innocent of the offense charged nor of the intention to cause
damage to the herein plaintiff-appellee.
We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent that, she had not violated her oath as a member
of the Philippine Bar upon the ground that when she issued the checks which bounced, she did not intend to
cause damage to complainant Ms. Marquez.
The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals upon respondent
Tuanda. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty involved moral
turpitude." We should add that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously
affects public interest and public order. In Lozano v. Martinez, 2 the Court explained the nature of the offense
of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in the following terms:
xxx xxx xxx

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. . . . The
thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks
and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the
practice is prescribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property
but an offense against public order.
xxx xxx xxx
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the
parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at
large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to
the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation,
multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure
the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
interest. 3 (Italics supplied)
Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been convicted of crimes
involving moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows:
Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of
the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases
at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. (Italics supplied)
Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. The
Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any
of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney
shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.
(Italics supplied)
We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her
attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the
laws of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to
and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. In Melendrez v. Decena, 4 this
Court stressed that:
the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of good
moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission to the
practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of
law. 5

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall remain
suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court. A copy of this Resolution shall be
forwarded to the Bar Confidant and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the record of
respondent.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 4947

June 7, 2007

ROSA YAP-PARAS, petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. JUSTO PARAS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
GARCIA, J.:
For resolution is this Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment1 dated April 11, 2005, filed by herein
petitioner-movant Rosa Yap Paras against respondent Atty. Justo Paras, for the latter's alleged violation of a
suspension order earlier meted upon him by the Court. The motion alleges:
4. That the respondent in this case admits that he has continued his practice of law and in fact filed
pleadings in court after the receipt of suspension on the ground that the alleged filing of his motion
for reconsideration suspends or interrupt (sic) the running of the period to appeal,
and prays that for his violation of the suspension order, the respondent be declared in contempt of court and
be disbarred.
Briefly, the facts may be stated as follows:
On September 9, 1998, herein petitioner-movant filed a verified Petition2 praying for the disbarment of her
estranged husband respondent Atty. Justo J. Paras alleging acts of deceit, malpractice, grave misconduct,
grossly immoral conduct and violation of oath as a lawyer committed by the latter.
On February 14, 2005, the Court issued a Resolution3 finding Atty. Paras guilty of committing a falsehood in
violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, the Court resolved to
suspend Atty. Paras from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, with a warning that commission of
the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Per records, the aforesaid Resolution was received by Atty. Paras on March 18, 2005. Thereafter, he filed a
Motion for Reconsideration dated March 28, 2005.4
During the pendency of Atty. Paras' motion for reconsideration, complainant-movant filed with the Court the
instant Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment, alleging thereunder, inter alia, that Atty. Paras violated the
suspension order earlier issued by the Court with his continued practice of law.
In time, the Court issued a Resolution dated July 18, 2005,5 denying for lack of merit Atty. Paras' motion for
reconsideration, to wit:

Administrative Case No. 4947 (Rosa Yap Paras vs. Atty. Justo Paras) Acting on the respondent's
motion for reconsideration dated March 28, 2005 of the resolution of February 14, 2005 which
suspended him from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, the Court Resolves to DENY the
motion for lack of merit.
The Court further Resolves to NOTE:
(a) the complainant's opposition dated April 11, 2005 to the said motion for reconsideration
with leave of Court;
(b) the respondent's motion dated May 6, 2005 for immediate resolution of the motion for
reconsideration; and
(c) the complainant's motion for contempt and/or disbarment dated April 11, 2005, praying
that respondent be declared in contempt of court and ordered disbarred and
to REQUIRE the respondent to COMMENT thereon, within ten (10) days from notice.
In the same resolution, the Court required Atty. Paras to comment on petitioner-movant's Motion for
Contempt and/or Disbarment.
After more than a year, or on September 12, 2006 Atty. Paras filed with the Court a Manifestation6 , stating
that he had completely and faithfully served his one (1) year suspension from the practice of law from August
25, 2005, the day after he received the denial resolution on his motion for reconsideration, to August 24,
2006.
It appearing that Atty. Paras failed to file a comment on the Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment, the
Court issued another Resolution dated November 27, 2006 requiring Atty. Paras to show cause why he
should not be held in contempt of court for such failure and to comply with the said resolution within ten
(10) days from receipt.
Consequently, a Comment on Motion for Contempt and Explanation on Failure to Timely File Required
Comment7 was filed by Atty. Paras denying all the allegations in petitioner-movant's Motion for Contempt
and/or Disbarment. He likewise claimed that he had never done nor made any conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice, nor undermine or put to naught or
violate any of the pertinent causes enumerated in Section 3, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Here, we are called upon to impose on Atty. Paras the highest punishment to an erring lawyer disbarment
or to hold him in contempt for his failure to comply with this Court's resolutions.
In a number of cases,8 we have repeatedly explained and stressed that the purpose of disbarment is not
meant as a punishment to deprive an attorney of a means of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the
courts and the public from members of the bar who have become unfit and unworthy to be part of the
esteemed and noble profession. Likewise, the purpose of the exercise of the power to cite for contempt is to
safeguard the functions of the court to assure respect for court orders by attorneys who, as much as judges,
are responsible for the orderly administration of justice.
We find no sufficient basis to support petitioner-movant's allegation that Atty. Paras violated the Court's
suspension order, what with the fact that Atty. Paras himself took the initiative to inform the lower courts of
his one- year suspension from law practice.9

It is clear, however, that all lawyers are expected to recognize the authority of the Supreme Court and obey
its lawful processes and orders. Despite errors which one may impute on the orders of the Court, these must
be respected, especially by the bar or the lawyers who are themselves officers of the courts. It is well to
emphasize again that a resolution of the Supreme Court is not be construed as a mere request, nor should it
be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively.10 Court orders are to be respected not because the
justices or judges who issue them should be respected, but because of the respect and consideration that
should be extended to the judicial branch of the government. This is absolutely essential if our government is
to be a government of laws and not of men.11
Here, Atty. Paras admitted that he had been less than prudent, and indeed fell short, of his obligation to
follow, obey and comply with the specific Order of the Honorable Supreme Court contained in Its Resolution
dated July 18, 2005 due to his deteriorating health condition which required him to undergo a coronary
angiogram and bypass graft12 . He likewise expressed his profound and immeasurable sorrowness amidst
regrets for his delayed compliance with the Court's order.
Given the above, the Court takes this opportunity to remind the parties in the instant case, as well petitionermovant's counsels, to avoid further squabbles and unnecessary filing of administrative cases against each
other. An examination of the records reveals a pervasive atmosphere of animosity between Atty. Paras and
petitioner's counsels as evidenced by the number of administrative cases between them. It is well to stress
that mutual bickerings and unjustified recriminations between attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal
profession and will not receive sympathy from this Court.13 Lawyers should treat each other with courtesy,
fairness, candor and civility.14
All told, the Court deems a reprimand with warning as a sufficient sanction for Atty Paras' failure to promptly
comply with its directives. The imposition of this sanction in the present case would be more consistent with
the avowed purpose of a disciplinary case, which is not so much to punish the individual attorney as to
protect the dispensation of justice by sheltering the judiciary and the public from the misconduct or
inefficiency of officers of the court.15
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment is DENIED. However, Atty. Justo Paras is
herebyREPRIMANDED for his failure to observe the respect due the Court in not promptly complying with
this Court's resolution, with WARNING that a more drastic punishment will be imposed upon him for a
repetition of the same act.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. CA-03-35

July 24, 2003

ATTY. ROSALIO DE LA ROSA, complainant,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICES JOSE L. SABIO, JR., PERLITA TRIA-TIRONA, OSWALDO AGCAOILI, MARIANO
DEL CASTILLO, MeTC JUDGE EUGENIO MENDINUETO, ATTYS. GILBERT REYES, DEOGRACIAS FELLONE and
ANTONIO HERNANDEZ, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On August 14, 2002, a letter-complaint1 addressed to the Chief Justice was received by the Office of the Court
Administrator, charging respondents with deliberately causing the delay of the prosecution of Criminal Case
No. 59354 for Estafa entitled, "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff versus Ferdinand Santos, Robert John
Sobrepea, Federico Campos, Polo Pantaleon, and Rafael Perez De Tagle, Jr., Accused" pending before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 72. Complainant is the private prosecutor in the said criminal
case.
During the preliminary investigation of the case, the City Prosecutor of Pasig City dismissed the complaint for
estafa on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. On appeal to the Secretary of Justice, the said Resolution
was set aside and the City Prosecutor of Pasig City was directed to file the necessary Information for Estafa
under Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code against the five accused.2 The case was raffled to
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 72, presided by respondent Judge Eugenio C. Mendinueto.
Accused Polo S. Pantaleon and Federico O. Campos filed a "Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause".3 On the other hand, accused Ferdinand Santos, Robert John Sobrepea, and Rafael Perez De Tagle, Jr.
filed a "Petition for Review with Urgent Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary
Injunction" before the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67388.
Meanwhile, a hearing was conducted by the trial court to determine the existence of probable cause. It
appeared from the evidence presented therein that accused Pantaleon and Campos were not connected with
the Fil-Estate Properties Properties, Inc. when the transaction complained of occurred. Consequently, the
criminal case against them was dismissed.4 As to the other three accused, respondent Judge suspended the
proceedings pending the outcome of CA-G.R. SP No. 67388.
On November 8, 2001, the Court of Appeals, through the Special Sixteenth Division, composed of respondent
Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Perlita J. Tirona and Mariano C. Del Castillo, issued a Temporary Restraining
Order directing the trial court and the City Prosecutor of Pasig City to refrain from conducting any further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 59354 until further orders.5 The Court of Appeals further directed
complainant to file his comment to the petition for review. Instead of filing the required comment,
complainant filed a motion to quash the Temporary Restraining Order.6 The three accused (petitioners
therein), through their respective counsel, respondent Attys. Gilbert Reyes, Deogracias Fellone and Antonio
Hernandez, filed written oppositions to the motion.7

Meanwhile, the Temporary Restraining Order expired after the period of sixty days without a writ of
preliminary injunction being issued. Hence, complainant filed with the trial court a "Motion to Commence
Proceedings", which was denied on the ground that it would be practical as well as procedurally appropriate
to await the final resolution of CA-G.R. SP No. 67388 in order to avoid the possibility of conflicting
resolutions. The motion for reconsideration filed by complainant was likewise denied.8
On September 2, 2002, the Court of Appeals, through its Fourteenth Division, denied due course and
dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 67388.9
Thus, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint against respondent Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr.,
Oswaldo Agcaoili, Perlita Tria-Tirona and Mariano Del Castillo for ignorance of the law and inexcusable
negligence when they issued the Temporary Restraining Order without basis. Complainant alleged that
respondent Justices deliberately delayed the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 59354 by issuing the
Temporary Restraining Order despite the fact that respondent Judge Mendinueto was mandated by the
Constitution and Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to act within ten days from receipt of the
Information; and that respondent Justices failed to resolve the Motion to Quash despite the lapse of more
than ten months. Complainant further charged that respondent Judge was likewise guilty of deliberately
delaying Criminal Case No. 59354, when he refused to commence proceedings despite the lapse of the
Temporary Restraining Order.
Complainant also charged respondent lawyers, Attys. Gilbert Reyes, Deogracias Fellone and Antonio
Hernandez, for having masterminded the scheme to frustrate the prosecution of the case against their three
clients through the petition for review filed before the Court of Appeals.
In their joint comment10 filed on October 1, 2002, respondent Justices Sabio, Tria-Tirona, Del Castillo and
Agcaoili denied that there was delay in the disposition of CA-G.R. SP No. 67388. They alleged that the petition
was resolved relatively early considering the pendency of other cases of equal importance and the heavy
caseload of the Justices concerned. Specifically, the petition, which was filed on October 26, 2001, was
resolved on September 2, 2002. In addition, respondent Justice Sabio, to whom CA-G.R. SP No. 67388 was
raffled, was designated by the Presiding Justice, together with other Court of Appeals Justices, to help
expedite the disposition of cases of "1997 and below" vintage under the Zero Backlog Project of the Court of
Appeals.
In his comment11 filed on October 7, 2002, respondent Judge Mendinueto explained that he refused to
proceed with Criminal Case No. 59354 notwithstanding the lapse of the sixty-day effectivity of the Temporary
Restraining Order in deference to the final outcome of CA-G.R. SP No. 67388 and in order to avoid the absurd
possibility of two conflicting resolutions by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
In their joint comment,12 respondent lawyers averred that their filing of the petition before the appellate
court was a legitimate move to protect the interests of their clients. They contended that while the Secretary
of Justice is not among the quasi-judicial agencies whose orders or judgments may be the subject of a
petition for review, the enumeration in Rule 43, Section 2 of the Rules of Court is not exclusive, as held in the
case of Carpio v. Sulu Resources Development Corporation.13 They further alleged that any error in the
remedy they chose did not render them administratively liable considering that they did not act in bad faith.
After several exchanges of various pleadings between complainant and the three-lawyer respondents,14 the
Court referred the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator for investigation, report and
recommendation.15However, considering that some of the respondents are incumbent Justices of the Court
of Appeals, the case was subsequently referred to Retired Justice Romulo S. Quimbo, Consultant of the Office

of the Court Administrator,16pursuant to Section 3, Rule 14017 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
01-8-10-SC, dated September 11, 2001.
On June 5, 2003, Justice Quimbo submitted his report with the recommendation that the administrative case
against all the respondents be dismissed for lack of merit.
The Investigating Justice found that respondent Justices of the Court of Appeals did not commit error in
requiring complainant (respondent therein) to comment and in granting the prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order so as not to frustrate or prejudice whatever action the said court may take relative to the
petition. While the petition was eventually dismissed on the ground that Rule 43 was inapplicable,
respondent Justices cannot be held administratively liable for not dismissing the petition outright since such
omission did not amount to a flagrant disregard of the facts, jurisprudence and applicable law. Likewise,
there is no showing that respondent Justices knowingly issued an unjust and baseless Temporary Restraining
Order. Moreover, the length of time the petition remained pending before the Court of Appeals was justified
by the heavy caseload of the Justices concerned.
Similarly, there were no grounds to impose administrative sanctions on respondent Judge Eugenio C.
Mendinueto. His decision to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case even after the expiration of the
Temporary Restraining Order showed a becoming modesty and deference to a higher court. There was also
no showing that respondent Judge connived and confederated to frustrate justice in said criminal case.
In the same way, the complaint against respondent lawyers was found to be unsubstantiated. There was no
evidence that they misused the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice; or that they deliberately
delayed the case, impeded the execution of a judgment, or misused court processes. Rather, the action of the
three respondent lawyers was well within the bounds of the fair and honorable conduct referred to in the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Investigating Justice, however, took note of the allusion by complainant in his pleadings to the three
respondent lawyers as "brilliant lawyers", "legal supermen" or "sages," which he said amounted to sarcasm.
We agree with the recommendation of the Investigating Justice Romulo S. Quimbo.
No evidence was presented to show that all the respondents, either individually or collectively, adopted a
schematic plan to delay the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 59354. Apparently, the conspiracy theory
advanced by complainant was formulated after the respondent Justices granted the Temporary Restraining
Order and required complainant to comment on the petition filed by the three respondent lawyers, instead
of dismissing the petition outright.
As held in the recent case of Sacmar v. Judge Reyes-Carpio,18 a charge of knowingly rendering an unjust and
baseless order will prosper, only if it is shown that the issuance of the order was indeed unjust and the
respondents did not merely commit an error of judgment or took the unpopular side of a controversial point
of law. Their failure to correctly interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not
necessarily render them administratively liable.19 Magistrates are not expected to be infallible in their
judgments.
In the case at bar, the records fail to show that the respondent Justices and respondent Judge were guilty of
fraud, dishonesty, corruption or, at the very least, bad faith. To merit disciplinary action from this Court,
there should be a showing that the complained judicial acts of respondent Judge, more so of respondent

Justices of the Court of Appeals, were attended by fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith.20 There being
none, there is no cogent ground to hold them administratively liable.
Furthermore, the legal remedy taken by respondent lawyers, which was later found to be erroneous, does
not constitute proof that they deliberately and knowingly intended to forestall the hearing of Criminal Case
No. 59354. There was no evidence that they have overstepped the norms of their Lawyers Oath in
advocating the interest of their clients. To be sure, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
requires them to represent their clients with zeal within the bounds of law. Accordingly, in the judicial forum,
their clients were entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law
of the land, and the three respondent lawyers were expected to avail of such remedy or defense. Indeed,
complainant failed to show adequate proof that the three respondent lawyers deliberately and knowingly
"hatched a scheme and toyed with the law"21 when they filed the said petition before the Court of Appeals.
It bears stressing that it is the duty of a lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward
his professional colleagues.22 As officers of the court, lawyers are mandated to conduct themselves
honorably, fairly and candidly toward each other. Though a lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic,
it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. Obviously,
complainants use of sarcasm in calling the three respondent lawyers "brilliant lawyers", "legal supermen"
and "sages" fell short of this mandate. It served no useful purpose. The use of intemperate language and
unkind ascriptions have no place in the dignity of judicial forum. Civility among members of the legal
profession is a treasured tradition that must at no time be lost to it.23
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the complaint against all the respondents is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 7399

August 25, 2009

ANTERO J. POBRE, Complainant,

vs.
Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites the Courts
attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos speech delivered on the Senate
floor:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated,
debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of
this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the
Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots.
I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.
To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court.
Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady
senator.
In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not deny
making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those statements were covered by the
constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of
her duty as member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring
out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation. She averred
that she wanted to expose what she believed "to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC]," which,
after sending out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would
eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for
nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that non-sitting members
of the Court, like her, would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the
Constitution, which provides: "A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in
session.No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in
the Congress or in any committee thereof." Explaining the import of the underscored portion of the
provision, the Court, in Osmea, Jr. v. Pendatun, said:

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every
legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and
encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is
indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected
from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion
offense."1
As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and arises as a
means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department. Without parliamentary
immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum.
Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for their
private indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to
the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a
judgment against them based upon a judges speculation as to the motives.2
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of
parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of
the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently
into every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and its
citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they
perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or
of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the
privilege.3 The disciplinary authority of the assembly4 and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage
or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity.5
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or
disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary
proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the last word on the matter.
The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar,
used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has
undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her
statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as
stating that she wanted "to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the
Supreme Court," and calling the Court a "Supreme Court of idiots."
The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.6 We draw her attention to the ensuing passage in Sotto that
she should have taken to heart in the first place:
x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of this Court and believe that they
cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and
perhaps chaos would be the result.1avvphi1
No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be allowed to erode the
peoples faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide:
Canon 8, Rule 8.01.A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive
or otherwise improper.

Canon 11.A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others.
Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her achievements speak for themselves. She was a
former Regional Trial Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited authority on constitutional and international
law, an author of numerous law textbooks, and an elected senator of the land. Needless to stress, Senator
Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity
and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in public service are
keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than
their brethren in private practice.7 Senator Santiago should have known, as any perceptive individual, the
impact her statements would make on the peoples faith in the integrity of the courts.
As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege speech as a prelude to crafting remedial legislation
on the JBC. This allegation strikes the Court as an afterthought in light of the insulting tenor of what she said.
We quote the passage once more:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated,
debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of
this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the
Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by
idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x. (Emphasis ours.)
A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements were expressions of personal
anger and frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks
were outside the pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary immunity must not be
allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and its
magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust. Authorities are agreed that parliamentary
immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the individual members of the Parliament or Congress for
their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for the benefit of the people and the institution that represents
them.
To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger without indulging in insulting rhetoric and
offensive personalities.
Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiagos outburst was directly traceable to what she considered as an
"unjust act" the JBC had taken in connection with her application for the position of Chief Justice. But while
the JBC functions under the Courts supervision, its individual members, save perhaps for the Chief Justice
who sits as the JBCs ex-officio chairperson,8 have no official duty to nominate candidates for appointment to
the position of Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to understand Senator Santiagos wholesale and
indiscriminate assault on the members of the Court and her choice of critical and defamatory words against
all of them.
At any event, equally important as the speech and debate clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution is Sec.
5(5) of Art. VIII of the Constitution that provides:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of the law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance
to the underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.)
The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, exercises specific authority to promulgate rules governing the Integrated Bar with the end in view
that the integration of the Bar will, among other things:
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from the
assaults that politics and self interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and
independence;
xxxx
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.9
In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda,10 we reiterated our pronouncement in Rheem
of the Philippines v. Ferrer11 that the duty of attorneys to the courts can only be maintained by rendering no
service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which they are bound to uphold. The Court wrote
in Rheem of the Philippines:
x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that "[i]t is the duty of a lawyer to maintain
towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office,
but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly
incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against "unjust criticism and clamor." And more. The
attorneys oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be "with all good fidelity x x x to the courts."
Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel12 that:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends
of justice." His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice." Faith in the courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve. For,
to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the
liberties of the people." Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and
moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so
essential to the proper administration of justice."13
The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a strict Code. Society has
entrusted that profession with the administration of the law and dispensation of justice. Generally speaking,
a lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct
committed while in the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also constitutes a violation of
his/her oath as a lawyer.14
Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as their
misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor,15 a good character being an essential
qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such privilege. When the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of "conduct" or "misconduct," the reference is not
confined to ones behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers professional duties, but
also covers any misconduct, whichalbeit unrelated to the actual practice of their professionwould show

them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license and the law invest in
them.16
This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the peoples faith in courts and trust in the rule of law, has
consistently exercised its disciplinary authority on lawyers who, for malevolent purpose or personal malice,
attempt to obstruct the orderly administration of justice, trifle with the integrity of courts, and embarrass or,
worse, malign the men and women who compose them. We have done it in the case of former Senator
Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty. Noel Sorreda in Sorreda, and in the case of Atty. Francisco B. Cruz
in Tacordan v. Ang17 who repeatedly insulted and threatened the Court in a most insolent manner.
The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for what
otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and its members.
The factual and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even without any
sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional consideration dictates this kind of disposition.
We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senators offensive and disrespectful language that
definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty.
Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the
parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect them against
prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the peoples representatives, to perform the
functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other forums outside
the congressional hall.18 It is intended to protect members of Congress against government pressure and
intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its members.
The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a
Senator from using, under any circumstance, "offensive or improper language against another Senator
or against any public institution."19 But as to Senator Santiagos unparliamentary remarks, the Senate
President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics
Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such circumstance.20 The lady
senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and
avoided imposing their own rules on her.
Finally, the lady senator questions Pobres motives in filing his complaint, stating that disciplinary
proceedings must be undertaken solely for the public welfare. We cannot agree with her more. We cannot
overstress that the senators use of intemperate language to demean and denigrate the highest court of the
land is a clear violation of the duty of respect lawyers owe to the courts.21
Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has failed to prove that she in fact made the statements
in question. Suffice it to say in this regard that, although she has not categorically denied making such
statements, she has unequivocally said making them as part of her privilege speech. Her implied admission is
good enough for the Court.
WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is,
conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7136

August 1, 2007

JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for Disbarment1 before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli
Eala (respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."
In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:
He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced
respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled "Mary Ann") Tantoco with
whom he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January to March 2001, Irene
had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read "I love you," "I
miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall."
Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of the
following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she
replied that she slept at her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On the
second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.
On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday celebration at which he saw her and
respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the
venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal
belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household appliances.
Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words "I Love You" on its
face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his
wedding to Irene, reading:
My everdearest Irene,

By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I will say a prayer
for you that you may find meaning in what you're about to do.
Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness but experience
eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because there's a
bigger plan for the two of us?
I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything humanly possible
to love you. And today, as you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!
I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on you, to the time we
spent together, up to the final moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will love you until
the life in me is gone and until we are together again.
Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last me a lifetime.
Always remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS
. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!
BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!
I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I'M LIVING MY TWEETIE YOU'LL BE!"2
Eternally
NOLI

yours,

Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th Street, New
Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned
still later that when his friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a
concert, she was pregnant.
In his ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the above-quoted letter was
handwritten.
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:
14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they
attended social functions together. For instance, in or about the third week of September 2001, the
couple attended the launch of the "Wine All You Can" promotion of French wines, held at the Mega
Strip of SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in Section B of
the Manila Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page 21. Respondent and Irene were
photographed together; their picture was captioned: "Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala." A
photocopy of the report is attached as Annex C.4 (Italics and emphasis in the original;
CAPITALIZATION of the phrase "flaunting their adulterous relationship" supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as
alleged in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their relationship
was low profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families, and that
Respondent, as far as the general public was concerned, was still known to be legally married to
Mary Anne Tantoco.5 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:
15. Respondent's adulterous conduct with the complainant's wife and his apparent abandoning or
neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit to
keep his membership in the bar. He flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a
"piece of paper." Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainant's bride on the
very day of her wedding, vowing to continue his love for her "until we are together again," as now
they are.6 (Underscoring supplied),
respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:
5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding
his adulterousrelationship and that his acts demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making him
unfit to keep his membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondent's relationship with Irene
was not under scandalous circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his own family:
5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as
in fact they still occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware of Respondent's special
friendship with Irene.
xxxx
5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage by calling
the institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his reference [in his above-quoted
handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage between Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was
merely with respect to the formality of the marriage contract.7 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent admitted8 paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:
18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. The
Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the family
(Article XV, Sec. 2).9
And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:
19. Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as a
lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the complainant's wife,
he mocked the institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the complainant's
marriage, commits adultery with his wife, and degrades the legal profession.10 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the reason being
thatunder the circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect to his purely personal and low
profile special relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount
to grossly immoral conduct as would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of
the Rules of Court.11 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,12 alleging that Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene
named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father. Complainant attached to the Reply, as
Annex "A," a copy of a Certificate of Live Birth13 bearing Irene's signature and naming respondent as the
father of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14, 2002 at St. Luke's
Hospital.
Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS14 dated January 10, 2003 from
respondent in which he denied having "personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth attached to the
complainant's Reply."15 Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a civil case filed
by complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint for adultery against
respondent and Irene which was pending before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.
During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant's Complaint-Affidavit and Reply to Answer were
adopted as his testimony on direct examination.16 Respondent's counsel did not cross-examine
complainant.17
After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION18 dated October 26, 2004, found the charge against respondent sufficiently proven.
The Commissioner thus recommended19 that respondent be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility reading:
Rule
1.01:
A
lawyer
shall
not
deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied),

engage

in

unlawful,

dishonest, immoral or

and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession. (Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006
briefly reading:
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06
CBD Case No. 02-936
Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala

RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for
lack of merit.20 (Italics and emphasis in the original)
Hence, the present petition21 of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule 139 22 of
the Rules of Court.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its above-quoted 33-word
Resolution shows.
Respondent contends, in his Comment23 on the present petition of complainant, that there is no evidence
against him.24 The contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:
While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. "C") and the news item
published in the Manila Standard (Exh. "D"), even taken together do not sufficiently prove that
respondent is carrying on an adulterous relationship with complainant's wife, there are other pieces
of evidence on record which support the accusation of complainant against respondent.
It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent through counsel made
the following statements to wit: "Respondent specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an
adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the
matter being [that]their relationship was low profile and known only to immediate members of their
respective families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the
complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect
to his purely personal and low profile relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous
circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct . . ."
These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that there is indeed a "special"
relationship between him and complainant's wife, Irene, [which] taken together with the
Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex "H-1") sufficiently prove that there
was indeed an illicit relationship between respondent and Irene which resulted in the birth of the
child "Samantha". In the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it should be noted that complainant's
wife Irene supplied the information that respondent was the father of the child. Given the fact that
the respondent admitted his special relationship with Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene
would lie or make any misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child. It should be
underscored that respondent has not categorically denied that he is the father of Samantha Louise
Irene Moje.25 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous relationship with Irene,
"adultery" being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that "committed by any married
woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal
knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void."26 (Italics
supplied) What respondent denies is having flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it was "low
profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families."
In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant,

a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are
not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated
otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it in affirmation or
at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an
admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or
modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it
has been held that thequalifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is
admitted.27 (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal knowledge" of Irene's daughter Samantha
Louise Irene Moje's Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent a "lawyer," 38 years
old as the child's father. And the phrase "NOT MARRIED" is entered on the desired information on "DATE
AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the certificate28 with her
signature on the Marriage Certificate29 shows that they were affixed by one and the same person. Notatu
dignum is that, as the Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent never denied being the father of the
child.
Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical Center, in his January 29, 2003
Affidavit30 which he identified at the witness stand, declared that Irene gave the information in the Certificate
of Live Birth that the child's father is "Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala," who was 38 years old and a lawyer.31
Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been sufficiently proven by
more than clearly preponderant evidence that evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive
and credible than that of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other32 which is the
quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may
proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, "clearly preponderant evidence"
is all that is required.33 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship with Irene was not, under
Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, reading:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a
ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts
hereinabove enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima
facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
under scandalous circumstances.34
The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the phrase
"grossly immoral conduct," not "under scandalous circumstances." Sexual intercourse under scandalous
circumstances is, following Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:
ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall
have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall
cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods.
x x x x,
an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with a woman
elsewhere.
"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be
characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding circumstances."35 The case at bar
involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial
whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug
v. Rongcal:36
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with
complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree" in order to merit disciplinary
sanction. We disagree.
xxxx
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between
two unmarriedadults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is
not so with respect tobetrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital
relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful
and immoral as it manifestsdeliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital
vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.37 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:38
The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent did contract a
bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that the records of this administrative case substantiate the
findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed
respondent has beencarrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct
and indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This
detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and
privileges which his license confers upon him.39 (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law which goes:
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly
swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution andobey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I
will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote
or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no
man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon
myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me
God. (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional provision,
obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support."40
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03
of Canon7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law."
Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the case before the IBP
Commissioner, filed a Manifestation41 on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that complainant's petition
for nullity of his (complainant's) marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed against respondent and
Irene "based on the same set of facts alleged in the instant case," which was pending review before the
Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn.
The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainant's Motion to Withdraw Petition
for Review reads:
Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the petition for review,
we are inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3,
2000, which provides that "notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the petitioner may
withdraw the same at any time before it is finally resolved, in which case the appealed resolution
shall stand as though no appeal has been taken."42 (Emphasis supplied by complainant)
That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is
immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the marriage was declared null and void.43 As a lawyer,
respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are
presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.44 In carrying on an
extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant was null
and void, and despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred
by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.

As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted to
state that before complainant filed his December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the
DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the Quezon
City Prosecutor's Office of complainant's complaint for adultery. In reversing the City Prosecutor's Resolution,
DOJ Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:
Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the fair estimation of the
Department, sufficiently establish all the elements of the offense of adultery on the part of both
respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded to complainant that she was going out on
dates with respondent Eala, and this she did when complainant confronted her about Eala's frequent
phone calls and text messages to her. Complainant also personally witnessed Moje and Eala having a
rendezvous on two occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje to be
married to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was married to another woman. Moreover,
Moje's eventual abandonment of their conjugal home, after complainant had once more confronted
her about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit relationship involving both respondents. This
becomes all the more apparent by Moje's subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11th Street, New
Manila, Quezon City, which was a few blocks away from the church where she had exchange marital
vows with complainant.
It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially since Eala's vehicle and that
of Moje's were always seen there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said address
whereas Eala asserts that that was where he held office. The happenstance that it was in that said
address that Eala and Moje had decided to hold office for the firm that both had formed smacks too
much of a coincidence. For one, the said address appears to be a residential house, for that was
where Moje stayed all throughout after her separation from complainant. It was both respondent's
love nest, to put short; their illicit affair that was carried out there bore fruit a few months later
when Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby hospital of St. Luke's Medical Center. What finally
militates against the respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth of the girl,
Moje furnished the information that Eala was the father. This speaks all too eloquently of the
unlawful and damning nature of the adulterous acts of the respondents. Complainant's supposed
illegal procurement of the birth certificate is most certainly beside the point for both respondents
Eala and Moje have not denied, in any categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the child
Samantha Irene Louise Moje.45 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the
DOJ no choice but to grant complainant's motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if respondent
and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in court, the
same would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint.
Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,46 viz:
x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these [administrative]
proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables
one to escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is
acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal case47 (Italics
in the original),
this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,48 held:

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they
mayproceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on January 28, 2006 by the Board
of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of
office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of respondent in the
Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 6396 October 25, 2005
ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VIRGIL R. CASTRO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
Tinga, J.:
This administrative case concerns a lawyer who hurled invectives at a Clerk of Court. Members of the bar
decorum must at all times comfort themselves in a manner befitting their noble profession.
Complainant Atty. Rosalie Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya. On 8 May 2003, she filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a Complaint-Affidavit1 with supporting documents2 against respondent
Atty. Virgil R. Castro for Unprofessional Conduct, specifically violation of Canon 7, Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and
Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.3 The charge in the complaint is summed up as follows:
Respondent Atty. Castro was a private practitioner and Vice-President of IBP-Nueva Vizcaya Chapter. On 5
May 2003, respondent went to complainants office to inquire whether the complete records of Civil Case
No. 784, entitled Sps. Crispino Castillano v. Sps. Federico S. Castillano and Felicidad Aberin, had already been
remanded to the court of origin, MCTC Dupax del Norte, Alfonso Castaned, Nueva Vizcaya. It must be noted
that respondent was not the counsel of record of either party in Civil Case No. 784.
Complainant informed respondent that the record had not yet been transmitted since a certified true copy of
the decision of the Court of Appeals should first be presented to serve as basis for the transmittal of the
records to the court of origin. To this respondent retorted scornfully, "Who will certify the Court of Appeals
Decision, the Court of Appeals? You mean to say, I would still have to go to Manila to get a certified true
copy?" Surprised at this outburst, complainant replied, "Sir, its in the Rules but you could show us the copy
sent to the party you claim to be representing." Respondent then replied, "Then you should have notified me
of the said requirement. That was two weeks ago and I have been frequenting your office since then, but you
never bothered to notify me." Complainant replied, "It is not our duty, Sir, to notify you of the said
requirement."
Respondent then answered, "You mean to say it is not your duty to remand the record of the case?"
Complainant responded, "No, Sir, I mean, its not our duty to notify you that you have to submit a copy of the
Court of Appeals decision." Respondent angrily declared in Ilocano, "Kayat mo nga saw-en, awan pakialam
yon? Kasdiay?" ("You mean to say you dont care anymore? Is that the way it is?") He then turned and left
the office, banging the door on his way out to show his anger. The banging of the door was so loud it was
heard by the people at the adjacent RTC, Branch 30 where a hearing was taking place.4
After a few minutes, respondent returned to the office, still enraged, and pointed his finger at complainant
and shouted, "Ukinnan, no adda ti unget mo iti kilientek haan mo nga ibales kaniak ah!" ("Vulva of your

mother! If you are harboring ill feelings against my client, dont turn your ire on me!") Complainant was
shocked at respondents words but still managed to reply, "I dont even know your client, Sir." Respondent
left the office and as he passed by complainants window, he again shouted, "Ukinnam nga babai!" ("Vulva of
your mother, you woman!")5
Complainant suffered acute embarrassment at the incident, as it happened in her office of which she was,
and still is, the head and in front of her staff. She felt that her credibility had been tarnished and diminished,
eliciting doubt on her ability to command full respect from her staff.6
The Complaint-Affidavit, filed three days after the incident, was supported by an Affidavit7 signed by
employees of RTC-Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya who witnessed the incident. The Affidavit narrated the same
incident as witnessed by the said employees. A Motion to File Additional Affidavit/Documentary Evidence was
filed by complainant on 25 September 2003.8
On 26 May 2003, the CBD-IBP issued an Order9 requiring respondent to submit his answer to the complaint.
Respondent submitted his Compliance10 dated 18 June 2003. Respondent explained that he was counsel for
the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 847, entitled Sps. Federico Castillano, et al. v. Sps. Crispin Castillano, et al., filed
with the RTC of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 30. He learned of the finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 64962 with respect to Civil Case No. 847 before the lower court. Prior to the incident, he went to
the office of the complainant to request for the transmittal of the records of the case to the MCTC and the
complainant reassured him of the same.
Respondent admits having inquired about the status of the transmittal of the records on 5 May 2003.
However, he has no explanation as to what transpired on that day. Instead, he narrates that on 25 May 2003,
twelve days after the incident, the records had not yet been transmitted, and he subsequently learned that
these records were returned to the court of origin.
The hearing for the administrative complaint before the CBD was set on 25 September 2003 by the
Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan. However, on said date, only complainant appeared. The
latter also moved that the case be submitted for resolution.11 Respondent later on filed
a Manifestation stating that the reason for his non-appearance was because he was still recuperating from
physical injuries and that he was not mentally fit to prepare the required pleadings as his vehicle was rained
with bullets on 19 August 2003. He also expressed his public apology to the complainant in the
same Manifestation.12
Complainant filed a Manifestation expressing her desire not to appear on the next hearing date in view of
respondents public apology, adding that respondent personally and humbly asked for forgiveness which she
accepted.13
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be reprimanded and warned that any other
complaint for breach of his professional duties shall be dealt with more severely.14 The IBP submitted to this
Court a Notice of Resolution adopting and approving the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.15
At the onset, it should be noted that respondent was not the counsel of record of Civil Case No. 784. Had he
been counsel of record, it would have been easy for him to present the required certified true copy of the
decision of the Court of Appeals. He need not have gone to Manila to procure a certified true copy of the
decision since the Court of Appeals furnishes the parties and their counsel of record a duplicate original or
certified true copy of its decision.

His explanation that he will enter his appearance in the case when its records were already transmitted to
the MCTC is unacceptable. Not being the counsel of record and there being no authorization from either the
parties to represent them, respondent had no right to impose his will on the clerk of court.
Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Rule 8.02A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another
lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to
those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
Through his acts of constantly checking the transmittal of the records of Civil Case No. 784, respondent
deliberately encroached upon the legal functions of the counsel of record of that case. It does not matter
whether he did so in good faith.
Moreover, in the course of his questionable activities relating to Civil Case No. 784, respondent acted rudely
towards an officer of the court. He raised his voice at the clerk of court and uttered at her the most vulgar of
invectives. Not only was it ill-mannered but also unbecoming considering that he did all these to a woman
and in front of her subordinates.
As held in Alcantara v. Atty. Pefianco,16 respondent ought to have realized that this sort of public behavior
can only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it.17 These acts
violate Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and Rule 8.01, to wit:
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness to practice law, now
shall he, whether in public or private life behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
Moreover, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that lawyers conduct themselves with
courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of
the legal profession. They must act honorably, fairly and candidly towards each other and otherwise conduct
themselves without reproach at all times.18
As correctly evaluated by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent did not categorically deny the charges
in the complaint. Instead, he gave a lengthy narration of the prefatory facts of the case as well as of the
incident on 5 May 2003.
Complainant also alleged in her Complaint-Affidavit that respondents uncharacteristic behavior was not an
isolated incident. He has supposedly done the same to Attys. Abraham Johnny G. Asuncion and Temmy
Lambino, the latter having filed a case against respondent pending before this Court.19 We, however, cannot
acknowledge such allegation absent any evidence showing the veracity of such claim. No affidavits to that
effect were submitted by either Atty. Asuncion or Atty. Lambino.

Nonetheless, the penalty to be imposed should be tempered owing to the fact that respondent had
apologized to the complainant and the latter had accepted it. This is not to say, however, that respondent
should be absolved from his actuations. People are accountable for the consequences of the things they say
and do even if they repent afterwards. The fact remains that things done cannot be undone and words
uttered cannot be taken back. Hence, he should bear the consequences of his actions.
The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers is the esteem of their brethren. This esteem cannot be
purchased, perfunctorily created, or gained by artifice or contrivance. It is born of sharp contexts and thrives
despite conflicting interest. It emanates solely from integrity, character, brains and skills in the honorable
performance of professional duty.20
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby FINED in the amount of TEN THOUSAND
(P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that any similar infraction with be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of
thisDecision be furnished the Bar Confidant for appropriate annotation in the record of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 6116

August 1, 2012

ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Engr. Gilbert Tumbokon
against respondent Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco for grave dishonesty, gross misconduct constituting deceit and
grossly immoral conduct.
In his Complaint,1 complainant narrated that respondent undertook to give him 20% commission, later
reduced to 10%, of the attorney's fees the latter would receive in representing Spouses Amable and
Rosalinda Yap (Sps. Yap), whom he referred, in an action for partition of the estate of the late Benjamin Yap
(Civil Case No. 4986 before the Regional Trial Court of Aklan). Their agreement was reflected in a letter2 dated
August 11, 1995. However, respondent failed to pay him the agreed commission notwithstanding receipt of
attorney's fees amounting to 17% of the total estate or about P 40 million. Instead, he was informed through
a letter3 dated July 16, 1997 that Sps. Yap assumed to pay the same after respondent had agreed to reduce
his attorney's fees from 25% to 17%. He then demanded the payment of his commission4 which respondent
ignored.
Complainant further alleged that respondent has not lived up to the high moral standards required of his
profession for having abandoned his legal wife, Milagros Hilado, with whom he has two children, and
cohabited with Mae FlorGalido, with whom he has four children. He also accused respondent of engaging in
money-lending business5 without the required authorization from the BangkoSentralngPilipinas.
In his defense, respondent explained that he accepted Sps. Yap's case on a 25% contingent fee basis, and
advanced all the expenses. He disputed the August 11, 1995 letter for being a forgery and claimed that Sps.
Yap assumed to pay complainant's commission which he clarified in his July 16, 1997 letter. He, thus, prayed
for the dismissal of the complaint and for the corresponding sanction against complainant's counsel, Atty.
Florencio B. Gonzales, for filing a baseless complaint.6
In the Resolution7 dated February 16, 2004, the Court resolved to refer this administrative case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In his Report and
Recommendation8dated October 10, 2008, the Investigating IBP Commissioner recommended that
respondent be suspended for one (1) year from the active practice of law, for violation of the Lawyer's Oath,
Rule 1.01, Canon 1; Rule 7.03, Canon 7 and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Code). The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the same in its Resolution No. XIX-20104539 dated August

28, 2010. Respondent moved for reconsideration10 which was denied in Resolution No. XIX-2011-141 dated
October 28, 2011.
After due consideration, We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess and
continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers are expected to maintain at
all times a high standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform
their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values
and norms embodied in the Code.11 Lawyers may, thus, be disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of the
above standards whether in their professional or in their private capacity.
In the present case, respondent's defense that forgery had attended the execution of the August 11, 1995
letter was belied by his July 16, 1997 letter admitting to have undertaken the payment of complainant's
commission but passing on the responsibility to Sps. Yap. Clearly, respondent has violated Rule 9.02,12 Canon
9 of the Code which prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal services with
persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases which do not obtain in the case at bar.
Furthermore, respondent did not deny the accusation that he abandoned his legal family to cohabit with his
mistress with whom he begot four children notwithstanding that his moral character as well as his moral
fitness to be retained in the Roll of Attorneys has been assailed. The settled rule is that betrayal of the marital
vow of fidelity or sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws.13Consequently, We find no reason to disturb the IBP's finding that respondent violated
the Lawyer's Oath14 and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in
"unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
However, We find the charge of engaging in illegal money lending not to have been sufficiently
established. A "business" requires some form of investment and a sufficient number of customers to whom
its output can be sold at profit on a consistent basis.15 The lending of money to a single person without
showing that such service is made available to other persons on a consistent basis cannot be construed
asindicia that respondent is engaged in the business of lending.
1wphi1

Nonetheless, while We rule that respondent should be sanctioned for his actions, We are minded that the
power to disbar should be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously
affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and as member of the bar,16 or the
misconduct borders on the criminal, or committed under scandalous circumstance,17 which do not obtain
here. Considering the circumstances of the case, We deem it appropriate that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of one (1) year as recommended.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO is found GUILTY of violation of the Lawyers Oath,
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the same Code
andSUSPENDED from the active practice of law ONE (1) YEAR effective upon notice hereof.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of the Philippine
Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.