Professional Documents
Culture Documents
15CV31078
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Plaintift
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Case
No. l5CV3
1078
Defendant.
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UTCR 5.050
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motion. Plaintiffs
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estimate that 60 minutes are required for oral argument. Official coufi reporting services are
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requested.
MOTION
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(1)
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Declaring that Portland City Code Section 30.01.085 ("Ordinance") is invalid and
(2)
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This motion is supported by the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the
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Declaration of Timothy Gray in Support of Plaintiffls Motion for Summary Judgment and the
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Page 1 - PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LI,P
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I.
INTRODUCTION
This action challenges Portland City Code Section 30.01.085 ("Ordinance"), which flouts
an unambiguous and express preemption provision duly enacted by the Oregon legislature. The
Ordinance is irreconcilable with the preemption statute and does not fall within any of the
limited exceptions contained in that statute. Accordingly, this Courl should declare the
91
control enactments and reserved to the state the exclusive right to regulate residential rental
.225 notonly ensures uniform statewide rent regulations, it prevents "the
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prices. ORS
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91
.225(1)'
Despite thirty years of exclusive state control of rent regulation, the City of Portland has
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rent price adjustments. The Ordinance prohibits residential property lessors from adjusting rent
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prices more than five percent over a 12-month period without providing a full 90 days' notice'
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By tripling the notice period specified by ORS 90.220, the Ordinance conflicts with Oregon state
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law and constricts property owners' ability to respond efficiently to changes in the rental market.
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For the duration of this extended notice period, the Ordinance "controls the rent that may be
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charged for the rental of any dwelling," in violation of ORS 91.225. Therefore, the Ordinance is
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BACKGROUND
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A.
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policies, Oregon's Legislative Assembly passed emergency legislation in 1985 that preempted
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local rent regulation. In its entirety, the resulting statute now provides:
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(3) This section does not impair the right of any state agency, cit!,
county or urban renewal agency as defined by ORS 457 '035 to
reserve to itselfthe right to approve rent increases, establish base
rents or establish limitations on rents on any residential property
for which it has entered into a contract under which certain
benefits are applied to the property for the expressed putpose of
providing reduced rents for low income tenants. Such benefits
include, but are not limited to, properly tax exemptions, long-tetm
financing, rent subsidies, code enforcement procedures and zoning
density bonuses.
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(5) Cities, counties and state agencies may impose temporary rent
controls when a natural or man-made disaster that materially
eliminates a significant portion of the rental housing supply occurs,
but must remove the controls when the rental housing supply is
restored to substantially normal levels.
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(6) As used in this section, "dwelling unit" and "rent" have the
meaning given those terms in ORS 90.100.
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(7) This section is applicable throughout this state and in all cities
and counties therein. The electors ot the governing body of a city
or county shall not enact, and the governing body shall not
enforce, any ordinance, resolulion or other regulation that is
inconsistent with this section.
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ORS 91 .225 (emphasis added). By its plain text, ORS 9l .225 unambiguously preempts any local
enactment that "controls the rent that may be charged for the rental of any dwelling unit," subject
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ORS 91 .225 was to avoid a patchwork of harmful and conflicting local laws, As part of this
system, the legislature adopted a statewide rent increase notice period. ORS 90.220 provides:
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30-day written notice thereof in the case of a month-to-month tenancy
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period reflects the legislature's careful balancing of the interests of tenants, the rights of
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landlords, and the risks of interfering with the efficient functioning of the residential rental
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market.
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B.
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Despite the state legislature's deliberate choice of a 3O-day notice period, the Portland
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City Council decided that "Portland renters need more advance notice of rental increases than the
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state law minimum notice of 30 days," due to "[r]ecord high rents." Ordinance
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Accordingly, on October 14,2015,the Portland City Council added the Ordinance to the
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Id.
No. 187380'
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Act.
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DWT 28472413v3
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or Associated
Housing Costs by 5 percent or more over a 12 month period unless
the Landlord gives notice in writing to each affected Tenant: (a) at
least 90 days prior to the effective date of the rent increase; or (b)
the time period designated in the Rental Agreement, whichever is
longer. Such notice must specify the amount of the increase' the
amount of the new Rent or Associated Housing Costs and the date,
as calculated under the Act, when the increase becomes effective.
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a Tenant's Rent
Portland City Code Section 30.01.085. Subsection D. of the Ordinance imposes stringent
penalties for violation of the notice requirement, including fines of "up to three months Rent as
well as actual damages, reasonable attorney fees and costs" for each affected tenant.
On November 13, 2015, only 30 days after its enactment, the 90-day notice period took
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effect.
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C.
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Declaration of Timothy Gray in Support of Plaintifls Motion for Summary Judgment ("Gray
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Decl."), fl3. Plaintiff owns multi-family residential property within the City of Portland, which it
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leases out under Rental Agreements governed by the Residential Landlord and Tenant
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chapter 90. Gray Decl., tj4. Plaintiff has entered Rental Agreements that allow rent increases
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with 30 days'notice in accordance with ORS 90.220. Gray Decl., fl5. Plaintiff is adversely
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affected by the enactment and enforcement of the Ordinance, which prevents plaintiff from
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adjusting rent prices in accordance with its Rental Agreements and ORS chapter 90. Gray Decl',
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T6.
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Act, ORS
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on Novemb er 17 ,2015, seeking a declaration that the
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STANDARI)
declarations and admissions on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
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law." ORCP 47 C. No
genuine
most favorable to the adverse party, no objectively reasonable juror could retum a verdict for the
adverse party. ORCP 47 C;Jones v. General Motors Corp.,325 Or 404,407 (1997). If the
party moving for summary judgment has produced enough evidence to establish the absence of a
genuine issue as to any material fact, the adverse parly must demonstrate that it has sufficient
evidence to entitle it to a jury determination. Estes v. Lewis and Clark College,l52 Ot App 372,
383 (1ee8).
if, based upon the record before the court viewed in a manner
IV.
ARGUMENT
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As an initial matter, plaintiff has standing to challenge the validity of the Ordinance'
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injunctive relief
Plaintiff has standing because its legal rights are currently affected by the Ordinance.
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Standing is a concept that "identifies whether a party to a legal proceeding possesses a status or
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qualification necessary for the assertion, enforcement, or adjudication of legal rights or duties'"
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standing "depends on the particular requirements of the statute under which he or she is seeking
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relief." Morganv.
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plaintiff
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seeks declaratory relief under the DJA, the statutory provisions of the DJA govern
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0105706-000001
ORS 28.020. Thus, to establish standing under the DJA, a plaintiff must show that his or her
"rights, status or other legal relations" are "affected by" the statute or ordinance at issue'
Whether a plaintiff s "rights, status or other legal relations" are "affected" within the
of
meaning of ORS 28.020 "implicates three related but separate considerations." Doyle v' City
Medford,356 Or 336,372 (2014) (en banc). First, there must be "some injury or other impact
upon a legally recognized interest beyond an abstract interest in the correct application of the
validity of
parly
must involve a dispute based on present facts rather than on contingent or hypothetical events."
law." Morgan,353 Or at 195. This means "the challenged law must affect that
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granted, "must redress the injury that is the subject of the declaratory judgment action." Id'
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197
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or ordinance where that party has demonstrated that its "rights, status or other legal relations are
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affected by the law or enactment at issue." See League of Oregon Cities v. State of Oregon,334
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Or 645,658 (2002).
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Plaintiff satisfies all of the requirements for standing under ORS 28.020' First, because
as a result
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Rental Agreements and ORS 90.220, plaintiff has suffered an "injury or other impact upon a
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App 102, 105,06 (1983) (holding that intent to use property for
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challenged ordinance gives rise to standing); Thunderbird Mobile Club,234 Or App 457 , 467 -68
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(holding that declaration would have immediate effect on plaintiff s legal interests where "the
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ordinance presently affects the marketabitity and value of plaintiff s property.")' Second,
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plaintiff
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enactment of the Ordinance, constituting a "dispute based on present facts rather than on
for
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invalid will "redress the injury that is the subject of the declaratory judgment action," as plaintiff
will
state
on plaintiff s legal interests, and plaintiff has standing to seek declaratory relief pursuant to ORS
28.020.
be able to avoid further financial impediments by modifying rent prices in accordance with
law. Morgan,353 Or at 191. Because the Ordinance directly affects plaintiffls "rights,
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plaintiff
seek
injunctive relief.
Because plaintiff has standing to pursue a claim for declaratory relief, it follows that
seek injunctive
of
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standing to seek injunctive relief," the Oregon Supreme Court has "long applied essentially the
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same standing requirements that ordinarily apply in declaratory judgment actions." Nordbye
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BRCP/GM Ellington,2Tl Or App 168, 177 (2015). In fact, as the Oregon Supreme Court has
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noted, in a number of cases addressing the standing requirements under the DJA where plaintif
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sought both declaratory and injunctive relief, the court "did not distinguish between the forms of
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Kubiaczyk,32l Or
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apply to fplaintiff s] request for declaratory relief and injunctive relief," plaintiff has standing to
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seek injunctive relief for the same reasons that plaintiff has standing to seek declaratory relief'
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." Morgou
Barcik
B.
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(1995)). Thus, "in light of the fact that the same standing standards
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v.
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"When a local enactment is found incompatible with a state law in an aea of substantive
policy, the state law will displace the local rule." City of La Grande v. Public Employees
Retirement Bd.,28I Or 137,I49 (1978). Although courts should "interpret local enactments,
possible, to be intended to function consistently with state laws," local enactments must yield to
"legislative policy" where "both cannot operate concurrently" or where "the legislature meant its
law to be exclusive." Id. at 148. Thus, a statute expressly preempts a "local rule where the text,
context, and legislative history of the statute unambiguously expresses an intention to preclude
local govemments from regulating in the same area as that govemed by the statute." Rogue
if
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Valley Sewer Servs. v. City of Phoenix,357 Or 437 , 450-51 (2015). The legislature may express
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such as "no local authority shall enact any ordinances, rules or regulations in conflict with the
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clear terms,"
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."
of
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Portland v. Metro,250 Or App 437, 443 (2012). Instead, the application of the statute to a
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particular local enactment "is a question of statutory construction resolved by resort to the
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familiar methodology set forth in State v. Gaines,346 Ot 160, 771 (2009)." 1d When
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interpreting a statute under this methodology, courts begin by examining the text and context of
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the statute and then consider any legislative history proffered by the parties. State v. Gaines,346
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Or 160, 171-72 (2009). "If the legislature's intent remains unclear after examining text, context,
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and legislative history, the court may resort to general maxims of statutory construction to aid in
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2.
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ORS 91 .225 unambiguously preempts local enactments like Portland's ordinance. The
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The plain text of ORS 91.225 shows that it preempts the Ordinance.
statute begins by listing the dangers posed by "the imposition of general restrictions on housing
Page 9 - PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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rents," and then "declares that the imposition of rent control on housing in the State of Oregon is
a matter
or resolutionwhich controls the rent that may be chargedfor the rental of any dwelling Ltnit'"
ORS 91 .225(2) (emphasis added). The statute's final subsection provides, "This section is
applicable throughout this state and in all cities and counties therein. The electors or the
governing body of a city or county shall not enact, and the governing body shall not enforce any
provisions constitute a clearer expression of preemptive intent than even the paradigmatic
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("fN]o local
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authority shall enact any ordinances, rules or regulations in conflict with the provisions hereof.")
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Accordingly, ORS 9L225 expressly preempts all local rent regulations that do not fall into its
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naffow exceptions.
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The only remaining question is whether ORS 91 .225 preempts the Ordinance at issue
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amount charged as rent for housing and often also of eviction." Ll/ebster's Third New
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Dictionary 1923 (unabridged ed2002). Economists apply the term to a variety of policies
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ranging from setting price ceilings to regulating the timing of price increases. See, e.g., Bengt
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Turner and StephenMalpezzi, A Review of Empirical Evidence on the Costs and Benefits of Rent
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Control,l0 Swedish Econ Pol'y Rev I 1,17 (2003). ("Another approach to rent control is to
* put limits on the extent to which rents can be increased. {< {< * [T]his format does not attempt to
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Yet, rather than narrowly prohibiting particular policies, the legislature targeted any "imposition
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of general restrictions on housing rents," any "imposition of rent control," or "any ordinance or
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resolution which controls the rent that may be eharged for the rental of any dwelling unit." ORS
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91
Bolstering this conclusion, the exceptions to ORS 91.225 refer to a broad range of
otherwise preempted policies.l For instance, ORS 9L225(3) expressly permits local governments
to "approve rent increases, establish base rents or establish limitations on rents" for properties
governments are permitted to limit rent increases during the 120-day notice period preceding the
govemments are preempted from approving rent increases, establishing base rents or limitations
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concocted ones..
By controlling permitted rent charges and imposing conditions on the ability to increase
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rents, the Ordinance falls within the broad scope of ORS 9l.225. Under the Ordinance, "[a]
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Landlord may not increase a Tenant's Rent or Associated Housing Costs by 5 percent or more
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over a 12 month period unless the Landlord gives notice in writing to each affected Tenant: (a) at
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3Q-day notice period required by statute, effectively imposing a 60-day moratorium on rent
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increases above a five percent cap. During this 60-day period, the Ordinance "controls the rent
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that may be charged for the rental of any dwelling unit," in violation of ORS 91 .225. Like all
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rent control laws, the effect of the Ordinance is to burden landlords' ability to increase rents in
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phrase "a Landlord may not increase a Tenant's Rent," could be anything other than a "general
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In fact, the City Council was well aware of the risk of preemption, but hoped that the
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Ordinance would withstand legal challenge because it was "reasonable." Declaration of Chris
Swift in Support of Plaintifls Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 2. During the October 7,
2015 public meeting, a proposed amendment extending the notice period to 120 days triggered a
discussion of the Ordinance's dubious legality. The Ordinance's own sponsor, Commissioner
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Saltzman, worried that"a90 day notice -- is defensible and potentially legal, whereas 120 day*
* veers toward preemption." Id. The testifying Deputy City Attorney agreed, cautioning against
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1d. V/hen pressed on the distinction between a9}-day period and a 120-day period, the Deputy
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a question
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is not legal*
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He later added:
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defensible
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gray here and there is a lot of risk. x 'r * The question is how much risk are we willing to take of
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a court overtuming
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seemed reasonable, Mayor Hales explained his vote by stating, "Very interesting discussion
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greater, but I am pleased to hear that. To me, now, that I have heard that, it makes sense, why
>F
t x threading
the needle, I guess, is how I'd like to refer to these amendmenTs." Id.
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say that the risks are not, you know, not imaginary 'o
as
also acknowledged,
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"I would
as
perhaps be
of
are we here? We are here because of a financial emergency. And therefore, we ought to focus
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on the financial question. And we're trying to avoid harm to our citizens by extraordinary rent
that's both a sound policy basis and focusing on the heart of problem." Id.
subjective "reasonableness" of an ordinance (e.g. only a little rent control); it expressly preempts
"any ordinance or resolution which controls the rent that may be charged * * *.'r ORS 91.225
(emphasis added). Reading a reasonableness safe harbor into the statute would impermissibly
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adopt "a narrowing construction of state law to avoid preemptive effect" and would subvert the
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legislature is not "defensible and potentially legal." The plain text of ORS 91.225 establishes
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that local govemments have no power to regulate rent increases-there is simply no needle for
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3.
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443
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as to the
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history dispels
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Oregon Laws 1985 (Enrolled H.B. 2505). See Exhibit 1. ORS 91.225(2) is identical to that
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which was contained in the enrolled House Bill and the Bill as originally introduced, which is
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attached as Exhibit
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2.
On April 30, 1985, the House Committee on the Judiciary held a hearing on the bill as
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introduced. Among those testiffing as proponents was Charlie Hales, who, at the time
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represented the Home Builders Association Metropolitan Portland. During that hearing, Mr.
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Hales spoke of the need for total statewide permanent preemption with respect to rent regulation
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Page 13 - PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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rt<{<**t
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at rent control
See
Exhibit 4.
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Page 14 - PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ruDGMENT
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permanent injunction.
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A party is entitled to injunctive relief where there is "an appreciable threat of continuing
harm," Eagles Five, LLC v. Lawton,250 Or App 413, 422 (2012), and the harm is "irreparable,
plaintiff would expect as a member of the general public." Eckles v. State,306 Or 380, 386
(1988). Finally, pursuant to ORS 28.080, a court may grant "othet forms of coercive relief,
including injunctive relief' when "based on a declaratory judgment" and when "necessary and
proper." Ken Leahy Constr., Inc. v. Cascade Gen., Lnc.,329 Or 566,575 (1999).
Here, plaintifls entitlement to injunctive relief is beyond dispute. Plaintiff has a right to
the possession, use, and enjoyment of its property. Hall v. State ex rel Oregon Dep't of Transp',
355 Or 503, 51
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"the
challenged action injures the plaintiff in some special sense that goes beyond the injury the
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as here,
(2014) (property owner has "right of possession, enjoyment, and use"); Nearing
v, l4/eaver,295 Or 702,707 (19S3) (property owner has legally protected "interest in the use and
enjoyment of their land). Plaintiff seeks the ability to manage its own property in response to
market forces and subject to state law. That is unquestionably a lawful pursuit, but for the
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Ordinance
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Even though the Ordinance is invalid, the threat of its enforcement interferes with
plaintiff
s use
injunction is a property remedy against enforcement of an invalid law goes back at least a
century and remains well-established. Northwestern Title Loans, LLC v, Division of Finance and
Corporate Securities,lS0 Or App I ,8 (2002) (citing Alum. IJtensil Co. v. City of North Bend,
210 Or 472,419 (1957) "and the cases collected therein dating back to 1905 (if the threatened
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enforcement of an allegedly invalid ordinance or statute may harm the property rights of a party,
the court has authority to issue an injunction to prevent the threatened harm from occurring.)")'
Moreover, under ORS 23.080, "further relief may be granted whenever necessary or
proper," and such "further relief' may include injunctive relief. See Ken Leahy Constr., Inc.,
329 Or
necessary to effectuate the declaration that Ordinance is invalid and to give plaintiff complete
relief.
***
of an injunction is a prerequisite in every case seeking injunctive relief under ORS 28.080
see
id. at 572, 57
5-7
6 ("We need not decide whether proof of all the equitable elements
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the manner contemplated by ORS 28.080
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so that
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plaintiff in
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the courl should grant plaintiff s motion, issue a declaratory
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judgment declaring that the Ordinance is invalid and unenforceable, and enter an injunction
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0 105706-000001
EXHIBIT 1
Enrolled
'
CHAPTER
AN ACT
(
Relating to rent control on housing; and declaring an emergency.
Be
It
SECTION 2. (l) The Legislative Assembly frnds that there is a social and economic need to insure
an
adequate supply of affordable housing for Oregonians. The Legislative Assembly also finds thaf the imposition of
general restrictions on housing rents will disrupt an orderly housing market, increase deferred maintenance of
existing housing stok, lead to abandonment ofexisting rental units and create a property tax shift from rentalowned to owner-occupied housing. Therefore, the Legislative Assembly declares that the imposition of rent
control on housing in the State of Oregon is a matter of state-wide concern.
(2) Except as provided in subsections (3) to (5) ofthis section, a city or county shall not enact any ordinance
or resolution which controls the rent that may be charged for the rental of any dwelling unit.
(3) This section does not impair the right ofany state agency, city, county or urban renewal agency as defined
by ORS a57.035 to reserve to itselfthe right to approve rent increases, establish base rents or establish limitations
on rents en any residential property for which it has entered intg a contract under which certain benefits are
ipplie to the'property for the expressed purpose of providingieduced rents for low income tenants. Such
benefits include, but arc not limited to, property tax exemptions, long-term nancing, rent subsidies, code
enforcement procedures and zoning density bonuses.
(4) Cities and counties are not prohibited from including in condominium conversion ordinances a
requirement that, during the notification period specihed in ORS 94.116, the owner or developer may not raise
the rents ofany affected tenant excpt in a proportional amount equal to the percentage increase in the All Items
Ponland Consumer Price Index since the date of the last rent increase for the dwelling unit then occupied by the
affected tenant.
(5) Cities, counties and state agencies may impose temporary rent controls when a natural or man-made
disaster that materially eliminates a significant portion of the rental housing supply occurs, but must remove the
controls when the rental housing supply is restored to substantially normal levels.
(6) As used in this section, "dwelling unit" and "rent" have the meaning given those terms in ORS 91.705.
(7) This section is applicable throughout this state and in all cities and counties therein. The electors or the
governing body ofa city or county shall not cnact, and the governing body shall not enforce, any ordinance,
resolution or othr regulation that is inconsistent with this section.
^
"*-***
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SECTION 3. This Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety,
an emergency is declared to exist, and this Act takes effect July I, 1985.
Passed by House
Received by Governor:
M.,
Chief Clerk of Hoqse
1985
Approved:
M.,
985
Spcaker of Housc
Covernor
1985
Presdent ofSenale
Secrtary ofState
PaEe 2
LXill't]
FA,
*2*-* ili
EXHIBIT 2
House
Bill 2505
'
SUMMARY
subject to
The following summary is not prepared by the sponsors of the measurc and is not a part of the body thereof
features ofthe measure as introduced.
essential
ofthe
briefstatement
ri
is
eito's
an
assmuty.
Legislative
the
consideratioriby
housing
Retains existing law, scheduled for repeal on July 1, I 985, that prohibits adoption ofrent controls on
by cities and counties.
Declares emergency, effective July I' 1985.
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Be
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SECTION l. Section 2 of this Act is added to and made a part of oRS chapter 91'
SECTION 2. (l ) The lgislative Assembly finds and declares that the imposition of rent controls on housing
in this statc is
(2) Except as provided in subsectons (3) to (5) ofthis section, a city or couny shall not enact any ordinance
or resolution which controls the rent that may be charged for the rental of any dwelling unit'
(3) This section does not impair the right ofany state agency, city, cou.nty or urban renewal agency as defined
l0
by ORS 457.035 to reserve to itselfthe right to approve rent increases, establish base rents or establish limitations
t2
on rents on any residcntial property for which it has entered into a contract under which certain benefils are
applied to the property for the expressed purpose of providing reduced rents for low income tenants' Such
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benefits include, but are not limited to, property tax exemptions, long-term fltnancing, rent subsidies, code
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(4) Cities and counties are not prohibited from including in condominium conversion ordinances a
g4.ll6,the owner or developer may not raise
requirement that, during the notification period specified in ORS
All Items
the rents ofany affected tenant except in a proportional amount equal to the percentage increase in the
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portland Consumer price Index since the date of the last rent increase for the dwelling unit then occupied by the
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affected tenant.
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(5) Cities, counties and state agencies may impose temporary rent controls when a natural or man-made
disaster that materially eliminates a significant portion of the rental housing supply occurs, but must remove the
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controls when the rental housing supply is restored to substantially normal levels.
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(6) As used in this section, "dwclling unit" and "rent" have the meaning given thos terms in ORS 91.705'
(?) This section is applicable throughout this state and in all cities and counties therein. The electors or the
ofa city or coun shall not enact, and the governing body shall not enforce, any ordinance,
25
governing body
26
face in an amended section is new; matter litalic and bracketedl is existing law to be omitted'
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2505
SECTION 3. This Act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety,
an emergncy is declared to exist, and this Act takes effect July
l,
1985.
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EXHIBIT 3
HOUSE AMENDMENTS TO
HOUSE BILL 2505
By COMMITTEE ON
May
JUDICIARY
10
"SECTION.2.
(l)
The Igislative Assembly finds that there is a social and economic need to insure an
adequate supply of affordable housing for Oregonians. The Legislative Assembly also hnds that the imposition
of
general restrictions on housing rents will disrupt an orderly housing market, increase defened maintenance
of
existing housing stock, lead to abandonment ofexisting rental units and create a property tax shifl from rental-
owned to owner-occupied housing. Therefore, the Legislative Assembly declares that the imposition of rent
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EXHIBIT 4
Charlie Hales: Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. For the record, I
am Charlie Hales with the Home Builders Association of Metropolitan Portland. Mr. Irvine has
stated our organization's position so my testimony will be brief. Prior to working for the Home
Builders, I worked for the Mobile Home Park Association for 5 years and saw some of these
issues over and over during that time. I also had the chance to look down the gun barrel at rent
control measures in Jackson County and on the ballet in Lane County and the City of Springfield
and I think we sometimes forget after a couple of years how close we came in November of 1982
to having rent control underway in Oregon which is what the need was for this legislation in the
first place and why it's now being brought to you in making permanent. House Bill 2505 is just
that, lt's an opportunity. It's an opportunity to preserye Oregon from that kind of a threat and it's
an opportunity to benefit from other states' bad experiences with rent control. We provided you
with this enornous book not simply to wow you with our ability to make photocopies but to
show you the depth of data that is now available from other states. The major issues that are
addressed in this book, what rent control does to maintenance and abandonment are now well
documented. Maintenance stops and abandonment begins. What it does to new construction is
well documented. The comparison of Oregon to Washington DC over the last few years in here
is an excellent demonstrator of what happens to construction of rental housing under rent control
- it stops. There is no longer any question about it. What happens to tax shifts, the movement of
the tar burden from rental housing to single family housing as that rental housing deteriorates
under rent control? That is now well documented as well. And the cost of administration f,rnally
is also very, very clear from other cities' examples. One of the worst of course is Santa Monica
where they enacted rent control in 1979 and where the cost of administration went from an
assessment of $12.50 a unit in 1980 to $72.00 a unit last year. I'm soruy, in 1982. And in 1983,
the Court of Appeals in California ruled that those costs of administration may be passed on
directly to tenants. So tenants in Santa Monica, in addition to the other costs of rent control, are
paying $72.00 a year per unit to have it enforced. That works out to a budget of 2.3 million and
60 employees in enforcement control in a city the size of Eugene. That is an inefficient way to
regulaie tire housing market. Now, I think what is also documented well for you is the loss of
loal control in other jurisdictions that the failure to pass House Bill 2505 would engender. How
could Tualatin resist rent control if Tigard had it? And I think equally important is the fact thatT
other states have now done what is asked of you in House Bill 2505 and that is to ha'e enacted
permanent prohibitions against local rent control in the interest of state wide concern' Finally, I
ii* tfr" problems of mobile home park tenants remain and the kind of exercise vou have had to
go through this afternoon is only going to be repeated unless we do something about the time
bomb of mobile home parks sitting on conditional uses in industrial zones throughout the State'
We sort of blundered into this situation through a series of historical accidents wherein local
govemments in the post-war decades took land that was one day going to be industrial and said,
Ok, l"t', put a trailer park there for a few years. That looks like a pretty good temporaly use,"
And trailers were in those days a pretty good form of temporary housing that still had their
wheels and axels and trailer tons on them. Trouble is, those units evolved into permanent
Page
DwT 28s37087v1 0105706-000001
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April 30,
1985.
TAPE 547
housing and became an attractive lifestyle for many of the people who have testified before you
today and they are less mobile then they once were. But the time bomb is there. There are a lot
of Terrace Heights out there waiting for us unless we find a way to produce replacement stock in
mobile home spaces for those displaced residents and there is very little that we can do to stop
that displacement I believe. But stopping House Bill 2505 is not the solution. Allowing rent
control to get started in Oregon is only going to exacerbate the problems that 2915 addresses.
Those problems need to be addressed in this session and in the future. But what we need to do is
remove the threat of rent control in order to have a better and more, creative approach to those
problems. I would be happy to answer any questions.
2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I hereby certify that I served a copy of the foregoing: PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DECLARATION OF CHRIS SWIFT IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND DECLARATION OF
TIMOTHY GRAY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT on:
Dennis M. Vannier, Esq.
Portland City Attorneys Office
1221 SW 4th Avenue, Room 430
Portland, OR 97204
Telephone 503-823-9967
Email Dennis.Vannier@portlandoregon.gov
Of Attorneys for Defendant City of Portland
by mailing a copy thereof in a sealed, first-class postage prepaid envelope,
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Dated this 14th day of December, 2015.
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP
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