MOBILIA VS UMEZAWA

(How is Jurisdiction Determined)

Facts:
Mobilia Products Japan sent Hajime Umezawa to the Philippines in order to
head Mobilia Products, Inc. as President and General Manager. To qualify him as
such and as a Board Director, he was entrusted with one nominal share of stock.
Umezawa, then the President and General Manager of Mobilia organized
another company with his wife, and his sister to be known as Astem Philippines
Corporation, without the knowledge of the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer and
the other members of the Board of Directors of Mobilia.
The said company would be engaged in the same business as Mobilia. Pending
formal organization, Umezawa, wanted to accelerate the market potentials of Astem
by participating in the International Furniture Fair held in Singapore.
Pressed for time, equipment and machinery,and manpower, Umezawa, stole
furniture from petitioner Mobilia so that the said pieces of furniture would be
presented and exhibited as belonging to Astem in the International Furniture Fair.
Later, based on orders booked for Astem, Umezawa, ordered and caused the
manufacture of eighty-nine (89) pieces of furniture .The said pieces of furniture
were made with Mobilia supplies, materials and machineries, as well as with Mobilia
time and personnel, all of which were under the administration and control of
Umezawa as President and General Manager.
Umezawa was later sued for Qualified Theft, the information filed by the
prosecutor reads as follows:
That during or about the period comprised between the 18th and 19th day of
February 1995, in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused, while being then the President and General Manager of
Mobilia Products, Inc., a corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of
furniture, holding office and doing business in the Mactan Export Processing Zone,
Lapu-Lapu City, with grave abuse of the confidence reposed upon him by his employer,
with intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal
and carry away from the corporations factory in Mactan Export Processing Zone, LapuLapu City, expensive pieces of furniture, to wit; x x x with an aggregate value of
P3,219,875.00, Philippine currency, without the consent of his employer, to the
damage and prejudice of Mobilia Products, Inc., x x x
That on the 8th day of February 1995, in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Philippines, within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while being the
President and General Manager of Mobilia Products, Inc., a corporation engaged in the
manufacture and export of quality furniture, whose principal place of business is at the
Mactan Export Processing Zone, Lapu-Lapu City, with intent to gain, without the consent
of his employer, and with grave abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away from the corporations factory the
following expensive pieces of furniture, to wit: X X X with an aggregate value of
P500,000.00 Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of Mobilia Products,
Inc.CONTRARY TO LAW.

Another Information for estafa was thereafter filed against the same accused,
the information filed by the prosecutor reads as follows:

That sometime in March 1995, in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Philippines, within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of unfaithfulness and abuse of
confidence reposed upon him as the President and General Manager of Mobilia Products, Inc.,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate and convert to his own
personal use and benefit the amount of Seventeen Million One Hundred Eight Thousand Five
Hundred (P17,108,500.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, which was the total value of the
furnitures ordered and manufactured by the accused or at his instance using Mobilia supplies,
materials and machineries, as well as time and personnel which were supposed to be for the
exclusive use of Mobilia Products, Inc. but were converted for the use and benefit of the
accused and Astem Philippines Corporation, a company or firm engaged in the same business
as that of Mobilia Products, Inc., which is, [in] the manufacture and production of quality
furniture for export, owned by the accused, to the damage and prejudice of Mobilia Products,
Inc.CONTRARY TO LAW.

The trial court issued a Joint Order dismissing the cases for lack of jurisdiction. It
held that the dispute between the private complainant and the accused over the
ownership of the properties subject of the charges is intra-corporate in nature, and
was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC. It ruled that Umezawa, as a
member of the board of directors and president of MPI, was also a stockholder
thereof. While Umezawa claimed to be the bona fide owner of the properties subject
of the Informations which he appropriated for himself, the private complainant
disputes the same; hence, according to the trial court, the conflicting claims of the
parties should be resolved by the SEC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the criminal cases against
respondent.
Case law has it that in order to determine the jurisdiction of the court in criminal
cases, the complaint or Information must be examined for the purpose of
ascertaining whether or not the facts set out therein and the prescribed period
provided for by law are within the jurisdiction of the court, and where the said
Information or complaint is filed. It is settled that the jurisdiction of the court
in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or
Information and not by the findings based on the evidence of the court
after trial. Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by the law in force at
the time of the filing of the Information or complaint. Once jurisdiction is vested in
the court, it is retained up to the end of the litigation. Indeed, in People v. Purisima,
[33] this Court held that:
In criminal prosecutions, it is settled that the jurisdiction of the court is not
determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial or even by the
result of the evidence that would be presented at the trial, but by the extent of the
penalty which the law imposes for the misdemeanor, crime or violation charged in
the complaint. If the facts recited in the complaint and the punishment provided for
by law are sufficient to show that the court in which the complaint is presented has
jurisdiction, that court must assume jurisdiction.
Patently, then, based on the material allegations of the Informations in the three
cases, the court a quo had exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes charged.

PP VS SUNGA
(How is Jurisdiction Over the Person of the Accused Acquired)
(When the private complainant no longer wants pursue the case)
FACTS:
An information for Attempted Homicide was filed by the Fiscal against Rafael
Anadilla, Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla. Trial of the case was set on 11 and 12
March. The hearing set on 11 March was, however, postponed in view of the
absence of one of the accused, respondent Rafael Anadilla who had not yet been
arrested. On the same date, the court a quo issued an order for the arrest of said
accused, and at the same time set the trial of the case for 29 and 30 July 1974.
On 20 March 1974, the court a quo issued the now assailed order which reads:
Considering that the offended party is no longer interested in the further
prosecution of this case and there being no objection on the part of the accused
Ariston Anadilla, Rafael Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, this case is hereby DISMISSED
with costs de oficio.
Consequently, the order of arrest issued by this Court against the accused
Rafael Anadilla dated March 11, 1974, is hereby ordered lifted and has no force
and effect.

The Provincial Fiscal moved to reconsider the order of dismissal. This was denied by
the court a quo in
ISSUE:
The issue in this petition is whether the court a quo may dismiss a criminal case on
the basis of an affidavit of desistance executed by the offended party, but without a
motion to dismiss filed by the prosecuting fiscal.
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action.
The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the
authority to hear and determine the case. When after the filing of the
complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued

by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to
the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the accused.
While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether
or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not [sic], once the case had already
been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in
the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. The only
qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of
the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.
A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court
who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done
before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the
records of the investigation.
To avoid similar situations, the Court takes the view that, while the Crespo doctrine
has settled that the trial court is the sole judge on whether a criminal case should
be dismissed (after the complaint or information has been filed in court), still, any
move on the part of the complainant or offended party to dismiss the criminal case,
even if without objection of the accused, should first be referred to the prosecuting
fiscal for his own view on the matter. He is, after all, in control of the prosecution of
the case and he may have his own reasons why the case should not be dismissed. It
is only after hearing the prosecuting fiscal's view that the Court should exercise its
exclusive authority to continue or dismiss the case.