Luis Jacob Retanan

POLSC 144

2012-07920

Prof. Kraft

Seminar Paper: Norms (Revised)

Nov 27, 2015

Collapse and Metamorphosis

(Rationalism and the Return of Norms)
Introduction
The end of cold war had dramatically changed the international political order. It
had brought hope for a better world but also challenges in building one. March and Olsen
(1999) summarizes the contemporary international political landscape into three key
observations, (1) reconstitutions of national boundaries through reintegration and
secession, (2) decentralization of the identities of nation-states due to the reemergence
and intensification of multi-ethnic solidarities, and (3) empowerment of international
institutions that substantively weakens the impermeability of the state to external
pressures (pg. 945-946). And these three observations boils down into one underlying
phenomenon that had made possible their realization the return of norms into the
international arena.
After suffering a huge blow from E.H. Carrs Twenty Years Crisis, the ideational
normative study of international relations was cast aside and a materialist-egoistic
ontology of realism and liberalism replaced its dominion over the rationalist paradigm in
IR (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1999). The fundamental principle of such positivist ontology
is utility maximization expressed in rational-choice approach towards international
politics. Rational-choice approach follows the logic of expected consequences a
calculative mindset that analyzes the probable consequences of an action in terms of
gains and losses with respect to certain interests (March & Olsen, 1998) The supremacy
of this approach in IR stems from the fact that its explanatory power is austerely based on
the principle of parsimony.
However this parsimonious egoistic outlook on political reality has been and is
being challenged not only with the rise of international and transnational organizations
but also more importantly and dangerously with the rise of irrational conflicts driven by

multi-ethnic and religious hatreds. One of the paradigmatic examples is the Bosnian War
(1992-1995) that was characterized by a series of massacres in Bosnia. Simple rationalchoice approach cannot explain their unrestricted brutality. These immediate threats to
humanity reemphasize the relevance of norms along with identity and culture as an
important aspect in understanding international politics. Is the return of the norms in the
international political landscape signal the collapse of rationalism?
Definitions: Norms, Institutions, Identity and Worldview
Before this essay develop a critique to the paradigm of rationalism in IR, I think it
is prudent to define the concepts that the critique will be looking into first in order to
avoid misconceptualizations and unnecessary reiterations. The definitions that will be
used here is in line with the conceptualizations developed by the normative and
constructivist researches in IR. These are four concepts that this paper will be analyzing,
(a) norms, (b) institutions, (c) identity, and (d) worldview. Indeed they have a common
underlying essence but we need to differentiate them from one another for conceptual
clarity.
Norms are generally agreed as standard appropriate behavior for actors with a
given identity while institutions are the collections of interrelated norms (Finnemore &
Sikkink, 1999). But more than aggregation, the two are also different in terms of
formality and scope of influence (Schlter & Theesfald, 2008). In terms of formality,
institutions are reflected often formally in jurisprudential language while norms can be
informally expressed in an ordinary everyday language. Thus institutions in order to be
such require the power of the state while norms only require the assent of the community.
While in terms of commonality, institutions must be widely recognized and most
importantly internalized in contrast norms can be such even it is only known in a personal
level. This implies that the interpretation of institutions must be rigidly objective while
the interpretations of norms must only have a more or less shared notion about them.
Nevertheless these mechanisms of societal order can only be built upon and sustained by
the collective identity of the community.
The concept of identity has been foremost a controversial philosophical issue
the problem of self. What is the self? The three main schools of modern philosophy have

different contending views regarding this. The rationalists argue that the self is
constituted in the mind itself. The empiricists on the other hand argue that the self is
brought about by raw experiences While for the idealists, the self is brought about by the
interplay of inherent structures of the mind and the senses that constitutes the individual
perceptions of the world and of his self. The tone of the rationalist school resonates an
individualistic perspective towards identity. Identity, in this perspective, is viewed as
personal identity, which Fearon (1999) describes as a set of attributes, beliefs, desire, or
principles of action that a person thinks distinguish her in socially relevant ways. (pg.
11). Thus in such kind of conception of identity, self-interest plays a crucial role. But
considering the recent events of our time, we must also examine what the empiricist and
idealist schools are saying. Experiences and our perceptions of these experiences shape
us intentionally and unintentionally. Identity is in these perspectives is viewed as social
identity and being so according to Fearon (1999), identity is just a social category, a
group of people designated by a label that is commonly used either by the people
designated, others or both. (pg. 10). This essay will look upon both of these definitions
in the development of its critique.
Finally the concept of worldview, which is defined by Vidal (2008) as an
overarching concept that encapsulates the six fundamental philosophical inquiries of
mankind, (a) ontology model of reality as a whole, (b) explanation model of the past,
(c) prediction model of the future, (d) axiology theory of values, (e) praxeology
theory of actions, and (f) epistemology theory of knowledge (pg. 4). It can be then
concluded that a worldview acts as a sphere of reality; norms, institutions and even
identities are ultimately rooted from it. Does this concept constitute a challenge towards
the rationalist individualistic view? Depends, if the worldview is brought about by the
individual then no but if the worldview is the one who brought in the individual the
conception of his self and of the world then it is a conceptual dissonant. That two
contending views shall be taken up later in the critique.

The Collapse of Rationalism?

The outbreak multi-ethnic and sectarian conflicts along with their brutal ethnic
violence give us the justification to question the ontological authority of the rationalist
paradigm in the field of international relations.
The Bosnian War (1992-1995) is a conflict primarily between the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Republic of Srpska after the disintegration of Titos
Yugoslavia. The dissolution of Titos Yugoslavia paved the way for the rise of
nationalistic sentiments among the ethnic groups in the region primarily the Serbs,
Croats, and Albanians. Their identities are further complicated by the fact that these
ethnicities are divided by religion, Orthodox, Catholic and Muslims. The only underlying
commonality is that all of them vied to establish their own independent republics. But
what had started to be a war for territorial control turned into a bloody ethnic conflict.
Their paramilitaries violently disperse, oppress or cleansed subjugated communities that
do not share their identity in order to create homogenize states (Kalyvas & Sambanis;
2005). The 1995 Srebrenica massacre where 1000 Bosnian Muslims were slaughtered by
Serb forces was a horrific testament of this ethnic brutality. How can supposedly rational
people horrifyingly mutilate one another in the name of something intangible?
Rationalist paradigm attempts to provide a parsimonious explanation of these
ideational aspects of international reality by inculcating norms to its materialistconsequentialist rational-choice approach. As discussed by Finnemore and Sikkink
(1999) in the perspective of rational-choice, norms are social constructs that are
strategically created by individuals in order to gain what they want. And the persistence
of norms stems only from the continuous conformity of individuals to them because of
their utility to their common interests. Being interests as the central motivating factor;
persuasion, bargaining and negotiation are then the mechanisms in which these norms are
institutionalized or discarded (pg. 909-915). This implies that norms are mere instruments
and expressions of an egocentric-materialist identity. Yet moderate rationalist tries to
accommodate instead of absorbing norms into the paradigm by raising the idea that
norms as they are gradually internalized and institutionalized by individuals can also
act against self-interests and constrain available choices (March & Olsen, 1998;

Finnemore & Sikkink, 1999). But nevertheless there are still choices in which rationality
can be exercised upon.
Considering the rational-choice model for the case of ethnic violence of the
Bosnian War, it can be then argued that the very cause of this violence is none other than
economic and political, specifically the interest of territorial gain of the involved actors.
Identities and norms in this case are then used as mere decorative justifications. However,
before consigning with such parsimonious conclusion, we must first look critically on
two things, (a) the logicality of its parsimony; theoretical structure, and (b) its view
concerning human interests; ontological source of agency.
Uncertain Logic
Rational-choice as a decision-making approach is essentially a hypotheticodeductive method centered on utility maximization. This means that it always deals with
the problem in an if-then statement built upon the criterion of utility. Given problem A, if
we do B then we deduce to a conclusive outcome C that will be able to effectively solve
problem A. It is simple and efficient for decision-making that makes it a powerful
approach in international relations it saves both time and energy. But there are
loopholes in this approach in terms of its objectivity that needed to be brought into the
light, (1) its inductive methodology (2) its epistemic credibility, and (3) its omniscient
logic.
The philosopher of science Carl Hempel pointed out that the validity of a
hypothesis is based on the method of induction. If we do B then we should lead to C and
when the observation of certain relevant facts points that indeed C occurs, thus it can be
already serve as confirmatory evidence that B is true. But it is like saying that if all swans
are white then every swan that I will see is white. That hypothesis remains valid if every
other day I observe that indeed every swan is white but what if one day I see a black
swan? The objectivity of the hypothesis collapses into a fallacy. Rational-choice approach
by being consequentialist and utility driven sees outcomes as the primary confirmatory
evidences of the objectivity of its hypotheses thus as long as their predictions comes true
their hypotheses are right. The problem in this inductive character of rational-choice
approach is the possibility of being habituated into thinking that its strategies, being

successful in the past, will always be and must be right but of course we cannot always be
certain of that. Thus norms, being accommodated as constructive strategies by the
rationalist paradigm, can be unreflectively standardized into dogmatic solutions by the
very logic of the rational-choice approach thereby compromising their instrumentality.
Rationalist hardliners may go around the problem of induction by using the
Popperian view positing that their rational-choice theory can be falsified because it has
clear and simple objective conceptual parameters. Thus an attack on its inductive
characteristic has no effect in its epistemic credibility. But the recent recognition of
power of norms and identities and their accommodation into the rationalist paradigm as
constraining mechanism of individual choices show an eclectic attitude of the rationalchoice adherents. This eclecticism within the paradigm may have improved its
explanatory power in making sense of the contemporary international reality but it also
compromises the clarity of its conceptual boundaries due to the necessity of incorporating
new assumptions. Addition of new assumptions as corroborations to the theory, deducing
from Putnam, compromise the falsifiability of the theory itself as it increases logically
the probability that what is being tested for falsifiability are auxiliary assumptions only.
And being only corroborations, their falsification does not falsify the theory itself. And
Popper emphasizes that if a theory can no longer be tested whether it is falsifiable or not
then its epistemic credibility as a legitimate science can be put into question. Eclecticism
as it tries to enable the theory to produce parsimonious explanations, it also at the same
time compromise the credibility of the theory of being parsimonious leading to a
paradoxical theoretical framework.
But ultimately what makes the logicality of rational-choice theory and
consequently the whole rationalist paradigm questionable is its omniscient
presuppositions. All of its assumptions and inductions are based on the faith that the
future is knowable there is some underlying order in reality that can be grasped by
human reason. The theory of bounded rationality challenges that omniscient essence of
the rationalist paradigm. Bounded rationality says that the human rationality is limited
due to the facts that, (1) the information of the decision-maker will always be limited
because of the cost and energy required in procuring them, (2) the decision-makers have
their own cognitive and emotive biases that lead to the framing of choices, and (3) the

external environment is inherently complex and ambiguous (Jones, 1999) These external
and internal limitations imply that an individual cannot and will not be able to fully
maximize or optimize the available choices to him.
Thereby the rational-choice model, hailed as a parsimonious way of predicting
human choices, is in reality based on an uncertain logical thinking.
Presupposition of Interests
Where do interests emanate? In investigating the rationalist paradigm of
international relations, it is systematically misleading and naively simplistic to think that
the source of agency is the sovereign state only because it appears to have the power to
be the ultimate actor consistently driving global politics. Such thinking rests on a statecentric presupposition that treats the state as a Leviathan on its own right as if it is devoid
of any human elements and influence. But nevertheless the very concept of sovereign
state traces back to Thomas Hobbes, who emphasizes that it is the interaction of
individuals rational psyche that fundamentally architect the existence of the state.
Therefore, it can be said that the state acts only as an extension of individuals collective
interests.
Thus the interest of the individual is the primary source of agency of the
rationalist approach. The individual has his own interests that he wants to be maximized
despite the given internal and external constrains of his rationality. He is willing to
gamble despite of the underlying uncertainty of the logic that he will be using in the
hopes of fulfilling his own interests. The ownness of interests is the most powerful card
of the rationalist paradigm it is still the individual that acts. But do we really own our
interests or is it just also a mere presupposition?
The philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer, a German philosopher, provides a direct
challenge on the individualistic view of rationalism on human interests. Schopenhauer
points out that it is irrationality and not rationality, which forms the fundamental essence
of our being. He conceptualizes this irrational essence of man into what he calls as the
Will the inner urges, instincts and feelings within us. By being the fundamental core
of our being, the irrational Will constitutes and directs our rationality. Thereby the
interests that we consciously construe in our minds are ultimately driven by passions

emanating from the Will. But can the mind check the power of the Will? Being irrational,
it is then beyond the comprehension and control of the mind. The mind is a mere
instrument of realizing the Will. This implies three things, (1) interest being based on the
erratic character of the Will cannot be the core element in norm-building process, (2)
interest is the extension of the Will and (3) interest is ultimately not the product of
rationality of the mind but only the product of its rationalization of the Will. The second
and third implications raise a controversial point. Can it be radically concluded that our
interests is not really our own?
In line with Kants philosophy, Schopenhauer affirms that indeed the mind and its
cognitive structures enable us to constitute our own representations of the world but
ultimately for him these representations are manifestations of the feelings within us the
Will. Thus by characterizing it as the Will instead of a will it can be implied from
Schopenhauer that it is something not in the possession of the individuals rationality but
a metaphysical thing that is independent of it but innate in the being of an individual.
From this argument, it is then only a mere presupposition that ones interest is essentially
his own.
Sociologists of knowledge indeed affirm also that the individuals interests is not
really his own. But it is not exactly Schopenhauers metaphysical/psychological concept
of the Will that constitutes and drives human interests but it is ultimately the dominant
worldview the total ideology of the community where the individual finds himself in.
Individuals are trapped within the worldviews of their communities due to the fact that
ideologies, being total in characteristic, have all the answers to all valid questions
(Popper, 1966) This enables them to impose themselves in all aspects of life, framing our
perceptions of reality and behaviors in accordance with their dogmatic principles. Thus it
can be radically deduced that everything is determined by total ideologies including
human behavior itself. Instinctive behaviors are either continually conditioned to be
suppressed or amplified by the community depending on what their hegemonic
worldview dictates. This ideological conditioning consequently (transforms) the Will
the irrational feelings, urges and instincts within our being into a mere reflection of the
ideology.

This seemingly Orwellian tendencies of total ideologies implies three things, (1)
interest will always be reflective only of the dominant worldview of the community thus
incommensurable, (2) interest being a product of a total ideology cannot be used as a
mechanism for establishing cooperative norms as there is no way of objectively
evaluating it, and (3) interest becomes inherently dominating as it advances the
worldview, leading to the creation and imposition of hegemonic norms and institutions
that will keep it in line with the worldview.
Bosnian Civil War: Rationalism Collapses
If we reexamine the context of the Bosnian War, it can be argued that to conclude
that the conflict along with its horrific genocides is primarily due to political and
economic interests of the involved ethnic groups is inadequate, unreceptive and even
fallacious due to (a) the uncertain logic of parsimonious strategies, and (b) rationalist
presupposition of the nature of human interests.
In the theoretical level, the effort of the rationalist paradigm to improve the
parsimonious explanatory power of its rational-choice approach by incorporating
ideational elements (norms, identity and culture) as variables to be considered
compromises its own parsimony. Moreover the inductive character of the approach gives
false certainty that their hypotheses are always right and cultivates the habit of insisting
that their hypotheses are always right. This leads to the dogmatization of norms that
compromise their very instrumentality as constructive strategies.
In the ontological level, the very root of the rationalist paradigm, the view that
individuals have their own interests that they intend to pursue and optimize has been
disclosed by the notions of irrationality and ideology as a mere presupposition. The
rationalist thesis claims that the civil war and the radicalization of ethnic solidarity have
been brought about by socio-economic factors such as poverty and wealth inequality. But
why individuals of those ethnic groups resort to a bloody war instead of ethnic
cooperation as a means of alleviating these socio-economic ills? Utility-maximization
could be argued but nonetheless it is weak due to the fact that it can also be argued for
ethnic-cooperation depending on how scholars perceive what values worth utilizing and
how these are utilized thus conceptually does not provide clear explanation why war

instead of cooperation. Kalyvas and Sambanis (2005) considered in their analysis the
ancient hatred discourse. It argues that the ultimate cause of the civil war is the pursuit
of ethnic domination in an ethnically fragmented region that leads to marginalization,
inequality and feelings of injustice. Ethnic domination highlights the totalizing tendencies
of cultures that create a hostile perception of the differences of others and the irrational
necessity to keep them at bay. This ultimately hinders dialogue and cooperation, and
leaves war as the only rational action to solve their problems.
Thus what brought about the territorial interest of the Serbs, Albanians and
Bosnians is ultimately their pursuit of ethnic domination masked by the romanticism of
solidarity. The feelings of oneness and of belongingness that had been established into the
norms and identities of their cultures compelled their individuality to take and pursue an
interest of territorial gain that had led into a bloody inter-ethnic conflict.
With the loss of individuality and the resignification of cultural norms and
identities in the contemporary global political arena, the dominance of rationalism
collapses.
Metamorphosis of Rationalism
The rationalist paradigm collapses with the resignification of norms and identity
but collapses into what? It is somehow intuitive to think that the collapse means
collapse into nothingness total insignification but it may also be the case that its
collapse paves into a metamorphosis disclosure of latent character. This part of the
essay shall discuss the deeper kind of individuality disclosed by Husserls renewal of
rationalism in his phenomenological philosophy, and its apparent emergence and gradual
realization through the return of norms in the international political arena.
Husserlian Rationalism
The return of norms challenges the very core principle of rationalism and that is
individualism the ownness of ones actions. And the most powerful critics of the
rationalist paradigm in international relations ground their arguments on the susceptibility
of the self to be absorbed by socio-psychological forces beyond its control and its

apprehension. This causes the problem of ownness how then do we know that we own
our own awareness?
The problem of ownness, in my view, has been decisively settled by Descartes
discovery of the cogito. His methodological skepticism showed that by questioning the
world we live in we become more aware of our individuality. Total ideologies lose their
totality in our consciousness the moment their ontologies are put into question. The
cogito therefore enables us to transcend from the dominant norms of the community and
to introspect what have we become. However by transcending the structures of the world,
we consequently retreat to a solipsistic consciousness, in which we can be aware of is
only ourselves that leads to the so-called problem of other minds. In a solipsistic
consciousness, our interests are then indeed our own. But the price of being our own is
the inability to optimize those interests, as our knowledge is strictly limited only to our
own awareness of our selves. By not being able to definitely understand others and the
world itself, the interests that we are able to construe will be utterly constrained, useless
and directionless. Thus it is necessary to deal also with the problem of other minds.
The problem of other minds has always been a dreaded issue in philosophy and
international politics. Thanks to Descartes, what we can only now be sure of is our own
being. But our interests can only be of use when we are able to understand other human
beings as well. And the only way to do that is to have an intersubjective communication.
The concept of intersubjectivity started as Husserls enterprise of renewing a kind of
rationalism free from egoistic solipsism. Intersubjectivity is being able not only to
recognize the existence of other persons but also at the same time being able to
understand what they are experiencing. Husserls Fifth Meditation laid down the
operational criteria of intersubjectivity:
(1) Each subject must be self-constituted.
(2) Each subject must be constituted as such in each other subject or it will result will
be a completely monadological universe where communication is impossible.
(3) Each must constitute a world of objectivity, which in some identical with the
world constituted by the others or there will be no common ground for
communication.

(4) The world, which each one constitutes, must be a world comprising ones self and
others, or else the unity of the world will be destroyed; many conceptions of the
world destroy what the world really is.
The first two are the criteria for realizing intersubjective relationships while the last two
are for maintaining them. Thus the operationalization of these criteria must necessarily be
successive. The first criterion expresses individuality the awareness of ones self as
the primary condition for intersubjectivity because without it then there will be no
subjects to relate with. The second criterion is receptivity, which is the most crucial
criterion for it establishes how we are able to relate with one another.
Husserl is fully aware of the problem of other minds so he set out to disprove it
with these proofs: (a) body, (b) sphere of ownness, (c) association, and (d) empathy. The
first three proofs essentially say that if the other is doing what you, a being with a mind,
are doing like movement and being resilient in difficult times therefore that other has also
a mind. However it is his fourth proof that proves to be the most powerful. Empathy is
what constitutes an intersubjective experience because it is in this intentional act of the
consciousness that we see the other as an image of ourselves. It is a conscious relation of
ones own experiences to others experiences by attributing others experiences as if they
are our own. It this analogical apprehension that paves the way for the recognition of
each other as fellow human beings (Ferrarello, 2012)
Having hurdled the problem of other minds, the third criterion can now be
operationalized, which is mutuality. By being able to comprehend one anothers
intentions, we are able to construe interests that will be of value to us and at the same
time to others as well. Our interests if it is to be of any utility must be then in mutual
relation with others interests. Intersubjectivity implies not only of the interconnection of
consciousness but also the interdependence of interests. Norms and institutions that are
built by this interdependence will not only act as constructive strategies of our interests
but consequently also as sustaining mechanisms of intersubjective communication that
foster trust and cooperation.
The fourth criterion, which is unity, can be viewed as the internationalization of
intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity because of its emphatic character is inherently
inclusive, reflective and progressive. The cultivation of intersubjective understanding in

the domestic level inevitably expands communal receptiveness into cosmopolitan

awareness. It realizes its fullest actuality as it achieves a cosmopolitan character. And the
complete manifestation of that realization is the establishment of international society
where norms and institutions are (a) receptive of the common needs of humanity, and (b)
proactive in building trust and cooperation.
UN Peace Building in Bosnia: New Rationalism
The kind of rationalism that Husserl developed emerges on the onset of the
collapse of the purely egoistic and simplistic rationalism in the face of rising totalizing
cultures. This then shows that the return of norms and identity in the contemporary global
arena has two faces a face that expresses irrational radicalization, and a face that
expresses a new form of rationalism based on intersubjective understanding the latter
signals the metamorphosis of rationalism. One exemplary phenomenal manifestation is
the norm-building organization of the United Nations, more specifically its ongoing
peace-building projects in the war torn Bosnia-Herzegovina region.
The United Nations is continuously exerting the effort of building peace in the
Bosnia-Herzegovina region. Last June 2014, three UN organizations, UNDP, UNICEF
and UNESCO, in cooperation with the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina launch a
joint peace-building project, Dialogue for the Future: Promoting Coexistence and
Diversity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which aims to foster (a) spaces for inter-cultural
dialogues, (b) trust building, (c) increase participation, awareness and influence of the
youth in policy dialogues in impacting the regions development and reform agenda, (d)
ensure that education supports greater social cohesion, and (e) communities advance
common peacebuilding goals through culture. And slowly this norm-building enterprise
is laying the groundwork for a more cooperative perception in the region and it begins
with the youth. Last April 2015, the first youth conferences in Sarajevo were held. One
hundred and seventeen youth delegates convened and share their constructive ideas that
will help in promoting peace and community development, environmental protection and
gender equality. UN hopes that through the youth of Bosnia-Herzegovina its efforts will
establish norms that will cultivate and sustain cooperative intersubjectivity in the region.
(undp.org, 2014)

Nevertheless the continuous operation of intersubjectivity in the global level

ultimately relies on the constant effort of individuals to consciously direct their selves
into an emphatic awareness of other people if they want to make the most out of their
interests. Therefore the realization of humanity of intersubjective understanding is not
mere utopian naivety but the positive consequence of individual rationality.
Conclusion
The return of norms in the landscape of international politics has put the
epistemological authority of the dominant rationalist paradigm in the field of
international relations in a very uncertain position. The uncertainty of its position stems
from the fact that the challenges posited to it see the individuality of the person as the
very core of the rationalist paradigm and at the same time the source of its problem. They
are partly correct. Individuality is indeed the essence and at the same time problem of
rationalism but it is also where the solution to its problem lies. Awareness of our selves
ultimately leads to our emphatic interconnection with other people. This empathy
cultivates intersubjective understanding and culminates in the establishment of
international norms deeply receptive of the needs of humanity. Therefore the return of
norms signals the collapse of rationalisms egoistic-materialist character but at the same
time the emergence of its emphatic nature.
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