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SkepticisminDantos
AnalyticalPhilosophyofHistory
Thequestionofwhetherpasthistoricaleventsarerealandwhetherornotwecanknow
themisofcrucialimportancetothestudyofhistoryandthestudyofthephilosophyofhistory.
Inhis
AnalyticalPhilosophyofHistory
,Dantospendsaconsiderableamountoftimeattempting
torefuteskepticsofwhetherornotwecanknowpastevents.Dantopublished
Analytical
PhilosophyofHistory
in1965,inthedaysofpostpositivism.Thoseheattemptedtorefute
includeA.J.AyerandBertrandRussell.TheyrepresentthePhenomenologicalandPositivist
campsofskepticism.Iwanttospecificallylookathisargumentagainstskepticismandseeifit
isavalidcritiqueofskepticism.
Dantosargumentagainstskepticismtowardsthepastcanbesummarizedthus:
skepticismregardingpasthistoricaleventsreducestoskepticismingeneral,skepticismin
generalhasnothingofrealinteresttoaddtothediscussioninstudyofphilosophyofhistory.1
Hewantstoaddresswhatheseesasthreeargumentsthatcouldpotentiallybemadeagainst
knowledgeofthepast.
(1)UsingtheVerifiabilityCriterionofMeaningwecanmakethefollowingargument:
Everystatementpurportedlyaboutthepastisstrictlyspeaking
meaningless
.Butthen,
withmeaninglessstatements,thequestionwhethertheyaretrueorfalsecannot,in
principle,arise.So,ifwecannotmakeameaningfulstatementaboutthepast,wecannot
makeatruestatementaboutthepast.2
(2)Itispossiblethattheworldasitis,withourcurrentmemoriesandphysiological
statesincluded,cameintobeingonlyfiveminutesago.Thus,ifitisthecasethatthe

ArthurC.Danto,
AnalyticalPhilosophyofHistory
(NewYork:Cambridge,1968),8586.
Ibid,29.

1
2

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worldonlycameintobeingfiveminutesago,therewould[be]nothingforstatements
purportedlyaboutthepasttoreferto.3
Wecannotknowwhetherornotitisthecasethat
theworldcameintobeingfiveminutesago.Therefore,wecannotknowwhetherornot
wecanmaketruestatementsaboutapastthatisontologicallyreal.4
(3)Statementsmadeaboutpasthistoricaleventsaremadebyhistoriansthathavemotives
formakingsuchstatementsandfeelingsaboutsuchstatements.Thesemotivesand
feelingspreventhistoriansfrommakingundistortedstatements.Thosewhoattemptto
detectthesemotivesandfeelinghavemotivesandfeelingsthemselveswhichinturn
preventsthemfrommakingundistortedstatements.Therefore,historiansareunableto
maketrulyobjectivestatementsaboutpasthistoricalevents.5
Dantoclaimsthatwhilewemaybeablerejectthesimpleformsoftheseargumentswith
relativeease,wehavetoaddresstheargumentsintheirstrongestform.Inregardstothefirst
argument,letussupposethatweadopttheverificationistview.Ifitfollowsthatallstatements
aboutthepastaremeaningless,thenallstatementsaboutthefuturearealsomeaningless.The
onlystatementsthatcancarryanymeaningaretenseless.6
Dantosargumentessentiallyboils
downtoitbeingimpossibletomaketenselessstatementsthataretrueaboutpastevents.True
statementsrelatetotheirtruthgivingpredicatesintermsofthepast,truestatementsaboutthe
pastrelatetotheirtruthgivingevents.7
Thisfirstargumentisnotaveryseriousthreattoknowledgeofpastevents.Onecould
saythatveryfewtakeverificationismtotheextentthattheargumentdoes.Thisargumentarises

Ibid,30.
Ibid,3031.
5
Ibid,31.
6
Ibid,58.
7
Ibid.
3
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fromapositivistviewpoint.Itisthelogicalconclusionofverificationismandthesearchfor
justifyinghistoryasascience.
Inthesecondargument,DantofollowsthelogicofRussellsthoughtexperimentthrough.
Russellhimselfrejectedhisthesisthattheworldcameintobeingonlyfiveminutesagosaying
thatnoonecanmaintainthisbelief.Now,iftheworldandeverythinginitcameintobeingonly
fiveminutesago,itdoesnotfollowthattruestatementsaboutthepastcannotbemade.Suppose
Ihavebeenridingmybicycleforthepasthourandalltheevidenceincludingmymemories
confirmthiseventhoughtheworldcameintobeingnotfiveminutesago.IfIweretostate,
fourminutesago,Iwasridingmybike,Iwouldbestatingsomethingthatistrue.However,if
Iweretostate,fortyminutesago,IwasridingmybikeorIstartedridingmybikeanhour
ago,Iwouldbestatingsomethingthatisnottrue.However,thereisnodiscernibledifference
tousbetweentherealfiveminutesagoandthefalseperceptionofalloftimebeforefiveminutes
ago.
ThispointstothemainthrustofDantoscounterargumentfiveminutesisquitethe
arbitrarynumber.Ifwehavenoreasontothinkthattherearenopasteventsbeyondfiveminutes
ago,wehavenoreasontobelievethattherearepasteventsbeyondthispresentone.Whatabout
whatwearesensingimmediately,irrespectiveoftime?Dothingsexistifwecannotsensethem?
DoesWashingtonD.C.existifIamnottheretoseeit?WhataboutwhatIamsensing?Danto
asksifweshouldtrustoursensesforthingsthataremerelyafewfeetaway.Ashenotes,thisis
quicklycollapsingintoskepticismingeneral.8
Ifwehavenoreasontobelievethattherearepast
eventsbeyondthispresentone,whyshouldwebelievethatthereisthispresentevent?In

Ibid,8182.

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regardstothefiveminuteworldthesis,Dantostatesthat[Russell]cannotoptforhischoice
withoutallowingsomethingtocountasevidence,andifheallowsanywhynotall?9
Ifgeneral
skepticismisnotviableforknowinganythingabouttheworld(includingskepticism)andyour
mildlyskepticalviewcollapsesintogeneralskepticism,thenyoushouldrejectyourmildly
skepticalviews.
Asforthethirdandfinalargument,IthinkthatDantospendstoomuchtimeconsidering
theimplicationsofrelativism.Allheneedstodoisrejectthehiddenpremiseofthethird
argumentwhichstatesthat
inordertosayanythingworthwhileinregardstothepast,youmust
haveaperfectlyobjectiveperspectiveofthepast
.Wecannothaveaperfectviewofthepast,but
thisdoesnotmeanthatwecannotsayanythingtrueaboutthepast.
However,Dantodoesnottakethisroute.Dantofirstaddressesthecommonarguments
broughtupagainstrelativism:
Thisargumentwouldseemonthefaceofitopentoaneasychargeofmeaninglessness.
What,forinstance,woulditmeantosaythateveryobjectintheworldwerecrooked?...
Butinfactthisobjectisnotespeciallycompelling,andtheproponentsof(3)can,and
commonlydogetarounditeasily.Fortheyarenotsaying,ineffect,somethinglike
Everythingiscrookedbutonlythatacertainclassofthingsarecrooked.10
DantoarguesagainstWilliamWalshsrelativism.11
Washsevidencebasednarrativismreduces
intorelativism.WhileBreisachclaimsthatWalshsnarrativismdoesnotexplicitlydoubtan
accessibleobjectivereality,henotesthatnarrativismhasthetendencytodenysuchinthelater

Ibid,85
Ibid,32.
11
Ibid,102.
9

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halfofthetwentiethcentury.12
Dantoessentiallyarguesthatdisagreementsthatariseoverpast
eventsbecauseofmotivesorfeelingsultimatelydonotleadtohistoricalrelativismifitisjust
aboutstatementsofthepast.Historicalrelativismasaformofskepticismcanonlyariseif
philosophicalrelativismistrue.Ifrelativismingeneralisreducibletoskepticism,thenweend
upwiththesameconclusionsasthelasttwoargumentstheyhavenothingtotellusaboutthe
philosophyofhistory.However,historiansreallydohavedifferentmotivesandfeelings,soin
thatsensehistoricalrelativismistrue.
13
IagreemostlywiththeargumentsthatDantopresents.However,themaincritiqueI
haveofDantosargumentsisthatheassumesametaphysicoftime.Heismostlyconcerned
withepistemologicalquestionsconcerningpasthistoricalevents.However,hepursues
epistemologicalproblemswithoutansweringquestionsabouttheontologicalstatusofthepast,
bothintermsofnow,inthepresent,andintermsofitsstatuswhenthepastwasthepresent.
Dantojustassumesthattherearepasteventsandthatwecanknowthingsaboutthosepast
events.Hejumpsstraightintoepistemologicalconcerns,butdoeshehavearealbasisforeven
beingabletotalkaboutthoseconcerns?Itcouldbethecasethathisargumentsagainst
skepticismtowardspasthistoricaleventsfailsbecausehemissessomethingaboutthenatureof
timeitselfandbecausehedoesnotconsiderametaphysicoftime.
WhatistheimportanceofDantosarguments?Well,thereisalotatstakeifwecannot
maketrue(atleastinpart)claimsaboutthepast,thenthedisciplineofhistoryislargely
pointless.AsBreisachputsit,suchaskepticismishardlyreassuringforhistorysexistenceasa
discipline.14
Eitherstatementsmadeaboutthepastareexplicitlyfalse,ortheycarrynocontent
rd
ErnstBreisach,
Historiography:Ancient,Medieval,andModern
,3
ed.(Chicago:Chicago,2007),382.
ArthurC.Danto,
AnalyticalPhilosophyofHistory
(NewYork:Cambridge,1968),108111.
14
rd
ErnstBreisach,
Historiography:Ancient,Medieval,andModern
,3
ed.(Chicago:Chicago,2007),379.
12
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tobetrueorfalse.Butthereismoreatstakethanjustthestudyofhistoryiftheskeptical
argumentsagainsthistoryhold,theempiricalsciencesultimatelyfailbecausetheygather
evidenceovertimeandtrytomakesenseofit.Thus,experimentsthatdependuponstatements
madeaboutthepastrunintotheproblemsthatariseinmakingclaimsaboutthepast.
However,eventhoughempiricalsciencesandhistoryasadisciplinemayfail,canwe
retainhumanmeaningifstatementsaboutthepastareeitherexplicitlyfalseormeaningless?
Cananyworldviewexistundertheseterms?Ourrelationshipsandknowledgeofotherpeople
arelargelybaseduponourinteractionswiththeminthepast.Ifpastfactsarefalseor
meaningless,thenourrelationshipsarebuiltuponafalsepremise.IfDantosarguments
succeed,thenallofhumanitywouldbesubjecttothefullfurorofskepticism.
Bibliography
ArthurC.Danto,
AnalyticalPhilosophyofHistory
,NewYork:Cambridge,1968.
rd
ErnstBreisach,
Historiography:Ancient,Medieval,andModern
,3
ed.,Chicago:Chicago,

2007.