Preliminary Considerations

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the

DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs.
JOSEFINA B. VDA. DE NERI, SPS. GRACIANO B. NERI, JR. and
VICTORIA BABIERA, SPS. VICTORIA NERI and MARIO
FERNANDEZ, RAMON NERI, SPS. TERESA NERI and ALBERTO
YRASTORZA and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CAGAYAN DE
ORO CITY, respondents.
G.R. No. 139588
March 4, 2004

covered by the said title against the respondents on the merit that
the court has no jurisdiction over the person and the property by its
failure to comply with the mandated requirement by
Commonwealth Act No.141, Section 51 of a copy of an application
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title served on the Director of
Bureau of Lands and for the failure of the respondents to comply
with Sections 2 and 3 of PD 239 requiring them to the plan to be reverified and approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands.

A petition for review on certiorari filed by the Republic of the

Philippines through the Director of the Bureau of Lands before the
Court seeking to reverse and set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming the decision of the RTC which dismissed the
petitioners complaint for the annulment of Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 0662 and reversion of Lot 2821 in Cagayan De Oro
City to whom the heirs of Graciano Neri, Sr. filed an application for
judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title before the RTC
of Misamis Oriental.

On March 18, 1985, the Court rendered a decision in favor of the

petitioners. On July 17, 1985, Leonel and 22 others filed a motion
for leave to intervene praying that OCT No. 0662 be nullified on the
grounds that they are occupying the property even before 1969
and made extensive improvements thereto and that they were
never informed of Neris application in LRC Case No. N-531. The
Court denied the motion and dismissed the complaint and the
complaint-in-intervention for lack of jurisdiction and proceeded to a
full-blown trial and to submit memoranda in support of the parties
respective contentions.

The private respondents are owners of a certain parcel of land in

Cagayan de Oro City and they alleged that they do not know any
mortgage or encumbrances affecting such land or any other person
has any estate or legal interest therein legal or equitable
possession, remainder reversion or expectance and such land was
inherited from late Graciano Neri and prayed before the Court that
a Certificate of Title be issued in their favour under the provisions
of the Land Registration Act. Furthermore, they alleged that the
Bureau of Forest and Development had classified the subject lot as
alienable and disposable.

The court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint against the

Republic of the Philippines for failure to prove actual averments and
declaring as valid and legal all the proceedings taken by the Court
of First Instance of Misamis Oriental regarding OCT No. 0662. The
petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the
lower court gravely erred in rendering a decision without holding a
trial and giving an opportunity to appellant to present evidence
because it rendered judgment based on the pleadings
notwithstanding factual issues that were raised by the parties.

Thereafter the applicants filed an amended application in the same

case and the Court issued a notice of initial hearing addressed to
the proper parties. On the designated time and date, no
representative from the Office of the Solicitor General and the
Bureau of Lands appeared in court. The court then issued an order
allowing the applicants to adduce evidence ex parte. For failure of
the Office of the Solicitor General and Director of the Bureau of
Lands to appeal, the court rendered judgment granting the
application.
On January 5, 1981, the Office of the Solicitor General, for and in
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Director of the
Bureau of Lands, filed with the court a quo a complaint for the
annulment of OCT No. 0662 and the reversion of the property

Hence, the petitioner filed its petition for review on certiorari

praying that the Court resolved the issues.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC erred in rendering the decision without a fullblown trial, based solely on the pleadings of the parties and the
documents appended to their memorandum?
HELD:
A party may waive its right to present testimonial evidence and opt
to adduce documentary evidence and thereafter, submit the case
for resolution based solely on their pleadings and documentary
evidence.

The trial court dispensed with a full-blown trial because, precisely,

the parties themselves agreed thereto, on the claim that the issues
raised may be resolved on the basis of the pleadings, the
memoranda and the appended documents, without need of
presenting witnesses thereon. A party may waive its right to
present testimonial evidence and opt to adduce documentary
evidence and thereafter, submit the case for resolution based
solely on their pleadings and documentary evidence. In this case,
no less than the petitioner, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General through Special Attorney Vicente Seria, agreed to
dispense with a full-blown trial.

(5) Facts which are legally presumed.

However, to prove the material allegations of its complaint as

provided in Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court which reads:
Burden of proof. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present
evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or
defense by the amount of evidence required by law. Initially, the
burden of proof is with the plaintiff who initiated the action. But in
the final analysis, the party upon whom the ultimate burden lies is
to be determined by the pleadings, not by who is the plaintiff or the
defendant. The test for determining where the burden of proof lies
is to ask which party to an action or suit will fail if he offers no
evidence competent to show the facts averred as the basis for the
relief he seeks to obtain, and based on the result of an inquiry,
which party would be successful if he offers no evidence.

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES INC., Petitioner, vs.

BPI/MS INSURANCE CORP. and MITSUI SUM TOMO
INSURANCE CO. LTD., Respondents.
FACTS:
On Aug. 29, 2003, Sumitomo Corporation shipped through MV
Eastern Challenger, a vessel owned by petitioner Eastern Shipping
Lines, Inc., 31 steel sheets in coil from Yokohama, Japan for delivery
in favor of the consignee Calamba Steel Center Inc. The cargo was
insured against all risk by Sumitomo with Mitsui Sumitomo
Insurance Co., Ltd. On Sept. 6 2003, the shipment arrived at the
port of Manila. Upon unloading from the vessel, 9 coils were in bad
condition. The cargo was turned over to Asian Terminals, Inc. (ATI)
for stevedoring, storage and safekeeping pending Calamba Steels
withdrawal of the goods. When ATI delivered the cargo to Calamba
Steel, the latter rejected its damaged portion for being unfit for its
intended purpose. On Sept. 13, 2003, a second shipment of 28
steel sheets in coil was made by Sumitomo through MV Eastern
Challenger for transport and delivery again to Calamba Steel. This
second shipment arrived at the port of Manila on Sept. 23, 2003.
However, upon unloading of the cargo from the said vessel, 11 coils
were found damaged. The possession of the said cargo was then
transferred to ATI for stevedoring, storage and safekeeping pending
withdrawal by Calamba Steel. When ATI delivered the goods,
Calamba Steel rejected the damaged portion the same being unfit
for its intended purpose. Lastly, on Sept. 29, 2003, Sumitomo again
shipped 117 steel sheets in coil through MV Eastern Venus, again in
favor of Calamba Steel. This third shipment was also insured by
Sumitomo with Mitsui. The same arrived at the port of Manila on
Oct. 11, 2003. Upon its discharge, 6 coils in bad condition.
Thereafter, the possession of the cargo was turned over to ATI for
stevedoring, storage and safekeeping pending withdrawal thereof
by Calamba Steel. The damaged portion of the goods being unfit

In ordinary civil cases, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the
material allegations of the complaint which are denied by the
defendant, and the defendant has the burden of proving the
material allegations in his case where he sets up a new matter. All
facts in issue and relevant facts must, as a general rule, be proven
by evidence except the following:
(1) Allegations contained in the complaint or answer immaterial to
the issues.
(2) Facts which are admitted or which are not denied in the answer,
provided they have been sufficiently alleged.
(3) Those which are the subject of an agreed statement of facts
between the parties; as well as those admitted by the party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case.
(4) Facts which are the subject of judicial notice.

(6) Facts peculiarly within the knowledge of the opposite party.

The Court nullified Original Certificate Title No. 0662 under the
names of the private respondents and orders the reversion of the
property covered by the said title to the petitioner due to failure of
the respondents to comply with the requirements of PD 1529
before they filed their application for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title and the evidence showed that they failed to append
a survey plan duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands
to their application.

for its intended purpose, Calamba Steel rejected the damaged

portion upon ATIs delivery of the third shipment.
Calamba Steel filed an insurance claim with Mitsui through BPI/MS
Insurance Corporation (BPI/MS), and the former was paid the sums
of US$7,677.12, US$14,782.05 and US$7,751.15 for the damage
suffered by all three shipments or for the total amount of
US$30,210.32. On Aug. 31, 2004, as insurer and subrogee of
Calamba Steel, Mitsui and BPI/MS filed a Complaint for Damages
against petitioner and ATI. RTC rendered its decision against
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. and Asian Terminals, Inc. Aggrieved,
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. and ATI appealed to the CA. CA in its
decision affirmed with modification the RTCs findings and ruling,
holding that both petitioner and ATI were very negligent in the
handling of the cargoes. Petitioner and ATI filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but was denied.
Both petitioner and ATI filed their respective separate petitions for
review on certiorari before the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA committed any reversible error in finding that
petitioner is solidarily liable with ATI on account of the damage
incurred by the goods.
RULING:
No, CA did not commit any error. In petitions for review on
certiorari, only questions of law may be put in issue, thus,
questions of fact cannot be entertained (Sec. 1, Rule 45 Rules of
Court).
A question of law, on one hand, exists when the doubt or
controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence
to a certain set of facts, or when the issue does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the
truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact, on
the other hand, exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the
truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of
the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the
witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding
circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the
whole, and the probability of the situation.
The resolution of the question as to who between petitioner and ATI
should be liable for the damage to the goods is indubitably factual,

and would clearly impose upon this Court the task of reviewing,
examining and evaluating or weighing all over again the probative
value of the evidence presented.
While it is true that the aforementioned rule admits of certain
exceptions, SC finds that none are applicable in this case. The Court
finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the RTC which
were duly affirmed by the CA. Unanimous with the CA, the Court
gives credence and accords respect to the factual findings of the
RTC highlighting the solidary liability of both petitioner and ATI.
In sum, petitioner failed to show any reversible error on the part of
the CA in affirming the ruling of the RTC as to warrant the
modification, much less the reversal of its assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Rule 129
ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR. vs. AMERICAN
EXPRESS
INTERNATIONAL, INC., and/or IAN T. FISH and DOMINIC
MASCRINAS
G.R. No. 159507
April 19, 2006
Facts:
Saludo is a Filipino citizen, of legal age, and a member of the House
of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern
Leyte, Philippines. AMEX, Inc. is a corporation doing business in the
Philippines and engaged in providing credit and other credit
facilities and allied services with office address at 4th floor, ACE
Building, Rada Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City.
The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful
dishonor of petitioner Saludo's AMEX credit card and the
supplementary card issued to his daughter. Because of the great
inconvenience and damages that Saludo had experienced from the
bad faith, wanton, reckless and oppressive acts of respondents, he
then prayed AMEX be adjudged to pay him, jointly and severally,
actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
Respondents averred that the complaint should be dismissed on
the ground that venue was improperly laid because none of the
parties was a resident of Leyte. They alleged that respondents were
not residents of Southern Leyte. Moreover, notwithstanding the
claim in his complaint, petitioner Saludo was not allegedly a
resident thereof as evidenced by the fact that his community tax
certificate, which was presented when he executed the complaint's
verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at
Pasay City. To buttress their contention, respondents pointed out
that petitioner Saludo's complaint was prepared in Pasay City and

signed by a lawyer of the said city. Respondents prayed for the

dismissal of the complaint a quo.
Petitioner asserted that any allegation refuting his residency in
Southern Leyte was baseless and unfounded considering that he
was the congressman of the lone district thereof at the time of the
filing of his complaint. He urged the court a quo to take judicial
notice of this particular fact. His community tax certificate was
issued at Pasay City only because he has an office thereat and the
office messenger obtained the same in the said city. In any event,
the community tax certificate is not determinative of one's
residence.
The Court a quo decided in favor of the petitioner. The appellate
court on the other hand ruled in favor of the respondents. Basing
from Rule 4, section 2 of the Rules of Court, venue of personal
actions basically provides that personal actions may be
commenced and tried where plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, at the election of plaintiff. Venue was
improperly laid in the court a quo, according to the appellate court,
because not one of the parties was a resident of Southern Leyte.
The appellate court chided the court a quo for stating that as
incumbent congressman of the lone district of Southern Leyte,
judicial notice could be taken of the fact of petitioner Saludo's
residence thereat. No evidence had yet been adduced that
petitioner Saludo was then the congressman of Southern Leyte and
actual resident of Ichon, Macrohon of the said province. The
appellate court held that, based on his complaint, petitioner Saludo
was actually residing in Pasay City. It faulted him for filing his
complaint with the court a quo when the said venue is inconvenient
to the parties to the case. It opined that under the rules, the
possible choices of venue are Pasay City or Makati City, or any
place in the National Capital Judicial Region, at the option of
petitioner Saludo.
Issue:
Whether the court may take a judicial notice of a matter within the
locality where the court sits
Ruling:
Yes, it may.
The appellate court committed reversible error in finding that
petitioner Saludo was not a resident of Southern Leyte at the time
of the filing of his complaint, and consequently holding that venue
was improperly laid in the court a quo.
There is no dispute that petitioner Saludo was the congressman or
the representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte at the time
of filing of his complaint with the court a quo. As a member of the
House of Representatives, petitioner Saludo was correctly deemed

by the court a quo as possessing the requirements for the said

position, including that he was then a resident of the district which
he was representing.
Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone representative
of the district of Southern Leyte, had his residence (or domicile)
therein as the term is construed in relation to election laws,
necessarily, he is also deemed to have had his residence therein for
purposes of venue for filing personal actions. Put in another
manner, Southern Leyte, as the domicile of petitioner Saludo, was
also his residence, as the term is understood in its popular sense.
This is because "residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence
coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time."
The fact then that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate
was issued at Pasay City is of no moment because granting
arguendo that he could be considered a resident therein, the same
does not preclude his having a residence in Southern Leyte for
purposes of venue. A man can have but one domicile for one and
the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places
of residence. That petitioner Saludo was the congressman or
representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte at the time of
the filing of his complaint was admitted as a fact by the court a
quo. In this connection, it consequently held that, as such,
petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte, the district he was
the representing, could be taken judicial notice of. The court a quo
cannot be faulted for doing so because courts are allowed "to take
judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are
capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to
judges because of their judicial functions." Courts are likewise
bound to take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence,
of the law in force in the Philippines, including its Constitution.
The concept of "facts of common knowledge" in the context of
judicial notice has been explained as those facts that are "so
commonly known in the community as to make it unprofitable to
require proof, and so certainly known to as to make it indisputable
among reasonable men."
Moreover, "though usually facts of
'common knowledge' will be generally known throughout the
country, it is sufficient as a basis for judicial notice that they be
known in the local community where the trial court sits." Certainly,
the fact of petitioner Saludo being the duly elected representative
of Southern Leyte at the time could be properly taken judicial
notice of by the court a quo, the same being a matter of common
knowledge in the community where it sits. Further, petitioner
Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte could likewise be properly
taken judicial notice of by the court a quo. It is bound to know that,
under the Constitution, one of the qualifications of a congressman

or representative to the House of Representatives is having a

residence in the district in which he shall be elected.
CASENT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP., vs. PHILBANKING
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 150731 September 14, 2007
FACTS
In 1984, petitioner Casent Realty Development Corporation
executed two promissory notes in favor of Rare Realty Corporation
involving the amounts of PhP 300,000 (PN No. 84-04) and PhP
681,500 (PN No. 84-05). It was agreed in PN No. 84-04 that the loan
it covered would earn an interest of 36% per annum and a penalty
of 12% in case of non-payment by June 27, 1985, while the loan
covered by PN No. 84-05 would earn an interest of 18% per annum
and 12% penalty if not paid by June 25, 1985. On August 8, 1986,
these promissory notes were assigned to respondent Philbanking
Corporation through a Deed of Assignment.
Respondent alleged that despite demands, petitioner failed to pay
the promissory notes upon maturity such that its obligation already
amounted to PhP 5,673,303.90 as of July 15, 1993. Respondent
filed on July 20, 1993 a complaint before the Makati City RTC for the
collection of said amount.
In its Answer, petitioner raised the following defenses:
On August 27, 1986, the parties executed a Dacion en Pago which
ceded and conveyed petitioners property in Iloilo City to
respondent, with the intention of totally extinguishing petitioners
outstanding accounts with respondent. Petitioner presented a
Confirmation Statement dated April 3, 1989 issued by respondent
stating that petitioner had no loans with the bank as of December
31, 1988 and that petitioner complied with the condition in the
Dacion regarding the repurchase of the property since the
obligation was fully paid. Respondent sent confirmation statements
in the latter months of 1989, which showed that petitioner had no
more outstanding loan.
The parties failed to reach an amicable settlement during the pretrial conference. Thereafter, respondent presented its evidence and
formally offered its exhibits. Petitioner then filed a Motion for
Judgment on Demurrer to the Evidence, pointing out that the
plaintiffs failure to file a Reply to the Answer which raised the
Dacion and Confirmation Statement constituted an admission of the
genuineness and execution of said documents; and that since the
Dacion obliterated petitioners obligation covered by the promissory
notes, the bank had no right to collect anymore.

Respondent subsequently filed an Opposition which alleged that

the grounds relied upon by petitioner in its demurrer involved its
defense and not insufficiency of evidence.
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner and dismissed the
complaint.
Respondent appealed.
The appellate court ruled that under the Rules of Civil Procedure,
the only issue to be resolved in a demurrer is whether the plaintiff
has shown any right to relief under the facts presented and the law.
Thus, it held that the trial court erred when it considered the
Answer which alleged the Dacion, and that its genuineness and due
execution were not at issue. It added that the court a quo should
have resolved whether the two promissory notes were covered by
the Dacion, and that since petitioners demurrer was granted, it had
already lost its right to present its evidence.
The CA found that under the Deed of Assignment, respondent
clearly had the right to proceed against the promissory notes
assigned by Rare Realty.
Petitioner asserts that its obligation to pay under the promissory
notes was already extinguished as evidenced by the Dacion and
Confirmation Statement. Petitioner submits that when it presented
these documents in its Answer, respondent should have denied the
same under oath. Since respondent failed to file a Reply, the
genuineness and due execution of said documents were deemed
admitted, thus also admitting that the loan was already paid. On
the other hand, respondent states that while it failed to file aReply,
all the new matters were deemed controverted pursuant to Section
10, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court. Also, the loan which was covered
by the Dacion refers to another loan of petitioner amounting to PhP
3,921,750 which was obtained directly from the respondent as of
August 1986. Furthermore, petitioner argued that assuming
respondent admitted the genuineness and due execution of the
Dacion and Confirmation Statement, said admission was not allencompassing as to include the allegations and defenses pleaded
in petitioners Answer.
ISSUE
Should judicial admissions be considered in resolving a demurrer to
evidence. If yes, are the judicial admissions in this case sufficient to
warrant the dismissal of the complaint.
RULING
The petition is partly meritorious.
Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has completed
the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for

dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff
has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have
the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on
appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to
have waived the right to present evidence.
What should be resolved in a motion to dismiss based on a
demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief
based on the facts and the law. The evidence contemplated by the
rule on demurrer is that which pertains to the merits of the case,
excluding technical aspects such as capacity to sue. However, the
plaintiffs evidence should not be the only basis in resolving a
demurrer to evidence. The facts referred to in Section 8 should
include all the means sanctioned by the Rules of Court in
ascertaining matters in judicial proceedings. These include judicial
admissions, matters of judicial notice, stipulations made during the
pre-trial and trial, admissions, and presumptions, the only exclusion
being the defendants evidence.
Admission of the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion and
Confirmation Statement does not prevent the introduction of
evidence showing that the Dacionexcludes the promissory notes.
Petitioner, by way of defense, should have presented evidence to
show that the Dacion includes the promissory notes.
In 1989, however, Rare Realty defaulted in its payment to
respondent. Thus, respondent proceeded against the security
assigned to it, that is, the promissory notes issued by the petitioner.
Under these promissory notes, petitioner is liable for the amount of
PhP 300,000 with an interest of 36% per annum and a penalty of
12% for failure to pay on the maturity date, June 27, 1985; and for
the amount of PhP 681,500 with an interest of 18% per annum and
a penalty of 12% for failure to pay on the maturity date, June 25,
1985.
WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the CA are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
Solidbank v. Mindanao Ferroalloy
GR. no. 153535, 464 SCRA 409
July 28, 2005
Topic: Court may take judicial notice of bank proceedings
Facts:
The Korean corporations namely, the Ssangyong
Corporation, the Pohang Iron and Steel Company and the Dongil
Industries Company, Ltd., together with the Maria Christina
Chemical Industries (MCCI) decided to forge a joint venture and
establish a corporation under the name of Mindanao Ferroalloy
Corporation (Corporation). Before the said Corporation started its

operations it secured a loan from the Solidbank. As the business

continued, its indebtedness became greater than its assets. It again
secured a loan from the said bank through its representatives
however, the former and the latter agreed to restructure the two
loan availments. To secure payment of said loans, the Corporation,
through its representatives, executed a Deed of Assignment in
favor of the Bank covering its rights, titles and interest over the
Mitsubishi Bank Ltd. Tokyo for the account of Ssangyong
Corporation. Aside from this, it executed an additional security by
way of Quedan.
However, after the execution of said deeds, the Corporation
stopped its operations. It failed to pay its loan availments and
afterwards, failed to comply with the series of demand for payment.
As a result, the said bank filed a complaint against the respondents.
The lower court decided in favor of the respondents stating that the
petitioner failed to adduce a morsel of evidence to prove the
personal liability of the said respondents. On the other hand, the
petitioner interposed an appeal from the decision of the Court. The
CA affirmed the decision of the lower court and took judicial notice
of the practice of the banks and financing institutions to
investigate, examine, and assess all properties offered by
borrowers as collateral , in order to determine the feasibility and
advisability of granting loans.
Issue: Whether or not bank practices may be proper subject of
judicial notice
Ruling:
Yes, the court may take judicial notice of the bank proceedings as
provided by the rules of court.
The rules provide that while a court is not mandated to take
judicial notice of this practice under Section 1 of Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court, it nevertheless may do so under Section 2 of the
same rule. The latter rule provides that a court, in its discretion,
may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge,
or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
Thus, the court has taken judicial notice of the practices of
banks and other financial institutions. Precisely, it has noted that it
is their uniform practice, before approving a loan, to investigate,
examine, and assess would be borrowers credit standing or real
estate offered as security for the loan applied for.
Rule 129. Topic on judicial contents of another case:
Gener vs De Leon, GR No. 130730, October 19, 2001

courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of

the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried
or pending in the same court, except when with the knowledge of
the adverse party reference is made to these cases and the latter
did not object thereto.
Facts:
Respondent De Leon filed a forcible entry case against petitioner
Gener, alleging that he is the original claimant and actual
possessor in good faith under a bona fide claim of ownership to a
certain parcel of agricultural land in Bulacan. The said land was
part of the bed of the Angat River which was formerly adjacent to
the boundary of lot that is covered by the Certificate of Title of De
Leon. A flood caused that part of the river to develop and elevated
and dried up land where De Leon extended occupation, planting
and cultivating coconuts, bananas and vegetables. In May 1989,
Gener allegedly through force, threat and intimidation unlawfully
entered the property and deprived De Leon possession thereof. De
Leon demand Gener to vacate the premises but was ignored.
Efforts to settle the dispute amicably thru the brgy justice system
did not prosper prompting De Leon to file an ejectment case
against Gener.
Gener on the other hand denied all allegations of the respondent
and claimed to be the real owner of the property as evidenced by
the notarized deed of sale which was executed in October 1988 by
Benjamin Joaquin who is the heir of the former possessor of the
land, Proceso Joaquin. The land was declared for taxation purposes
in the name of Gener and declared the land as private. De Leons
father, in an affidavit, mentioned that P. Joaquin was the owner the
neighboring lot in the east side of their lot.
Gener further attested that it was De Leon who forcibly entered the
lot in question as evidenced by two criminal cases on malicious
mischief he filed against the workers of De Deleon who entered the
disputed land and destroyed the planted trees thereon. He also
invoked that the right to file an action for ejection already
prescribed after filing the same beyond the 1 year prescription
period. Trial ensued where Gener is the only witness to his defense
while De Leon presented oral testimonies of witnesses who stated
that he was the owner of the lot in dispute. Gener presented a deed
of sale, a tax declaration of the land in his name and recalled the 2
criminal cases he filed on malicious mischief against the worker of
De Leon. The MTC ruled in favor of De Leon but the decision was
reversed by the RTC and dismissed the forcible entry case against
Gener. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the decision of the
RTC and reinstated the decision of the MTC. A motion for
reconsideration was then filed before the SC.
Issue: Whether or not the ejectment case may lie against Gener?

Ruling:
The court ruled that in the ejectment case the issue to be resolved
is who would be entitled to the physical or material possession of
the property in dispute. Respondent De Leon has his claim founded
from the presentation of testimonial evidence of various witnesses
while Gener has his claim founded on documentary evidence which
the MTC failed to appreciate during the trial. As against the mere
testimonial evidence relied upon by respondents that they were
forcibly ejected from the land by petitioner on May 8, 1989, the
documentary evidence of petitioners prior possession, more
particularly the evidence of the two (2) criminal charges he filed.
Oral testimony, depending as it does exclusively on human
memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence,
especially when said documentary evidence is not opposed. The
MTC should have taken judicial notice of the criminal cases
presented by Gener. While as a general rule the court is not
authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of
other cases even when such case is tried or pending on the same
court, the exception to this rule is that in the absence of objection
of the other party, the court may treat such evidence as part of the
original record of the case when it is presented or referred to with
the knowledge of the adverse party who fails to object thereto, the
MTC should have taken judicial notice of such fact to resolve the
case in an expedient manner.
It can thus inferred that Gener took possession of the property
earlier than Oct 1988 which was the date he first filed the criminal
case on malicious mischief and De Leon filed the petition for
forcible entry in April 1990, the cause of action already prescribed
thus the MTC has no jurisdiction to hear the case. The SC dismissed
the complaint on forcible entry witout the prejudice to file an
appropriate action in the RTC.
PEOPLE VS. POLICARPIO
G.R. No. L-69844, February 23, 1988
(the signing of a receipt is in the nature of an extrajudicial
confession; inadmissible for having been given without assistance
of counsels)
Facts:
In response to a tip from an informant, operatives of the Narcotic
Command, Camp Crame proceeded to Bagong Bayan, Rizal to
entrap the accused who is believed to be engaged in the sell and
distribution of Marijuana. Pat. Mangila who posed as a buyer met up
with the accused together with the informant. Upon receiving the
marijuana leaves from the accused, Pat. Mangila tendered to the
former the marked P20.00 bill. Pat. Mangila then made a signal to
his companions and the accused was arrested. The marked bill was

confiscated from the accused. The latter also led the operatives to
his house where 6 small plastic bags of marijuana were confiscated.
The accused, along with the confiscated prohibited drugs were then
brought to Camp Crame.
At the PC Headquarters, the accused signed a bond paper
acknowledging that the six small plastic bags of marijuana leaves
were confiscated from him. He likewise signed a document
acknowledging the fact that the marked P20.00 bill was confiscated
from him. Similarly, accused signed a sworn statement where he
opted not to give statement until he is represented by a counsel.
The RTC of Rizal convicted the accused with Violation of Section 4.
Article II of Republic Act 6425 as amended.
Issue:
Is the receipt of acknowledgement signed by the accused
admissible in evidence?
Ruling:
No.
The appellant was the victim of a clever ruse to make him sign
these alleged receipts which in effect are extra-judicial confessions
of the commission of the offense. Indeed it is unusual for appellant
to be made to sign receipts for what were taken from him. It is the
police officers who confiscated the same who should have signed
such receipts. No doubt this is a violation of the constitutional right
of appellant to remain silent whereby he was made to admit the
commission of the offense without informing him of his right. Such
a confession obtained in violation of the Constitution is inadmissible
in evidence.
Rule 130
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RUFINO UMANITO
G.R. No. 172607 April 16, 2009
DNA Evidence
FACTS:
The instant case involved a charge of rape. The accused Rufino
Umanito was found by the RTC guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape. he alleged 1989 rape of the private complainant,
AAA, had resulted in her pregnancy and the birth of a child herein
after identified as "BBB." In view of that fact, as well as the defense
of alibi raised by Umanito, the Court deemed uncovering whether
or not Umanito is the father of BBB. With the advance in genetics
and the availability of new technology, it can now be determined
with reasonable certainty whether appellant is the father of AAA's
child. The DNA test result shall be simultaneously disclosed to the
parties in Court. The [NBI] is, therefore, enjoined not to disclose to

the parties in advance the DNA test results. The [NBI] is further
enjoined to observe the confidentiality of the DNA profiles and all
results or other information obtained from DNA testing and is
hereby ordered to preserve the evidence until such time as the
accused has been acquitted or served his sentence. The DNA
analysis on the Buccal Swabs and Blood stained on FTA paper taken
from [AAA], [BBB], and Umanito, to determine whether or not
Umanito is the biological father of [BBB], showed that there is a
Complete Match in all of the 15 loci tested between the alleles of
Umanito and [BBB]; That based on the above findings, there is
a99.9999% probability of paternity that Umanito is the biological
father of BBB. The defense admitted that if thevalue of the
Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a
disputable presumption of paternity.
ISSUE:
Whether Umanito is the biological father of [BBB].
RULING: Court resolved, for the very first time, to apply the then
recently promulgated New Rules on DNA Evidence (DNA Rules). The
DNA testing has evinced a contrary conclusion, and that as testified
to by AAA, Umanito had fathered the child she gave birth to on 5
April 1990, nine months after the day she said she was raped by
Umanito.
Disputable
presumptions
are
satisfactory
if
uncontradicted but may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence (Rule 131, Section 3).The disputable presumption that
was established as a result of the DNA testing was not contradicted
and overcome by other evidence considering that the accused did
notobject to the admission of the results of the DNA testing
(Exhibits "A" and "B" inclusive of sub-markings) nor presented
evidence to rebut the same. By filing Motion to Withdraw Appeal,
Umanito is deemed to have acceded to the rulings of the RTC and
the Court of Appeals finding him guilty of the crime of rape, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuaand the
indemnification of the private complainant in the sum of
P50,000.00.Given that the results of the Court-ordered DNA testing
conforms with the conclusions of the lower courts, andthat no
cause is presented for us to deviate from the penalties imposed
below, the Court sees no reason to deny Umanitos Motion to
Withdraw Appeal.The instant case is now CLOSED and
TERMINATED.