Professional Documents
Culture Documents
in Post-Cominunist Europe
ffiCNMBRIDGE
qtr uNrvERsrrY PREss
Contents
pdge vul
List of Figwres
ix
xi
List of Tables
I'reface
r
L
l
4
s
h
7
Introduction
An Experiential Approach to Societal Continuity and Change
A
Appcndix B
A lrpcrrdix C
ppcndix
Appcndix
r6
3r
57
9z
IZI
r46
t64
r67
17O^
175
ll('ercnrces
t89
Irttlcx
zor
Tables
Figures
3.r
i.,
page 33
36
Society
Average Number of Org anrzational Memberships per Person,
Prior Regime TYPe Averages
6z
4.2
64
4.3
4.r
5.9
MembershiP
Post-Communist Disappointment and Organrzational
MembershiP
4.2
4.j
4.4
by CountrY
5.r Income and organizational Membership
-5.2
Education and Organ tzatronal Membership
5.3 Ag. and Organ tzattonal Membership
i.4 Gender and Organ rzatronal Membership
Membership
i.S
-5.2 City Size and Organ rzatronal
Any Voluntary Organizations
Not
for
Reasons
Joining
-S
.7 Mistrust of Communist Organizations and Organ tzattonal
Membership TodaY
g persistence of Friendship Networks and Organ tzational
.
4.r
69
4.5
4.6
94
97
4-7
4.8
98
4-9
95
99
T03
4-r o
ro6
4.
ro8
,t.t
IIO
.+.r
\.
6t
65
to r99i-971
Country Rankings
Changes in Levels of Membership, r 995-97 to r999i
'Western
Germ any
Russia, Eastern Germany, and
Economic S7ell-Being and Organtzatronal Membership
Political Rights and Civil Liberties and Organ rzatronal
Membership
" Civili zatron" and Organ Lzatronal Membership
Prior Regime Type and Organ rzatronal Membership
Democratic Longevity and Organ rzattonal Membership
(Post-Authoritarian and Post-Communist Countries Only)
OLS Regression Analysis of Aggregate Membership in
Volun tary Organ izattons (All Countries )
OLS Regression Analysis of Aggregate Membership in
Volun tary Organ rzatrons (Post-Autho rrtaruan and
Post-Communist Countries Only)
OLS Regression Analysis of Aggre gate Membership in
\ft>lunt
page
7r
73
75
77
79
8o
8z
83
84
88
(,ourttrics Orrly)
( )l ,S ltt'grt'ssiorr Arralysis of lndividual-[,eve[ Membership
irr Vollnlt:lry ( )r'g:urizrttiorts (ltussirt, lirtstcrn (]ermany, ancl
89
Wt'slt't'lt (,t'l-lll:llly.,
('(
llttllirlt'tl
too
t\
List of Tables
5.2
'Western
5.3
6.r
B. r
C. r
D. r
D.z
D
roz
r42
R.espondents
177
Preface
III
r67
17T
178
r 8r
xii
Preface
projcct trct't'tcttdotrsl y.
llrlsr) ()w('nr:lny tlr,url<s lo tlt,,rt'wlt,,ltr'l;tr',1 tttc itt ltttsrt,t .tlt,l ( 't'l'ltl,lllI
wlritt, I w:ts ('()ntlrr,, rirrli nr\1 lit'l.lrv,,tl*. lrr l(''.'.t,t, I u,,,ttl.l ,",It't l,tllt' lrl,.t'
th is
Preface
xlll
I
Introduction
This book explores the general theme of how people adapt to a new democratic system, concentrating on the citizens of post-communist Europe, who
have lived through tremendous political and economic changes over the
past two decades. It traces their life experiences and trajectories, from living in communist political and economic systems to adapting to the rapid
and sweeping changes of post-communist democracy and market capitalism. In states where the Communist Party dominated for decades with its
omnipresent ideology and mechanisms of social control, ordinary people
developed strategies for getting by in an economy in which shortages were
rampant, and in a political system in which laws and institutions rarely
functioned as intended or promised. This book shows how, to what extent, and in what ways these adaptive strategies have persisted in the new
post-communlst era.
More specifically, this book focuses on civil society - conceived of as
e crucial part of the public space between the state and the family, and
crnb<ldied in voluntary organizations - and it seeks to explain why postc<rmmunist civil society is distinctively weak, characterized by low levels
of <trganizational membership and participation by ordinary citizens. The
rrsscrtion that civil society is weak throughout post-communist Europe denrrrrrds evidence and explanation. A major task of this book is therefore to
l)rcscnt a clear and detailed account of comparative levels of participation
in voluntary organizations across a wide set of countries. This "empirical
lr:rscf irrc," which introduces original and recent sources of data, provides an
t.rrrpiric:rl foundation to debates that are frequently marred by incomparable
tlirtir, with conclusions often reduced to hunches and wishful thinking. While
rlrc cstrrlrf ishnrent of a broad comparative baseline of organizational membcrslril'r is csscntial to this book, its most important and challenging task is
to ploviclr.rr cirus,rl cxplatttrtiotr to acc()unt f<lr the particularly low levels of
P(,sl ( ( )illtllu n lsl clvl(' l)ll rrlclpiltl()11.
POST.COMMUNIST EUROPE
Although the topic, data, theorS and methods of this book are of wider
relevance for comparative politics, the specific project focuses on the region of post-communist Europe in order to explain a remarkable pattern
of low, perhaps even declining, rates of participation in the volunt ary organrzations of civil society. These consistently low levels of org anrzational
membership are especially surprising given the well-documented increases
in the numbers of existing orga ntzatrons in the region since the collapse of
communism.t
Throughout the book, I refer to "post-communist Europe" as a distinctive
and coherent region. The very use of this phrase necessitates a definition of
which types of countries are included and a discussion of how the region
has been viewed and treated by other scholars. My use of "post-communist
Europe" has both a geographic and a substantive component. GeographicallS it includes only those countries that arc located on the European continent, thereby leaving out non-European post-communist countries in the
Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as non-Soviet countries such as China,
North Korea, and Cuba. Although I believe that the similarities between
European and non-European post-communist countries are probably far
greater than most scholars reco gnLze, to include the non-European nations
in my analysis would go far beyond the scope of this book, as well as obfuscate its conceptual and thematic focus. Substantively, since I am primarily
concerned with the role of civil society in countries that are in the process
of dem ocratrzation - indeed, I argue that civil society requires at least the
minimum legal protection afforded it by democratic institutions - I am not
referring to countries that were blatantly non-democratic at the time I conducted my research. This distinction is import ant because, unlike studies
that focus on the entire universe of up to z8 post-communist countries in
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union ,' rt narrows the realm of cases
by
half , leaving those countries tha t arc generally the most
"pproximately
successful in both political and economic terms. In short, my use of the category "the region of post-communist Europe" is meant to encompass those
Introduction
post-communist countries on the European continent that have achieved at
least a basic minimum of procedural demo cracy.3
Broadly speakitrg, scholars have looked at the countries of postcommunist Europe in two different ways, emphasizing either the new
opportunities of the post-communist present or the lasting effects of the
communist past. The first approach, which was especially domin ant in the
early- to mid -r99os, either assumes or argues explicitly that contemporary
political and economic attributes and policies are the most important factors for explaining and predicting cross-national varration. Scholars have
emphasized a range of variables, including the "mode of transition,"4 po-
litical "craftrng,"s institutional design,6 and economic policies and conditions ., By focusing on such generic factors, analysts have been able to include
post-communist countries in a broader comp aratle framework, thus treating them as another set of "cases" to which they can extend the theories
and arguments developed in studies of Latin American and South European
countrles.
The second approach, in contrast, accounts for current developments in
post-communist countries by emphasizing causal variables that arc particular
legacies of the communist experience. Many advocates of this approach have
crttrcized the "tabula rasa" element of the first, which they view as ignoring
rhe crucial historical and cultural context of communism. The specific factrrrs of the second approach that scholars choose to emphasize are quite
varied; they include the nature and consequences of political opposition and
crises,8 the simultaneity of post-communist political, economic, and (in some
crrses) even national transitions re the particular institutional design of comnrunist systems,'o and the attitudinal orientations and behavioral practices
"
'
for example, Lester M. Salamon et al., Global Ciuil Society: Dimensions of the Nonprofit
Sector (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies, 1999); Civicu s, The New
Ciuic Atlas: Profiles of Ciuil Society in 6o Countries ( \Tashington, DC: Civicus, tggZ); Grzegorz
See,
Ekiert and Jan Kubik, Rebellious Ciuil Society: Popwlar Protest and Democratic Consolidation in
Poland, r9|9-r99j (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999).
'
for example, Valerie Bunce, "The Political Economy of Postsocialism," in Slauic Reuieut,,
Vol. 58, No.4 Gggg), pp. 756-793; M. Steven Fish, "Postcommunist Sr-rbversiorr: Social
Science and Democrattzation in East Europe and Eurasia," rn Slauic Raieu:, Vrl. .5[], No. 4
(tggg), pp. 794-84; M. Steven Fish., "The Dcterminarrts of liconorrric llcfonrr irr tlrt'l)ostCommunist \W<>rlrl," in F',ast l;,urr\rcan I'tililics tutd Sor'ir'fir's, Vol. r z., No. r (r..1r1ll)., pgr. lr 78:
M. Stcvclt liislr., "l)crttocr':ttizrtliott's llt'tlrtisitt's:'l'lrt'l)oslt()nlnttnrisl l'.xP1'1-ir'nrr'," irr l't*l
,\ttttir,l Af f,tirs,Vttl. 14. No. 1 (l.t.t,rl), l)l). I r r= 1,17.
See,
I explain and discuss my critena for selecting countries in much greater detail in Chaptet 4.
't 'l-erry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Modes of Transition in Latin America,
S<>uthern and Eastern Europe," rn International Social Science Journal, Vol. 43, No. z (r99r),
;tp.269-284.
'
(;iuseppe
[ | rr ivt'rsity l)rcss , 1 99 S)
l{ { irz,r.gorz. lil< icrt,'Tbe State against Society: Political Crises and Their Aftermath in East Central
.
li,rtt'r
Press.- T996).
'
that developed under communism.-' But the historical emphasis and causal
logic are similar, and the common argument is that without an understandini of the communist past, it is difficult to make sense of the post-communist
prir.rr, and furure. peihaps paradoxicallg while one might expect the power
has
of leg"cie, to decrease on., ii-., the scholarly attention paid to legacies
providing
system'
socialist
state
of
the
increased since the collapse
just discussed.
".,,rlny
a much-needed correction to the ahistorical approach
hotly debated,"
been
have
approaches
Although these two contending
from both.'l
elements
incorporate
io
trying
,.hJl"rs are increasingly
-arry
Mo.eover, scholars from Loth approaches
,,
Ken
Jowitt,
University of California
Press,rgqz);PiotrSztompka,..Civilizationallncompetence:TheTrapofP-ost-Comrnunist
Societies,"
inZehschriftftisoziologie,Yol.zz,No.z F9%),pp.85-95;PiotrSztompka,"The
in Comparatiue
Intangibies and Imponierables oi the Transition to Democracy," in Studies
,,
,l
.*.ttr"g. L.*".n
Karl, "The
schmitter and Terry Karl, on the-othec Philippe c. schmitter and Terry Lynn
Should
East
the
to
Far
How
consolodologists:
and
Transitologists
of
conceptual Travels
Valerie
They Attempt to Go?" in Shuic Reuiew,Vol. 53, No' r (spring 1994]), PP'r73-r85;
..Should Transitologists Be Grounded?" in slauic Reuietu, Vol. 54, No. r (1995)'
Bunce,
..From Iron Curtain to a Papp.rrl_r27; Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter,
in Shuic Reuieut'
i., c,rrt"ir* Grounding Transitologists or Students of Postcommunism?"
Vol. 54, No. 4 (1995)' PP.965-978.
aspects from both approaches, see, for example,-Juan J' Linz
that
For recent books
"o-birre
Europe,
and Alfred Stepan, problems of betnoaatic Transition and Consolidation: Southem
Press,
Universify
Hopkins
(Baltimore:
Europe
Johns
Post-C,omnu.tnist
and
South Americal
Post-cornnnnist
in
Design
Institutiotal
Pretss,
K.
ryg6); Jon Elster, claus offe, and Ulrich
S.rlrii, Rebuilding the Ship at Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); David
Property in Fast
Stark and L6szl6 Bruszt, Postsocialist Pathuays: Transforming Politics and
CentT
Sovietology.
,6 See,forex-amplc,hikicrt,'l'brsltlrtl4ttittslSrllr,/vlllrtttrr',Srr/rtt't:rltrltrsltlttlittttsiV;rlcriclJtlrrtt''
..I{t'giorral l)iflt,rt.tru.s irr l)r'rrrorritliz;ttiolt:'l ltc li.tst vrtrttc tlrr S,ttllr''' n l\*l '\rt'td Alh't's'
Vtrl.t.t'Nrl.1(r..rr1tl)'1r1r'rl|,,.,1ri|ltttlrr',..'|'|rc|,.,|ttt..t||,r,tlr.tttt,lr|l'lr'.t..rrti.rIrlttt''
Introduction
This study builds on the perspective and findings from the legacies approach'
but it complements it in two crucial respects' and, overall, it suggests a theoretical reconsideration of the question of the relative similarities or differences between the countries of post-communist Europe. First, given the
difficulty in compiling comparable data across countries and regions, the
studies that stress the differences among post-communist countries often
lack a concrete comparative reference point with which to evaluate and
compare those differences to those between post-communist and non-postcommunistcountries.rT Yet, without wider comparisons, it is difficult to specify bout different a difference is. In contrast, this book incorporates new
and wide-ranging sources of data to compare the membership patterns of
post-communist citizens to those of people from other regions of the world'
While there are of course differences among post-communist countries that is, levels of organizational membership are certainly not identical across
the region - these differences are relatively minor when seen from a larger
comparative persPective.
Second, while the emphasis on the differences among post-communist
countries may be appropriate for studies that focus on elites or institutions,
the findings of this book point to important, but often overlooked, similarities on the "mass" or societal level. Although the sudden disappearance
of communist institutions allowed domestic elites and foreign advisers to
create rapidly new political and economic institutions that differed gteatly
from country to country, societal similarities have been much more resistant
to change. In this sense, this study builds upon some of the findings from
recent comparative survey research, which has found striking similarities
rrmong post-communist countries, particularly with regard to such themes
ls the importance of freedom from state control and a common mistrust of
the organizations of civil society.'8
In short, the focus on ordinary citizens, by means of widely comparative data, introduces a new perspective on the coherence of postcommunist Europe as a region, and it thus complements and enhances the
currently dominant emphasis on post-communist differences. This is not
"
's
Scvcral importantexceptionsincludeLinzandStepan,ProblemsofDernocraticTransitionand
(imstiidati6n;Bunce, 'Regional Differences in Democratization"; and B6la Greskovits, TDe
l\litical Econottty of Protzst and Patience: East European and Intin American Transfonnations
(itnpared (New York: Central European University Press, 1998).
Scc cspccially the many studies produced by Richard Rose and his colleagues, including
f{rth;rrcl fl<rsc, "|rcedom as a Fundamental Value," in lnterrational Social Science lourttal,
Nr r. r .15 ( r 995 ), pp. 454-47 | i William Mishler and Richard Rose, "Trust, Distrust and SkepI it isrr r; l\ lru l;r r l;.vrt ltrir t iorrs of (liv il a nd Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies,"
n ht,t,,h,l t,llt,/rti s, Vrl. 5e, No. r ( , y.tZ), pp. 4 r tl-45 r; and Richard Rose, William Mishler'
.t1tf (llrrrrti.rrr llit(.rt)lcr. lr,r,,t\nt(ttnkl ltsAltenutliut's:llndcrstandingPost-CommunistSocir'll'' (ll,rllrttrotc: l,rlttts I lolrlittts I llttvt'tsity Itrt'ss, r.1'18)'
'Weakness
to deny the existence of many other differences among the countries and
societies of the region, but in terms of levels of membership in volunt ary
organizatrons, this variation is more acctxately viewed as "differences in degree"rather than as "differences in kind." In other words, not only do postcommunist citizens join organizations significantly less often than citizens
from other countries and regions of the world, but there is also less variation
among post-communist countries than there ts between them and non-post-
in volu ntary organi zations, however - and especially when viewed in a wide,
cross-regional perspective - the findings and analysis of this book point to a
striking simil arrty throughout the region of post-communist Europe.
CASE STUDIES
One way in which I demonstrate this similar pattern of relatively low levels
of membership in voluntary organizatlons in post-communist Europe is by
focusing on two case studies, Russia and Eastern Germany. These two cases
Introduction
differ greatly on most contempor ary factors that would constitute alternative
explanations of variation in levels of participation in volunt ary organrzations: economic levels are very high in Eastern Germany but extremely low
in Russia; politic al and legal institutions are very well developed in Eastern
'West
German system, while
Germany, which inherited the well-developed
the Russian political and legal systems are still very weak and undeveloped;
and both societies belong to different cultural and religious "civtlizations."
The substantial variation between these two cases in these areas provides
maximal analytic leverage for explaining the causes of the similarly low
levels of civic participation across post-communist Europ e.'e
f<rr example. But the term here refers to the contemp orary post-communist period, where
it is beyond dispute that Russia and Eastern Germany differ widely on the most commonly
articulated alternative variables. On the method of agreement, see John Stuart Mill, A Syst.cm of Logic: Ratiocinatiue and Inductiue (New York: Harper, fi46), Book III, Chapter 8, " Of
the four methods of experimental inquiry"; on most different systems designs, see Adam
l)rzeworski and Henry Teune, The Logic of Comparatiue Social Inqulry (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, r97o), Chapter z) "Research Designs." For a balanced discussion of
thc strengths and weaknesses of Mill's methods, see Stanley Lieberson, "Small N's and
llig Clonclusions: An Examination of the Reasoning in Comparative Studies Based on
rf Srnall Number of Cases," in Charles C Ragin and Howard S. Becker, eds.,What Is
tt (,asc? Exploring the Foundations of Social Inquiry (Cambridge: Cambridge University
f
"'
re In other words,
'r
'
tt
t'ss., 1r1.12).
lror' :ur cxccllent account of the economic problems in contemporary Russia, see David M.
W<r<rrlruff, Mtmqt tJnmade: Barter and the Fate of Russian Capitalism (Ithaca, NY Cornell
llnivt'r'sity I)rcss, tL).)q).On the problems of developing an effective legal system in Russia,
Pos/-Souiet Affairs,
lror nry owrr irrtt'r'1'rrctltion of thc liast-\West German division, see Marc Howard, "An East
(,r'rrrr,rrr l',tlrrrrt iry? t lrrtlcrst:rrrrlirrg tlrc Ncw [)ivision of Unified Germany," rnGermanPolitics
,trrrl ,\t,, lr'l1', Vol. t 1, Nt). ,l (t (/()S)., l'tlt. 49-7o.
\r'r' N.rrrr y l( rr',,, l{rrssl, trr litll..: ('ttlltrtt'iutrl (:(,ttt,(t'sttlitnt tltrritt14l'crcslroifta (lthact., NY: Cornell
i lt t t t'r'l ,.ll \, Itl t'rs. I .),) ')
.Weakness
Introdaction
Europe. It provides an opportunity to examine the origins and the core of the
state-socialist system, the country in which its effects were most pronounced,
and also in which contemporary post-communist problems are particularly
acute. Eastern Germany, in contrast, is the "critical case" to explain, because
it is so counterintuitive; having benefited from West German wealth and
institutions since unification, the expectation is that it should have a strong
and vibrant civil society today. In fact, however, increasinglS many of the
studies that compare Eastern and Western Germany have been concluding
'West are far greater than initially
that the differences between East and
expecred (and hoped). The most striking indicator of this persistent social
division is the intermarriage rate. In Berlin - which is, of course, the city with
the most interaction between West and East, where people from both sides
live and work in close proximity - the intermarriage rate between Easterners
and Westerners in 1995 was just 3.4y", a paltry figure when compared to
the rate of over zoTo between either group and foreigners.'a By 1998, rather
than increasing over time, the intermarriage rate in Berlin actually dropped
to under z.4o/o.zs In terms of participation in voluntary associations'
most studies show that the gap between West and East remains very large
as well.t6
,3
Jeffrey S. Kopstein and David A. Reilly "Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation
of the Postcommunist World," inVorldPolitics, Vol. 53, No. r (zooo), pp'r-7.
'a See Allgemeine Deutsche Nachrichtenagentuq "Die Ost-West Ehe bleibt auch weiter die
Ausnahme," in Berliner Zeitung, August 9, 1996.
,5 See Peter Neumann und Ulrich Paul, "Zehn Jahre nach der Grenz<iffnung entsteht eine neue
Berlin-Identitdt," in Berliner Zeltrzzg, November 9, 1999.
,6 See Stephen Padgett, Orgnzizing Detnocracy in Easten Gematry: Interest Groups in Post'Wade
Communist Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, zooo);
Jacoby, Imiation and Politics: Redesigning Modem Gertnarry (Ithaca, Nt Cornell University Press, zooo);
Bernhard Wessels, "Biirger und Organisationen in Ost- und Westdeutschland: Vereint und
doch verschieden?" in Volker Eichener et al., eds.,Probbtne der Einheit: Organkierte Interessen
in Ostdeutschhnd (Marburg: Metropolis-Verlag, ry9zl; Dieter Rucht, Barbara Blattert, and
Dieter Rink, Soziale Bewegtngen auf dem Weg zur lrctiwtionalisierung. Zum Strukturunndel
"alterntiuer" Gruppm in beidenTeilen Deutschlands (Frankfurt/M: Campus, t9971;Eckhard
Priller, 'Verinderungen in der politischen und sozialen Beteiligung in Ostdeutschland," in
'Wolfgang Zafp and Roland Habich eds. Wohlfahrtsentwicklung im uereinten Deutschland.
,
.Wmtdel
und Lebensqwlitiit (Berlin: Edition Sigma, r 996); l lclnrtrt K.
Sozialstuktur, sozialer
Anheier et al., eds., Det Dritte Sektor in Deutschland: Organisatiorcn 4tuischcn St.dal urd Murkt
ingesellschaxlzhen Wandel (Berlin: Fldition Signra, r ygfl);.liirgcrr llitrrr; I lwc Koch, :t rttl Stcph:t rr
Telschow, Sptttucrcine im Itlx'rgut11' l)fu Vutinsl'unls'lt'll itt (lsltltrlv ltl'ttnl(A'rt ltt'rt: Mt'yt'r
See
tund
Mcycr, r.29y).
Despite the wide structural differences between Eastern Germany and Russia
today the findings of this book point to striking social similarities, and
this evidence provides strong support for arguments about the lasting impact of the communist experience. Both populations are undergoing similar societal processes in coping with the legacy of a long experience of
living under a rigid communist system, while bitterly acceptittg the reality of a new political and economic order that many citizens akeady feel
has let them down. And the fact that these two societies which most
people would assume are completely different todaS over a decade since
the collapse of communism - show such similarities gives strong support
for the claim that, at least in terms of membership in volunt ary organizations, the differences between post-communist countries are best character:zed as differences in degree, not differences in kind. Although more
detailed research and analysis still needs to be extended to other countries in
post-communist Europe, particularly to those located between Russia and
Eastern Germany - both geographically and in terms of competing political,
economic, and "civilizational" variables - I argue that the same causal processes apply, in varyitrg ways and to varyitg degrees, to the rest of the region
as well.
,t'HE
lrrrt solves the puzzle, using two very different, but complement
dtY.-
cthodological approaches.
The following two chapters are primarily theoretical and conceptual. In
( ,lrarpter z) I present the theoretical framework that guides the rest of the
l,ook. After considering two alternative perspectives that emphasize the imlrrrrt:rnce of the state and the economy, I develop an "experiential" ^pptoach
Io societal continuity and change. This theoretical approach focuses on indivirlrrels as agents who make choices, and it emphasizes real-life experiences,
r';rtlrcr than general attitudes and orientations. I argue that for societal change
to r)ccr,rr rlr'!cl to last, a confluence of three factors must take place: first, new
rrrst it ut iorrs rrrtrst l-rc eruthoritative and binding; second, they should build
ul)()n t'ristirrg trrrditions llncl culture; and third, several decades and gener,r t iorrs ;u'(' rrt't'tlt'rl t o chrulllc 1-re oplc's hal-rits and acculturation so that the
,,o. rcl;tl r lt,utl'.(' is tlt'r'isivt' rtlttl t'lttltlrilrg.
rr r
'Weakness
ro
,ro* th"t participation is voluntary; (z) many of the private and informal
networks ihat developed under communism
because of the
politicization
and state control of the public sphere, as well as the shortage economy - still
persist today in an altogether new institutional environment' and they serve
as a disincentive for many people to join formal organizations; and (3 ) many
'7
Disrdrr, cspct.i;rlly pp. lt(r -ti7, r-lt7l Vlrrrlrrrrr Slrl;t1x'rtlrrlih, I'rtllh ,ttnl l'rir',tlc l.ilc
rl lltr,\tn,it l\t4ilt: (:lttu,lt,tl Vtilut.\ t,, l\*l .\l,iltrt llrr'rr,r (( )xlotrl: ( )rlortl I ltlivcrsily l'rcss,
World
r,rll,r),
Introdwction
rr
both of which are based on legal-rattonal institutions and organizing principles, and the three remainitrg arenas, which consist of organi zatrons and
groups of people. I contend that, whereas the groups of political society
consist mainly of political elites who are concerned with office-seeking
and individual power, and the organizations of economic society include
economic elites who are primarily interested in material profit, civil society
is the realm of ordinary citizens, who join and participate in organtzations
based on their own interests, needs, or desires, without directly seeking power
or profit - even though they sometimes strive for political influence and often
need financial support.
in thc older democracies and the post-authoritarian counIrit's. (,r)nll):lrcd to thc two othcr gr()Lrps, the post-communist countries are
.r lrrrost ('xclusivt'ly gr'orrp-rccl rtt thc lowcst levcls of <lrganizational member-
('()rrrrtrics than
rz
have declined significantly especially when compared to those in the postauthoritarian countries. Finally, from t995-97 to 1999' the levels of participation dropped in Eastern Germany and Russia, showing not only that
organizational membership is very low in post-communist countries but also
r3
Introduction
'$Thether
'l
r4
This book is based on several different types and sources of. data, and it employs multiple methods in an attempt to provide a causal explanation that is
theoretically and empirically convincing. In addition to analysis of existing
data and secondary literature, I incorporate the findings from my own empirical research, applying an inductive theoretical approach in conjunction
with both quantitative and qualitative methods. The combination of closedended survey data and open-ended interviews allows for an examination of
this study's central puzzle using two distinct, but complementary, methods of
gathering data, thus helping to corroborate and extend the book's findings.
The statistical analysis involves the testing and ruling out of a series of
alternative hypotheses, while demonstrating the explanatory power of the
three main theoretical factors that I hypothesize will affect organizational
membership. And the interpretive approach adds depth and flesh to the statistical findings; it contributes much more detailed, contextualized, and evocative descriptions of the argument's causal logic.
The use and combination of these two different methodological approaches provides a more rigorous application and test of the book's main
theoretical argument about the causal effect of people's prior experiences on
their current social behavior. Moreover, this methodological complementarity answers the recent calls from comparativists of all different theoretical
and methodological persuasions, who have been urging scholars t<l inc<lrporate multiple methods in their empirical rescarch.", Most inrportantly, tht'
"9 See,forcxantplt,(iirryKirrg, llolx'r't().Kcolt.rttc,.rrrtl Sl.llrcyVcrlr,r,l)rrnjlrlgl,xt,illrtrlttrt11t:
Sciuttilirlnli'rutrrinlltttlil,tlrt+'llrv,n,lt(l)rirrretorr:l'ultrr.totrllrrrvenrtyl'rr.rr,r,ru,1);l),rvrrl
Introdwction
r5
fact that these two different approaches point to the same results, showing
the same strong support for histori cal and experiential factors, gives even
more credence to the argument and findings than could be achieved if only
one method had been used.
to make
D. Laitin, "Disciplining Political Science," in AmericanPolitical Science Reuiew, Vol. 89, No.
z (tggS), pp. 454-456; and the chapters by Mark I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman,
Margaret Levi, Marc Howard Ross, and Ira Katznelson in Lichbach and Zuckerman, eds.,
Comparatiue Politics: Ratiannlify, Culture, and Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, rg97).
z
An Experiential Apptoach to Societal Continuity
and Change
r7
role of the state in strengthenittg civil society.' In other words, rather than
view civil society and the state in opposition to one another, or as being
" zero-sum, " one should consider how - historically, across countries, and
often in unintended ways - the state can be a maior actor in creating and
supporting civil society. Phrased as a social-scientific hypothesis, this argument predicts that a strong, active, and supportive state will encour age the
development of civil society.
INTRODUCTION
among elites and widespread corruption in almost all branches of government, the question of civil society has taken a back seat to the many other
ongoing elite-level, institutional, and ideological developments that dominate both the headlines and schola rly analyses of Russia. As other scholars
have shown, civil society rapidly disappeared from the Russian political and
scholarly agenda in the years followittg the period of mobrhzation around
the collapse of the communist regime.' Indeed, even though some scholars
have measured an increase in the number of organi zations, few people would
argue that civil society is vibr ant in Russia tod ay.r
Another important argument about the conditions, or even "prerequisites," for the development of civil society involves economics. This hypothesis predicts that a stable and functioning economic system, one that
enhances the material well-being of its cittzens, is necess ary for a country's
civil society to develop over the long run.4 The case of Russia once agarn
pr:ovides powerful support for this argument, as economic uncertainty and
chaos have persisted and even increased since the collapse of communism.
In other words, in such an unsettling economic climate, given that so many
'
'
See,
for example, Theda Skocpol, "How Americans Became Civic," in Theda Skocpol and
Morris P. Fiorina, eds., Ciuic Engagement in American Democracy ('Washington, DC: Brookings
f rr stitution Press and the Russell Sage Foundation, r9g9); Jonah D. LevS Tocqueuillel Reuenge:
,\tate, Society, and Economy in Contemporctry) France (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
l)rcss, 1 99il; Padge tt, Organizing Democracy in Eastern Germany;Peter A. Hall, " Social Capital
irr []ritain," in British lournalof Political Science, Vol. 29, No. I ftggg), pp. 417-46r.
St.c, fr>r example, M. Steven Fish, Democracy from Scratch: apposition and Regime in the New
Iitrssian Reuolution (Prrnceton: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Michael E. Urban,The
Iit,ltirth of Politics in Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, r991l. For a similar
rlisclssion about llastern Germany, see Charles S. Maier, Dissolution:TheCrisisof Communism
tttttl tltc I;,url tf l|ttst Ocrmany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, r9g7).
St.t.., {.or t'xlnr1'rlc., thc balanced and weil-informed account of the challenges facing Russian
'Weigle,
Russia's
rrrrtl its rclatiorrship with the Russian state, in Marcia A.
lleltttions in the Transition from Communism (University Park:
l'r'rrf rr),lv,rrri;r St:rtr' ( lrrivt'rsity l)rcss, zooo)., cspecially pp. 33j-379.
r t )f ( (lns('r ('(()rr()rrrit tlt'1rr iv:rti(vr ('tut lr',rrl t() ()r'll:lrriz,ccl :.tctiolt and revolt, but it is important
Itr tf r,,lurllrrrslr sPonl;nl('()r ts ltlltlt'sl h'()nr ()r'l,,:urizt'tl luttl sttstltirttd lnrticipatkm in a democratic
rvil
sor it.ty.,
I rl,rr,tl I'rojtt
l: ,\lttlt,-,\trialy
.,r'llrrtp,, 1,,,r .lr ('\,.'ll,'nl ;t(( ottrrl rll plr)lt'.,1 .tt liotts itt posl c()tllttltttlisf l)<llltlttl., s('('Ill<icrt trlrtl
fr rrlrrl.. lt,'1,,'llt,trt.' ('tt'11 ,\tt, 1,'11'.
I8
'Weakness
people are struggling to make ends meet, to survive through the next winter,
to help their family members and close friends, how can one expect them to
be founding and joining voluntary associations?
From the Russian story, as well as from those of other weakly institutionali zed states with struggling economies, it would seem that economic
instability and a lack of state support fully explain the weakness of civil society. But the low levels of org antzatronal membership throughout the rest
termined by the choices and actions of each and every individual in that
societg the most appropriate unit of analysis is the individual. Only by considering the motivations of individuals will we be able to understand and
explain their behavior. And only by considering individual behavior will we
be able to make sense of collective patterns within and across societies. Although such country-level variables as the economy and the roles of the state
and political institutions are important, a focus on individual-level factors
provides the most direct link to understanding and explaining organi zatronal
membership in a comparative perspectlve.
5 Padgett makes a similar point, as he writes that "Even in the 'leacling' post-ct)rrtmtutist c()r.nltries likethe CzechRepublic, Hungary and Polarrcl, whcrc rrurrkt't frrtnsifion rutd tlclnocrrttic
consolidation are most advarnced., cnre rgcrrt sot'io-t'cortorttic slt'ttc lrr cs ru (' ult( ()ttrltlr'iv(' l()
association:rl c<>llectivisltt." St'(' l):rrlpit'tt, ( )t,q,llti:,ttt,t4 I)t'tttrttttltY ttt li,,t\lt'tt, (,t't',,tttttlt., p. l(r(r.
r' Scc, frlrcxilr'r'rplt'., l,t'V/.,'lirtrlttt't,tllt", lit'r,t'il,t1t'r Pf r, !rt1 lr,t,.ttt,l lt.t.l;,1,'tl. ( )1.1', tttt':tt,.ql)t'tttt)t ttlr..]..'
itt lirtstt't'tt ( )rrtttrltty. PP, I 5 ., f,
r9
recreational habits and social and politic al participation - often remain relrrtively stable over their lives, adapted prim arrly to changes in the life-cycle
rrs they age. Moreover, the change may be only pafiral or temporaryr.Partral
change is often sparked by new circumstances, which lead people to reevalurr tc their prior experiences and change their behavior accordingly. But if the
ncw circumstances do not match people's expectations the change in their
lrclrarvior may not be long-lasting, and they revert to their earlier patterns.
t lltirnately, the process of interpretation and reevaluation is dynamic and
orrsoing, even if it does not necessarlly lead to lasting change.
Ilow clocs lasting societal change take place? \il/hen, ho*, and under
wlr,rt corrclitions cloes societal change become durable? My answer to these
ttrf ('stions irrvolvcs lroth institutional and cultural components, and I view
tlrt' pr'()('('ss rrs nrrrclr nrorc graclual ancl historically contingent than new ecorrorrrit irrstitrrliorrrrl tlrcorit's 1',r't'clict. My approarch to institutions follows the
lr.rtliliorr ol'lristoric'rrl irrstituti()n:llisttt" wlriclr clcfincs institutions "both as
l(,,,,r , r\lr,,lrl, r, ,lr(l I l,rr rlll t, ll,'ntrtr rrltI rultl ll,, ,\ll,'ttt,tlu,t'x, |.
r,\.
organ
differenti
of
action unier conditions
institutions can create confining condi
ity"'8 Moreover'
-odify
".rd
,o.i.tul ihurrg.. Althoug
long-lasting
thrJe factois take on lawli"ke properti
they do represent crucial factlrs in th
is likely to be only pattial and more easily reversible'
Now I turn to
The discussion thus far has remained at a vety abstract level.
post-communist expea mofe specific consideration of the communist and
describe
.i.".., i" "rder to substantiate my general claims. In this section' I which,
I
the transformative impact of the-communist institutional system,
on
effect
;;il;;h;i a significant, decisive, and in.many ways homogenizing section' I
th! reconfigu."1io' of communist societies. Then' in the following
choices
tufn to the post-communist time period, focusing on individual-level
andbehavior,andshowhowthelegacyofthiscommunistexperiencehasan
important and lasting influence on post-communist developments'
s Ira Katznelson, "structure and Configuration in Comparative Politics," in Lichbach and
Zuckerman, Comparatiue Politics,
p' roz'
partially
9 Katznelson. ,.Structure .nd Conigrrrrtion in Comparative Politics." Katzncls.n,
llltilitl
ilinls
ttt;tcro;ttl'tlysis
contigttrittivc
"rr
that
quoting from Margaret Somers, writes
'll
(()11(('l)ls'l() r(c()llstrll(l ;ttttl
tt'ttt''trl
artl
spatial
dcpl,rys
ihat
'vt't
Lyiic"l"n"rratiuity
'lttll)lrl)li('
ltisl.tir'tl :l(t()rs' lll(
timC irncl spircc thc orrtologicrl ll:lllrlliv(s:lrttl rtlrtli.lrslliPs.l
,ilrtl.rrllrrltlnltft;tltv(stl,,,ti,rl,,,tttllrtitlrv|r.,ttt,l1l,,',,t,,t.tltltl'''""ltottrrllllrrrtt'lttlltt'ts
'FJrrttltrtl\'lrl
lrlllr\( lrltrrlll\''
\"rttrt"
lvitlrollrIr t,lt'v.tttl rtttttl l"tt''""\tr'1\lrrlirtrtl(
lrr\"'i'rl\'t'rr'tllr'lrttt''
\,trorr l{rllrrr'l'rrrt"lrrlilr"lr\\'"rlltrl'(ll"'llrrrrrrll'rrl
.11p,f \,',r.rl
\','l rr,Ir')rJ'1,plr
""1 '""
ZI
The communist experience in Eastern Europe and the Soviet trJnion provides an excellent example of the transformative potential of institutions.
Before the establishment of the communist system, after \forld tWar I in
Russia and in the early post-\World \War II period in Eastern Europe, the
region consisted of a very diverse group of countries. In addition to having different religious faiths, havitrg belonged to different historical empires,
and having fought on different sides in both world wars, they had vastly
different levels of industrial :u.,atron and economic development, ?S well as
different political traditions. By the r95os, however, the communist leadership - enforced by the ruthless policies of "Moscow Centre" - had succeeded
in imposing and enforcing "replica regimes" that were charactertzed by the
same institutional and ideological rnechanisms throughout the Soviet bloc.'o
Although the communists certainly incorporated and reinforced pre-existing
historical tendencies," over the next jo years the "party of a new type" also
succeeded in creating a "society of a new type."
Ken Jowitt , an astute and original scholar in the field of comparatlve communism, has argued convincingly that the distinguishing feature of what he
calls "I-eninist" regimes was the concept of "charismatic impersonalism."
In a 1978 essaS he wrote: "In both liberal and Leninist regimes (in contrast
to peasant-status societies), social action is primarl\y oriented to impersonal
norms. Sfhat is particular about Leninist regimes is that impersonality is not
expressed in procedural values and rules (i.e., due process), but rather in the
charism atrc impersonality of the pafty organi zatlon The novelty of Leninism
els an organi zailonis its substitution of charismatic impersonality for the procedural irnpersonality dominant in the \7est " " In other words, like the liberal
societies of the \fest, communist societies were based on impersonal institutions and norms, but their central and defining feature was the existence of
rfre Communist Party as the locus and core of all social organizatlon' whose
lrLrthority was transcendent, unquestioned, and charismatrc.r3 Although the
(.xtent of that authority did vary somewhat across the communist bloc, and it
rlirninished over the decades of communist rule, the institutional charism a of
thc Communist Party remained a defining feature that distinguished Soviettype regimes from other forms of non-dernocratic rule.14
In a recent book, Valerie Bunce has provided a useful synthesis of the variorrs elements of that communist experience, which she refers to as having
''
(()rlnnunisl pcriod' scc Anclrcw C. Janos, "Continuity and Change in Eastern Europe:
ol l)ost (.ornnrunist l)olitics," in F,astF,urr$canPoliticsandSocieties, Vol. 8, No. r
(t',v',11),lrlt.I il.
' I(('lrrrrrtctl ,r., " I lrt' I r'rrrrrisl l'lrt'rr()nr('non.," in f owilt., Nr'ttr Wtryld Disrvder, yt. l.
' ; r\ 1,,,, ',t'r' \lt'1r111 11 | I l,rrr(,( )n. I tttt,',tntl lir'tutlrrlirttt: M,trtisttt tttttl ll.tt / )r'.sqqll ttf',\ttt'icl Ittslittltitttts
(( 1,,t1', I llrll, llrtt\( t"tl\ ,,1 N,rrllr ( .ttolttt,t l't("'1., ,,t't')
r l l .l, r r lrrgr tlr, ,lr,.tltr lton lrr lrvr r rr t otnrrrrrtrt',1 ,trt,l .rtrllrottl.ltt.ttt t('l',tttl(", ttl tttrt, lt
1',tr.tlt't
rlttrrl rrr ( lr,r1'g,1
tlrt'1111'
\lrrrtt'1',it's
':rr
"homo genrzing,"and her framing of the distinctive features of communism can serve to structure this discussion as well.'5 Bunce focuses on
four central factors: (r) "the ideological mission of the ruling elite," (t) "the
construction . . . of a conjoined economic and political monopoly that rested
in the hands of the Communist Party," 3) "the fusion of not just the polity
and the economy but also the party and the state," and (fi "the extraordinary institutional penetration of the state. "'6 All of these features existed in
communist systems across the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, with the
partial exceptions of the more pluralist Yugoslavia and, to a lesser extent,
Poland and Hungary.
Bunce's first factor refers to the fact that communist regimes, unlike authoritarian ones, which strive for stability and generally work within a capitalist economic environmenr, we re "future-oriented, avowedly anticapitalist
and premised on a commitment to rapid transformation of the economy,
the society, and, following that, in theory at least, the polity as well."'7 In
practical terms, communist countries - most of which were late economic
developers relying on nineteenth-century models of production and growth embarked on major plans of moderntzatton, which included increasittg
indust rraltzation and urbani zatron at the expense of agriculture, modern
technology, and socioeconomic development. The unfortunate legacy of this
strident and defiant, and ultimately defective, ideology is that much of the
region of the post-communist landsc ape is cluttered with inefficient and outdated factories, which have proven to be both difficult to reforrn and difficult
to abolish.
The sccepcl factor that distinguishes communist regimes is the complete
political and economic monopoly of the Communist Party. Unlike systems
that allow for private ownership and market competition, the communist
sysrem placed all responsibility for political, economic, and ideological planning in the hands of the communist elite, acting in the name of the Party.
This led to what T. H. Rigby calls a "mono-organtzatronal" order, namely
the substitution of the Party for pluralism and competition in all fields, areas'
and sectors.'B As a result, the state-socialist system came to be charactetrzed
by the interdependence, or even "fusionr" of economics and politics - both
of which had a built-in need for increasing growth and power - under the
dominating influence of the Party.'q This fusion explains, for example, why
communist regimes insisted on ensuring full employment, which was a political prioriqi, even if such a policy eliminated the elasticity of labor markets
r5
Institutions.
Institutions, pp. z | -z5.
Instilttlittrrs.,,l). ' |
T. F-|. l{iglty., 'l'br (,lt,tttgrtt,g,\,r'lt'l ,\1"'1,'rtt: NT,tttrt (
Ortrlt,tt l.,q,1,', /tlr/t ut lttttrtIi (l\1.1,'trltol: | ,lrr',rr.l I l;l'rr-
l|,
||ttrrtt.'\lt/,t,l'l\lll,ltt,,ltltt|ll'|l.,,||
1','
2)
mobility.""
Even further, the Pa fty actually attempted to supplant the very need for
independent social activity with a dense institutional web of groups and organrzatrons in which membership and participation were generally mandatory
or coerced" Few people could avoid this Party-state control of the public
sphere, since almost every child had to join the youth organizatron, and
almost every working adult belonged to a trade union and other mass organrzations." Bunce provides an evocative description of the "remarkably
r-rniform set of experiences" of communist citizens:
Whethe r cttrzens engaged in political, economic, social, or cultural activities, they
wcre controlled in what they could do by the party. Thus, the party did not just
orchcstrate elite recruitment, voting, attendance at rallies, and the content of the
rn:rss rncclia. It arlso functioned in the economy as the only employetrthe only defender
ol'wor'l<crs' rights (through party-controlled unions), the only setter of production
n()r'n)s., rurcl tlrc <>nly allocator of vacation time (while being the only builder and
Ittstitttlio,/.{, l). r
'
l'tit r rsl, )u
t tt t t
ior
i.
(
r)
I'r,'.,.,. t,,
,1). r .,1rrr
r.tllt {
11,11t1,
lltr'f /\,\/i
(ltr
irrtt'ton:
l)r
rt'13irncs., scc
irrrt'lolr Urrivt'r'sity
zA
maintainer of vacation retreats). At the same time, the party allocated all goods and
was the
set all prices. FinallS it was the party (sometimes through enterprises) that
opportunities
and
transportation,
sole distributor of housing, education, health care,
In short, the communist Party sought to monitor and control virtually every
aspect of economic, political, and even social life, and this feature distinguished communism from other non-democratic authoritarian regimes.
Another crucial element of the communist experience involves the peculiar social consequences of centralized economic planning. In an economic
system with chronic shortages,'4 only a few privileged people - usually elite
members of the Communis-t Party, who shopped at special stores that had
'western goods could avoid the long lines,. bland choices,
a full supply of
and frequently missing necessities, from salt to toilet paper, that marked the
situation and Communist Party constate ec;nomy. Together,
"tph.t. the economic
constricted and sometimes reshaped the range of
trol of the public
possibilities for thought and action. In other words, since the public sphere
i"", ,o politicized, cJntrolled, and monitored, and since valued goods and
servicesiere hard to acquire without connections or help, people developed
common patterns of adaptive behavior.
The central characteristic of these social and behavioral patterns was
the distinction between the public and private realms.'5 As Jowitt writes,
restating his own argument from almost 20 years earlier, -"The Leninist
experience irr F.astern Europe...reinforced the exclusive distinction and
dichotomic rrrrtrrgonism between the official and private realms.""6 Bunce
adds, " H<lr1logcnization also encouraged individuals within socialist systems
to {ivide their personalities into a public and conformist self, on the one hand,
and a privat. arrd -ore rebellious self, on the other - what was referred to
23 Bunce, Subuersiue Institutiors, p. 28.
,4 See the classic works on the state-socialist economy by Jlnos Kornai, including: Economics
system:
of shortage (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing companS t98o\; The Socialist
ih, potlfl*t n"onomy of Com*u.tnism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, r99z).
See,forexample,shlapentokh,PublicandPriuateLifeoftheSouietPeopb;OlegKharkhordin,
rhi cottectlui and. the lndiuidual in Russia: A Study of Practices (Berkeley: university of
California Press, r999).
,,The Leninist Legacy," in
,6
Jowitt, Neu.,'World Disorder, p. 287.ln his 1974 piece,
Jowitt,
regimes have stinrio*itt-*.ot., "Through their organization and ethos, then, [Leninist]
thrt lrc
,rlat"d u series of informal adaptive fesponses - behavioral and attitudinal thc
tratliof
basic
clcntcnts
certain
of
supportive
and
in many respects consrstent with
thc
tional political culture in these societies. These elements in tLtrrr rtrc rtrrtirhctic;tl to
(()rlr
()ll
I
strtr(ltrr(
rrn
cfhos:rrtd
with
society
of a regime and
"pp"urinaa
tlrc virtlrility ol irrr
''rttlitrttt'tl
pi"-anrnry relation.ship bt.twccrr tlrc prrblir ;rrrtl priv;tlt'tt'rtlltts.,ttt
ttt lllc tolr'rtl
IrIt,""'ttl
tlirllit:ltiltttistlt
orr
llrt'v:tltr,'ol
lriltl
r)orrrrs,
parr,rn"l rrrlcs ltntl
,.lli,.riu,.'rrrtitiprrrrt." Sr.r."l'olitir.rl (.rrltrrrc rrr I cttltttrl ltr';itrrtr",." rlr N,lr' \\i'rl,/ lllut'l't'
'j
pp. i,ir,
l.t
.'
Change
25
'ri llt'rrr||
z6
In this section, I introduce and develop the three main causal factors that
guide the empirical analysis in subsequent chapters of the book. I explain
why the mistrust of communist organi zatrons, the persistence of friendship
networks, and post-communist disappointment have a mutually reinforcing
negative effect on participation in volu ntary organi zatrons today. The common theoretical element of these three factors is experiential, in that they
connccr pcol-rlc's prirlr experiences, and their interpretation of those expericnccs, with tlrcir cu rrct'lt behavior.
Mistrust of Communist Organizations
One <tf the most striking features of state-socialist societies was the clear
distincrion between their formal institutions and the informal behavior
of people in everyday life. Every communist country had an intricately
organized,array of formal organizations having almost the same institutional form. These organizations included youth groups, the Communist
Party, trade unions, cultural federations, peasant and worker groups,
women's groups, and many others, ns well as less-politicized (but still
state-controlled) groups and organizations that ranged from sports clubs
to book lovers'clubs. Most people belonged to multiple organizatrons, but
their membership was often mandatory, coerced, or used for instrumental
purposes. Increasingly over the life of the communist regimes, as the Party
lost the legitimacy and popular enthusiasm that it had gcncnttccl irr its crtrlicr
stages, people joined organizatrons becausc thcy hrrrl to., lrt't'rtust'tlrc'y wct-('
7
"'lw, (,,lttt'Pls .l
)rl,,trl. ( )rlortl
rrll, rt- l(n',(', I t,'t.,l,,ttt
I tl,,'tlt' ((
r
)-7
threatened with negative consequences if they did not join, or because they
improved their career chances by joining. Only in the case of less politicrzed
associations, like book lovers' clubs and sports clubs, did people join for
less coercive or instrumental reasons.
- where membership
in state-controlled organi zattons was more a form ahty, a matter of obligation and expediency rather than deeply felt - was that relationships in the
private sphere were extremely meaningful and genuine. Broadly speaking,
r''- Scc'
il
for cxrunple, Giuseppe Di Palma, "Legitimation from the Top to Civil Society: Politico(,rrlturrrl Ohrrrrgc in llirstern E,urope," in WorldPolitics,Vol.44, No. 3 Gggt), pp. 49-8o;and
'/,bip,n it'w l{rrrr., ctl.,'f\tc llc.amcrgcnce
of Ciuil SocieQ in Eastern Europe and the Souiet Union
(lirrrltlt'r": Wt'stvit'w l)rcss., 1..19 r ).
lror lrrrllr('r ('rrrpiricrtlsul)l)()rt ol this lrrcl< <lf tr-ust, see Mishlerand Rose, "TrustrDistrustand
Sl,.t'Ptit isnr," 1)p. { rll 4srl:rrrrl l{i.lt:u'tl l{osr', "l)ostcor'nnrurrisrn ancl thc Protrlern of Trust,"
rrr | ,rrr\, l)i:rnr,,rr.l :rrrtl I\4;rtr l'. l'l,rttrrt'r; t'tls., 'l'ltt Oktlttl ll,r'srrrgt'rtcc tl'I)emrrrtlry,, zncl ccl.
(lt,r lrrnor(': f , rlrrr., I lr,;'tl,, ttr.. l lnr\ ('r.,rt\ ltr('s\1 t ()()()), lrlr. -rS t J(r i. Also st't' l'iott' Sztolttpl<:t.,
" f rrt',1 .rtr,l I nr('rlltrrli l)r'ln()r r.tt t' l("...orr,, lrortt l)rll;urtl," itt lttlt'ntttlituttll ,\tttitil,,,q1," Vol rr,
N,t t(t,trt(,), 1r1r t' (,!
'Weakness
28
there were two main reasons for this. First, because the formal and public sphere was highly politicized, and also tightly controlled, people could
express themselves openly only within close circles of trusted friends and
family. Second, because of the shortage of goods to buy in communist
societies, connections played an essential role, whether the need was for
spare parts
to fix a
car
stores.
two reasons why private nefworks were so important also correspond to two different, although sometimes overlapping, aPes of private networks that existed in communist societies. The first encompassed
how people socialized and with whom they spent their free time, and
the second involved a more instrumental use of connections to acquire
goods and services, and to get ahead in general.la The first type of network consisted primarily of a small number of close and trusted friends
and family membersl the second type included the many distant acquaintances or people with whom one interacted mainly for the purpose of receiving something. These two networks overlapped to the extent that close
friends and family also helped each other instrumentally, but only rarely
did instrumental acquaintances enter the small and trusted circle of close
These
friends.
Today, over a decade after the collapse of the system that had created
and sustained this vibrant private sphefe, networks of close friends and
family rcrnairr extremely prominent and important throughout the postcgtrrrnrrrrist rcgi<ur.15 The networks of instrumental connections, however,
hrrvt. charrgccl to varyirrg degrees across post-communist countries, since
thc rrrurl<ct cc()n()my can eliminate the need to acquire goods and services
through informal channels.35 In many'Western societies voluntary organizatiolls h:rve become central to the social and political culture, and people
join them to meet new people and to expand their horizons through public activities. In post-communist societies, however, many people are still
extremely invested in their own private circles and simply feel no need,
much less any desire, to join and participate in organizations, when they
feel that, socially they already have everything that they could need or
want.
34 For an excellent analysis of the use of connections in Soviet and contemporary Russia, see
Alena V. Ledeneva, Russia's Econotry of Fauours: Blat, NetworkinS, and Informal Exchange
(cambridge: cambridge University Press, rgg8). on Eastern Germany, see Beate Viilkcr
and Henk Flap, "Getting Ahead in the GDR: Social Capital and Statrrs Attaitrmcnt untler
Communism," in Acta Sociologica,Yol. 42, No. I (r999), pp. t7-34'
35 See also James L. Gibson, "sociarl Networks, (livil Socicty, rrrrtl tltt' l)rospt'tls lirr tlrt'(]rrt
soli<lating I{Lrssirr's l)crrrocrrrtic'li'rrrrsitiort," it Arrttrirrur futrnul,,l l\lilir,tl \tit'rttr', Vol. .1r'
(if)f(."
rrr
(1'1'1tr)'
Change
29
Post-Communist Disappointment
The third reason that helps to explain the particularly low levels of public
participation in post-communist Europe is the widespread disappointment,
and for some even disillusionment, with political and economic developments since the collapse of the state-socialist slstem.37 Although it is most
pronounced among those people who were personally involved in the movements leading to the creation of the new institutional order, this third factor
applies to the wider population as well. For most people throughout the former Soviet bloc, the years r989-9r represent a unique, momentous' and fascinating time in their lives, when their world was changing rapidly and dramatically. Although they had many fears and uncertainties about where the
changes would lead them, most people experienced at least a brief moment
of genuine excitement, hope, and idealism during those times of rapid transformation. Moreover, they shared the belief that the end of Communist Party
rule, the emergence of new democratic and market institutions, and at long
last the freedom and right to speak freely, to associate openly with others, and
to travel beyond the "iron curtain" would change their lives for the better.38
In the years since those dramatic times, however, many post-communist
citizens feel that they have been let down, even cheated, by the new system
that quickly replaced the old one. Even though a vast majority in every postcommunist country does not want to go back in time,3r the political and
economic systems that have since taken root seem to have disappointed most
people who had believed and hoped that a new political and economic system
would live up to their ideals. This disappointment has only increased people's
demobilization and withdrawal from public activities since the collapse of
communlsm.
In terms of societal change, the new post-communist institutions are still
perceived as being more incoherent than authoritative, more alien than
familiar, and still very new. As a result, the behavioral patterns in postcommunist societies can best be understood by considering the communist
institutions and their enduring legacy, rather than by focusing on contem-
'Weakness
3o
CONCLUSION
,.programmed,,, destined to remain the same their entire adult lives. only an
that is both dynamic and interactive, and that focuses on people's
"ip.o".h
actnal experiences,can lead to a more grounded and realistic understanding
of human behavior and societal change.
More specifically, in terms of the low levels of otganizational membership
in post-communist Europe todaS the main argument of this book - and one
that I document and tesi in Chapters 5 and 6, using both quantitative and
qualitative methods - emphasizes three main causal factors, and all three
involve people's ongoing reinterpretations of their prior and present experiences. these thtee factors consist of (r) the prior experiences that people
have with organizations, and particularly the legacy of mistrust of all formal
organizations caused by forced participation in communist organizations,
(z) the persistence of informal private networks, which function as a substitute f<>r, or altcrnative to, formal and public organizations, and (3) the
disappgirrtrlcrrt with the new democratic and capitalist systems of today,
whiclr has lcrl rnatry pcople to avoid the public sphere. As I demonstrate in
sulrscclucnt chrtptcrs, these three factors together present the most persuasivc accr>unt of the causal link between people's interpretations of their prior
and their current social behavior and activities.
experiences
'Before
turning to the empirical analysis, however, the following chapter
provides an account of civil society discussing how it should be conceptualized and measured and what role it plays in the context of democracy and
democratization.
INTRODUCTION
Only twenty years ago "civil society" was an arcane concept in political
theory. Today it is a term that floods academic, journalistic, and even everyd^y discourse. The concept of civil society was revitalrzed in the r98os by
the Polish opposition movement and the subsequent wave of dem ocratrzation around the world.' Since then, civil society as an object of study has
experienced a veritable explosion, and today it is commonly applied to very
different contexts throughout the world.'Inthe new post-Cold \War era, in
which many countries have embarked on various forms of dem ocratrzation,
civil society has come to be seen as one of the main indicators of that process.
Moreover, almost every large international foundation or institute has established some kind of "civil society initiative " for the purpose of monitoring
'
'
See, for example, the excellent account by Michael H. Bernhard, The Origins of Democ.Workers,
Intellectuals, and Oppositional Politics, 1976-198o (New York:
ratization in Poland:
Columbia University Press, r9%).
F-or just a few examples of recently published and wide-ranging applications of civil society,
see: Sheila Carapico, Ciuil Society In Yemen: The Political Economy of Actiuism in Modern Arabia
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Yossi Shain and Gary Sussman, "From
Occupation to State-Building: Palestinian Political Society Meets Palestinian Civil Societ5" in
()ouernment and Opposition,Yol.33, No. I ftgg8); Larry Diamond, A. H. M. Kirk-Greene,
rrrrd Oyeleye Oyediran, eds., Transition.Without End: Nigerian Politics and Ciuil Society under
lldlnngida (Bourlcler: Lynne Rienner Publishers, rygZ); Gordon White, Jude Howell, and
Slrrrrrg Xirroyuru-r, In Search of Ciuil Society: Market Reform and Social Change in Contemporary
(',ltirr,t (()xforcl: ()xforcl [Iniversity Press, r996); Sunhyuk Kim, "Civil Society and Democr':rtizrrti<rrr irr South Korc:rI.," in IQvca lrrurnal., Vol. 38, No. z (rgg8); Jeffrey Haynes, Democtitt'\t ttrrtl (',it,il ,\ot it'l'yt irr tltr 'l'l.tirtl Wtild: I>rilitir.s and New Political Mouements (Cambridge:
f 'olity l'rt'ss, t 1)t)7); lolrrr A. lr,ootlt ;utrl l):ttricilt llltycr Itichard, "Civil Society, Political
(,,rlrtl,rl, ,ultl l)t'rrrot'r;tliz;tlion nr (.r'rrtrrrl Arrrt'r'ic':t," irr lortrttll ol l'tilitics.,, Vll. (ro' No. j
1
,1,1S
PUBLIC SPHERE
3z
and strengthening civil society in countries across the globe, and especially
in post-communist EuroPe
A vibrant civil society is often seen as the key ingredientin the success
of advanced democracies in the west, as well as a panacea for developing
(based on legal-rational
institutions and
organizing principles)
(consisting of concrete
organizations and
groups of people)
For arr urrclcrstrrrrditrg of the place and role of civil society, it is useful to
start with ir wide view of social relations in any given democratic or dernocratizing system. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan. have provided a starting
point for it ir ftoua perspe6ive in their recent book, in which they disiinguish between fiu. int.i".ting and mutually reinforcing "arenas" of demJcratization:5 (r) civil society, (z) political societg (3) economic society'
(a) the rule of law, and (S) state buieauctacy' Figure 3'r represents my illustrated summary of these different arenas, and the interaction between
them.
3 For abalanced overview of some of these programs, see Thomas Carothets, AidingDemocracy
Peace,
Abroad: The Learning Curue ('Washingtona DC: Carnegie Endowment for International
1999).
MIT'Prcss', r 'lllz);
among others,Jean L. Cohen,ClassandCiuilsociety (Carnbriclgc, MA:
'l'btrnry (()rrrrrbritlgc., MA: Ml'l'
Prilitical
and
Socicty
Ciuit
Arato,
Andrew
and
Jean f. Cohen
press, r99z);Jr>hn Keanc., Dentrttrcttlt ttnil oitril Sotit'ly: ()rr tbt l'rrtli,ttttt(ttls ttf Iitrrttltt'tttt '\rt
(|otrlttllnt,ti ,\rrr i,tl rttttl l','lili,,tl l\tt('t't
cialism, the lrirrsltt,cls lit Dr,ltt)(.tit(\t, tttttl lltt, I'rtlilt'ttt rtf
("tt'tl \or rr'l\' (Nt'\\' \'ttrli: l'tcr' l'l't's\'
l'ltt'1,1,',r,,1
St'lilirrr;ul.'
(1.<rrrtl'rr: Vt,rso, ;r;i,ili); rrrr.l A,l;rrrr
See,
,,1r; .l
lt,ttt"tlt'rtl
rltltl l'rtlt""lt'l'lltrttt
{.l.
I lrt' Ar('n,t\
.Weakness
j4
and friendship networks, on the one hand, from civil society and the other
four arenas, on the other. This distinction refers to the important difference
between social activities that are within close and trusted circles and those
that go beyond them to involve interaction with other forms of organization in the society atlarge.In other words, there is a qualitative difference
between a gathering of family and friends - whether small or large, occasional or regular - and activities that involve a formally established group'
where diffeient kinds of people come together based on a common idea,
interest, talent, or cause.
Next, we should distinguish between the two arenas that are above, and
the three that are below, the dotted line in Figure 3 . r. The state bureaucracy
and the rule of law are based first and foremost on legal-rational institwtions
and organizing principles, which provide the essential core of any modern
democratic system. Political society, economic society, and civil society, in
contrast, .o.rritt of conqete organizntions and groups ofpeople that shape and
define the particular character of that democratic system. As indicated by
the thick arrow connecting these two categories of arenas, they interact in a
mutually reinforcing way. Indeed, the more the state bureaucracy and legal
systenl b...r,r. institutionalized along legal-rational principles, the greater
tire frccclorrrs arrcl <lpportunities for actors and organizations in economic'
politicrrl, rtrrcl civil society to associate. Similarly, the stronger and more inilrrcrrtirrl tlrcst'grou1'rs rlttd organizations become, the better the chances for
ltringing rrlrorrt r statc bureaucracy and rule of law based on legal-rational
principlcs.T
'
Thc rclationship among the three arenas located below the dotted line in
Figure 3 . r, consisting of concrete organizations and groups of people, is more
co-ple*. Simply put, political sociefy refers to elite politics, na,mely, political
leadirship and the competition for political power and office. Economic
society r.J.rt to the myriad of business organizations pursuing economic
profit in a capitalist system. Ciuil society refers to the realm of organizations'
g.oopr, and associations that are formally established, legally protected,
6 On the origins of the concept of the public sphere, see Jiirgen Habermas, The Sttuch.tral
Transformalion of the Pubtic Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Socie4r, translated
by Thomas Burger with the assistance of Frederick Lawrence (cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
r9g9); and craig calhoun, ed., Habermas and the Public sphere (cambridge' MA: MIT' Prcss,
r992]'.
7 The negative side of this mutual interaction is that witlxnil t lcg;rl rrrtiolrrrl slrtlt'bttrt'llttttrtcy
and rule of law, there can bc fcw opportrrrritit's for tht riglrts ()l ()tl',:ttli/:lli()tls:ttttl tilizt'tts to
,ttl( l.\txl.ltlrtll\.lll(l
t)r('ssrrr(.s.llrt'r..w,rrrlrllrt.littlr.lilir.lilr,,,,,l,rl{urtlr,'t,r;,,trt.t,,tt,,ll,'1irlr'ttt,'rr.rl1,tttt,t1,l,tttl,l
Democratization
35
autonomously run, and voluntarily joined by ordinary citizens. More explicitly, the conceptual and empiri cal feature that differentiates civil society
from political society and economic society is the important distinction berween the elite and the mass level. In civil society, individual members can
effect or prevent change by actirg through their organizatton In both economic society and political soci ety, however, individual elites still have the
power to control policies, even when they are not acting within, or on behalf
of, an organi zatron In other words, while political society and econgmic
society are composed primarily of elite actors and institutions in pursuit of
power or profit, civil society is the realm of ordinary cittzens, who join and
participate in groups and associations because of their everyday interests,
needs, and desires. Thus, unlike the organizations of political society and
economic society, the organizations of civil socie ty - although they often
seek political influence and are constantly in need of financial support
have neither power nor profit as their objective or rationale.B
Although I have just explained the crucial differences between these concepts, this does not mean that there are clear-cut conceptual or practical
lines separating them in the real world. On the contrary, there is a small
but signific ant ouerlap among the three arenas. As shown in Figure 3.2,
we can conceive of the three arenas as overlapping circles. The central
elements of political society consist of the leadership groups of political
parties, inter-party alliances, and professional politicians and elites. Economic society - which, with civil society, maintains a close connection to
the private sphere, since its origins stem from the very concept of private
property and personal and family entrepreneurship - includes, most importantly, businesses, financial institutions, entrepreneurs, and economic elites.
Finally, civil society encompasses a wide array of groupS, associations, and
organizattons, including community and local organizatrons; human rights,
peace, and environmental groups; educational or cultural activities; churches
l)lt l\ \
o Leadership Groups
of
Political Parties
o Inter - party alliances
o
Media
o Elite-based
Political Parties
o Labor Unions
o Professional,
o Environmental or ecological
Employer,
and Producer
Associations
o Economic
Interest
Groups and
NGOs
movements
o Education or cultural activities
o Churches or religious organizations
o Sports and leisure clubs
o Women's groups
o Veterans' organizations
o Youth groups
o
o
o Businesses
o Financial Institutions
o Entrepreneurs and
Economic Elites
Elderly groups
. Disabled
groups
o Self-help groups
Political/
(membership)
o Political Interest
Groups and NGOs
'Weakness
J8
than onetype of aren a atthe same time. For example, political interest groups
Democratization
39
strong support for the depiction in Figure 3.r of the interaction between
the two arenas above the dotted line (state bureau cracy and rule of law)
and the three arenas below it (political society, economic society, and civil
society).
Michael
e For example, Ernest Gellner characterizes civil society as "the social residue left when the
srate is subtracted. " See Gellner, Conditions of Liberty: Ciuil Society and Its Riuals (Ncw York:
Allen Lane/Penguin Press, 1994), p. ztzro See, for example, Andrew Arato, "Civil Society vs. the Statct: l)olrtlrtl 1..;flo-8t''" irt'li'/os,
No.4Z (r98r).
.f
r., ed
..,
Orsnanwnity
4o
In
combination of both spontaneous mobilization and loose organization.
they are formally organized, then they belong to civil societS
il;;;if
in Figure 3 .z
urrd in fact many of the examples of civil society organizations
,.f., ,o so-e for- of social rirovement. But what is distinctive about social
often resist their movement's institutional-ou.rn"rrr, is that their leaders
may be perceived as giving in or selling
formalization
such
izationbecause
Indeed,
out, resulting in the rapid demobilization of members and followers.
tend
witfiin the w]der .o.tr"", of civil society, social movement organizations
to come and go, or rise and fall, -o'L fttqotntly thanthe more."normal"
rr .".tya"y tip.t of voluntary organizations, thus resulting in what Sidney
bership
its own
tion and organization, but the point is that there will always be room
in. in,.rpr.otion about the extent to which empirical rcality fits a socialfor these inscientific catcgory. The key, as I develop in the last section' is
and
arbitrary
than
tathet
terpretations io t. .orrrirtint und comparative,
isolated.
Afurtherproblemconcernsthoseorganizationsthatfitthegeneraldefassociate
inition of civil sociery where ordinary citizens come together and
interests
those
where
but
concerns,
and
based on their common interests
KIan
Klux
Ku
the
should
example,
For
are anti-liberal or anti-democratic.
Federation
Russian
the
of
Party
iffft, the Mafia, or the Communist
The answer necessitates
ifpnEi be considered civil society organizations?
belong, and which do
groups
which
of
q,rulifi."tion on the demarcation
";r-,.-E;r" though the internal structure and dynamics of some non-liberal
anizations' only
gr;rrpt ,rr"y ,.r!-ble those of more
other gr<lups' ilr
4
that
those groups or organizations
of civil socicty'
realm,
a mutJaily recogniied public
ilr I ir lrlt
Intcgr.fc(l I)crs'cclrvt'olt soci:rl M()V( llr('rll\ rttt.l ltt'volttliott,"
('t
rt
lt ;ttttl /'ttt
l<t t
ilil ir s.
tttrttt'
r'l
4r
For this reason, I exclude extremist groups like the KKK, because they
are predicated on the denigration and destruction of other grouPS, whose
legitim acy they do not accept. I also exclude the Mafia, because it consists
of mainly for-profit criminal organi zatrons that place themselves beyond the
reach of the law. However, this is not to say that all org anrzations have to
be "good" or even benign to count as civil society organizatrons. The KPRR
for example, certainly has many distasteful attributes that may endanger
democratic stability in Russia, but it still accepts the rule of law and the right
of other pafiies and groups to exist.'B Although some may object that this
restriction adds a \Testern normative bias to the definition, it is important to
keep in mind that civil societS both as a theoretical construct and a practical
reahty, comes from the particular historical experience of the \7est. It is
therefore not at all a contradiction to specify that the groups belonging to
civil society must follow the general liberal democratic principles that have
long been associated with its development. re
A final and related point involves the distinction between "civil society"
and " social capitalr " two concepts that have become increasingly widesp read
in rece nt years, and that some scholars use indiscriminately or interchangeabIy. Social capital, as defined and applied most prominently by Robert
Putnam, refers to "connections among individuals - social networks and the
norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them. "'o The basic
18 For example, the KPRF proposed a motion in parliament rn 1996 that would have declared
the r99r dissolution of the Soviet Union illegal, but when the motion did not pass, the KPRF
-Weigle,
accepted its failure without seeking to go outside of the parliamentary system. See
Russia's Liberal Proiect, pp. 33o-33r .If , however, this situation were to change, and the KPRF
were to move in the direction that sorne analysts fear it might) one would have to reconsider
including it within the realm of civil society.
re For a similar argument andjustification for the exclusion of "fanatrcal organizations," see
M. Steven Fish, "Russia's Fourth Transitior," rnJournalof Democracy, Vol. 5, No. I Ggg+),
p.4t.Larcy Diamond also adds the following qualification: "To the extent that an organi-
fi
ffi;ii,::fi
'Weakness
4z
difference between the two concepts is that social capital is a broader and
more general category than civil society, for it encompasses all types of relationships between people, not simply public activities in a democratic and legal setting. In other words, while membership and participation in voluntary
irganizations are included in definitions of both civil society and social capital, the networks and activities of the KKK, the Mafia, or other malevolent
and anti-democratic organizations, which are excluded from civil society, do
count as social capital." Moreover, private networks and relations between
close friends and family members, which are excluded from the public realm
of civil society, remain quite important in most applications of social capital.
FinallS civil society is generally viewed as a behavioral and institutional phenomenon, whereas social capital emphasizes the more amorphous "norm"
or "value" of inter-personal trust. These distinctions are not meant to imply
that there is antagonism or tension between these two related concepts' or
even between those who write on one or the other of them. Instead, they are
meant to elucidate the differences between civil society and social capital in
a way that might help diminish the conceptual confusion that often prevails
in contemporary discussions.
Overal! the conception and delineation of civil society articulated in this
section remain true to the theoretical and historical origins of the concept and
to contemporary discussions of democracy and democratization. My own
contribution shows how different types of groups and organizations from the
real worlcl :rctuirlly fit into an otherwise mainly theoretical conceptualization
9f civil socicty. lJrrving specified what civil society is, and how it fits into a
wiclcr s<lcictal pcrspcctive, I now turn to a consideration of its importance
within thc ficlcl of cor-nparative politics.
A common understanding of most scholars who write about civil society however they may define or operationalize it - is the assumption that civil
society has a positive and beneficial influence. For most people, the term
immediately brings to mind a peaceful, moral, and idealistic image, which
is implicitly contrasted to its opposite, "uncivil society."" But what exactly
"
Aker the publication of Mahing Democracy Work, Putnam was criticized for not adequatcly
addressing what some scholars call the "KKK problem." To his credit, in Bowling Aknrc
he tackles the problem directly, including a short chapter called "The Darl< Sidc of Strcirtl
Capital," pp.35o1q.
",
Sometimes this contrrtst is nrirclc cxplicit; for cxrrtttplc, irr Itis ltr;tj,rr sPutlt olt ltrly 16, 1997,
(;('ll
entitlecl "Rclcwirrg thc $nitt'tl Nrrtiorrs: A l)tt,lltrtttttttt lot l(tlotrtt," IlN S((l('l:tly
crrrl l(tlfi Alttllttt rt'lt'rrttl t() lll( illlp()ltillrl 1',lolr;rl lttttl lt' "tt'tttlttt lltt'tttttttl3 rrl'trtrrivil
s.rit.lv' rritrrirr:rls, (l1rll l)1\ltr.t\ .1r(l lr'rorrrlr " l rr ,rr ( nll,tl',trrl', r',rltttttl tlt.tl ,l,r',1,';t,
k";u'tLr 'rrrtl
llll(l\'11 "1(l1l\" lll ltrr"l 'rttlltlllllll t l'rrt"1tt. 'rr'l'ttt
.t rl(\v l)(t\ll('(ll\r('rrll
lrrr"/'r'(l"rr'l'rrr
rttl\tttttttttttttttl
(.rrNfrr,l,l,.r,1,.lirr,r|rl\rtr,'lt'(ttttll,tltt'tt"l','ltlt'
Democratization
4j
are the benefits of civil society? This section briefly summarizes the main
arguments about the "virtues" of civil society, in order to justify why it
should be considered an important object of study in comparative politics,
particularly in the subfield of democ raclr and democ ratrzation.
Larry Diamond presents a general account of the role of civil society,
listing many ways in which it can exert a positive influence on the process
of democratic consolidation. According to Diamond, in addition to "checking and limitittg the power of the state," civil society "stimulates political
participation, develops a democratic culture of tolerance and bargarning, creates additional channels for articulating and representing interests, generates
cross-cutting cleavages, recruits and trains new politic al leaders, improves
the functioning of democ ratrc institutions, widens and enriches the flow of
information to cittzens, and produces supporting coalitions on beh aIf of economic reform ," all of which help to strengthen and legitim ate a democratic
state.'3 \(/hile Diamond adds that a strong civil society in itself is no substitute for solid political and legal institutions, which are a sine qua non for a
democ ratrc system, h. concludes that once these basic institutions are set in
place, civil society can and indeed must develop in order to establish a more
deeply rooted, legitimate, and effective demo crac)r.
Diamond's account provides a useful summ aty of the potential virtues of
civil society in a democ ratrc system, but we still need to explore how civil
society actually causes or influences them. Skeptics may remain unconvinced
by wide-reaching gen erahzations about the beneficial effects of civil society even those that seem logical or obvious - in the absence of concrete evidence
about how the causal mechanism works empirically. In other words, could
other factors, such as economic well-being, the effectiveness of democ ratrc
Irrstitution;rlizrttion," in American Behauioral Scientist, Yol. 40, No. 5 GggZ), pp. 562-514;
f(crrrrt'th Ncwtort., "S<lcirtl Oapital and DemocraCy," rn American Behauioral Scientist,VoI. 4o,
No. s (r,l 97), l')l). 575-5tt(',; Arrclrcw Greeley, "Colemern Revisited: Religious Structures
;rs rf Sortttt' ol Sot'irtl (,:rpit:r1.," irr Atttaric,trt 13chuuirtral Scicntist., Vol. 40, No. 5 ftggl),
l)l'). \fi z \().1; llolr l,tlw,rt'..ls;urtl Mirlr:rt'l W. l.'olt'y., "Soci:rl(,rrpit:rlantl tlrc Political F.crlrrorny
rrf ()ttr l)trtonlr'n1," irr ;\utr'ntrut llt'l,,tt'i,,titl ,\tit'ttlisl. Vol..1o, N<1. S (r.,r.)/), p;-1. 669-678
li,rl' | ..lrr,rr.l', ,rrrtl l\lrr lr,rr'l \\/, | .'lt'\', "( iv'rl Sot it't\, .rrr..l ,\,,t r.rl (,;rPitrrl !it'yorrtl l)rrlrrrnr,"' irl
\t tr'ttlt',1. \','l | '. Nr,, r (t,t,tli). IP tr | | l,; llrortt,t., l{ (,tls,lr k, " lltt'
44
for a democracy.
Overall, the scholarship on the effects of civil society can be broken down
into two general approaches. The first, most closely associated.with Putnam's
work, emphasizes the positive effects that participation in civil society has on
individuai people, which in turn contributes to a more peaceful, harmonious,
and democratic society. The second approach is generally associated with the
work of historical institutionalists, such as Theda Skocpol' who argue that
the organizations of civil society provide a direct source of popular influence
on politic"l or economic developments, thus benefiting individuals and sociery Of course, these two types of arguments are not mutually exclusive,
ol'l)opullr Satisfaction with Government and Regime Performance in GermanS" in
llririshlinrrtt,rl rtl'l\litit:alScicnce,Vol.zg,No. +(rgggl,pp.64t-672;MargaretLevi,"Social
rrrrtl Urrsocirrl (iat;itirl: A llcview Essay of Robert Putnam's MakingDemocracy Work," in
l\'litits o *nitty, Vrl. 24, No. r (r996), pp. 45-55.
Shrrpirrg
,5 'l'his :rrgurrrcrrt ulso cxte nds to the economic realm. Whether this involves employer associatiorrs, l,rlt6r uniqrts, 9r local government, it is generally accepted that a well-developed civil
society will contribute to a better functioning and more socially representative economic
system. An alternative explanation, however, that emphasizes the impact of institutional
incentives rather than social capital, is articulated by Lane Kenworthy, "civic Engagement,
Social Capital, and Economic Cooperation," in Atnerican Behauioral Scimtist, Vol. 4o, No. 5
'n
i\
r,r'l
45
and proponents of one often recogntze the importance of the other, but their
difference in emphasis - either on the value of participation or on the power
of institutional leverage - is analytically and substantively significant.
In terms of membership in volunt ary organizations - which is a criticaI element of his concept of social capital - Putnam incorporates Mark
Granovetter's classic argument about the paradoxical importance of distant or "weak" ties, as opposed to close or "strong" ties, when it comes
to finditrg employment or expanding one's horizon of life opportunities"'e
Close ties to family and friends are obviously still very much connected to
one's overall well-being; yet, in a larger economic and political sense, the
types of dist ant acquaintances that a person might make through organizatrons may actually be more valuable than family and close friends. As
Putnam describes, Granovetter's finding has been tested and confirmed in a
variety of contexts: "Dozens of studies from Albany to Singapore and from
Dresden to Detroit have found that at all levels in the social hierarchy and in
al| parts of the economy, soci al capttal is a powerful resource for achievittg
occupational advancement, social status, and economic rewards - perhaps
even more important than human caprtal (education and experience)."3o
More specifically, the basic logic of arguments made by Putnam and other
"social capitalists" is that civil society organizatrons serve as what Putnam)
paraphrasing Tocqueville, calls "schools for democracy""3r In other words,
L7 Pntnanr I*nuling Alone, p. z'87.
,
rtl lior cx:unprlc, hc fincls that "the more integrated we are with our communitg the less likely
w(,rrrc. lo cx1-lcrirrlrcc colcls, lrci,rrt lrttacl(s, strokes, cancer, depression, and premature death
of rtf l srtrts." l)ulttrtttt ., Iltttilirte Akttrt'., 1't. 326
;'r) St.t.M:rrl< (,r':urovt'tt('r', "'l'lrt'Slrt'rtgtlr ol: Wt'rtl<'['ics.," in Anteric.an
lournalof Sociolog,Vol.7B
.Weakness
46
explicitly political - the more they internalize the norms and behavior of a
participatory democratic citizenry,which can only strengthen the institutions
and performance of a country's democrattc government.
Unlike Putnam, who emphasizes the social-psychological benefits of consensus and cooperation that group participation will provide to its members and to society overall, historical institutionalists emphasize the role
of group conflict and struggle in shaping the development of modern
democracy.i' As Skocpol and Fiorina put it, "From an institutionalist
perspective, voluntary associations matter as sources of popular leverage,
not lust as facilitators of individual participation and generalized social
trust. " 33
equitable policy-making.
:+
3, For a clear articulation of this approach, see Skocpol, "How Americans Becarnc (livic,"
pp. z7-8o.In this tradition, also see Barrington Moore, Social Origins of l)ictakrsltip ,trul
(Boston: Beacon Press, r966); Thomas Ertmatr, Birth ttf tltc l,et'ittkrrr llttihlirty
Sates and Regimes in Medieual and Early Modarn li,ux4tc (('.lrtttbr itlgt': ( );t rr r h ritll',t' I lrr ivc rsit y
(
Press, r997); Dietrich Rueschcnrcycr, l.lvclyrrc I ltrlrt'l Stt'plrt'rts, rttttl lrrlrrr | ). Str'plrcrrs, irlrl
rl
47
reached.
I)*to"ro.y
talistDruek4tmutandl)nrxx'rtt<-y((lhitrrlyr:tlrlivcrsityol (lrr'r1i'rl'tr""',t't't')
llrcd;tSl<6ctr6l ,rrrtl M,,r risl'. liiorillr,"M,rliirrliScrrscol llrr'(tvt, lttl'..t1',r'ttt,tttl)rlr.ttr',"ttt
Democratization
t\
crrrlicr irr this chapte r, the historical institutional approach has contributed a valuable understiutrlirrg of tltc wrry irr which the state and civil society interact in a symbiotic relationship,
r':ttltt'r' tltrut sirtrply dcfinirrg orlc ils the absence of the other.
Arttv ( iulnr:uln, "l;t't't'rl<)n'l ()l' Associlrtiorr: Arr Irrtrclcluctory Essayr" in A-y Gutmann, ed.,
f irt r;tt,'t rllt', / ),'tu()( tilt I ut,'\ttt,'tl(,1. l). | ()().
\r'r' 'r,rnrrrt I I' I lrrrrlrrrt',lorr. I'1,,' I'l,tt,/ \\,{lr u': I)t'tttt,( t'ttli.!,tlirttt irt tltt, Ltllt,'lirrttlit,llt
(N,,tnt.ur I lnt\'('t,,tl\' (,1 ( )[l,rlr,,nt,r l't(',,.,. 1,1,1t ).
(',r,ttlur1t
48
civil
one major point of contention in contemporary discussions is whether
ideal
an
,*1.,y i, pri-"rily a normative and moral concept that serves as
participatory'
more
communicative,
more
become
to
societies
all
challenging
,-"rr.
"g-"rir"".ian,
Representing
op.ruti'orr"lized'andmeasured empirically by social scientists.
naive view
"the
th. for*.. view, Beniamin Barber dismisses what he calls
isolation,"
that facts arrd values can be easily sorted out and kept in splendid
,,the interdependence of the ideal and the actual does not
and he adds that
.anything goes,' b-ut it does close the door on some simplistic
mean that
there are
notion that we ."., .urily arrive at an 'objective' definition, or that
'scientific'
--Wftif. answers to our political questions' "18
I sympathize witl this desire to avoid pseudo-scientific reductionto civil
ism and naivet6, I am not willing to reject the empirical approach
the
next
is
rcsearch
,r.i.,y per se. on the contrary, I believe that comparatiue
common
some
without
society. And
-ujo. challenge for the study of civil
which to
standards - whether qualitative, quantitative, or both - with
of
the.attributes
olti-utely, understand
.""f"",., compare' describe,
"rri,
.iuil ,o.i.ty i' difi.r.rrt .o.ri.*tr, research on civil
society
Democratization
49
l)' : t ''
||llill];..'.I]i;,..,''..,,,'..,:::;;.,l]:,|'.1';',,'i;j;
l)l) t,,i I l,r\ 1.,tttrlll.tr r,l( ,'llt, t ,rrr,l J.ln(", \l,rlron, lt , "( ()n(('l)trr,rl'\trt'lt
lrrrrri'ltt'r'r,,rlr',1:
50
in non-'Western countries,
civil society - as a specifically Sflestern concept given that'-"ny oi these have recently embarked on various forms of
ivesternization that include the development of democratic and capitalist
systems based on an ideal-typical'Western model. At least within countries
that are to some extent democratizing, civil society - measured by voluntary organizations and participation within them - is a legitimate and
approp.iale object of exploration and analysis. That said, and here Hann's
becomes very instructive, when the results of this type of analysis
"ijrrr*n,
shlw social patterns that are distinct from those of Western countries, it
is crucial foi scholars to take the next step and explain why this is the
case.
Having addressed these two important challenges to, and warnings about'
the eripirical study of civil roii.tS I now turn to a discussion of two
alternatiive empirical approaches' I focus on how they have been, and
can be, applied to port-.o-munist Europe' particularly within a wider
comparative perspective.
The most common approach used in empirical studies of civil society
focuses on the orgurriruiio.rs and associations themselves. Many studies
presenr extensive d"tu o.r the distribution of different types of organi,oti.rn, within a country's civil society, listing the numbers and percentages <lf voluntary associations that break down into different categories.44
Thcrc arc rwo main problems with this type of report: first, the categories
0f tyl.rcs ()f organizations are rarely standardized, and they vafy tremen.l,ruriy fr.rrr st'cly to study, thus ruling out meaningful comparison across
cour;ics; ,...r,,.1, the data are often collected haphazardly, based on unclcar ancl unsystematic sampling methods, resulting in a dubious claim of
representatlveness.
The most interesting and productive comparative work on voluntary orscholganizations has been clnd,tcied in Germany where several groups_ of
'Western
and
Eastern
in
society
of
civil
aspects
I., h"u. compared various
Germany. Despite using differint empirical methods, focusing on different
r.u.hing different interpretations and conclusions, these
types of groupr,
".rd
.!r.ur.hltt emphasize the iommon empirical finding that civil society is
weaker, and in some cases substantially weaker' in the East than in the
Democratization
showing the changes in the number of registered groups over time. This
allows for an analysis of trends, a vital topic in most discussions of civil
society, which attempt to measure or predict changes in the level of civil society over time. In post-communist countries, these trends often show large
increases in the number of org annations. For example, citing a report by
the Social Statistics Department of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office,
Ferenc Miszlivetz and Jody Jensen write, "The data. . . show an unprecedented growth in the number of civil, nonprofit organizations in the past
five years," and they specify that the number of groups more than tripled
from 1989 to 1992.46 Similarly, Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik report an
enormous increase in the number of organizattons in Poland from 1989 to
1996.47 And Lev Jakobson, Boris Rudnik, and Sergei Shishkin show that the
number of organizattons in Russia has almost doubled from 1995 to 1997,
and even the r99j totals are certainly much higher than they were in the
early r99os.48
\7hile a consideration of trends in the number of registered organrzations is certainly more helpful than a simple typology of different types of
organizatrons, nonetheless it has several problems. First, once agarn, the
data should be viewed with a certain skepticism, given inconsistent methods
for counting the number of org antzations across countries, especially when
based on a sub-sample of organrzatrons. These discrepancies make comparative analysis particularly difficult and tentative, and the findings have only
limited utility for researchers seeking to establish a comparative "baseline"
<ln civil society across countries and regions. Moreover, as Putnam correctly
points out, most studies that count organi zal.:rons merely tabulate the number
'rt
See , frrr example, Padgett, Organizing Democrdcy in Eastern Germarry; Jacoby Imitation
tlnd l'rilitics; \7essels, "Biirger und Organisationen in Ost- und \Testdeutschland: verein t u rr cl cloch ve rschiec{en ? " in Probleme der Einheit; Rucht, Blattert, and Rink, Soziale
Rct/tizr"
Adapting categories in comparative Analysis," in AmericanPolitical scfuncc
(1993),
845-855.
No.4
PP'
aa
vrl
llT'
Forexample,or-rR,ls.i",r".F.M.Borodkin,"Tretii Sel<torv(iostrclrtrstvclilrtgotltrrstviy:r,"
lltrll'.rttt;t'
in Mir Rossii,No. z (r997), pp. 67-116. Also scc th('c()untry sttttlics ol Attstri:t'
(itty;ltt:1, ll:riti, llrrrrl',.11\'' I rtvir'
Canada. the (lzcch I{cprrblit, l)clrrttrtrli, li1,,yPt. l;rrtlr<t',
\( llr('rr irr( ]ivlr rt"'
Mcxico, Ntw /,t.,rl,tlrl. llrrssirr, Sl.vrrkirr, Sl,,ritt, srvitz, tl,ttr,l. Illr.rirrt,.rrr(l
'l'lu,Nttt,(.it,i,t\tl,t:.lrrtlrr'(ivi,rrr',,lrrrr.tlr,,l,tt.t.rr((rtrrl'rl((lrtr'.rlrlr(ll.llr(rllltlrllrrcrrt
rt,tts
llt tl .lll\
l lrllllr'lll''rrll
l{ 1,'t" (,lllllll{
\r l\
l( llll,ll'
l('
llrrrn., l(oclr.' rrrrcl 'l'clschow., Sprvtuereine im Ubergang. Also see the chapter "Germany," by
I lt'lrrrrrt l(. Arrlrcicr' irr ( livicus., '['loc Ncw Ciuic Atlas.
I't'r't'rrt Misz.livt'tz:urrl focly fcrtsctt., "An l'.n-rcrging Paradox: Civil Society from Above?"
lr l)it'tritlr ltrrt'stlrt'rrrt'yt'r; Mruilyrr l{rrt'scltcrncycr, ltncl I}yiirn Wittrock, eds., Participation
,tttrl I)t'urttt tttty li,l\l tuttl Wt'\l: (',tttttltrltisols tttttl Ittlt'rltrt'ldliolls (Arttrrlttl<., NY: M. E. Sharpe,
r ,,,)li ). I. |"i,1.
t\tlrts.
52
of
NGOs.5'
In other
4e putnam writes that "Nothing whatever can be inferred about the civic vitality of a community
from the birth rate of new organizations, unless at the same time we also examine the death
rate of older ones. The discovery that, say, half of all environmental organizations now tn
existence were founded in the last decade proves absolutely nothing about organizational
trends, unless we also know how many similar groups have disappeared over the same period.
1';'1'1)
Democratization
53
54
on attitudes and values that are standard in American and West European
surveys, scholars attempted to place post-communist countries into a larger
comparative context. This good intention was marred, however, by the fact
that many of the questions were either incomprehensible or meaningless to
many post-communist citizens - particularly during the time surrounding
the collapse of the Soviet Union - thus yielding results that were often inconsequential and sometimes baffling.l+
The best application of survey techniques to post-communist Europe has
come from Richard Rose and his colleagues, who have conducted regular,
extensive, and perceptive Surveys across most countries in post-communist
Europe. Instead of using a standard battery of questions from a'Western context, Rose and his collaborators developed the New Democracies Barometer
(NDB), a large questionnaire that measures' among many others, such concepts as support for the communist and the current regimes, optimism about
the future, multiple economic portfolios, and social capital. Moreover, their
publications pay careful attention to the historical context of the communist
experience, the revolutionary upheaval of ry89-9r, and especially the process of post-communist transformation.55 In fact, many other surveys have
begun to incorporate NDB questions as "models" to replicate.
Vhile the NDB provides a wide comparative basis across much of postcommunist Europe, its findings are somewhat limited in their applicability to
this project. First of all, Eastern Germany and Russia - the two case studies
at the heart of this book - are both excluded from the large database, although for different reasons. Because of what Rose and Haerpfer call the
"ready-rnade state," Eastern Germany is viewed as being "uniquely privileged," arrd therefore it is kept separate from the other post-communist
countries.s(' Russia, on the other hand, is considered so important that it has
its own New Russia Barometer (NRB), which does repeat parts of the NDB
questions, but is rarely included in the comparative analysis.5T Furthermore,
Culture in the Early t99os," in Miller, Reisinger, and Hesli, Public Opinion and Regime
change; william M. Reisinger, Arthur H. Miller, Vicki L. Hesli, and Kristen Hill Maher,
"Political Values in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania: Sources and Implications for Democtacy," in British Joumal of Political Scienc'e,YoI' 24, No. z (1994)' pp. 183-224.
54 For example, Jeffrey Hahn reached the surprising conclusion that " On the whole, the picture
of Russian political culture that emerges from this study is one not strikingly different from
what is found in Western industrial democracies." Hahn, "Continuity and Change in Russian
Political Culture," p. 4zo.
55 See the impressive synthesis written by Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer, Demttcraty and |ts
Abernatiues.
s6 SeeRichardRoseandChristianHaerpfer, "Thehnprrctof a Rcady-MirdcStrttc: li:tst (it'rrrr;trts
55
since the NDB includes only post-communist countries, it does not allow for
comparisons with countries outside the region. Of more importance to this
study than their case selectior, however, is that the NDB and NRB do not
ask any questions about membership in organi zatrons of civil society. This
is unfortunate, especially since they do ask respondents about their trwst rn
various institutions of civil society and these results are striking, showing
great distrust and skepticism.58
(\fVS), that
It'r r l( )c rrl
ti't,;ttiolt.
57 DemocracyandltsAhannttit'rs,thcnr;rjorPublitrtliortbrtsctl
l)('r\pt'rltv(', r;lllrt'r'lltrrtr lo irrtply tlrrrl it lrrrs its ()wn c()rtrsc rrlrcl logic that
Itottt lltost'ol ttt'rlqlrl't,rr inli (()urtlrit's llrrtt rtls., sltru't'tl rr sirrrilru'('()r'nrrrrurist
56
CONCLUSION
'ril7hile
sufvey research does provide the best method for cross-national comparisons of civil society such a "comparative baseline" is only a starting point
lo, -or. complicated and specific analysis to account for divergent' anomalous, or surprising results.'S7hether by making individual-level comparisons
between respondents' answers to other closed-ended survey questions - thus
E-pirical
Baseline
on the results from the ryiS-gZ'World Values Survey and my own replication of its basic question on organizational membership in surveys in
Russia and Eastern Germany in t999. The findings are quite striking, showing consistently low levels of organizational membership in post-communist
co".rnt.i.r, and they set the stage for more in-depth analysis
interpretive - which I conduct in the subsequent chapters'
statistical and
INTRODUCTION
Having defined and described the concept of civil society and justified the
need to measure it com paratlvely, I now present and analyze recent empirical evidence that includes a wide set of countries from around the world.
Although civil society is only one of many important challenges facing postcommunist societies and one should therefore be cautious in extenditrg
these results and findings to other issues - it does provide us with a baseline
from which to measure and compare types of democracy across societies.
Again, as emphasized in the previous chapter, while a vrbrant civil society in
itself is no guarantee of democratic survival, citi zen involvement and participation do represent an essential component of the quality of dem oqacy.
The main goal of this chapter is to present this empirical baseline - a consistent and comparative measure of membership in voluntary organizations
from a wide range of countries and regions - and to analyze the possible
causes of differing levels of organizational membership across countries.
Overall, the findings of this chapter point to consistently and system atrcelly low levels of membership thioughout the countries of post-communist
lrurope, when compared to the levels in many other countries from outside
t lrc region. After characterrztng and analyzitrg the particular weakness of
l)ost-communist civil society in this chapter, the followitrg two chapters apply individual-level analysis - using both a representative survey and in-depth
irrfr'r'vicws - in order to account for this strikirg finding.
I
ITEGIME ryPE
;J,'i,"']",::
,:,'1,',ll',','l'i;li::::: ,ll'',
l'l;,:il;:,
58
lrI
Sllll)'t'l ll. llrttttt's, "'l'lt,' [Vl.rlrilrz.tliptl 1l lt,tlttt,,tl ltlt'rrlrlt' lll Nt'rr' l)t'rtl()(l'lLl("'," lll
S;ltrttt.l l l ll,trrrt.,, ,rrrrl f .rrrr,., \111r,11, ,'.1., . ll,,' l'tt,.lrtttttttttttlt'.1 ( tlt"t'tt (ltrrrl.ll)t"'l: I t't'.lllll',
|,rtttrtl,tlturr. 1r1,1t'l). 1r t,'
St't'
59
While the uniqueness of the older democracies is fairly obvious, the distinction between the post-authoritartan and post-communrst categones requires further specification. For the most paft,I am followittg the pioneering
work of Juan Linz, although with several modifications for the purposes of
this project.s The post-authoritarian category generally refers to countries
that began to dem ocratrze either in or after the mid- r97os, countries in which
democ racy has generally been consolidated but not without struggle and
occasional setbacks. Linz defines the authoritarian regime type as follows:
"political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluraliSffi, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without
extensive nor lsic] intensive political mobilizatron, except at some polnts m
their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable
ones."6 My application of the authorrtarran regime type - or, when referring to the current period, the "prior regime type" of post-authoritarian
countrles - rs conslstent with Ltnz's definition, as well as with the country
studies in his book with Alfred Stepan, in which they present a chapter each
on Spain, Portugal, Greece, Urugudyr Braztl, Argentina, and Chile.z I have
a Note that \Testern Germany and Japan are included in this category, since both had pre.War
II democratic traditions and institutions that were rapidly reestablished in the
W<rrld
1-rost-war period, and which have remained stable and successful ever since (although in'West
which
"Tbtalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in Fred I. Greenstein
:rntf Nt'lsorr W. l)olsby., cds.., I-land(took of Political Science (Reading, MA: Addison-\7esley,
197\), l"rlr. t7r-4r r. lior 1l sununrrry of the rnain argument, see Linz and StepanrProblemsof
I )t'r t tt x rit I it' I'r,t t rsi t it t I tt ttd ( )t nr st ilitla l it tn, pp. 3fl-l+.
"Art Atrtlroritrtt'irtrt llt'girrrc:'l'lrc (lrtsc of Sprtin.," in Flrik Allardt and Stein
f rr;rrr I lirtz,
l(rrl,.l,.;ur, ('(ls , Mrrss l',lilits:,\lttrlits itr l'tlitiul,\rrr'lr tlt4qy (Nt'w Yorl<: lrrcc Prcss, rL)7o)., p. z,55
(r rlt'tl rrr I tt/ .rrr.l Slt'11:rrr, l'l,,l,lt'ttts ttf l)t'tttot titlir 'l'r,tttsiliotr tuttl (,oz.srlitlttit)rr, l). lll).
Scc
.f rr rr
"
Itorlrrli.rl,rrr,l (,r('('t('.u('t rrrtlotltttt.ttr'11', ttot ttr.'ltt.lt'.1 itr tltt'ttrosl r('(('ttl Wor-ltl V:rlrtt's Surv('y,
( ollnlil('\ ol Sottlltct rr l:trt()l)('.
6o
also included Bangladesh, the Philippines, South Korea, and South Africa,
which certainly belong to the post-authoritarian category even though they
are not located within the geographical areas in Linz and Stepan's study.8
In addition to democracy and authoritarianism, Linz defines and applies
two other regime types that are relevant here: totalitarianism and posttotalitarianism.e A totalit arian regime is one that "has eliminated almost
all pre-existing political, economic, and social pluralism, has a unified, articulated, guiding, utopian ideologg has intensive and extensive mobthzation,
and has a leadership that rules, often charismatically with undefined limits
and great unpredictability and vulnerability for elites and nonelites alike. "'o
\rhile the contrast between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes should
be clear, the post-to talrtarian regime type serves to capture those countries
that fit in between. Post-to tahtarian regimes, which emerge from within a
totalit arranregime after some period of thawing or loosening of control, and
which can range from "early" to "frozen" to "mature" post-totalttatianism,
tolerate more forms of pluralism than were permissible under the earlier totahtarian regime. That said, however, Linz insists that even post-totahtarian
regimes are significantly drfferent from author rtarranregimes in several ways,
most importantly in that they still permit much less social pluralism.
8 One could object that South Africa's "transition to democracy" was different from those in
the other posr-authoritarian countries, both because of the highly politicized nature of the
resistance to apartheid and because the authoritarian rule actually included a democratic
regime for the white population, and these inherited democratic institutions facilitated the
incorporation of the black majority after the collapse of the apartheid system. But since
Bo"/o of the population had lived under an authoritarian regime, deprived of basic political
rights and civil liberties, it still makes sense to include South Africa in this category of regime
type. Moreover, the undeniable vibrancy of South African civil society today stands in sharp
contrast to the low levels of membership throughout post-communist Europe; it is worth
remembering that many analysts had expected and hoped that post-communist civil society
would be strong, active, and vibrant, much like what has actually happened in South Africrl.
9 Linzalso discusses the category of "sultanism," which refers to the extremely repressivc ltttcl
arbrtrary rule of a single leader and his family, with very little tolerzlnce of s<>cial pluntlisttr.
I have omitted this category from my discussion, becaruse <xrly Romanirt - which w:ts rtls<r
a communist regime, ancl is therefore placc:cl in thc colnr'nutlist crttt:gory - fits tlrt'tlcfirtitiolt
of sultanism, lnd norrer of tl"rc otlrcr ('x:un1'rlt's ol:sttltrrnistit' rt'giltrt's (llrriti, tlrt' l)olttittit';ttt
llcprrfiic., thc (lt,rrtrrrl Alrit:rrr ltt'prrlrlir,lrrurr rrrtl Nor llr ltott':t) l;rll witlrirr llrt'tt';tlrrr ol tlris
6r
D emo
Arena Characteristics
Authoritarian
Totalit arian
Post-Totalitarian
Medium to high
Low to medium
Low
Low
Low to medium
Low
Constitutionalism and
rule of law
Low to high
Low
Medium
Low to high
Low
Low to medium
Medium to high
Low
Low to
autonomy
autonomy of state
bureau cracy
(communist)
or medium
low-medium
(fascist)
Note: The character of the arenas in the prior nondemocratic regime in the period relatively
to the start of the transition is of greatest importance for the tasks democratic leaders
will face. The less developed the arena, the greater the tasks democratrc leaders will have to
accomplish before the new regime can be a consolidated democracy.
Sowrce:Linz and Step an, t996, Table 4.r,p.56 (the table and note are reproduced exactlg except
that the additional category of "sultanism" has been omitted, for reasons explained earlier).
close
In this chapter, I inco rporate the k.y assumptions and definitions of Linz's
typologS but I orga nrze it slightly differently. I group the totalit arran and
post-to talitarian ideal types into one categorS which, for the sake of clarity
and simplicity I call "communist. " I believe that this combination is justified, particularly when communist regimes are distinguished from authoritarran regimes. Indeed, dS Ltnz and Stepan themselves write, "Empirically,
of course, most of the Soviet-type systems in the r98os were not totalitarian.
However, the 'soviet type' regimes, with the exception of Poland, could not
be understood in their distinctiveness by includitrg them in the catego ry of an
tlo pr'oviclc strong support for [,inz's conceptual distinctions, showing that
llrir)r' r'('llirrrt'lypt' r-('nllrirrs ll cr'r,rcilrl c:irtcg<lry fr>r understar-rding current levels
st rrtly.
l('| | 1rZ ;ttrtl Slr.;r.1tt, l', ttltlt'ttt,.,tl I)t'utttr lrlllt I't,ttt',llttttt ,ltttl ('t)tl',t,lt,l,tlt,,/,. l)
'1,,
|| | rtrz .ut(l \l('lt,tn. l't, tlrlt'ttt., ttl Ilt'tnttr tttltr 'l't,ttt.'tltrtu ,ttttl ('t,n\(,lt,l,tltt,r/i
l) .l |
Li
In this section, I present the empirical findings from the \7orld Values
Survey questionnaire. My objective here is to charactertze my dependent
variable - membership in the nine different types of volunt ary organizations
listed in the previous chapter - as precisely and thoroughly as possible, show-
c(dN
OO\
tl t^
.9, o\
=o\
F
trq)
ing patterns and vanatrons across countries and regions. Overall, the results
FS
EE
o-
provide strong and clear empirical evidence that membership in volu ntary
organi zatrons is significantly lower in post-communist countries than in both
the older democracies and the post-authoritanan countries.
Before turning to each of the nine specific categories of org anrzations,
Figure 4.r presents a highly aggregated and broad view of the average overall
membership, comparing the three categories of prior regime type. " Although
one might expect that the post-authoritarran and post-communist countries
would be relatively similar, given their prior non-democratic regimes, we see
that the post-authoritarian mean on both scales is actu ally closer to the older
democracies than to the post-communrst average.
Figure 4.2 presents these findings in somewhat more detail, with the
prior regime type averages of all nine categories of org anrzations. The results show very clearly that, for all types of organizations except labor
unions, the post-communist mean is much lower than the means in the
other two groups, and the difference between the older democracies and
post-authoritarian averages is relatively small when compared to the large
gap between post-autho rttartan and post-communrst countnes.
\fhile Figure 4r.z presents only the prior regime type avetages for each of
the nine specific organrzatrons, Table 4.,,lists the country totals, along with
the group averages in parentheses, thus providitrg a gene ral reference point
for comparisons both within and between groups. Close inspection of the
scores on Table 4.2 points to the same general finding across eight of the
nine types of organrzatrons: the older democracies generally have the highest
scores, followed relatively closely by the post-authoritarran countries, and
the post-communist countries are grouped toward the very bottom. Few
post-communist countries score higher than the post-authoritarran mean for
rury of the nine organizations, a striking finding given the wide variety of
U)
(.)
bD
(s
$-{
a)
0.)
l-.
r>\
r-'r
G)
bD
q.)
(d^
o .:
trLr
c(d^
(6F
'='=a
oh
=f
A.
(s r,
69
O
o-
rJ.r
a
rt.
-{
a
,.L.'
0)
.'rl
Ei'b
c^
u)v
(l)
t,,
8o
()Lr
9R
(DF
E=
bz
E
ba)
bD
(g
l_r
q)
-.
-f
63
r'
The one major exception to this pattern is, of course, labor unions.
f{rrthcr thnrn being grouped at the lowest levels, the post-communist countrics rrctually show much higher rates of labor union membership than the
l)()st-:rtrtlroritrrrirur coLrntries, zrlthough still lower than the older democrat.it's. I lr)wcvcr., wc sltoulcl llc carcful not to overstate the importance of these
q_)
I
f)
lf)C!lf)r
Nr
f,
r'
r--.i
l,rt
'' Wlrt'rr ,rrli.'.1 :rll ol tlrt' (lu('slions ()n llr'()lrl) nl('r)rllt'r'slti1'r., tlrt' r-('sl)()nilcrtts lrlrcl to choose
lrr'ltt't'r'tr llt,' l,,llorvitttl ()l)lt()tt\: ".tt ltvt' tlt('tttllt'r;" "l't,tssivt' ttl('tltltt't'," :ttttl "tt()l ll tlt('lllllt'r."
Itt r^tr'r\ r.r'.(' ('\( ('l)l r,'lrlqroui, ()r,i,lrrrz,tti()n.,. ltt,tvr'\'r'r. llrt' tttttttltt't ol rtt livt' nr('ntlrt't's is lo<l
'.rrr,rll 1,, tr',ltr,rrrt '.t'1r,rt.tlr'.rllt'trltnn"',o I lr.tr','lt,rlplrt'rl lp1'.r'llr6t tlrt'lir',1 l\\'() (,1)1t11',, l(',t\'11',
llr, l,.r',r, rlt',lrrr lr,n .r', r rilr lrr l\\'( ( n nrr'nrl,r'r', (.tr ltt r 'r l',r',',tt r ) ,trt,l n.rr nr('ilrlt, l',
65
(in Percent)
x()
Church
t-{
Religious
ct)
c)
.\u
sOto
,,JoL,llo,,
$-r
o\
I
r^t
s6ro olqelrreL.lc
o\
o\
\\
\)
q
;euorsse;ord
v)
(d
(.)
c.)
O.',
s6ro leluauuoltnuo
.h
r-r
a.)
bo
q.)
*.
$-r
seryed
;ecr1rlod
$-r
.rl
N
suorun roqel
bD
li
s6ro crlsrue ro
'lernllnc'leuorlecnpo
a
(.)
Ar
,X
C.)
z
sqnlc IeuorleoJcor
pue spods
C)
s6ro
snor6r;ar pue qcrnqe
E
a.)
F
/.,
"j
Artistic
or
Cultural,
5r
4r
38
5z
45
37
23
or
Labor
Union
z3
z3
Sweden
z9
Finland
8z
32
Norway
32
45
39
ZI
)')
r7
t6
49
3o
r7
48
r9
IZ
zo
r3
Switzerland
\7.
Germany
63
5r
47
(tz.rl
20
(+o.6)
(zl.o)
3r.t)
87
6o
4r
47
t6
.ra
))
5o
37
24
II
mean) (+l.r)
Po st -,Auth
South
South
52
IZ
Japan
(group
Africa
Korea
Chile
59
z9
35
z9
BraziI
6z
3r
z6
r8
Venezuela
Bangladesh
Spain
45
ZI
34
z4
29
z5
43
r7
r4
Uruguay
Argentina
Philippines
(group mean)
35
z3
r5
r3
(+6.8)
Qt.gl
34
r8
r8
))
20
r8
r6
r4
zz
r4
r9
IZ
II
r5
t6
IO
(zz.z)
(zt.g)
r4
r4
zo
z9
ommunist countries
r8
Macedonia
))
E. Germany
ZI
3r
Slovenia
3o
Romania
Slovakia
38
r5
r9
ro
z9
2Z
9
9
6
17
z4
20
r3
9
4
8
(
rz.8
Po st- C
Czech
Republic
Hungary
[-atvia
Ru ssia
d
v)
ti
Recreational
Educational,
Sports
ZI
0-)
bo
Active in
Church or
Religious
Older democracies
United States 78
Australia
47
q)
suorlercosse
or
['.st<lnia
I Ik ra inc
r4
L)
n)r'rt rt )
IO
t4
l)
IZ
l,ithrr:urirr
(1irou
r4
(tz.z)
z
4
I
(r.r)
z3
ZI
r9
r6
I2
r8
4o
r3
33
II
r3
r+.t
(8.a
(zo-+)
14
)
M
otooloc)ro(-)
TfCacnNrVt't
SJOqtt|OUI OJU Oqrn
iFl
sluopuodrol to']G
11.
(ctmtinued)
'Weakness
66
67
Sweden
r5
r3
t6
z3
35
Finland
IO
r5
ZI
Norway
r6
z6
z8
3r
Switzerland
r7
zo
z3
z3
IZ
r3
r5
))
I2
20
Gt.t)
(zr.t)
Qs-tl
,,)
r8
3z
zo
rABLE
4.L (continued)
Political
Partv
Environmental
United States
50
z5
35
4r
3r
Australia
IO
r7
3o
3r
zz
Older dernocracies
Germany
9
7
Japan
(group mean) (fi.6)
\7.
an countri e s
(zr-zl
South Africa
South Korea
44
ZI
IZ
z5
r9
r4
Chile
t6
r4
r4
r8
r8
ZI
r9
r4
r7
t6
3r
r3
r5
r7
r5
r9
IO
r3
r7
T2
IO
IO
IO
IO
BraziI
Venezuela
Bangladesh
Spain
Uruguay
16
r3
Argentina
IO
r3
8
Philippines
(group mean) (fi.r)
ommuni st
Maccclon irt
Po st - C
L,.
co
(]cnrany
Sloven ia
Romania
Slovakia
Czech Republic
II
G+-t)
ftt.z)
(rz.r)
Gt.t)
r4
r4
r3
r5
zo
r4
4
6
IZ
IT
r3
)a
r3
untri e s
ZI
IZ
7
7
Hungary
IO
4
6
Latvia
Russia
Estonia
Ukraine
,,
,,
Lithuania
Bulgaria
(group mean)
(s.s
(+.')
0.6)
z
)
')
z
z
(6.o)
r3
r8
9
4
I
z
I
I
I
0.,)
much of their membership rolls in some countries, despite their uncertain status and role in the post-communist period. Overall, however' union membership rates have been dropping consistently since the collapse of communism,
especially when compared to the old days of almost full membership.'r ltt
short, the rates of labor union membership across the three country group-
ings stand out as somewhat of an anomaly within the nine types of organizations asked about in the WVS questionnaire, in that levels of union
membership in post-communist countries are not at the absolute bottom.
However, this finding should not be that surprising in light of the central
role that unions played in communist societies and especially because the
levels of membership appear to be declining gradually in the post-communist
period.'a
Among the other eight types of organizations, post-communist countries
have particularly low levels of membership in those that are more political in nature, such as political parties and environmental groups. Similarly post-communist countries have consistently very low levels of church
membership, as well as very low membership levels in educational, cultural,
and artistic organizations. These levels stand in stark contrast to the much
higher levels and wider variation in religious and cultural membership in
the post-authoritarian countries and the older democracies. However, the
post-communist countries have a much wider variation in membership in
the type of organizations that involve leisure time and certain economic activities, namely, sports of recreational clubs and charitable organizations.
Several post-communist countries have relatively high levels of membership
in such organizations compared to that in many post-authoritarian countries.
ln the analysis that follows, I use an aggregate measure of organizational
rncrrrbcrship. The measure that forms the basis of the statistical analysis orr thc cor.lrtry lcvel in this chapter and the individual level in the following
rr ()rr tlrt, toltirrrrily
rl
rl
( )
(Jt
P
m
.
(Jr
l\)
N)
O)
1\)
O)
N)
Sweden
vxo
g)
zo.
do
j-i
N)
Finland
t\)
Xo
Fi 0)
+,
Yao
0a (o
^f
AN)
Norway
5
\l
l\)
Switzerland
i\J
N)
rl
pJ
W. Germany
t\)
Japan
F'
'lJ
t] o)
6
(t)
Chile
-t-.
o)
vll
Spain
ao
Uruguay
?,)
(o
J
(o
-r
-bo
oN)
Argentina
o
-a
b
(^)
Philippines
ct)
Macedonia
\-\
ilr
O
J
E. Germany
\o
\o
Slovenia
9t
J
I
.(J
-u)
oo
o-3
::t{f
@'
(=- .'+
CDf
Homania
A
-a
J
Slovakia
t\)
-a
b
\|
Czech Rep
Hungary
o
g)
(t)
(-f
Latvia
?l
oo
X<o
Russia
-t
(uJlsds dued
t\rtrrrrrlt ) '.)rr()l(J
)r')(f l)rr:
rr()rsf
u')'v
"-o, ,"-Ul":;jl;l;::g ,,
aruPf,aq
r-
\(\
Venezuela
?; o
OP
,{
Brazil
Bangladesh
'-g)
FUf
CD=
;o
to
..e
((uos.rad
rad sdrqsreqruaur dnor8 6-9 's- 'z-r 'o ''B'al sar:o8a1e:r lallrrus orul s^rurp
llern se
-uodsar Surdnor8 Surpnpur 'drqsraquraur leuorlezrue8ro;o sarnsperu tuerqJrp
1r:rlls liursr.r
sll\ollot lBrF srsdluue aql pareedar 1 ,seserg due acnporlur lou prp Burpo:r srrll trrrl.l .trnsue oJ
Jr
S. Korea
=
+8
\o
\lO
tl
ttl
(r)
()l
Pue JeeJf, lsou eql sI leql alnseeu eql sr lr asnpf,aq uos;ad rad sdrqsraqurau yeuorlezrueS.ro
.egrrf,sap
Jo requnu Ietot aqr Jo xapur eql esn I
llrlra I teqt s8urpug aqt perroJurar Ipo suorl
-prJ esar{I 'uouezruuS-ro ue
sJaqureru
rlJE,, eJB or{1!^ sluapuodsa: asoql Burtq8ram se
S. Africa
\.,
(r.l
Australia
cDo
F.i=
'O
Jr)
(Jl
o United States
Yo.o
o
5
ll of orqflnizitliollitl
Estonia
Ukraine
Lithuania
Bulgaria
\o
IO)
(tl
o
b
s
9
O)
o
drlunoc raqro due ueqt drqsrequeru lguorlezrue?roto slalel ro,/'^ol rlrnru seq
qJIq^A 'uedvf sr dleruoue 3ul1u1s tsoru aql ,seroelooruop replo eqr Buoury
'ad& aulSar rorrd uo paseq
s8uldnor8 drlunoc oql ol pet?ler dyesole ere slelel dlqsraquaur leqt s^ oqs
ern8g srql 'S'o p aroJs e qlr^{ (uEBIng
Jo reqr ol u^{op e8uer serors eqt
lsuor1ezrue8rc 65.{.
Jo Jeqtueru e sr uosrad e?e:ew eql eJeql\,se1e15 parFn
.edf1
egr ul sr oroJs rsaq8rq aql (suorlezrue8ro euru runrurxeru p
Jo 1ng
eur8er rorrd lg reqreSot padnor8 serrlunof, aql qrr'\ ,uosrad rad sdrqsreg
-rueru Jo Jequnu a8ereule eql JoJ sarocs drtunoJ eql s,{,oqs
.}
arn8rg
er'slEnPIAIPuI
PUB serlerf,os ssoJcs drqsrequreu leuorlezrueSro lnoge suorsnlJuof, Surqoear
-reJ eroru pup Jepr^4. qJEeJ ol Jepro ur uorsrcard euros Burtgrrf,Es quo.{r\ sr
lr
aiong
/o
ssau4oag1
89
7o
7r
out toward the top, with the former Soviet Republics and Bulgaria gener-
rABLE
ally groupe d at the bottom. Although there are certainly differences between
post-communist countries, that there is not a single post-communist equivalent to South Africa - not a single country that significantly exceeds the
average membership from another prior regime type group - indicates that,
when viewed from this larger comparative perspective, the differences within
the post-communist group appear to represent "dtfferences in degreer" not
"differences in kind."
Rankings
r99o-9r Country-Rank
Order
to r99
j-97: Country
r99S-97 Country-Rank
Order
\WEAKNESS OR DECLINE?
Before I turn to an analysis that justifies the prior regime type distinctions
more systematically, one underlying issue remains to be addressed. Having
demonstrated the low levels of post-communist organi zatronal membership,
both in absolute terms and relative to other countries and regions in the
world, can we also evaluate the extent to which there has been a decline in
participation in the years since the collapse of communism, as some scholars
have suggested?'B Xfithout time-series data by country it is impossible to
give a definitive answer, but I can offer several tentative suggestions. The
\World Values Survey was also conducted in r99o-9r, but unfortunately
the question on voluntary organizatrons was worded slighdy differently in
that questionnaire, which rules out the possibility of a direct comparison of
results.'e However, the countries can still be compared for their rankitrg and
how that might have changed from r99o-9r to 1995-97. Tablr- +.3 shows
the rankings of all of the countries that were included in both surveys, in
which all of the questions on org anrzational membership were asked.
One should be cautious in analyzittg these results, partrcularly since
the country rankings are relative to one another. A country's rise or decline in rank does not necess arrly indicate an increase or decrease in
membership - although that could be the case because other countries
might have had more clf an increase or decrease, which could hav e affected
the rankings without any change actually taking place within that first country"In short, there is little way of knowing exactly how levels of membership
within each country have changed from r99o-9r to r995-97 without replicating survey questions identically.
18 See, for example, Padgett, Organizing Democracy in Eastern Germany; Bill Lomax, "The
Strange Death of Civil Society in Post-Communist Hungary," rn Journal of Communist Studies and kansition Politics, Vol. 13, No. r (tggZ), pp. 4r-63; Aleksander Smolar, "Fronr
Opposition to Atomrzation," tn Journal of DemocrAqt, Vol. 7, No. t (1996), pp. z4-3t1.
re In r99o-9r, the question was as follows: "Please look carefully at the follr>wirrg list of
voluntary organizations and activities and say. . . (u) which, if arry, clo you bclorrg to?
(b) which, if afly, are you currently doing unpiricl volrnrtnry work for'?" ln rr)r)5-.27, tlrt'
question asked: "N<)w I rutt goirrg t() r('rrcl olf ;r lisl of'volrrrtlru'y ()r'li:utiz:ttiorts; lor t'rrrlr orrt',
cotrlcl y<ltr tcll rnc wlrctlrt'r'y()u ;lr'(':ln ;tt'livt'nt('lttlrt't.;ttt itr,tt tiv('nr('rttlrt'r, or rrol ;t nr('nrllr'r ,,1
tlr:tt tylx'ol or'11:utiz:tlion."'l'lrt'.rrrtlr()r\ ('rltl.rrrr llr.rt llrt'n('\\/ \'('t\run "lt'ntls lo r'lrt rl lrryilr,'r
It'vr'ls ol , l,rirtt.'.1 'nr('nrlt,'r,,lttg'',- lt, rllr
\ttttr'\ to111'lrrrrrll, gr
I
.tr
\\1,
rrl,l
\/,r1rr,.,.
:,,.
RUssia.....,..
ilithuan:i:a
:,.SIoVenia,',
R6:man:ia
:::r::::::i.ir:::::::
:t: :
Poi$t':$6'ffiffiunibr
:i::::::::.:::::::r:j:j:.:i:: ::::j:r:.:f
,.iliji:iiJi
ii:ii:ii,
,..l.H.unga'fy
,::,i''Jt:,;atVia.,,
,.':,;,',..RU,sSia:,',,,
':,',.E,stbfiiA'i.l
tifhub:nii.a
,.Builga*.ie
Note: The avetage membership for t99o-9r was calculated based on eight types of organizations, the same as in the 1995-97 average except for charitable argantzations, which were
not included in the r99o-9r questionnaire. This table shows only those countries that were
included in both the r99o-9r and the 1995-97 WVS, and that were asked all portions of
the membership question in both surveys, thus leaving out Austraha, Bangladesh, the Czech
Republic, Macedonia, the Philippines, Slovakia, Switzerland, Ukraine, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
South Africa is also excluded from this table, since the auth orrtanan apartheid regime did not
collapse until well after the t99o-9r survey was conducted.
Source:
Values Survey.
-7)
(,t'r lll.lll\',
I li'lttrtr
rABLE
Russia
r995-
Average
Germany
Eastern
Western Germany
r995-
r995-
97
rg99 Change 97
o.65
number of
Eastern
1999 Change
97
rg99
z.Tz
z.oo -o,r2
Change
organrzational
memberships
per person
Source: r99S-97 World Values Survey and 1999 PCOMS
person.
73
(PCOMS)
decline, from
r '.1'r', r.tllt
lll)
li ' ,,\
rcortonr ic Wcll-Rcing
'l'lrt. logic lrclrirrd thc first hypothesis is clear, since it is commonly believed
rlr:rt rlrt' stt'r'rrgtlr ol'civil socicty is u procluct of increasittg levels of economic
tr,,,ll ltr,itt,q irr lr s()('it'ly. lrrtlt't'rl, ()n(' oft tltt' c('tlf rrtl tcttets tlf mrtclernization
llr..,,r'y t\ tlr,rt rlrt' lrililtcl' rt r'()ultll'y's strltttl:tl'tl ol livilrg., tltt' lll()l'c villrltltf
rvrll lr,' rl., ,1,'rn()( r'.1( \'r ,rrrrl llrc nr()r'(' ils r itiz('tts will l);tl'lit iPtllt' ilt t'ivil
.Weakness
74
See, for example, Seyrnour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracyi Economic
Development and Political Legitimacy," rn American Political Science Reuiew, Vol. 53, No. z
GgSg), pp. 69-ro5; Evelyne Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John D. Stephens, "The
Impact of Economic Development on Democracg " rn Journal of Economic PerspectiuesrYol. 7 ,
No. 3 ftggZ), pp. 7t-86; and Larry Diamond, "Economic Development and Democracy
Reconsidered," in Gary Marks andLarry Diamond, eds., ReexaminingDemocracy (Newbury
Park: Sage, r99z), pp. 93-ry9.
23 To make the East German and Vest German GDP per capita rates reflect the endtrring
(although diminishing) economic differences between the two groups, I adjusted slightly tlrc
German GDP per capita score, by adding to"/o to \Testern Gerrrrany and sulrtr:rctirrg to",4,
for Eastern Germany. Since the r 997 all-Gerrnan GDP per capita wrls listccl :rs $zo,lloo' lirr'
the statistical analysis I used a rate of $zz,flBo for \flcstcnr (icrnrrury rurd $'8,72o lor lirrslt'r'rr
Germany. This rnirrgin col'rcsponrls [o rttost t'stirttrttcs of llrt' irrcorrrt' tlillt'r'('nct's lrt'tw('('rr l',;rsl
ancl Wcst (it'rtttru)s. St't'., lir t'x:unplt', Mit'lrrrcl ( ilirrrrlirrli ,rrrrl (,1:rus Srlnl;11r,'1., "Arrlilt'it lrrrrrlg
<lsttft'ttlse ltt'r' liirtltonnn('n ;ul w('sttlt'ulst ltt' Nil,r',rrts: lrttrr' li'll,urtl,,,rrrlrr,tlrrrr,'." in ///, lt't,utls,
(r(r.
75
Capita
(rggZ in U.S.$)
per Person
30)ZOO
27 r4oo
2.47
Japan
z4r5oo
o.9z
Switzerland
\7. Germany
Australia
Finland
z3 r8oo
zz188o
2.rz
zrr4oo
2.68
2OTOOO
2.48
Sweden
1917oo
z.6z
E. Germary
18 17zo
r.44
Spain
t6r4oo
r.39
(group mean)
(zz,5oo)
(r.tgl
South Korea
13
r7oo
z-44
Chile
tt16oo
2-32
Czech Republic
r or 8oo
Slovenia
r orooo
r.o7
r.30
GDP per
Income
Level
Highest group
Middle group
Country
United States
Norway
Argentina
Uruguay
Slovakia
Lowest group
9r7oo
8,9oo
8,6oo
Organizational Memberships
.59
', t)
I.I
r.39
I.TZ
Venezuela
8,3oo
r.84
Hungary
(group mean)
o.8z
'4oo
(g,88g)
('.+g)
Estonia
6,450
Brazll
63oo
o-64
z.13
South Africa
6rzoo
3.o7
Romania
Russia
Latvta
Lithuania
Bulgaria
Philippines
Ukraine
Bangladesh
Macedonia
(group mean)
r3oo
-r4
4r7oo
4rz6o
4rz3o
o.6
4rroo
)ZOO
o.35
T.o3
zr5oo
o.6o
r r33o
r-53
96o
(4;28)
o.70
o.46
r.50
(t.r
s)
No/r,: (;t)l) pcr ca1-rita is Ineasured in U.S. dollars, adjusted to purchasing power parity. GDP
l)(.r'(rrpitrr is corrclrrtcrl wirlr orgilnizational membership atr - .62 (p < .oor).
\o/rrr r'; (,lA Wor'ltl li;tc'tlrool< (r ygti); tgL)\-L)7 W<lrld Values Survey.
76
Perspectiue
77
Level of Political
Freedom
House
Organizatronal
Liberties
Country
Scores
The second hypothesis relates to the strength of a country's political institutions and their ability to ensure the political rigbts and ciuil liberties of its citizens. Political institutional arguments are also common explanations for the
strengths and weaknesses ofcivil society, since it is generally agreed that the
more repressive a regime (even if it is still viewed as democratic overall),
Highest group
United States
Australia
I
I
I
I
I
I
3.59
2.68
(')
(2.68\
r.5
r.5
r.5
r.5
r.5
r.5
r.5
r.5
r.5
3-o7
Nf:
Finland
Norway
Switzerland
(group mean)
Middle group
South Africa
Germany
E. Germany
.W.
Spain
Slovenia
Czech Republic
Japan
Hungary
Lithuania
Uruguay
Estonia
South Korea
[,owest group
I r,ut.,,t(
|t(ln Itrtltlr,,lr('r,,.
I,1,1,))
r.7
r.7
z.6z
2.48
2.47
) t)
z.rz
r-44
r39
r3C-
r.o7
o.9z
o.8z
o.46
5
5
,,
r39
o-64
z-44
Chile
Latvta
z.3z
o.70
Bulgaria
(group mean)
2.25
o.35
G.z)
ft.t61
Argentina
2.5
I.IO
Venezuela
Slovakia
2.7
t-84
2.7
I.IZ
Philippines
2.7
Brazll
z.T3
Romania
)t
)a
Bangladesh
3.25
r-53
Macedonia
3-5
3.5
3-5
o.65
3.')
ft.26)
Russia
Ukraine
(group mean)
"Civilization"
llt'rrrs\\/rr li,
Sweden
-o3
I.T4
r.50
o.6o
Np/r,.- lirecclorn l-lerrsc scores range from r (the highest score) to 7 (the lowest). The scores
l)r(.s(.rrlt.tl rrrt. tlrc irvcrilgcs of thc 1c1c15-c16 and r .)96-97 scores. Political rights and civil liberties
(rvirlr rr flippctl scrrlt') rrrr: corrclrrtccl with orgnnizational membership atr : .46 (P < .or).
,\o//l'r,': lrr-t't'rlottt I loust' ( r 9,2.;); l ()95-97 Wtlrltl Valtlcs Srlrvcy.
'Weakness
78
of Organizational
"Civilization"
Country
"Western"
United States
Australia
3-59
2.68
Sweden
z.6z
Finland
"Non-Western"
'6
r-44
Spain
Slovenia
r39
Slovakia
Czech Republic
Hungary
T.TZ
o.8z
Latvra
o-70
Estonia
o.64
Lithuania
o"46
(group mean)
G.zo)
South Africa
South Korea
Chile
Brazrl
3-o7
z-44
z-32
z.13
Venezuela
Bangladesh
r.53
r.30
in particular his classification and mapping of countries on pp. zz-27 oI Tbe Clash of
Nrr/c:
r-o7
t-84
r.50
r89
I.T4
I.IO
r.o3
o.9z
o.6
Ukraine
Bulgaria
(group mean)
Ciuilizatiotr.s.
z.Iz
E. Germany
Japan
Russia
Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 \r9%t,
pp. 22-49; Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Ciuilizations and the Remaking of World Order
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
See
\7. Germany
Macedonia
Uruguay
Romania
Argentina
Philippines
also irrc<>rporate the category of prior regime type, as elaborated earlier in this chapter, into this analysis. To reiterate, in the current time
period, the expectation of the prior regime type hypothesis is that the
older democracies will have the highest levels of organizational activitg
followed relatively closely by the post-authoritarian countries, and the
'5
Switzerland
2.48
z-47
2.22
Norway
and "non-'Western."'8 The overall finding shows that, while the relationship
between civilization and organizational membership is positive, it is generally
very weak. The "'Western" countries average r.7o memberships per person,
while the "non-I7estern" countries have a mean of r.47. Moreover, there is
wide variation within each group of countries, with the "'W'estern" countries
ranging from a high of 3.59 inthe United States to a low of .46 in Lithuania,
and the "non-rD(/estern" countries ranging from 3.o7 in South Africa to .35
in Bulgaria. Among the "'Western" countries, what is most noticeable is that
the seven lowest scores - and eight out of the lowest nine - consist of postcommunist countries. Similarly, among the "non-'Western" countries, the
three lowest scores come from post-communist countries. In short, it appears
unlikely that civilization has any systematic relationship with membership
in civil s<lciety organizations.
79
o.6o
o-35
ft.+z)
(not signif.).
z7-z\;
r99 j-97
-conun unisf c()t.nrtrics will lag behind the other two groups considerably.
clrrtrt clcpictccl vistrally in Figu re 4.3. The correlation
Irt'lw('(-n prir)r' r'('Hin'r(' tyl)(' rlrt(l ()rglutiz,rtri<lrrltl nl('rttl'rc'rshill is vcry high., ilncJ
l)( )st
'f
st
8o
TABLE
of Org anizational
citizens have had much more time to experience and live in a free and democratic society and have thus developed a famrliarity with volunt ary organ:u.,a'Western
tions. Of the eight older democracies, only a few elderly citizens of
Germany and Japan have actually experienced as adults anything other than
a democratic system .'e Inthis sense, democ ratic longevity is central to the distinction between democratic and non-democratic regimes. It seems logical,
Country
Older democracv
United States
Australia
3.59
2.68
Sweden
z.6z
Finland
z-48
Norway
2.47
Switzerland
'W.
Germany
2.ZZ
Japan
o.92
(group mean)
(z-tg)
South Africa
South Korea
3-o7
2.44
Chile
2-32
2-13
Braztl
Post-Communist
r.84
Uruguay
Argentina
Philippines
(group mean)
r.39
r.53
r49
r -o3
(r.82)
r.50
r-44
r
Romania
Slovakia
r"r4
-3C-
I.IZ
r -o7
While each of these variables does have the overall predicted effect on organizartional membership across countries, the relationship is hardly monotonic.
o.8z
o.70
Russia
o-6
Estonia
Ukraine
o.64
o.6o
o.46
Bulgaria
(group mean)
with
o.35
(o.gt
organrzational membership
at r
Hungary
Latvra
Lithuania
cases
actually negdtiue, given that Chile, South Korea, and South Africa are the
three post-authoritarran countries with the shortest experience with democracy) but the highest levels of organrzatronal membership. Thus, while democratic longevity is a crucial element of the difference between democratic and
non-democratic prior regime types, it proves to be a much less important factor when comparing post-authoritaian and post-communist countries.
I.IO
Slovenia
Czech R.epublic
therefore, when comparing post-authoritanan and post-communist countries, that the length of time a country has been democratic would have a
strong and positive influence on participation in civil socie ty, regardless of
prior regime type. The expectation of this hypothesis is that more years of
experience with democ racy will lead ta a more vibrant civil society.
Table 4.9 presents the post-authoritarian and post-communist countries
according to their "years of continuous democracy."3o The table shows
that although post-authoritarian countries do generally have both a longer
experience with democ racy and higher rates of participation, democratic
longevity and organi zatronal membership are only weakly correlated over-
z.rz
Venezuela
Bangladesh
Spain
Macedonia
E. Germ any
8r
Democratic Longevity
Post-Authoritarian
() -l'his
more distant non-democratic legacy may have a persisting effect in these two countries
toclay (although much less so for \Testern Germany), since they have the two lowest scores
()n organizational membership of the older democracies.
i() 'l'his variable is adapted from Ronald Inglehart's measure of "years of continuous democracy
s i rr cc 1 c.-Lo." See Ronald Inglehar t, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cwltural, Economic,
trrd Prilitical Change in 43 Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), especially
l)l'), .].s 7-35t1. I have extended his scores to reflect the number of years a country has been
torrtirrrrously dcmocratic until 1997 and added a few countries that he did not include
(lf:rrrglrrrlcsh., Mirccclonia,, the Philippines, Ukraine, Urugtay, and Venezuela). I have also
:rrliustt'tl :l l'cw scorcs thlt wcre slighdy inaccurate, namelS Argentina (which has been
,1,'rrr,rtrrttic'sirrc't' r.)fl], rtot r985)., Ilrrtzil (sir-rce r985, not 1986), and Chile (since r99o,
rrot 1r,p,1l). M()r'('()v('r; I lt:tvt'slrutrlttrdizt'rl tlrc post-conrnrunist c-lern<lcracies, which Inglehart
r,,t1,'rl s,,rrrcwltrtl lr:rlrllrrz:urlly. so tlr:rt tlrt' rrort Sovit'l lirtst Iirrrol-rclu't coulttrics have tcl9c..rr llrt'rr \t.utrr1 (l:rlt',;trrtl tlrr'lortrrt't'Sovir'l l{t'prrlrli,.s ltrtvt' ;t)r)r. l;ol':rll <lf lltt'st'cils('s.,
l,,llr'\\,ntfi lrrlglt'll.nl'.. Irott'tlttt,', nt tounllrlq tlr('\'('iur. ol tortlttttt()u\ (1,'ltt,)rl;l( ), I sl:tl't witlt
tlr, lrr'.1 \r',u tf l,'t tlrr' tt,ur',tltnn \\'.r', r nrirltlr'lr'rl
,
'Weakness
8z
"l,y
Prior Regime
83
of
of
Continuous
Democracy
Average Number
of Org anizational
3o
r.84
Years
Variable
Coefficients
.o3
(.oa
.or
Cllhzation
.13
Type
Country
Post-Authoritarian
Venezuela
Spain
zo
Argentina
r4
I.IO
Braztl
r3
2-r3
Uruguay
IZ
II
II
r.39
7
6
z-32
2.44
3.o7
Constant
r.55
Bangladesh
Philippines
Chile
South Korea
South Africa
(group mean)
Post-Communist
r -o3
-.97*
(.sa
r.r4
SEE
.5o
.59
3r
I.I2
r -o7
Note: Table entries are unstandardrzed regression coeffiwith standard errors in parentheses. The dependent
variable is the average number of organrzatronal memberships per person in each country.
* p..o5 (one-tailed)
'World
Sowrce: 1995-97 \7orld Values Surveg CIA
Factbook (rgg8), Freedom House (tggg), and Huntington
o.8z
o.35
Slovenia
r.50
r.30
Latvia
o.70
Russia
o-65
E stonia
Ukraine
6
6
o.64
o.6o
o.46
(6.9)
(o.gr
(t.+zl
cients,
('gg6)-
Note: Democratic longevity refers to the years of continuous, uninterrupted democracy in r 997
r -.14 (not signif.). Among the post-authoritarian countries onlS the correla@ot signif.), and among the post-communist countries, it is.zr (not signif.).
Source: r99S-97 \forld Values Survey and Inglehart (tggZ).
membership at
-.q
involve post-communist cases, which tend to have much lower levels of organrzattonal membership than would be predicted by the general relationship
between the vartables. To weigh the relative effect of prior regime type against
the other factors, we can turn to multiple regression analysis.
Table 4.ro presents the regression results with all 3 r countrics incluclccl. r'
The results show that GDP per capitat., p<llitical rights rutcl civil libcrtics, rutrl
lr Notc tlrirt tlrt'viu'iirlllt'lir rlt'nr()('r';rtit'lorrlit'viry
-.o3
(.+8)
With the older democracies excluded, democratic longevity is correlated with organizational
tion is
Adjusted R'
(group mean)
(.t8
r-53
Bulgaria
Macedonia
Lithuania
(.rt )
('Western)
(r.82)
r.44
Hungary
(r2"8)
E. Germany
Romania
Slovakia
Czech Republic
r39
cllhzation have positive coefficients that are not statistically signific ant.3z
The dummy variables for prior authoritarian experience and prior communist experience both have the predicted negative effect, but only prior communist experience is statistically significant. Ceteris paribus, prior communist
experience is associated with a .97 decrease in the predicted organi zatronal
membership. Considering that the range on the dependent variable extends
only up to a maximum of 3.Sg organizattonal memberships per person, a
decline of . 97 rs substantively very large. The effect of GDP per caprta, the
tJ.S. d<lllars, and the Freedom House scale is flipped, so that a higher score corresponds to
grcrrtcr political rights and civil liberties. A full description of how the variables were coded
is proviclccl irr Appendix A.
l'r Altlrorrglt wltcrr rrll jr countrics are included there is some multicollinearity (e.g., GDP per
t';tlritit :rtttl tlrt' l;rct'dotn I lotrsc scores alre correlatcd at r .75, and the Freedom House
s('()r'('s ruttl civiliz:rtiort rtt | .,.7o)., it rlocs r)()t sullsr:rrrtirrlly affcct the results here. \ffhen
()n('()r
(()tttlrirr:tlion
('x('lrrtlt'rl
.uty
ol lltt'sc tlu't't'v:u'i:tlrlcs is
f-r'orrr tht'rrrrrrlysis., thcy rrrt.still
ttol :.l,ttt\lr.,rllt'rrlirrili.,tttl,:utcl tlrc tot'lficit'rrls lor ;trior :rtrllrrilru'irut t'r;lt'l'it'lrr'('ilrrtl ;ll'ior'
('\l)r't tr'rrtc lr,trtlly r lr,lnl:c'rt ;rll.
( rflilnllIlt\l
'Weakness
84
rABLE
Vo
4.n
luntary
Cowntries Only)
Variable
Model r
Model z
.o5
.o3
(.ot
Political rights and civil liberties
(.oz)
-.oo5
(-r+)
Clrhzation
(-Western)
-.26
(.+o)
Prior communist
-.gz**
experlence
-.8
Democratic longevrty
7***
(.zz)
G6)
-.o4
(.oz)
ft.+t\
r.57***
(.26)
Adjusted R'
.47
.45
SEE
.50
z3
.5r
r.9 4
Constant
23
Note: Table entries are unstandardi zed rcgression coefficients, with standard
errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the average number of organizational memberships per person in each country.
*p
..o5; ** p < .or; *** p < .oor (all one-tailed)
Source : I c)L) j-L)7 \W<rrld Values Surveg CIA \forld Factbook (tgg8 ), Freedom
Hcrusc (t999)., I lrrntington (tgg6), and Inglehart (tggZ).
of one thousand
dollars in GDP per caprta is associated with only a .% increase in the predicted organi zatronal membership.
Table 4.n presents the same analysis, but this time with the eight older
democracies excluded, thus allowing us to focus on the important distinction between the legacies of authoritarian and comrnunist regimes. Model r
shows all of the relevant independent variables,lr including the varrable for
the length of time a country has been democ rattc, and agaln prior communist
experience is the only varrable that is statistically signific ant.34
it is 1'r't'st'rrl, rtrullr t.lllirr.';trrl1, .lot's rtol tli.'rr, llt,'',.' t,'',ttllt. I vrrr llt,ttrt',lt
(,(,i,ltt(l llr,'ltt't'rlrtttt
(;l)l) pt'l t:t1ril;r,rrrtl tltr'l'tt't'tlotn llotrr.(".((Dt('\,tlc tot t('l,ttt'rl ,rt I
74 Aglrirr., rtltlr<luglr
l lprr\(.
'.rtl'',l.trrlr.rllt
.lt,ttr1i,
tlr,
,ll ,
tr tlt,lttlttll',
(,1, llt,'
r r)r llt, t, trt',
,)tltl'.'.lrtlt
\.tlr.rltlt'
,lrtt",
ltol
85
rights and civil liberties will actually lead to lower levels of organi zatronal
membership, that "\(/estern" clrhzations are less compatible with civil
society, or that more years of experience with democ racy will decrease levels of organizatLonal membership. Rather, they should be interpreted in the
context of the differences between prior regime types. Many countries with a
prior communist experience score well on the Freedom House scores and are
classified as "\7este rnr" yet still have relatively low levels of org anizational
membership. Even though post-communist countries have fewer years of
experience with democracy than many post-authoritarran countries, some
of the highest-scoring post-authoritarian countries are those with the fewest
years of democratic experience, thus helping to account for that variable's
surprising negative coefficient.
Model z on Table 4.rr trims out the variables for political rights and
civil liberties, civil tzatron, and democ ratrc longevity, and it shows that prior
communist experience agarn has a very significant negative effect on organtzatronal membership, while GDP per caprta is still not statistically significant. In this model, with the older democracies excluded, prior communist
experience is associated with a .8 7 decrease in the predicted number of organrzatronal memberships per person in each country, a very large effect given
the narrow range of membership in these countries.
Tables 4.ro and 4.rr show that the only variable that is consistently significant, both statistically and substantively, is prior communist experience, and
it explains most of the variatton in both models. \7hile GDP per captta and
the Freedom House scores are both positively correlated with levels of organrzatronal membership, when controlling for other factors in a multlartate
model, they emerge as statistically insignificant. The implications of these
cross-national findings suggest that, although economic growth and stable
political institutions may be associated with higher levels of membership in
voluntary organizatrons, they have more limited explanatory power when
controlling for prior regime type. Moreover, while "clrltzation" may be
trseful for predicting - or perhaps creatitrg - strategic military alliances between types of countries, it appears to have little utility for explaining levcls of membership in civil society organizations. Democratic longevity is
rur essential element of the prior regime type typology that distinguishes
bctween older democracies and other countries that recently experienced
nor'r-detnocratic rule, but it does not help to explain cross-national differ('nccs elnrong pclst-authoritarian and post-communist countries. Rather, it
:rl)pcrrrs thart thc lasting legacy of different types of non-democratic regimes,
,uttl tltc wrtys in lvhich these regimes ruled and exercised control over their
f)()l)ulrrtions., rs nrorc irnportant than simply the number of years since the
I r :trrsit iort lo rlcnt()cr'1'tcy.
sltorl., tlt('('nrlrn'irr1i l('grrcy ()f':r courrtr"y's pr-ior rr'13irrrc typer - particularly
()lntlt'it's
lor
witlr :t llrtot' t r)ninrunist r'\f-rt'l'it'lrrt' s('('nls f<l 1ll:f y ll t-n()rC
rf rf)orl.ull t,rl,'llt.ut lltt'st'olltct ('(()n,rnrit. irrstituti()n;t1.,.'ivilitttliorr,rl.,:urtl
f
rr
(
It-ttt;'',t1,11 f ,l,
tr'l\,.
86
Perspectiue
87
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL ANALYSIS
likely than men to be affihated with any organi zation, political or non-
The analysis until now has remained on the country level, focusing exclusively on the contemporary institutional variables and the prior regime type
typology. This section extends the analysis to include individual-level data
from the \[VS, and thus to surmount the problem of cross-level inferen ce,3s
politic aI." 3e
by using a constructe d dataset that mixes the \fVS data on individuals with
the two main aggregate variables developed in the previous section.l6 This
allows us not only to control for demographic variables but also to test some
of the most prominent individual-level variables in debates about partici pation and civil society on a very large sample from a wide array of democratic
countnes.
Rosenstone, Who Votes? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 198o). Also see the discussiort
in Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality. By means of an excepti<>nally clctailctl
questionnaire and extensive follow-up interviews, Verba, Schlozman, rtncl Rrady w('rc rtblt'
to go "beyond SES" to include other factors such as "civic skills" in tlrcir (livic: Volurtlrtrisnt
Model. However, it should be pointecl out thrtt wlrilc tlrcy crilicizc tltt'SliS Irtotlr'l tor lrt'irrg
"weaker theoretic:rlly," tlrcry clo rt()t (ltrt'sliott its rr'lt'v:ur((':lrrrl illtl)()t'l:ttt(('; iltslt';ttl, lltt'y sr'r'li
t<litchi(:vc"ttriclrt'l'rlrrtlcrst:uttlinll()l lrrlwsori.)('(()ttottti,, portlt,,tt l.',t,1'. lopolitr.;tlrttlivily"
(P. r')).
1lt l,,tlrrr ltlion t\
1,,('tr,'r.rllt' \'rr'\\'t'tl ,r., tlr,' rnrr',1 tttt|rotl.tttl r'lltttrttl
('\,rrrt1rl1'. \\/,,llrrr;,i,'r ,ur,l l(, )'.('n'.t,rtr'. \\'/,,, \i,/,".:
8tJ
rABLE
Unstan dardized
Coefficients
Variable
C
owntry -L
et, e I
Vari ab
(.oot
I-Jnstan dardized
.r7***
C ountry -L
(.o6)
.og***
.o6***
Education
(.ot )
. r6***
(.oo6)
.o03***
(.oor )
Gender (male)
rr***
***
City
size
-.o7***
(.ot
Trust in others
"I'clcvision watching
.05**
(.oz )
-.o4**
(.ot
I)ostrttrt tcri
rt
Ii
srn
Education
Ag.
(.ooz)
.oor
size
Trust in others
.oz**
r -70
zr
Note: For the unstand ardized coefficients, standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent
variable is the average number of organ rzattonal memberships per person.
* p ..o5; **
*** < .oor (all one-tailed)
P
P < .or'
Source: r9g5-97'World Values Survey and CIA \7orld Factbook (r998).
caprta has a very strong positive effect, as predicted, and the prior regime
type variables both have the expected negative effect, although prior comrnunist experience is considerably stronger than prior authoritarian experience.
Overall, when comparing the relative impact of cnrch varriablc by cxrlnrirrirrg,
the beta weights, we see that prior conlnuttist cxp('r'icrtcc lrrts tlrc stt'ortgt'st
coefficicnt (- "L9), followccl by crlucirtiort (.rll) ruttl t il)l'pt'r'cirpitrr (.rZ). ( )l
thc otltt'r' irrtlivitlurtl lcvt'l viu'i;tlrlt's, ittr ont(' rttttl c'ity sizt' lt:tvt' lrctrt wt'iglrls
ol' .o(, ;uttl .t ).f r r'('\l'rt't lrvt'l\,.. rvltr't'(',t\ llrt' t('nt,ttttilrli lil,t' r'.lnl'.(' lrottt .o:
.or
.o5***
-.03
***
-.o3
-.or
-.o3*
Postmaterialism
.og***
(-oz)
-.or
.04***
(-or)
.o3***
1768
***
Television watching
Constant
.49***
SEE
.05
(.ot
-.oz**
Adjusted R'
rg***
r 8***
(.or
-.04***
,.::,
(.ol
City
(.or)
(-l<>rrstant
.oo7
(.ot )
.r4***
Gender (male)
.og***
Ie s
.or
.o3***
-.?-8***
(.oor
(.oz)
r o***
Income
r 8***
.03
-.98***
(.ol
-.zg***
Income
Ag.
.04***
(.oot
In diui du al -L eu el Vari ab le s
Standardized
Coefficients (Beta)
arcI Vari ab Ie s
-.o3*
-r.r5***
Coefficients
-. rr*
(.os
.04***
89
rABLE
Standardized
Coefficients (Beta)
le s
Perspectiue
.64***
(.o8
Adjusted R'
.rz
.SEE
r.59
r 5 ,o36
Note: For the unstandardrzed coefficients, standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent
virriable is the average number of organrzatronal memberships per person.
' l, ..o5; **P < .or' *** p < .oor (all one-tailed)
,\ourcc: r995-97 \forld Values Survey and CIA 'World Factbook (r998).
I t r .o 1 . I".vcn though their coefficients are relatively weake r, allof the hypothes('s frortt tlrc litcrrlture on individual participation are supported by these
finrlirrgs.
As ilr t ltt' l)r'('vious sccrion., ir is worth rcpcrlting thc same analysis
w il lr t'('lil)( ltttlt'l'tt s l't't lrtt lltt' r lltlcr tlt'tt)( )r'r'rrr'ics ('xclrrclcd., irr orclcr to
9o
of the individual-level coefficients are weaker and less signific ant than they
were when cittzens from all the countries were included, but they generally
have the same sign as predicted (with the exception of trust, which now has
an unexpected but very slight negative effect). Education, however, has an
even larger coefficient in the restricted sample, showittg that its strong effect
on org anrzatronal membership does not apply only to the older democracies.
Prior communist experience remains the most powerful explanato ry varuable
in the regression, and GDP per caprta is somewhat weaker than in Tablt- 4.rL,
although still quite robust.
Overall, a person's prior communist experience is associated with a decrease of .g8 in her or his predicted organi zatronal membership , an extremely
large amount given the range of the scale of orga nrzattonal membership, and
especially since this takes into account the effect of other variables widely
considered to have a strong influence on participation.
CONCLUSION
clcclining, lcve ls of membership throughout post-communist Europe. Moreover, while there is a great deal of variation within the older democracies and
post-authoritartan prior regime type categories, the varratton among postcommunist countries appears to be differences that are "in degree , " and not
"in kind." This conclusion is confirmed by multivariate regression analysis,
9r
ersh
ip
93
are with post-communist developments, the less likely they are to participate. By taking into account these three specifically post-communist factors,
this analysis considerably improves our understanding of the reasons for low
post-communist membership in the organi zatrons of civil society.
SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS IN \WESTERN GERMANY,
EASTERN GERMANY, AND RUSSIA
This section incorporates the results from the 1999 PCOMS survey of
INTRODUCTION
Having described and analyzed the range of variation in levels of organrzational membership across 3r countries in Chapter 4rlnow turn to an analysis of the factors that explain the distinctively low levels of post-communist
membership. This chapter presents an analysis of the Post-Communist Organizational Membership Study (PCOMS) surveS which was conducted in
'Western
1999 with representative samples in Russia, Eastern Germany, and
Germany, using the same measure of average number of organi zatronal memberships per person as the previous chapter.
In this chapter, I start by briefly revisiting the main socioeconomic factors
deve f opcd in Ohapter 4,butthis time while focusing on the three populations
'West
fr<rm the I)(IOMS survey. The
German sample adds a comp aratle perspcctivc to the East German and Russian samples, and it also enables me to
include the varrable for "prior communist experience" in the analysis. The
results of the PCOMS survey show that, while several of the socioeconomic
variables are statistically signific ant, prior communist experience remains
the most powerful explanato ry factor.
Although - just as in Chapter 4 - the variable "prior communist expe-
Western Germ dny, Eastern Germ dny, and Russia and tests a set of applicable
individual-level hypotheses.' The goal is to estimate the relative significance
of several independent variables, within each society separately as well as
in the pooled dataset. In this section, I focus on socioeconomic status (SES),
which in numerous studies has been identified as a strong predictor of participation.' Figures 5. r to 5.5 show the levels of organrzattonal membership for
each of the three samples on the four main SES factors - incoffie, education,
age, gender - as well as on city size.
Figure 5. r divides each of the three samples into quintiles based on total
household income, showing the average number of organizatronal memberships per person in each quintile. The results indicate that in all three
societies people with higher levels of income tend to have higher levels of
organi zattonal membership.
Figure 5.2 presents the different education levels within the three samples,
with the country-specific education vartables recoded to fit a continuum that
includes values for lo*, medium, high, and very high.l The figure shows that,
with one minor exception, increasing levels of education are indeed associated with higher levels of organizatronal membership, in all three samples.
The vartable for age is especially approp iate to test in the post-communist
l-
o
n
Lr.r
o1
o.
L
CL
o.
-c
o
1I-
r.c
o
ll
tr
o
E
G
?
o
-
N
c ntr
4l \,/.\.'
o
L
Lowest 1/5
Fourth 1/5
Third 1/5
Top 1/5
Second 1/5
Income Group
@
FiGURE
Russia
o zc
L
,-\
l-
oL
o-
a,
o-L
=o
L
:
F
15
=G
c1
.9
F
G
.N
o5
F
o)
l-
o
High
Medium
Education Level
El
FIGURE
Russia
Very High
.Weakness
96
societal-level studies.a Figure 53 presents the results for each of the three
samples, dividing the respondents into six age groups: under 25, 25-34,
35-44,45-54, 55-64, and 65 and over.s The \7est German sample shows
t-
o
o
that organiza:.:'onal membership is at its highest for people aged 45-54, with
slight drop for those aged 55-64, followed by a much sharper drop for those
65 and over. The East German sample follows the same basic trend, but the
differences among the age groups are much smaller. Finally, the Russian sample is interesting in two respects. First, the life-cycle decline in membership
starts much sooner, as the most active age group is 35-44, and subsequent
age groups show steady declines thereafter. Second, the under 25 age group a sub-sample that is unfortunately missing from the \7est German and East
German surveys - which had very little direct contact with communist organrzatrons, actually has relatively high levels of organizatronal membership.
Although still too early to determine with any certainty, it does appear that,
at least in terms of membership in civil society org anrzations, generational
change is taking place in Russia, with younger people participating more
Ec
(d
LO
(o
$
(o
I
LO
LO
slr)
rO
CL
(,
L
ct)
s$
I
lO
e
(,
\\
\)
q
orooo residents, those with r o,ooo to 5o,ooo, those with 5orooo to 5oorooo,
and finally cities with over 5oo,ooo. The pattern for \Testern Germany shows
that there is a steady decrease in levels of orga nrzattonal membership as the
size of the city increases. For Eastern Germany and especially for Russia,
however, the trend is actually the opposite: organrzatronal membership tends
to be higher in larger cities. Once agaln, it does appeat that the communist experience - with its large projects for urbantzatton, industrtaltzation,
and the collect wrzatron of agriculture - was responsible for reshaping tw<r
otherwise verv different societies in a simil ar way.
v)
Li
(.)
scf)
I
LO
\3
z
N
bo
rO
N
t-
oc
for example, Richard Rose and Ellen Carnaghan, "Generatiorral lrftccts ()n Attittttlt's lo
Communist Regimes: A Comparative AnalysiS," in l'os/-,\'ot,ir'l Af'ftirs.Yttl. rr, No. r (r.7';5),
See,
(-)
bo
pp.z8-t6.
l w6trltl lili.t' lo llr;rrrl, \lr, lr.rt I lit rr'l,,rr,l l,,r l),rrrtrrrr ,rrt llrr trr r rl l,, ,lt ,ltttt',rrr',lr
ttltl'1, '.
:rrrtl l,'r, l', ,rl ;,.ttlt( tl,tlt,,,t r,, lt( tr ( { }tlli) tltttt' llr, ll,t,,
v)
cf)
Note that since thc F,ast (icl-rrr:yl ilptl Wt'st (,t'r1t:1) s;tntl'tl,'s; ,li.l rtol itt. lrrtlt rrr\' r(',1)()tttlt ttl',
undcr 25., this grrlrrp is lurlotlunirl('lv .'r..lrr.l.'tl ll.ttt lltt ," ,lt',t',
o\
o\
o\
lO
(\l
C\l
lO
,
t-
lf)
c)
l lrlr.rorlrtzrrrrtbr6
I!
g
Ll-r
o
Lrr
o1
ot-
o-
CL
-c
o
1-
r.c
ll
=1
(E
,9
+.
(E
.N
E
o)
o5
L.
o
Male
Female
Gender
El
FTGLRE
Russia
-/
a.-
a\
.:
N
F
-\
under 1 0,000
50,000-499,999
0.000-49.999
City Size
El
FTGURE
Russia
Eastern Germany
El
Western Germany
(.999).
5.5. City Size and Organizattonal Membership. Sowrce: PCOMS
over 500,000
roo
rABLE
Variable
Model A
Income
Education
(.oz)
.o6*
r4***
(.oa
Ag.
.oo6***
(.ooz)
Gender (male)
.25
***
(.os
City
srze
-.o7***
(.oz)
Prior communist
Model B
Model C
.rz***
(-oz)
(.oz)
.rz***
(.ol )
r3 ***
(.ot
(.oor
(.o+
(.o+
-.o8***
(.or)
-.ooo6
AJ
**
(.oz)
- r. 26***
)
- r. 6r***
(.os
SIrl-'.
-.05
(.os
Adjusted R'
.zr***
r .44***
(.o+
Russian dummy
Constant
.ooz#
(.oor )
.zz***
experlence
East German dummy
r o***
(.t)
r.44***
r -49***
(.tr
(.rr)
.o4
-34
.35
.98
2644
-97
-7n
r.r8
2644
2644
No/r': 'lirlllc crttrics arc unstandardized regression coefficients, with standard errors in parenthe-
Now we can turn to regression analysis to measure the effect of these five
basic variables on organi zational membership, while also controlling for
individual-level prior communist experience. I operationalize the prior communist experience within the pooled sample in two ways. First, I substitute
a dummy variable for prior communist experience, with Russians and East
Germans coded r, and West Germans coded o. Second, I include a dummy
vartable for East Germans and a dummy variable for Russians, in order to
compare the direction and strength of the coefficients in both countries and
to ensure that the same causal mechanism is taking place in each. When I
analyze the countries separately, however, I cannot include theser vilrirrlrlcs,
since they are constant for all respondents in each coLrntry.
Tables 5.r and S.z present nrultivuriirtc rcgrcssion r('sr,rlts. lrr 'lirblt. 5.r.,
which inclttdes thc 1-ro<llc,cl rcspotttlcrtts l.l"orrr :rll lllrt'r' c'()untry slunplt.s.,
Moclcl A tcsts tlrt'SliS:utrl c'ily si'r,t'vru'i;tlrlt's tolit'tlrt'r', slrotuvinlg tlr:rt.,:rs frr'1.
tf ictt'tl., iltc't)ttl('., t'tllr(:lliort., :uttl ;ll1(' lt,tv,' l)()\ilit,t' r'llt't ls (ln ()r!,,.vn/.rltorr,tl
Explaining
O r ganizational
Memb er sh ip
IOI
membership, men participate more than women, and city size has a negative
effect. Of these five variables, income, age,7 gender,and city size are all highly
statistically significant, while education has somewhat less significance. Despite these significant coefficients - which should not be surprising, given the
very large sample size - Model A explains only 4"/" of the variability in this
pooled sample.
Model B adds the individual-level variable for prior communist experience. In this model, with the exception of age, all of the variables are statistically significant, most highly so.'When looking at the coefficients, however, it
becomes clear that most of the explanatory power comes from the prior communist experience variable, which is associated with a very large decrease
of r.44 in the predicted, organizational membership. Moreover, Model B explains 34To of the variability in the sample, a major improvement over the
Russian
4"/o explained by Model A. Model C substitutes East German and
j"--y variables for prior communist experience, and the results show that
the two variables have similarly strong negative effects, both highly statistically significant and with similarly low standard errors. The effect of being
East German is associated with a decrease of r.z6 in the predicted otganizational membership, while being Russian is associated with a slightly larger
decrease of r.6r. That these coefficients are so similar suggests a strong
commonality between East Germans and Russians, at least in terms of their
organizational membership.
f"Ut. 5.2 presents a multivariate analysis of the three country samples,
showing the most fully specified model for each country separately. The
results show that income and education have positive and statistically significant effects in all three countries. Age is significant only in Russia, showing
a negative effect on participation, which is surprising given that the effect
is positive in both Eastern Germany and Western Germany. The ef"f
"ge gender is positive in all three countries, showing that men participate
fect of
more than do women, and it is statistically significant in Eastern Germany
and in'Western Germany, but not in Russia. Finall5 city size is statistically
significant only in the West German sample, where it has a strong negative
ef-fect, unlike the slightly positive, but not statistically significant, effects of
city size in the Russian and East German samples.
overall, the fully specified model of the SES variables and city size combine to explain 3o/" of the variability in the Russian sample, 5% in the
'West
German sample. Given that
l.last German sample, and xooh in the
experience is by far
communist
prior
Table
in the pooled sample from
5.r,
this suggests that
variables,
independent
other
nrorc powerful than any ofthe
missed by the
are
factors
that
post-communist
r ht'r'c nrrry bc othcr specifically
prior
commuthe
of
itsclf,
the
cstablishment
itr
intpor-taltt
Sl,lS rtrotlcl. Whilc
<lrganizations
irr
thc
prrrticipntion
orr
lrr.girtivc
cfti'ct
str()ltll
rrist crpt'r'ir.nc(.'s
'Weakness
IOL
al
cl
ol
Variable
Russia
Eastern Germany
'Western
Income
.o5**
.o9***
(.oz)
Education
.o6*
(.ot )
- -**
.r)
.r5***
(.ot )
(.ot)
(.o5
Ag.
-.oo3
Gender (male)
(.ooz)
.o4
size
Constant
(.oz)
.ooz
.ooo7
(.oot
(.ooa
.r8**
(.oz)
.44***
.oz
.oo4
(.or)
(.o+
-.r5***
.24*
.o07
(.os
City
(.os
(.o+)
Cg
Germanv
.zr**
cOl
'-N
a
a
c3
oa
(Uu)
EC
L-l-o
fr
I
L\-
'F
tE
'-N
E
o i
9E
o-=
/l\
t-
oq.,.=F9
.*t
+,
i=OOoc
OCCCiE
Es
(D c=
F='--
CS
>
L
r-,
@8trtrtr
4..
6.oo
o
c
FEg
R(o
-L_
9q
60x
olFlUi
Eqb
_c!F
bo6
>\>c
Fb6
CS
91
=
o
c
a
o
o
E
a
ab
L(Dtrl
.a
tr
oo(u
-o=_
E.>:
gHb A
; T-E- Ro\
6-*:o
r.24***
(.tz)
(.zo)
(-26)
Adjusted R'
.o3
.o5
.ro
SEE
.72
I.ZI
roo9
.96
842
793
Note: Table entries are unstandardized regression coefficients, with standard errors in parenof organrzational memberships per person
in each country.
* p ..o.t; **
lt < .or;*** P < .oor (all one-tailed)
Sr>urcc: l)atrr corne from PCOMS (tggg).
theses. The dependent variable is the average number
-??5^-
c
.0,
EJ
.9 '6
a F'= o
-.=
o-c-
o,
o
c
Lo=
Ha3 ;
-te='=
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o^
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3
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q
q@
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e,6 E ? ';
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U
of civil socicty does not tell us very much about why this is the case. \7e
still ncccl to unclerstand much more about the nature of that communist
cxpcrience, arrd why its legacy seems to have such a discouraging effect on
participation in the organizattons of civil society today.
Altern ativ e Explan ation
$-r-
=
FEVEO
F bgEs E
ob EBEs
E
TEEP =
T s552
ur
5(,'.1,,
ol l',:tsl (;('t'nt.uts
gEFE
E.
F;b5'
eP
_6'E= S
3EE3
q, > X I .=
s
E:5= E
grt! 7
-E EPsf
Ea5
E
E
g:ds *
q EsiE
?
u
# HH:o
g
sEea &
FE'E:
gE PE
II
l!
ro4
in this sample
this sentiment, whereas almost t8"/o of Russians do agree with it. \fhen
these first two options ate combined, however, one sees that a total of
68% of Russians and 6o"/o of East Germans have very negative views to'West
German
ward volunt ary organi zattons, compared to only 42"/" of the
sample.
Since this question was posed only to respondents who are not members of any organi zattons, the contrast between the three societies is even
starker in the context of the overall survey where 8 f/" of \fest Germans are
members of at least one organi zatton, ds opposed to 52"/" of East Germans
and 35% of Russians. In other words, within the full population (i.e., not
just non-members), the relative percentages of people who simply do not
that voluntary organizatrons are indeec-l lcss publicly visiblc irr l{ussi:t t lrrtrt
in Germany, and clnly slightly nr()rc so itt li:rsl('r'n ( it'r'nlrlny lltrut ilr Wt'slt't'n
Gcrrnat'ly. llilrlrlly., tlrt' l:tst olrtiort irr t'('sl)()ns(' lo tltt' sut'v('y (lu('sliott w:ls
"otll('l- t-('ils()nS.'" :rlrtl lltt't','sulls slttlw llt,tl l',;tlt ( ,r't.tlt,tns,u (',r11.rilt ilt lrt'lw('('tl
Explaining
O r ganizational
Memb ersh ip
ro5
\flest Germans and Russians, but this time they are closer to the Russians, as
many more'West Germans claim to have their own reasons for not joining
organizations.
Overall, the results depicted in Figure 5 .6 show very clearly that many East
Germans and Russians, for whatever reasons, do not want to ioin voluntary
organizations. But the obvious question remains: why not?
POST-COMMUNIST FACTORS IN RUSSIA AND EASTERN GERMANY
rngre they avoided them during the communist period, the less likely they
will be to participate in voluntary organizations today. The logic of this arltsmcnt goes against a common view, articulated optimistically by many in
thc carly post-communist period' that those people who had avoided or opposcd corrntunist organizations would be eager to participate now that the
t orrrrrrrrrrist systcln tto lottgcr cxists, and that people who were active during
rlrt' corrrrrrtrrrist pcriod wortld ltc lrt<trc rcsigttccl lrrrcl passive today.
'lir rrrr.:tsrrrt.tlris lrypothcsis, rlrc l)(l()MS srtrvcy iltcltrclctl tlrtcstions abottt
tltc s;rtrtc ttittt't;ttt'1iot'lt's ol ot1',rtttiz;tliotts irl. ltrtlt'tl irl tht'Worltl Vlrlrrcs
-lo\
o\
o\
.9''
r07
o-
(,
\\)
The second argument that I incorporate into this analysis involves the Priuate networAs that developed in the communist system. These networks arose
because the shortage economy created a climate in which people needed connections and help to acquire many goods and services, and because the public domain was so controlled and politic tzed that people formed trusting ties
with their close friends and family. This hypothesis predicts that those people who have maintained their vibrant friendship circles will feel less need or
desire to participate in voluntary organizatlons. To operationalize friendship
networks and to measure change in networks over time, the PCOMS survey
included questions (at different points in the questionnaire) referring both
to the communist period and to the contemporary period, asking how often
people used to rely on, or currently rely or, friends for help in fixing their
house or car) or assisting someone in their family, or in coping with difficult
situations in gen eral. I then constructed two indices of reliance on friends,
one for the communist period and one for the contemporary period. Finally,
to measure the persistence of or change in these networks, I subtracted the
current index from the communist index, yielding three basic categories: less
reliance, more reliance, and no change. Since the important cleavage is between respondents whose use of personal networks ha s decreased and those
for whom it has persisted., I group together respondents whose reliance on
friends is either "the same or more." Figure 5.8 thus differentiates between
respondents with either "low" or "high" levels of persistence of friendship
networks.
The results show interesting differences between Russians and East
Germans. For Russians, levels of participation in voluntary organizatrons are
virtually identical, whether or not their friendship networks have persisted
(i.e., whether or not they currently rely on friends as much as they used to).
lior llrrst (icrrnans,, however, those people whose personal networks have
rr<rt 1-rcrsistccl sr)cln to 1'rrrrticiprrtc in voluntary organizatrons at higher levels
o
L
o
.9
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ri
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tsl
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r{-
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rts
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l-{
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ts
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U)
z
r'
aa
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Y-oqqnclo
rOOOO
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u
tt
ll 'lll(.(,tlt.1,.rlr\,()l "l111v" lpislrrrsl ltlllllit's lo lltost'rvlt,l \v('t('ltt('ttlllt'r's olt 4-r1 c()lllllltlllist <lr"rtt,.,1111" 1lt5lt1,rl lo lltr)!,(' wlr,r lrr'l,,tr;',.'tl t,, I r()tlttltttltisl r)l'[l;lltiz:tlirltts, :ttttl
1,,.11/,tlt()1.,,
-'lrrlilt' 11.,1t1.,1 l(f 11t,,.,.'rvlr,, \v('t('nt('ntlt,-ts ol ,rttl\',) .'(ottlllllllll\l
ot1l.llll/,tlt(rtts.
0.8
E
o
07
o.
L
to
o6
CL
05
c)
-o
tr
04
(tr
03
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02
low
high
FIGURE
Russia
Eastern Germany
5.8. Persistence of Friendship Networks and Organizational Membership. Source: PCOMS (tgggl.
FJ
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Eastern Germany
FrcuRE 5.9. Post-Communist Disappointment and Organizational Membership. Source: PCOMS (tSSg).
r.r.BLE
R:rs-.i.i
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Table entries are unstandardized regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the number of organizational
memberships per person in each country.
\otej
-
(all one-tailed)
IIZ
For each of the three sets of regressions, the first model shows the four
variables from the SES model and city size, the second model shows my three
posr-communist variables, and the third model shows all eight variables
combined. The results show clearly that the addition of the post-communist
variables significantly improves our understanding of organi zattonal membership. In all three samples, the adjusted R-squared scores for the postcommunist variables are much higher than for the SES factors alone, and
they rise slightly when all eight vartables are included together.
Of the SES factors, income remains the most statistically signific ant.
Education is also statistically significant in the SES models, but loses its significance when included in the fully specified models. Ag. has a significant
negative effect in the fully specified model in Russia, but less so in Eastern
Germany. As akeady noted, men participate more than women, particularly
in Eastern Germany, where gender is statistically significant in the complete
model. Finally, city size has little to no statistical significance in most of the
models.
Explaining Organizational
Membership
nj
with communist organi zattons seems to have carried over into the current
period.e
bership. These results show that, at least in Eastern Germdny, there is often
a trade-off between the vibrant social networks that developed during the
communist period and the propensity to participate in volunt ary organva'
tions today.
Overall, these findings show that the three post-communist factors I have
presented here help considerably to explain the reasons for the particularly
low levels of organrzattonal participation in post-communist countries. The
specification of these three main elements of the communist experience elucidates the finding - both on the country level, with the cross-national study
'West
Germans added to
,.tf 3t countries, and on the individual level, with
the East German and Russian samples - that the dummy variable "prior
communist experience" is by far the most significant when tested against a
h<lst clf alternative explanations.
The common theoretical element of these three causal factors is that, in
sr:cl<irrg to survive in a complex and fast-changing world, people use their
llri<)r cxl)cricnce's as rl rcfcrcnce p<lint for their current choices and actions.
Wirlrout corrsiclcring tlrosc cxp(:ricttccs - how they shaped people, and how
1rt'oplt' r'r'flt'ct ul)()n ltttrl irrtcrpt'r't tltt'rn
'' lrr tlrt' lollon,urll ( lr,rlttt'r, I r'rPlorr llrr",r' r.r,ru('.r ur nrrrr lr lirt',rl<'l tlt't;ril, lll irrgirrlg ilr tlrt'st<ll'it's
Irr lrn ilt.ilr\' (f l tttt' llt rlr'1ttlr rlll('l \'l('\\' I(",|liltttlt.ttl',
rr4
ersh
ip
II5
Having shown the relative similarity among the countries in postcommunist Europe in Chapter 4, and having specified several important
causal factors that can account for the low levels of post-communist
participation in this chapter, the next chapter seeks to contribute a more
comprehensive and discerning account of the ways in which post-communist
citizens understand their prior experiences and explain their current choices
and activities. By analyzing 6o in-depth interviews, with a stratified random sample of 3o ordinary East Germans and a quota sample of 3o ordinary Russians, I incorporate an interpretive methodological approach that
complements and bolsters the findings presented in this chapter.
r.
Official May
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INTRODUCTION
4 charactertzed, illust rated, and demonstrated the particular weakof civil society in post-communist Europe, and Chapter 5 employed
statistical analysis to identify and test the explan atory power of a set of
individual-level causal factors that could account for levels of partici pation, both across and within countries. This chapter adopts a very different
Chapt er
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ness
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|) l''r,,r t.l,'t,r tlt'l:ttlt'tlrlist ussiorr ol nr1, r('s(',r r..'lr rrrt'tlrocls lor- tht' in-clcpth interviews,
It,,rt | ',t l, t lr tl trt\ r(.ll'lott,lt nl',, llort nr\' ',,rrrr1'rl('s ( ()nrl):u t' lo llrt' l,rrgc N srtrrrplcs
( )Nl(r'.ut\( \. trrtl lrorr | .,,tr,ltr. l,,l tlr, trrlcr \ r( \\,.,, .r,r rr,,'ll .rs llrt' ;rt lrr;rl irrlt'r vit'w
, r, lt ttrlr t\ t( \t
rzz
Sr
r23
to do a lot of things that they didn't want to do, and now it's swung in the opposite
direction, and they say, no, not again.
ily
nr(:lu.r
t lr;t
t tht'y
t<t
rz4
lawyer, who is
now employed by the German state and thus lives very comfortably: "Many
people from the former GDR feel that way, that they say, 'we were members
long enough, and now we don't have to be members in order to be engaged in
somethirg, or to support something.' " Similarly, a z9-year-old East German
male mechanic explains his aversion to group membership:
I don't want to commit myself to anything, not to some group. I would rather be
independent, free. . . . If I say, "Now I want to do something for the protection of
animals," then I go and give a contribution, or ask if I can do something. But only
once. I don't want to be depend ent again and then have to go regularly or something. I
don't want that. . . . F GDR times] it was more or less an obligation, and they forced
you in or told you that you must do this or that. But it's just that dependency, where
they tell you "yo., must go to this meeting" or whatever, and it was an obligation,
that'swhat I don't want. And therefore I don't do that now, be dependent somewhere.
I'd rather think for myself.
rz5
join Greenpeace or something, I don't want at all to be an active member. I also don't
want to just sit here and and think about which action I have to do next or something.
For me that time is, I'll say it now, over. I now prefer to play the supportive role, that
says, "oka5 it's a good thing what you're doing. \fhere I can help you, I will." But
I don't want to be one of these "organrzation people" anymore.
plc thcir c()nur'lunist cxperience evokes extreme and even hostile reactions.
\7ell, reallS
This quotation makes clear how strong the aversion is to membership, which
to many post-communist citizens implies an obligatory participation. It does
not necess arrly represent a rejection of the causes themselves, however. This
respondent seems to think that today's organ tzatrons will make him feel the
way he did before, zS coerced into continued membership or as somehow
((ltttt,,tl,ttl
I don't have time, and I'm not interested. But the most important is
that, well, the Soviet systen, it instilled an antipathy or aversion, because any experience with organrzations was unpleas ant. That is, [to many people] an organtzauon
is that which imposes an obligation. And obligations under socialism were so rigid
that now I just don't want to participate. Maybe they [organizations] are completely
different, but I just don't want to.
This response is very similar to those given by several East Germans. This
Russian man's opinion of communist organi zatrons was entirely negative,
viewing membership and participation as an obligation rather than a free
choice, and this experience has left him dissatisfied and unwilling to participate ln any contemporary organlzatlons.
Another example comes from a Sz-year-old Russian woman who works as
slrlcsclcrl< in rr snrall clothing store. She explains, "Maybe it's left over from
t lrc (,ornnrurrists., l'rut I l<ccp ar vcry cautious attitude towards these groups."
1l
Slrt'll()('s orr to tcll rr l()ns story ubout I'rcr crpcricnce while living in Yerevan,
Ar-rnt'rrirr., tlur-rrrr,, tlrt' r.lt'vrtslrttirrti crtt-llrtlu;ll<r' irt 1.2llll. Shc retnembers that
nr;ur\' ( ()nnnurrist or'1!.utiz,tliotts w('r(' pl,'..lr',irrti sul)1'rorl :utrl pr()n'risirrg rricl
lrut tlr.rt lrttlt' ol rt :rt tu.rllt r('.r( lrt',1 tlr,' ;tt',,plt' nr n('('(1. Sin('(' llrcrt.' slt(' :trltls.,
,,1f,'lr,r', r('nr.urrr'.1 \'('rV rlr',lru',llul ,l .rnV l.,t',1 ,rl ollr.'r.rl ()rt',,tt/:tliort- llr
r26
other words, like that of many of the East German respondents, this Russian
woman's view of contemporary organizations is tainted by her prior experiences with communist organizations, leaving her feeling detached and
dissatisfied.
The example of an active, mobile, albeit currently unemployed, z4-yearold Russian woman echoes a point made by several of the East Germans.
Although she does not specifically refer to her communist experience in this
,.rporr*, her explanation for not participating shows that the unwillingness to join organizations does not necessarily mean lack of interest:
I'm continuing to be busy with my own things. I'm interested in societal/group activities. I can iook at them, but I'm not ready to participate in them. I don't know,
maybe when I continue my studies, maybe something will change in my life, but for
now, I don't participate in any organizations and I don't want to. It's not interesting to me. If there's something that has to be done, the only thing I know is that
if iomething has to be done, changes in the country or something, then yes, I'll do
it, but for now especially I just don't see any. . ..I like art, theater, and also social
interaction at [evening] parties. I don't miss much. I watch the news, television, for
now things are calm, and I'm calm too. If it's necessar5 I'll do it. If it's necessary
to go ooi to demonstrations, I'll go out to demonstrations, and even, maybe, go
on a hunger strike, if it's necessary. But for now everything is calm, good, and I'm
calm roo. I'm living in the present, now, and I don't want to change anything in this
life.
\While she docs not manifest the same direct hostility toward voluntary organizati<lns that others do, her comments show that she attributes her current
unwillingncss to parrticipate to factors beyond her control, saying that her
aftitude nright change if the situation in the country changes, necessitating
action. Importantly, her apparent passivity is accompanied by a great deal
of interest in and potential commitment to action.
I don't
This response reveals thilt pc()plc crrrr bc irrvolvt'tl irr :rct ivitit's tlrrtt itr'('trslr
ally ass<lcintccl with s()tn('s()rt ()t v()lunlilry ott',:tttizrtliorts, wltt'lltt'r'r't'li1',i,,rls,
lrthlctir., or polilir;rl, willrr)lrl w;lnlirrli or rt,,'.lirtti to iorrr lll( ()ll',,llll7:lllorl
l
r27
Having addressed the similarities between the East German and Russian
distrust of organizations, based primarily on past experiences with communist organizations, I should also note several differences. The East
German respondents tend to show more anger and resentment toward the
old communist organi zatrons, whereas the Russians display a more general
view of organizations as unnecessary, useless, and sometimes distasteful.
This observation also applies to the responses to the survey question depicted in Figure 5 .6, which showed that, whereas few East German or \fest
German respondents claimed that they find organizatrons "to be completely
uselessr" r8o/o of the Russian non-members did. Nevertheless, what is
especially striking is that in the precedittg quotations the Russian and East
German respondents tended to raise the same issues, show similar thought
processes by evaluating present organizations based on past experiences,
and reach the same conclusion in choosing not to participate. That citizens
in two completely different societies, with entirely different institutions and
cultures, could give such similar explanations constitutes strong evidence for
the explanatory power of people's mistrust of communist organizatrons as
a caus al factor that accounts for the low levels of membership in voluntary
associations today.
Until novv, I have focused on the gre at majority of people who have negatiue
reactions to communist organizations and to their experiences with them,
and who explain their current aversion to volu ntary organi zatrons with rcference to their forced participation in organizatrons in the communist past.
The other element of this argument, however, involves those people who had
positiue experiences with, and therefore low mistrust of, communist organizatrons. According to the logic of this argument, as was demonstrated statistically in the previous chapter, these people should be more acttve partlcrpants
today.
The results of my in-depth interviews also provide strong support for this
aspect of the argument. Of the rr Russian and rz East German respondents
who are currently members of one or more voluntary orgaruzatrons, most
were also members of several communist organizatlons in the past. Moreover, by focusing on those respondents who are most active today, the logic
of the argument becomes even more clear. Of the two R.ussian and three
East German respondents who are currently members of two or more organizations, ail five developed extensive org anrzational experience, skills, and
spririt cluring the cornmunist period.
'l'frc nrost rlctive such respondent is a
3;-year-old East German protestant
l)rrst()r. Obviously vcry rrctivc in u rcligi()us organizatron, h. also participates
in clrru'ity., y()utll.' ,rncl nlusicrrl ()r-llrrrriz:tfions. IIis crr-rciarl experience with
()r't',:rrriz:rliorrs ()('r'rrr-r-t'tl irt tlrt' l:tlt' 1 t,;,tios., r,lurirrR tltt' r('voltrti()ttltry pcri()cl.,
vt,lrcn', .r., .r \'()unt,, slutlt'ltl ol llrt'r,1.,1,,\,., lrr'' lt,',..lnl(' l,',t,lt'r' ol :l sttltlt'rtl ('()tlt
f f uf lrr' rl I r'r;ttt!,,. I lt' ortr',,un tt',,l ,ur,l l,'.1 ,lr'., u',',r()n l',r'()ul)\ ,ttttl tlt'lr,llt's, ,lltrl
rz8
'Weakness
well-known "Monday demonstrations," which ultimately put the most direct pressure on the regime.
Although he was unsure of his career path during his studies, he states that
the excitement of his activities and experiences convinced him to become a
pastor and that he feels a responsibility to help and support his fellow GDR
cittzens in coping with their difficulties after unification.
The next example comes from a very poor 47-year-old Russian woman
who now runs a struggling educational tourism business for children. Today
she belongs to and supports both cultural and women's org anrzatrons. She
also acquired organi zattonal experience in the communist period, both in
her participation in several state-run organizations, such as the Red Cross
and a book lovers' club, and especially in her non-state activities in the
r9}os. Since her (now ex-) husband was a poet, their friends were typically
literary and cultural figures, many of whom were dissidents under suspicion by the regime. She describes her involvement in helpittg to publish underground Samizdat materials, recording Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's banned
Gwlag Archipelago onto a poor quality audiocassette and then distributing
it, and supporting the anti-communist opposition movements in the eatly
r99os) when she spent full days demonstrating on the Palace Square in
Lening rad. The recent revolutionary period was the most invigorating and
fulfilling time of her life, and she claims that she will never stop being active,
no fflarttcr how bad the situation in Russia becomes"
-l'lrc of hcr lLussian respondent belongittg to two organizations is a
5c.l-/crrr-olcl rnrrle actor and theater director active in artistic and charity
()r-prrrrizrrtions. t.lc also developed his interests, skills, and habits during the
c()n.urrurrist pcriod. Although his membership in communist organizatrorrs
wers purely a formality, he was active in literary and artistic circles, which
rnet regularly to read and discuss books and themes that were either banned
or discouraged by the regime. Most importantly, however, he developed
his own artistic talents, both as an actor and a director during that time,
and he has continued his organi zattonal activities in the post-communist
he was an early and active participant in the
TL9
period.
tWhereas the first three examples involved people who were especially
active in non-state groups and activities, the following two respondents, both
East Germa n, participated in official communist organi zatrons, and they now
rjo
rrt,l
r3r
3z-year-old East German plumber claims that "old friends are now more
focused on themselves. They are not interested anymore in what others
are doing." And a 41-year-old Russian audio technician states that "people
have become more withdrawn into themselves. \fell, maybe this doesn't apply to everyone, and some people still get together with friends, and all is
still good, but for me it's somehow happened that we've drifted apatt."
Another Russian, a 3z-year-old female bookkeeper, expresses her disenchantment with interpersonal relations in even more despondent terms:
Before, friendshlp relations were somehow closer and better. That is, before there was
more of a genuine friendship. Today it's somehow being lost. \7hy? I don't know,
life has become such that everyone is fighting for his piece of bread. Before, the
government gave it to him, and he didn't really think about it. He had time to get
together with friends every d^y, to go here or there, but now, well, it's every person
for himself. Every person for himself, yes.
Echoing the view that relations have deteriorated signific antIy, but this time
from an East German perspective, a 3z-year-old male gardener explains:
It's become colder. . . . In the GDR there was this warmth between people. Maybe they
couldn't stand each other, but they needed each other somehoq because of those
connections. But that's entirely gone now. Everyone does his thing, and everyone
thinks, or maybe tries to convince himself , that "I don't need him, that ass! No, I
don't need him at aIIr I can br'ty anything, go away!" So it's become more aggressive,
and it's colder.
This response brings to light a cruci aI difference between the two case studies, namely, that today the need to use connections to acquire goods and
services is essentially absent in Eastern Germany but largely continues in
Russia. Moreover, as I explain later in greater detail, Russians have to cope
with the realities of economic adversity in a way that East Gerrnans cannot even imagine. As a 34-year-old Russian sanitary-technical worker puts
it, "Everyone has simply withdrawn into themselves, because of their lack
of means. They've withdrawn into themselves, because they have to make
money and feed their families. "
Many respondents in both countries talked about the new importance
of money in their societies. Concerning the effect of money on relations
between people, the Russian language institute director quoted earlier offers
a prototypical response:
Wcll., they Ifriendship relations] have become more monetarily based, I would say,
l'rccirusc vcry mLrch now depends on money, because many friends have become depcncf crrt orr nriltcriarl statu s. That is what has changed. Relations depend on material
,rrrtl linrurcirrl frrctors. llcforc, this als<l cxistcd, but not to the extent that we find
'{:r'r' :r ttcl tttur-lt st r-oltgcr.
f r rtf rr y. Now,r,l,r ys il's nrtt('lt ln
A ) , \,('.u ,,1,1 l',:rst ( it'r'nl:ur \ /()nr:ln., wllo w:ls l'tlt-lll('t-ly l't c()()l( :ltlcl is c:ttrr('ntlv un('rrr;,1()\,('(l,,r.ltls tlr:rt tlrc n('w t,,lt',,1 ttl()tt('y lr,ts irrstill,'.1 ,r s('tts('ol'
r3z
enuy)which she believes did not exist in GDR times, and which she views
being destructive of human relationshlps:
Before
as
together, and
people did many things together. There was no envy. These days, only money matters.
Today many families are fighting over financial affairs, over inheritance, mainly things
that used to be completely banal. In my family it's no different, and I can give many
examples. It's mainly because some people haven't done well after the.Wende - [two
are] unemployed, for example. . . . Others live up by the Ostsee. They inherited land
from their mother, started a business there, and are now millionaires. Yes, they're
both in the same family. Of course, they both don't speak a single word to each other
anymore, because the [unemployed] ones say, "They took it away from me." And
because of that, it's very, very complicated, yes. This thing, that I was saying, the
Wende, and especially these financial things, have destroyed much, so much. This is
because all of a sudden envy plays a role where it didn't exist before.
This description of the effects of recent wealth and poverty within one
family points to a general view of society that many people hold, namely,
rhat social inequalities have increased dramatically since the collapse of communism. The followirg two quotations show similar interpretations of the
new social inequalities in both countries, while also demonstrating some of
the clear differences between life in Russia and in Eastern Germany. The first
comes from
a fi-year-old
\7ell, somehow relations between people have changed, it seems to me . . . The stratification of society is very deep. In Soviet days, we were all more or less at the same
level. \7e didn't really know what was there on top. But it seems to me that even
the Communist Party was still somehow more modest. Because [to d^y] when they
show these three-story brick mansions, well, they're worth such a colossal amount of
money. But the common masses are everywhere and destitute. And because of that,
.We
all used to be more or less even, and we
relations between people have changed.
had cars, like "Zhrgulis." But now you see all over Moscow these incredibly expensive cars. . . . There's a big difference between, how can I put it, the rich elite and the
completely poor people. An extremely large stratification. And especially between
people, there are certainly many fights and skirmishes.
The next response comes from a 46-year-old female East German secretirry:
The financial situation has become very different. In the GDR' cvcrybocly wrls brrsically at one level, with few variations. Of coLrrse rl b<lss rttrtclr' r'n()r-(' llrrtn :r s('('r-t'l:rry.
But the differences were not very t'rig. T<rclrry it's r-t',rlly :r f irtrurt i,tl prolrlt'ttt, :utrl tlris
prestige-thinking has bcc<lrrrc rrruclr rn()r-('l)r'()rrrirtt'rtl, I tlrirrlt. ll s()nr('()nt'lruys:l
bigger car., thcrr s()n'r('()n(' ('lst' loolis .rl lrirrr slt.urtit'l\,,, {r1 rl \()nr('()n(' Ittul,l" ,t lt.,u'r('.
| 1t,",.' l,.trrtl', ol tlttlt1", r tt'.tlt
l-lrrt sr)n't(.()n(. (.1s,. ,,trlv liv.'., nr .t lt'rrlt'tl .tlr,trltttt-rtl
ry3
friction. I mean, ther e are certainly people who don't care. But there are also people who suffer under these conditions and who say, "I won't go see them anymore;
they've become too conceited for me, " or something like that. . . . In that respect,
I think, that camaraderie, which used to exist, isn't there anymore. . . . There are
certainly good friendships that stick together through thick and thin, and that live
through everything, but some also fall apart, I think.
These
:t
ry4
135
This means that they have to build something entirely new. And you have to reahze
that the majority of GDR citizens only rarely changed their workplace - they often
stayed in the same company for zo) 3c.) 40 years, and these companies were made
bankrupt. To find a new friendship circle zo years later is almost impossible.
Before, at work there was a dtfferent "togethernessr" now, there isn't. People were
in a "collective." People were in a community, [and] they worked together for many
years"...[No*,] one person stops workinE, a new person comes in, and you don't
haue that contact anymore.Before, with our co-workers, for example, on international
women's day we had a party, and for Christmas, and for this and that too. . . . Now
it's only work.'Work and maybe just ro minutes in between to talk, and that's it.
respondents.
To sum marrze' the four themes raised in many interviews
/ ((\t("'
t.,
A common element in many responses is that, for most people, their experiences under communism serve as a reference point for their contemporary evaluations. I believe that this observation fits all post-communist
societies - albeit in different ways, dependittg on the extent of pov erty, of
people's personal contact with social inequalities, and of the changes in
people's workplaces - and that many citizens of other countries would thus
respond within the range of answers given by my East German and Russian
- the increased
focus on personal life, the newly prominent and destructive role of money,
the far greater social inequality, and the transformation of the work
environment - have been major causes for change in interpersonal relations.
The picture that emerges from these responses is one of interpersonal relations that have changed dramatically in both East German and Russian
societies, albeit with certain differences reflecting the two populations. Indeed, one might conclude that the old private networks that were so well
developed under communism - either the friendships of deep trust or the
relationships of instrumental necessity - are coming undone tod ar/, perhaps
opening people to the possibility of joining voluntary organizatror-Is for social interaction. However, when focusing on their own personal lives, rnany
respondents present a quit e dtfferent picture, reportittg fewer changes in their
interpersonal relations. This is an indication that people do not necess arrly
apply the dominant discourse - that "money" and "greed" have destroyed
the valuable social fabric that was the best part of socialism - to their own
lives. Of course, it is difficult to determine exactly where the boundary is
between "society overall" and one's "own personal life," since some people
rnight count only close family members in the latter category, while others
rnight include anybody that they know even remotely. \fhat is clear from my
irrterview results is that many people make that distinction intheir ownminds.
Mrrrcover, nrost of my respondents, in both Russia and Eastern Germ"ny,
sc'r'rcrrrlly vicw their own condition as being better, or certainly "less worse,"
tlrrrrr thut ol' othcrs in tl-reir society.
'l'lris is rrr>t to suggcst thart it is inaccurate or misleading to observe
\.un(' ur tlr,'ir ()\vn ,.il'. lt's. ()rr tlr,'(()!rlr'.ll'y., t',ivt'lt tlt:rt pcttlllc l'lrtsc thcir
('\.tlu.rltotr ol .,ot tr'l\ ()n 1,,('n,'l,tl llrlt't.tt ll()n\ rvltlt slt':lttll('t's ()tt llrt'sll't't'l ttlri,rllr tll,,l.lltl .trrlll.urrl,ur((",, rl ',lr,,rrl,l ltol n('((".',.tlll\ l,,ll,,rry tlr.rl l)('()1llt"s
r36
interactions with close friends and family have also become more cold and
unpleasant - although in some cases they certainly have. The important
point here is that for some people social networks, which were such a vital
and distinctive feature of communist societies, have partially changed, as
was revealed by many of the responses quoted earlier. But for others) close
social networks have remained essentially the same, even though there is
still a strong sentiment that broader social relations have deterio rated.
This point was made explicitly by respondents in both countries, of all ages
and occupations. They attested to the stability of their social networks with
such phrases as: "Actu ally they've stayed the same as they always were. Nothing has changed";8 "V/ell, in my circles, there haven't been any changes";e
"Nothirg has changed. It's stayed the same. Nothing that I know of has
changedat all";'o "I haven't experienced any changes, what I used to have is
still there";" "In my circles things haven't changed at all";" "Friends don't
depend on anything, they're friends. That's what they were, and that's stayed
the same. They can'tchange. Friendship doesn't change";'3 "\fell, today it's
more about money and wealtho and money plays a more important role than
it did in GDR times. But as for my family and the people and friends who've
always been close to me, nothing has changed at all, actually."'+
In sho fi, for the many people who have experienced little change in their
social networks, and who continue to have the close ties they developed under communism, the satisfaction with their own networks helps to explain
their non-participation. Moreover, given that the common communist experience serves as an explicit reference point for respondents in both Eastern
Germany and Russia, we can suggest that this factor applies, in varying
ways and to varying degrees, to the many post-communist countries that lie
IO
II
l2-
rl
r.l
1,-
ry7
A aT-year-old
East German man, who runs a transport business, characte:-izes people's expectations in similar, albeit less evocative, terms:
In my
circles . . . people
consumption. . . . These goals were, you can say, somewhat primitive. I don't think
there were any bigger ones. For the most part it was travel, yes, and that blinded
people.
These
I felt that it was very good, that it was marvelous, remarkable . . . The feeling of freedom was, well, it was truly excellent. At first it was euphoric, but shortly afterwards,
it became disappointing.. ..It seemed that in this joy, you could say everything, you
c<luld say the truth to one another, not just somewhere in some kitchen, but openl5
,rrrcl that the newspapers would actually write the same thing that you think. But
vcry little has actually changed in real life. That is, words don't immediately have an
cffcct on thir-rgs., and reality moves much more slowly. There was a euphoria about
srrrr-tirrg to spcrlk., rrnd we thought that everything would change at once. But it turns
orrt tlrrlt's rtot crlrctly riuht.
Arrtl tlrt'slurr(' ,l 7-yc1v--olcl-lrrrst (icnlrrur rnan quoted earlier adds that "those
wlrorrr I l<rr1)Wr llrt'y iu'('v('r'y' v('r'y rlisrrl)l)()irrtccl. Because many didn't want
tlris 'l lr,'y \,V:rrrtt'tl s()rrrt'tlrirrri r ()nrl)lt'tt'ly' tlillt'r't'nt. I thirtl< thc biggest part of
tlr,' l)()l)rll.tliolt tlitllr't \\z,lllt wlt;tl \\/(' ll()w lt:tr','. No w:ty. Nolltltly."
I ooInti,, 1,.t, 1,.. .,()nr(' r('.,1)()n(lcttl', t(-ln.ttk,',1 ;tltrltlt ltow tt:ltv(' tlrt'y w('l-('
rr 11,.",' , n1,,.l.rlron', .urtl lt,,rl r'.t',tlV tlrct \\'('t(' tttl',1,'.1 lrt' tlr,' l)t()tllls('\
ryB
of politicians. A
it
as
follows:
\7e had great hopes. And, in principle, the population of the Soviet Union was a
.We
believed the printed word. And when the new big
trusting people, very trusting.
politics arrived, the people weren't politicized,weren't ready for it. And participation
in all of these games was like the participation of children in some game of adults.
And then looking back now, how ridiculous we were! To believe those people who
were playing! \We were just participants in their "high" games.
A big portion [of people] have become frustrated. . . . Many people hoped for too
much frona these changes, or too spontaneously. Many people had illusions that
were far too big. And they were then very disappointed. . . . Not everything has gone
well. And because of that, many people who went with excitement and good will
to the demonstrations are disappointed today, because they're unemployed, or have
other problems.
The k.y point in these two descriptions is that during the time of optimism slrrrounding the collapse of communism, many people were exceedingly trusting of what they heard, unaware of the difficulties they were soon
face, and unprepared for the adjustments they would have to make.
The main object of people's blame and disdain is undoubtedly politicians.
Although the desire to "throw the rascals out" is centralto awell-functioni^g
democ rattc system, the dislike of almost all politicians and political parties
is particularly strong in the fledgling post-communist democracies - as evidenced by public opinion surveys, as well as by the large number of electoral
reversals throughout the region in recent years. This disappointment with
contemporary politics obviously takes on a different form in each country,
depending on the particular constellation of political forces and personalities.
In this respect, the Russian and East German cases are as different as one can
imagine within the spectrum of post-comrnunist Europe. German unification
was an utterly unique event, giving East Germans a "ready-made state" that
has made them "uniquely privileged."15 But the fact that almost every elite
.West
Germans'6 has given East Germans a very
position is controlled by
visible target for blame: not only politicians, but West German politicians,
personified by former Chancellor Helmut Kohl. In contrast, the loarthing of
politicians in Russia is more typical of other East European countrics - whe rc
no "internal other" (i.e., 'West German) group crln bc blarrrccl rrlthttrrglt
"foreign" and "\(/estern" governments ancl le aclcrs il rc ccrt:r irr ly hr'ltl p:r r-tly
responsible for domestic problcrls.
to
It
Sct' ll()s('irnrl I lrr('rl)lr'r, " I lrt' lnrJr,lr I ol .r l(t',t.lr i\l r,lr \t,tlt' "
I(r St't' Willr,'lrtr lirrrlilrrr. I lrllr, l(,'ltr n',lot l. r'l rl , / ltlt'tt ttr lt,'trl',, l,l,ttt,l
.t1t',tltt,lr (l cr,','t l'. tt',('tt: | ,",1 ,' i. lirr,lr r, lr, t ',') ')
ry9
Moreover, the z6-year-old Russian office manager quoted earlier on his high
hopes and the "intoxication of freedom," claims that "I am disappointed in
e\ierythirg, everything in our politics. Right now our entire highest power
is 9 9% corrupt." Finally, a 47-year-old Russian male cornputer technician
gives more specific reasons for his disappointment with his country's political
leadership:
viernr,
me? First, they deceived the people, and second, they robbed them. \7hy? \7hen
I worked, I didn't steal, I earne d a certain amount of money. I worked evenings,
nights, and counted in my head and with the computer that I'd earned a certain amount of money. I counted on it. But then it turned out that it was gone!
Everything! Nothing left. And now, I'm supposed to trust this government? No, of
course not.
These quotations show the utter and complete disgust with contemporaqr
politics in Russia, which is probably more extreme than just about anywhere
in the world. For many years while he was president, the twice-elected Boris
Yeltsin's approval rating wavered between f/" and z"/", a percentage that is
almost unheard of, especially so consistently over time.
But the aversion to politics and politicians in Russia is only part of the
reason why people are so disappointed. Another major component, akeady
discussed in previous sections, has to do with the realities of economic hardship aurcl thc strr-rggle for survival that many people face today. As explained
by a c1u itc succcf ssfu I zll-year-old Russian female lawyer,
Wlrt'rr Yt'ltsirr wrrs t'lt'ctt'tl f,r- tlrt' fir-st tirnc., it wzts absolutely grandiose.... And I
lrt'lit'vt'tl tlr;rt \v('w('r'('orr tl)r'l.r;ltlr tlr:rt w()rrlrl [rrirrg rrs cl()scr tcl a good life. Changes
lr,rr'.' l;rl<t'rr 1rl:rtt', w,rlllottl ;r tlottlrl I ilt' lt,tt ,lt,tlt1',t'tl too",/,, I tt-lctlll in terms of
)rrr.,rl,rlrllt,, 1,,,1,).r()rttt^llunt,, or .rt lrr,'r,".,'ll r,'.rlrr,tli()n. (lr'lirrirt'ly. ltvt'lt ilt lt ttllrr()w
f
,,( n,,('. ll,.t(,t('\\'urrl,,rr', ()r otr',lotr ',1r,'1r.", llrrt tlrr olltt't tlrirrti is tlt:tl tlris llils l'('vt',tlt'tl
nr.ur\ ,,lr,,rlt onuni,,',, rr lrt,, lr ',tr',rrrlt. .rirtlt \\,t',r tt tlr, t( ',ttll l lr,rt t'.. ttt.ltt\' ;'t,',,1r1,'
r4q^
have been sacrificed for the sake of this. Sixty percent of our population lives on the
edge
I'm disappointed, disappointed, not satisfied with anything. I know that abroad, of
course, many people join these types of organizattons. But I think they have different
problems. \fhen, in gen eral,there is only one problem here now; and that's to survive,
to survive so that you don't feel humiliated. \7hen you go to some store and see
expensive products and food, and you can't afford it yourself. I don't knornz, I never
experienced this until now. . . . I know that I need to live, and I need to work. I go
to the theater, listen to music. For that I don't need any organization. I have many
friends, some of whom work in the the ater, and I spend time with them. That's it.
Vell, agarn,I don't need any official organ:Zations for that.
This response also serves as a good example of the way in which the factors
I have outlined can overlap and be mutually reinforcing. In this excerpt,
the respondent states clearly that her struggle to get by precludes any participation in volu ntary organizations, but she also adds that she has many
friends and is very socially actle and states that she does not feel any need
for "official" organizations.
In summary, the disappointment felt by many ordrnary Russians has at
its root the widesp read economic devastation that has taken place in their
country since the collapse of communism. The target for blame is generally
the politicians surrounding Boris Yeltsin, who are seen to have " stolen "
much of Russia's property and wealth, and even its dignity.
The East German case is different in several ways, as the following examples show. Overall, the k.y features of this East German disappointment can
be characterrzed by two interrelated themes that distinguish it from Russia:
(t ) feelings of havittg been misled by 'West German promises, and (r) the
psychologically devastating effects of unemployment. \fhile these factors
are certainly not as severe as the struggles for subsistence and survival that
many Russians face, they have given many East Germans a feeling of generarl
malaise and dissatisfaction with the new political and economic clrder, lcaclittg them to be even more reluctant to participate in voluntary organiz;rtiorrs.
Indicative of the first theme having been misled by Wcst ( icrnrlr n
elites - a 37-year-old East German homemal<cr cxprcsscs hcr cliscrrclrrrrrt
ment with Helmut Kohl, and his Christian l)crrrocrrrtic IJrrion ((.1)tl) ()v('r'
the eight years when he wi'rs he r clrrurc('ll<,r:
Sfe all votc'tl l:or- tlrt' (,l)tl. Arr,l Kolrl, lr,' ,.,trrl,l .rlrr,.rr',
pr()tttist's. Alrtl !v(' \{,('r(' , lr'rtlurt', lo llr.'rrr ,r lrttli', lrrrl
tl()w n,,lrr,,l\, \,\,o1rl.l volt' lor K,,lrl .rrr\'nrorr ( ru,rr,rrrlr
It
r4a
\fhile this view is probably somewhat standard for many East Germans'
:z7-year-old unemployed woman, who was also quoted earlier on the topic
of money and greed, explains her disgust with the way in which Kohl initiated the unification process, and how this has alienated her from the new
system:
And I noticed quickly that it was coming when we received roo Marks as "greetings
money" lBegrilpungsgeld]. Yes, "greetings mon ey." . . . And then these political things,
what actually happened, these people all sat together, and they just listened to Helmut
Kohl and voted for the CDU. My reaction was, these people didn't think, they were
just emotional! After that,I'd had enough. So it all happened pretty quickly. . . . I was
thinking, this is too euphoric, what's going on. So for me it's certain that I won't
grow old in this state. It's not my country! It has nothing to do with me being a GDR
citrzen, but rather on the basis of the politics of this state.
A majority of the East German responses probably fit in between these two
views, particularly with regard to the national level of the CDIJ and Helmut
Kohl personally. Indeed, less than half a year after my interviews were conducted, Kohl was resoundingly defeated, ending his unprecedented r 8 -year
rule, and the East German electorate was primarily responsible for the transfer of power to a new coalition government led by the Social Democratrc
Party (SPD).Itr the years since this new government came to power in 1998,
the East German elector ate has repeatedly expressed dramatic fluctuations
in its preferences, generally voting resoundin gly against each recently elected
government in local and state elections" In this sense, East Germans resemble
crtrzens of other post-communist countries more than they do \7est Germans,
whose voting patterns are much more stable and predictable.
The people who feel most resentful tow ard \fest Germans are usually the
East German activists who were so centralin bringing about the revolutionary changes in the first place, and who feel that the process and terms of
German unification represented a betrayal of the goals that they took sigpificant risks to pursue. For example, a 33-year-old social worker, who had
lrcen very active in the late r98os, explains why he has withdrawn from most
()
r-s:r
t'ti,e d, a ctivities
Whcn I rc:rlizccl that the takeover by \Mest Germany was going to happen, that we'd
rrctrrrrlly lost rhc rcvolLrtion, simply because we didn't make use of the chance to create
s()nrt.tlrin.il nc'wr f hcn I l-rccan-rc' vcry frustrated, and it was all over for me.
l,:rtt.r' irr r lrt' intt'r-vit'w' wlrt'rt ,lt'scribirrg lris current jtb in a major West
( ,t'r'nrilrr .'lrru'ily ()r'tl:utiz,:tliort., ltt' sl:llt's lh;rt thcrc ilre very few East German
nt(,lrrl',.,rs irr t lrt'()t-l,,:rniz.rf i()n1 .rrrtl llr,,rr.' rvlto ltt-(' tll('lllllcrs lrre gelrerally much
l,'r, :rt livt.. I lrt' r('.rs()n., ,r( ( (,r,lur1i to lrirrr, is tlr:rt "t'ttlltly ltltvc withcJrarwn
()t .1(' ryltlr.ll.t\\,ntl,, lloltt rrtti.tlll/.tltrt;1',. l',t'r,lll'-(' llrt'1' lt't'l :l lil'(':ll tlt':tl tlf
|
)(
r42
TABLE
6t.
Eastern Germanv
Number of Times
Number of Respondents
Unemployment Mentioned
(Percent of Total)
Number of Respondents
(Percent of Total)
o
I
z
z6(86.7%)
2(6.7%)
2(6.7%)
.,
o
o
4t
Valid ld
3o
6(zo.o"/")
s (16.7%)
z2ts%)
6(zo.o"/")
6(zo.o"/o)
3o
Note: Measurements for this table were conducted by using word searches through all of the
interview transcripts for any mention of unemployment (as noun, verb, or adjective), counting
each sentence where the word was mentioned at least once (i.e., if it was mentioned several
times in the same sentence, it still counted as one).
Source: Author's interviews ( 1998).
r43
As support for this point about the depth of this value of work, and
\fest German politics and politilevel, the second main aspect of East
German disappointment is much more specific. Simply put, unemployment
has emerged as the central and domin ant complaint in East German society today. It was the main issue in the 1998 elections - held shortly after I
conducted my interviews - and it remains an overwhelming topic of conversation, concern, and distress throughout the population.
'While the theme of dissatisfaction with
cians remains at
a fairly general
Table 6. r provides evidence of the extent to which the issue of unemployment dominates the East German discourse, particularly when compared to
Russia. In my in-depth interviews, I did not ask any open-ended questions
that addressed the issue of unemployment directly but the table shows the
number of times that respondents brought up the issue of unemployment,
contrasting my two case studies. The difference is clear and overwhelming.
\X/here as 26 out of my
3o Russian respondents did not mention unemployment ataIl, only six East Germans left it out.'7 Most East Germans brought
it up several times throughout the intervieq and one woman - a 4r -year-old
cook who was unemployed for several years and whose husband is currently
t7 \(/hile it is
1'r<lssiblt'rhrrt tlrt'st'lirrtlinlis \^/orrltl lr:rv('lrt't'rr tlillt rr rrt lr,r.l I ( ('n(lrrt tr.l rnr rrrtt'r
vicws:tftt'r tlrr' llttssirtrr linrurt i,tl .. risis ol t\rtr',tt',1 r,),,$, I ,l,rrrlrt tlr.rt un('rrrl'l,,1nr( nt rrr l(rr.,,,r,r
It:ts ltt'.()nl(' :t\ l)t()lntttrnl ,t l,t,,lrl,'nr ,t', rl t', trr t ,r',lr In ( ,r Inr,ur\. |.rr Irr rrl.rr lt ,,rr( (' l( rr,,,,r,trr
,l,,tltt'slit prt ,,,1u( lt\ tl\ t, trr rllt ltt tr.r,,r rl l,,ll,,rr trrr, llr, ( 1,,t,.
The national government, as it spread itself around here, destroyed everything that
we had, and didn't even try to rebuild something responsibly even olrr products, that
we made in GDR times, and they weren't all bad! . . .
'T'his Lrnenrploynrent. I know that from my own experience, I was unemployed myself
frrr- | ,/, ycrrrs irr 1c)c) t_..)2. My husband is currently unemployed. These \Testern
c()n'rplurics cr)nlc lrcrc rrncl brrilcl, [-rut they bring their own people. Or a bunch of
Iort'igrrcrs' wlrt'f hcr l)ort ugu('s(' ()r s<lnrcthing else. I don't know how much they
rrr:rl<t'.' lrut tlrt'st'l'orciqrrt'r's ru'('trrl<irrg thc jol-rs from our own people.
\('rolttl.,',1t,".1t,,\\",
lt.,tt,:ll',()lrizilrli
r44
'Weakness
unemployment has been for her family. Third, she blames Chancellor Kohl
and his government for what she views as false promises and anti-Eastern
policies. And finally, she raises the very sensitive issue of the responsibility
of foreigners for East German unemployment. Although this last point goes
beyond the themes of this chapter, her apparent willingness to take out her
frustration on foreign workers is indicative of the potentially dangerous consequences that this East German frustration and disappointment could have
in the near future.
It should be clear that this widesp read East German disappointment is
hardly encouraging for participation in volunt ary organizations, and this
effect was demonstrated statistically in Chapter 5. Although, as I have explained, the situation is somewhat different from that in Russia given
the unique role of N7estern Germany and the widespread unemployment
in Eastern Germany, as well as the severity of the economic collapse in
Russia - the effect on public participation is actu ally quite similar. The following response - from a n-year-old East German woman who , after several
years of being unemployed herself, has just started a construction supplies
business sums up what I view as the basic element of post-communist
disappointment:
-fhings
have definitely changed. \7e continue to discuss politics, but nobody would
go into the streets again. Because everyone has some worry or another, really. And
they're all different, for some people bigger, for others smaller. And they keep you
preoccupied. I mean, for example, we have friends, both of whom are unemployed.
They're just busy trying to get by, find a job. They have nothing left that would let
them become politically engaged agarn.
Leaving aside the specific example of her unemployed friends, the main
point is that many people - whether in Eastern Germany Russia, or in the
many countries in between are extremely preoccupied with their own
worries, problems, and struggles in adaptrng to a new system that they see
as bein g far from perfect.
Just as I tried to do in the two previous sections - on the mistrust of communist organizations and the persistence of friendship networks - in this
section I have attempted to show how the third factor of disappointmenr
applies to the two case studies. In so doing, I have emphasized both similarities and drfferences, for the purpose of drawing wider conclusions tlrat
may apply to other post-communist countries as well. Despitc tlrc ntorc obvious differences, which vary based on the p<lliticrrl forccs rrrrcl ('c()rrorrric
situation in each countrS the underlyirrg rutd irrrrclrun('ntrrl sirrril:u'ity irr tlrt'
responses just discussed is thltt pcoplc ('vlllulrlt' llrt' l)r'('s('nt lr,rst'tl ()n t lrt'ir'
experiences in, rtntl cxp('ctrrfi()ns l'r'orn., lllt'l)rtsl. Arrr.l ,r\,r lt'srrll ,rf itlt';rlislit
expectlttiotts f<ll'lltt'n('w l)()sI t'onunlnu\l r't,t llt,rt lr,tr','\() l.rr l',()n('1.u.1i,.11,
ttltftlllillt'tl., lttltny posl (()ttuntntisl t rlrl('ni lcr'l ,lr',.r1)lrorrlrrrr'nl ,rrrtl .r nr.rl.ust.
145
that further discourages them from participation in public social life and the
organi zatrons of civil society.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has provided an in-depth interpretiv e analysis that accounts for
the low levels of participation in volunt ary organi zattons in two very different post-communist societies. By providing many of the original quotations
from my interview respondents, while contextuahztng and analyzing their
responses in comparative perspective, the methodology of this chapter complements the statistical approach from the previous chapter. The advant age
of this interpretive approach is that it allows for rich and vivid representations of people's experiences and thoughts in their own words.
In this analysis, I found three main factors that apply, in varying ways
and to varyirg degrees, to both of my case studies. Simply put, a great number of citrzens in Russia and Eastern Germany feel a strong and lingering
sense of distrust of any kind of public org anrzatron, a general satisfaction
with their own personal networks (accompanied by n sense of deteriorating
relations within society overall), and disappointment in the developments of
post-communism. Although it needs to be established by further empirical
research
that these
three factors also apply to the many post-communist countries that lie in
between Russia and Eastern Germ any, both geographically and in terms of
their levels of participation today.
The common theoretical element of all three of these factors involves
the way in which people refer to, interpret, and sometimes react to their
prior experiences. As argued in Chapter z) post-communist citizens were
not shaped by an immutable set of cultural values and predispositions, nor
do they respond autom attcally to the incentive structures of contem porary
institutions. Rather, they are perceptive social actors who have experienced
a tremendous amount of turmoil in the past several decades, including living through a dramatic and unexpected revolutionary uphe aval that took
them from one type of political and economic system to another one that is
radtcally different. Put in this context, and supported by the many fascinatirrg st<rries afteady recounted, this chapter shows how these people interpret
thcir prior and current experiences, and how this leads them to act accordingly. ()vcrall, in addition to providing a more complete understanding of
rlrc clistirrct cxpcricnccs that post-communist citizens have lived through, this
l)(,f's1'rcctivt' hclprs fo cx1'rlrtitt wlry lc'vcls of participation in voluntary organi'r.ttli()ns lll-(' so rrruclr lowt'r' in l)()sl .r'onlnltutist llurope than in other regions
t lrt' w,,r'1.1.
'l
Conclwsion
Conclusion
r47
original communist institutions that shaped most living adults today. But at
the same time, this process of generational change is not certain or automatic,
given how many other factors act together to influence a person's sociahza-
tion and the development of that person's public or private relations and
habits. Another mechanism for change can be facilitated by more active
"
role of the state in supporting and working with volunt ary organizations,
and by relating them to people's personal life histories such that organizations become viewed as less alienatirg and imposing. Overall, however,
barring unforeseen improvements in the way new institutions and policies
are implemented, we are unlikely to see dramatic changes in the pattern of
non-participation throughout post-communist Europe.
THE REGION OF POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE
In previous chapters, while providing relevant theoretical and empirical context, I have kept the discussion focused on the specific topic at the heart of this
book: participation in the organizations of civil society in post-communist
Errrope. This concluding chapter, in contrast, has a broader and more speculative purpose. I consider three important themes that are central to *id..
debates about the future of the region. First, I explain how the arguments
and findings of this book should change overall conceptions of the region
of post-communist Europe, particularly with regard to the lasting impact of
the societal legacies of the communist experience. I argue that analysis have
tended to focus too much on elites and institutions rather than on society
and ordinary citizens, and that they have therefore been too quick in overlooking or dismissing the relative societal similarities
port-communist
"*ong
countries in the region.
second, I discuss and interpret the relevance of my empirical findings for
the prospects for democracy and democratic stability in the region, addressing both positive and negative interpretations. I argue that, while the weakness of civil society does not necessarily mean that post-communist democracy is in danger of collapse or breakdown, it does prevent the development
of the "civic skills" that are so important for supporting and consolidating
a democratic system, and it also ensures that many post-communist citizens
lack the institutional representation and leverage that could otherwise be
provided them by active voluntary organizations.
Finally, I speculate about the extent to which the empirical findings arrcl
trends I have presented might change in the future. Although I argue thar
change is unlikely to occur rapidly or decisively, given the powcrfrrl arrrl
lasting legacy of the communist experience, as well as thc rclativc frrilrrrc. .f
neo-liberal institutional "crafting,," I clo suggcst tw<l 1'lossiblc rrrcch:rrrisprs
for change, and how these rright ()ccrlr ()r bc cncorrrrrgt,rl to rlcvclol'r. ( it,1t'
rational chrrngc prcscnts rr vory grlrtlrr:rl rrrt.irrrs lirr lt'plrrt.inli,ltlr.r P.r,plt.
irr socicty witlr tlrt'ir tlt.st'r'rrtlrrrtls. wlro will lr,rvr. ltrrtl lt.ss r.rlrosrlr.r.to tlrr.
l.l(t
l<itttl."
Mrlt'('()v('t; lry I'or'usiltll ()n ll:tsl('r'n (,t'l'nl:uly lutcl ltttssilt, tw<l cases that
tlill,'r'l:r'r';rlly lronl ()n(';urrltlrt'r'in lt'r'rtrs of tltt'nr()st conlnl()n llltcntrttivc ex;rl:ul,rliolrs llr,tl ,rr-t'lr,t\('(l ,rtt 1r)nlt'trt|rot',n'v ct()n()rttir'r'()ntliri()tts ruttl llolitic'lrl
| 4tl
Wcukrtdss
( ,iuil
Conclusion
institutions, I have been able to identify and dcrnonstrate the causal power
of three experiential factors that apply to both countries, albeit with cirtain
variations. Although more research is needed on other post-communist countries in the region, I am suggesting that, since the core of the argument is
an understanding
post-communist democ racy. Accordirg to this view, does democ racy still
mean "rule by the people" if the people choose not to participate in ruling?
More forebodingly one could argue that such a hollow democ racy will
remain unstable, since civic organi zatrons lack the active support of the population, leaving demo cracy at risk of being toppled by hostile forces, whether
based on non-democratic historical traditions or a nevv, anti-democratic
ideolo gy.'
On the other hand, a more positive and optimistic interpretation would
suggest that the absence of a vibrant civil society poses no obstacle to democracy and democ ratic stability. Indeed, political participation and trust in
government are supposedly in decline throughout much of the world, as
people withdraw from public activities in increasingly large numbers. Perhaps the post-communist present, havitrg skipped or bypassed the " stage " of
an actrve participatory democ racy) actually resembles the democ ratrc future
in the rest of the world.' Moreover, in terms of democratrc stability some
argue that a strong and vibrant civil society can actually contribute to the
breakdown of democ racy, and in this sense - paradoxically - democracy in
post-communist Europe may be enhanced or even saved by the absence of
citizen p articip ati o n in vo lu ntaty organi zations .J
My own view of post-communist democ racy differs from both the positive
and negative scenarios. Even rf participation in voluntary organizations is
declining in the older democracies,+ this does not mean that levels of organizatronal membership around the world are converging. Quite the contrary.
As shown in Chapter 4, the older democracies and the post-authoritartan
countries are generally closely paired, but the post-communist countries have
much less participation, and the available evidence over time suggests that
there may even be a further decline in the aheady low levels of organrzafional
membership among the post-communlst countnes. In short, potential trends
toward convergence should not be overstated.5
elxperience
and its effect on individuals and societies in the Soviet bloc, the same basic factors will apply elsewhere as well. In other words, citizens throughout post-communist Europe will, in varying ways and to varying degrees:
(r) maintain strong feelings of mistrust of voluntary organizations that result from their prior experience with communist organizations; (z) continue
to make use of private friendship networks that have persisted in the current
time period, and which serve as a disincentive to joining voluntary organizations; and (3) feel extremely disappointed with the new political and economic system, thus discouraging them even more from participating in public
activities.
These findings provide a new perspective to the study of politics and society in post-communist Europe. They support much of the recent scholarship
that stresses the importance of communist legacies in shaping contemporary
developments, not only in terms of elites or institutioni, bnt .rp..Llly in
terms of societies and ordinary citizens. Based on an application of multiple methodological approaches, anchored by recent comparative data and
evidence - both on the aggregate level across a wide group of countries, as
well as on the individual level within several case studies - this book,s societal perspective both complements and challenges the findings from studies
that focus primarily on elites or institutional design.
, Although I have in some places reached firm conclusions, my general
findings and arguments represent only the beginning of .*pior"iion into
questions about the relative distinctiveness of the co,lttt.i.r of postcommunist Europe in a larger comparative perspective. vThether invoiving
cross-national surveys, focused comparisons, or in-depth case studies, more
systematic research is needed that compares the countries of post-communist
Europe to non-post-communist countries from other regions of the world.
rfe still have much to learn about the singularity of the communist experience, its potentially changing legacy, and its impact on civil society and
'
See,
for example, Ken Jowitt's discussion of "movements of rager" in New Woild Disorder,
'
I
democracy.
This argument is put forward, albeit only tentatively in Padgett, Organizing Democracy in
Eastern Germany.
See, for exan-rple, Berman, " Civil Society and the Collapse of the \Teimar Republic,"
pp. 40 t-4zL)\ Stephen E. Hanson and Jeffrey S. Kopstein, "The Weimar/Russia Comparison," in /'ost-Souit:t Affairs, Vrl. r3, No. I GggZ), pp. z5z-283.
+ 'l'his cllirrr., rnrlrlc f:ur()us by llobcrt Putnam's research on the United States, may not acturrlly ryrply to otlrt'r-rtdv:urct'tl irrrlustrirrliz.ccl countries. See, for example, Hallr "Social Capital
in llritrrin," rlnrl llo l(otlrstt'in, "Soti:rl (,:rpit:rl irr tlre Social Democratic Stater" papers prest'tttt'tl :tl tlrt' 1r;r,rll Arrlrrr;rl Mt't'lirrlq r,l tlrt'Arnt'r-ic:ut I)olitical Science Association, Boston,
r49
,l
:ts wcll as the still relalcvt'ls,rl otli.rtttz.tlron.rl rrr.'trrlrt't,,lrr1) nr llr,'tlrrrlt'rl St;rlt's. lior'('xrnrplt', ltt'writcs.,
" lotl.t\'. .t'. r 'r r \'('.u',.11io, l\rn('n(.ut',,tl('nto11' lrl,,'lf lo lrr' ulv(,lvt'.1 ilr volrlrrl,lty:tss()(i;rtions
tlr,trr ,lrl r rltrt lr',,,1 nr(r',1 olltrt n.llrrrn'. (',r'r' l'ttln.trrt- ll,,tt'lnt.t: ,'ll,tttr', 1', ,1 lt
lrvr'11' lrrlilr
r50
Wcukn(,ss
Although the weakness of civil society may not be a harbinger of democracy's demise in post-communist Europe,
6 Ott the role of political elites in the breakdown of demo cracy) see, for
example, Juan
.f
Linz, The Break-down of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, And Reequilibration (Ba ltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Pres s, 1978 ); Nancy Bermeo, "Dem ocracy in Europe, " ilr Dae dalus,
Vol. r23, No. t (rgg+), pp. t59-r78; Thomas Ertrnan, "Democracy rrrrcl l)ictatorship in
Interwar \Testern Europe Revisited," in WorldPolitics, Vll. .5o, No. 3 (r99ll),, ;rp. 47s-5o5.
7 In this sense, I agree with Hanson and Kopstcin's point thrrt "whilc tlrt'lt.gircy ol totrrlitrrrianism indeed poses significant obstaclcs to tht'fr)nnrltion of rr postc'onrnurrist 'r'ivil socit.ty.,'
social atomization rlrlty als<l sinrrtlt:rttcously l)()s('olrsl;rt'lt's lo tlrr'(r(',rlron ol ;r wt,rl<rrlrlr.rru
thoritarialtisttt." Sc(' Ilrutson ruttl Ko;rslcin., "'llrt' Wcirrr;rr'/l(ussr;r (,ornp,rrr\o1.," p. :.',,7. (\1
baltrltct'., lt()w('v('t; lvir'w lltr'wr';tlirtt'ss ol porl ronunrrrrrrl trvrl \o( r('t\'.r,r,r l-r, tor llr.tl t5 1t()l('
Ir oulrlirrli Ilrrut ir is lrr'.u't('nnr11.
Conclwsion
I5I
t52-
Wcakrl('ss
low and perhaps even ate declining? \7hile plausible, such a scenario is
highly unlikely, for three main reasons. First, the statistics on the number
of org anrzations are misleading, as many of the organi zatrons counted either have disappeared as quickly as they appeared or have been leadin g a
"pseudo-existence" that corresponds little with their putative goals and activities." Second, since so many organrzatrons are completely dependent on
'Western grants for
their funds and support, they are often more beholden
to the requirements of 'Western donor agencies than to the larger public
whose interests they are supposed to serve. " This further contributes to
the prevalence of an elitist form of democracy throughout much of postcommunist Europe. Third, and perhaps most important, without the energy,
sense of purpose, and legitim acy that an active membership provides, many
organizatrons can have only a limited influence on the policy-making process. As Skocpol argues based on the American context, "Because membership numbers and face-to-face meetings mattered in all the classic American
volunt ary associations, those who were leaders, or who wanted to use officerships in these groups to symbohze or validate broader societal leadership, had to care about mobilizing and inspiring large numbers of fellow
members. Members counted. Leaders had to mobrhze and interact with others, or they were not successful. " t3 In post-communist Europe, there are
few members to be counted, and as a result, the organizations are rarely
successful.
rr
rz
See Ferenc Miszlletz andJodyJensen, "An Emerging Paradox: Civil Society from Above?"
in Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Marilyn Rueschemeyer, and Bjorn \Wittrock, eds., Particiltation
and Democraq) East and'West: Comparisons and Interpretatiozs (Armonk, NY: M. 11. Sharpe,
r53
Conclusion
"Civil Privatism"
as Functional Equivalent
to Civil Society?
Although I have characterrzed post-communist civil society as being distinctively weak, and post-communist citizens as organi zatronally passive and
detached, it would be a mistake to conclude that post-communist citizens
are atomized individuals, torn from meaningful ties and relations with other
people. Quite the contrarS since, as the findings of this book show; many
post-communist citizens still value and make use of the vibrant private networks that they developed under communism. Furthermore, I have suggested
in Chapters 5 and 6 that these active private networks are to some extent
an alternative to, or a substitute for, the social ties that many people in nonpost-communist societies typically acquire through voluntary organizations.
This leads to a critical question: do these private networks also serve as
the fwnctional eqwiualent of membership in volu ntary organi zattons ? In other
words, could one argue that a high level of priv ate participation compensates
for the low level of public participation, and that post-communist democracy is healthy and vibrant after all? In this sense, these private networks
might be characterized as what Jrirgen Habermas calls "civil privatisffi," referring to a form of passive citizenship and self-orientation that is crucial for
legitimating a democratic regime.'4 This seems plausible given that private
friendship networks also play a signific ant role in Putnam's conception of
"social capitdlr" as he includes measures of time spent visiting with friends,
hosting dinner parties, and informally socializing, along with various public
activities and a general measure of social trust in other people.
\7hile it is a tempting way to find a reason for optimism in the otherwise
bleak situation in post-communist Europe, I think it would be wrong on
several counts to conclude that private networks serve the same purpose
as public organuzations. First, as Habermas makes clear, not only does civil
privatism not supplant public activity, it is itself "secured informally through
the structures of the public realm."r5 Moreover, to view civil privatism as a
sufficient alternative to the public realm of civil society is to accept what Jean
Cohen and Andrew Arato call "realist, elite models of democracyr" which
"leave politics to the professionals in political society and advocate 'civil
privatism' for the members of society. "'6 In short, private networks serve an
important purpose in democratic societies, alongside and in addition /o public
participation, but they do not replace it.
One reason why Putnam views private networks and public participation
bcrth as being important elements of social caprtal is that they are mutually
Abroad; Marina C)tt<)way arrcl 'l'lrcrcsrr ( ,hurrg., " l)cbuting Democracy Assistance; Toward ir Ncw l):trltrligrtt.," in lttrrttd ol' I)t,tttt)('nr(ry, Vol. I o.,
No. 4 ftggg) pp. 99-t r j; $fcclcl.,Otllisirtttttnd (lllrtsitur; Vrtlt'r'it'Spt'r'lirr1i, ( )r,g,uti:,irtgWt)ttt(u
in Contemltrrary Itrssirl; I;,tt,gt'rtth'rirt,t1 'l'rtttsiliott ((,;nrrlrritllic: (,.rrrrlrrrrlpit' llrrrvr.t'stty l't'r.ss,
See Carothers, Aiding Democraqt
, gss).
Skor'1rrll,
"llow
(.tvtt," ;rp, 6, ,
(r11-
.f
f'r't'ss, t.)7
S).,
t's;lt't'rlrlly
pgr.
6tl*75.
7 L.
rt.n .ut(l Ar.rlo., ( ',tt,tl ,\,tr tt'l1t tu,rl l\iltltr,tl 'l'lrt't,t'),r l), I(,5. Alsr) scc tlrc clrtssic criticltte of
r'lrlrst (rflr(('Plrnn\ ol tlcnt()(l;tt1,, l)clcr lt,rr lu,tr lr ,ul(l ff4,rtl()n llin':llz., "'l'ltt''lwo l;:tct's <lf
trr\\'r't," lll ,\tttr'llt,ltt ltt,ltltr,tl ,\t tr'llr r'l(r'l'lr'tl'. Vrtl 1fr (ltlfrJ ), lll). ,).17 ()\l
f
(
,rrf
I t.{
\Vr',l/.//('.s.\
sLlpportivc. In othcr wol-cls' it is gcrtcrally uttclc:rstoocl that people's active private networks can ernc1 oftcn clo trarnslate irrto public activities. For example,
scholars who study sclcial rttovements have founcl thet private friendship networks provide excellent oppclrtunities to "recrLr it" pcople into movements.'7
According to this logic, the existence of vibrant private networks should help
to enable, rather than to prevent, the development <>f a more participatory
public sphere, since the existing networks could serve as a source of recruitment and mobili zatron.
In post-communist societies, however, the distinction between public and
private - a defining feature of communist regimes, as described in Chapt er z remains very strong today.'8 There is still much less overlap and interaction
between priv ate and public activities than in other types of societies, since
people's close family and friendship networks are viewed as a realm that is
by definition separate from, and antagonistic to, the larger domain of public,
state-controlled activities. In the language of network theorS these private
networks remain "strong ties" that do not develop into the kind of crosscutting "weak ties" that, paradoxically would open the door to a wider set
of acquaintances, contacts, and opportunities.'e Moreover, post-communist
private networks today do not contain the implicit support of the public
sphere that the concept of "civil privatism" presupposes in order to legiti-
r55
Conclwsion
they could acquire the kind of public "civic skills" that would benefit their
society and democracy.
On the whole, negative and positive interpretations of the empirical findings of this book and their impact on democ racy in post-communist Europe
are both overstated. Post-communist democ racy is neither thrivittg nor on the
verge of collapse. Instead, it is likely to continue to "muddle through," with
elites and institutions that vary widely in their style and performance, but a
citrzenry thatremains disengaged from the public sphere. The distinguishing
element of post-communist democ racy is - and probably will be for several
more decades and generations - the troublitg, but not fataI, characteristic
TIME
Having specified the implications for democracy and democ ratrc stability of
this book's empirical findings, in this section I address the question of how
the weakness of post-communist civil society might change over time. In so
doing, I reiter ate part of the theoretical argument from Chapt er z) but in a
more speculative manner and in the context of post-communist institutional
change. Although I argue that the current situation is unlikely to change in
the near future, I discuss the two ways in which a gradual increase in orga-
conditions that imposed a strict division between public and private spheres.
Their vibrancy is difficult to transfer into public groups or orga nrzatrons, because private networks are predicated on a long-standing resistance to group
activity" In and of themselves, they are certainly not bad for democracy, but
these private networks do not substitute for the public realm of civil society.
of civil society.
As I argued in Chapter zrthe new institutional designs in post-communist
Europe have not yet brought about lasting societal change. Not only has
little time elapsed since the new institutions were established, but these
institutions' theoretical and logical underpinnings are based on neo-liberal
notions of self-reliance and self-motivation, which are completely inconsistent with people's prior experiences under communism. Moreover, the very
nature of these neo-liberal ideals makes them difficult to spread, since people
crurrrot be "forced" to ioin and participate in voluntary organizations. By
clcfinition, the desire and motivation must come from within. As a result,
tlrc 1-rost-c<)nrlunist institutional changeS, which have been extensive and
wirl('sl)rcrrcl, lr:rvc rrof yct brulught about a concomitant change in the socit't:rl lrt'lrrrvi<)r- ()f i,,irrirrli voluntrtry organir,ations.If anything, these changes
lr:r vt' r't'irr lor-r't'tl ltrir)/' soci:t l prtttt'r'ns., rtt lcrtst witlr regard to the distinction
'l'lr(' ('v irlt'rrcc frtlnt the region of postlrt'r u,,('('n t lr,' Pu l',lit' ,r rrtl priv:t tt' sPlrt't't's.
()nnnurusl
(
l,ur<)l)(' l',oirrls lo lltt' linrils r,l itrslitrrti()tl:ll '"crtrftittll" ,tncJ trl the
l).rrlr.rl f ,ulrtrr ol llrt'.ut lntt'r ls,rl l)()\l t unululltl\l ttt'o lil)('t':tl ilrstitrrt.iolts t<t
trl rrt'', tlr.it tr',,ul,l t(",()lt.tlr' rvrllr llri' tvl,l,'l l)()l)tll,tlitllt.
in public institutions.'o
I",tlSlt't
tt ( )t'l lltrlul,.
('.,1)r't
r,rllf 1r1t
t ( ,(
t, ,
'
56
WzArrr,s-s
rl
\flhat should we expect to find irr r o years' tirnc? will levels of membership
and participation gradually increase, at least in somc countries? Any attempt
to answer these questions is purely speculative, a risky venture for a social
scientist, but especially for one within the field of "p.st-sovietologg" given
the extended debates in sovietology about the problems, and failures, of
prediction.'- Nonetheless, the findings of this book warrant some cautious
speculation about the conditions for, and the likelihood of, change in the
patterns of non-participation in the organizations of civil society.
For the countries with the lowest levels of participation - such as Bulgaria,
Lithuania, Russia, and ukraine - which generally have weak and unsupportive states and unstable economies, it is unlikely that citizen participation
in voluntary organizations will increase significantly. In this sinse, barring
any miraculous turnarounds, the structural impediments of the state and
the economy will serve to keep organizational membership very low, and
the specifically post-communist factors that I have identified will not change
substantially either.
However, for those countries on the higher end of the post-communist
spectrum of participation in voluntary organizations - such as Hungary the
Czech Republic, Eastern Germang Slovakia, Slovenia, and Romania it is
quite possible, and in some cases even quite likely that the state and economy
will become stronger over the next decade. The question remains: will this
lead to an increase in organizational membership and participation? If so,
will participation increase to the extent that these countries will eventually
start to resemble countries in the post-authoritarian and older democracies
country groupings, rather than remaining close to other post-communist
countries? In my view, although perhaps it could happen in one or two
individual countries, such a development is unlikely to occur, unless there
are drastic improvements in the way in which domestic states and foreign
funders approach post-communist citizens and their prior experiences living
in communist regimes.
The phenomenon of non-participation that has emerged in the postcommunist period is not accidental or temporary. Rather, it represents the
continuation of a pattern of social relations and behavior that developed
over several decades, under the very distinct conditions of the communist
system. Ironically, now in a very different institutional environment, this
pattern seems in many ways to have been reinforced in the post-communist
time period. Moreover, a dynamic analysis of changes over time, as shown in
r57
Conclusion
;1
i
"
r!'r\.'.
'r I'rltr
sfl
Wutrrr,s-s
tl
it will
see, for example, Richard G. Braungart and Margaret M. Braungart, "[.ifc-(]6ursc arrl
GenerationalPolitics," inAnnualReuianof sociology,vol. rz (r9g6), pp. zo5-z j,r; Sr.rrlcy
A. Renshon, ed. Handbook of Political Socialization: Theory and Rcscttrch (Nt.w ygr1: lrrct.
Press, 1977);
Oit izanship
liluctt
ir
trr,
r59
Conclwsion
The second mechanism by which post-communist citizens could conceivably become more active participants in civil society is more difficult, but
also more heartening, because it allows for the possibility of new policies
influencing current and future developments in a positive way. The most
fundamental requirement for post-communist citizens to change their participatory habits involves their acquiring familiarity, comfort, and a new
positive association with voluntary organizations. But this cannot occur
easily or automatically, even with the passing of time, given the daunting
obstacles to participation described in Chapters 5 and 6. Many of the existing organizations, which have been steadily increasing in numbers since the
collapse of communism, have been created by Western organizations and
are to varying degrees dependent upon'Western funds and conditions. As a
result, much of the organizational initiative comes from "above," namely,
from outside or foreign sources with little understanding of communism and
post-communism. It should come as no surprise' therefore, that in trying to
convince people to join, many appeals come across as empty or unfamiliar
at best, or foolish and misguided at worst. Moreover, the realities of fundraising in conditions of economic uncertainty are such that the local leaders
and activists in organizations are often more beholden to their funders than
to the people they are trying to engage and inspire.'5
Perhaps even more importantly many of the new organizations that are
supported by'Western sources contain an underlying anti-communist theme,
one that implies that the way people lived under communism was wrong, unethical, or unsuitable for a democratic and capitalist society. Such a message
might seem to be justified by the finding that the persistence of communist-era
private networks serves as a disincentive for joining public organizations irr other words, since they are an impediment, perhaps they should simply
lrc wipccl rtw:ry. Howcver, while the denunciation of the communist systern
rrrrry bc ncccsslrry for convincing people to start anew, and to change their
orrtkrol<s rtnrl socirrl pllttcrns, thc explicit or implicit condemnation of peoplc's lili'stylt.s rurtl pt.rsorrrrl historics has thc opp<lsite effect, leading to even
nr()r'(.nrisun(lt.rst:rrrtlirrli. rt'signrtiort. ruttl rlist'rtg,rgcrrtcltt. UnfortunatelS the
'r' \r r'(
.il
llr('r',.
\t,lttt,r' l)t'tttrtt
11,r/
t,t,
t6o
'Weakness
message of many organizations does not make the distinction between eval-
uating the communist system and criticizing people's own lives. Until that
distinction becomes clear, and until the leaders of organizations learn to value
and appreciate what so many post-communist citizens view as the positive
aspects of life in a communist system, as well as their personal resourcefulness and ingenuit)! most attempts to mobilize people to participate in
voluntary organizations will continue to backfire, or at least to fall on dead
or skeptical ears.
CONCLUSION
This discussion - and, indeed, this entire book - begs the crucial, yet frustrating, question of what can be done to help encourage more post-communist
citizens to take part in public organizational activities. While this represents a daunting task that is unlikely to produce rapid changes, there are
some steps that can be taken. One obvious precondition that I have repeated
throughout this book is the importance of improving economic conditions,
particularly in those countries in which many citizens have been facing nearcatastrophic economic obstacles. This applies not simply to the development
of a wealthy business elite or to an aggregate measure of national productivity or growth, but especially to improving the actual standards of living
of most ordinary people, so that they might have the economic means to
devote time and energy to voluntary organizations and possibly to contribute a donation or membership fee that could pay off for them in the
longer run.
In addition to broad improvements in the overall economy, a second
step for strengthening post-communist civil society involves a reappraisal
of the role of the state and its relation to the organizations of civil society.
As discussed in earlier chapters, contrary to the simplistic views of many
conservative commentators or politicians,Lz a convincing body of research
that incorporates a larger historical and comparative perspective has demonstrated that the state has played a crucial role in enabling, facilitating, and
encouraging the existence and flourishing of voluntary organizations.r8 Although obviously it cannot force its citizens to join organizations, the state
can, among other actions, pass legislation that protects the rights of organizations, as well as provide tax or other institutional incentives that encourage
organizations to recruit more members.
27 For examples of the conservative
approach in the American dchrrtt., st't. Willirrrrr A. St h:rrrrhrrr,
"All Community Is Local: The Key to Arrrcricrt's (livic l{cnt.wrrl," :rntl l);rn ( lr;rts rntl I{itli
Santorum, "Civil Socicty arr<l tht: IlutDblc lLrlc,,l (iovcrrrrt rrt," lxrtlr irr |)irrrrrrr.. (',1,ilililil,ilt\,
Works.
'8 Scc, firr t xrtntplt', slirx pol, "l lorv Arrrt'r i( .ut.. lt(.(.trrrr ( .rvrr "; l r \ t, lin,1rr, ttll,':, li, tTrt.tt ;
ft;rtf13'tt, ()r,\'tttt trr,r:llr'ttti,t,r,\'utl;tt\lt'ttr(,tttil,ut\'.,rrr,l ll.rll, "f,,,,rrl (.||,rt,rl rrr lirrt.rrrr
r6r
Conclusion
politically
In this sense, the example of West Germany after World War II is instructive. Although one should not equate the post-Stalin communist systems of
Eastern Europe with the murderous Nazi regime on a moral level, there are
significant parallels - especially for Eastern Germang most obviously, but
also for the rest of post-communist Europe - in terms of institutional and
societal change in the aftermath of a period of non-democratic rule. Few
observers would deny that post-war'West Germans, who were commonly
viewed after the war as the prototype of "the authoritarian personalityr"'e
have successfully internalized the liberal-democratic norms and habits of a
democratic society. Even Daniel Goldhagen, one of the harshest critics of
German culture and its inability to change, has praised "the character and
the democratic promise of contemporary Germany."3o
In addition to the revitalization of preexisting democratic traditions from
the Weimar period, the main factor that contributed to the striking tlansformation of West German society was the successful transplanting of lTestern
political and economic institutions by the Allied forces in the early post-war
period.l' This leads to two crucial questions: if West German society could
change so rapidly and dramatically after \(orld War II, could the same process take place in post-unification Eastern Germany or in post-communist
Europe in general? How were the new institutions and policies transplanted
to post-war'West Germang and what might this tell us about contemporary
Theodor W. Adorno et al., Tbe Autboritarian Personality (New York: Harper, r95o).
ro l)arricl .fonah (ioldhagen,"Mod.ellBundesrepublik:National History, Democracy and Interrrirtigrraf izirfigrr irt (iertnany," in Robcrt R. Shandley, ed.,UnwillingGenruns?TheGoldhagen
'e
I )r/r,rtr, ( M
irrlt';t polis:
I lrr
ivcrsity of M
itt
Ititlcrs Willitrll l;,ttrntirynrs: ()rdintrv ()tnntns aru! tbc Holocaust (New York: Knopf,
1,19{,).
1' frttrlry, lttttl,tlfitt,,ttnl l\litns;,llstt st'r'Mitlr.rt'l;r l{itltlcr, "liroltl Statc (ltrlture to Citizen
( rrlrrrrc: ll,lrtr..rl l'.rrtrr.r.rrr,l tlrr'l'o,.trv.rr lr.rrrllun.rlr(rtt (tl l)olititrrl (lrrltrlrc itr (icrttrltly,"
rrr frrlrrr \ ftr.r,lt., ll, r,r'rlt,( r.rrrl,,rrl.,rrr,l \.rr.rlr I ltr,'Wrlr.rrt1.r'rlt , ll,rl\Nttrtt liittrslrt'tttltirttt
,l(,rtttt,trrt, lr\rrrr l\rl,or, llntttt'.tlt,'l Nlr,lrrli.lr l'r( . r'r','))
r6z
'Weakness
Eastern Germany and in post-communist Europe, in contrast, the new institutions have been imposed with little consultation, agreement, or alliance
with volunt ary organi zattons - in part because there were fewer available
organizations but primarily because of the unwillingness of \West German
policy makers to allow for a more flexible interpretation and adaptation of
|(, t l
Conclusion
ii
i
r63
and they may actually reinforce previous attitudes and habits developed
during the communist era. For these reasons, although change is certainly
possible, the pattern of aweak post-communist civil society is likely to persist
long into the future.
Coding of the
Variables
165
APPENDIX A
r-
\7estern,
non-\7estern.
Prior regime t1pe. This concept, which derives from Juan Linz's Totalitarian
and Authoritarian Regimes, is coded as two dummy varlables: prior awthoritarian experience (r - yes, o - no) and prior communist experience (r - YeS,
e - no).
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
r-ro scale within each country, in response to the following question: "Here is a scale of incomes. We would like to know in
what group your household is, counting all wageS, salaries, pensions and
other incomes that come in. Just give the letter of the group your household
falls into, before taxes and other deductions."
Income. Coded on a
The followittg describes the coding for each of the variables used in the
statistical analysis in Chapter 4.
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Organizational membership. "Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizatrons; for each one, could you tell me whether you are an active
member, an inactive member, or not a member of that type of organrzatton? "
The question referred to the followitrg types of org anizations: (t ) church
or religious organizatrons, (t) sports or recreational clubs, (3) educational,
cultural, or arttstic organizations, (+) labor unions, (5 ) political parties or
movements, (6) environmental organizattons, (7) professional associations,
(8) charitable organizatrons, and (g) any other voluntary organizatron The
dependent variable is an index of the total number of claimed memberships (active or inactive), with a minimum score of o and a maximum
score of 9. In the country-level analysis, the dependent variable refers to
r-
male, o
female.
the auerage numbe r of organi zatronal memberships per person for the entire
country.
o - can't bc
GDP Per capita. The figures come from the r 998 CIA
'World
Factbook,
arrcl
tclcl careful.
Tblwiskm watcbing. lrr rcsp()nsc to the followitg question: "Do you ever
:r('('('ssto'l'V', )
i lr, I t's l)('t' ( l.t y"
)r
| ) ltrltlt'sl)('t',l,ty.'
#:T::TfJilT
more than
r66
Appendix A
This index is based on the respondent's first and second choices in the original fouritem Materialist/Postmaterialist values battery. If both Materialist items are given
high prioritg the score is cc r''; if both Postmaterialist items are given high prioritg
the score is c( 3D; if one Materialist item and one Postmaterialist item are given high
priority the score is " 2." If the respondent makes only one or no choices, the result
is missing data.
The actual question reads as follows: "If you had to choose, which one of the
things on this cardwould you say is most important?...And which would
be the next most important?" The respondent is then offered the followitg choices: "Maintaining order in the nation))' ccGiving people more say in
important government decisions"; "Fighting rising prices"; "Protecting freedom of speech. " The first and third options are considered to be materialist,
while the second and fourth are deemed postmaterialist.
APPENDIX B
TABLE
Variables
Average Number of
GDP per
Political Rights
and Civil
Liberties"
.59
3o^.2
r.o
r.5
Australia
3.o7
2.68
6.2
zr.4
Sweden
z.6z
19.7
Finland
z-48
2.47
27.4
South Korea
Chile
Switzerland
2.45
ry.7
z.o
z.o
Brazrl
z.r2
2.rz
6.3
3.5
22.9
r.5
Venezuela
r.85
8.3
2.5
E. Germany
r.44
18.7
Spain
r49
t6.4
Uruguay
Romania
Slovakia
Argentina
Czech Republic
Philippines
r.39
T.r4
8.9
r.5
r.5
r.5
5.3
2.O
T.T2
8.6
3.o
I.IO
9.7
2.5
r.o7
r o.8
r.5
H unga ry
o. [Jz
3.2
7.4
2.5
[,atvia
4,3
r.5
r.5
ussiit
o.70
o.66
4.7
3.5
listort in
o,6 4
ft.5
I.5
Organizational
Country
Memberships
per Person'
United States
South Africa
Norway
'$7.
Germany
2.32
z.z2
I .O4
Capitab
(in $ r,ooos)
zo.o
u.6
4.8
r.o
r.o
r.o
r.o
r.o
(umtinued)
thJ
r68
TABLE B.
Appendix B
r (continued)
Average Number of
Organizational of
Average Number of
Organizational
Country
Ukraine
Memberships
per Person'
Political Rights
GDP per Caprtab and Civil
(in $ r,ooos)
Liberties'
2.5
Lithuania
o-59
o-45
4.2
r.5
Bulgaria
o36
4.7
2.5
z.6o
4.6
r.86
9.4
I.I
2.3
o.8z
7.o
2.4
3.5
United States
Australia
3.59
3.o7
2.68
Sweden
z.6z
Finland
2.48
South Africa
Prior Regime
Civilizationd
'Western
non-\Testern
'Western
'Western
'Western
'Western
Norway
2.47
South Korea
2.45
Chile
Switzerland
z.3z
', )',
'Western
Brazll
z.rz
z.rz
non-'Western
'S7.
Germany
Venezuela
r.85
E. Germany
r.44
r.39
r.39
r-T4
Spain
Uruguay
Romania
Slovakia
Argentina
Czech Republic
Philippines
Hungary
Latvra
I.IZ
I.IO
'Western
non-'Western
'Western
'Western
non-Western
non-\Testern
'Western
non-\Testern
r.o7
'Western
r.o4
non-\Testern
\Testern
Ukraine
o.8z
o-70
o.66
o.64
o-59
Lithuania
o.45
Bulgaria
og6
Russia
Estonia
non-\Testern
non-'Western
'Western
non-'Western
'Western
non-'Western
'Western
non-'Western
Typ.
democratic
authoritarian
democr atlc
democratic
democratic
democr atic
authoritarian
author ttartan
democratic
author ttartan
democr attc
author ttartan
communrst
authoritarian
authoritarian
communlst
communrst
authoritarian
communrst
authoritarian
communrst
communrst
communlst
communrst
communrst
communist
con'r nr trn
Memberships
per Person
Prior Regime
Civilizationd
Typ.
z.6o
'Western
democr atic
t.86
mainly
authoritarian
o.8z
non-'Western
'Western
and
non-'Western
communtst
Organizational
Memberships
per Person
Country
Post-Communist mean
Average Number of
Country
r6g
ist
(most
17r
APPENDIX C
Eastern Germany
(%)
(%l
Western GermanY
(%)
Gender
Female
8.s
57.9
56.3
Male
4r.5
42.r
$.8
Ag.
rg.5
4c'-49
23.o
16.o
)) )
)) )
zo.z
50-5 9
6o-69
Over 7o
Education
ry.5
zo.z
16-S
tt.6
ry-9
tht' tlisrttssiort irt Str';lltcrt Wltttr', ltrt lr.rrrl l((,\('i ,rrrtl l.rrr MrAllisrcr,
/trrsslil Vrlr'.s ((ilr;rllr;utr, Nl; (,lr;rtlr;rrrr ll()u\er t,r,r,), ltlt, l ,r ] ',),
l7(
llrt11,
6.9
17.8
Low
Medium
High
6.4
r.9
r.7
52.4
74-5
7z.r
zo.o
ZI.I
ro-7
rz.9
16.8
Very high
r)oo9
rroo3
r roo8
Valid N
Sowrce: PCOMS
9.4
(rggg).
asked only
questions 6-8.
*trH#lrITr.""i:U#:T*:
(lr.
The PCOMS surveys asked the followittg qLrestior.rs, irr aclclitiorr to rcclucstirrg
3-7
z8.o
ZI.I
3c,-39
2.4
2r-3
Under 3o
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
Environmental organLzatron
Professional association
Charitable organizatron
Any other vcllunt ary organi zatron
[n thc Soviet/GDR time period, how often did you rely on friends for
lrclpr with thc followirrg:
:I
.l
ll1['.l,,,,,(s
rlt t't'ly
llcv('l'
T7z
Appendix C
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
actrvrtres
3
4
5
try to remember how you felt in the late r98os, when all of
Q+.
these changes in the GDR/USSR were going on. 'V7hat were your
expectations regardittg your own life ?
Please
z
3
4
5
somewhat better
stay the same
somewhat worse
much worse
Q5.Looking back novv, compared to what you expected, how would
you describe the changes in your life over the past decade ?
s"'fen:
T'" 3ff$tr1T:::"s
3
4
5
somewhat worse
much worse
Q6. Generally speaking, these days, how often do you rely on friends for
herpf"n*H]:ns:
j
4
173
Labor union
Politic al party
Environmental organizatton
Professional association
Charitable organization
Atty other voluntary organizatron
Q8'
X*'*::il;J:'/:n'rr#m,,0.'jj,exprains
j
4
organizations
5
6
useless
other reasons
Q9. In your opinion, how have relations between people become in the
ye
in Russian/East
become:
r
z
much better
somewhat better
:HJ*iliT:,,.
'5
much worse
Qro. \fhat about for you personally, how have interpersonal relations in
your own life become?
rarely
never
a. working (assembling, installing, fixing) on house, car, etc.
b. caring for someone in you r family (brrby, elderly pcrson., ctc.)
c. in difficult situations (sirrrply for srrpport)
QZ. I am going to rcilcl off rr list of voltttttrtt"y orllirrrizrrfiorrs; ft)r crrclr r)ncr
ccttllcl yott tcll nl(' wltt'f ltc'r y()u ;u'r' r'urrt'rtlly iut :lclivr' nlr.nrllt.r; rul
r
z
last r o
MY
ip Study Suru qt
ersh
I
L
l
4
s
rtruch bcttcr
sorllcwhltt lrcttt'r
st lt
y t llt'
s,l
tllt'
s()tltt'wltitl w()t's('
nlttr'h w()t'sc
r74
Appendix C
developing in
EG/Russia?
Qtt.
r
z
3
4
very satisfied
fairly satisfied
not very satrsfied
not at alI satisfied
4
5
APPENDIX D
almost never
hard to say
SAMPLING METHODS
Although ide ally one does not mix sampling methods across cases, the
practic al realities of my project were such that I had to follow two quite different sampling procedures. In Eastern Germ dny, the official survey institute
FORSA, which also conducted the large-N survey, provided me with a list
of people in Lerpzig and Eastern Berlin who had agreed to be contacted by
an American researcher interested in askittg about their "life experiences."
Although the institute did not tally a response rate when gatherittg the names
of and contact information for these respondents, only one person contacted
by me declined to be interviewed. In Russia, however, the procedure for finditrg respondents was more complicated. Since telephone penetration in Russia
is quite low, and, more importantly, since it is notoriously difficult to find
Russians willing to participate irt surveys,' I had to follow a quota sampling
, A1 entployce;rl ;r rrrrrjnr'l(rrssiiut sut'vey irrrtitutc toltl tttc off-tltc-rccorcl that this is also how
1r(f!t splvcy\;1'c ((,n(lrrtterl rn l{urrl;r1 lrlng;t wttle wclr ol I'cs('rlrchcrs ilr tltc fie'ld t<l firtcl
7\
li
l
I
I
I
Appendix D
176
TABLE
11oirr1,,
tl,,.r'lo
tloor',
",
"r' ""
"
'r'
In-Depth Interview
Large-N Survey
Respondents
Respondents
Russia
Eastern
Female
So"h (tS)
So"h (tS)
So"h (tS)
5o"A (tS)
4r.
rc"/" 3l
zt.ro/o
Ag.
When conducting an in-depth study it is impossible to achieve the representativeness of large-N surveys, since many different types of people cannot
be captured by the small number of respondents. Furthermore, it is difficult
to determine how "typtcal" or "unusual" the views and experiences of any
respondent may be compared to those of people outside of the sample with
similar basic demographic characteristics. Nonetheless, it is still advisable,
if one seeks to reach conclusions that apply to the overall population, to
select respondents who resemble that population as closely as possible, for
doing so can only increase the plausibility and the explan atory power of the
arguments derived from a small-N sample.
Table D. r presents basic distributions of my 6o respondents, which I
contrast with the simiiar groupings from the representative large-N survey
discussed in Appendix C. The table shows that my respondents were roughly
similar to the survey respondents in gender and age distributions. In terms of
educationr' however, my sample overrepresents highly educated Russians;
overrepresentation is a common problem in small-^/ research, particularly
when one relies on a quota sampling method. That said, I believe that this
overrepresentation does not distort the analysis, since the in-depth interview
respondents resemble the large-N sarnple in most other respects, and since
the effect of education is somewhat limited anyway, as shown in Chapter 5.
Thble D.r also shows the percentage of former members of the Communist
Party in both countries, revealing that my East German sample slightly overrepresents former Party members, although two of the eight had actually left
the Party by the mid-r98os.
In terms of participation in voluntary organizations today, Table D.r
shows the number of my respondents who are members of o, r , L) 3, or
4 such organizations. As we would expect, the rates of menrlrership :.rre
Respondents
Gender
Male
THE IN-DEPTH SAMPLE IN A \X/IDER COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
177
Under 3o
30-39
40-49
50-5 9
Over 6o
Education
Low
Medium
High
ry%
$l
$)
$)
zo"h (6)
rc"/" G)
z7%
z7%
o
$)
n% Qt)
z7%
p%
p%
(g)
(g)
rc"/" 3)
zo"/" (6)
z%Q)
6o"/" (t8)
n% ('o)
S8.S%
5"/"
T9.5"/"
z3.oo/"
57 .9"
42.r"/"
2.4"4
zr .3"/"
zz.zoh
6.o"h zz.zo/o
2o.4"/" 3r.8"h
6.+%
r.9"/"
52.4"/"
74.5'/"
4rt"h
4.6"h
Members
ry% (+) z7% $)
Not members SZ% Q6) n% Qr)
8"h fi.2"1"
8z.7oh 8l.l%
17
.,
o
o
I
I
I
-43
.6o
3o
3o
)
4
Average number of
-45
.78
organrzational
memberships per
person (today)
Valid N
Too9
roo3
slightly higher in Eastern GermanS where the average number of organizatronal mernberships per person is.6o (.78 in the large-NsurveY), than in
Russia, where the score is .43 QS in the large-Nsurvey). In both countries,
the intcrvicw rcsponcicnts have slightly lower levels of membership than resp()nclcrrts irr tlrc lrrrgcr siunplc, but thc' levels are still in the same general
rll I I ll('.
Appendix D
178
TABLE
Russia
NRB Mean
E,astcrn
Cermanv
NDB Mean
Distrust
So"h
Skepticism 45%
Trust
6%
46"h
4z"h
to%"
32"/"
3r"A
6o"h
8%
y%
37"h
o"/"
4s%
_^ o/
)5 /o
9"/"
n%
r6"/"
Communist 6l%
Current
Soo/o
In five years 8o"/"
5r"/"
36%
49"h
Positive evaluation of economic regimes
Communist
Current
In five years
Valid N
74%
fi%
4"/"
30
7
7
6t"/"
3aoh
6+%
r4oh
n"h
320h
44"/"
860/"
6S%"
3o
g087
3535
Source: Russian and East German data come from author's interviervs (t998); New Russia
Barometer results come from White, Rose, and McAllister (rggZ); New Democracies Barometer
data come from Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer (tgg8).
179
the responses above zero are coded "positive." In terms of political regimes,
Table D.z shows that my Russian respondents were more positive than the
interviews. The first question involves trust in institutions, and it asks respondents to rank, on a seven-point scale, their trust in n dtfferent institutions
(government, parliament, the President/Chancellor, civil servants, courts,
politic al parties, the army, police, me dra, church , trade unions, and private
enterprise). Richard Rose and his colleagues divide the responses into three
categories: distrust (scores of r or z), skepticism (scores of 31 4, ot 5), and
trust (scores of 6 or 7). The first rows in Table D.z show the percentage of
distrustful, skeptical, and trustful respondents in my two samples, compared
to the average scores from the NRB and the nine Central and East European
countries in the NDB.I The results show that the Russian respondents
are very close to the NRB mean and that the East German respondents
resemble the NDB mean. Relative to each other, of course, the Russian
respondents are much more distrustful than the East Germans, which is not
surprisitg given the many problems and the high levels of disappointment in
My purpose here is to
Russia today.
All of the interviews took place in r 998, it March-April and Jnly in Russia
and in May-June in Eastern Germany. I conducted the interviews myself,
in either German or Russian, usually at the respondents' home, although
The next two questions in Table D.z replicate the main clepencle nt
variable in R.ose's studies, namely, people's eualuation of ltrirv, r urrcnt, and
futwre political and economic regimes. The respondents rrrc lrsl<r'cl [o cvrrlurrtr:
each regime separately on a "heaven-hcll" scalc ir<lrn -l roo to too' rurrl
3 See Richarcl Il<lst', Willi:rrrr Misltlcrl .ur.l t lu r',tr,rrr I Lrt rl,lcr. I),'rrt,tt t,tt \, ,ttt,l ll', ,'\lt,'ut,tlu,r't
'Ihc Nl)li c()urtllit's irr, lrr.l.' ltrrlli.u r,r, tlr, ( z,, lr ltr l'1rl,lr. , \l,,r,rl, r,r, l lunr: u \. l'ol.rrr,l.
l(orrr:uri:r. Slovt'rri.r, lir'l.u u,., ,ur(l I ll.r.rrrr,'
ship and on attitudinal questions that fit the national and regional expe ctations. Moreover, the convergence with the findings from the large-N analysis
small--|,I
analysis can be gen erahzed and applied to the wider population as well.
DESCRIPTION OF THE INTERVIEWS
r8o
Appendix D
both countries: r hour and 24 mrnutes in Russia, and r hour and z5 minutes
in Eastern Germany. The longest interview in Russia lasted z hours and
5o minutes, and the shortest was only 4o minutes; in Eastern Germany the
longest was two hours and zo minutes, and the shortest was 5j mlnutes.
During each interview; I guided the respondent through a discussion of his
or her life history, focusing on themes such as social patterns, membership
in organizations, private networks, and levels of trust, as well as on general values and ideals. I tape-recorded all of the interviews, which were then
transcribed into text documents, enabling computer-assisted analysis of the
responses. Although I broached all of the themes in every intervieq usually
bringing them up in the order presented in the guidelines, the time and attention I gave to a particular theme would vary accordirg to what was most
relevant and tangible for the respondent. The interview transcripts have provided me with rich datathat can be compared and that enables an interpretive
analysis of the causes of non-participatron m post-communist societies.
Table D.3 summarizes the main characteristics for each respondent, show-
The interviews consisted of two very different parts: (t ) open-ended questions about a series of themes, and (z) selected closed-ended questions
(mainly from the New Democracies Barometer, New Russia Barometer, and
'World
Values Survey), to ascertain basic and standard demographic information that could be used to com pare the responses and characteristics of my respondents with results from larger studies - as shown in Thbles D.r and D.z.
My top priority for each interview was to make the respondent comfortable and willing to talk freely and openly about the themes and questions thar
I brought up. Another priority was to keep the interviews as standardized as
possible, so that their results could be systematic ally compared. \fhile these
may be somewhat conflicting imperatives, I tried to balance them as much
as possible.
The major themes that I addressed in my interviews and examples of the
r8r
ID
City
EGor Berlin
Gender
M
Membership
none
business
EGoz Berlin
33
medium construction
sports
entrepreneur
EGo3 Berlin
4z
mediurn
EGo4 Berlin
37
medium
EGo5 Berlin
EGo6 Berlin
M
F
46
29
high
high
journalist
elementaty
EGoT Berlin
4e
high
advisor
educational
none
none
school teacher
EGo8 Berlin
EGog Berlin
EGro
Berlin
EGrr
Berlin
6z
3e
42
high
high
medium
27
medium
for
professional
disabled people
technical scientist
secretary
truck driver and
mechanic
unemployed (was
professional
none
none
none
cook)
EGrz
EGr3
Berlin
Berlin
29
69
medium
mechanic
low
pensioner (was
EGr4
Berlin
32
medium
temporary hiring
none
none
salesclerk)
none
agency
EGr 5 Berlin
56
high
lawyer
EGr6
Leipzig
4r
medium
cook in medical
professional
trade union
EGIT
EGr 8
EGrg
Leipzig
40
32
47
medium
medium
medium
tax advisor
Q
Q
medium
46
56
rrtccliu m
higlr
secretary
strrtc-ertnployed
l5
rtrt'tliurtr
s,t lt'st.lt'r-l<
center
Lerpzig M
Lerpzig F
EGzo Leipzig
[,ei pzig
F'
lr
lr(Jzi
Lcipzig
l,t'ipzig
r.1
| t'r1)/ rll
E,Gz
low
plumber
bookbinder at
library
bookkeeper
pensioner (was
salesclerk
l;.()zz
l:l
lr,( '
none
none
none
none
muslc
none
none
wlt'f
grrrclcning
(r t
ttrlirtrrrtl)
Appendix D
18z
TABLE
D.3 ftontinued)
Current
EGz5 Leipzig
EGz6 Leipzig
M
M
jj
58
ID
City
EGzT Leipzig
Gender
medium
high
ID
Rzr Moscow M
charitable
high school
none
68
medium
pensioner (was
metal worker)
none
EGzg Leipzig
M
M
3L
js
medium
high
gardener
englneer
trade union
religious,
music, youth,
charitable
trade union
pensioner (was
cultural
M
M
6o
5e
high
high
j7
high
director of
Membership
none
language
rnstrtute
Rzz
Moscow
Rr3
Moscow
47
high
computer
technician
none
Sz
high
unemployed
none
doctor
St. Petersburg
St. Petersburg
City
charitable
electrician)
social worker
pastor
Organizational
EGz8 Leipzig
EG3o Leipzig
Current
Organizational
Membership
teacher
Ror
Roz
r83
engineer)
Ro3
Ro4
St. Petersburg M
St. Petersburg F
27
48
medium
medium
manual worker
unemployed
none
Ro5
Ro6
Ro7
Ro8
Ro9
St. Petersburg
St. Petersburg
55
38
24
z8
45
medium
high
medium
high
high
former nurse
none
medical doctor
unemployed
lawyer
real estate
trade union
religious/
P.t4
Rr5
Moscow
Moscow
P.z6
Moscow
Moscow
Moscow
Rz9
R3o
P.r7
Rz8
52
44
high
medium
z6
3j
j4
high
high
medium
Moscow
5e
high
artrstrc,
Moscow
48
high
economrst
none
salesclerk
low-level
technician
office manager
office manager
sanitary-technical
none
none
musrc
none
none
worker
charitable
spiritual
F
St. Petersburg F
St. Petersburg F
St. Petersburg F
none
o
Rrr
Rrz
Rt3
St. Petersburg M
St. Petersburg M
St. Petersburg F
L5
3r
47
6r
St. Petersburg
high
high
high
high
lawyer
physicist
education
tourlsm
company
pensioner (and
Z. WARM-UP/gIOGRAPHY
none
I'd like to start by asking you some general questions about yourself. 'S7here
were you born, where did you grow up, how long have you been living in
[city], how long in this apartment, where are your parents from. . . ?
none
trade union
women's,
cultural,
youth
St. Petersburg
none
St. Petersburg
Rt
jL
high
none
bookkeeper for
investment firm
45
hish
cultural
high
medium
publishing
company
paleontologist
typist/secre tary
Rr6
Rr7
Rr 8
Moscow
Moscow
Moscow
F
F
Rr9
Rzo
Moscow
M<lscow
t;
7r
47
je
17
sl
high
nrccliuttt
lr
iglr
edtrcationa I
socio logist
s('cu rit y g,rr:t rtl
Ir,rttt'rttltJtt't'
3. ACTIVITIES
TIME PERIOD
cleaner)
Rt4
INTRODUCTION
professional
business
Rr
I.
cultural
Now I would like to ask you a few questions on your life in the Soviet
Union/GDR. Rather than tell me what you would do today if the Soviet
Union/GDR were still around, I would like you to try as much as possible
to put yourself back into that time period and to tell me how you thought
and what you did back then.
..
none
sc lf-hc
n()nc
ll()ll('
ll()ll('
lp
r84
Appendix D
3.2
'Were
strangers, and that which they said within close circles of family
and friends. In other words, that people feared that they could be
reported on or that they could have problems or get into trouble for
expressing their true opinions
.Was
it really so? How so? Could you give me some examples?
3.3 Societal life in the GDR/Soviet Union was apparcntly highly organized. There were all sorts of different orga nrzattons and groups, such
as [several examples], and many people took part in their activities.
..
l;1"'::r;;:;"*m:',^T'[i,:;;:;;;:::;:';i;:,;i:l;#:]:i;-:,
were given by the collective/group] at your place of work? (If yes)
'Were
you asked to do this? (Please explain...)
'Were
there any alternative or informal organi zatlons or clubs that
'S7hat
you
ever take
3.4 How did you usually spend your free time? (family, friends, coworkers, etc. )
4.2 Did you (or any close friends or relatives) ever find yourself in diffifor no'c being
4.3 And how have things changed today in this regard? Do you feel
more free to express yourself? What, rf anything, are you careful
about talking about in public? Are there still subjects that you feel
you have to avoid in certain public situations ?
5. CIVIC PARTICIPATION
j. r The last years and months of the GDR/Soviet Union saw the emergence of many types of social movements, public demonstrations,
and meetings. How well do you remember these times? \7hat was
your reaction to the events takitrg place ? Did you yourself participate
in any of these events ?
If respondent did participate: Have your (political) activities continued until today, or was this only a passittg phase in your life?
3.5 Some have described the GDR/Soviet Union as a society where people
were excluded from political life, and therefore they placed more
emphasis on their private lives, spending their time within circles of
'What do you
famlly and friends, with their hobbies, in their niches.
cterrzation? Does it fit the way you lived? \fhat
\fhy?
If responden t did not participate: Did you have any friends or close
acquaintances who were politic ally active at that time ? [If so] Have
their activities changed since then? How so?
[Spontaneous follow-up questions . . .]
l}*r."t"*;*"
3.6 It is often said that the state tried to control people's private lives. Did
you ever feel that the state was in any way controlling or invading
any personal
S.z Xfhat about the first free elections? Did you participate atthattime?
Do you remember how you felt and thought about it then? And has
that changed over time? (If yes) How so?
5
3.8 People say that connections were more important than money in
the Soviet Union/GDR because there wasn't much to buy with your
money, but with good friends and connections you could basically
get what you wanted. Do you think this description of Soviet/lrast
German society is accurate? How did you experiencc it in y()r,rr own
life? Could you give me some examplcs?
4.
|)|
s't't N( ;'t't ( ) N s;
t)|
ss I M t, l,A t'l ( ) N
4.1 lt is oltt'rr s:u(l tlr,rt irr Sovrt'r/(;l)l( lnnt's Pr',rplt' lr.t,l lo tlrllt'tcttlt,tlt'
Irctrv('('rr rvlt.tl l lr,'\' ...u(l ortl l, rtr,l rtt Irttltlr.. - .rl w,,r 1,.. ( )r ur ltottl ol
r85
.3 Today in [city] there are allsorts of orga nizatrons that people can join,
for example: [snow GARD: Church or religious org anrzatron; sport or
recreation organizationsl art, music, or educational organizations;
labor unions; political parties or movements; environmental organizations; professional associations; charitable organizations, and
many others.l Are you a member of any of these organrzatrons? How
alrotrt any clther kinds of groups or organizations?
lf ycs: Which one (s)? \Would you say that you are an active memlrt'r'()l'iltr irr:rctivt'r'n('rrrbcr? l'-low malny meetings do you attend a
wt't'lt
Appendix D
186
at
first made at
institutions that are at either extreme, and asked them (a) why and
(b) to talk about some of their experiences with this institution or
group
meetings . . .]
group, etc.]
. . .]
6. PRIVATE LIFE
6.r
8. GENERATIONS
8.
63
Approximately what
age
8.2 \7hat differentiates your generation from others? Do you think that
older or younger people look at the world differently than you do ?
How
6.4 How wide is your understanding of "family"?'S7hom do you consider as family? \fhere do your relatives live? How close arc you to
those who live far away? How important is family to you?
8.4 Can you remember one (or more) important moment(s) in the world
that you feel shaped your political beliefs? Please explain what it was,
and how it influenced you.
step above?
6.6 Do you sociahze with your neighbors? If so, how close is your relationship? Do you ever visit your neighbors just to talk? If your
neighbor asked to borrow money would you loan it?
so?
8.3 Do you think you understand people who are closer to your age
better than you understand other people? How so? How strongly do
you feel a sense of solidarity with people of you r age in comparison
to people of other ages ?
6.7
generation?
6.2 How did you get to know your closest friends (or spouse)?
.S7ith
r87
9.r
6.8 How and how much have interpersonal relations changed in the years
since the collapse of the USSR/GDR? And what about in your close
circle of familv and friends ?
9.2 In your opinion, what values do you see making up today's society? How have they changed in comparison to Soviet/GDR times? In
other words, what was important to people back then, and what is
important to them today?
7- TRUST
Generally speakitrg, would you say that most people can be trusted
or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people ?
9.3 In an ideal world, what are the values that you would most like to
7.r
the green/ecology m()vemcnt; thc w()nl('n's nr( )v('nl('rrt; t ll(' l)('oplt' y()rl
xtcn tlt'tl
f':r lr r i I y
y()ur-
times
these?
\fhy
)w (:nru rl
Wlr(.r'(' orr llris st .rlt' woultl y,,u prrl tlrr' ft<)rtll('r c()tllttttrtrist regime?
r)'( s( svst"' or 1i'lrv( r'rir':11
Y,f i;';; :::',:l]:l ),,11, ;:i':ll,i;,",]]',';,:ll'l
sr tt
''
Appendix D
r88
\fhere on this scale would you put our system of governing five
years in the future
References
..
.]
T.:. *
"
(:',"#ffi *'o:;it"'i.ff 11 ff ; -
oer
)H
nv
ee
ks
rr.3 In the past year, have you or another member of you family at some
time been on short time or not paid for a full week's work by your
employer? (If yes for self or family member) How many weeks did it
last
rr.4 Here is a scale for ranking how the economy works: the top, plus
roo, is the best; the bottom, minus roo, the worst. [sHow cano]
'sfhere
on this scale would you put the socialist economy before
r989/r99r?
Where on this scale would you put the present economic system?
\il/here on this scale would you put our economic system in five
years time?
r
ri
u.6
3H'ff#H;',r::rtr',1f#,T#t**:H;:5
Achen, Christopher H., and $7. Phillips Shivelg Cross-Leuel Inference (Chicago: lJniversity of Chicago Press, 1995).
Adorno, Theodor \il/., Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, R. Nevitt Sanford'
Betty Aron, Maria Hertz Levinson, and William Morrow, The Awthoritarian Personality (New York: Harper, r95o).
Allgemeine Deutsche Nachrichtenagentur, "Die Ost-.West Ehe bleibt auch weiter die
Ausnahffier" in Berliner Zeitwng, August 9, 1996.
Anheier, Helmut K., "Germ lny," in The New Ciuic Atlas: Profiles of Ciuil Society in 6o
Countries (Washington, DC: Civicus , 1997)'.
Anheier, Helmut K., et aI., eds. , Der Dritte Sektor in Deutschland: Organisationen
Zwischen Staatund Markt im gesellschaftlizhen'Wandel (Berlin: Edition Sigma, 1998).
Arato, Andrew, "Civil Society vs. the State: Poland, t98o-8r," in Telos, No. 47
pp.908-928.
B:rnr, .f iirgen, tlwc K<lch, and Stephan Telschow, Sportuereine im Ubergang. Die Vereinslundschaft in ()stdautschland (Aachen: Meyer und Meyer, r995).
li