ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: GENERAL PRINCIPLES

When the application of an administrative issuance modifies existing laws or exceeds the intended
scope, the issuance becomes void. (Romulo v. Southwing; GR No. 164171)
To be valid, an administrative issuance, such as an executive order, must comply with the following
requisites: (1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature; (2) It must be promulgated in
accordance with the prescribed procedure; (3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the
legislature; and (4) It must be reasonable

It is an axiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and
capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be
reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the
purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid. (Lupanco v.
CA; GR No. L-77372)
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees right to
liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as
to how they should prepare for the examination.

As a general rule, under the principles of administrative law in force in this jurisdiction, decisions of
administrative officers shall not be disturbed by the courts, except when the former have acted without
or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Findings of administrative officials
and agencies who have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are
generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by
substantial evidence and are controlling on the reviewing authorities because of their acknowledged
expertise in the fields of specialization to which they are assigned. Even the courts of justice, including
this Court, are bound by such findings in the absence of a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion,
which is not present in this case at bar. (Biak na Bato Mining v. Secretary Tanco; GR No. 34267-68)
There is no question that the decision of the Director of Mines as affirmed by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources is substantially supported by evidence. Substantial evidence has
been defined or construed to mean not necessarily preponderant proof as required in ordinary civil
cases but such kind of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination requires the
expertise, specialized training and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in
an administrative proceeding before resort to the courts is had even if the matter may well be within
their proper jurisdiction. (Euro-Med Labs v. Province of Batangas; GR No. 148106)
Petitioners claim therefore involved compliance with applicable auditing laws and rules on
procurement. Such matters are not within the usual area of knowledge, experience and expertise of
most judges but within the special competence of COA auditors and accountants.

The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having
been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong,
the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply
with the law. (Biraogo v. Phil Truth Commission; GR No. 192135)
The Court is not convinced that although Section 17 allows the President the discretion to expand the
scope of investigations of the PTC so as to include the acts of graft and corruption committed in other
past administrations since it does not guarantee that they would be covered in the future. Such
expanded mandate of the commission will still depend on the whim and caprice of the President. If he
would decide not to include them, the section would then be meaningless.

When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does not
become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock

corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also
corporate powers. (MIAA v. CA; GR No. 155650)
The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges from the public does not remove the
character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for public use.

GSIS manages the funds for the life insurance, retirement, survivorship, and disability benefits of all
government employees and their beneficiaries. This undertaking, to be sure, constitutes an essential
and vital function which the government, through one of its agencies or instrumentalities, ought to
perform if social security services to civil service employees are to be delivered with reasonable
dispatch. (GSIS v. Manila City Assessor; GR No. 186242)
GSIS is not a GOCC but an instrumentality of the National Government. GSIS capital is not divided
into unit shares. Also, GSIS, has no members to speak of. The subject properties under GSISs name are
owned by the Republic. The GSIS is but a mere trustee of the subject properties which have either been
ceded to it by the Government or acquired for the enhancement
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: QUASI LEGISLATIVE
While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a
power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of
general supervision over local governments. The regions themselves are not territorial and political
divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are mere groupings of contiguous
provinces for administrative purposes. (Chiongbian v. Orbos; GR No. 96754)
The regrouping of contiguous provinces is not even analogous to a redistricting or to the division or
merger of local governments, which all have political consequences on the right of people residing in
those political units to vote and to be voted for.

The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is

mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their
violation or otherwise impose a burden or the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within
this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons
such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have
been circularized to all concerned. (Tanada v. Tubera; GR No. L-63915)

The rule under our jurisdiction is only judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies made in
the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine. The doctrine of
primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises its quasijudicial or
adjudicatory function. (Smart Telecomm v. NTC; GR No. 151908)
Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty,
international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in
the courts, including the regional trial courts. This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes
the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political
departments.

Following the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Laws, because the PPA circulars are inconsistent with EO 1088,
they are void and ineffective. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid
only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (Eastern Shipping Lines v. CA; GR No.
116356)
Because the PPA circulars are inconsistent with EO 1088, they are void and ineffective. It is axiomatic
that an administrative agency, like the PPA, has no discretion whether to implement the law or not. Its
duty is to enforce it. Unarguably, therefore, if there is any conflict between the PPA circular and a law,
such as EO 1088, the latter prevails.

The questioned circulars are shown to be a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the
executive branch of Government. Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable

for lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required
in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1)
and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987. (Phil Assoc. of Service Exporters v.
Torres; GR No. 101279)
The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is not
unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppressive. It has been necessitated by the growing complexity of
the modern society.

The license of the pilots is granted in the form of an appointment which allows them to engage in
pilotage until they retire at the age 70 years. This is a vested right. It is readily apparent that PPA-AO
No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession before their compulsory
retirement. (Corona v. United Harbor Pilots; GR No. 111953)
As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are
essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of
its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need
not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing.

When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further
than its bare issuance for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already
prescribed. But, when the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can
facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially adds to or
increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly
affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given
the force and effect of law. (Commission or Internal Revenue v. CA; GR No. 119761)
The SC found that RMC 37-93 cannot be viewed as simply a corrective measure. The BIR did not simply
interpret the law; verily, it legislated under its quasi-legislative authority. The due observance of the
requirements of notice, of hearing, and of publication should not have been then ignored.

After careful examination of the provisions of both P.D. No. 451 and BP. Blg. 232, the Court considers
that the legal authority of respondent DECS Secretary to set maximum permissible rates or levels of
tuition and other school fees, and to issue guidelines for the imposition and collection thereof, like DECS
Order No. 30, must be sustained. (Lina v. Carino; GR No. 100127)
The rates and charges adopted by such private school shall be collectible, and their application or use
authorized provided that such rates and charges are in accord with rules and regulations promulgated
by the DECS.

A direct invocation of the Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed
only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. The Court has been consistent that it will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress
desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances,
such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary
remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. (Holy Spirit Homeowners
v. Defensor; GR No. 163980)
Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, the Courts power to evaluate the validity of an implementing
rule or regulation is generally appellate in nature. Thus, following the doctrine of hierarchy of courts,
the instant petition should have been initially filed with the Regional Trial Court.

Administrative Order No. 308 is unconstitutional. It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No.
308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National
Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various
contending state policies the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against
dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. (Ople v. Torres; GR No. 127685)
The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated
when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less

verify the correctness of the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks
to prevent.

Under his constitutional power of control, the President can direct all government entities, in the
exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to
achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public. The Presidents
constitutional power of control is self-executing and does not need any implementing legislation. (KMU
v. NEDA; GR No. 167798)
The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government entities.
Ople v. Torres is not authority to hold that E.O. 420 violates the right to privacy because in that case the
assailed executive issuance, broadly drawn and devoid of safeguards, was annulled solely on the
ground that the subject matter required legislation.

Employees of the BIR and the BOC may by law be entitled to a reward when, as a consequence of their
zeal in the enforcement of tax and customs laws, they exceed their revenue targets. However, in
exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not they
conformed to the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power
exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution. (ABAKADA Party List v. Purisima; GR No. 166715)

For an administrative regulation, such as the Circular in this case, to have the force of penal law, (1) the
violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statute itself; and (2)
the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself. (Perez v. LG Refillers; GR No.
159149)
Clearly, it is B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, which defines what constitute punishable acts involving
petroleum products and which set the minimum and maximum limits for the corresponding penalties.
The Circular merely implements the said law, albeit it is silent on the maximum pecuniary penalty for
refillers, marketers, and dealers. Nothing in the Circular contravenes the law.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: JUDICIAL POWERS
A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court and other than a
legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule making."
(Presl Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v. CA; GR No. 38578)
If the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is not a quasi-judicial body, it cannot be said to be coequal or coordinate with the Regional Trial Court. There is nothing in its enabling statutes that would
demonstrate its standing at par with the said court.

Since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and it is not one of those agencies whose decisions, orders or
resolutions are appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, the resolution of the Secretary of
Justice finding probable cause to indict petitioners for estafa is, therefore, not appealable to the Court
of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed
petitioners petition for review. (Santos v. Go; GR No. 156081)
A quasi-judicial body is as an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature which
affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. A quasijudicial agency
performs adjudicatory functions such that its awards, determine the rights of parties, and their
decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court.

It cannot be denied as well that in determining whether or not a structure is illegal or it should be
demolished, property rights are involved thereby needing notices and opportunity to be heard as
provided for in the constitutionally guaranteed right of due process. In pursuit of these functions, the
city mayor has to exercise quasi-judicial powers. A quasi-judicial function, as applying to the action
discretion, etc. of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their
official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. (City Engineer of Baguio v. Baniqued; GR
No. 150270)

The Mayor, although performing executive functions, also exercises quasi-judicial function which may
be corrected by prohibition.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the
judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. (Carino v. CHR; GR No. 96681)
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant
by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much
less take over the functions of the latter.

The dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action filed against petitioner or give
him a clean bill of health in all respects. Considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well
as the procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the
findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other (Ocampo v.
Ombudsman; GR No. 114683)

The doctrine of res judicata certainly applies to adversary administrative proceedings. (UPSU v.
Laguesma; GR No. ________)
the principle of finality of administrative determination compels respect for the finding of the Secretary
of Labor that route managers are managerial employees as defined by law in the absence of anything
to show that such determination is without substantial evidence to support it.

Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the second
motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary. (Fortich v. Corono; GR No. 131457)
When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the Decision of March
29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the
said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision

Being under the control of the President, the decision of the Secretary of Justice is subject to review of
the former. In fine, recourse from the decision of the Secretary of Justice should be to the President,
instead of the CA, under the established principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. (Orosa v.
Roa; GR No. 140423)
The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that if an appeal or remedy obtains or
is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made
to the courts. Immediate recourse to the court would be premature and precipitate.

Under Circular No. 1-91, appeals from the arbitral awards of the CIAC may be brought to the Court of
Appeals, and not to the Supreme Court alone. In the first place, it is a quasi-judicial agency. A quasijudicial agency or body has been defined as an organ of government other than a court and other than
a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making.
(Metro Construction v. Chatham Properties; GR No. 141897)
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over appeals from final orders or decisions of the CIAC is further
fortified by the amendments to B.P. Blg.129, as introduced by R.A. No. 7902

Statutes imposing prior restraints on speech are generally illegal and presumed unconstitutional
breaches of the freedom of speech. The exceptions to prior restraint are movies, television, and radio
broadcast censorship in view of its access to numerous people, including the young who must be
insulated from the prejudicial effects of unprotected speech. (Soriano v. MTRCB; GR No. 164785)

The MTRCB may validly impose under its charter without running afoul of the free speech clause.

In order that a special civil action of certiorari may be invoked, the petition must be directed against
any tribunal, board or officer "exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions," which "acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law." (Doran v. Judge Luczon; GR No. 151344)
Judge Luczon was designated by this Court merely to investigate and, thereafter, submit a report and
the appropriate recommendation relative to the said complaint. His function is merely investigative and
recommendatory in nature.

According to well-settled rules, an agency is said to be exercising judicial function by which he has the
power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to
determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial function is a
term which applies to the action and discretion of public administrative officers or bodies, which are
required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions
from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. Ministerial
function is one which an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a
prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his/its own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done. (Distelliera Limtuaco v. Advertising Board of the Phils.; GR No. 164242)
The acts sought to be prohibited in this case are not the acts of a tribunal, board, officer, or person
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. What is at contest here is the power and
authority of a private organization, composed of several members-organizations, which power and
authority were vested to it by its own members. Obviously, prohibition will not lie in this case.

Task Force Maguindanaos fact-finding investigation, which is to probe into the veracity of the alleged
fraud that marred the elections in said province; and consequently, to determine whether the
certificates of canvass were genuine or spurious, and whether an election offense had possibly been
committed, could by no means be classified as a purely ministerial or administrative function. The
COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was exercising its quasi-judicial power in pursuit of the
truth behind the allegations of massive fraud during the elections in Maguindanao. (Lintang Bedol v.
COMELEC; GR No. 179830)
To withhold from the COMELEC the power to punish individuals who refuse to appear during a
factfinding investigation, despite a previous notice and order to attend, would render nugatory the
COMELECs investigative power, which is an essential incident to its constitutional mandate to secure
the conduct of honest and credible elections.

According to the authorities such proceedings, where the owner of the property appears, are so far
considered as quasi-criminal proceeding as to relieve the owner from being a witness against himself
and to prevent the compulsory production of his books and papers. As a consequence, proceedings for
forfeiture of property are deemed criminal or penal. Accordingly, since the defendants are exempted in
a criminal case from the obligation to be witnesses against themselves, such applies thereto. (Cabal v.
Kapunan; GR No. L-19052)

In an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, Board of Medical
Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against
to take the witness stand without his consent. (Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners; GR No. L25018)

The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of
counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute
right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an
administrative inquiry. (Lumiqued v. Exevea; GR No. 117565)
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal
proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may

not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondents capacity to
represent himself and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person being investigated with
counsel.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
Well-settled is the rule in our jurisdiction that before bringing an action in or resorting to the Courts of
Justice, all remedies of administrative character affecting or determinative of the controversy at that
level should first be exhausted by the aggrieved party. (Bangus Fry Fisherfolk v. Lazanas; GR No.
131442)
The decision of the Regional Director may still be elevated to the Office of the Secretary of the DENR to
fully comply with the process of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

The purpose of the requirement of filing a Motion for Reconsideration before resorting to courts is to
give the COMELEC an opportunity to correct the error imputed to it and as long as such Motion has not
been filed, resort to courts through certiorari is premature. (Bernardo et al. v. Abalos, et al; GR No.
137266)
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, can only be
resorted to if "there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law." Having failed to file the required motion for reconsideration of the challenged Resolution,
petitioners' instant petition is certainly premature. Significantly, they have not raised any plausible
reason for their direct recourse to this Court.

Neither is the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applicable in this case. Besides the fact
that the AAB was patently without jurisdiction to act on the administrative complaints filed against
respondents Dinopol and Bungubung, the instant petition raises only questions of law, one of the
exceptions to the general rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. (Corona v. CA; GR No. 97356)

The rationale behind the doctrine is that the administrative agency concerned is in the best position to
correct any previous error committed in its forum. This is not, however, a hard-fastened rule. It admits
exception. Among the established exceptions are: 1) when the question raised is purely legal; 2) when
the administrative body is in estoppel; 3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; 4) when there
is urgent need for judicial intervention; 5) when the claim involved is small; 6) when irreparable
damage will be suffered; 7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 8) when strong
public interest is involved; 9) when the subject of the controversy is private land; and 10) in quo
warranto proceedings. (Marcol v. Lavina; GR No. 166753)

In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto
itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence. (Villaflor v. CA; GR No. 95694)
The Supreme Court has recognized that the Director of Lands is a quasi-judicial officer who passes on
issues of mixed facts and law.

Resolving questions of law, which involve the interpretation and application of laws, constitutes
essentially an exercise of judicial power that is exclusively allocated to the Supreme Court and such
lower courts the Legislature may establish. (Ongsuco v. Malones; GR No. 182065)
In the instant case, the parties are not disputing any factual matter on which they still need to present
evidence. The sole issue petitioners raised before the RTC in Civil Case No. 25843 was whether
Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 was valid and enforceable despite the absence, prior to its enactment,
of a public hearing held in accordance with Article 276 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
the Local Government Code. This is undoubtedly a pure question of law, within the competence and
jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve.

The prohibition on the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the collection of taxes applies only to
national internal revenue taxes, and not to local taxes. (Angeles City v. Angeles City Electric Corp; GR
No. 166134)
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: JUDICIAL REVIEW
When facts and circumstances later transpire that would render the execution inequitable or unjust, the
interested party may ask a court to stay its execution or prevent its enforcement. In the case at bar, no
exception exists as shown by the facts. If the finality and executor of the decision of ERB would be
disturbed then it would result to openly disregarding the rule on finality of judgments. (Phil Sinter Corp.
v. Cagayan Electric Power; GR No. 127731)
Where the law provides for an appeal from the decisions of administrative bodies to the Supreme Court
or to Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies are co-equal with RTCs in terms of rank. Hence, such
are beyond the control of RTCs. Being co-equal, it intended to ensure judicial stability in the
administration of justice.

Courts of justice will not

the sound discretion of
arbitrarily or with grave
manner such that their
137473)

generally interfere with purely administrative matters which are addressed to

government agencies unless there is a clear showing that the latter acted
abuse of discretion or when they have acted in a capricious and whimsical
action may amount to an excess of jurisdiction (Remolana v. CSC; GR No.

A civil service employee can be dismissed from the government service for an offense which is not
work-related or which is not connected with the performance of his official duty. The rationale for the
rule is that if a government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave
misconduct, even if said defects of character are not connected with his office, they affect his right
to continue in office.

Courts of justice will not generally interfere with purely administrative matters which are addressed to
the sound discretion of government agencies unless there is a clear showing that the latter acted
arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or when they have acted in a capricious and whimsical
manner such that their action may amount to an excess of jurisdiction. (Mollaneda v. Umacob; GR No.
140128)
An administrative agency can delegate the power to hear and receive evidence to a hearing officer, as
long as the administrative body makes its own independent conclusions. Such findings shall be
conclusive upon the courts.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that an administrative decision must first be appealed to

administrative superiors up to the highest level before it may be elevated to a court of justice for
review. The power of judicial review may therefore be exercised only if an appeal is first made by the
highest administrative body in the hierarchy of the executive branch of government. (Valencia v. CA; GR
No. 122363)
Where the respondent is a Department Secretary, whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the
implied or assumed approval of the latter, unless the President actually disapproves them,
administrative remedies have already been exhausted.

Since the complaint was filed first in the Ombudsman, and the Ombudsman opted to assume
jurisdiction over the complaint, the Ombudsman's exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of the
Sangguniang Bayan exercising concurrent jurisdiction. (Ombudsman v. Rodriguez; GR No. 172700)
The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with the sangguniang bayan over administrative cases
against elective barangay officials occupying positions below salary grade 27, such as private
respondent in the case at bar.
SYLLABUS