Raynera v Hiceta

1. Reynaldo Raynera was travelling on his way home riding a motrcyle on the
southbound lane of East Service Road Muntinlupa.
2. On the other hand, a Isuzu truck, driven by Orpilla and owned owned by Hiceta, was
travelling ahead of him at 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. The truck was loaded with two
metal sheets extended on both sides, 2 feet on the left and three 3 feet on the right.
There were also two pairs of red lights on both sides of the metal plates.
3. At some point on the road, Reynaldo Raynera crashed his motorcycle into the left rear
portion of the truck trailer, which was without tail lights.
4. Due to the collision, Reynaldo sustained head injuries. He was rushed to the
Paraaque Medical Center but upon arrival at the hospital, he was pronounced dead
on arrival.
5. The heirs of the deceased demanded from respondents' payment of damages arising
from the death of Reynaldo as a result of the vehicular accident.
6. The respondents refused to pay the claims.
7. Petitioners, hence, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Manila a complaint for damages
against respondents' owner and driver of the Isuzu truck.
8. Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. The trial court also applied the
doctrine of contributory negligence and reduced the responsibility of respondents by
20%.
9. On Appeal, CA held that the victim's bumping into the left rear portion of the truck
was the proximate cause of his death, and consequently, absolved respondents from
liability.
ISSUE: 1. Whether the truck is responsible for the accident
2. Whether Isuzu truck driver is liable under the last clear chance doctrine.
HELD: 1. No. Despite the absence of tail lights and license plate, respondents' truck was
visible in the highway. It was traveling at a moderate speed, approximately 20 to 30
kilometers per hour. It used the service road, instead of the highway, because the cargo
they were hauling posed a danger to passing motorists. And in compliance with the LTO
Traffic Code, they installed 2 pairs of lights on top of the steel plates.
2. No. The Doctrine cannot be attributed to the Isuzu truck driver. It has been said
that drivers of vehicles "who bump the rear of another vehicle" are presumed to be "the
cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence." The rationale behind the
presumption is that the driver of the rear vehicle has full control of the situation as he is
in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him.
SC agreed with the Court of Appeals that the responsibility to avoid the collision with the
front vehicle lies with the driver of the rear vehicle. Consequently, no other person was
to blame but the victim himself since he was the one who bumped his motorcycle into
the rear of the Isuzu truck. He had the last clear chance of avoiding the accident.

CANLAS vs. CA
1. In August 1982, Canlas and Maosca, decided to venture in business and to raise the
capital needed therefor.
2. Canlas executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing Maosca to mortgage two
parcels of land situated in Paranaque.
3. Subsequently, Spouses Canlas agreed to sell the two lots to Maosca, for and in
consideration of 850K. (500K payable within one week, and the balance of 350K shall
serve Canlas investment in the business)
4. Canlas delivered to Maosca the transfer certificates of title of the two lots sold.
Maosca, on his part, issued two postdated checks in favor of Canlas in the amounts
of 40K and 460K, but turned out that the check covering the 460K was not sufficiently
funded. Spouses Canlas received only 40K.
5. Thereafter, Maosca, with the use of the SPA previously issued by Canlas, was able to
secure a 100K loan from a certain Atty. Manuel by mortgaging the same parcels of
land, with the help of impostors who misrepresented themselves as the spouses
Canlas.
6. Then, Maosca, using the same parcels of land as and through the involvement of the
same impostors, applied and was approved of another loan by Asian Savings Bank in
the amount of 500K.
7. When the loan was not paid, the bank, extra-judicially foreclosed the mortgage.
8. Upon learning of the unauthorized mortgage, Canlas moved for the cancellation of the
adverse claim and for the issuance of a writ of possession. The trial Court granted
both motions.
9. On appeal, CA reversed the ruling of trial court, concluding that Canlas was a party to
the fraudulent scheme of Maosca and therefore, estopped from impugning the validity of the
mortgage because when Manosca went to the Asian Saving Bank, Canlas was with him, and
Canlas was introduced to the bank personnel as Leonardo Ray which he never corrected.

10.

Hence, this appeal.

Issues: Whether the doctrine of last clear chance is attributable to private respondent
Asian Savings Bank?
Held: Yes. The doctrine of last clear chance is applicable. The respondent bank must
suffer the resulting loss.
In essence, the doctrine of last clear chance is to the effect that where both parties are
negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of
the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought about
the occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the
impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequencesarising
therefrom.
In the case at bar, the respondent bank did not observe the required diligence in
verifying the real identity of the couple who introduced themselves as the spouses

Canlas. Not a single identification card was presented by the impostor-loan applicants to
show their true identity. And yet the bank approved the loan on sheer finding that the
signatures affixed on a deed of mortgage. In fact the deed of mortgage referred to did
not bear the tax identification number of the spouses, as well as the Community Tax
Certificate of Angelina Canlas.
Applying Art. 1173 It could be said that the degree of diligence required of banks is more
than that of a good father of a family in keeping with their responsibility to exercise the
necessary care and prudence in dealing even on a registered or titled property.
CONSOLIDATED BANK VS CA and L.C. DIAZ and COMPANY
1. Petitioner Consolidated Bank, also known as Solid Bank, is a banking corporation
organized and existing under Philippine laws.
2. L.C. Diaz opened a savings account with Consolidated Bank. On August 1991 L.C. Diaz
through its cashier, Mercedes Macaraya, filled up a savings cash deposit slip for P990
and a savings checks deposit slip for P50.
3. Macaraya gave the passbook to the messenger of L.C. Diaz, Ismael Calapre, and
instructed him to deposit the money with Solid Bank.
4. Calapre went to the bank and presented to Teller No. 6 the two deposit slips and the
passbook. The teller acknowledged the receipt of and stamped the deposit slips with
the words DUPLICATE and SAVING TELLER 6 SOLIDBANK HEAD OFFICE.
5. Since the transaction took time and Calapre had to make another deposit for L.C. Diaz
with Allied Bank, he left the passbook with Solid bank. When Calapre returned to
Solidbank to retrieve the passbook, Teller No. 6 informed him that somebody got the
passbook. So Calapre went back to L.C. Diaz and reported the incident to Macaraya.
6. Macaraya immediately prepared a deposit slip in duplicate copies with a check of
P200K. Then, Macaraya and Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6
the deposit slip and check. The teller stamped the words DUPLICATE and SAVING
TELLER 6 SOLIDBANK HEAD OFFICE on the duplicate copy of the deposit slip.
7. When Macaraya asked for the passbook, Teller No. 6 told Macaraya that someone got
the passbook but she could not remember to whom she gave the passbook.
8. When Macaraya asked Teller No. 6 if Calapre got the passbook, Teller No. 6 answered
that someone shorter than Calapre got the passbook.
9. The following day L.C. Diaz learned of the unauthorized withdrawal the day before (14
August 1991) of P300K from its savings account. The withdrawal slip bore the
signatures of the authorized signatories of L.C. Diaz but the signatories denied signing
the withdrawal slip.
10. L.C. Diaz demanded from Solidbank the return of its money but Solidbank refused.
L.C. Diaz filed a Complaint for Recovery of a Sum of Money against Solidbank. The
trial court absolved Solidbank.
11.
On appeal, CA reversed the decision of the trial court. CA denied the MR of
Solidbank. Hence this petition.
Issue: Is the last clear chance doctrine applicable in this case?
Held: No. We do not apply the doctrine of last clear chance to the present case. The
rules on simple loan or mutuum apply in this case, hence, the bank was liable for breach
of contract (culpa contractual) and not by virtue of a quasi-delict.

In a culpa contractual, neither the contributory negligence of the plaintiff nor his last
clear chance to avoid the loss, would exonerate the defendant from liability. Such
contributory negligence or last clear chance by the plaintiff merely serves to reduce the
recovery of damages by the plaintiff but does not exculpate the defendant from his
breach of contract.
With regard to the damages, SC held that if the defendant exercised the proper diligence
in the selection and supervision of its employee, or if the plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence, then the courts may reduce the award of damages. In this case,
L.C. Diaz was guilty of contributory negligence. Thus, the liability of Solidbank was
reduced to 60% of the actual damages. The remaining 40% of the actual damages shall
be borne by L.C. Diaz and Company.

ENGADA vs. CA
1. On November 1989, Edwin Iran was driving a blue Toyota Tamaraw jeepney bound for
Iloilo City.
2. On board the jeepeney was Sheila Seyan, the registered owner of the Tamaraw.
3. The Tamaraw passengers allegedly saw from the opposite direction a speeding Isuzu
pick-up, driven by Rogelio Engada.
4. When it was just a few meters away from the Tamaraw, the Isuzu pick-ups right signal
light flashed, at the same time, it swerved to its left, encroaching upon the lane of the
Tamaraw and headed towards a head-on collision course with it.
5. Seyan shouted at Iran to avoid the pick-up. So, Iran swerved to his left but the pick-up
also swerved to its right. Thus, the pick-up collided with the Tamaraw.
6. The impact caused the head and chassis of the Tamaraw to separate from its body.
Seyan was thrown out of the Tamaraw and suffered physical injuries. Also Seyan
incurred P130,000 in medical expenses.
7. A criminal complaint for damage to property through reckless imprudence with
serious physical injuries was filed with the MTC against petitioner Rogelio Engada and
Edwin Iran. Probable cause was found against petitioner, while the complaint against
Iran was dismissed.
8. The MTC found Engada found guilty beyond reasonable and was ordered to pay
damages to Mrs. Seyan.
9. On appeal, CA affirmed the findings of the lower court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES: Whether or not the Last Clear Chance doctrine is applicable in favor of Engada.
HELD: No. It is a settled rule that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of
overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road
is clear and he should not proceed if he cannot do so in safety. For failing to observe the
duty of diligence and care imposed on drivers of vehicles abandoning their lane,
petitioner must be held liable. Edwin Iran could not be faulted when, in his attempt to

avoid the pick-up, he swerved to his left. Engadas acts placed Iran in an emergency
situation which forced him to act quickly.
The doctrine of last clear chance states that a person who has the last clear chance or
opportunity to avoid an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is
considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. However, the
doctrine cannot be interpose in cases where the emergency rule applies. Iran only
swerved to the left to avoid Engadas pickup , which was already on a head-on path
towards Irans Tamaraw jeepney. No convincing proof was adduced by Engada that Iran
could have avoided a head-on collision