IN

THE 12 JUDICIAL COUNTY COURT

OF BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS

EX PARTE
DENISE MCVEA,

Petitioner.

HABEAS NO. W2613

TRIAL CAUSE NO. 443420

________________________________________________________________

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITIONERS
APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
__________________________________________________________________

SUBMITTED BY:

DENISE MCVEA
PETITIONER PRO SE
1006 WYOMING STREET
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAAS 78203
(210)460-0104

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. SUMMARY

Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus and to be released immediately from
bond and its restraint of liberty based on constitutional due process grounds
pursuant to Article 11 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.

Petitioner brings this petition on three constitutional grounds:

GROUND 1: The charging instrument is invalid and void. Absent a valid charging
instrument, the continued restraint of petitioner under bond is a violation of
constitutional law. Therefore, petitioner must be immediately release from bond
and this prosecution dismissed by operation of law. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 32.01.

GROUND 2: There is a complete and utter absence of probable cause to believe that
Petitioner committed an offense. The facts of the case supported by clear and
unassailable proof of Petitioners actual innocence - are such that the absence of
probable cause cannot be cured. Consequently, Petitioner must be immediately
released from bond and this prosecution dismissed by operation of law. Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) U.S. Supreme Court.

GROUND 3: Petitioner asserts that this prosecution is solely brought to gain
strategic advantage over Petitioner, in violation of state and federal law. Petitioner
is a published author, journalist and human rights advocate who has documented
widespread criminality and corruption within the Bexar County judiciary. Petitioner
asserts that Bexar Countys primary purpose in holding Petitioner to bond despite
the complete absence of probable cause is to discredit Petitioner and to pressure
Petitioner to waiver her constitutional rights through a coerced plea bargain. This is
a criminal offense under Texas Penal Code Sect. 39.03.


II. JURISDICTION

Both the district and county courts have original jurisdiction to issue the writ
of habeas corpus even though the criminal proceeding under attack is a
misdemeanor.1

Additionally, Article 11.09 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides
that a person confined under a misdemeanor charge may apply to the county judge
of the county in which the misdemeanor is charged to have been committed. TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.09; Ex parte Schmidt, 109 S.W.3d 480, 483 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2003) (When they are read together, Article V, section 16 of the Constitution,
Section 25.0003(a) of the Government Code, and Article 11.05 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure give the statutory county court at law, and the judges of that

1 Ex parte Johnson, 561 S.W.2d 841 (Tex.Cr. App.1978); Ex parte Phelper, 433 S.W.2d 897

(Tex.Cr.App.1968).

court, the power to issue the writ of habeas corpus when a person is restrained by
an accusation or conviction of misdemeanor. See also Ex parte Jordan, 659 S.W.2d
827, 828 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (appeals from denial of relief sought in a
misdemeanor post conviction writ of habeas corpus should be directed to the courts
of appeals. (emphasis in original). Therefore, this court has jurisdiction over this
petition for writ of habeas corpus.

III. COGNIZABILITY

Generally, a claim is cognizable under a pretrial writ of habeas corpus if,
resolved in the defendant's favor, it would deprive the trial court of the power to
proceed and result in the appellant's immediate release.2 First, the accused may
challenge the State's power to restrain him at all. Second, the accused may challenge
the manner of his pretrial restraint, i.e., the denial of bail or conditions attached to
bail. Third, the accused may raise certain issues which, if meritorious, would bar
prosecution or conviction.3
TEX. CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN., Art. 11.01 describes the writ of habeas corpus
as "the remedy to be used when any person is restrained in his liberty." This
extraordinary writ is "an order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, directed
to anyone having a person in his custody, or under his restraint, commanding him to
produce such person ... and show why he is held in custody or under restraint."
(Emphasis added.)

Additionally, Art. 11.22 defines the term restraint as: "the kind of
control which one person exercises over another, not to confine him
within certain limits, but to subject him to the general authority and
power of the person claiming such right."


Habeas corpus is a proper remedy when a defendant is subject to conditions
of bond because these conditions restrain his liberty within the meaning of Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure article 11.01. 4 Because Petitioner has been on bond in
Bexar County since November 16, 2013, this petition is cognizable under a writ of
habeas corpus. Further, a defendant may challenge even unpreserved errors in a
charging instrument for the first time.on habeas.5


IV. STANDARD FOR HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF

Petitioners claims meet the standard for habeas corpus relief. An applicant
for habeas corpus relief has the burden of proving facts which would entitle the
applicant to the relief sought. Ex parte Kimes, 872 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex.Crim.

2 Ex parte Barnet, 2014.
3 Ex parte Smith (October 19, 2005, No. PD-0616-04).

4 Ex parte Robinson, 641 SW 2d 552 Tex: Crt. Of Crim. App. 1982.

5 Studer v. State, 799 SW 2d 263, 271 (Tex. Crim. App 1990).

App.1993). Petitioner must also establish that she is either "confined" or "restrained
at the time of the application for writ"6 and show that she has no other adequate
remedy.7 Appellant law precludes applicant from appealing an interlocutory order
until after trial and the court has already denied petitioners motion to set aside
indictment or information and motion to dismiss. See trial record. Finally, the
applicant has been under continuous criminal bond in Bexar County pursuant to
Magistrate Intake No. 1631569 since November 16, 2013. A copy of Petitioners
bond order is hereby attached as Exhibit A and herein incorporated by reference.8

V. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

1.
Petitioner is a published journalist, author, and human rights advocate. In
2010, she began research for a book project about pro se litigants in America,
focusing her research on the Bexar County Courthouse. She began documenting
unexpected but widespread improprieties in the civil district courts, especially as
they related to the constitutional rights and guarantees of pro se litigants. This
journalistic work gained the ire of the district judges. The verified letter to Bexar
County District Judge Antonia Arteaga from Denise McVea is attached as Exhibit B
and herein incorporated by reference.9

2.
On May 8, 2013, Petitioner wrote a letter to Bexar County Civil District Court
Staff Attorney Dinah Gaines protesting the civil court judges policy of allowing
young assistant staff attorneys to contest and then summarily rule on pro se
litigants requests to proceed with their cases without paying court costs. These
extrajudicial hearings were held outside of the courtroom and outside of the
presence of a judge. Importantly, the attorneys making the judgments were
adversaries. Petitioner complained that the judges systematic default judgments
against pro se litigants were unconstitutional because the judges and their staff
denied the litigants access to a proper hearing in court before a judge as required by
law. Petitioner estimates that more than a thousand Bexar County residents had
their civil cases dismissed in this manner.10

3.
Almost immediately after her written protest, Petitioner began to experience
protracted and intense official oppression from judges, police, lawyers, city and
county officials, and others. However, Petitioner continued to document the actions
of these public servants. She now has a treasure trove of documentation outlining
numerous official acts by county and city officials and employees that were
unlawful, unethical, and often criminal in nature.11


6 Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, 769 S.W.2d 554, 558 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (restraint required before

writ relief can be granted); TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 11.01.

7 Ex parte Groves, 571 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tex.Crim. App.1978).
8 Exhibit A: Intake #1631569, Magistrate NO. 208330, November 16, 2013.
9 Exhibit B: Verified letter from Denise McVea to District Judge Antonia Arteaga, July 21, 2015.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.

4.
A key target of the oppression was 1614 Martin Luther King Boulevard, a
former abandoned crack house and drug den that Petitioner took possession of
pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Article 16.001. Petitioners purpose in
adverse possession of the property was in essence a social experiment; the objective
was to recover blighted inner city property and transform it into an asset for a
neglected neighborhood. After spending thousands of dollars, she was well on her
way to completing a civil rights information center, complete with bookstore,
reading room, and library.12

5.
On January 21, 2013, Petitioner became the first San Antonio resident in
recent city history to be arrested and criminally prosecuted for a garage sale
violation. The arrest occurred on Martin Luther King Day, while Petitioner and
volunteers were conducting an information and sales event at 1614 Martin Luther
King for participants in the citys Martin Luther King March.13


6.
On the evening of September 7, 2013, absent writ of possession, Kristina
Combs, Texas notary public Ofelia Lisa Hernandez and others broke into 1614
Martin Luther King Blvd. and began removing items under cloak of darkness. San
Antonio Police Department Offense Case #SAPD13196530 is hereby attached as
Exhibit C and herein incorporated by reference.14 Although this act is an offense
under Texas Penal Code Art. 31.03 and other crimes, police refused to properly
investigate.

7.
On September 15, 2013, Petitioners alarm company notified her that the
MLK property was again broken into. This time, absent writ of possession, notary
Ofelia Lisa Hernandez and others, in constant telephonic contact with Kristina
Combs, broke into another building on the property and removed more documents
and items. Again, the police refused to properly investigate. SAPD Call for Service
Sheet SAPD-2013-0887108 is hereby attached as Exhibit D and incorporated by
reference.15

8.
On November 13, 2013, former Bexar County Judge Barbara Nellermoe,
despite her court having no jurisdiction over the matter, and requiring no proof of
actual title from Combs, essentially awarded Combs the real property, improperly

12 Arteaga.

13 Although Petitioner was never taken before a magistrate, or given a probable cause determination,

the local federal court would later rule in summary judgment that police could arrest citizens for any
non-criminal reason, and that citizens arrested for non-criminal reasons could be detained and
prosecuted without probable cause, Miranda warnings, a hearing before a magistrate or any other
constitutional protections.
14 Exhibit C: SAPD Offense Report SAPD13196530, September 9, 2013.
15 Exhibit D: SAPD-2013-0887108, September 15, 2013.

awarded attorneys fees to Combs, and ordered the illegal eviction of Petitioner and
her organization from the property.16

9. On November 16, 2013, Combs attacked Petitioner when Petitioner
attempted to video record Combs and others illegally removing Petitioners books
from the property.17 Despite video evidence of Combs attack against Petitioner,
video and eyewitness proof of Combs theft of Petitioners personal property, police
officers arrested Petitioner and charged Petitioner with the offense of misdemeanor
assault - bodily injury, based solely on allegations made by the complainant, Kristina
Combs. Exhibit E, SAPD Offense Report No. SAPD13252834, is hereby attached as
Exhibit E and herein incorporated by reference. 18 A copy of the video recording of
the incident, taken by Petitioner, is hereby attached as Exhibit F and herein
incorporated by reference.19

JURAT
I, Denise McVea, by her signature on this instrument, swear upon
penalty of perjury that I am the person who recorded the video attached as
Exhibit F and that the video is a correct representation of what occurred on
November 16, 2015.

10. No arraignment has been held in this case.

11. On June 4, 2014, Court-certified Forensic Document Examiner Wendy
Carlson issued a report finding that the signatures on the quitclaim deeds Combs
used to gain control of Petitioners property were forged. The majority of the forged
quitclaim deeds were notarized by Ofelia Lisa Hernandez, Combs co-participant in
the burglaries of 1614 Martin Luther King. The Carlson Report is hereby attached as
Exhibit G and herein incorporated by reference.20

12. On July 14, 2014, the court heard Defendants motion for discovery and
inspection.

13. On August 28, 2014, Petitioner filed an amended motion to set aside
indictment of information and motion for dismissal and requested that the case be
dismissed on the grounds that prosecutors had shown no probable cause to support
the prosecution, had no evidence in their possession that would support the
prosecution, and that prosecutors had been provided exculpatory evidence that

16 Cause No. 2103-CI-14927, Bexar County District Court, San Antonio, Texas. In her order,
Nellermoe gave Petitioner 2 hours to remove property worth thousands of dollars, including an
entire bookstore and an entire law library. Nellermoe denied Petitioners ex parte request to allow
inventory, but then refused to sign her own order denying that relief.
17 Even if Judge Nellermoes order evicting Petitioner was not void on its face, Combs; theft of nearly
all of Petitioners personal property is still a violation of state criminal property laws.
18 Exhibit E: SAPD 13252834, November 16, 2013.
19 Exhibit F: Video-recording of November 16, 2013 assault incident.
20 Exhibit G: Carlson Forensic Report, June 4, 2014.

showed that Kristina Combs had, in fact, attacked Petitioner to cover up criminal
activity, documented by Petitioner. The Court denied Petitioners request to set
aside information and motion for dismissal. Petitioner made a timely objection to
the courts denial of her motion to dismiss. However, the Court did not rule on the
objection. Petitioner objects and excepts to the courts failure/refusal to rule on
Petitioners objections.

VI. PRESERVATION OF PETITIONERS OBJECTIONS

In accordance with Texas Appellate Rule of Procedure Rule 33.1(2)(B),
Petitioner now OBJECTS and EXCEPTS to any and all refusals/failures of the court to
rule on Petitioners objections in pretrial hearings.

1.
During the September 29, 2014 dismissal/set aside hearing, the Court did
not allow Petitioner to show exculpatory video evidence during the proceeding.
Petitioner objected, but the Court failed to rule on Petitioners objection. Petitioner
OBJECTS and EXCEPTS to the judges refusal to rule on her objection to the judges
ruling to not allow Petitioner to show video evidence in her motion for dismissal/set
aside
2.
During the September 29, 2014 dismissal/set aside hearing, the Court limited
Petitioners arguments to 15 minutes. Petitioner objected, but the Court failed to
rule on Petitioner s objection. Petitioner OBJECTS and Excepts to the judges refusal
to rule on her objection to the judges limiting her argument to 15 minutes during
the dismissal/set aside hearing.

3.
During the September 29, 2014 dismissal/set aside hearing, the Court did not
require the State to show probable cause for the continued prosecution of
Petitioner. Petitioner objected, but the Court failed to rule on the objection.
Petitioner objects and excepts to the judges refusal to order the STATE to show
probable cause during the dismissal/set aside hearing.

4.
During the September 29, 2014 dismissal/set aside hearing, Petitioner
objects to the judges refusal to allow testimonial evidence. Petitioner objected, but
the Court failed to rule on the objection. Petitioner objects to the judges refusal to
rule on Petitioners objection to the courts refusal to allow testimonial evidence
during the September 29, 2014 dismissal/set aside hearing.

5.
During the September 29, 2014 dismissal/set aside hearing, Petitioner
objected to the validity of the charging instrument against Petitioner because it was
not notarized, verified or certified, and the name of the issuer was illegible. The
Court failed to rule on the objection. Petitioner objects and excepts to the judges
refusal to rule on Petitioners Objections related to the invalidity of the charging
instrument.

6.
Defendant objects to the courts refusal to rule on Petitioners object to the
courts ruling that prosecutors provide all relevant discovery only 30 days before
trial and asserts that order is a violation of the Brady and Morton Acts, and abuse of
discretion.
7.
Generally, Petitioner objects to the Courts refusal to provide Petitioner with
an evidentiary hearing so that probable cause might be established.
8.
Petitioner interprets all of the judges noted responses to her objection as a
refusal to rule on the objection and objects and excepts to those refusals to make a
ruling.

VII. GROUNDS

1.
Ground 1: State has failed to return a valid charging instrument in the
statutory time limit.

Petitioner has been held to criminal bond in Bexar County for nearly two
years on the authority of a facially invalid charging instrument. The information and
the attached complaint are fatally defective, because they do not meet the requisites
of valid charging instruments.

A.
The Information does not adequately allege reckless or criminally
negligent acts.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 21.15. requires that whenever recklessness or
criminal negligence enters into or is a part or element of any offense, or it is charged
that the accused acted recklessly or with criminal negligence in the commission of
an offense, the complaint, information, or indictment in order to be sufficient in any
such case must allege, with reasonable certainty, the act or acts relied upon to
constitute recklessness or criminal negligence, and in no event shall it be sufficient
to allege merely that the accused, in committing the offense, acted recklessly or with
criminal negligence.
In this case, the information fails to allege with reasonable certainty the acts
relied upon to constitute recklessness, an essential element of the offense. 21
According to the Texas Penal Code, an act is defined as a bodily movement,
whether voluntary or involuntary.22 A person acts recklessly, or is reckless with
respect to the circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when
he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur.23 The information and complaint alleged
no facts or circumstances surrounding the alleged act that would show that the
alleged act was done in a reckless manner. The failure to allege an element of an
offense in an information or indictment is a defect of substance.24

21 Smith v. State, 309 S.W. 3d 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
22 Tex. Penal Code Ann. Art. 1.07(a)(10)(Vernon 2003).
23 Ibid. Art.6.03(c) (Vernon) 2003.
24 Studer v. State, 799 SW 2d 263(Tex. Crim. App. 1990).

An instrument which does not contain every essential element of an offense

does not charge the commission of an offense and therefore is not a charging
instrument under the constitution and does not invest the trial court with
jurisdiction.25 Because there is no valid information filed in this case, and the time
to file a valid charging instrument has expired, the immediate release of Petitioner is
required by operation of law. Petitioner moves to dismiss this cause and release
Petitioner from all restraint.

B. The document accompanying the information fails to meet the standard of a valid
affidavit.

CCP Article 21.22 makes clear that no information shall be presented until
affidavit has been made by some credible person charging the defendant with an
offense. The affidavit shall be filed with the information. It may be sworn to before
the district or county attorney who, for that purpose, shall have power to administer
the oath, or it may be made before any officer authorized by law to administer
oaths. The affidavit in this case does not even meet the standards of an unsworn
affidavit pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 132.001.

(a) Except as provided by Subsection (b), an unsworn declaration may be
used in lieu of a written sworn declaration, verification, certification, oath, or
affidavit required by statute or required by a rule, order, or requirement
adopted as provided by law.
(b) This section does not apply to a lien required to be filed with a county clerk,
an instrument concerning real or personal property required to be filed with a
county clerk, or an oath of office or an oath required to be taken before a
specified official other than a notary public.
(c) An unsworn declaration made under this section must be:
(1) in writing; and
(2) subscribed by the person making the declaration as true under penalty of
perjury.

The complaint fails both the standard of an affidavit and unsworn
declaration. There is no certification, verification or seal, no credible person
identified, and no evidence that the unidentified person making the allegations has
any personal knowledge of the facts behind the charge. A copy of the Clerks Original
Complaint and Information are hereby attached as Exhibits H and I26, respectively,
and hereby incorporated by reference.27 Because the document filed as an affidavit
in this case fails to meet the standard of an affidavit, oath or unsworn declaration
and fails both standards of statute and rule, it is void. And without a valid affidavit
attached pursuant to CCP Art. 21.22, no valid information has been presented in this
case.28


25 Murk v. State, 775 SW2d 415 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989).
26 Exhibit I: Information
27 Exhibit H: Clerks Original Complaint, Magistrate Case No. 1604556.

28 Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 32.01.

10

 When a defendant has been detained in custody or held to bail for his
appearance to answer any criminal accusation, the prosecution, unless
otherwise ordered by the court, for good cause shown, supported by
affidavit, shall be dismissed and the bail discharged, if indictment or
information be not presented against such defendant on or before the last
day of the next term of the court which is held after his commitment or
admission to bail or on or before the 180th day after the date of
commitment or admission to bail, whichever date is later.29

By operation of law, article 32.01 prevents citizens from being left in jail or
on bail for long periods of time without being indicted. Ex parte Martin, 6 S.W.3d
524, 529 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). The statute gives a person held in custody without
indictment a means to obtain his release, because the statute requires the State to
indict within the period set by article 32.01, show good cause for the delay, or
suffer the dismissal of the charges.30 Id.
Since there is no valid charging instrument on file, and the time period for
filing a valid charging instrument has expired, Petitioner must be released
immediately by operation of law. Petitioner seeks immediate release from bond on
the ground that the charging instruments in Cause No. 443420 are invalid, pursuant
to Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 32.01.

2. Ground 2: No probable cause to believe Petitioner is guilty of the charged
offense.
Under Texas law, the prosecutor has substantial discretion in determining
whether to prosecute and, if so, the nature of the charges to bring IF, and only if,
the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed a statutory
offense. 31 Criminal prosecutions are supposed to be brought in good faith. Even at
this late stage, prosecutors have no probable cause to believe that the Petitioner is
guilty of an offense.32
Under constitutional law, the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial
determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty
following arrest.33 A state ... must provide a fair and reliable determination of
probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restrain of liberty and this
determination must be made by a judicial officer either before or promptly after
arrest.34 This courts refusal to require prosecutors to show probable cause for the
prosecution of Petitioner has substantially degraded Petitioners constitutional
rights to due process.

29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.

31 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (after Petitioner declined a plea bargain

agreement, the State also charged him as a recidivist).

32 Art. 11.46. IF PROOF SHOWS OFFENSE. Where, upon an examination under habeas corpus, it
appears to the court or judge that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been
committed by the prisoner, he shall not be discharged, but shall be committed or admitted to bail.
Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722.
33 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) U.S. Supreme Crt.
34 Ibid.

11


A. Video record of incident constitutes material proof of actual innocence.

The evidence in custody of prosecutors shows that no probable cause exists
for the continued prosecution of Petitioner and, importantly, that the absence of
probable cause is incurable. In early 2014, Plaintiff provided to prosecutor Matthew
Ludowig a DVD containing a copy of the video recording she recorded on November
16, 2013. That digital evidence, alone and in conjunction with other evidence
available to prosecutors, provides ample and unassailable proof of Petitioners
actual innocence.
First, prosecutors needed only to compare the actions and events on the
video (Exhibit F) with the November 16, 2103 police report (Exhibit E) to see that
Combs made material misrepresentations to the arresting officers. Two wit:
According to the police report, Combs told police that Petitioner entered the
property aggressively demanding to retrieve items from the building and then
struck Combs when she was told to leave. The video soundly discredits those
allegations.
Secondly, the video shows Combs in the actual commission of a crime:
stealing boxes of books belonging to Petitioner. The video record also reveals that
Petitioners frame of mind and intent was to record the theft of her personal items.
Indeed, the eventual thefts of thousands of books and tens of thousands of dollars
worth of other items would have been illegal even if Combs had not filed fraudulent
quitclaim deeds in court. In any other county in the United States, that crime,
captured on video, would have resulted in the arrest and prosecution of Combs.
Third, , the video shows Combs leaving the place she was standing and
approaching Petitioner, and shows that Petitioner was stationary when Combs
struck her. It also captured the aggression in Combs voice at the moment she struck
Petitioner and captures Petitioner saying okay to Combs demand that Petitioner
get off the property. [@00:35].
The video depicts several facts that are indisputable: 1), that Kristina Combs
material misrepresented the circumstances to police; 2), that Combs approached a
stationary petitioner [@00:33-00:35,], 3), that Combs and others aggressively
pursued a retreating Petitioner [@00:40], 4) that Combs viciously kicked
Petitioners car when Petitioner gained safety [@00:58], 5) that Combs and her
companions kidnapped Petitioner by surrounding her car, 6) that Combs illegally
parked her vehicle in the middle of a busy commercial street, and significantly, 7)
Combs face shows no sign of bruising, reddening, cuts or abrasion after the
encounter, a stark contrast to the bloodied photo she later supplied to prosecutors
[@01:07]. The evidence shows a criminal mind, desperate to distract authorities
from the litany of serious criminal offenses she has been racking up. These are the
circumstances that prosecutors have failed to acknowledge as they pursue a
criminal charge in the absence of all probable cause to support it.

B. Photographic proof of injured hand buttresses video evidence.

12

Petitioner also showed prosecutor Matthew Ludowig photos of the bloody

gouge Combs made on Petitioners left hand when Combs struck Petitioner in an
effort to dislodge the recording device. A copy of that image is attached as Exhibit
J.35

Ground 3: Prosecution is effort to gain unfair advantage of Petitioner

Petitioner asserts that this prosecution is being maintained in the absence of
probable cause for one reason only: To gain an unfair advantage over the Petitioner,
a journalist and civil rights advocate who has documented widespread corruption
and criminality on the part of Bexar County judicial officers and officers of the court
for the past five years. The verified Arteaga letter, attached as Exhibit, outlines just a
portion of the official oppression Petitioner has suffered at the hands of judicial
officers, officers of the court, and others. This official oppression includes multiple
false arrests, the illegal seizure of Petitioners material assets, improper fines,
adverse judgments not supported by law, death threats, cyber hacking. The State
has a duty to seek the truth in its investigation of crime, and where its investigative
procedures are so seriously flawed that they undermine confidence in the verdict,
the accuseds right to due process has been violated.36 Here, the refusal of the
prosecutors to investigate Combs claims and their refusal to countenance the
preponderance of evidence pointing to Petitioners actual innocence clearly is
calculated to assist Combs and her con-conspirators, whose crimes are already well
documented. This prosecution, rife with due process violations and prosecutorial
misconduct, is part and parcel related to the official oppression and cover up that is
calculated to prejudice Petitioner and is therefore a denial of due process of law.37
Finally, official oppression is a penal offense under Texas law.

PRAYER

Petitioner prays that she be released immediately from custody, that the
charges against her be dropped and that she be afforded any and all relief to which
she may be justly entitled.

Respectfully submitted:

_________________________________
Denise McVea
1006 Wyoming Street
San Antonio, Texas 78203
(210)460-0104



35 Exhibit J: copy of photo of gouged hand, mark on car where Combs kicked it.
36 Ex parte Bradley, 781 SW 2d 886 Tex: Crt. Crim. App. 1989.
37 Reid v. State, 560 SW 2d 99- Tex: Crt. Crim. App. 1978.

13




















CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
instrument was hand-delivered to the Bexar County District Attorneys office on
October 16, 2015.


Elizabeth Martinez or first chair in open court.


Signed:


_________________________________
Denise McVea
1006 Wyoming Street
San Antonio, Texas 78203
(210)460-0104

14