TABLE OF CONTENTS

Case
Numb
er
Case Name
1 Lara v. Del Rosario, 94 Phil. 778
2 Tanada v. Tuvera 136 S 27 and 146 S 446
Nagkakaisang Maralita v. Military Shrine Services, 5
3 June 2013
4 Yao Kee v. Sy Gonzales, 167 S 736
5 Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa, 197 S 853
6 Aruego, Jr. v. CA, 254 S 711
7 Bernabe v. Alejo, 21 January 2002
8 Guy v. CA, 502 S 151
9 Ting v. Ting, 31 March 2009
10 Ayala Corp v. Rosa Diana Realty, 1 December 2000
11 Pp. v. Veneracion, 249 S 251
12 Roldan Jr. v. Madrona, 4 September 2002
13 Phil. Rabiit Bus Lines v. Arciaga, 148 S 438
14 Ursua v. CA, 10 April 1996
15 CIR v. Primetown, 28 August 2007
16 Labad v. University of Southern Phil, 9 August 2001
17 CIR v. Primetown, 28 August 2007
18 Recio v. Recio, 2 October 2001
19 Llorente v. CA, 23 November 2000
20 Van Dorn v. Romillo, 139 S 139
21 Aznar v. Garcia, 7 S 95
22 Bellis v. Bellis, 20 S 358
23 PCIB v. Escolin, 56 S 266
24 American Airlines v. Court of Appeals, 9 March 2000
25 Go v. Cordero, 4 May 2010
26 Villanueva v Rosqueta, 19 January 2010
27 Cruz v NLRC, 7 February 2000
28 Globe McKay v Barrios, 119 S 461
29 RCPI v CA, 143 S 657
30 UE v Jader, 17 February 2000
31 Hotel Nikko v Reyes 452 S 532
32 Hermosisima v CA 109 P 629
33 Galang v CA 4 S 55
34 Gashem Shookat Baksh v CA 219 S 115
35 Wassmer v Velez 12 S 648
36 Land Bank of the Philippines v Ong 24 November 2010
37 Concepcion v CA, 31 January 2000
38 Amonoy v Spouses Gutierrez, 15 February 2001
39 Guaring v CA, 269 S 283

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83

Manantan v CA, 29 January 2001

Bonite v Zosa, 162 S 173
Cojuangco v CA, 2 July 1999
Alcuaz v PSBA, 161 S 7
Non v Dames, 185 S 523
Arafiles v Philippine Journalists, 25 March 2004
International Flavors v Argos, 10 September 2001
Marcia v CA, 120 S 7
Ruiz v Ucol, 153 S 14
Barredo v Garcia, 73 P 607
Capili v People, 3 July 2013
Beltran v People, 20 June 2000
Diaz v Merced, 109 P 155
Continental Steel v Montano, 13 October 2009
Geluz v CA, 2 S 801
Catalan v Basa, 31 July 2007
Pp v Bayotas, 236 S 239
Marcos v COMELEC, 248 S 300
Reyes v COMELE, 25 June 2013
RP v Albios, 16 October 2013
Espinosa v Omana, 12 October 2011
Estrada v Escritor 408 S 1
Ancheta v Ancheta, 4 March 2004
Pp v Borromeo, 133 S 106
Abadilla v Tabiliran, 249 S 447
Dela Rosa v Heirs, 480 S 334
Garcia vda De Chua v CA, 5 March 1998
Eugenio v Velez, 185 S 425
Silverio v. Republic, 22 October 2007
RP v Cagandahan, 12 September 2008
Obergefell v Hodges, 26 June 2015 (576 US 2015)
Donato v Luna, 160 S 14
Weigel v Sempio Diy, 143 S 499
Atienza v Brillantes, 29 March 1995
Beso v Judge Daguman, 28 January 2000
Alcantara v Alcantara, 28 August 2007
Sevilla v Cardenas, 494 S 1
Aranes v Occiano, 380 S 402
Vda De Jacob v CA, 312 S 772
Trinidad v Trinidad, 20 April 1998
Republic v CA, 2 September 1994
Carino v Carino, 351 S 127
Morigo v People, 422 S 376
Moreno v Bernabe, 14 July 1995

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118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127

Navarro v Dumagtoy, 259 S 129

Fujiki v Marinay, 26 June 2013
Tenchavez v Escano, 15S 355
RP v Iyoy, 21 September 2005
Pilapil v Ibay-Somera, 30 June 1989
Quita v CA, 300 S 406
San Luis v San Luis, 514 S 294
Corpuz v Sto Tomas and the Solicitor General, 11
August 2010
RP v Orbecido III, 427 S 114
Bangayan v Bangayan, 3 July 2014
Abbas v Abbas, 30 July 2013
Mallion v Alcantara, 31 October 2006
Cojuancgco Sr v Palma, 438 S 306
Republic v CA, 236 S 257
Sy v CA, 330 S 550
Manzano v Sanchez, 354 S 1
Ninal v Bayadog, 14 March 2000
De Castro v De Castro, 13 February 2008
RP v Dayot, 28 March 2008
Cosca v Palaypayon, 237 S 249
Perez v Catindig, 10 March 2015
Nollora v People, 9 December 2011
Pp v Odtuhan, 17 July 2013
Macarrrubo v Macarrubo, 27 February 2004
Mijares v Villa Luz, 274 S 1
Wiegel v Sempio Diy, 143 S 499
Balabog v Balabog, 7 March 1997
Jarillo v People, 29 September 2009
Tamano v Ortiz, 29 June 1998
Republic v CA, 477 S 277
Republic v Bernudes, 299 S 57
Republic v Nolasco, 17 March 1993
Valdez v Republic, 8 September 2009
Bienvenido v CA, 237 S 676
Manuel v People, 476 S 461
Calisterio v Calisterio, 330 S 201
Carino v Carino, 2 February 2001
Mercado v Tan, 1 August 2000
Domingo v CA, 226 S 572
Chi Ming Tsoi v CA and Lao, 266 S 324
Santos v CA, 240 S 20
Republic v CA and Olaviano, 268 S 198
Barcelona v CA, 412 S 41
Tongol v Tongol, 537 S 135

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171

Kalaw v Fernandez, 14 January 2015

RP v Encelan, 9 January 2013
RP v CA, 12 November 2012
Mendoza v RP, 12 November 2012
Ochosa v Alano and RP, 26 January 2011
Yambao v Repulic, 24 January 2011
Marable v Marable, 17 January 2011
Agraviador v Agraviador, 8 December 2010
Ligeralde v Patalinghug et al, 15 April 2010
Reyes v Reyes, 18 August 2010
Toring v Toring and RP, 3 August 2010
Suazo v Suazo and RP, 12 March 2010
Azcueta v Republic, 588 S 196
Alcazar v Alcazar, 13 October 2009
Aspillaga v Aspillaga, 26 October 2009
Najera v Najera, 3 July 2009
Te v Te, 13 February 2009
Paras v Paras, August 2, 2007
Zamora v CA, 7 February 2007
Ferraris v Ferraris, 495 S 396
Antonio v Reyes, 10 March 2006
Siayngco v Siayngco, 4 October 2004
Villalon v Villalon, 475 S 572
Buenaventura v CA, 454 S 261
RP v Hamano, 428 S 735
Dedel v CA, 29 January 2004
Republic v Dagdag, 351 S 425
Pesca v Pesca, 17 April 2001
Marcos v Marcos, 19 October 2000
Enrico v Heirs, 534 S 418
Catalan v CA, 6 February 2007
Ablaza v Republic, 11 August 2010
Carlos v Sandoval, 16 December 2008
Maquilan v Maquilan, 8 June 2007
RP v Cuison-Melgar, 486 S 177
Corpus v Ochotrenta, 435 S 446
Macias v Macias, 410 S 365
Sin v Sin, 355 S 285
Tuason v CA and Tuason, 256 S 158
Pacete v Carriaga, 17 March 1994
Silva v CA, 275 S 604
Montanez v Cipriano, 22 October 2012
Teves v People, 24 August 2011
Jarillo v People, 28 June 2010

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215

Valdez v Vales, 31 July 1996

Villanueva v CA, 27 October 2006
Anaya v Palaroan, 36 S 97
Buccat v Buccat, 72 P 19
Pp v Santiago, 51 P 68
Reyes v Zaballero, 89 P 39
Jimenez v Republic, 109 P 274
Calderon v Roxas, 9 January 2013
Ong v Ong, 505 S 76
Banez v Banez, 374 S 340
Gaudionco v Penaranda, 27 November 1987
Prima Partosa-Jo v CA, 216 S 692
Arroyo v CA, 19 November 1991
Ginez v Bugayong, 100 P 616
People v Zapata and Bondoc, 16 Maay 1951
Ocampo v Florenciano, 23 February 1960
Matubis v Parexedes, 109 P 789
Pp v Schneckenberger, 73 P 413
Pp v Sansano, 59 P 73
Benedicto v Dela Rama, 3 P 34
Brown v Yambao, 102 P 168
Contreras v Macaraig, 33 S 222
Araneta v Concepcion, 99 P 708
Somosa-Ramos v Vamerita, 46 S 110
Sabalones v CA, 14 Februaru 1994
Espriritu v Layug v CA, 15 March 1995
Lapuz Sy v Eufemio, 43 S 177
Laperal v Republic, 6 S 357
Siochi v Gozon, 18 March 2010
Pp v Jumawan, 21 April 2014
Imbong v Ochoa, 8 April 2014
Ilusorio v Ilusorio, 12 May 2000
Arroyo v Vasquez-Arroyo, 42 P 54
Goitia v Campos Rueda, 35 P 252
Cuenca v Cuenca, 8 December 1988
Go v CA, 272 S 752
Valino v Adriano, 22 April 2014
Chan v Chan, 24 July 2013
Arcaba v Vda, De Batocael, 370 S 414
Matabuena v Cervantes, 38 S 284
Grecio v Sun Life, 48 P 53
Harding v Commercial Union, 38 P 464
Imani v Metrobank, 17 November 2010
Navarro v Judge Escobido and Go, 27 November 2009

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Villanueva v CA, 427 S 439

Ching v CA, 423 S 371
Tan v CA, 273 S 229
Ros and Aguete v PNB Laoag, 6 April 2011
Cheesman v IAC, 21 January 1991
Matthews v Taylor, 22 June 2009
Aggabao v Parulan, 1 September 2010
Fuentes et al v Roca et al, 21 April 2010
Sps De Leon et al v De Leon et al, 23 July 2009
Sps Bautista v Silva, 502 S 334
Homeowners' Savings and Loan v Dallo, 453 S 283
Abalos v Macatangay, 439 S 649
Roxas v CA, 26 June 1991
Nicolas v CA, 154 S 635
Muller v Muller, 500 S 65
Beumer v Amores, 3 December 2012
Cruz v Cristobal, 498 S 37
Go v Yamane, 489 S 107
Oligario v CA, 238 S 96
Nable-Jose v Nable-Jose, 41 P 713
Luna v Linatoc, 74 P 15
Wong v CA, 19 August 1991
De Ocampo v Delizo, 69 S 216
Vda De Consuegra v GSIS, 37 S 315
Salvador v CA, 243 S 239
Sarmiento v Ordones, 17 August 1987
Villanueva v IAC, 192 S 21
Manotok Realty v CA, 30 April 1987
Ong v CA, 29 November 1991
Ravina v Avrille, 16 October 2009
Titan Consturction Corp v David, 15 March 2010
Castro v Miat, 397S 271
Francisco v CA, 25 November 1998
Diaz v CA, 10 November 1986
Ayala Instruments v CA, 12 February 1998
Domingo v Reed, 477 S 227
Enbrodo v CA, 233 S 755
Carlos v Abelardo, 9 April 2002
BA Finance v CA, 28 May 1988
Johnson and Johnson v CA, 23 September 1996
Bautista v Silva, 502 S 334
Alfredo v Borras, 404 S 145
Jardeleza v Jardeleza, 347 S 10
Guiang v CA, 26 June 1998

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Uy v CA, 346 S 246

Relucio v Lopez, 16 January 2002
Heirs of Reyes v Mijares, 410 S 97
Perez v CA, 255 S 238
In re Bernas, 14 S 327
Lacson v Lacson, 24 S 837
Maxey v CA, 129 S 187
Valdes v RTC,31 July 1996
Dino v Dino, 19 January 2011
Gonzales v Gonzales, 478 S 327
Flora v Pardo, 420 S 396
Mercado v Fehr, 414 S 288
Tumlos v Fernandez, 330 S 718
Malang v Moson, 338 S 393
Metrobank v Pascual, 547 S 246
Francisco v Master Ironworks, 451 S 494
Frenzel v Catito, 11 July 2003
Joaquino v Reyes, 434 S 260
Mallilin Jr v Castillo, 333 S 628
Saguid v CA, 10 June 2003
Juaniza v Jose, 89 S 306
Adriano v CA, 27 March 2000
Trinidad-Ramos v Pangilinan, 20 July 2010
Modequillo v Breva, 31 May 1990
Sps Fortaleza v Sps Lapitan, 15 August 2012
Equitable PCI v OJ-Mark Trading Inc and SPS Martinez,
11 August 2010
Josef v Santos, 27 Nobember 2008
Kelly v Planters' Products, 9 July 2008
Gomez v Sta. Ines, 473 S 25
Manacop v CA, 11 August 1997
Taneo v CA, 304 S 308
Guerrero v RTC, 229 S 274
Scavias v CA, 273 S 803
Hiyas Savings v Acuna, 500 S 514
Martinez v Martinez, 461 S 562
Hontiveros v RTC of Iloilo City, 309S 340
Vda De Manalo v CA, 16 January 2011
Uy v Chua, 18 September 2009
Santos v CA, 475 S 1
Mendoza v CA, 19 S 756
Versoza v Versoza, 27 November 1968
De Asis v CA, 303 S 176
Fernandez v Fernandez, 363 S 811
Concepcion v CA, 468 S 438

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Angeles v Maglaya, 469 S 363

Jao v CA, 152 S 359
Andal v Macaraig, 89 P 165
Babiera v Catotal, 333 S 487
Benitez-Badua v CA, 229 S 468
Liyao v Tanhoti-Liyao, 7 March 2002
Estate of Juan Dizon v CA, 366 S 499
Tijing v CA, 8 March 2001
Go Kim Huy v Go Kim Huy, 365 S 490
Tecson v COMELEC, 3 March 2004
In Re: Julian Lim Wang, 30 March 2005
Tayag v Tayag-Gailor, 549 S 68
Verceles v Posada, 522 S 518
Rodriguez v Lim, 509 S 68
Cabatania v Regodos, 411 S 96
Eceta v Eceta, 428 S 782
Alberto v CA, 232 S 745
De Jesus v Estate of Dizon, 2 October 2001
Aparicho v Parugaya
Gotardo v Buling, 15 August 2012
Rivero v CA, 458 S 715
Pp v Abella, 6 January 2010
People v Bayani, 8 October 1996
People v Manahan, 29 September 1999
Nepomuceno v Lopez, 18 March 2010
Rivera v Heirs, 496 S 135
Cabatania v CA, 441 S 96
Lagabala v Santiago, 4 December 2001
Locsin v Locsin, 10 December 2001
Ilano v CA, 230 S 242
Fernandez v CA, 230 S 130
Rodriguez v CA, 245 S 150
Jison v Jison, 24 February 1998
Pe Lim v CA, 270 S 1
Agustin v CA, 460 S 315
Herrera v Alba, 460 S 197
Pp v Vallejo, 9 May 2002
Pp v Yatar, 428 S 504
Reyes v Mauricio, 24 November 2010
Estate of Ong v Diaz, 540 S 480
Briones v Miguel, 440 S 455
Marquino v IAC, 27 June 1994
Tayag v CA, 209 S 665
Republic v Abadilla, 29 January 1999

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Dela Cruz v Garcia, 31 July 2009

Verceles v Posadas, 522 S 518
In Re: Adoption of Stephanie Garcia, 454 S 541
Pp v Glabo, 371 S 567
Mangulabnan v IAC, 31 May 1990
Tonog v CA, 376 S 523
RP v Abadilla, 302 S 358
Mossesgeld v CA, 300 S 464
Silvia v CA, 275 S 604
David v CA, 250 S 82
De Santos v Angeles, 12 December 1995
Abadilla v Tabiliran, 249 S 448
Republc v Hughes, 26 October 1997
Republc v Toledano, 8 June 1994
Republic v Hernandez, 9 February 1996
Republic v CA, 15 March 1996
Republic v Dye, 20 March 1997
In Re: Michelle and Michael Lim, 21 May 2009
Landingin v Republic, 493 S 415
Cang v CA, 25 September 1998
DSWD v Belen, 275 S 645
Teotico v Del Val, 13 S 406
Lahom v Sibulo, 14 July 2003
Lim-Lua v Lua, 5 June 2013
Montefalcon v Vasquez, 17 June 2008
Lacson v Lacson, 499 S 677
Quisumbing v Icao, 34 S 132
Francisco v Zandueta, 61 P 752
Ruiz v CA, 29 January 1996
Sps Lim v Lim, 30 October 2009
Verceles v Posada, 27 April 2007
Mangonon v CA, 494 S 1
De Guzman v Perez, 496 S 474
Lam v Chua, 426 S 29
Reyes v Ines-Luciano, 28 February 1979
Santero v CFI, 14 September 1987
Bucal v Bucal, 17 June 2015
Beckett v Olegario, 30 January 2013
In Re: Thornton, 16 August 2004
Madrinan v Madrinan, 12 July 2007
Vancil v Belmes, 19 June 2001
Bondagjiy v Bondagjiy, 7 December 2001
Sayala v Islao, 266S 317
Dacasin v Dacasin, 5 February 2010

392 Gamboa-Hirsch v CA, 11 July 2007

393 Gualberto v Gualberto, 28 June 2005
394 Galancgo v CA, 22 December 1997
Espirity and Layug v CA and Masauding, 15 March
395 1995
396 Perez v CA, 255 S 661
397 Sagala-Eslao v CA and Cordero-Ouye, 16 January 1997
398 Quita v CA and Dandan, 22 December 1998
399 Santos v CA, 242 S 407
400 Libi v IAC, 18 September 1992
401 Tamargo v CA, 209 S 5180
402 Hebron v Loyola, 5 July 2010
403 Sombong v CA, 31 July 1996
404 Aquinas School v Sps Inton, 26 January 2011
405 St. Joseph College v Miranda, 29 June 2010
406 St. Mary's Academy v Carpitanos, 6 February 2002
407 Amadora v CA, 160 S 315
408 Salvosa v IAC, 5 October 1988
409 PSBA v CA, 4 February 1992
Remo v The Honorable Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 5
410 March 2010
411 Yasin v Sharia District Court, 23 February 1995
412 In Re: Julian Lin Wang, 30 March 2005
413 Naldoza v RP, 15 March 1982
414 RP v CA, 14 December 1988
415 Moore v RP, 26 June 1966
416 Pp v Joseph Estrada, 2 April 2009
417 Bienvenido v CA, 24 October 1994
418 Republic v Coseteng-Magpayo, 2 February 2-11
419 Silverio v Republic, 22 October 2007
420 Baldos v CA, 9 July 2010
421 Lee v CA, 11 October 2001

1. LARA V. DEL ROSARIO

G.R. No. L-6339
FACTS:
In 1950, defendant Petronilo Del Rosario, Jr., operated a taxi business under the name of Waval
Taxi. He employed three mechanics and 49 chauffeurs or drivers, the latter having worked for
periods ranging from 2 to 37 months.
On September 4, 1950, Del Rosario sold his 25 units or cabs to La Mallorca, a transportation
company. As as a result, the plaintiffs lost their jobs because La Mallorca failed to continue their
employment.
They brought this action against Del Rosario to recover compensation for overtime work
rendered beyond eight hours, on Sundays and legal holidays, as well as one month salary
(mesada) provided for in article 302 of the Code of Commerce because their former employer
failed to give them one month notice prior to his action. Subsequently, the three mechanics
unconditionally withdrew their claims. So only the 49 drivers remained as plaintiffs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the claim of the plaintiffs-appellants for overtime compensation under the EightHour Labor Law is valid.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court held that the month pay (mesada) under article 302 of the Code of
Commerce, has been repealed by Article 2270 by the new Civil Code. The repeal took place on
August 30, 1950, one year after the Civil Codes publication in the Official Gazette. Hence, the
compensation for the alleged termination of services of the plaintiffs dated September 4, 1950 is
no longer covered by Article 302 of the Code of Commerce; thus, the new Civil Code shall
apply.
Moreover, assuming that Article 302 of the Code of Commerce was still in force, particularly the
salary corresponding to said month, commonly known as mesada. Still, the plaintiffs, being paid
in a commission basis and have no fixed salary either by the day, week, or month, it would be
impossible for their fixed salary to be computed. Hence, Article 302 of the Code of Commerce
shall not apply as it only refers to employees receiving a fixed salary.

2. A. TANADA, ET AL. V. TUVERA, ET AL.

GR No. L-63915
FACTS:
Petitioners filed for a writ of mandamus to the Supreme Court, to compel the respondent public
officials to publish, and or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of several presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementation, and administrative orders. Petitioners invoke the Constitutional right to be
informed on matters of public concern, as well as the principle that laws, to be valid and
enforceable, must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated.
Respondents, through the Solicitor General, prayed for the dismissal of the case, arguing that the
petitioners have no legal standing to bring the instant petition before the court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication is needed before the presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation, and administrative
orders can take effect, despite the same providing for their own effectivity dates.
RULING:
Yes it is. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code which states that, Laws
shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. The provision does not preclude the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties
for their violation or otherwise impose a burden on the people, such as tax and revenue measures,
fall within this category. It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a
public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that
before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its
contents. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat."Thus, the Court ordered the respondents to publish in the
Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and
unless so published, the same shall have no binding force and effect.

2. B. TANADA, ET AL. V. TUVERA, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-63915
FACTS:
Petitioners are moving for the reconsideration/ clarification of the 1985 decision. They suggest
that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not;
that publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in
the Official Gazette. The OSG, in his comment, claimed that the motion was only for a request
for an advisory opinion, and that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the
Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative; that
publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case
the subject decision was concurred in only by three justices and consequently not binding. When
the February Revolution came, the court required the new OSG to file a rejoinder. Responding,
he submitted that issuances intended only for the internal administration of a government agency
or for particular persons did not have to be published; that publication when necessary must be in
full and in the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision under reconsideration was not
binding because it was not supported by eight members of this Court.
ISSUE:
What does the phrase unless otherwise provided refer to?
RULING:
The subject of contention is still Article 2 of the Civil Code. The clause "unless it is otherwise
provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which
cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law
effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that
the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. It is not correct to say that under the
disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission
would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are
supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon
its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after
publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and
they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply because they did not know
of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One
can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be
communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.
The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open
society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to
public cognizance. Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of
skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored

rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a
valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people.

3. NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA V. MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES

G. R. No. 187587
FACTS:
IN 1957, President Carlos Garcia issued Proclamation No. 423, reserving parcels of land in
Pasig, Taguig, Paraaque, Rizal, and Pasay City as a military reservation, more commonly
known as Fort Bonifacio.
In 1967, President Ferdinand Marcos amended Proclamation No. 423 and reserved a portion of
Fort Bonifacio for a national shrine. Today, this area is known as Libingan ng mga Bayani. In
1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476, further amending Proclamation No. 423
by excluding certain barangays in Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from
forming part of the military reservation. At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President
Marcos made a handwritten addendum, which read: P.S.This includes Western Bicutan
(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos. That same year, Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the
Official Gazette without the addendum.
In 1999, members of Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) filed a petition
with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) to convert the areas they were
occupying in Western Bicutan from public land to alienable land pursuant to Proclamation No.
2476. COSLAP granted the request, ruling that despite the lack of publication of the addendum,
the intention of President Marcos could not be defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of
others.
The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision of COSLAP. On appeal, the Supreme Court
(SC) sustained the CA. It ruled that the Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that was not
part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without publication, the note never had any legal
force and effect.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the hand written note has effect of law because of its non publication.
RULING: It was undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not included when
Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette. The SC, however, noted that the
issue of whether President Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan in Proclamation No.
2476 was not only irrelevant but speculative. Courts cannot speculate on the probable intent of
the legislature apart from the words appearing in the law.

Citing Taada v. Hon. Tuvera, the SC also reiterated that requirement of publication is
indispensable in order to give effect to the law, unless the law itself has otherwise provided. The
phrase unless otherwise provided refers to a different effectivity date other than after fifteen
days following the completion of the laws publication in the Official Gazette. Nevertheless, this
does not imply that the requirement of publication may be dispensed with

4. YAO KEE vs. SY GONZALES

G.R. No. L-55960
FACTS:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 leaving behind properties here in the
Philippines.Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a petition for the grant of letters of
administration alleging that they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego. The
petition was opposed by Yao Kee et al alleging that Yao Kee is the lawful wife of the deceased
whom he married in China. The trial court rendered decision in favor of the opposition. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, modifying the decision declaring the marriage
of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee as not has been proven valid in accordance with the laws of China. Hence,
both parties moved for reconsideration to which the Supreme Court granted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat is valid in accordance with Philippine laws.
RULING:
Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proven as any other fact. To establish the
validity of marriage, the existence of foreign law as a question of fact and the alleged marriage
must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.For failure to prove the foreign law or custom
and consequently of the marriage, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat in China cannot be
recognized in the jurisdiction of Philippine courts.

5. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS V. DELA ROSA

197 S 853
FACTS:
The board of special inquiry admitted the Gatchalians as Filipino citizens on July 6, 1961.
William Gatchalian was issued an identification certificate. The board of commissioners was
directed by the Secretary of Justice to Review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground
that the entrant was a Filipino citizen such included the case of William Gatchalian. As a result of
the decision of the board of special inquiry which recommended for the reversal of the decision
of the Board of Commissioners. Acting commissioner issued an order affirming the decision of
the Board of Special Inquiry.
The Commission on Immigration and Deportation ordered the arrest of William and was released
upon posting P200,000 cash bond on August 15, 1990. Thus on the 29thof the same month, he
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC of Manila. A motion to dismiss was
filed but denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not William Gatchalian is a Filipino citizen.
RULING:
William Gatchalian was declared as a Filipino Citizen. Having been declared the marriage as
valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father, a Filipino and as a
legitimate child. The respondent belongs to a class of Filipinos who are citizens of the
Philippines at the time of the adoption of the constitution.

6. ARUEGO V. CA
G.R. No. 112193
FACTS:
On March 7, 1983, a complaint for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional
rights was filed before RTC Manila by the minors Antonia Aruego and alleged the sister Evelyn
Aruego represented by their mother Luz Fabian. The complaint was opposed by the legitimate
children of Jose Aruego Jr. The complaint avers that the late Jose M. Aruego, Sr., a married man,
had an amorous relationship with Luz M. Fabian sometime in 1959 until his death on March 30,
1982. Out of this relationship were born Antonia F. Aruego and Evelyn F. Aruego on October 5,
1962 and September 3, 1963, respectively.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Antonia Aruego. A petition for certiorari was then filed
alleging that the trial court lost jurisdiction over the complaint on the ground of prescription.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition filed on March 7, 1983, or almost one (1) year after the death of the
presumed father on March 30, 1982, has clearly prescribed under the new rule as provided in the
Family Code and cannot be given retroactive effect
RULING:
The action brought by private respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition and
enforcement of successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the Family Code, must
be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family
Code. The present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned,
as its application will prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have her case decided
under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The right was vested to her by the fact that she filed her
action under the regime of the Civil Code. Prescinding from this, the conclusion then ought to be
that the action was not yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the putative
father was already deceased, since private respondent was then still a minor when it was filed, an
exception to the general rule provided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. Hence, the trial court,
which acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the complaint, never lost jurisdiction
over the same despite the passage of E.O. No. 209, also known as the Family Code of the
Philippines.
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.

8. MICHAEL C. GUY V. CA
G.R. No. 163707
FACTS:
On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei,
represented by their mother Remedios Oanes filed a petition for letters of administration before
the RTC of Makati City. Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged
illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati City on October 1992. He left an
estate valued at almost 10 million consisting of real and personal properties. His known heirs are
his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all
surnamed Guy.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition. Petitioner asserted that his deceased father left
no debts and that his estate can be settled without securing letters of administration. He further
argued that private respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children
during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code. Moreover, he
argued that the private respondent's claim had been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise
extinguished by reason of Remedios' Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for
the financial and educational assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor
children discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.
RTC and CA both denied the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether Remedios Release and Waiver Claim waives the successional rights of her daughters?
Whether the respondents are barred from filing and proving their filiation to Sima Wei?
RULING:
The Court DISMISSED the petition. As regards Remedios' Release and Waiver of Claim, the
same does not bar private respondents from claiming successional rights. The Release and
Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that
Remedios received an educational plan and financial assistance. The document does not
specifically mention private respondents' hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, thus it
cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights. Moreover, her children are still minors
and under Art. 1044 of the Civil Code, successional rights of minors can only be waived by
judicial authorization.
Moreover, in the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their
successional rights because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate
children of the deceased. A right cannot be waived unless such right is already vested. Since the
children are born under the regime of the Civil Code, Art. 285 has vested them the right to apply
for recognition as illegitimate children within 4 years after they reach the age majority.

9. TING V. TING
G.R. No. 166562
FACTS:
On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and, Carmen filed
a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City for the declaration of nullity of their marriage
based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological
incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became
manifest thereafter.
On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its decision declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Onates findings and the
admissions made by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found him to be
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. On October
19, 2000, the petitioner appealed to the CA, reversing the trial courts decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological incapacity
for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code has
been realized incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however,
only became manifest thereafter.
RULING:
No. By the very nature of case involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and
understood to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the
psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedent,
gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly
advisable, are not conditions in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best,
courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the
merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case presented before it,
must always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also
on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.
But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and
expert opinion of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a partys alleged
psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be presented and according, be
weighed by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage.
The petition for review on certiorari is granted.
10. AYALA CORP. V. ROSA DIANA REALTY

G.R. No. 134284

FACTS:
Petitioner Ayala Corporation was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Alfaro
Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City. On April 20, 1976, Ayala Corporation sold the lot to Manuel
Sy who is married to Vilma Po and Sy Ka Kieng who is married to Rosa Chan. The Deed of Sale
executed between Ayala Corporation and the buyers contained Special Conditions of Sale and
Deed Restrictions. The Special Conditions of Sale were: a) the vendees shall build on the lot and
submit the building plans to the vendor before September 30, 1976 for the latters approval b) the
construction of the building shall start on or before March 30, 1977 and completed before 1979.
Before such completion, neither the deed of sale shall be registered nor the title released even if
the purchase price shall have been fully paid and c) there shall be no resale of the property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of restriction can be enforced by Ayala Corporation.
RULING:
Contractual obligations between parties have the force of law between them and absent any
allegation that the same are contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy,
they must be complied with in good faith. The party guilty of violating the deed of restrictions
may only be held alternatively liable for substitute performance of its obligation, that is, for the
payment of damages.

11. PEOPLE V. VENERACION

G.R. No. 119987-88
FACTS: On August 2, 1994, respondent Lorenzo P. Veneracion, the presiding Judge of the RTC
of National Capital Judicial Region, refused to impose death penalty to the four accused that
were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide of a seven year old girl.
Instead of death penalty, he imposed a reclusion perpetua to each of the accused. The city
prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration praying that the penalty of death be imposed upon
the four accused. The respondent judge refused to act.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 9 of the Civil Code of the Philippines has been violated by the
respondent judge for imposing penalty lower than that prescribed by law.
RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should
impose the proper penalty provided for by the law on the accused regardless of his own religious
or moral beliefs. In this case the respondent judge must impose the death penalty. This is
consistent in the rule laid down in the Civil Code Article 9 that no judge or court shall decline to
render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws

12. ROLDAN V. MADRONA

G.R. No. 152989
FACTS:
Petitioner, the owner of a parcel of land, applied for a Private Land Timber Permit (PLTP) from
the DENR, for him to cut some trees for a proposed road and poultry farm in his property. While
his permit was being processed, petitioner proceeded with cutting said trees and using the cut
logs to build his chicken cages. Following this, representatives from CENRO of the DENR and
personnel from the ISAFP of Tacloban City raided petitioners place, allegedly without a search
warrant, and conducted inventory of the cut trees, then entrusted the cut trees to a kagawad.
When a warrant was issued, the CENRO group and ISAFP returned and confiscated a number of
sawn lumber/flitches and felled timber logs. A complaint was then filed by CENRO to the City
Prosecutor of Ormoc for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, the latter issuing a resolution, finding
probable cause to convict petitioner. An information was filed and jurisdiction was transferred to
the RTC. Petitioner was issued a warrant of arrest but he filed a motion for judicial determination
of probable cause and the recall of his warrant of arrest. This motion was denied but the bail of
the petitioner was reduced. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is valid for the penalty for qualified theft to be applied under Section 68 of PD
705.
RULING:
Yes, it is valid. Under Sec 68 of PD 705, or the Revised Forestry Code, Any person who shall
cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber
or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC
What is being mentioned with regards to Articles 309 and 310 are the penalties imposed, and
not the act of qualified theft itself. It must be stressed that petitioner is not being charged for
qualified theft but for violation of Section 68, PD 705, and that the penalty imposed for the
violation of the same shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310.
Although petitioner believes his penalty should not be equated to the penalty of qualified theft,
the judiciary is never concerned with the wisdom of the law since it is a settled rule that the
fundamental duty of the Court is to apply the law regardless of who may be affected, even if the
law is harsh - dura lex sed lex. Thus, the petition was denied.

13. PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES V. ARCIAGA

148 S 438
FACTS:
On August 24, 1960, Taurino Singson, a paying passenger on board a bus belonging to the
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines Inc., sustained multiple serious physical injuries when the said bus
crashed thus he filed a complaint for contractual tort. The defendant interposed the defense that
the collision was due to a fortuitous event. At a scheduled trial on April 29, 1967, after previous
postponements, only the defendant appeared and upon motion of its counsel, the Court dismissed
the case for non-appearance of plaintiff. The plaintiffs counsel through Miss May Altuna
received the order of dismissal on May 6, 1967. On July 6, 1967, plaintiff filed a Petition for
Relief accompanied by an affidavit of said plaintiff indicating the reason of his non-appearance.
The lower court granted the petition. After the motion for reconsideration filed by the
defendants counsel was denied, the defendant filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals but said petition was later denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the 60-day period provided in Sec. 38
of the Rules of Court is mandatory and non-extendible and that the said court erred in applying
the ruled of equity in the case at bar.
RULING:
The Court of Appeals has erred with regards to the issue under consideration. Section 3 of the
Rules of Court clearly states that a petition provide for in either of the preceding sections of this
rule must be verified, filed within sixty days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, order or
other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six months after such judgment or order was
entered or said proceeding was taken. It is undisputed that the Petition for Relief in the case
was filed 61 days from receipt of the notice of dismissal or one day late. Furthermore, there
being an express provision of law under which the remedy can be invoked, equity as a ground
for the reopening of the case cannot be invoked by the private respondent. The rule is, equity
follows the law: the meaning of the principle is stated as follows: There are instances, indeed
in which a court of equity gives a remedy, where the law gives none; but where a particular
remedy is given by the law, and that remedy is bounded and circumscribed by particular rules, it
would be very improper for the court to take it up where the law leaves it and to extend it further
than the law allows.

14. URSUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 112170

FACTS:
Petitioner Cesario Ursua was convicted for violation of Sec. 1 of CA No. 142, as amended by RA
6085 otherwise known as An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases by the RTC of Davao City
which was affirmed by the CA. Allegedly petitioner when asked by his counsel to take his letter
of request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firms messenger Oscar Perez had
personal matters to attend to, instead of writing his name wrote the name Oscar Perez when he
was requested to sign. However, Loida Kahulugan who gave him the copy of complaint was able
to know through Josefa Amparo that petitioner is not Oscar Perez. Loida reported the matter to
the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged. Petitioner
comes for review of his conviction to the SC as he reasserts his innocence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Cesario Ursua should be acquitted on the ground that he was charged
under the wrong law.
RULING:
The SC held that petitioner be acquitted of the crime charged. Time and again the SC has decreed
that the statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evil sought
to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind
and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court
may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,
contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers.

15. CIR v PRIMETOWN

G.R. No. 162155
FACTS:

Vice Chair of Primetown, Gilbert Yap, applied on March 11, 1999 for a refund or credit of
income tax which Primetown paid in 1997. He claims that they are entitled for a refund because
they suffered losses that year due to the increase of cost of labor and materials, etc. However,
despite the losses, they still paid their quarterly income tax and remitted creditable withholding
tax from real estate sales to BIR. Thus, they were claiming for a refund on that said tax. On May
13, 1999, Elizabeth Santos,a revenue officer required Primetown to submit additional documents
for the said refund, to which Primetown complied with. However, its claim was not acted upon
which prompted it to file a petition for review in Court of Tax Appeals on April 14, 2000. CTA
dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the 2-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial
claim for tax refund according to Sec 229 of NIRC. According to CTA, the two-year period is
equivalent to 730 days pursuant to Art 13 of NCC. Since Primetown filed its final adjustment
return on April 14, 1998 and that year 2000 was a leap year, the petition was filed 731 days after
Primetown filed its final adjusted return. Thus, beyond the reglementary period. Primetown
appealed to CA. CA reversed the decision of CTA. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition was filed within the prescribed two-year period.
RULING:
Pursuant to EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987, a year shall be understood to be 12
calendar months. The SC defined a calendar month as a month designated in the calendar
without regard to the number of days it may contain. The court held that Administrative Code of
1987 impliedly repealed Art 13 of NCC as the provisions are irreconcilable. Primetown is
entitled for the refund since it is filed within the 2-year reglementary period.

16. LABAD V. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 139665
FACTS:
Petitioner Ma. Vilma S. Labad, an employee of University of Southern Philippines (USP), was
under probation due to a complaint filed to her by the Parent-Teacher Association on February 1,

1996. The complaints rooted on Dishonesty, Misconduct, and Unfitness as a teacher, which
involved incidents when Labad lied of the amount she paid for the yearbook, violation of RA
7079 (Campus Journalism Act of 1991), no release of the said yearbook, and abuse of students.
The Investigation Committee, constructed by USP, held that there should be a non renewal of
Labads probationary status. The salient dates are summarized as follows:
April 14, 1998- Civil Service affirmed the Investigation Committees decision
December 11, 1998- Civil services Committee denied Labads Motion for Reconsideration.
December 28, 1998- Labad filed a Motion for Extension to file Petition to CA.
January 12, 1999- Labad filed a Petition for Review to CA.
February 17, 1999- Labad received a Resolution granting her Petition for Extension.
March 10, 1999- Labad received a Resolution from the CA dismissing her Petition for Review. It
stated that considering that the petition for review was filed on January 12, 1999 by registered
mail, beyond the extended period which expired on January 10, 1999, the petition for review is
dismissed.
On March 24, 1999, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.
On July 29, 1999, counsel of petitioner received a copy of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated July 22, 1999 denying the motion for reconsideration of petitioner. The Resolution stated
that considering that petitioner herself admits filing the petition at least one day late, the motion
for reconsideration is hereby denied.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the Petition for Review filed by petitioner before it on
the ground that the petition was filed late
Whether the extension period started on December 26, 1998 or on December 28, 1998.
RULING:
In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court,
or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time
begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the period,
as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court
sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.
Based on Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court and as applied in several cases, where the last
day for doing any act required or permitted by law falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal
holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day. In this
case, petitioner still had until December 28, 1998, a Monday and the next business day to move
for a 15-day extension considering that December 26, 1998, the last day for petitioner to file her
petition for review fell on a Saturday. The motion for extension filed on December 28, 1998 was
thus filed on time since it was filed before the expiration of the time sought to be extended. The
next issue to resolve then is when should the 15-day extension be reckoned, should it be counted
from December 26, 1998 or December 28, 1998?

As a rule, the extension should be tacked to the original period and commence immediately after
the expiration of such period. In this case, petitioner specifically manifested that she be granted
an extension of 15 days from December 28, 1998 or until January 12, 1999 for her to file her
petition for review. Hence, the period for reckoning the commencement of the additional 15 days
should have been from December 28, 1998, and not December 26, 1998. Thus, the petition filed
by petitioner with the Court of Appeals on January 12, 1998, exactly 15 days from December 28,
1998, was filed on time.
The underpinning consideration in Moskowski, Vda. de Capulong and in the case at bar, is the
liberal interpretation of the Rules to achieve substantial justice. Petitioner would be outright
denied her right to appeal if the original period of December 26, 1998 would be the basis of the
15day extension period. While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it
is an essential part of our judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to
deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of
technicalities.
The Supreme Court granted the petition and the case is remanded to the appellate court for
further proceedings.

17. CIR v PRIMETOWN

G.R. No. 162155
FACTS:
Vice Chair of Primetown, Gilbert Yap, applied on March 11, 1999 for a refund or credit of
income tax which Primetown paid in 1997. He claims that they are entitled for a refund because
they suffered losses that year due to the increase of cost of labor and materials, etc. However,
despite the losses, they still paid their quarterly income tax and remitted creditable withholding
tax from real estate sales to BIR. Thus, they were claiming for a refund on that said tax. On May
13, 1999, Elizabeth Santos,a revenue officer required Primetown to submit additional documents
for the said refund, to which Primetown complied with. However, its claim was not acted upon
which prompted it to file a petition for review in Court of Tax Appeals on April 14, 2000. CTA
dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the 2-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial
claim for tax refund according to Sec 229 of NIRC. According to CTA, the two-year period is
equivalent to 730 days pursuant to Art 13 of NCC. Since Primetown filed its final adjustment
return on April 14, 1998 and that year 2000 was a leap year, the petition was filed 731 days after
Primetown filed its final adjusted return. Thus, beyond the reglementary period. Primetown
appealed to CA. CA reversed the decision of CTA. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition was filed within the prescribed two-year period.
RULING:
Pursuant to EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987, a year shall be understood to be 12
calendar months. The SC defined a calendar month as a month designated in the calendar
without regard to the number of days it may contain. The court held that Administrative Code of
1987 impliedly repealed Art 13 of NCC as the provisions are irreconcilable. Primetown is
entitled for the refund since it is filed within the 2-year reglementary period.

19. LLORENTE V. LLORENTE

GR No. 124371
FACTS:
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States. On 1937,
Lorenzo and petitioner Paula, were married. Later, Lorenzo was admitted to the United States
citizenship and a Certificate of Naturalization was issued in his favor by the United States
District Court, Southern District of New York.
Upon the liberation of the Philippines from the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted
an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife. When he arrived in the Philippines, he
discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was living in and having an adulterous
relationship with his brother.
As such, Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, the couple drew a written
agreement to the effect that Paula will not receive any support from Lorenzo. Moreover, they
will nullify their marriage before the court and Lorenzo will not file any adulterous case against
Paula. The agreement was then signed and duly notified.
Lorenzo returned to the United States and filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State
of California in the County of San Diego. Upon approval, the divorce decree became final. In the
meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines where he married Alicia, the respondent. They
lived for 25 years as husband and wife. Then, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. In
the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children. When he died,
Paula filed a case demanding the estate of the latter, for according to her she is the surviving wife
of the deceased. And that the will of Lorenzo giving everything to Alicia and his children is
against her rights and children.
RTC granted the petition because the divorce decree of Lorenzo is deemed invalid. As such, his
marriage to Alicia was also void and Paula was still the legal wife of the latter. Thus, Paula and
her children shall be the heir of the deceased. CA affirmed the decision but modified it. Only the
first child of Paula shall be considered as the child of the deceased.
ISSUE:
Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
RULING:
The Court REVERSED the decision of the RTC and CA and RECOGNIZED as VALID the
decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of
the State of California in and for the County of San Diego.
Furthermore, the Court REMANDS the case to the court of origin for determination of the
intrinsic validity of Lorenzos will and determination of the parties successional rights allowing
proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate
dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.

The Supreme Court based their decision on the following jurisprudence:

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and
to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall
be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever
may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be
found.
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the
time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4)
death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed. Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these
incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.
Thus, the Court held that the foreign law of San Diego must be proved and alleged regarding the
stated matters. RTC and CA made a bad judgment when they assumed that US as a whole,
follows the law of domicile and thus applied renvoi. There is no such thing as one American law.
The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general
American law. There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the
United States. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only
within the State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent
was a resident. Second, there is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called
for or required by New York State law.
On the issue regarding the divorce of Lorenzo and Paula, the State of California legally bestowed
the divorce. As an American Citizen, Lorenzo is legally divorced with Paula. The Court held that
the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized
in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to
the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court.
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
The will of Lorenzo executed in the Philippines are probated in the Philippine law. However, the
intrinsic validity, as Art. 16 mandates shall be governed by the national law of the deceased. As
such, it must be referred to New York. The trial court must refer to the law of New York
regarding their successional or testamentary laws.

20. VAN DORN V. ROMILLO

G.R. No. L-68470

FACTS:
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a
citizen of the United States. They got married in Hong Kong in 1972. Thereafter, they
established their residence in the Philippines and begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and
December 18, 1975. Subsequently, they were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982, and
that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
On June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioners business in Ermita,
Manila is their conjugal property; that petitioner be ordered to render accounting of the business;
and that private respondent be declared to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to
dismiss the case contending that the cause of action is barred by the judgment in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and
petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The denial now is the subject of the
certiorari proceeding.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties is binding only to the alien spouse.
RULING:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American Law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the decision of his own countrys court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is stopped
by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of
the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be
one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the
Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.

21. AZNAR V. GARCIA

G.R. NO. L-16749
FACTS:
Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to California where he resided for a
period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his
death. In his will, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen
(legitimate), as his only heir, but left a legacy sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen
Garcia (illegitimate). The Counsel for Helen claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2 of the
Civil Code, California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred
back to the law of the domicile. On the other hand, counsel for Maria, averred that the national
law of the deceased must apply, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything under
California law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be applied in determining the
successional rights of his heirs.
RULING:
The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there
are two rules in California on the matter; the internal law which applies to Californians
domiciled in California and the conflict rule for Californians domiciled outside of California.
Christensen being domiciled in the Philippines, the law of his domicile must be followed. The
case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings the determination of the
successional rights under Philippine law only.

22. BELLIS vs. BELLIS

G.R. No. L-23678
FACTS:
Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States.
By his first wife whom he divorced he had five legitimate children, by his second wife, who
survived him, he had three legitimate children, and three illegitimate children. Before he died, he
made two wills, one disposing of his Texas properties and the other disposing his Philippine
properties. In both wills, his illegitimate children were not given anything. The illegitimate
children opposed the will on the ground that they have been deprived of their legitimates to
which they should be entitled, if Philippine law were to be applied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the successional rights of the
illegitimate children.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the said children are not entitled to their legitimes under the Texas
Law, being the national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes.The parties admit that the
decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of
Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the
provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law,
the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of
succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of
the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.
Intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever
may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be
found.

23. PCIB V ESCOLIN

56 S 266
FACTS:
Linnie Jane Hodges, a Texan who was a domiciliary of the Philippines, died and left a will in
favor of her husband Charles Newton Hodges. It was conditioned in her will that, during the life
of her husband, he was to be bequeathed all of what was to be left of her estate. At the death of
Charles, however, all of what was left of Linnies estate is to be inherited by her siblings.
Subsequently, the will was probated and Charles was appointed as the Executor of Linnies
estate. He was authorized to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the
properties left by Linnie in consonance with the wishes contained in her will. Annually
thereafter, Charles submitted to the court the corresponding statements of account of his
administration.
When Charles died, respondent Magno was appointed by the RTC as Administratrix of the
Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, and as Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles
Newton Hodges. When Special Proceedings underwent for the Testate Estate of Charles,
respondent was eventually replaced by PCIB. Although at first the probate proceedings
proceeded jointly, each of them, PCIB and Magno, began acting later on separately and
independently of each other, with apparent sanction of the trial court.
PCIB filed to this court a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that the lower court's
orders allowing respondent Magno to continue acting as administratrix of the estate of Linnie be
set aside. It contended, among others, that the provision in her will instituting her brothers and
sisters in the manner therein specified is in the nature of a testamentary substitution, and is not in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code, thus it is ineffective and may not be
enforced. Thus, the estate she left could not be more than one-half of her share of the conjugal
partnership, notwithstanding the fact that she was citizen of Texas, U.S.A. On the other hand,
respondent-appellee Magno contends, among others, that the applicable law to Linnies will is
that of Texas under which, she alleges, there is no system of legitime, hence, the estate of Linnie
cannot be less than her share or one-half of the conjugal partnership properties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Texas law should apply.
RULING:
The court cannot yet determine such, and has remanded the case back to the trial court since both
parties failed to provide proof as to the Texas law. The Estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her
brothers and sisters depends on (1) whether upon the proper application of the principle of renvoi
in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, it will appear that
Hodges had no legitime, and (2) whether or not it can be held that Hodges had legally and
effectively renounced his inheritance from his wife.
Pending such further proceedings the considered opinion is that since, under the terms of the will
of Mrs. Hodges, her husband could not have anyway legally adjudicated or caused to be

adjudicated to himself her whole share of their conjugal partnership, the resulting estate of Mrs.
Hodges, of which Magno is the uncontested administratrix, cannot be less than one-fourth of the
conjugal partnership properties, as of the time of her death, minus what have been gratuitously
disposed of therefrom, by Hodges in favor of third persons since then, for even if it were
assumed that, as contended by PCIB, under Article 16 of the Civil Code and applying renvoi the
laws of the Philippines are the ones ultimately applicable, such one-fourth share would be her
free disposable portion, taking into account already the legitime of her husband under Article 900
of the CCP. Thus, until final judgment is ultimately rendered regarding (1) the manner of
applying Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines to the situation obtaining in these cases
the said estate consists of one-fourth of the community properties of the said spouses, as of the
time of the death of the wife, minus whatever the husband had already gratuitously disposed of
in favor of third persons from said date until his death

24. AMERICAN AIRLINES V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 116044-45
FACTS:
Plaintiff Mendoza filed an action for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu for the
alleged embarrassment and mental anguish he suffered at the Geneva airport when the American
Airlines security officers prevented him from boarding the plane, detained him for about an hour
and allowed him to board the plane only after all the other passengers have boarded. Petitioner
American Airlines filed a motion to dismiss the action for damages filed by the private
respondent for the lack of jurisdiction under section 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention. However,
the motion was denied. The Court of Appeals later affirmed the trial courts decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contract of transportation between the private respondent and private
respondent would be considered as a single operation and part of the contract of transportation
entered into by the private respondent with Singapore Airlines in Manila?
RULING:
It was held that the contract of carriage between the private responded and Singapore Airlines
although performed by different carriers under a series of airlines tickets, including that issued by
the American Airlines constitutes a single operation. Members of the TATA are under a general
pool partnership agreement wherein, they act as agent of each other in the issuance of tickets to
contracted passengers to boost ticket sales worldwide which are inaccessible in some parts of the
world.
Petitioners agreement to take place of the original designated carrier binds it under the contract
of carriage entered into by the private respondent and Singapore Airlines in Manila. Therefore,
findings of the Court of Appeals are affirmed. Case was ordered to be remanded for more
investigation for action against damages.

25. GO vs. CORDERO

G.R. No. 164703
FACTS:
Sometime in 1996, Mortimer F. Cordero, Vice-President of Pamana Marketing Corporation
(Pamana), ventured into the business of marketing inter-island passenger vessels. After
contacting various overseas fast ferry manufacturers from all over the world, he came to meet
Tony Robinson, an Australian national based in Brisbane, Australia, who is the Managing
Director of Aluminium Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA).
After negotiations with Felipe Landicho and Vincent Tecson, lawyers of Allan C. Go who is the
owner/operator of ACG Express Liner of Cebu City, a single proprietorship; Cordero was able to
close a deal for the purchase of two (2) SEACAT 25 as evidenced by the Memorandum of
Agreement dated August 7, 1997. Accordingly, the parties executed Shipbuilding Contract No.
7825 for one (1) high-speed catamaran (SEACAT 25) for the price of US$1,465,512.00. Per
agreement between Robinson and Cordero, the latter shall receive commissions totaling
US$328,742.00, or 22.43% of the purchase price, from the sale of each vessel.
However, Cordero later discovered that Go was dealing directly with Robinson when he was
informed by Dennis Padua of Wartsila Philippines that Go was canvassing for a second
catamaran engine from their company which provided the ship engine for the first SEACAT 25.
Padua told Cordero that Go instructed him to fax the requested quotation of the second engine to
the Park Royal Hotel in Brisbane where Go was then staying. Cordero tried to contact Go and
Landicho to confirm the matter but they were nowhere to be found, while Robinson refused to
answer his calls. Cordero immediately flew to Brisbane to clarify matters with Robinson, only to
find out that Go and Landicho were already there in Brisbane negotiating for the sale of the
second SEACAT 25. Despite repeated follow-up calls, no explanation was given by Robinson,
Go, Landicho and Tecson who even made Cordero believe there would be no further sale
between AFFA and ACG Express Liner.
On August 21, 1998, Cordero instituted Civil Case No. 98-35332 seeking to hold Robinson, Go,
Tecson and Landicho liable jointly and solidarily for conniving and conspiring together in
violating his exclusive distributorship in bad faith and wanton disregard of his rights, thus
depriving him of his due commissions. Robinson filed a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of
jurisdiction over his person and failure to state a cause of action, asserting that there was no act
committed in violation of the distributorship agreement. Said motion was denied by the trial
court on December 20, 1999. Robinson was likewise declared in default for failure to file his
answer within the period granted by the trial court. As for Go and Tecson, their motion to dismiss
based on failure to state a cause of action was likewise denied by the trial court on February 26,
1999. Subsequently, they filed their Answer denying that they have anything to do with the
termination by AFFA of Corderos authority as exclusive distributor in the Philippines. On the
contrary, they averred it was Cordero who stopped communicating with Go in connection with
the purchase of the first vessel from AFFA and was not doing his part in making progress status
reports and airing the clients grievances to his principal, AFFA, such that Go engaged the
services of Landicho to fly to Australia and attend to the documents needed for shipment of the
vessel to the Philippines. In any case, Cordero no longer had cause of action for his commission

for the sale of the second vessel under the memorandum of agreement dated August 7, 1997
considering the termination of his authority by AFFAs lawyers on June 26, 1998.
On May 31, 2000, the trial court rendered its judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against
defendants Allan C. Go, Tony Robinson, Felipe Landicho, and Vincent Tecson. On January 29,
2001, the CA rendered judgment granting the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 60354
and setting aside the trial courts orders of execution pending appeal.The case before the
Supreme Court is a consolidation of the petitions for review under Rule 45 separately filed by Go
(G.R. No. 164703) and Cordero (G.R. No. 164747).
ISSUE:
a)
Whether petitioner Cordero has the legal personality to sue the respondents for breach of
contract; and
b)
Whether the respondents may be held liable for damages to Cordero for his unpaid
commissions and termination of his exclusive distributorship appointment by the principal,
AFFA.
RULING:
While it is true that a third person cannot possibly be sued for breach of contract because only
parties can breach contractual provisions, a contracting party may sue a third person not for
breach but for inducing another to commit such breach. The elements of tort interference are: (1)
existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of a
contract; and (3) interference of the third person is without legal justification.
The presence of the first and second elements is not disputed. Through the letters issued by
Robinson attesting that Cordero is the exclusive distributor of AFFA in the Philippines,
respondents were clearly aware of the contract between Cordero and AFFA represented by
Robinson. In fact, evidence on record showed that respondents initially dealt with and
recognized Cordero as such exclusive dealer of AFFA high-speed catamaran vessels in the
Philippines. In that capacity as exclusive distributor, petitioner Go entered into the
Memorandum of Agreement and Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825 with Cordero in behalf of
AFFA.
The rule is that the defendant found guilty of interference with contractual relations cannot be
held liable for more than the amount for which the party who was inducted to break the contract
can be held liable. Respondents Go, Landicho and Tecson were therefore correctly held liable
for the balance of petitioner Corderos commission from the sale of the first SEACAT 25, in the
amount of US$31,522.09 or its peso equivalent, which AFFA/Robinson did not pay in violation
of the exclusive distributorship agreement, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from June
24, 1998 until the same is fully paid. Respondents having acted in bad faith, moral damages
may be recovered under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.

26. TITUS B. VILLANUEVA vs. EMMA M. ROSQUETA

G.R. No. 180764
FACTS:
Respondent Emma M. Rosqueta (Rosqueta), formerly Deputy Commissioner of the Revenue
Collection and Monitoring Group of the Bureau of Customs (the Bureau), tendered her courtesy
resignation from that post on January 23, 2001, shortly after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
assumed office. But five months later on June 5, 2001, she withdrew her resignation, claiming
that she enjoyed security of tenure and that she had resigned against her will on orders of her
superior.
Meantime, on July 13, 2001 President Arroyo appointed Gil Valera (Valera) to respondent
Rosquetas position. Challenging such appointment, Rosqueta filed a petition for prohibition, quo
warranto, and injunction against petitioner Titus B. Villanueva (Villanueva), then Commissioner
of Customs, the Secretary of Finance, and Valera with the Regional Trial Court. Petitioner
Villanueva, Valera, and the Secretary of Finance challenged the injunction order before the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 66070. On September 14, 2001 the CA issued its own TRO,
enjoining the implementation of the RTCs injunction order. But the TRO lapsed after 60 days
and the CA eventually dismissed the petition before it.
But the RTC dismissed respondent Rosquetas complaint, stating that petitioner Villanueva
committed no wrong and incurred no omission that entitled her to damages. The RTC found that
Villanueva had validly and legally replaced her as Deputy Commissioner seven months before
the Bureaus centennial anniversary. But the CA reversed the RTCs decision, holding instead
that petitioner Villanuevas refusal to comply with the preliminary injunction order issued in the
quo warranto case earned for Rosqueta the right to recover moral damages from him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding petitioner Villanueva liable in damages to respondent
Rosqueta for ignoring the preliminary injunction order that the RTC issued in the quo warranto
case (Civil Case 01-101539), thus denying her of the right to do her job as Deputy Commissioner
of the Bureau and to be officially recognized as such public officer.
RULING:
Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in the
exercise of his legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acts in bad
faith, with intent to prejudice another. Complementing this principle are Articles 20 and 21 of the
Civil Code which grant the latter indemnity for the injury he suffers because of such abuse of
right or duty.
But petitioner Villanueva cannot seek shelter in the alleged advice that the OSG gave him.
Surely, a government official of his rank must know that a preliminary injunction order issued by
a court of law had to be obeyed, especially since the question of Valeras right to replace
respondent Rosqueta had not yet been properly resolved. That petitioner Villanueva ignored the

injunction shows bad faith and intent to spite Rosqueta who remained in the eyes of the law the
Deputy Commissioner.

27. CRUZ V. NLRC

G.R. NO. 116384
FACTS:
Respondent Norkis Distributors, Inc. is engaged in the business of selling motorcycles and
household appliances, with branches all over the country. Petitioner Viola Cruz was hired and
employed by Norkis sometime in March 1997 as cashier/bookkeeper. In October 1990, the
Valencia branch of Norkis was scheduled to transfer its office to another place. While petitioner
and her co-employees were busy packing up and making an inventory of the things to be moved,
the petitioner suddenly collapsed. She was rushed to the Monsanto General Hospital in Valencia,
Bukidnon in the evening of the same day but was able to report for work the following day.
On October 17, 1990, petitioner was transferred to the Capitol College General Hospital in
Cagayan de Oro City and was confined thereat until October 25. She was diagnosed to be
suffering from "CNS Infection: TB Meningitis vs. Cryptococcal Meningitis." Starting October
15, 1990, the petitioner stopped reporting for work. On October 19, 1990, respondent Norkis was
informed by petitioners co-employees of her condition, and it was able to recruit a replacement
cashier/bookkeeper in the person of Hernando Juaman, two (2) days after petitioners collapse.
On December 28, 1990, petitioner sent a letter to Norkis to verify the status of her employment.
As an answer, she received a termination letter citing health reasons as the cause for her
dismissal. On March 18, 1991, petitioner lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal against the
private respondents, praying for payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, service
incentive, leave pay, maternity leave pay, 13th month pay, holiday pay and other money claims,
before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Cagayan De Oro City. The Labor Arbiter rendered
a decision in her favor. From the said decision both parties appealed to the NLRC. The Fifth
Division of the NLRC reversed and set aside the appealed decision of the Labor Arbiter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to recover moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees
from private respondents
RULING:
Under Section 8, Rule I, Book VI of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code,
for a disease to be a valid ground for the dismissal of the employee, the continued employment
of such employee is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or the health of his coemployees, and there must be a certification by a competent public health authority that the
disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6)
months, even with proper medical treatment. Since the burden of proving the validity of the
dismissal of the employee rests on the employer, the latter should likewise bear the burden of
showing that the requisites for a valid dismissal due to a disease have been complied with. In the
absence of the required certification by a competent public health authority, the Court has ruled
against the validity of the employees dismissal. Considering that in the present case, the alleged
reason for the dismissal of petitioner was her illness, the private respondents have to prove that
their decision to terminate the services of petitioner was reached after compliance with the

aforestated requisites under Section 8. Private respondents having failed to substantiate the same,
the dismissal of petitioner on the ground of illness cannot be upheld.
Moreover, petitioners absence was explained by the undeniable fact that she was confined for
treatment in several hospitals for around three (3) months. The claim of respondent Norkis that it
was not informed of the sickness of petitioner is belied by the fact that on October 14, 1990, the
day before petitioner stopped going to work, she collapsed within the office premises and was
immediately rushed to a hospital. Such fact should explain why petitioner deemed it unnecessary
to inform respondent Norkis that she was sick. Moreover, private respondents were apparently
told that the petitioner was ill because in the letter of termination dated November 2, 1990, they
advised petitioner that the company has decided to replace her as her "present ill-health condition
has made you (her) incapable of performing your (her) assigned duties and functions effectively."
That she did not file any sick leave was of no moment considering that there was no
communication from the respondent company regarding the status of petitioners employment.
The said letter of termination, dated November 2, 1990, was only received by petitioner in
January 1991, after she wrote them (private respondents) on December 28, 1990, requesting
financial assistance.
There is merit in petitioners submission that the award of moral and exemplary damages in her
favor is warranted by her unjustified dismissal. Award of moral and exemplary damages for an
illegally dismissed employee is proper where the employee had been harassed and arbitrarily
terminated by the employer. Moral damages may be awarded to compensate one for diverse
injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation
occasioned by the employers unreasonable dismissal of the employee. This Court has
consistently accorded the working class a right to recover damages for unjust dismissals tainted
with bad faith; where the motive of the employer in dismissing the employee is far from noble.
The award of such damages is based not on the Labor Code but on Article 220 of the Civil Code.
However, under the attendant facts and circumstances, the Court is of the sense that the amount
of One Hundred Twenty Thousand (P120,000.00) Pesos awarded by the Labor Arbiter for moral
and exemplary damages is too much. Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos of moral damages and
Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos of exemplary damages should suffice.
The Supreme Court granted the petition. The resolution of National Labor Relations Commission
in NLRC is set aside and the resolution of the Labor Arbiter is hereby REINSTATED, with the
modification that the award of damages is reduced to Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, as
moral damages, and Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos, as exemplary damages.

28. GLOBE MCKAY V CA

176 SCRA 778
FACTS:
10 November 1972, herein private respondent Restituto Tobias, a purchasing agent and
administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager, discovered fictitious purchases
and other fraudulent transactions, which caused Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp loss of
several thousands of pesos. He reported it to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to
the Executive Vice President and General Manager Herbert Hendry. A day after the report,
Hendry told Tobias that he was number one suspect and ordered him one week forced leave.
When Tobias returned to work after said leave, Hendry called him a crook and a swindler,
ordered him to take a lie detector test, and to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature and
initials for police investigation. Moreover, petitioners hired a private investigator. Private
investigation was still incomplete; the lie detector tests yielded negative results; reports from
Manila police investigators and from the Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner are in
favor of Tobias. Petitioners filed with the Fiscals Office of Manila a total of six (6) criminal
cases against private respondent Tobias, but were dismissed.
Tobias received a notice of termination of his employment from petitioners in January 1973,
effective December 1972. He sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company
(RETELCO); but Hendry wrote a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by
Globe Mackay due to dishonesty. Tobias, then, filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged
unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. The Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private
respondent, ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual
damages, two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and
costs; hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.
RULING:
Yes. The Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant circumstances,
finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private
respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified: when Hendry told Tobias to just
confess or else the company would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail;
his (Hendry) scornful remarks about Filipinos ("You Filipinos cannot be trusted.) as well as
against Tobias (crook, and swindler); the writing of a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias
was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty; and the filing of six criminal cases by
petitioners against private respondent. All these reveal that petitioners are motivated by
malicious and unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause damage to private respondent. The
imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of
Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 09055 is AFFIRMED.

30. UE V. JADER
GR No. 132344
FACTS:

The respondent, Jader, was enrolled in the defendants' College of Law in the first semester of his
last year he failed to take the regular final examination in Practice Court I for which he was
given an incomplete grade. He enrolled for the second semester as fourth year law student and he
filed an application for the removal of the incomplete grade given him by Professor Carlos
Ortega which was approved by the Dean after payment of the required fee. He took the
examination but was informed late that his grade from the removals was 5.
His name was even included in the tentative list and the invitation for the
Commencement Exercise. During commencement, her parents were even there to witness his
graduation. They even celebrated the said graduation with their relatives and friends. Thereafter,
he already enrolled for review in preparation for the bar only to find out that his grade for
Practice Court 1 was 5 and thus, he was not officially considered as a graduate of LLB in the said
university. Hence, he filed a suit for moral damages that he suffered from the said negligence of
the petitioner.
RTC affirmed the petition for grant of damage (P35, 470). CA affirmed but modified the
decision by imposing P50, 000 as moral damage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent should receive moral damages from the negligence of the
petitioner which allegedly brought embarrassment and anxiety to the respondent.
RULING:
The Court modified the decision of CA wherein the award of moral damage was nullified.
The Court held that as a senior law student, respondent should have been responsible
enough to ensure that all his affairs, specifically those pertaining to his academic achievement,
are in order. Given these considerations, the Court failed to see how respondent could have
suffered untold embarrassment in attending the graduation rites, enrolling in the bar review
classes and not being able to take the bar exams. If respondent was indeed humiliated by his
failure to take the bar, he brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the
requirements including his school records, before preparing himself for the bar examination.
Certainly, taking the bar examinations does not only entail a mental preparation on the subjects
thereof; there are also prerequisites of documentation and submission of requirements which the
prospective examinee must meet.

31. HOTEL NIKKO V. REYES

G.R. No. 154259
FACTS:

Plaintiff Roberto Reyes (Amay Bisaya) was having coffee at the Nikko Hotel
lobby on October 13, 1994 at around six in the morning when Dr. Violeta Filart, a long-time
friend, approached him and invited him to a party at the penthouse where the hotels former
managers birthday was being celebrated. He consented and carried the latters present. At the
party, when he was helping himself at the buffet table, Ruby Lim, one of the petitioners,
approached him and asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by those around the
buffet table. Then, a Makati policeman accompanied the embarrassed Amay Bisaya in leaving
the penthouse.
Ruby Lim accepted the fact that she asked Mr. Reyes to leave but not in the manner he claimed.
She said she politely asked Mr. Reyes to finish his food and leave the party as the celebrant
wants the party to be intimate, and that he was not invited. On the other hand, Dr. Filart denied
Amay Bisayas claim that she invited him to the party.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Lims conduct was abusive enough to make the petitioners
liable for damages caused to plaintiff.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that any damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered
through Ms. Lims exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good
faith, must be his to bear alone.
The plaintiff failed in proving the ill-motive of the petitioners. It was from his confession that
when Ms. Lim approached him, they were very close that they nearly kissed each other.
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when she requested the latter to leave the
party, it is apparent that the request was meant to be heard by him only and there could have been
no intention on her part to cause him embarrassment. It was plaintiffs reaction to the request that
must have made the other guests aware of what transpired between them. Had plaintiff simply
left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to take him out. Therefore, we find
the petitioners not guilty of violating Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.

32. HERMOSISIMA V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. L-14628
FACTS:

Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a teacher in the
Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger
than she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no
promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance
underwriter in the City of Cebu, where intimacy developed among her and the petitioner, since
one evening in 1953, when after coming from the movies; they had sexual intercourse in his
cabin on board M/V "Escao," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February
1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to
marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and
clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez. On
October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas filed with said of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural
child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity of child
and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry the
complainant. Upon her motion, said court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by
way of alimony pendente lite, P50.00 a month, which was, on February 16, 1955, reduced to
P30.00 a month.
The judgment of the RTC is hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris Hermosisima, as the
natural daughter of defendant, and confirming the order pendente lite, ordering defendant to pay
to the said child, through plaintiff, the sum of thirty pesos (P30.00), payable on or before the fifth
day of every month sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of four thousand five
hundred pesos (P4,500.00) for actual and compensatory damages; the sum of five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) as moral damages; and the further sum of five thousand pesos (P500.00) as
attorney's fees for plaintiff, with costs against defendant. On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court
of Appeals affirmed this decision, except as to the actual and compensatory damages and the
moral damages, which were increased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.
ISSUE:
Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry?
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that seduction does not exist in the present case thus the petitioner is not
morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the
complainant who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former
high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be when she became intimate
with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found
that,complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him,
she "wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of
clergy." Thus the complainant is not entitled to award of damages.

33. BEATRIZ GALANG vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL.

G.R. No.L-17248
FACTS:
Rodrigo courted Beatriz in 1953 and they, thereafter, became engaged, albeit Rodrigo's mother
was opposed to their marriage; that on April 15, 1955 Rodrigo and his father went to her house
and her marriage with Rodrigo were arranged, with the concurrence of her mother, appellant
Maximino Quinit having agreed to give dowry and to defray the expenses of the marriage, with
the exception of the wedding dress of appellee; that they agreed to have the marriage celebrated
in Baguio, for which reason on April 27, 1955, appellee, Rodrigo and the latter's father left for
Baguio; that upon arriving at Colorado Falls, however, Maximino made them alight from the bus
and took them to the house of Adolfo Dagawan with whom Maximino agreed that appellee and
Rodrigo would stay in said house, Maximino to pay P5.00 daily for their lodging and asked
Dagawan to make all arrangements for their wedding in Baguio and to act as their sponsor; that
after making these arrangements Maximino left, while appellee and Rodrigo remained in
Dagawan's house where they lived as husband and wife until May 9, that on May 7, appellee and
Rodrigo, accompanied by Dagawan, went to Baguio to secure a marriage license but failed
because Rodrigo did not have a residence certificate, although both prospective contracting
parties signed the corresponding application; that on May 9, on the pretext that he going to their
hometown to get his residence certificate, Rodrigo left Colorado Falls and never returned; that
when appellee returned to their hometown (Sison, Pangasinan), she found out that Rodrigo's
parents had sprinted him away because, in their opinion, appellee's reputation was unsavory.
The Court of First Instance sustained plaintiff's pretense, but the Court of Appeals considered her
evidence unworthy of credence, and, hence, absolved Maximino Quinit.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Rodrigo and Maximo Quinit are liable for damages due to the alleged breach of
promise to marry?
RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the reason that mere breach
of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.In the light of the clear and manifest intent of our
law making body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry, the award of moral
damages made by the Court of First Instance is, accordingly, untenable.

34. GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH V. CA

G.R. No. 97336
FACTS:
Respondent filed with the trial court the complaint for damages against the petitioner for the
alleged violation of their agreement to get married. Petitioner is an Iranian citizen, an exchange
student taking a medical course at Lyceum Northwestern Colleges. He courted and promised to
marry the respondent. After, they sought the approval of the respondents parents, petitioner
forced her to live with him; she was a virgin before she began living with him. During such time,
petitioner began maltreating her and threatening to kill her. After a confrontation with a barangay
captain, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him
anymore, mentioning also that he was already married to someone living in Bacolod City. The
petitioner, in his Counterclaim, alleged that opposite of respondents claims. The RTC and the
CA ruled in favor of the respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of
Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
RULING:
Yes it may, the petition is denied. The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is
not an actionable wrong. This notwithstanding, the Civil Code contains a provision, Article 21,
which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.
Where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a
woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of
the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of
marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or
inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud
and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter.
It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's
parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." In a
breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be
recovered together with actual damages, should there be any, such as the wedding presentations.

35. WASSMER V. VELEZ

12 S 648
FACTS:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned to get married. However, Velez went away and
Beatriz did not hear from him again. Beatriz sued Francisco and asked the latter to pay her moral
damages. Velez contended that there is no provision of the law authorizing an action for breach
of promise to marry. However, the court did not find this defense meritorious because even
though it is true that there is no law for breach of promise to marry, Wassmer still suffered
frustration and public humiliation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff moral damages?
RULING:
The case at bar is not a mere breach of promise to marry because it is not considered an
actionable wrong. The mere fact the couple have already filed a marriage license and already
spent for invitations, wedding apparels, gives the plaintiff reason to demand for payment of
damages. The court affirmed the previous judgment and ordered the defendant to pay the
plaintiff moral damages for the humiliation she suffered; actual damages for the expenses
incurred and exemplary damages because the defendant acted fraudulently in making the
plaintiff believe that he will come back and the wedding will push through.

36. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ONG

G.R. No. 190755

FACTS:
Spouses Sy obtained a 16 Million php loan from Land Bank secured by three (3) residential lots,
five (5) cargo trucks, and a warehouse. Under the loan agreement, PhP 6 million of the loan
would be short-term and would mature on February 28, 1997, while the balance of PhP 10
million would be payable in seven (7) years. The Notice of Loan Approval dated February 22,
1996 contained an acceleration clause wherein any default in payment of amortizations or other
charges would accelerate the maturity of the loan.
They failed to pay, and they sold the three parcels of land to Alfredo Ong. When Ong paid the
remaining amount, the application for assumption of mortgage was not approved by Land Bank.
The bank learned from its credit investigation report that the Ongs had a real estate mortgage in
the amount of PhP 18,300,000 with another bank that was past due. Thus, the bank foreclosed the
properties. Ong filed an action for recovery of the money that he paid, and won in the RTC. On
appeal to the CA, it likewise affirmed the RTC decision. Thus, Land Bank appeals to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Land Bank is liable to Ong.
RULING:
The petition has no merit but amount is modified.
CIVIL LAW: Unjust enrichment.
Unjust enrichment exists "when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when
a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice,
equity and good conscience."There is unjust enrichment under Art.22 of the Civil Code when (1)
a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages
to another.
Land Bank made Alfredo believe that with the payment of PhP 750,000, he would be able to
assume the mortgage of the SpousesSy. The act of receiving payment without returning it when
demanded is contrary to the adage of giving someone what is due to him. The outcome of the
application would have been different had Land Bank first conducted the credit investigation
before accepting Alfredos payment. He would have been notified that his assumption of
mortgage had been disapproved; and he would not have taken the futile action of paying PhP
750,000. The procedure Land Bank took in acting on Alfredos application cannot be said to have
been fair and proper.
Petition is DISMISSED, but the interest is at 6%.

37. CONCEPCION vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 120706
FACTS:
Sometime in 1985, the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas are living in an apartment
being leased to them by Florence Bing Concepcion, who also resides in the same compound
where the apartment was located. Nestor was engaged in the business of supplying government
agencies and private entities with office equipment, appliances and other fixtures on a cash or
credit basis. Bing joined the venture and contributed capital on the condition that after her capital
investment was returned to her, any profit earned would be divided equally between her and
Nestor.
Sometime in the second week of July 1985, Rodrigo Concepcion the brother of the deceased
husband of Bing accosted Nestor at the latters apartment and accusing him of having adulterous
relationship with Bing. Rodrigo threatened that should something happen to Rodrigos sick
mother, in case the latter learned of the affair, he would kill Florence.
As a result of the incident, Nestor felt extreme embarrassment and shame to the extent that he
could no longer face his neighbors. Florence also ceased to do business with him by not
contributing capital anymore so much so that the business venture was no longer feasible. To
make matters worse, the relationship between Allem and Nestor has soured from the doubt of
fidelity and frequent bickering and quarrels. Allem even expressed her desire to leave her
husband. Nestor was forced to demand from Rodrigo damages and a public apology.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nestors right to privacy had been shattered by Rodrigo and is Nestor entitled to
damages.
RULING:
The court has ruled that Nestor is entitled to damages. Although the defendant claims that there
was neither violation done that was enlisted under Article 26 and 2219 of the New Civil Code
which constitute libel, slander, or any other form of defamation nor does it involve prying into
the privacy of anothers residence, it was still adjudged that the act done was form of that
manner. The Code commission stresses in no uncertain terms that the human personality must be
exalted. The sacredness of human personality is a concomitant consideration of every plan for
human amelioration. The touchstone of every system of law, of the culture and civilization of
every county, is how far it dignifies man. If the statutes insufficiently protect a person from being
unjustly humiliated, in short if human personality is not exalted then the laws are indeed
defective, thus, under this article, the right of persons are amply protected, and damages are
provided for violations of a persons dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind. There is no
question that Nestor suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and
social humiliation as a proximate result of petitioners abusive, scandalous, and insulting
language. Nestor, therefore is entitled to damages.
38. AMONOY V. SPOUSES GUTIERREZ

G.R. NO. 140420

FACTS:
In 1965, Atty. Sergio Amonoy represented Alfonso Formilda in a partition case. Since Fornilda
had no money to pay, he agreed to make use of whatever property he acquires as a security for
the payment of Amonoys attorneys fees which amounts to P27k. In July 1969, Fornilda died. A
month later, the property was finally adjudicated and Fornilda, through his heirs, got his just
share from the property in dispute. Fornilda was however unable to pay Amonoy. Hence,
Amonoy sought to foreclose the property in 1970. The heirs of Fornilda, the spouses Jose
Gutierrez and Angela Fornilda then sued Amonoy questioning the validity of his mortgage
agreement with Fornilda. It was their claim that the attorneys fees he was collecting was
unconscionable and that the same was based on an invalid mortgage due to the existing attorneyclient relationship between him and Fornilda at the time the mortgage was executed.
The spouses lost in the trial court as well as in the Court of Appeals but they appealed to the
Supreme Court. Meanwhile, in 1973, Amonoy was able to foreclose the property. Amonoy was
also the highest bidder in the public sale conducted in view of the foreclosure. He was able to
buy the property of Fornilda for P23k. But constructed on said property was the house of the
spouses Gutierrez. Pending the spouses appeal with the Supreme Court, Amonoy was able to
secure a demolition order and started demolishing the houses of the spouses. But on June 2,
1986, the Supreme Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against the demolition
order. On June 4, 1986, Amonoy received a copy of the TRO. Finally, on June 24, 1989, the
Supreme Court promulgated a decision where it ruled that the mortgage between Amonoy and
Fornilda is void, hence, Amonoy has no right over the property. But by this time, the house of the
spouses was already demolished because it appears that despite the TRO, Amonoy continued
demolishing the house until it was fully demolished in the middle of 1987.
The spouses then sued Amonoy for damages. It is now the contention of Amonoy that he
incurred no liability because he was merely exercising his right to demolish
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages
RULING:
Well-settled is the maxim that damage resulting from the legitimate exercise of a persons rights
is a loss without injury -- damnum absque injuria -- for which the law gives no remedy. Although
the acts of petitioner may have been legally justified at the outset, their continuation after the
issuance of the TRO amounted to an insidious abuse of his right. Indubitably, his actions were
tainted with bad faith. Had he not insisted on completing the demolition, respondents would not
have suffered the loss that engendered the suit before the RTC. Verily, his acts constituted not
only an abuse of a right, but an invalid exercise of a right that had been suspended when he
received the TRO from this Court on June 4, 1986. By then, he was no longer entitled to proceed
with the demolition. As quoted by the Supreme Court: The exercise of a right ends when the
right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused, especially to the prejudice of others.

Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,
sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in
the performance of ones duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give
everyone his due; recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the
norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.
Clearly then, the demolition of the spouses house by Amonoy, despite his receipt of the TRO,
was not only an abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such right.
The Supreme Court denied the petition.

39. HEIRS OF GUARING vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 108395
FACTS:

On November 7, 1987, the car driven by TeodoroGuaring Jr. collided with the Philippine Rabbit
Bus driven by Angelo Cuevas and with a Toyota Cressida Car driven by Eligio Enriquez, along
the North Luzon Expressway in San Rafael, Mexico Pampanga. As a consequence, Guaring
died.The trial court ruled in favor of herein petitioners, but lost in the Court of Appeals where the
accused was acquitted based on reasonable doubt. This was because it was found out that the
deceased was the one who acted negligently. The accused the claimed appealed in the court that
the civil case filed against him be extinguished since the extinguishment of his criminal liability
necessarily follows the extinguishment of his civil liability, since his civil liability aroused from
his criminal liability. The petitioners disagreed on this ground, claiming that the civil case should
pursue. This was then appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil liability of the accused is extinguished due to his acquittal.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the acquittal of the bus driver was based on reasonable doubt,
which means that the civil case for damages was not barred since the cause of action of the heirs
was based on quasi-delict. Even if damages are sought on the basis of crime and not quasi-delict,
the acquittal of the bus driver will not bar recovery of damages because the acquittal was based
not on a finding that he was not guilty but only on reasonable doubt. Thus, it has been held that
the judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it
includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil
liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the
liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature as, for instance, in the felonies of
estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil
liability; and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of
which the accused was acquitted.Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that the proceedings for the
civil case of the said incident must continue for the recovery of damages of the victims heirs.
The case was remanded to the trial court to determine the civil liability of the accused.

41. BONITE V. ZOSA

GR No. L-33772
FACTS:

The petitioners were the family of the deceased, Florencio Bonite, who was a caminero of the
Bureau of Public Highways in Oroquieta City. He was hit by a truck driven by private
respondent, as a result of which, Bonite died on that same day. Consequently, a criminal
complaint for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed by the surviving heirs of the
deceased (now petitioners) against the respondent Abamonga, with the City Court of Oroquieta
City. Petitioners through their counsel Atty. Alberto Dulalas, as private prosecutor, actively
participated in the prosecution of the criminal case against the accused.
After trial on the merits, a decision was rendered by the court in the criminal case, acquitting the
accused Abamonga for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Thus, the petitioners filed an action for recovery of damages against the same accused on
account of the death of Florencio Bonite, with the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental.
In an order dated 25 February 1971, the court a quo dismissed the complaint for damages.
Thus, the petitioners move for a motion for reconsideration but such was denied. Hence this
petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an independent civil action is barred from the petitioner because of the failure in
the criminal action to make a reservation to file a separate civil action and their active
participation in the prosecution of the criminal case.
RULING:
The Court REVERSED the decision of Court of First Instance.
The Court held that in the instant case, the criminal complaint for homicide through reckless
imprudence was dismissed on the ground that the guilt of the accused (herein private respondent)
was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, petitioners have the right to file an
independent civil action for damages, the acquittal of the accused in the criminal case
notwithstanding. Moreover, the petitioners may base the separate civil action to Art. 2176 of the
Civil Code. Such that an acquittal of the accused from a charge of criminal negligence, whether
on reasonable doubt or not, is not a bar to a subsequent civil action for recovery of civil liability,
arising not from criminal negligence, but from a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. It has been held
that Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in referring to "fault or negligence" covers acts "not
punishable by law" as well as acts that may be criminal in character, whether intentional and
voluntary or negligent.
Moreover, Art. 29 does not does not state that the right to file an independent civil action for
damages can be availed of only in offenses not arising from a tortious act. The only requisite set
forth therein for the exercise of the right to file a civil action for damages is that the accused
must have been acquitted in the criminal action based on reasonable doubt. In fact, the
reservation of the right to file an independent civil action has been deleted from Section 2, Rule
111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, in consonance with the decisions of this Court
declaring such requirement of a reservation as ineffective

Lastly, that petitioners actively participated in the prosecution of the criminal case does not bar
them from filing an independent and separate civil action for damages under Article 29 of the
Civil Code. The civil action based on criminal liability and a civil action under Article 29 are two
separate and independent actions.

42. COJUANGCO V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 119398
FACTS:
Cojuangco, a known businessman-sportsman owned several racehorses which he entered in
sweepstakes races. Several of his horses won the races on various dates, and won prizes together
with the 30% due for trainer/grooms. He sent letters of demand for the collection of the prizes
due him but private respondents PCSO and its then chairman Fernando Carrascoso Jr.
consistently replied that the demanded prizes are being withheld on advice of PCGG.
Consequently, Cojuangco filed this case before the Manila RTC but before the receipt summons,
PCGG advised private respondents that it poses no more objection to its remittance of the
prized winnings. This was immediately communicated to petitioners counsel Estelito Mendoza
by Carrascoso but the former refused to accept the prizes at this point, reasoning that the matter
had already been brought to court.
The trial court ruled that the private respondents had no authority to withhold the subject
racehorse winnings since no writ of sequestration was issued by PCGG. Ordering the private
respondents to pay in solidum the claimed winnings, the trial court further held that, by not
paying the winnings, Carrascoso had acted in bad faith amounting to the persecution and
harassment of petitioner and his family. While the case was pending with the CA, the petitioner
moved for partial execution pending appeal to which the private respondents posed no objection
to.
CA reversed the trial courts finding of bad faith, holding that the former PCSO chairman was
merely carrying out the instruction of the PCGG. It likewise noted that Carrascosos acts of
promptly replying to demands and not objecting to partial execution negated bad faith.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the award for damages against respondent Carrascoso is warranted by evidence
and the law.
RULING:
YES AND NO. Petitioner is only entitled to nominal damages. Bad faith does not simply
connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty due to some motive or
interest of ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. There is sufficient evidence on record to
support Respondent Courts conclusion that Carrascoso did not act in bad faith. His letters to
PCGG indicated his uncertainties as to the extent of the sequestration against the properties of
the plaintiff. There is also denying that plaintiff is a very close political and business associate of
the former President Marcos. Sequestration was also a novel remedy. Under these equivocalities,
Carrascoso could not be faulted in asking further instructions from the PCGG, on what to do and
more so, to obey the instructions given. Besides, EO2 has just been issued by President Aquino,
freezing all assets and properties in the Philippines (of) former President Marcos and/or his
wifetheir close friends, subordinates, business associates

The extant rule is that public officers shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary damages
for acts done in the performance of official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith,
malice or gross negligence. Attorneys fees and expenses of litigation cannot be imposed either,
in the absence of clear showing of any of the grounds provided therefor under the Civil Code.
The trial courts award of these kinds of damages must perforce be deleted.
Nevertheless, this Court agrees with the petitioner and the trial that Respondent Carrascoso may
still be held liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstruct, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and
liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) The rights against deprivation of property without due process of law;
Under the aforecited article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad
faith. To be liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner,
even on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of ones duties.
We hold that petitioners right to the use of his property was unduly impeded. While Respondent
Carrascoso may have relied upon the PCGGs instructions, he could have further sought the
specific legal basis therefor. A little exercise of prudence would have disclosed that there was no
writ issued specifically for the sequestration of the racehorse winnings of petitioner. There was
apparently no record of any such writ covering his racehorses either. The issuance of a
sequestration order requires the showing of a prima facie case and due regard for the
requirements of due process. The withholding of the prize winnings of petitioner without a
properly issued sequestration order clearly spoke of a violation of his property rights without due
process of law.
Art. 2221 of the Civil Code authorizes the award of nominal damages to a plaintiff whose right
has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that
right, not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered.

43. ALCUAZ V. PSBA

G.R. NO. 76353
FACTS: In 1986, some PSBA students, herein petitioners Alcuaz et. al. staged demonstrations in
the premises of the school. In order for the demonstration to be settled, an agreement was entered
into among others the regulations for the conduct of protest action. In spite of the agreement, it
was alleged that the petitioners, committed tumultuous and anarchic acts within the premises of
the school, fanned by the cooperation of the intervening professors, causing disruption of classes
to the prejudice of the majority students. The school took administrative sanctions upon them in
view of their participation in the demonstration. The students and the intervening professors were
sanctioned. They were dismissed and terminated.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a deprivation of constitutional rights of expression and
assembly and of due process of law of the students who have been barred from re-enrollment.
RULING: The Supreme Court held that due process in disciplinary cases such as the case at bar
does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings
in the courts of justice. The Court has already recognized the right of the school to refuse reenrollment of students for academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations. In the
schools administrative process, both students and professors were given three (3) days from
receipt of letter to explain in writing why the school should not take administrative sanction
against them. With respect to the academic activities of the students and the teaching loads of the
teachers, the respondent school has created new class for the petitioners and the intervening
professors during and when the investigation was going on.

44. NON VS. DAMES

185 SCRA 523
FACTS:
Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were
not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or
participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. The subject of
the protests is not, however, made clear in the pleadings.
Petitioners filed a petition in the court seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the school,
but the trial court dismissed the petition. They now petition the court to reverse its ruling in
Alcuaz vs. PSBA1, which was also applied in the case. The court said that petitioners waived
their privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent college when they adopted,
signed, and used its enrollment form for the first semester of school year 1988-89, which states
that: The Mabini College reserves the right to deny admission of students whose scholarship and
attendance are unsatisfactory and to require withdrawal of students whose conduct discredits the
institution and/or whose activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficient operation of the
college. Students, therefore, are required to behave in accord with the Mabini College code of
conduct and discipline.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the students right to freedom of speech and assembly infringed.
RULING:
Yes. The protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the Constitution
is similarly available to students is well-settled in our jurisdiction. However there are limitations.
The permissible limitation on Student Exercise of Constitutional Rights within the school
presupposes that conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason whether it
stems from time, place, or type of behavior should not materially disrupt classwork or must not
involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.

45. ARAFILES V. PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC., ET AL.

G.R. No. 150256

March 25, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint against respondents before the RTC for damages. The suit is based
on an article the respondent had written, about a complaint filed against the petitioner for forcible
abduction with rape and forcible abduction of an employee of PAGASA. Petitioner alleged that
on account of the grossly malicious and overly sensationalized reporting in the news item,
aspersions were cast on his character; his reputation as a director of the NIAS at the PAGASA
was injured; he became the object of public contempt and ridicule as he was depicted as a sexcrazed stalker and serial rapist; and the news item deferred his promotion.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner however, the CA reversed the decision and
dismissed the petition, thus the case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the publication of the news item was not attended
with malice to thus free respondents of liability for damages.
RULING:
No it did not, the petition is denied. Article 33 of the Civil Code provides that In cases of
defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In
actions for damages for libel, it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain libelous
material must be examined and viewed as a whole. In the case at bar, the SC finds that the
presentation of the news item subject of petitioners complaint may have been in a sensational
manner, but it is not per se illegal and that respondent was not sufficiently able to establish a
preponderance of evidence. In determining the manner in which a given event should be
presented as a news item and the importance to be attached thereto, newspapers must enjoy a
certain degree of discretion. Thus, the newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as
to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In
the preparation of stories, press reporters and editors usually have to race with their deadlines;
and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a
point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.

46. INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS V. ARGOS

G.R. No. 130362
FACTS:
Respondents Merlin Argos and Jaja Pineda are the general manager and commercial director,
respectively, of the Fragrances Division of the petitioner International Flavors and Fragrances,
Inc. (IFFI). The general managers reported directly to Hernan Costa, the appointed managing
director. Costa and respondents had serious differences. When the positions of the general
managers became redundant, respondents agreed to the termination of their services. They signed
a Release Waiver and Quitclaim. That same time, Costa issued a Personnel Announcement
which described respondents as persona non grata and urged the employees not to have
further dealings with them. Two Informations were filed against Costa for the criminal charge of
libel. In addition, respondents filed a civil case for damages against Costa and Petitioner
Corporation (IFFI), in its subsidiary capacity as employer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents could sue petitioner for damages based on subsidiary liability
in an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code, during the pendency of the
criminal libel cases against petitioners employee.
RULING:
Article 33 of the Civil Code provides specifically that in cases of defamation, the injured party
may bring a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.
Such civil action proceeds independently of the criminal prosecution and requires only a
preponderance of evidence. In Joaquin vs. Aniceto, 12 SCRA 308 (1964), the Court held that
Article 33 contemplates an action against the employee in his primary civil liability. It does not
apply to an action against the employer to enforce its subsidiary civil liability, because such
liability arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case or when the employee is
adjudged guilty of the wrongful act in a criminal action and found to have committed the offense
in the discharge of his duties. Any action brought against the employer based on its subsidiary
liability before the conviction of its employee is premature.

47. MARCIA VS. CA

G.R. No. L-34529

FACTS:
In 1956, a passenger bus in Pampanga operated by private respondent Victory Liner, Inc. and
driven by its employee Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting
in the latter's death and in physical injuries to herein petitioners. Thereupon, an information for
homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against Paje in the CFI
of Pampanga. A month later, an action for damages was filed in the CFI of Rizal by petitioners
against the Victory Liner, Inc. and Paje, alleging that, the mishap was due to the reckless
imprudence and negligence of the latter in driving the passenger bus. Paje was convicted by the
CFI but was acquitted on appeal ruling that appellant was not even guilty of civil negligence and
that it was a pure accident. The CFI of Rizal subsequently dismissed the civil case.
ISSUE:
W/N the civil action is an independent one, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action.
RULING:
Decision affirmed.
Reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article
33 of the Civil Code. The above article speaks only of defamation, fraud and physical injuries.
The injuries suffered by herein petitioners were alleged to be the result of criminal negligence;
they were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no independent civil action for damages may be
instituted in connection therewith.
The charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide and physical injuries but for reckless
imprudence or criminal negligence resulting in homicide and physical injuries suffered by Edgar
Marcia and Renato Yap. They are not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil
Code and, therefore, no civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution.

48. RUIZ vs. UCOL

G.R. No. L-454404
FACTS:

Agustina Tagaca, laundry-woman for plaintiff-appellant Atty. Jesus B. Ruiz filed an

administrative charge against defendant-appelleeEncarnacionUcol, a midwife in the health center
of Sarratt, Ilocos Norte. In an answer to the charges, Ucol alleged that Tagaca was a mere tool
used by Atty. Ruiz to get back to her because of a case filed by Ucols husband against Ruiz. She
was also alleged to have made remarks that Ruiz instigated the complaint and fabricated the
charges. The said case was dismissed but Ruiz decided to file his own criminal case against Ucol
based on the alleged libelous portions of Ucols answer. After the trial, the lower court rendered
judgment acquitting Ucol on the ground that her guilt was not established beyond reasonable
doubt. Instead of appealing the civil aspects of the case, Ruiz filed a separate complaint for
damages. Ucol moved for a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata which was then
granted by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte after being remanded by the Court of
Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ruiz is barred by the criminal case of libel from filing a separate civil action for
damages.
RULING:
Ruiz contends that there can be no res judicata in the case, since the decision of the trial court did
not pass upon the civil aspect of the criminal case. Article 33 of the Civil Code which gives an
offended party in cases of defamation, among others, the right to file a civil action distinct from
the criminal proceedings is not without limitations. The Supreme Court found that the appeal of
Ruiz is without merit as records of the trial court manifest that the suit being charged by Ruiz to
be a harassment suit on the followinggrounds. (1)Ruiz had something to do with the
administrative complaint, (2) Ruiz filed a criminal case for libel against Mrs. Ucols answer in
the administrative case after the administrative cases dismissal, (3) Ruiz acted as a private
prosecutor in the criminal caseactively handling as a lawyer the very case where he was the
complainant, and (4) After Ucol was acquitted, Ruiz pursued his anger at the Ucols by filing a
civil action for damages.

49. BARREDO V. GARCIA

73 P 607
FACTS:

On May 3, 1936, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxi driven by Pedro
Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilis. The carretela was overturned and a
passenger, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which resulted to his death. A
criminal action was filed against Fontanilla, and he was convicted. The court in the criminal case
granted the petition to reserve the civil action against Fausto Barredo, the proprietor of the
Malate Taxi and the employer of Fontanilla, making him primarily and directly responsible under
culpa aquiliana. It was undisputed that Fontanillas negligence was the cause of the accident as
he was driving on the wrong side of the road at high speed, and there was no showing that
Barredo exercised the diligence of a good father of a family. Barredos theory of defense is that
Fontanillas negligence being punishable by the Revised Penal Code, that his liability as
employer is only subsidiary liable but Fontanilla was sued for civil liability, hence, Barredo
claims that he cannot be held liable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Barredo, as employer is civilly liable for the acts of Fontanilla, his employee
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that complainants liability is not only subsidiary but also primary
liability. The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals which ruled that the liability
sought to be imposed upon Barredo in this action is not a civil obligation arising from a felony,
but an obligation imposed in Article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in the
selection or supervision of his servant or employee.
Quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code and is entirely
distinct and independent from a delict or crime as punished under the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). In this jurisdiction, the same negligent act causing damage may produce civil liability
(subsidiary) arising from a crime under Art. 103 of the RPC; or create an action for the quasi
delict or culpa aquiliana (primary) and the parties injured are free to choice which course to take.
In the instant case, the negligent act of Fontanilla produced two liabilities of Barredo. First, a
subsidiary one because of the civil liability of Fontanilla arising from the latters criminal
negligence; and second, Barredos primary and direct responsibility arising from his presumed
negligence as an employer in the selection of his employees or their supervision, under Art. 1903
of the Civil Code. The parties instituted an action for damages under Art. 1903 of the Civil Code.
Barredo was found guilty of negligence for carelessly employing Fontanilla, who had been
caught several times for violation of the Automobile Law and speeding violation.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals awarding damages in favor of
the plaintiffs plus P1,000 legal interest.
50. JAMES CAPILI VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
700 SCRA 443
FACTS:

In September 1999, James Capili married Karla Medina. But then, just three months later in
December 1999, he married another woman named Shirley Tismo.
In 2004, Karla Medina filed an action for declaration of nullity of the second marriage between
Capili and Tismo. In June 2004, Tismo filed a bigamy case against Capili.
Before a decision can be had in the bigamy case, the action filed by Karla Medina was granted
and Capilis marriage with Tismo was declared void by reason of the subsisting marriage
between Medina and Capili. Thereafter, Capili filed a motion to dismiss in the bigamy case. He
alleged that since the second marriage was already declared void ab initio that marriage never
took place and that therefore, there is no bigamy to speak of.
The trial court agreed with Capili and it dismissed the bigamy case. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed the dismissal and remanded the case to the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a declaration of nullity of the second marriage avoids a prosecution for bigamy.
RULING:
No. The elements of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
When Capili married Tismo, all the above elements are present. The crime of bigamy was
already consummated. It is already immaterial if the second was subsequently declared void.
The outcome of the civil case filed by Karla Medina had no bearing to the determination of
Capilis guilt or innocence in the bigamy case because all that is required for the charge of
bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted. He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
The Supreme Court also notes that even if a party has reason to believe that his first marriage is
void, he cannot simply contract a second marriage without having such first marriage be
judicially declared as void. The parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and
only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is
52. MERCED vs. DIEZ
G.R. No. L-15315
FACTS:

Petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of his marriage to Elizabeth Ceasar alleging that he
married Elizabeth by reason of force, threat and intimidation upon his persons by Elizabeths
relatives. Elizabeth on the other hand filed a criminal complaint alleging that petitioner has been
previously married to one Eufrocina Tan. He now files a petition for the suspension of the
criminal case on grounds of prejudicial question.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial question.
RULING:
In order that a person may be held liable for the crime of bigamy, the subsequent marriage must
have all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage. One of the essential elements of a valid marriage is that the consent thereto of the
contracting parties must be freely given. Without the element of consent a marriage would be
illegal and void. Since the validity of the second marriage is in question, subject of the action for
bigamy, cannot be determined in the criminal case and since prosecution for bigamy does not lie
unless all the elements concur, it is necessary then that a decision in a civil action must first be
secured.

53. CONTINENTAL STEEL V. MONTANO

G.R. No. 182836
FACTS:
In January 2006, the wife of Rolando Hortillano had a miscarriage which caused the death of
their unborn child. Hortillano, in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, then filed
death benefits claim from his employer, the Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation which
denied the claim. Eventually, the issue was submitted for arbitration and both parties agreed to
have Atty. Allan Montao act as the arbitrator. Montao ruled that Hortillano is entitled to his
claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of Montao.
On appeal, Continental Steel insisted that Hortillano is not entitled because under the CBA, death
benefits are awarded if an employees legitimate dependent has died; but that in this case, no
death has occurred because the fetus died inside the womb of the mother, that a fetus has no
juridical personality because it was never born pursuant to Article 40 of the Civil Code which
provides a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born; that the fetus was not born
hence it is not a legitimate dependent as contemplated by the CBA nor did it suffer death as
contemplated under civil laws.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the fetus is a legitimate dependent.
2. Whether or not a person has to be born before it could die.
RULING:
1. Yes. In the first place, the fact of marriage between Hortillano and his wife was never put in
question, hence they are presumed to be married. Second, children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents are legitimate. Hence, the unborn child (fetus) is already a legitimate
dependent the moment it was conceived (meeting of the sperm and egg cell).
2. No. Death is defined as cessation of life. Certainly, a child in the womb has life. There is no
need to discuss whether or not the unborn child acquired juridical personality that is not the
issue here. But nevertheless, life should not be equated to civil personality. Moreover, while the
Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not
explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die. In this case,
Hortillanos fetus had had life inside the womb as evidenced by the fact that it clung to life for 38
weeks before the unfortunate miscarriage. Thus, death occurred on a dependent hence Hortillano
as an employee is entitled to death benefit claims as provided for in their CBA.

54. GELUZ V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. L-16439
FACTS:
Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar lazo, respondent, came to know Antonio Geluz, the petitioner
and physician, through her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became pregnant some time in 1950 before
she and Oscar were legally married. As advised by her aunt and to conceal it from her parents,
she decided to have it aborted by Geluz. She had her pregnancy aborted again on October 1953
since she found it inconvenient as she was employed at COMELEC. After two years, on
February 21, 1955, she again became pregnant and was accompanied by her sister Purificacion
and the latters daughter Lucida at Geluz clinic at Carriedo and P. Gomez Street. Oscar at this
time was in the province of Cagayan campaigning for his election to the provincial board. He
doesnt have any idea nor given his consent on the abortion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the husband, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from
the physician who caused the same.
RULING:
The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award fixed at P3,000 for the death of a person
does not cover cases of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality which trial court
and Court of Appeals predicated.
Both trial court and CA wasnt able to find any basis for an award of moral damages evidently
because Oscars indifference to the previous abortions of Nita clearly indicates he was
unconcerned with the frustration of his parental affections. Instead of filing an administrative or
criminal case against Geluz, he turned his wifes indiscretion to personal profit and filed a civil
action for damages of which not only he but, including his wife would be the beneficiaries. It
shows that hes after obtaining a large money payment since he sued Geluz for P50,000 damages
and P3,000 attorneys fees that serves as indemnity claim, which under the circumstances was
clearly exaggerated.

55. CATALAN vs. BASA

G.R. No. 159567

FACTS:
Feliciano Catalan was discharged from military service due to his psychological incapacity of
schizophrenia on October 20, 1948. He married Corazon Cerezo on September 1949. On June
1951 he donated a parcel of land to his sister Mercedes Catalan. On December 1953 Feliciano
was declared incompetent and BPI was appointed as his guardian. Mercedes sold the properties
to herein respondents in 1979. In 1997, BPI, acting as Felicianos guardian filed an action or
declaration of nullity od documents and recovery of possession and ownership alleging that the
donation to Mercedes was void ab initio as Feliciano not of sound mind when he effected the
donation, ipso facto, the sale to herein respondents are void ab initio.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Felicianos donation is void for lack of consent due to incapacity.
RULING:
In order for a donation to be valid, the donors capacity to give consent at the time of the
donation is existing. There lies no doubt that insanity impinges on consent freely given. However
the burden of proving such incapacity rests upon the person who alleges it, if no sufficient proof
to this effect is presented, capacity is presumed. The evidence presented by petitioners was
insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was competent when he donated the
property in question. A study of the nature of schizophrenia will show that Feliciano could still
be presumed capable of attending to his rights.

56. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. BAYOTAS

G.R. No. 102007
FACTS:
Accused- appellee was convicted of rape. During the pendency of his appeal however, he died.
Consequently, the SC dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal, but for the civil aspect, the SC
deferred to the comment of the Sol. Gen. In his comment, he expressed the view that the death of
the accused did not extinguish his civil liability and that the appeal should still be resolved for
the purpose of reviewing the conviction where such liability was based. The counsel for the
accused- appellee opposed the view arguing that the death of the accused, after final judgement,
extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the accused- appellee extinguishes his civil liability.
RULING:
It does, the appeal is dismissed. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute, it
states, partly, that Criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the convict, as to the
personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when
the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. Despite jurisprudence indicating
otherwise, a re-examination of past cases impels the SC to revert to the old ruling.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the
criminal liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when
the criminal action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof,
said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon
facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of
the criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be
distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to
the institution of a separate civil action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding.
Thus, it is held that the death of appellant extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability
based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape.

57. MARCOS V. COMELEC

248 S 300
FACTS:
Imelda Romualdez Marcos was born in a town in the first Congressional district of Leyte. She
then migrated to Manila when her parents decided to live in the said place. She was married to
the then President Ferdinand Marcos, and consequently, lived in Ilocos.
After several years, and upon returning to her birth place, she ran as a congresswoman in the first
district of Leyte. Her opponent in that position was Cirilo Roy Montejo. The case started when
Montejo asked the COMELEC to disqualify Marcos for allegedly lacking the one-year residency
requirement mandated by the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Montejo claimed the former First
Lady placed her residency in the first district of the province at seven monthspreceeding the
balloting, which entailed that she lacked five months of the required residency. Marcos argued
that she has been a resident since childhood and has not abandoned her residency. The poll body
disqualified her, and as a consequence, she appealed it to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Imelda Marcos is a resident of the First District of Leyte, and could run for and
could be elected to a Congressional seat.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that Mrs. Imelda Marcos is a resident of the first District of Leyte and
could run for and could be elected to a Congressional seat. This is based on the ground that Mrs.
Marcos is still a resident of that place and did not actually lack the requirements of those persons
who could run a Congressional seat. Mrs. Marcos lived in Manila and in Ilocos for a long time
and only went back to her town and lived there for only seven months prior to the election but
she did not really intended to abandon her birth place. This was proved by the frequent visits that
she had in that place. Mrs. Marcos is said to have her domicile of her choice and of origin in
Leyte. Yes, she did left Leyte but had shown that her choice of residence was Leyte, as proved by
her visits. Therefore, Mrs. Marcos could run for and could be elected to a Congressional seat on
the First District of Leyte.

58. REYES V. COMELEC

G.R. No. 207264
FACTS:
The petitioners assail through a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Preliminary Injunction resolution of the Commission on Election ordering the
cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner for the position of the Representative of
the lone district of Marinduque. On October 31. 2012, Joseph Socorro Tan filed with the
Comelec an Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of
Regina Ongsiako Reyes, the petitioner, on the ground that it contained material
representations.On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC cancelled the certificate of candidacy of the
petitioner. She filed an MR on April 8, 2013. On May 14, 2013, COMELEC en banc denied her
MR. However, on May 18, 2013, she was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 Elections. On
June 5, 2013, COMELEC declared the May 14, 2013 Resolution final and Executory. On the
same day, petitioner took her oath of office before Feliciano Belmonte, the Speaker of the House
of Representatives. She has yet to assume office at that time, as her term officially starts at noon
of June 30, 2013.According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she
was duly proclaimed because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the
HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.
ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petitioner who is proclaimed as winner and
who has already taken her oath of office for the position of member of the House of
Representative of Marinduque.
RULING:
Yes, COMELEC retains jurisdiction because the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the
candidate is considered a Member of the House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. For one to be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of these requisites: (1) valid proclamation; (2)
proper oath, and (3) assumption of office. Thus the petitioner cannot be considered a member of
the HR yet as she has not assumed office yet. Also, the 2nd requirement was not validly
complied with as a valid oath must be made (1) before the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here, although she made the oath before Speaker
Belmonte, there is no indication that it was made during plenary or in open session and, thus, it
remains unclear whether the required oath of office was indeed complied. Furthermore, petition
for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to exist. For an
act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion
must be patent and gross. Here, this Court finds that petitioner failed to adequately and
substantially show that grave abuse of discretion exists.

59. REPUBLIC V. ALBIOS

G.R. No. 198780
FACTS:
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married, as evidenced by a
Certificate of Marriage. On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer, alleging that immediately after their marriage,
they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention
of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations.
Fringer did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pretrial and to admit her pre-trial brief. After the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the
prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the
schedule.
The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio. The RTC opined that the parties married each
other for convenience only. Albios stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to
enable her to acquire American citizenship and that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay
him the sum of $2,000.00. However, she did not pay Fringer $2,000.00 because the latter never
processed her petition for citizenship
The OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the
essential requisite of consent was lacking.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship
void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
RULING:
The marriage between the parties is valid
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, established the
principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a
arriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they
were married.This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the
marriage was not ntered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United
States.The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to
determining the intention of evading immigration laws. It must be noted, however, that this
standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the
legal validity or existence of a marriage.
In the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, which declared as valid a marriage entered into
solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage could not

be avoided erely because the marriage was entered into for a limited purpose.The 1980
immigration case of Matter of McKee, further recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was
intrinsically different from a nonsubsisting one.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2)
made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A reely givenconsent requires that the contracting
parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it
is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of
the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be
conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the
nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real
consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent
was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That
their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring
American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was
a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it
was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

60. ESPINOSA V. ATTY. OMANA

A.C. NO. 9081

FACTS:
On 17 November 1997, Rodolfo Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal sought Omanas legal
advice on whether they could dissolve their marriage and live separately. Omana prepared a
document entitled Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay. Espinosa and Marantal started implanting the
conditions of the said contract. However, Marantal took custody of all their children and took
possession of most of the conjugal property. Espinosa sought the advice of Glindo, his fellow
employee who is a law graduate, who informed him that the contract executed by Omana was
not valid. They hired the services of a lawyer to file a complaint against Omana before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD). Omana denied that
she prepared the contract. She admitted that Espinosa went to see her and requested for the
notarization of the contract but she told him that it was illegal. Omana alleged that Espinosa
returned the next day while she was out of the office and managed to persuade her part-time
office staff to notarize the document. Her office staff forged her signature and notarized the
contract.
The IBP-CBD found that Omana violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. The IBP-CBD stated that Omana had failed to exercise due diligence in the
performance of her function as a notary public and to comply with the requirements of the law.
The IBP-CBD noted the inconsistencies in the defense of Omana who first claimed that it was
her part-time staff who notarized the contract but then later claimed that it was her former maid
who notarized it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Kasunduaan ng Paghihiwalay is valid
RULING:
This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial
approval is void. The Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the
disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and
extra judicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is exactly what Omana did in this
case. Even if it were true that it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract, it only
showed Omanas negligence in doing her notarial duties. We reiterate that a notary public is
personally responsible for the entries in his notarial register and he could not relieve himself of
this responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries or any member of his staff.
The Supreme Court suspended Atty. Julieta A. Omaa from the practice of law for one year. It also
revoked Atty. Omanas notarial commission and suspended her as a notary public for two years.
61. ESTRADA VS ESCRITOR
AM P-02-1651

FACTS:
Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. Alejandro
Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of
Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living with
Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritors
husband, who had lived with another woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary.
On the other hand, Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Estrada is not related to
either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite. According to
the complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it will
appear as if the court allows such act.
Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch
Tower and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity
with their religious beliefs. After ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a
Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness which was approved by the congregation. Such
declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their
union. Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses since 1985 and has been a
presiding minister since 1991, testified and explained the import of and procedures for executing
the declaration which was completely executed by Escritor and Quilapios in Atimonan, Quezon
and was signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower Central Office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of gross and
immoral conduct and be penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.
RULING:
A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind.
The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room
for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This
benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it
does not offend compelling state interests.

The states interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its
ranks a high standard of morality and decency. There is nothing in the OCAs (Office of the
Court Administrator) memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this interest is so

compelling that it should override respondents plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is

inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling
interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the
government which is the Office of the Solicitor General.
In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an
opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the
respondents position that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it is within
the scope of free exercise protection. The Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where
the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her
right to religious freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing look at
respondents claim of religious freedom but must also apply the compelling state interest test.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator. The
Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity (a) to
examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to
present evidence on the state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's religious belief and
practice; and (c) to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least
restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days
from the Office of the Court Administrator's receipt of this Decision.

63. PP V. BORROMEO

GR No. L-61873
FACTS:
Elia, defendant, and Susana were married. On 1981, Matilde Taborada, mother of Susan,
recounted that Susana was shouting frantically for help because Elias was killing her. Matilde
then asked a child to call for the deceased brother, Geronimo, for help. Upon hearing the report
of the child, Geronimo informed his father and together they went to Susana's hut. The windows
and the door were closed and Geronimo could only peep through the bamboo slats at the wall
where he saw Susana lying down, motionless, apparently dead beside her one-month old child
who was crying. Elias Borromeo was lying near Susana still holding on to a bloody kitchen bolo.
Susana's father called for the Mabolo police and, after a few minutes, police officer Fernando C.
Abella and three policemen arrived. The peace officers shouted and ordered Elias to open the
door. Elias answered calmly that he would smoke first before he would open the door. When he
did, the peace officers found Susana already dead, her intestine having spilled out of her
abdomen. A small kitchen bolo was at her side.
RTC decided that Elias was guilty for parricide, however the former argued that he was not
legally married to the deceased. And thus, the crime charged of parricide must be homicide
instead.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in holding as it did that appellant and Susana Taborada (the
deceased) were legally and validly married in a church wedding ceremony, when the officiating
priest testified otherwise and there was no marriage contract executed on the occasion or later
on; hence, the accused could only be liable for homicide.
RULING:
The Court denied the petition thus, affirming the decision of RTC. However, the indemnity was
increased from P12,000 to P 30,000.
There is no better proof of marriage than the admission of the accused of the existence of such
marriage. In the testimony of Elias, he admitted that he was married to the deceased.
Moreover, the Court held that person living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in constant violation of decency and law. The
presumption in favor of matrimony is one of the strongest known in law. The law presumes
morality, and not immorality; marriage, and not concubinage: legitimacy, and not bastardy. There
is the presumption that persons living together as husband and wife are married to each other.
And, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the registry of marriage does not
invalidate said marriage, as long as in the celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are

present. The forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate to the registry is not one of said
requisites.
As such, the case is decided in favor of the validity of marriage. Thus, the crime is not homicide
but rather parricide. The penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua.

64. ABADILLA V. TABILIRAN

A.M. No. MTJ-92-716
FACTS:
Petitioner is the assigned clerk of court at the sala of herein respondent Judge. Respondent stands
charged with gross immorality, deceitful conduct and corruption unbecoming of a Judge. It is
alleged that he has scandalously and publicly cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan during the
existence of a previous marriage, represented himself as single in the marriage contract with
Priscilla. He also caused the registration of his three illegitimate children as legitimate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of the charges.
RULING:
Respondent is guilty of gross immorality for having scandalously and openly cohabited with said
Priscilla Baybayan during the existence of his marriage with Teresita Tabiliran. It makes
mockery of the inviolability and sanctity of marriage as a basic social institution. It is not only a
civil contract, but is a new relation, an institution on the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently every intendment of the law leans towards legalizing
matrimony. Respondent Judge is dismissed from service.

65. DELA ROSA V. HEIRS

G.R. NO. 155733
FACTS:
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died not only intestate, but they died without descendants.
Guillermo outlived Josefa by two years. Herein petitioners and respondents are their respective
relatives claiming rights to their intestate estate. The alleged heirs of Josefa consist of her half
and full-blood siblings, nephews. On Guillermos side, his sisters, nephews and nieces,
illegitimate child and de facto adopted child. The petitioner for letters of administration stated
that Guillermo and Rustia were never married. Josefa Delgado estate claimants are her natural
siblings. Josefa was the daughter of Felisa by one Lucio Ocampo with five other children without
the benefit of marriage. Felisa had another son by way of Ramon Osorio who is Luis Delgado,
one of the claimants in Josefas estate. If Luis Delgado is the legitimate child of Felisa she is
barred from inheriting from Josefa by the principle of absolute separation between the legitimate
and illegitimate families.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid marriage between Guillermo and Josefa and between Felisa and
Ramon.
RULING:
Every intendment of the law leans towards legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together
apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio, which means, presumption is always on the validity of marriage. Several
circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed between Guillermo and
Josefa. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Although a marriage
contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof that no
marriage in fact took place. Once the presumption of marriage arises other evidences may be
presented just as herein. The certificate of identity issued to Josefa as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, the
passport issued to her as Josefa Rustia, the declaration under oath of Guilermo that he was
married to Josefa buttress the presumption of the existence of marriage. Guillermo and Josefa are
married. Anent the marriage of Felisa by Ramon, the factors and evidence presented sufficiently
overcame the rebuttable presumption of marriage. Hence Luis Delgado can inherit from Josefa.

66. VDA. DE CHUA VS. CA

G.R. No. 116835

FACTS:
From 1970 up to 1981, Roberto Chua lived out of wedlock with private respondent Florita A.
Vallejo and they begot two sons. On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City.
On 2 July 1992, Vallejo filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City a petition for the
guardianship and administration over the persons and properties of the two minors.
Petitioner Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua, representing to be the surviving spouse of Roberto
Chua, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue. Petitioner alleged that at the
time of the decedents death, Davao City was his residence, hence, the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City is the proper forum. In support of her allegation, petitioner presented the following
documents: (1) photocopy of the marriage contract; (2) Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the
name of Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and a resident of Davao City; (3)
Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at Davao City indicating that he was married
and was born in Cotabato City; (4) Income Tax Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed in Davao City
where the status of the decedent was stated as married; and, (5) Passport of the decedent
specifying that he was married and his residence was Davao City.
Vallejo contends that movant/oppositor Antonietta Chua is not the surviving spouse of the late
Roberto L. Chua but a pretender to the estate of the latter since the deceased never contracted
marriage with any woman until he died.
The trial court ruled that petitioner has no personality to file the motion not having proven his
status as a wife of the decedent. The Order was appealed to the CA, but it decided in favor of
herein respondents.
ISSUE: Was petitioner able to prove her marriage to Roberto L. Chua?
RULING: No. The best proof of marriage between a man and wife is a marriage contract which
petitioner failed to produce. The lower court correctly disregarded the Photostat copy of the
marriage certificate which she presented, this being a violation of the best evidence rule, together
with other worthless pieces of evidence. Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates,
passports and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the private
respondent has submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the
alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized the
marriage that he has not solemnized said alleged marriage.

67. EUGENIO V. HON. VELEZ, ET AL.

G.R. No. 85140
FACTS:
Respondents, unaware of the death of their sister Vitaliana, filed for a petition of habeas corpus
against the petitioner before the RTC, alleging that petitioner had forcibly taken her and confined
her in his palacial residence, depriving her of her liberty without any legal authority. When the
writ was issued, it was returned unanswered; petitioner arguing that such writ cannot apply to a
corpse. As her common law husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of her body. The
respondents, with the leave of the court, amended their petition, arguing that the petitioner was
wrongfully interfering with their duty to bury Vitaliana.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner, as the common law husband, has legal custody of Vitalianas body.
RULING:
No he does not, the decision appealed from was affirmed, and the petition was denied. Philippine
Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who
cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband
and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be
considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. While it is true
that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in our society,
and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by
law, authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the
man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. In
any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment
which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. Thus, custody of the dead body of
Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters, the respondents.

68. SILVERIO V. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 174689
FACTS:
Petitioner avers that he is a male transsexual. He underwent psychological examination, hormone
treatment and breast augmentation culminating with sex reassignment surgery in Thailand. From
then on, petitioner deposed himself as female and got engaged. He now seeks to have his name
in his birth certificate changed and his sex from male to female.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner can change the entry of sex in his birth certificate.
RULING:
Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. However
a change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status. R.A. 9048 does not sanction
such change of name under such cause. It is further a substantial change for which the applicable
procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. However no reasonable interpretation of the
provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex
reassignment. A persons sex is an essential requisite in marriage and family relations. It is a part
of a persons legal capacity and civil status. To grant the changes sought by the petitioner will
substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow
the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment.

69. REPUBLIC vs. CAGANDAHAN

G.R. No. 166676
FACTS:
Petitioner was born on January 1981 and was registered as a female in the birth
certificate. While growing up she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed
with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a condition where a person thus afflicted possess
both male and female characteristics. While maturing it was the male characteristics that
continued to develop and be pronounced and hence, he deposed himself as a male person. He
now seeks to alter his name of Jennifer to Jeff.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for the change of name can be effected.
RULING:
Respondent undisputedly has CAH which involves intersex anatomy. The court is of the view
that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex, the determining factor in his gender
classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority,
with good reasons thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and
considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones there is preponderant biological
support for considering him as being male. The petition is granted.

70. OBERGEFELL V. HODGES

576 US 2015
FACTS:
Groups of same-sex couples sued their relevant state agencies in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and
Tennessee to challenge the constitutionality of those states' bans on same-sex marriage or refusal
to recognize legal same-sex marriages that occurred in jurisdictions that provided for such
marriages. The plaintiffs in each case argued that the states' statutes violated the Equal Protection
Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and one group of plaintiffs also
brought claims under the Civil Rights Act. In all the cases, the trial court found in favor of the
plaintiffs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the states' bans
on same-sex marriage and refusal to recognize marriages performed in other states did not
violate the couples' Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process.
ISSUE:
(1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two people of
the same sex?
(2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people
of the same sex that was legally licensed and performed in another state?
RULING:
Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to marry as one of the
fundamental liberties it protects, and that analysis applies to same-sex couples in the same
manner as it does to opposite-sex couples. Judicial precedent has held that the right to marry is a
fundamental liberty because it is inherent to the concept of individual autonomy, it protects the
most intimate association between two people, it safeguards children and families by according
legal recognition to building a home and raising children, and it has historically been recognized
as the keystone of social order. Because there are no differences between a same-sex union and
an opposite-sex union with respect to these principles, the exclusion of same-sex couples from
the right to marry violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also guarantees the right of same-sex couples to
marry as the denial of that right would deny same-sex couples equal protection under the law.
Marriage rights have traditionally been addressed through both parts of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the same interrelated principles of liberty and equality apply with equal force
to these cases; therefore, the Constitution protects the fundamental right of same-sex couples to
marry. The Court also held that the First Amendment protects the rights of religious
organizations to adhere to their principles, but it does not allow states to deny same-sex couples
the right to marry on the same terms as those for opposite-sex couples.

71. DONATO V. LUNA

160 SCRA 441
FACTS:
Private respondent Paz Abayan filed an information for bigamy against petitioner Leonilo
Donato. She also filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court a civil action for
declaration of nullity of marriage to petitioner because of a prior marriage of petitioner. Said civil
case was based on the ground that Paz consented to entering into the marriage which was
Donatos second since she had no previous knowledge that Donato was already married to a
certain Rosalinda Maluping on June 30, 1978.
In his answer petitioner claimed that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized
without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were
employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the
solemnization of the second marriage, Paz and Donato had lived together as husband and wife
without the benefit of wedlock for 5 years proven by a joint affidavit executed by them on
September 26, 1978 for which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant
to Article 76 of the Civil Code. Donato continued to live with Paz until November 1978 where
Paz left their home upon learning that Donato already previously married.
Prior to the date set for the trial of the criminal case, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the
proceedings of the case because the civil action raises a prejudicial question which must first be
determined before the criminal case can proceed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of
marriage pending on the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question
RULING:
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted that the
issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second
marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy.
Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the herein private respondent Paz B. Abayan who
filed the complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was
obtained through deceit. Petitioner Donato failed to prove that his consent to the second marriage
has been obtained by the use of threats, force and intimidation.
Furthermore, petitioner's averments that his consent was obtained by private respondent through
force, violence, intimidation and undue influence in entering a subsequent marriage is belled by
the joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

72. WIEGEL V. SEMPI-DIY

G.R. No. L-53703
FACTS:
In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the
declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic
Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel
(Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one
Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of
Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting
marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A.
Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union.
ISSUE:
Was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable?
RULING:
The Supreme Court finds the petition devoid of merit.There is no need for petitioner to prove that
her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties because assuming this to
be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore
valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married
respondent she was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to
respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first
husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs
according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes
she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with
respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be
regarded VOID under the law.
The petition is dismissed.

74. BESO vs. DAGUMAN

A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211
FACTS:
Petitioner and Bernardito Yman got married on August 28, 1997 by herein respondent Judge.
After the wedding herein petitioner was abandoned by her husband hence prompting her to check
with the Civil Registrar to inquire regarding the marriage contract to which it was found out that
the marriage was no registered. She now filed this administrative complaint against herein
respondent Judge alleging that the marriage was solemnized outside of his jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Judge has authority to solemnize the marriage.
RULING:
Article 7 of the Family Code provides that the Judge can solemnize a marriage within the court
jurisdiction. Considering that the respondent Judges jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta.
Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize the
marriage in the City of Calabayog where herein marriage was solemnized.

75. ALCANTARA V. ALCANTARA

GR No. 167746
FACTS:
On December 8,1982, Rosita Alcantara (respondent) and Restituto Alcantara (petitioner) went to
the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for
them. They met a person fixer who arranged their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino
Navarro, a minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel. The marriage was likewise
celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The wedding took place at the stairs in
Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel. However, there was a marriage license obtained
in Carmona, Cavite but neither of the parties is a resident of Carmona, Cavite and they never
went to the said place to apply for a license with its local civil registrar. Petitioner and respondent
went through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila
on March 26, 1983 utilizing the same marriage license. The marriage license number 7054133
is not identical with the marriage license number which appears in their marriage contract. There
is also a case filed by the respondent against herein petitioner before the MTC of Mandaluyong
for concubinage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between the petitioner and respondent is void.
RULING:
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of Family Code,
the applicable law would be the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its
celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code,
the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to
Article 53 of the same Code. The law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be
apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local
civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In the case at bar, the
marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number.
Moreover, the certification issued by the local civil registrar specifically identified the parties to
whom the marriage license was issued further validating the fact that a license was issued to the
parties herein.
Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the
contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior
to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do
not affect the validity of the marriage. The court still holds that there is no sufficient basis to
annul their marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its
validity but the parties or party responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally,
administratively liable.
The discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification of the Municipal civil
registrar, which states that the marriage license number issued to the parties is No. 7054133,

while the marriage contract states that the marriage license number of the parties is number
7054033. It is not impossible to assume that the same is a mere typographical error. It therefore
does not detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage
license to the parties.
The authority of the solemnizing officer shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be
presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary. The solemnizing officer is not dutybound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the
local civil registrar. All the said officer needs to know is that the license has been duly and
regularly issued by the competent official. Lastly, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their
civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever irregularities or defect attended the civil wedding.
The instant petition is denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
the decision of the RTC of Makati City is affirmed.

76. SEVILLA V. CARDENAS

G.R. NO. 167684
FACTS:
On 19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by
Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces
of the Philippines, Jaime and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced
to a certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date,
the father of Carmelita caused Jaime and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said
Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for his
supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license from any Civil
Registry, consequently, no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.
On March 28, 1994, a complaint was filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC. In its Decision
dated January 25, 2002, the RTC declared the nullity of the marriage of the parties for lack of the
requisite marriage license. Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision
dated 20 December 2004, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court. Jaime filed a
Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the Court of Appeals denied in a
Resolution dated 6 April 2005.
This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the parties herein
prior to the celebration of the marriages in question?
RULING:
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not
exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the
presumption of regularity of performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in
issuing the certifications, is effectively rebutted.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage
License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook
just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook,
we cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries
therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the
marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. The courts look upon this presumption with
great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
Therefore, the instant petition is denied.

77. ARAES vs OCCIANO

A.M. No.MTJ-02-1390
FACTS:
On 17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized petitioners marriage to her late groom
Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which
is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband
passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioners right to inherit the vast
properties left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the
pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge should be sanctioned for solemnizing marriage with lack of
marriage license and beyond his jurisdiction?
RULING:
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional trial
court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial
jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of
respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing
the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and
subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for
he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid
liability for violating the law on marriage.
The respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of
Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.

78. VDA. DE JACOB V. CA, ET AL,

G.R. No. 135216
FACTS:
Petitioner, who claimed to be the spouse of the deceased by virtue of a marriage contract, was
appointed the Special Administratix for the estates of the latter. Defendant, on the other hand, is
the legally adopted son who is in intervening in the estate proceedings, claimed that he is the sole
surviving heir of the deceased, questioning the validity of the marriage between the petitioner
and his adoptive father. The petitioner opposed the Motion for Intervention and filed a complaint
for injunction with damages, questioning respondents claim as the legal heir of the deceased.
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent, and the CA affirmed such decision, thus this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob and deceased Alfredo
E. Jacob was valid.
RULING:
It is, the petition is granted, and the CA decision is reversed and set aside. It is an established fact
that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. Clearly
then, the marriage was exceptional in character and did not require a marriage license under
Article 76 of the Civil Code. The Civil Code governs this case, because the questioned marriage
and the assailed adoption took place prior the effectivity of the Family Code. In addition, it is
settled that if the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, upon
proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a
copy or a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by recollection of
witnesses. Upon a showing that the document was duly executed and subsequently lost, without
any bad faith on the part of the offeror, secondary evidence may be adduced to prove its contents.
In the case at hand, the courts should have accepted the testimonies of the petitioner, Adela
Pilapil and the solemnizing officer, and considered as evidence the photographs, documentary
evidence, the subsequent authorization issued by the Archbishop and the affidavit of the
solemnizing officer. In addition, failure to send a copy of a marriage certificate for record
purposes does not invalidate the marriage. It is not the petitioners duty to send a copy of the
marriage certificate to the civil registrar. Instead, this charge fell upon the solemnizing officer.
Lastly, the jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that
a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage. Given the undisputed fact that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as
husband and wife, we find that the presumption of marriage was not rebutted in this case.

79. TRINIDAD V. TRINIDAD

G.R. 118904
FACTS:
On August 10, 1978, Petitioner Arturio Trinidad filed a complaint for partition and damages
against Private Respondents Felix and Lourdes, both surnamed Trinidad, before the Court of
First Instance, claiming that he was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, one of three (3)
children of Patricio Trinidad, who was the original owner of the parcels of land. Patricio Trinidad
died in 1940, leaving the four (4) parcels of land to his three (3) children, Inocentes, Lourdes and
Felix. In 1970, plaintiff demanded from the defendants to partition the land into three (3) equal
shares and to give him the one-third (1/3) individual share of his late father, but the defendants
refused.
Defendants denied that plaintiff was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants contended
that Inocentes was single when he died in 1941, before plaintiff's birth. Defendants also denied
that plaintiff had lived with them, and claimed that the parcels of land described in the complaint
had been in their possession since the death of their father in 1940 and that they had not given
plaintiff a share in the produce of the land.
Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of three (3) children, namely, Inocentes,
Lourdes and Felix. When Patricio died in 1940, survived by the above named children, he left
four (4) parcels of land, all situated at Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo Aklan.
Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate son of the late Inocentes
Trinidad.
On October 28, 1982, Felix died without issue, so he was not substituted as a party. On July 4,
1989, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. Respondent Court reversed the
trial court on the ground that petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that his
parents were legally married to each other and that acquisitive prescription against him had set
in.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner presented sufficient evidence of his parents' marriage and of his
filiation?
RULING:
The partition of the late Patricio's real properties requires preponderant proof that petitioner is a
co-owner or co-heir of the decedent's estate. His right as a co-owner would, in turn, depend on
whether he was born during the existence of a valid and subsisting marriage between his mother
(Felicidad) and his putative father (Inocentes). The Court held that such burden was successfully
discharged by petitioner and, thus, the reversed the assailed decision and resolution.

In Pugeda vs. Trias, it was ruled that when the question of whether a marriage has been
contracted arises in litigation, said marriage may be proven by relevant evidence. To prove the
fact of marriage, the following would constitute competent evidence: the testimony of a witness
to the matrimony, the couple's public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged
wedlock, the birth and the baptismal certificates of children born during such union, and the
mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents.
In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Aklan that all records of births, deaths and marriages were either lost, burned or destroyed during
the Japanese occupation of said municipality. This fact, however, is not fatal to petitioner's case.
Although the marriage contract is considered the primary evidence of the marital union,
petitioner's failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place, as other forms of
relevant evidence may take its place.
In place of a marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by petitioner: Isabel Meren, who
testified that she was present during the nuptial of Felicidad and Inocentes on May 5, 1942 in
New Washington, Aklan; and Jovita Gerardo, who testified that the couple deported themselves
as husband and wife after the marriage. Gerardo, the 77-year old barangay captain of Tigayon
and former board member of the local parent-teachers' association, used to visit Inocentes and
Felicidad's house twice or thrice a week, as she lived only thirty meters away. On July 21, 1943,
Gerardo dropped by Inocentes' house when Felicidad gave birth to petitioner. She also attended
petitioner's baptismal party held at the same house. Her testimony constitutes evidence of
common reputation respecting marriage. It further gives rise to the disputable presumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract
of marriage. Petitioner also presented his baptismal certificate in which Inocentes and Felicidad
were named as the child's father and mother.
Petitioner submitted in evidence a certification that records relative to his birth were either
destroyed during the last world war or burned when the old town hall was razed to the ground on
June 17, 1956. To prove his filiation, he presented in evidence two family pictures, his baptismal
certificate and Gerardo's testimony. Although a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive
proof of filiation, it is one of "the other means allowed under the Rules of Court and special
laws" to show pedigree.
The totality of petitioner's positive evidence clearly preponderates over private respondents' selfserving negations. Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by one
side outweighs that of the adverse party.

80. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 103047
FACTS:
Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin Cardenas.
They did not immediately live together and it was only upon Castro found out that she was
pregnant that they decided to live together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for only 4
months. Thereafter, they parted ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her brother with
the consent of Cardenas.
The baby was brought in the US and in Castros earnest desire to follow her daughter wanted to
put in order her marital status before leaving for US. She filed a petition seeking a declaration
for the nullity of her marriage. Her lawyer then found out that there was no marriage license
issued prior to the celebration of their marriage proven by the certification issued by the Civil
Registrar of Pasig.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by Castro is sufficient to
establish that no marriage license was issued to the parties prior to the solemnization of their
marriage?
RULING:
The court affirmed the decision of Court of Appeals that the certification issued by the Civil
Registrar unaccompanied by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that the office did
not issue a marriage license to the contracting parties. Albeit the fact that the testimony of Castro
is not supported by any other witnesses is not a ground to deny her petition because of the
peculiar circumstances of her case. Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of the
proceedings, which he chose to ignore.
Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by
private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.

81. SUSAN NICDAO-CARINO vs. SUSAN YEE CARINO

GR No. 132529
FACTS:
SPO4 Santiago CArio married petitioner Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969, with whom he had
two children, Sahlee and Sandee. On November 10, 1982, SPO4 Cario also married respondent
Susan Yee. In 1988, SPO4 Cario became bedridden due to diabetes and tuberculosis, and died
on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial
expenses. Both Susans filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance from various
government agencies pertaining to the deceased. Nicdao was able to collect P146,000 from
MBAI, PCCVI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig, while Yee received a total of P21,000
from GSIS burial and SSS burial insurance.
On December 14, 1993, Yee filed for collection of money against NIcdao, praying that Nicdao be
ordered to return to her at least one-half of the P146,000 NIcdao had collected. For failing to file
her answer, Nicdao was declared in default. Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took
place during the subsistence of and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the
marriage between Nicdao and Cario. But she claimed good faith, having no knowledge of the
previous marriage until at the funeral where she met Nicdao who introduced herself as the wife
of the deceased. Yee submitted that Carios marriage to Nicdao was void because it was
solemnized without the required marriage license.
ISSUES:
a) Whether or not the subsequent marriage is null and void;
b)
Whether or not, if yes to above, the wife of the deceased is entitled to collect the death
benefits from government agencies despite the nullity of their marriage.
RULING:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void.
Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes
of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to
be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even
after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.
Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the
absence therof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. It does not

follow, however, that since the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased was void ab initio, the death
benefits would now be awarded to Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for
purposes of remarriage, there must be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage; otherwise, the second
marriage would also be void.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property.

82. MORIGO V. PEOPLE

422 S 376
FACTS:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were board mates in Bohol for four years. The lost contacts
when the school year ended. When Lucio received a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore,
constant communication took place between them. They later became sweethearts. In 1986,
Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they
maintained constant communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed
to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on
August 30, 1990 in Bohol. Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio
behind. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against
appellant which was granted on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992. On
October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago in Bohol. On
September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, Lucio was charged with bigamy before the RTC of Bohol. After trial, the
court convicted him as charged, ruling that want of a marriage ceremony is not a defense in
bigamy and the parties in the marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is
void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of said
marriage. Lucio also cannot rely on the divorce decree, as the same is without force and effect
when both parties are not domiciled in the country which granted it and was merely resorted to
for the purpose of obtaining a divorce. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lucio is liable for Bigamy, in view of the finding that his first marriage was void
for having been no valid marriage ceremony
RULING:
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married.
But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there
is no first marriage to speak of.
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and
Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage
contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that
the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code. As the
dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, This simply means that there was
no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first
marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration
of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the
accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married.

The Supreme Court granted the petition. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set
aside. Petitioner Lucio Cacho Morigo is acquitted from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground
that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.

83. MORENO vs. BERNABE

A.M. No. MJT-94-963
FACTS:
On October 4, 1993, Marilou and Marcelo Moreno were married before respondent Judge
Bernabe. Marilou avers that Respondent Judge assured her that the marriage contract will be
released ten (10) days after October 4, 1993. Complainant then visited the office of the
Respondent Judge on October 15, 1993 only to find out that she could not get the marriage
contract because the Office of the Local Civil Registrar failed to issue a marriage license. She
claims that Respondent Judge connived with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to deceive her.
In his comment, Respondent denied that he conspired with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to
solemnize the marriage for the purpose of deceiving the complainant. The Respondent Judge
contends that he did not violate the law nor did he have the slightest intention to violate the law
when he, in good faith, solemnized the marriage, as he was moved only by a desire to help a
begging and pleading complainant who wanted some kind of assurance or security due to her
pregnant condition. In order to pacify complainant, Marcelo Moreno requested him to perform
the marriage ceremony, with the express assurance that "the marriage license was definitely
forthcoming since the necessary documents were complete.
In its Memorandum dated January 17, 1995, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended
that Respondent be held liable for misconduct for solemnizing a marriage without a marriage
license and that the appropriate administrative sanctions be imposed against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Respondent Judge is guilty of grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the
law by solemnizing the marriage without the required marriage license?
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that Respondent Judge, by his own admission that he solemnized the
marriage between complainant and Marcelo Moreno without the required marriage license, has
dismally failed to live up to his commitment to be the "embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence" and to his promise to be "faithful to the law."
Respondent cannot hide behind his claim of good faith and Christian motives which, at most,
would serve only to mitigate his liability but not exonerate him completely. Good intentions
could never justify violation of the law. Respondent is hereby ordered to pay a fine of
P10,000.00 and is sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.

85. FUJIKI V. MARINAY

GR No. 196049
FACTS:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay in the Philippines. The marriage did not sit well with petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki
could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage
being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married in the Philippines. Maekara brought
Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left
Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010,
Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 2011, Fujiki filed a
petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized;
(2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under
Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the
Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the
Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).
RTC dismissed the pettion assailing that Fujiki is not the proper party to attest the nullity of
marriage. Such is only reserved to both husband and/ or wife.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC: Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife.
ISSUE:
The following are the issues in the case:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on
the ground of bigamy.
RULING:
The Court granted the petition.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign

judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment
may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation
to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court
judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer
who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as
Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the
Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.
The Court finds no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While
the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance
with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
Fujiki just need to prove the divorce decree as required by the Rules of Court.
Moreover the Court held that Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the
ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the
same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the
Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no
doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil
registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the
substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most
intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law
the moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage include the right to be
supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property
regime of the marriage.

86. TENCHAVEZ V. ESCANO

G.R. No. L-19671
FACTS:
Pastor Tenchavez, 32, married Vicenta Escano, 27, on Feb. 24, 1948, in Cebu City. As of June
1948, the newly-weds were already estranged. On June 24, 1950, Escano left for the US. On
August 22, 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the plaintiff in the State of
Nevada on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character."
On October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce was issued by the Nevada Court. On September 13,
1954, Escano married an American Russel Leo Moran in Nevada. She now lives with him in
California and by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on August 8,
1958. On July 30, 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint for legal separation and damages against
VE and her parents in the CFI-Cebu.
Tenchavez poses the novel theory that Mamerto and Mina Escao are undeserving of an award
for damages because they are guilty of contributory negligence in failing to take up proper and
timely measures to dissuade their daughter Vicenta from leaving her husband Tenchavez
obtaining a foreign divorce and marrying another man (Moran). This theory cannot be
considered: first, because this was not raised in the court below; second, there is no evidence to
support it; third, it contradicts plaintiff's previous theory of alienation of affections in that
contributory negligence involves an omission to perform an act while alienation of affection
involves the performance of a positive act.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not at the the time Escano was still a Filipino citizen when the divorce decree was
issued.
2. Whether or not the award of moral damages against Escao may be given to Tenchavez on the
grounds of her refusal to perform her wifely duties, her denial of consortium, and desertion of
her husband.
RULING:
1.
Yes. At the time the divorce decree was issued, Escano like her husband, was still a
Filipino citizen. She was then subject to Philippine law under Art. 15 of the New Civil Code
(NCC). Philippine law, under the NCC then now in force, does not admit absolute divorce but
only provides for legal separation. For Philippine courts to recognize foreign divorce decrees
between Filipino citizens would be a patent violation of the declared policy of the State,
especially in view of the third paragraph of Art. 17, NCC. Moreover, recognition would give rise
to scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens to the detriment of those members of
our society whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorce
outside the Philippines.Therefore, a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and
decreed after the effectivity of the NCC, is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction.
2.
Yes. The acts of Vicenta (up to and including her divorce, for grounds not countenanced
by our law, which was hers at the time) constitute a wilful infliction of injury upon plaintiff's

feelings in a manner "contrary to morals, good customs or public policy" (Civil Code, Art. 21)
for which Article 2219 (10) authorizes an award of moral damages. It is also argued that, by the
award of moral damages, an additional effect of legal separation has been added to Article 106. It
was plain in the decision that the damages attached to her wrongful acts under the codal article
(Article 2176) expressly cited. But economic sanctions are not held in our law to be incompatible
with the respect accorded to individual liberty in civil cases. Thus, a consort who unjustifiably
deserts the conjugal abode can be denied support (Art. 178, Civil Code of the Phil.). And where
the wealth of the deserting spouse renders this remedy illusory, there is no cogent reason why the
court may not award damage as it may in cases of breach of other obligations to do intuitu
personae even if in private relations physical coercion be barred under the old maxim "Nemo
potest precise cogi and factum".
87. RP V. IYOY
G.R. NO. 152577
FACTS:
Respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones
Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five children Crasus, Jr., Daphne,
Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their
marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant."
In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their
five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely
a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that
he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985,
respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got
married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the
Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent
Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the
sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more: in
1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their
fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her
American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her American
husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had
invitations made in which she was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the time the Complaint
was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was
no more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his
Complaint that Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated
her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity,
being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code.
On 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of respondent
Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio. The Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming the
trial courts declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.

ISSUES:
a) Whether or not the totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the
finding of psychological incapacity of Fely?
b) Whether or not Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is applicable to
the case at bar?
RULING:
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his testimony,
which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other
corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on
the recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus
and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the
wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husbands surname.
Even considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasuss
Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had
such a grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of
marriage.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple
getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was
celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case
of Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino
citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed
before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for
the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same
Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for
divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family
rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad.
Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino
spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from Crasus.

88. PILAPIL V IBAY-SOMERA

G.R. No. 80116
FACTS:

Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German
national, were married in Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, such
connubial disharmony eventuated in Geiling initiating a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in
Germany. The Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on
the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for
adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging in one that, while still married to said Geiling,
Pilapil had an affair with a certain William Chia. The Assistant Fiscal, after the corresponding
investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal Victor approved a resolution
directing the filing of 2 complaint for adultery against the petitioner. The case entitled PP
Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia was assigned to the court presided by the respondent judge
Ibay-Somera.
A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was denied by the respondent. Pilapil filed
this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO, seeking the
annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.
As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.
ISSUE:
Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the complaint for adultery, considering
that it was done after obtaining a divorce decree?
RULING:
NO Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a
sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with
unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a
formal, requirement. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to
institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or
legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a logical
consequence since the raison detre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed
offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the
criminal case.
Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a
criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be
unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized
in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle
in our civil law on the matter of status of persons Under the same considerations and rationale,
private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to

commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he
filed suit.

89. QUITA V. CA, ET AL.

G.R. No. 124862
FACTS:
Petitioner and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines. Sometime
however, they obtained a final judgement of divorce in San Francisco, after which she remarried
twice. When Arturo died, he left no will. When letters of administration were to be issued, one
Atty. Cabasal was appointed due to the opposition of the respondent, claiming to be the surviving
spouse of the deceased, and the surviving children. Respondent later presented submitted the
final judgement of divorce between the petitioner and Arturo. Later, Ruperto, claiming to be the
sole surviving brother of the deceased, intervened. Due to the failure of providing evidence, the
RTC only the petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. On a motion for
reconsideration, the surviving children, but not the respondent, were declared heirs. The CA,
however, declared this decision null and void, and subsequently ordered that the case be
remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings. The motion for reconsideration was
denied, thus the case at hand.
ISSUE:
Who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent?
RULING:
The case was remanded to the trail court for further proceedings to determine whether or not
petitioner may inherit. It must be noted that respondent's claim to heirship was already resolved
by the trial court wherein it was found that their marriage was a bigamous one to the effect that
she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate
relationship.
However, if there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases. The citizenship of the petitioner at
the time of her divorce with Arturo must first be determined. The finding on their
citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a
basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce. The doubt persisted as to
whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. Once proved that she
was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, petitioner could very well lose her
right to inherit from Arturo.

90. SAN LUIS V. SAN LUIS

G.R. No. 133743
FACTS:
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis, who was the
former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born
six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963,
Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a
son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint
for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of
America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child
Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San
Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United
Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children with
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on
December 18, 1992. Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for
letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Respondent alleged that
she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100
San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedents surviving
heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second
marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at
P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent
prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be
issued to her. On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of
Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and
failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration
should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of
residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file
the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his
death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same
grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal of the petition. On February 28,
1994, the trial court issued an Order denying the two motions to dismiss.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held
that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the
Province of Laguna. Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside
the orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998
ISSUES:
a)

Whether or not the venue was properly laid in the case

b)
Whether or not respondent Felicidad has legal capacity to file the subject petition for
letters of administration?
RULING:
The Supreme Court finds that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of
administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction over
Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time,
Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in
Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. Thus, the subject petition was
validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
On the second issue, the Supreme Court held that respondent would qualify as an interested
person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the
existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and
Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly
performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article
144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the
beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a coownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and
industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed
equal, unless the contrary is proven. The case therefore is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings on the evidence to prove the validity of the divorce between Felicisimo and Merry
Lee.

91. CORPUZ V. SANTO TOMAS

G.R. No. 186571
FACTS:
Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization on November 29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent
Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other professional
commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines
sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was
having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a
petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts
petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on
January 8, 2006. Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another
Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went
to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and
Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the
National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn
still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be
judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of
1982.
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did
not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial
court. She offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a
similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus,
requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts. In its
October 30, 2008 decision, the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert
was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce
decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of
the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her
to be able to remarry under Philippine law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right
to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree?
RULING:
The Supreme Court qualifies its conclusion that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement that this
conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other words,
the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign
divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the

aliens national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires
proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody
of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine Foreign Service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a
copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed
to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this point,
simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more
appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent
with the Canadian divorce law. The petition was granted and the case is remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings.

93. BANGAYAN V. BANGAYAN

G.R. NO. 201061
FACTS:
In September 1979, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. married Azucena Alegre. In December 1981,
Azucena left for the United States of America. Meanwhile, starting 1979, Benjamin developed a
romantic relationship with Sally Go who was a customer in the auto parts and supplies business
owned by Benjamins family. In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband
and wife. Sallys father was against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to appease her
father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported
marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamins marital status, assured him that the marriage
contract would not be registered.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada, bringing their
childer with her. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents
against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a
petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage
before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the
formal requisites to a valid marriage.
Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in
accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as administrator of the
properties during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as
illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered properties became the subject of the partition before
the trial court. Aside from the seven properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally
named 37 properties in her answer.
The trial court ruled in favor of Benjamin. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not
bigamous. The trial court ruled that the second marriage was void not because of the existence of
the first marriage but because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage license. Hence,
bigamy was not committed in this case. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and nonexistent
RULING:
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros Registration Officer II of the
Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage license issued to
Benjamin and Sally. The certification from the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the nonissuance of a marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys
probative value, being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data
relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a
marriage contract, the marriage was void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license. s

pointed out by the trial court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in
jest"16 and "a simulated marriage, at the instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from
expected social humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the society especially from her
parents seen as Chinese conservatives." In short, it was a fictitious marriage.
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those
covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In this
case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly
established that no marriage license was issued to them.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.

94. ABBAS V. ABBAS

G.R. No. 183896
FACTS:
Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and
they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. He arrived in the
Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon, he
was at his mother-in-laws residence, located at 2676 F. Muoz St., Malate, Manila, when his
mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo
some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the
nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that
he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified
that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never
resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage
contract wherein the marriage license number could be found. The Municipal Civil Registrar,
Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage
license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967,
was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan.
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was
issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed thus
their marriage on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio. Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration
dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal the questioned
decision to the Court of Appeals.
The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the certification
of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the
marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification could
not be accorded probative value. The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and
documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was
compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2008 but the same was denied by the
CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008 hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing and setting aside the decision of the RTC
granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage?
RULING:
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and
Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for

Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to
another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage
License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the
names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the document.
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his
motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does
not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license,
given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot
be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be
applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and
Syed is void ab initio.
The petition is therefore granted.

96. COJUANGCO V. PALMA

GR No. L-69550
FACTS:
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Leo J. Palma, alleging
as grounds deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office, violation of his oath as a lawyer and
grossly immoral conduct.
Complainant and respondent met sometime in the 70s. Complainant was a client in the firm
where respondent is working. Respondent was then the lawyer assigned to handle his cases.
Owing to his growing business concerns, complainant decided to hire respondent as his personal
counsel. Consequently, respondents relationship with complainants family became intimate. He
traveled and dined with them abroad. He frequented their house and even tutored complainants
22-year old daughter Maria Luisa Cojuangco.
On June 22, 1982, without the knowledge of complainants family, respondent married Lisa in
Hongkong. It was only the next day that respondent informed complainant and assured him that
everything is legal. Complainant was shocked, knowing fully well that respondent is a married
man and has three children. Upon investigation, complainant found that respondent courted Lisa
during their tutoring sessions. Immediately, complainant sent his two sons to Hongkong to
convince Lisa to go home to Manila and discuss the matter with the family. Lisa was persuaded.
Complainant also came to know that: (a) on the date of the supposed marriage, respondent
requested from his (complainants) office an airplane ticket to and from Australia, with stop-over
in Hong Kong; (b) respondent misrepresented himself as bachelor before the Hong Kong
authorities to facilitate his marriage with Lisa; and (c)respondent was married to Elizabeth
Hermosisima and has three children, namely: Eugene Philippe, Elias Anton and Eduardo
Lorenzo. Complainant then filed a nullity of marriage between respondent and his daughter
disbarment case against the latter.
ISSUE:
The main issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not respondent committed the following
acts which warrant his disbarment:
a) Grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant;
b) His misrepresentation that there was no legal impediment or prohibition to his contracting a
second marriage;
c) The acts of respondent constitute deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office, grossly
immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer.

RULING:

The Court held that respondent is guilty of grossly misconduct and ordered to be disbarred.
While, complainant himself admitted that respondent was a good lawyer, however, professional
competency alone does not make a lawyer a worthy member of the Bar. Good moral character is
always an indispensable requirement. The ringing truth in this case is that respondent married
Lisa while he has a subsisting marriage with Elizabeth Hermosisima.
Undoubtedly, respondents act constitutes grossly immoral conduct, a ground for disbarment
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that
degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of
marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a
second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.
The Court held that respondents acts are manifestly immoral. First, he abandoned his lawful
wife and three children. Second, he lured an innocent young woman into marrying him. And
third, he misrepresented himself as a bachelor so he could contract marriage in a foreign land.
Moreover, the court determined that the respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, is that they shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. This is founded on the lawyers primordial duty to society as spelled out in
Canon 1 which states:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law and legal processes.

97. REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 103047
FACTS:
Respondent Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony
performed by a City Court Judge of Pasig City and was celebrated without the knowledge of
Castros parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended the procuring of documents required
for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage license.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was
unknown to Castros parents. They decided to live together when Castro discovered she was
pregnant. The cohabitation lasted only for four months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways.
Desiring to follow her daughter in the U.S., Castro wanted to put in order his marital status
before leaving for the U.S. She then discovered that there was no marriage license issued to
Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage as certified by the Civil Registrar of Pasig,
Metro Manila. Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or before June
24, 1970 in order to apply for a license. Neither did she sign any application therefor. She affixed
her signature only on the marriage contract on June 24, 1970 in Pasay City.
Respondent then filed a petition with the RTC of Quezon seeking for the judicial declaration of
nullity of her marriage claiming that no marriage license was ever issued to them prior to the
solemnization of their marriage.
The trial court denied the petition holding that the certification was inadequate to establish the
non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It
ruled that the inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to
show that there was no marriage license issued. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was
reversed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent are
sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to
the celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.
RULING:
Yes. At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing
marital relations was the New Civil Code. The law provides that no marriage license shall be
solemnized without a marriage license first issued by the Local Civil Registrar. Being one of the
essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab
initio. The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasig
enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data
relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion
and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and

inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to
the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is, in
itself, not a ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her
testimony is mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that the
subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The subject marriage
is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" a legally non-existent phrase but
ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives
and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the marriage
between Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to the parents of the former.

98. SY V. CA
G.R. NO. 127263
FACTS:
Petitioner Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15,
1973 at the Church of our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. Both were then 22 years old. Their
union was blessed with two children. On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal
dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately and their two children were in the custody of
their mother. On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation before the RTC
of San Fernando, Pampanga and was later amended to a petition for separation of property.
Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime of
separation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses. In
May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband. RTC
Manila convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced him
to 20 days imprisonment. Petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her
marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity on August 4, 1992. RTC and
Court of Appeals denied the petition and motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal by
certiorari, petitioner for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a
valid marriage license at the time of its celebration. The date of issue of marriage license and
marriage certificate is contained in their marriage contract which was attached in her petition for
absolute declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court. The date of the actual
celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage
license are different and incongruous.
ISSUES:
a) Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the
beginning for lack of marriage license at the time of the ceremony?
b) Whether or not the private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said
marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity?
RULING:
A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. The
pieces of evidence presented by petitioner at the beginning of the case, plainly and indubitably
show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. The marriage
contract also shows that the marriage license number 6237519 was issued in Carmona, Cavite
yet neither petitioner nor respondent ever resided in Carmona.
From the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued almost one year after the
ceremony took place. Article 80 of the Civil Code is clearly applicable in this case, there being
no claim of exceptional character enumerated in articles 72-79 of the Civil Code. The marriage
between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning. The remaining issue on the
psychological capacity is now mooted by the conclusion of this court that the marriage of

petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time their marriage
was solemnized.
Petition is granted. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina
Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for lack of marriage
license at the time of celebration.

99. BORJA-MANZANO V. SANCHEZ

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329
FACTS:
Herminia Borja-Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having
been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue,
Caloocan City. Four children were born out of that marriage. On 22 March 1993, however, her
husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.
When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was
void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were
separated. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with
gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator on 12 May 1999.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended
that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine
of P2,000.00, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with
more severely.
Respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law?
RULING:
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment
impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. In fact, in his Comment,
he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him
from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos
and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate
affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void
and bigamous marriage. The maxim ignorance of the law excuses no one has special
application to judges, who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the
embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be
conversant with the law and basic legal principles. And when the law transgressed is simple and
elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
The recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED,with
theMODIFICATIONthat the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque
Sanchez is increased to P20,000.00.

100. NINAL, ET AL. V.

BAYADOG

G.R. No. 133778

FACTS:
Pepito Nial was married to one Teodulfa Bellones, who bore the petitioners during such
marriage. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting to her death. One year and eight months later, he
married the respondent without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit
stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus
exempt from securing a marriage license. When Pepito died in a car accident, the petitioners filed
a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said
marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that
the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioners successional rights.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since
they are not among the persons who could file an action for annulment of marriage. The RTC
ruled that, because of the fact that the FC is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the
issues presented, the petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their fathers
marriage to respondent before his death. Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded
on a pure question of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage of respondent and Pepito is valid.
RULING:
It is not, it is void ab initio, thus the petition is granted. The two marriages involved, having been
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the FC, the applicable law to determine their validity is the
Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. A valid marriage license
is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio. However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code
wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article
76, referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively
with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years
before the marriage. In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said
that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their
wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage
with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each
other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect
union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage
contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with
respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been
separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was
actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation
by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".

101. DE CASTRO V. DE CASTRO

G.R. No. 160172
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married,
thus they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in
September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had
regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil
Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan,
in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they
had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on
the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and
respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid.

HELD:
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the
marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and
respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they
presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five years.
However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked
during cross-examination. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity
in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for
a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and
wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of
this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment
concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicants name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no
"scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit
which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no
value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license
requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab
initio.

102. REPUBLIC VS DAYOT

GR No. 175581
FACTS:
Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a
marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least 5years.
On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both
employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an
action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham
and his consent was secured through fraud.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Joses marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn
affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.
RULING:
CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time
they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living
together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on
November 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and
invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating
to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an
exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to
a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties
under oath. Hence, Jose and Felisas marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that an
action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe
and may be raised any time.

103. COSCA V. PALAYPAYON, JR.

A.M. No. MTJ-92-721

FACTS:
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on October 5,
1992, herein respondents were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal
solemnization of marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in
consideration of an appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received;
(5) infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing fees from
exempted entities.
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite
marriage license. Thus, these couples were able to get married by the simple expedient of paying
the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage license. It is alleged
that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7) marriages in the month of
July, 1992, when in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were null and void; that
respondents likewise made it appear that they have notarized only six (6) documents for July,
1992, but the Notarial Register will show that there were one hundred thirteen (113) documents
which were notarized during that month; and that respondents reported a notarial fee of only
P18.50 for each document, although in fact they collected P20.00 therefor and failed to account
for the difference. Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of court,
respondent judge forwarded to the Supreme Court the applications of Rodel Abogado, Ramon
Sambo, and Jessell Abiog. However, they were surprised when respondent Baroy reported for
duty as clerk of court on October 21, 1991. They later found out that respondent Baroy was the
one appointed because she gave a brand-new air-conditioning unit to respondent judge. Finally,
respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from the Rural Bank of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur, Inc. although such entity is exempt by law from the payment of said fees, and
that while the corresponding receipt was issued, respondent Baroy failed to remit the amount to
the Supreme Court and, instead, she deposited the same in her personal account.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Respondent Judge and the clerk of court were responsible of the complaints
charged?
RULING:
The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of
justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by propriety
and decorum but, above all else, must be beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an
example of integrity, uprightness and honesty.Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue, it
is a necessity. It applies, without qualification as to rank or position, from the judge to the least
of its personnel, they being standard-bearers of the exacting norms of ethics and morality
imposed upon a Court of justice.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that the formal
requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for

therein. Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites
shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal
requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
The Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon. Jr.,
with a stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar offenses in the future will
definitely be severely dealt with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby dismissed from
the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to employment in any
branch, agency or instrumentality of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.

104. DR. PEREZ V. ATTY. CATINDIG

A.C. NO. 5816
FACTS:
Atty. Tristan A. Catindig is already married to Lily Gomez in May 18, 1968. Sometime in 1983,
the paths of Atty. Catindig and Dr. Elmar O. Perez again crossed and they became sweethearts.
Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign
country to dissolve his marriage to Gomez. Sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez
obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic. Dr. Perez claimed that Atty. Catindig
assured her that the said divorce decree was lawful and valid and that there was no longer any
impediment to their marriage. Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the
State of Virginia in the United States of America.
Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since the
divorce decree that was obtained from the Dominican Republic is not recognized by Philippine
laws. Atty. Catindig, however, allegedly assured Dr. Perez that he would legalize their union
once he obtains a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gomez under the laws of the
Philippines.
Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter in the mail informing
her of Atty. Catindigs scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later, she came
upon a love letter written and signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In
the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once his
impediment is removed. Apparently, five months into their relationship, Atty. Baydo requested
Atty. Catindig to put a halt to their affair until such time that he is able to obtain the annulment of
his marriage. On August 13, 2001, Atty. Catindig filed a petition to declare the nullity of his
marriage to Gomez. On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he
moved to an upscale condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was
frequently seen.
Dr. Perez filed an administrative complaint for disbarment with the Office of the Bar Confidant
on August 27, 2002 against Atty. Catindig and Atty. Baydo for gross immorality and violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the PhilippinesCommission on Bar Discipline (IBP- CBD) for investigation. The Investigating Commissioner
of the IBP-CBD recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig for gross immorality, violation
of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
Investigating Commissioner pointed out that Atty. Catindigs act of marrying Dr. Perez despite
knowing fully well that his previous marriage to Gomez still subsisted was a grossly immoral
and illegal conduct, which warrants the ultimate penalty of disbarment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a
grossly immoral conduct

RULING:
The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from Atty. Catindigs
own admission, indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not only
corrupt and unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree. From his own admission, Atty.
Catindig knew that the divorce decree he obtained from the court in the Dominican Republic was
not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both Filipino citizens at that time. He
knew that he was still validly married to Gomez; that he cannot marry anew unless his previous
marriage be properly declared a nullity. Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void. This
notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. The foregoing circumstances seriously taint Atty.
Catindigs sense of social propriety and moral values. It is a blatant and purposeful disregard of
our laws on marriage.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindigs claim is true, it matters not that Dr. Perez
knew that their marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted to various legal
strategies in order to render a faade of validity to his otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez.
Such act is, at the very least, so unprincipled that it is reprehensible to the highest degree.
The Supreme Court resolved to adopt the recommendations of the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Tristan A. Catindig was found guilty of
gross immorality and of violating the Lawyers Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and was disbarred from the practice of law. The charge
of gross immorality against Atty. Karen E. Baydo is hereby dismissed for lack of evidence.

105. NOLLORA V. PEOPLE

G.R.No. 191425
FACTS:
Atilano Nollora Jr was married to Jesus Nollora. Their marriage was still subsisting when he
contracted a 2nd marriage with Rowena Geraldino, who is herself aware of his marriage with
Jesusa but still agreed and contracted marriage with him.
ISSUE:
W/N the 2nd marriage is bigamous and null and void ab initio.
RULING:
Yes. Under Art 349 of the RPC, the marriage is bigamous and pursuant to Art 35 of the Family
Code, it is void ab initio. Nolloras religious affiliation is inapplicable here. Neither of his
marriages were solemnized under the Muslim Law. The SC ruled that his two marriages were not
conducted according to the Code of Muslim. Hence, his religious affiliation may not be used as a
defense.

107. MACARRUBO V. MACARRUBO

A.C. No. 6148
FACTS:
Florence Teves Macarrubo (complainant), by herself and on behalf of her two children, filed on
June 6, 2000 a verified complaint for disbarment against Atty. Edmundo L. Macarubbo
(respondent) with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), alleging that respondent deceived
her into marrying him despite his prior subsisting marriage with a certain Helen Esparza.
Complainant averred that he started courting her in April 1991, he representing himself as a
bachelor; that they eventually contracted marriage which was celebrated on two occasions; and
that although respondent admitted that he was married to Helen Esparza on June 16, 1982, he
succeeded in convincing complainant, her family and friends that his previous marriage was
void. Complainant further averred that respondent entered into a third marriage with one
Josephine T. Constantino; and that he abandoned complainant and their children without
providing them any regular support up to the present time, leaving them in precarious living
conditions. After hearing during which both complainant and respondent took the witness stand,
the Investigating Commissioner rendered a Report and Recommendation that the said respondent
is suspended for three months for gross misconduct reflecting unfavorably on the moral norms of
the profession.
The final disposition of the present administrative case is now before this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Edmundo Macarrubo is guilty of gross misconduct.
RULING:
Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative
case against him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its
course,then the judgment of annulment of respondent's marriage does not also exonerate him
from a wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof - clear preponderance
of evidence - in disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar is met, then liability
attaches.
The disturbing fact that respondent was able to secure the annulment of his first two marriages
and is in the process of procuring the annulment of his third bears noting. Contrary to the finding
of the Investigating Commissioner, respondent, by his own admission, contracted a third
marriage.
Such pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions of marriage and family,
institutions that this society looks to for the rearing of our children, for the development of
values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of
our nation as a whole. This must be checked if not stopped. As officers of the court, lawyers must
not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be perceived to be of good moral

character and must lead a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community.
The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such,
including that which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage, outrages
the generally accepted moral standards of the community.
There can then be no other fate that awaits respondent, as a consequence of his grossly immoral
conduct, than to be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law.

108. MIJARES V. VILLA LUZ

A.C. No. 4431
FACTS:
Respondent a Justice of the Court of Appeals was charged with Bigamy by complainant and is
being recommended for suspension from practice of law.
Priscilla Castillo vda de Mijares and Justice Onofre Villaluz married each other pending the
court's decision on the former's marriage. However, their relationship was short lived as right
after the marriage, the complainant left their would-be-honeymoon place after some unbearable
utterances made by the respondent. Several months after, the complainant learned that
respondent a subsequently married a certain Lydia Geraldez, thus, the basis of this complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ret. Justice Onofre A. Villaluz be suspended from his practice of law.
RULING:
From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent dismally fails to meet the standard of moral
fitness for continued membership in the legal profession. The nature of the office of an attorney
at law requires that he shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a
condition precedent for admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential
for remaining in the practice of law. 6 Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
The commission of grossly immoral conduct and deceit are grounds for suspension or
disbarment of lawyers. However, considering that respondent is in the declining years of his life;
that his impulsive conduct during some episodes of the investigation reveal a degree of aberrant
reactive behavior probably ascribable to advanced age; and the undeniable fact that he has
rendered some years of commendable service in the Judiciary, the Court feels that disbarment
would be too harsh a penalty in this peculiar case. Hence, a suspension of two years, as
recommended, would suffice as a punitive but compassionate disciplinary measure.

109. WIEGEL V. SEMPIO DY

G.R. NO. L-53703

FACTS: In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked
for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic
Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva
Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous existing
marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at
our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior
subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband
Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prior marriage was void or merely voidable?
RULING: The Supreme Court finds the petition devoid of merit.There is no need for petitioner
to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties because
assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code),
and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when
she married respondent she was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her
marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first
husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs
according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes
she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with
respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be
regarded VOID under the law.
The petition is dismissed.

110. BALOGBOG VS. CA

GR No. 83598

FACTS:
Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog filed an action for partition and accounting against their Aunt
Leoncia and Uncle Gaudioso for partition and accounting of their grandparents estate at the
Court of First Instance of Cebu City which was granted by the latter. Leoncia and Gaudioso
appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed the lower courts decision.
Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal died intestate in 1951 and 1961 respectively. They have
three children, Leoncia, Gaudioso and Gavino, their older brother who died in 1935. Ramoncito
and Generoso was claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas
and that, as such they were entitled to the one-third share in the estate of their grandparents.
However, Leoncia and Gaudioso claimed they are not aware that their brother has 2 sons and that
he was married. They started to question the validity of the marriage between their brother
Gavino and Catalina despite how Gaudioso himself admitted during a police investigation
proceeding that indeed Ramonito is his nephew as the latter is the son of his elder brother
Gavino.
In the efforts of Ramoncito and Generoso to prove the validity of their parents marriage, they
presented Priscilo Trazo, 81 years old then mayor of Asturias from 1928 to 1934 and Matias
Pogoy who both testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife and that they
have three children. Catalina herself testified that she was handed a receipt presumably the
marriage certificate by Fr. Jomao-as but it was burned during the war.
On the other hand,Leoncia claimed that her brother Gavino died single at the family residence in
Asturias. She obtained a certificate from the local Civil Registrar of Asturias to the effect that the
office did not have a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina which was prepared by
Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga who testified in the hearing as well.
Leoncia and Gaudioso contended that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have been
proven in accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 because this was the law in
force at the time of the alleged marriage was celebrated.
Art. 53 provides that marriages celebrated under the Civil Code of 1889 should be proven only
by a certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry, unless the books thereof have not
been kept or have been lost, or unless they are questioned in the courts, in which case any other
proof, such as that of the continuous possession by parents of the status of husband and wife,
may be considered, provided that the registration of the birth of their children as their legitimate
children is also submitted in evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gavino and Catalinas marriage is valid.
RULING:

Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering Gavino
and Catalinas marriage as valid and thus entitle Ramonito and Generoso one third of their
grandparents estate.
The court further states that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 889 of Spain did not take effect,
having been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after the extension of
that code of this country. Therefore, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was
brought in the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in
accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code,
except as they related to vested rights, and the rules of evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the
presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally
married.
Albeit, a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, failure to present it
would not mean that marriage did not take place. Other evidence may be presented where in this
case evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the
marriage of Gavino and Catalina in 1929, that they have three children, one of whom, Petronilo,
died at the age of six and that they are recognized by Gavinos family and by the public as the
legitimate children of Gavino.

111. JARILLO V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 164435
FACTS:
Petitioner was convicted of bigamy. It was established that she contracted another marriage with
one Emmanuel Uy, despite still being married to Rafael Alocillo. In response, Emmanuel filed a
civil action for annulment of marriage. Thereafter, the criminal case for bigamy was filed by
Rafael. On appeal to the CA, petitioners conviction was affirmed in toto.
In the meantime, in the civil case for annulment filed by Emmanuel, the RTC declared her
marriage to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillos psychological
incapacity. In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a
ground for the reversal of her conviction. However, the CA denied the same, thus the instant
petition
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error.
RULING:
It did not, the petition is partly granted to the effect that the penalty imposed is modified.
Petitioners conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of petitioners two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid
defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the
previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already
consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioners marriage
to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction,
was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of
petitioner/s marriage to Uy make any difference. A marriage contracted during the subsistence of
a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an
argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. A plain reading of Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code therefore would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of
contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

112. TAMANO V. ORTIZ

G.R. 126603
FACTS:
On 31 May 1958 Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano (Tamano) married private respondent
Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) in civil rites. Prior his death on May 18, 1994, Tamano
also married petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano (Estrellita) in civil rites on June 2, 1993.
On 23 November 1994 private respondent Zorayda joined by her son Adib A. Tamano (Adib)
filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on the ground
that it was bigamous. Private respondents alleged that Tamano never divorced Zorayda and that
Estrellita was not single when she married Tamano as the decision annulling her previous
marriage with Romeo C. Llave never became final and executory for non-compliance with
publication requirements.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the regional trial court has jurisdiction in the case at bar.
RULING:
Petitioner argues that the shari'a courts have jurisdiction over the instant suit pursuant to Art. 13,
Title, II, PD No. 1083, which provides Art. 13. Application. (3) Subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, the essential
requisites and legal impediments to marriage, divorce, paternity and filiation, guardianship and
custody of minors, support and maintenance, claims for customary dower (mahr), betrothal,
breach of contract to marry, solemnization and registration of marriage and divorce, rights and
obligations between husband and wife, parental authority, and the property relations between
husband and wife shall be governed by this Code and other applicable Muslim laws.
As alleged in the complaint, petitioner and Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil
Code. Hence, contrary to the position of petitioner, the Civil Code is applicable in the instant
case. Assuming that indeed petitioner and Tamano were likewise married under Muslim laws, the
same would still fall under the general original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.
Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both
in civil and Muslim rites. Consequently, the shari'a courts are not vested with original and
exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws.
Consequently, the Regional Trial Courts are not divested of their general original jurisdiction.

114. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BERMUDEZ-LORINO

G.R. No. 160258

FACTS:
Respondent Gloria Bermudez-Lorino and her husband were married on June 12, 1987. Because
of her husbands violent character, Gloria found it safer to leave him behind and decided to go
back to her parents together with her three (3) children. In order to support the children, Gloria
was compelled to work abroad. From the time of her physical separation from her husband in
1991, Gloria has not heard of him at all. She had absolutely no communications with him, or
with any of his relatives. On August 14, 2000, nine (9) years after she left her husband, Gloria
filed a verified petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
In a decision dated November 7, 2001, the RTC, finding merit in the summary petition, rendered
judgment granting the same. In a decision dated September 23, 2003, the Court of Appeals,
treating the case as an ordinary appealed case under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure, denied the Republics appeal and accordingly affirmed the appealed RTC decision.
ISSUES:
a)
Whether or not the Court of Appeals duly acquired jurisdiction over the appeal on a final
and executory judgment of the Regional Trial Court
b)
Whether or not the factual and legal bases for a judicial declaration of presumptive death
under Article 41 of the Family Code were established in this case.
RULING:
The Court rules against petitioner Republic. Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI:
SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, sets the tenor for cases
covered by these rules. In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no
reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered
thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family Code, supra, are "immediately final and
executory". It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC to give due course to the
Republics appeal and order the transmittal of the entire records of the case to the Court of
Appeals.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision of
law, is immediately final and executory. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the
petition for declaration of presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no right to
appeal the RTC decision of November 7, 2001. But, if only to set the records straight and for the
future guidance of the bench and the bar, let it be stated that the RTCs decision dated November
7, 2001, was immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties. It was erroneous for the
OSG to file a notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give due course thereto. The Court of Appeals
acquired no jurisdiction over the case, and should have dismissed the appeal outright on that
ground.
The Court, therefore, finds in this case grave error on the part of both the RTC and the Court of
Appeals. To stress, the Court of Appeals should have dismissed the appeal on ground of lack of

jurisdiction, and reiterated the fact that the RTC decision of November 7, 2001 was immediately
final and executory.
As it were, the Court of Appeals committed grave reversible error when it failed to dismiss the
erroneous appeal of the Republic on ground of lack of jurisdiction because, by express provision
of law, the judgment was not appealable.

115. REPUBLIC V. NOLASCO

G.R. NO. 94053
FACTS:
Gregorio Nolasco, a seaman, first met Janet Monica Parker in a bar in England. After that, she
lived with him on his ship for 6 months. After his seaman's contract has expired, he brought her
to his hometown in San Jose, Antique. They got married in January 1982. After the marriage
celebration, he got another employment contract and left the province. In January 1983, Nolasco
received a letter from his mother that 15 days after Janet gave birth to their son, she left. He cut
short his contract to find Janet. He returned home in November 1983.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in
England proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at
No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and Parker
first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from among friends but they
too had no news of Janet Monica.
On 5 August 1988, Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of his wife Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition
prayed that respondent's wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the
marriage be declared null and void. The trial court granted Nolasco's petition. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently established a
basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had already died.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead
RULING:
In the case at bar, the Court found Nolasco's alleged attempt to ascertain about Janet's
whereabouts too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was
already dead.
Nolasco, after returning from his employment, instead of seeking help of local authorities or of
the British Embassy, secured another contract to London. Janet's alleged refusal to give any
information about her was too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. He did not
explain why he took him 9 months to finally reached San Jose after he asked leave from his
captain. He refused to identify his friends whom he inquired from. When the Court asked
Nolasco about the returned letters, he said he had lost them. Moreover, while he was in London,
he did not even dare to solicit help of authorities to find his wife.
The Family Code prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a
petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted. As pointed out by the SolicitorGeneral, there are four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of
the Family Code:

1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years
if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down
in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
of the absentee.
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the trial court and the Court of Appeals decision
declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead.
various legal strategies in order to render a faade of validity to his otherwise invalid marriage to
Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so unprincipled that it is reprehensible to the highest
degree.
The Supreme Court resolved to adopt the recommendations of the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Tristan A. Catindig was found guilty of
gross immorality and of violating the Lawyers Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and was disbarred from the practice of law. The charge
of gross immorality against Atty. Karen E. Baydo is hereby dismissed for lack of evidence.

116. VALDEZ VS REPUBLIC

GR No. 180863
FACTS:
Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971. She gave birth to a baby girl named
Nancy. They argued constantly because Sofio was unemployed and did not bring home any
money. In March 1972, the latter left their house. Angelita and her child waited until in May
1972, they decided to go back to her parents home. 3 years have passed without any word from
Sofio until in October 1975 when he showed up and they agreed to separate and executed a
document to that effect. It was the last time they saw each other and had never heard of ever
since. Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes in June 1985.
Virgilios application for naturalization in US was denied because petitioners marriage with
Sofio was subsisting. Hence, in March 2007, petitioner filed a petition seeking declaration of
presumptive death of Sofio.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of
presumptive death of Sofio.
RULING:
The court ruled that no decree on the presumption of Sofios death is necessary because Civil
Code governs during 1971 and not Family Code where at least 7 consecutive years of absence is
only needed. Thus, petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio and their marriage is legal and
valid.

118. MANUEL V. PEOPLE

GR. No. 165842

FACTS:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Court of Appeals affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, convicting the petitioner for the crime of
bigamy.
Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to Rubylus Gaa on July 18, 1975, who,
according to the former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned and was
never seen again by him after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in January 1996 when
the latter was only 21 years old. Three months after their meeting, the two got married through a
civil wedding in Baguio City without Gandaleras knowledge of Manuels first marriage. In the
course of their marriage, things got rocky and Gandalera learned that Eduardo was in fact already
married when he married him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo Manuel.
The latters defense being that his declaration of single in his marriage contract with Gandalera
was done because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he did not
know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying
Tina. The Regional Trial Court ruled against him sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6
years and 10 months to ten years, and an amount 0f P200,000.00 for moral damages.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally liable for
bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without
any malicious intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification on the RTCs
decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten years. Pecuniary reward for
moral damages was affirmed.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
a)
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled that
petitioners wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there
was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the Family
Code.
b)
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it affirmed
the award of Php200,000.00 as moral damages as it has no basis in fact and in law.
RULING:
The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or
evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good
faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates
malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is
presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Where a spouse is absent for the
requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a
judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and

convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the
present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later
charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. The
court rules against the petitioner.
The Court rules that the petitioners collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after
his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused
injury to the latter. The Court thus declares that the petitioners acts are against public policy as
they undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and
general welfare of society. Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the
petitioners perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages. Considering the attendant
circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just
and reasonable.

119 CALISTERIO vs. CALISTERIO

G.R. No. 136467
FACTS:
On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land with an
estimated value of P 604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his wife, herein respondent Marietta
Calisterio.Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to
James William Bounds on 13 January 1946 at Caloocan City. James Bounds disappeared without
a trace on 11 February 1947. Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years later, or on 08
May 1958, without Marietta having priorly secured a court declaration that James was
presumptively dead.
On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister of
Teodorico, filed a petition entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate Estate of the Deceased Teodorico
Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia Armas, Petitioner," claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving
heir of Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage between the latter and respondent Marietta Espinosa
Calisterio being allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void.
Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first marriage with James
Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter's absence, his whereabouts being unknown, for more
than eleven years before she contracted her second marriage with Teodorico. Contending to be
the surviving spouse of Teodorico, she sought priority in the administration of the estate of the
decedent.
On 05 February 1993, the trial court issued an order appointing jointly Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr.,
and respondent Marietta administrator and administratrix, respectively, of the intestate estate of
Teodorico. On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in favor of petitioner
Antonia. On 31 August 1998, the appellate court reversed the lower courts decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta is valid,
that, in turn, would be determinative of her right as a surviving spouse.
RULING:
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83 of the New Civil
Code which provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from
its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee,
though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed
to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the

absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be
valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.
Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first
spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved. A
judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the prescribed
period of absence is met.
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first husband, James William
Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered into a
second marriage in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having
been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid
notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James Bounds.
The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having been adduced to indicate
another property regime between the spouses, pertains to them in common. Upon its dissolution
with the death of Teodorico, the property should rightly be divided in two equal portions one
portion going to the surviving spouse and the other portion to the estate of the deceased spouse.
The successional right in intestacy of a surviving spouse over the net estate of the deceased,
concurring with legitimate brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces (the latter by right of
representation), is one-half of the inheritance, the brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces,
being entitled to the other half. Nephews and nieces, however, can only succeed by right of
representation in the presence of uncles and aunts; alone, upon the other hand, nephews and
nieces can succeed in their own right which is to say that brothers or sisters exclude nephews and
nieces except only in representation by the latter of their parents who predecease or are
incapacitated to succeed. The appellate court has thus erred in granting, in paragraph (c) of the
dispositive portion of its judgment, successional rights, to petitioner's children, along with their
own mother Antonia who herself is invoking successional rights over the estate of her deceased
brother.
It is hereby DECLARED that said one-half share of the decedent's estate pertains solely to
petitioner to the exclusion of her own children.

120. CARIO V. CARIO

G.R. NO. 132529

FACTS:
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two marriages; the first
was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario, with whom he had two children.
And the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cario with whom he
had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982. In November 23,
1992, SPO4 Santiago Cario passed away under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his
medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits
and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies.
On December 14, 1993, respondent filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against
the petitioner praying that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one
hundred forty-six thousand pesos. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money,
respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because
the same was solemnized without the required marriage license confirmed by the marriage
certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number and a
certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Manila stating that
they have no record of marriage license of the spouses Santiago Cario and Susan Nicdao Cario
who allegedly married in the said municipality on June 20, 1969.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cario are valid
in determining the beneficiary of his death benefits?
RULING:
Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao
and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage and
the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders a marriage void ab initio. In the case at
bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the
marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license was indispensable to the
validity of their marriage. The records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the
deceased bears no marriage license number and as certified by the Local Civil registrar of San
Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. The certification issued
by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to
keep a record of all data to the issuance of a marriage license. Therefore, the marriage between
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased having been solemnized without the necessary
marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the said requirement, is
undoubtedly void ab initio.
The declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and
petitioner does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The
fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree
declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of
respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio. To reiterate, under article 40

of Family Code,for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the
nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage,
otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not
be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, is governed by the
provisions of articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code, wherein, the properties acquired by the
parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. By intestate
succession, the said death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs and respondent,
not being the legal wife is not one of them. Conformably, even if the disputed death benefits
were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a coownership, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. There is no allegation of bad faith in
the present case; both parties of the first marriage are presumed in good faith. Thus, one-half of
the subject death benefits under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property
regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his
legal heirs, namely, his children.

122. DOMINGO V. CA, ET AL.

G.R. No. 104818
FACTS:
Respondent filed with the RTC a petition for "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation
of Property" against petitioner Roberto. She alleged that, unknown to her, petitioner had a
previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz, and that she only came to know of such marriage
when the latter sued them for bigamy. Respondent is an OFW to whom petitioner has been
completely dependent upon. While on her one-month vacation, she discovered that he was
cohabiting with another woman, and that he had been disposing of some of her properties
without her knowledge or consent. After she confronted him, he appointed her brother as her
brother/attorney-in-fact, despite this petitioner failed to turn over the properties. The petition
prayed that a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining
petitioner from exercising any act of administration and ownership over said properties; their
marriage be declared null and void and of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be declared the
sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time of their void marriage and such
properties be placed under the proper management and administration of the attorney-in-fact.
When petitioner filed for dismissal, it was denied. Petitioner then filed a special civil action
of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss. This was dismissed
by the CA, thus the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary for purposes of
remarriage.
RULING:
Yes it is, the petition is denied. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now
explicitly required in the FC, either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Article 40 of the
Family Code provides: The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes
of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage be
free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. Hence, in the
instance where a party who has previously contracted a marriage which remains subsisting
desires to enter into another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by law to
prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
In addition, when a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment
therein shall provide for "the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive
legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings."

123. CHI MING TSOI V. CA AND LAO

266 S 324
FACTS:
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao were married on May 22, 1988. Until their separation on March 15,
1989, there was no sexual contact between them. Hence, Gina (wife) filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage. Medical examinations showed that the wife was healthy,
normal and still a virgin, while the husband was found to be capable of having sexual intercourse
since he was not impotent.
The wife claimed that her husband was impotent, and was a closet homosexual as he did not
show his penis and since he was using his mothers eyebrow pencil and cleansing cream. She
also claimed that her husband married her, a Filipino citizen, in order to acquire or maintain his
residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man. On
the other hand, the husband claimed that it was his wife who was psychologically incapacitated
to perform basic marital obligations. He asserts that his wife avoided him whenever he wants to
have sexual intercourse with her. He further claimed that his wife filed the case because she was
afraid that she would be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and that he might
consummate their marriage. He also insisted that their marriage would remain valid because they
are still very young and there is still a chance to overcome their differences.
The trial court declared their marriage void on account of psychological incapacity of the
husband. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prolonged refusal of the husband to have sexual cooperation for the
procreation of children with his wife is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
RULING:
Yes. The prolonged refusal of the husband to have sexual cooperation for the procreation of
children with his wife is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, the Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. The husbands senseless
and protracted refusal to fulfill his marital obligations is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children based on
the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of

marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. Decision affirmed and petition denied for lack of merit.

124. LEOUEL SANTOS vs. CA

G.R. No. 112019
FACTS:
Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The
meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two
exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed,
shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J.
Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he
was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to
happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young
spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of
other things, like when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's
parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his
own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite
Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia
called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon
the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the
United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to
somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled
out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
ISSUE:
Whether or not Leouels marriage with Julia can be declared invalid.
RULING:
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to
adopt the provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to
allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the
Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis
(G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus:The Committee did not give any examples of
psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although
not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken
from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which reads:

Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila matrimonial
rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no
juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's
enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the
interpretation or construction of the codal provision. So the progress was from psycho-sexual to
psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be, however,
incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of
psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to assume the
ordinary obligations of marriage.
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials
of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic
cause of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity
consists of a real inability to render what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the
incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly
reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and
education of offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The
mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort,
obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder
which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb.
5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be
proved not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in
fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential
duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that
innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1
of the Family Code. The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of
our laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards
required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands
aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can
always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.
The petition is denied.

125. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MOLINA

G.R. No. 108763
FACTS:
On April 14, 1985, Roridel Olaviano Molina, respondent was married to Reynaldo Molina at the
Church of Saint Augustine, Manila. From their marriage was borne a child named Albert Andre
Olaviano Molina. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo started exhibiting signs of immaturity and
irresponsibility. He preferred to spend more time with the company of his friends and peers on
whom he squandered money, he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, ;and he was
never honest with the family finances. These circumstances led to frequent quarrels between the
petitioner and respondent. In February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, making
Roridel the sole breadwinner.
On October 1986, they were both estranged from each other. In February 1986, Roridel moved
back to Baguio with her parents and a few weeks later Reynaldo abandoned Roridel and left
Albert in her custody. Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as
husband and wife because of Roridels strange behavior and insistence to leave his group of
friends eve after their marriage, Roridels refusal to perform some of her marital duties like
cooking meals, and Roridels failure to run the household and handle their finances. On May,
1991, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio rendered judgment and declared the marriage void. The
Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the Regional Trial Courts decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not opposing and conflicting personalities is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
RULING:
No. Psychological incapacity must be judged according to: (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability. In this case, there was no clear showing of the psychological incapacity but
the mere showing of difficulty, refusal, neglect and irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities which do not constitute psychological incapacity. In this case, it is not enough to
prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons.
Essentially, it must be shown that they are incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not
physical, illness. Although there was evidence that the couple could not get along or are
incompatible with each other, there was no evidence of the gravity of the psychological
incapacity; neither its juridical antecedence nor incurability. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological, not physical.
The following guidelines must be proved in invoking psychological incapacity:
(1) The burden of proof to show nullity of the marriage lies in the plaintiff;
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
a.
Medically or clinically identified,

b. Alleged in the complaint,

c.
Sufficiently proven by experts, and
d.
Clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state.

126. BARCELONA V. CA
G.R. NO. 130087
FACTS:
Diana M. Barcelona, and Tadeo R. Bengzon were legally married at Holy Cross Parish. They
established their residence at Quezon City and begot five children. The couple often quarreled
because Diana was from a rich family, was a disorganized housekeeper and was often out
playing tennis all day. During a family crisis where Diana suffered from several miscarriages and
during sickness of a child, petitioner would withdraw herself and would not talk to the husband.
During her pregnancy, she would insist the husband to offer her more freedom and leave their
conjugal dwelling. The husband would eventually leave and the both of them eventually became
estranged from each other.
On March 29, 1995, respondent Bengzon filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage on the
grounds of psychological incapacity against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona. On July 21, 1995,
respondent filed a second Petition for Annulment of Marriage against the petitioner. Petitioner
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the second petition fails to state a cause of action
and second, it violates Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 on forum shopping.
On September 18, 1996, in an Order (first Order) Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo deferred resolution of
the Motion until the parties have ventilated their arguments in a hearing. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration. However, on January 21, 1997, the trial court through Pairing Judge
Rosalina L. Luna Pison issued an Order (second Order) denying the motion for reconsideration
on the ground that when the ground for dismissal is the complaints failure to state a cause of
action, the trial court determines such fact solely from the petition itself. According to Judge
Pison, a perusal of the allegations in the second petition shows that petitioner has violated
respondents right, thus resulting to a cause of action. Judge Pison also rejected petitioners claim
that respondent was guilty of forum shopping explaining that when respondent filed the second
petition, the first petition was no longer pending and was dismissed without prejudice.
The Court of Appeals affirmed with the Regional Trial Courts decision that the allegations in the
second petition state a cause of action sufficient to sustain a valid judgment if proven true as well
as the decision that the respondent has not committed forum shopping.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the second petition for annulment sufficiently states the cause of action
2) Whether or not the respondent violated Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-49 in
failing to state the filing of a previous petition for annulment of marriage, its termination and
status
RULING:
1) A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three essential elements: (1) a right in
favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises; (2) an obligation of the

defendant to respect such right; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant violates the right of
the plaintiff. The Court finds the second petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action. The
petition sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code.
The second petition states the ultimate facts on which respondent bases his claim in accordance
with Section 1, Rule 8 of the old Rules of Court. After Santos and Molina, the new Rules on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
provided that expert opinions need not be alleged. Under Section 2, it states that a petition under
Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or
both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its celebration.
2) The Court has consistently held that a certificate of non-forum shopping not attached to the
petition or one belatedly filed or one signed by counsel and not the party himself constitutes a
violation of the requirement. Such violation can result in the dismissal of the complaint or
petition. However, the Court has also previously held that the rule of substantial compliance
applies to the contents of the certification. The dismissal of the first petition precluded the
eventuality of litis pendentia. The first petitions dismissal did not also amount to res judicata.
Thus, there is no need to state in the certificate of non-forum shopping in the second petition
about the prior filing and dismissal of the first petition. The first petition was dismissed without
prejudice at the instance of respondent Tadeo to keep the peace between him and his grown up
children. The dismissal happened before service of answer or any responsive pleading. Clearly,
there is no litis pendentia since respondent Tadeo had already withdrawn and caused the
dismissal of the first petition when he subsequently filed the second petition. Neither is there res
judicata because the dismissal order was not a decision on the merits but a dismissal without
prejudice.
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the resolution of the Court of Appeals.

127. TONGOL vs. TONGOL

G.R. No. 157610
FACTS:
On August 27, 1967, petitioner Orlando G. Tongol and respondent Filipinas M. Tongol were
married. From their marriage they begot four children.
On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the Regional Trial Court, Makati a verified petition for
the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Filipinas on the ground that she is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations.
In his petition, Orlando stated that he and Filipinas marriage was objected by the latters family.
The continuous interference of Filipinas parents, their attempts to break up their union and their
influence on Filipinas made their marriage an unhappy one. Because of the influence of
Filipinas parents, she regarded Orlando with contempt. When Orlando started a junk shop
business, he was met with ridicule, instead of encouragement, from his wife. Eventually, his junk
shop business flourished and became profitable enough for Orlando to embark on a new business
venture by putting up a pharmaceutical company. Filipinas became interested and began to
interfere with the operation of the business; however, the employees of the company were aloof.
She also resented that her husband was getting along with the employees and, as a result, was the
subject of their frequent and continued quarrels. She even suspected Orlando of diverting the
income of his business to his relatives. The continued fighting persisted and affected their
children.
Filipinas, in her counter-petition claimed that the marriage was, indeed, fruitless; however, this
was the fault of Orlandos psychological incapacity. In 1990, Orlando decided to live separately
from Filipinas and on May 13, 1994, Orlando and Filipinas filed a petition for dissolution of their
conjugal partnership gains, granted by the Makati Regional Trial Court.
Evidence for Orlando consisted of his testimony, his sisters, his employees, and Dr. Cecilia
Villegas psychological examination of both parties. Meanwhile, evidence for the respondent
only consisted of her testimony.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional
Trial Courts decision in toto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is psychologically incapacitated.
RULING:
No. First, psychological incapacity must be more than just difficulty, refusal or neglect.
Second, the personality disorder or psychological incapacity of the respondent must be grave
enough to bring about her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Third, there
was no evidence that the psychological incapacity is incurable. Fourth, the psychological

incapacity considered in Article 36 must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations,

not necessarily to those not related to marriage like, in this case, the family business. Marriage
obligations must correspond to the management of the household and the provision of support
for the family. Fifth, marital obligations must not only include the spouses obligation to the
spouse but also that to her children. No evidence was shown that the respondent was negligent in
the rearing and care of her children as enumerated in Article 220 of the Family Code. Although,
the respondent exhibited Inadequate Personality Disorder, there was no evidence to prove that,
indeed, the respondent was incapacitated or incapable of complying with the essential
obligations of marriage.

129. REPUBLIC vs. ENCELAN

G.R. No. 170022
FACTS:
On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita and the union bore two children, Maricar and Manny.
To support his family, Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia on May 15, 1984. On June 12, 1986,
Cesar, while still in Saudi Arabia, learned that Lolita had been having an illicit affair with Alvin
Perez. Sometime in 1991, Lolita allegedly left the conjugal home with her children and lived
with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated. On June 16, 1995, Cesar filed with
the RTC a petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on
Lolitas psychological incapacity.
Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that Alvin used to be an associate
in her promotions business. She insisted that she is not psychologically incapacitated and that she
left their home because of irreconcilable differences with her mother-in-law. At the trial, Cesar
affirmed his allegations of Lolitas infidelity and subsequent abandonment of the family home.
He testified that he continued to provide financial support for Lolita and their children even after
he learned of her illicit affair with Alvin.
Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report on Lolita prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima
Flores of the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Flores found that Lolita was "not suffering
from any form of major psychiatric illness," but had been "unable to provide the expectations
expected of her for a good and lasting marital relationship"; her "transferring from one job to the
other depicts some interpersonal problems with co-workers as well as her impatience in attaining
her ambitions"; and "her refusal to go with her husband abroad signifies her reluctance to work
out a good marital and family relationship."
In its June 5, 2002 decision, the RTC declared Cesars marriage to Lolita void, finding sufficient
basis to declare Lolita psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. The CA originally set aside the RTCs verdict, finding that Lolitas abandonment of
the conjugal dwelling and infidelity were not serious cases of personality disorder/psychological
illness. In its amended decision,the CA found two circumstances indicative of Lolitas serious
psychological incapacity that resulted in her gross infidelity: (1) Lolitas unwarranted refusal to
perform her marital obligations to Cesar; and (2) Lolitas willful and deliberate act of abandoning
the conjugal dwelling. OSG filed the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there exists sufficient basis to nullify Cesars marriage to Lolita on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

RULING:

No. In interpreting Article 36 of the Family Code, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that
psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of
and to assume the basic marital obligations", not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the
juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and
incurability of the condition of the errant spouse.Cesar testified on the dates when he learned of
Lolitas alleged affair and her subsequent abandonment of their home, as well as his continued
financial support to her and their children even after he learned of the affair, but he merely
mentioned in passing Lolitas alleged affair with Alvin and her abandonment of the conjugal
dwelling.Sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not
necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; simply grounds for legal separation. To
constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment
are manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from
discharging the essential marital obligations.No evidence on record exists to support Cesars
allegation that Lolitas infidelity and abandonment were manifestations of any psychological
illness.
Dr. Flores observation on Lolitas interpersonal problems with co-workers does not suffice as a
consideration for the conclusion that she was at the time of her marriage psychologically
incapacitated to enter into a marital union with Cesar. Aside from the time element involved, a
wifes psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated with her professional/work
relationship; workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles apart from their marital
counterparts. Dr. Flores further belief that Lolitas refusal to go with Cesar abroad signified a
reluctance to work out a good marital relationship is a mere generalization unsupported by facts.

130. REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DE QUINTOS, JR.

G.R. No. 159594
FACTS:
Eduardo De Quintos, Jr. and Catalina Delos Santos-De Quintos were married on March 16, 1967
in civil rites solemnized by the Municipal Mayor of Lingayen Pangasinan. They were not blessed
with children due to Catalinas hysterectomy after her second miscarriage. On April 6, 1998,
Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage, citing Catalinas
psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations. Eduardo testified that
Catalinas psychological incapacity manifested when she always left their house without his
consent; engaged in petty arguments with him; constantly refused to do household chores or take
care of their adopted daughter; gossiping with the neighbors; gambling; and abandoning their
conjugal home to live with Bobbie Castro. A neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Annabelle L.
Reyes revealed that Catalina exhibited traits of Borderline Psychiatric Disorder and was not
curable. These manifested through her immaturity that rendered her psychologically
incapacitated to meet her marital obligations. Catalina did not interpose any objection to the
petition, but prayed to be given her share in the conjugal house and lot located in Bacabac,
Bugallon, Pangasinan.The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of Eduardo; however, the Court of
Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of evidence established psychological incapacity therefore rendering
the marriage null and void.
RULING:
No. First, Catalinas supposed behavior was not corroborated by others and, therefore, was not
established. Eduardos testimony was self-serving. Second, Dr. Reyes neuro-psychiatric
evaluation was ostensibly vague on the root cause, gravity, and incurability of the disorder. Dr.
Reyes merely established that Catalina was immature and childish and that her immaturity and
childishness could no longer be treated due to Catalinas reaching of an age of maturity. Thirdly,
Dr. Reyes had only one interview with Catalina and, therefore, lacked depth and objectivity
which would have been achieved if her report corroborated not only with Eduardos statements
but also with interviews by other persons. Fourth, no proof was made to establish the natal or
supervening disabling factor which effectively incapacitated Catalina from complying with her
basic marital functions. In this case, the Court cited Santos and Molina in setting the criteria or
standards to dispute psychological incapacity.

131. MENDOZA V. R.P.

G.R. NO. 157649

FACTS:
Petitioner Arabelle J. Mendoza and private respondent Dominic C. Mendoza met in 1989 upon
his return to the country from his employment in Papua New Guinea. They had been next-door
neighbors in the apartelle they were renting while in college she, at Assumption College while
he, at San Beda taking a business management course. After a month of courtship, they became
intimate which led to the pregnancy with their Daughter Alyssa Blanca. They got married when
she was eight months into her pregnancy in civil rites solemnized in Pasay City, June 24, 1991,
after which they moved to her place, remaining dependent on their parents for support.
Dominic remained jobless and dependent upon his father for support until he finished college in
October 1993. She took on various jobs, being the one with the fixed income, she shouldered all
of the familys expenses (i.e., rental, food, other bills and their childs educational needs). In
September 1994, she discovered his illicit relationship with Zaida, Dominics co-employee at
Toyota Motors. Eventually, communication between them became rare until they started to sleep
in separate rooms, thereby affecting their sexual relationship.
In November 1995, Dominic gave her a Daihatsu Charade car as a birthday present and later
asked her to issue two blank checks for the cars insurance coverage, only to find out that the
checks were not paid for the cars insurance coverage but for his personal needs. Worse, she also
found out that he did not pay for the car itself, forcing her to rely on her father-in-law to pay part
of the cost of the car, leaving her to bear the balance.
To make matters worse, Dominic was fired from his employment after he ran away with
P164,000.00 belonging to his employer. He was criminally charged with violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa, for which he was arrested and incarcerated. She and her mother
bailed him out of jail, but discovered that he had also swindled many clients some of whom were
even threatening her, her mother and her sister.
On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal home because Arabelle asked him for
"time and space to think things over." A month later, she refused his attempt at reconciliation,
causing him to threaten to commit suicide. At that, she and her family immediately left the house
to live in another place concealed from him.
On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for the declaration of the nullity of
her marriage with Dominic based on his psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition. In the RTC, petitioner
presented herself as a witness, together with a psychiatrist, Dr. Rocheflume Samson, and
Professor Marites Jimenez. On his part, Dominic did not appear during trial and presented no
evidence. On August 18, 2000, the RTC found all characteristics of psychological incapacity
gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability as set forth in Molina and declared the marriage
between petitioner and Dominic an absolute nullity. On March 19, 2003 the CA promulgated its
assailed decision reversing the judgment of the RTC.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the totality of evidence established is enough to declare that the respondent is
psychologically incapacitated.
RULING:
No. The findings of Dr. Samson were one-sided, self-serving and uncorroborated. It is because
only Arabelle was evaluated. Dr. Samson even conceded that there was a need to verify her
findings concerning Dominics psychological profile which were colored by Arabelles illfeelings toward him during her evaluation. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be
equated with psychological incapacity. The decision is based on Santos v. Court of Appeals as it
sets the guidelines for psychological incapacity as characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability." These guidelines do not necessarily require the root cause to
be medically or clinically identified by a physician or a psychologist. What is important is that
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. Finally, petitioner
contends that the Courts Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10 rendered appeals by the OSG no
longer required. On the contrary, the Resolution explicitly requires the OSG to actively
participate in all stages of the proceedings as seen in its provisions.

132. OCHOSA vs. ALANO

G.R. No. 167459
FACTS:
Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa met Bona J. Alano in August 1973 he, a young lieutenant in the AFP;
she, a 17-year-old 1st year college drop-out. They had a whirlwind romance that culminated into
sexual intimacy and eventual marriage on October 27, 1973 before the Honorable Judge Cesar S.
Principe in Basilan. The couple did not acquire any property. Neither did they incur any debts.
Their union produced no offspring. In 1976, however, they found an abandoned and neglected
one-year-old baby girl whom they later registered as their daughter, naming her Ramona Celeste
Alano Ochosa.
During their marriage, Jose was often assigned to various parts of the Philippine archipelago as
an officer in the AFP. Bona did not cohabit with him in his posts, preferring to stay in her
hometown of Basilan. Neither did Bona visit him in his areas of assignment, except in one (1)
occasion when Bona stayed with him for four (4) days.
Sometime in 1985, Jose was appointed as the Battalion Commander of the Security Escort
Group. He and Bona, along with Ramona, were given living quarters at Fort Bonifacio, Makati
City where they resided with their military aides.In 1987, Jose was charged with rebellion for his
alleged participation in the failed coup detat. He was incarcerated in Camp Crame.
Even at the onset of their marriage when Jose was assigned in various parts of the country, Bona
had illicit relations with other men. Bona entertained male visitors in her bedroom whenever Jose
was out of their living quarters at Fort Bonifacio. On one occasion, Bona was caught by
Demetrio Bajet y Lita, a security aide, having sex with Joses driver, Corporal Gagarin. Rumors
of Bonas sexual infidelity circulated in the military community. When Jose could no longer bear
these rumors, he got a military pass from his jail warden and confronted Bona.During their
confrontation, Bona admitted her relationship with Corporal Gagarin who also made a similar
admission to Jose. Jose drove Bona away from their living quarters. Bona left with Ramona and
went to Basilan.In 1994, Ramona left Bona and came to live with Jose. It is Jose who is currently
supporting the needs of Ramona.
Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, seeking to nullify his marriage to
Bona on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential obligations of
marriage.In a Decision dated 11 January 1999, the trial court granted the petition and nullified
the parties marriage. The OSG appealed with the CA which granted the appeal, reversed and set
aside the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.

RULING:
No. There is inadequate credible evidence that her defects (sexual disloyalty with Jose, sexual
promiscuity with other men) were already present at the inception of, or prior to, the marriage.
In other words, her alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the jurisprudential requisite
of juridical antecedence. Verily, Dr. Elizabeth E. Rondain evaluated Bonas psychological
condition (Histrionic Personality Disorder) indirectly from the information gathered solely from
Jose and his witnesses. This factual circumstance evokes the possibility that the information fed
to the psychiatrist is tainted with bias for Joses cause, in the absence of sufficient corroboration.
It is apparent from the above-cited testimonies that Bona, contrary to Joses assertion, had no
manifest desire to abandon Jose at the beginning of their marriage and was, in fact, living with
him for the most part of their relationship from 1973 up to the time when Jose drove her away
from their conjugal home in 1988. On the contrary, the record shows that it was Jose who was
constantly away from Bona by reason of his military duties and his later incarceration. A
reasonable explanation for Bonas refusal to accompany Jose in his military assignments in other
parts of Mindanao may be simply that those locations were known conflict areas in the seventies.
Any doubt as to Bonas desire to live with Jose would later be erased by the fact that Bona lived
with Jose in their conjugal home in Fort Bonifacio during the following decade. In view of the
foregoing, the badges of Bonas alleged psychological incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and
abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the period of time after her marriage to Jose
and not to the inception of the said marriage.

133. YAMBA V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.

G.R. No. 184063
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a petition before the RTC, praying that her marriage with the respondent be
declared null and void by reason of respondents psychological incapacity. She alleges that, since
the beginning, her and respondents married life had been marred by bickering, quarrels, and
recrimination due to the latters inability to comply with the essential obligations of married life;
that she was the only one who earned a living and took care of the children; that respondent did
nothing but eat and sleep all day, and spend time with friends; that when respondent would find a
job, he would not be able to stay in it for long; that respondent loved to gamble and would
gamble away whatever money would come his way; that respondent was insecure and jealous
and would get mad every time he would see petitioner talking to other people. She also consulted
a psychiatrist who concluded that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations. The RTC and the CA dismissed the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of petitioners evidence establish respondents psychological
incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage?
RULING:
It does not, the petition is denied. Article 36 of the Family Code states that, A marriage
contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. The intendment of the law has been to
confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. Thus, for a marriage to be annulled under Article 36 of the Family Code, the
psychologically incapacitated spouse must be shown to suffer no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes him or her to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
In this case, there is no showing that respondent was suffering from a psychological condition so
severe that he was unaware of his obligations to his wife and family. On the contrary,
respondents efforts, though few and far between they may be, showed an understanding of his
duty to provide for his family, albeit he did not meet with much success. Whether his failure was
brought about by his own indolence or irresponsibility, or by some other external factors, is not
relevant. What is clear is that respondent, in showing an awareness to provide for his family,
even with his many failings, does not suffer from psychological incapacity. His refusal to help
care for the children, his neglect for his business ventures, and his alleged unbearable jealousy
may indicate some emotional turmoil or mental difficulty, but none have been shown to amount
to a psychological abnormality. In addition, it has not been established that the same existed at
the time of the celebration of the marriage.

134. MARABLE V. MARABLE

G.R. No. 178741
FACTS:
In 1967, petitioner Rosalino L. Marable and respondent Myrna F. Marable met while still
classmates studying at Arellano University. He only became attracted to her only after they
happened to sit beside each other in a passenger bus. Despite having a girlfriend, petitioner
courted the respondent and eventually became sweethearts with Myrna demanding more love,
time and attention from Rosalino who appreciated this gesture. On December 19, 1970, the two
eloped and were married in civil rites at Tanay, Rizal before Mayor Antonio C. Esguerra. This
was followed by a church wedding on December 30, 1970 at the Chapel of the Muntinlupa
Bilibid Prison. They begot five children. The relationship turned sour. Verbal and physical
quarrels increased when their eldest daughter transferred from several schools because of
juvenile misconduct and had an unwanted teenage pregnancy. Rosalino then sought for peace,
love and affection from a relationship with another woman. Myrna eventually found out about
the affair. These aggravated their quarrels. Their business ventures failed. Rosalino felt unloved,
unwanted, and unappreciated; felt indifferent toward the respondent; left the conjugal home;
gave up all properties; and converted to Islam after dating several women. On October 8, 2001,
petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with respondent on grounds of
psychological incapacity. Petitioner also alleged that his family background from a poor family
and his father being a compulsive gambler and womanizer, made him obsess for attention and
strive for success only to find himself in misery and loneliness because of the void in his
relationship with his family. To support these, petitioner presented the Psychological Report of
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag and stated that he suffered from Antisocial Personality Disorder. The
Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision annulling the marriage while the Court of Appeals
reversed the said decision.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the totality of evidence established psychological incapacity therefore rendering
the marriage null and void.
RULING:
No. The findings of Dr. Tayags psychological report merely made a general conclusion that the
petitioner suffered from Anti-Social Personality Disorder; however, it failed to prove the root
cause of the psychological incapacity. It also failed to fit into the framework of the Molina
Doctrine. Moreover, there was no factual basis that the petitioner was a socially deviant,
rebellious, impulsive, self-centered and deceitful person. In fact, he was proven to act
responsibly during the marriage by working hard to provide for his family especially his
children. Petitioner also tried to make it appear that his family background was one of the
reasons why he engaged in extra-marital affairs when, actually, he was simply dissatisfied with
his marriage. He was also shown to have learned from his extra-marital affairs and has
immediately terminated them.

In short, petitioners marital infidelity, their squabbles, and conflicts in child-rearing does not
appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of
performing his spousal obligations. It has been held in various cases that sexual infidelity, by
itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity. It must be
shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make
petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage. That not being
the case with petitioner, his claim of psychological incapacity must fail. It bears stressing that
psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned party was
incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of
the marriage. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the intention of the law is to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.

135. AGRAVIADOR V. AGRAVIADOR

G.R. No.170729
FACTS:
The petitioner first met the respondent in 1971 at a beerhouse where the latter worked. The
petitioner, at that time, was a 24-year old security guard of the Bureau of Customs, while the
respondent was a 17-year old waitress. Their meeting led to a courtship, and they eventually
became sweethearts. They often spent nights together at the respondents rented room, and soon
entered into a common-law relationship. On May 23, 1973, the petitioner and the respondent
contracted marriage in a ceremony officiated by Reverend Juanito Reyes at a church in
Tondo,Manila. Out of their union, the petitioner and the respondent begot four (4) children,
namely: Erisque, Emmanuel, Evelyn, and Eymarey. Petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for
the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the respondent, under Article 36 of the Family
Code, as amended. He alleged that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to exercise
the essential obligations of marriage as she was carefree and irresponsible, and refused to do
household chores like cleaning and cooking; stayed away from their house for long periods of
time; had an affair with a lesbian; did not take care of their sick child; consulted a witch doctor in
order to bring him bad fate; and refused to use the family name Agraviador in her activities. The
petitioner likewise claimed that the respondent refused to have sex with him since 1993 because
she became very close to a male tenant in their house. In fact, he discovered their love notes to
each other, and caught them inside his room several times. In her answer, the respondent denied
that she engaged in extramarital affairs and maintained that it was the petitioner who refused to
have sex with her. She claimed that the petitioner wanted to have their marriage annulled because
he wanted to marry their former household helper, Gilda Camarin. She added that she was the
one who took care of their son at the hospital before he died.
The RTC nullified the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent in its decision and saw merit
in the petitioners testimony and Dr. Patacs psychiatric evaluation report. The CA, in its decision,
reversed and set aside the RTC resolution, and dismissed the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is basis to nullify the petitioners marriage to the respondent on the ground
of psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations.
RULING:
Court of Appeals decision is affirmed.
CIVIL LAW: petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code
which provides that "a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." It
introduced the concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage, although

this concept eludes exact definition. The initial common consensus on psychological
incapacityunder Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not involve a species of vice of
consent.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c)
incurability. It should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage." It must be confined to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage.
There is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by
a physician or psychologist as a conditionsine qua nonfor the declaration of nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert
opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that
psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly
established.
It is the petitioners theory the respondents psychological incapacity is premised on her refusal or
unwillingness to perform certain marital obligations, and a number of unpleasant personality
traits such as immaturity, irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness. These acts do not rise to the level
of psychological incapacity that the law requires, and should be distinguished from the difficulty,
if not outright refusal or neglect, in the performance of some marital obligations that characterize
some marriages. The intent of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders existing at the time of the marriage
clearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the
marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.
In the present case, the petitioners testimony failed to establish that the respondents condition is a
manifestation of a disordered personality rooted on some incapacitating or debilitating
psychological condition that makes her completely unable to discharge the essential marital
obligations. If at all, the petitioner merely showed that the respondent had some personality
defects that showed their manifestationduringthe marriage; his testimony sorely lacked details
necessary to establish that the respondents defects existed at the inception of the marriage.In
addition, the petitioner failed to discuss thegravityof the respondents condition; neither did he
mention that the respondents malady wasincurable, or if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the respondents means to undertake. The petitioners declarations that the respondent does
not accept her fault, does not want to change, and refused to reform are insufficient to establish a
psychological or mental defect that is serious, grave, or incurable as contemplated by Article 36
of the Family Code.
The petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.
136. LIGERALDE vs. PATALINGHUG

G.R. No. 168796

FACTS:
Silvino and May got married on October 3, 1984. They were blessed with four children.
Sometime in September 1995, May arrived home at 4:00 oclock in the morning. Her excuse was
that she had watched a video program in a neighboring town, but admitted later to have slept
with her Palestinian boyfriend in a hotel. In the midst of these, Silvinos deep love for her, the
thought of saving their marriage for the sake of their children, and the commitment of May to
reform dissuaded him from separating from her. He still wanted to reconcile with her. May was
back again to her old ways. This was demonstrated when Silvino arrived home one day and
learned that she was nowhere to be found. He searched for her and found her in a nearby
apartment drinking beer with a male lover. Later, May confessed that she had no more love for
him. They then lived separately. Silvino referred the matter to Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio for
psychological evaluation. The psychologist certified that May was psychologically incapacitated
to perform her essential marital obligations; that the incapacity started when she was still young
and became manifest after marriage; and that the same was serious and incurable. On October
22, 1999, the RTC declared the marriage of Silvino and May null and void. The Court of Appeals
reversed the RTC decision.
ISSUES:
(a)
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
jurisdiction.
(b) Whether or not May is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
RULING:
No. On procedural grounds, the Court agrees with the public respondent that the petitioner
should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 instead of this petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. For having availed of the wrong remedy, this petition deserves outright
dismissal.In order to avail of the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court, the petitioner must clearly show that the public respondent acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction. By
grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion and hostility. In sum, for the extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie, there
must be capricious, arbitrary or whimsical exercise of power. These were not proven in the close
scrutiny of the records.
No. (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the
root cause of the psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in
the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision; (3) the
incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of the marriage; (4) such

incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; and (5) such
illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage (Republic v. Court of Appeals). The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained
and established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial. An adulterous life is not
tantamount to psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36. Petitioner must be able to
establish that respondent's unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality, which
makes her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.

137. REYES V. REYES

G.R. NO. 185286
FACTS:
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the University of the
Philippines (UP) Diliman, in 1972 when they were both nineteen (19) years old. They got
married on December 5, 1976, petitioner was already five (5) months pregnant then. Thereafter,
they lived with the Ramons family. All living expenses were shouldered by Ramons parents,
and the couples respective salaries were spent solely for their personal needs.
After one year of being married, the monthly allowance ofP1,500.00 of respondent stopped
because Ramon resigned from his familys business. Because of this, Ramon engaged into a
fishpond business and eventually a scrap paper and carton trading business which both failed. To
prod respondent into assuming more responsibility, petitioner suggested that they live separately
from her in-laws. After two years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence and, this time,
moved in with Socorros mother where petitioner continued to carry the financial burdens
Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital affair. One
of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties marriage was a surgical operation on
petitioner for the removal of a cyst where respondent remained unconcerned and unattentive; and
simply read the newspaper, and played dumb when petitioner requested that he accompany her as
she was wheeled into the operating room.
As a last resort, petitioner approached respondents siblings and asked them to intervene, Adolfo
Reyes, respondents elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina, members of a marriage encounter
group, invited, sponsored and scheduled counseling sessions with petitioner and respondent, but
these did not improve the parties relationship as respondent remained uncooperative. In 1997,
Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological assessment; however,
respondent resisted and did not continue with the clinical psychologists recommendation to
undergo psychotherapy. At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of respondents
siblings, told respondent to move out of their house. With the de facto separation, the relationship
still did not improve. Neither did respondents relationship with his children.
Finally, in 2001, petitioner filed before the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage with the respondent, alleging the latters psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential
marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code. RTC affirmed petitioner. CA reversed
and set aside RTCs decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that the totality of the evidence presented
duly established the psychological incapacities of the parties to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage
RULING:

The clinical psychologists and psychiatrists assessment were not based solely on the narration
or personal interview of the petitioner. Other informants such as respondents own son, siblings
and in-laws, and sister-in-law (sister of petitioner), testified on their own observations of
respondents behavior and interactions with them, spanning the period of time they knew him.
These were also used as the basis of the doctors assessments.
Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the psychological makeup of
a person based on a number of factors culled from various sources. A person afflicted with a
personality disorder will not necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In this case,
considering that a personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis by
the respondent consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors separate diagnoses, does not
necessarily evoke credence and cannot trump the clinical findings of experts.
In sum, the Court find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and the respective
testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have problems; and
(2) these problems include chronic irresponsibility; inability to recognize and work towards
providing the needs of his family; several failed business attempts; substance abuse; and a trail of
unpaid money obligations.
In the case at bar, however, even without the experts conclusions, the factual antecedents
(narrative of events) alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point to the
inevitable conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital obligations.
The respondents pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to
perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2)
extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid money
obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family businesses; and (7)
criminal charges of estafa.
The Supreme Court granted the petition. It affirmed the decision of the trial court and declared
the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code.

138. TORING vs. TORING

G.R. No. 165321

FACTS:
Petitioner Ricardo P. Toring was introduced to Teresita M. Toring in 1978 at his aunts house in
Cebu. Teresita was then his cousins teacher in Hawaiian dance and was conducting lessons at
his aunts house. They became sweethearts after three months of courtship and eloped soon
after, hastened by the bid of another girlfriend, already pregnant, to get Ricardo to marry her.
Ricardo and Teresita were married on September 4, 1978 before Hon. Remigio Zari of the City
Court of Quezon City. They begot three children: Richardson, Rachel Anne, and Ric Jayson.
On February 1, 1999, more than twenty years after their wedding, Ricardo filed a petition for
annulment before the RTC. He claimed that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the
celebration of their marriage. Before the RTC, Ricardo offered in evidence their marriage
contract; the psychological evaluation and signature of his expert witness, psychiatrist Dr. Cecilia
R. Albaran, and his and Dr. Albarans respective testimonies.
Ricardo alleged that Teresita was an adulteress and a squanderer that she was very extravagant,
materialistic, controlling and demanding. He was an overseas seaman, and he regularly sent
money to his wife to cover the familys living expenses and their childrens tuition. However, not
only did she fail at paying the rent, utilities and other living expenses, she also she incurred debts
from other people and failed to remit amounts collected as sales agent of a plasticware and
cosmetics company. Also, during one of his visits to the country, he noticed that Teresitas
stomach was slightly bigger. He tried to convince her to have a medical examination but she
refused. Her miscarriage five months into her pregnancy confirmed his worst suspicions. Ricardo
alleged that the child could not have been his, as his three instances of sexual contact with
Teresita were characterized by withdrawals; other than these, no other sexual contacts with his
wife transpired, as he transferred and lived with his relatives after a month of living with Teresita
in Cebu. Ricardo reported, too, of rumors that his wife represented herself to others as single,
and went out on dates with other men when he was not around.
Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran diagnosed Teresita with Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Teresita should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with
essential marital obligations.
RULING:
No. Dr. Albarans psychological evaluation merely relied on Ricardo and Richardsons
testimonies. The mere narration of the statements of Ricardo and Richardson, coupled with the
results of the psychological tests administered only on Ricardo, without more, does not constitute
sufficient basis for the conclusion that Teresita suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from persons intimately related to them,

such as relatives, close friends or even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on the
allegedly incapacitated spouses condition at or about the time of marriage, or to subsequent
occurring events that trace their roots to the incapacity already present at the time of marriage.
Richardson, the spouses eldest son, would not have been a reliable witness as he could not have
been expected to know what happened between his parents until long after his birth. He merely
recounted isolated incidents. The root cause must be alleged and not just the manifestations
during the marriage described as refusal, difficulty or neglect.

140. AZCUETA V. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 180668
FACTS:
Petitioner Marietta C. Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta met in 1993. Less than two months after
their first meeting, they got married. At the time of their marriage, petitioner was 23 years old
while respondent was 28. They separated in 1997 after four years of marriage. They have no
children.
On 2002, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Meanwhile,
respondent failed to appear and file an answer despite service of summons upon him. Because of
this, the trial court directed the City Prosecutor to conduct an investigation whether there was
collusion between the parties. The Prosecutor found that there was no collusion between the
parties.
In her petition and during her testimony, petitioner claimed that her husband Rodolfo was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. According to
petitioner, Rodolfo was emotionally immature, irresponsible and continually failed to adapt
himself to married life and perform the essential responsibilities and duties of a husband.
Petitioner complained that Rodolfo never bothered to look for a job and instead always asked his
mother for financial assistance. Petitioner also complained that every time Rodolfo would get
drunk he became physically violent towards her. Their sexual relationship was also
unsatisfactory. They only had sex once a month and petitioner never enjoyed it.
Petitioner likewise presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist. Dr. Villegas testified that after
examining petitioner for her psychological evaluation, she found petitioner to be mature,
independent, very responsible, focused and has direction and ambition in life. She also observed
that petitioner works hard for what she wanted and therefore, she was not psychologically
incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. Dr. Villegas added that based
on the information gathered from petitioner, she found that Rodolfo showed that he was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital duties and responsibilities. Dr. Villegas
concluded that he was suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder associated with severe
inadequacy related to masculine strivings.
RTC declared the marriage null and void ab initio. However, CA reversed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the psychological evaluation made by Dr. Villegas without actual examination to
the husband sufficient as ground for psychological incapacity.
RULING:

The Court held that Rodolfo satisfied the requisites of Molina Doctrine, thus he was deemed
suffering from psychological incapacity. Thus, the said marriage was declared null and void ab
initio.
First, petitioner successfully discharged her burden to prove the psychological incapacity of her
husband.
Second, the root cause of Rodolfos psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the petition, sufficiently proven by expert testimony, and clearly explained
in the trial courts decision.
The petition alleged that from the beginning of their marriage, Rodolfo was not gainfully
employed and, despite pleas from petitioner, he could not be persuaded to even attempt to find
employment; that from the choice of the family abode to the couples daily sustenance, Rodolfo
relied on his mother; and that the couples inadequate sexual relations and Rodolfos refusal to
have a child stemmed from a psychological condition linked to his relationship to his mother.
The root cause of the above clinical condition is due to a strong and prolonged dependence with
a parent of the opposite sex, to a period when it becomes no longer appropriate. This situation
crippled his psychological functioning related to sex, self confidence, independence,
responsibility and maturity. It existed prior to marriage, but became manifest only after the
celebration due to marital stresses and demands. It is considered as permanent and incurable in
nature, because it started early in his life and therefore became so deeply ingrained into his
personality structure. It is severe or grave in degree, because it hampered and interfered with his
normal functioning related to heterosexual adjustment.
Third, Rodolfos psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of
and even before the celebration of marriage.
Fourth, Rodolfos psychological incapacity has been shown to be sufficiently grave, so as to
render him unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, petitioner, who is
afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations of
living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is
unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others.
Fifth, Rodolfo is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations embodied in
Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. As noted by the trial court, as a result of Rodolfos
dependent personality disorder, he cannot make his own decisions and cannot fulfill his
responsibilities as a husband. Rodolfo plainly failed to fulfill the marital obligations to live
together, observe mutual love, respect, support under Article 68.
Sixth, the incurability of Rodolfos condition which has been deeply ingrained in his system
since his early years was supported by evidence and duly explained by the expert witness.
As the court defense, in dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys psychological
incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting
the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological
disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in

that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional
indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are
manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly. Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no
marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning. To indulge in
imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a
stillborn marriage.

141. ALCAZAR vs. ALCAZAR

G.R. No. 174451
FACTS:
Petitioner Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar alleged in her Complaint that she was married to
respondent Rey C. Alcazar on 11 October 2000 by Rev. Augusto G. Pabustan (Pabustan), at the
latters residence. After their wedding, petitioner and respondent lived for five days in San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, the hometown of respondents parents. Thereafter, the newlyweds went
back to Manila, but respondent did not live with petitioner at the latters abode at 2601-C Jose
Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. On 23 October 2000, respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia, where he worked as an upholsterer in a furniture shop. While working in
Riyadh, respondent did not communicate with petitioner by phone or by letter. Petitioner tried to
call respondent for five times but respondent never answered. About a year and a half after
respondent left for Riyadh, a co-teacher informed petitioner that respondent was about to come
home to the Philippines. Petitioner was surprised why she was not advised by respondent of his
arrival.
Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent arrived in the Philippines, the
latter did not go home to petitioner at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. Instead,
respondent proceeded to his parents house in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Upon learning that
respondent was in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, petitioner went to see her brother-in-law in
Velasquez St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed that he was not aware of respondents whereabouts.
Petitioner traveled to San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, where she was informed that respondent
had been living with his parents since his arrival in March 2002.
Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines, he never contacted
her. Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of consummating his
marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to
paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code). There was also no
more possibility of reconciliation between petitioner and respondent.
During trial, petitioner presented herself, her mother Lolita Cabacungan (Cabacungan), and
clinical psychologist Nedy L. Tayag (Tayag) as witnesses. The psychologist diagnosed the
respondent to have Narcissistic Personality Disorder. The RTC denied petitioners complaint for
annulment of her marriage. The petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. The CA
affirmed RTCs decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rey is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
RULING:
No. Article 46 of the Family Code contemplates an annulment of marriage on the ground of
incapacity to consummate specifically denoting the permanent disability on the spouses to

perform and complete the act of sexual intercourse. What petitioner was actually seeking was the
declaration of nullity of marriage contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. Nevertheless,
Article 36 should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. Petitioners evidence, particularly her
and her mothers testimonies, merely established that respondent left petitioner soon after their
wedding to work in Saudi Arabia; that when respondent returned to the Philippines a year and a
half later, he directly went to live with his parents in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and not with
petitioner in Tondo, Manila; and that respondent also did not contact petitioner at all since
leaving for abroad. These testimonies though do not give us much insight into respondents
psychological state. Tayag, in evaluating respondents psychological state, had to rely on
information provided by petitioner.
Hence, we expect Tayag to have been more prudent and thorough in her evaluation of
respondents psychological condition, since her source of information, namely, petitioner, was
hardly impartial. The psychologist failed to trace Reys experiences in childhood, did not
describe the pattern of behavior that led her to conclude that, indeed, Rey was suffering from
Narcissistic Personality disorder; and did not relate how this rendered him truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal, or a
neglect in the performance of some marital obligations.

142. ASPILLAGA V. ASPILLAGA

G.R. NO. 170925
FACTS:
Rodolfo Aspillaga met Aurora Apon sometime in 1977 while they were students at the Philippine
Merchant Marine Academy and Lyceum of the Philippines, respectively. Rodolfo courted her and
five months later, they became sweethearts. Thereafter, Aurora left for Japan to study Japanese
culture, literature and language. Despite the distance, Rodolfo and Aurora maintained
communication.
In 1980, after Aurora returned to the Philippines, she and Rodolfo got married. They begot two
children, but Rodolfo claimed their marriage was tumultuous. He described Aurora as
domineering and frequently humiliated him even in front of his friends. He complained that
Aurora was a spendthrift as she overspent the family budget and made crucial family decisions
without consulting him. Rodolfo added that Aurora was tactless, suspicious, given to nagging
and jealousy as evidenced by the latters filing against him a criminal case (concubinage) and an
administrative case. He left the conjugal home, and filed on March 7, 1995, a petition for
annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Aurora. He
averred that Aurora failed to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
Aurora, for her part, alleged that sometime in 1991, Rodolfo gave her a plane ticket to Japan to
enable her to assume her teaching position in a university for a period of three months. In August
1991, upon her return to Manila, she discovered that while she was in Japan, Rodolfo brought
into their conjugal home her cousin, Lecita Rose A. Besina, as his concubine. Aurora alleged that
Rodolfos cohabitation with her cousin led to the disintegration of their marriage and their
eventual separation. In May 1992, Rodolfo abandoned their conjugal home to live with Besina.
Aurora claimed custody of the children.
Psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Eduardo Maaba revealed that both parties suffered psychological
handicaps traced from unhealthy maturational development. Both had strict, domineering,
disciplinarian role models. However, respondents mistrust, shallow heterosexual relationships
resulted in incapacitation in her ability to comply with the obligation of marriage. RTC found the
parties psychologically incapacitated. The CA reversed and set aside the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not both parties are psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations.
RULING:
No. Psychological incapacity is not mere difficulty, refusal, or neglect. Noteworthy, as
aptly pointed out by the appellate court, Rodolfo and Aurora initially had a blissful marital union
for several years. They married in 1982, and later affirmed the ceremony in church rites in 1983,
showing love and contentment with one another after a year of marriage. The letter of petitioner

on April 1, 1990 addressed to respondent revealed the harmonious relationship of the couple
continued during their marriage for about eight years from the time they married each other.
From this, it can be inferred that they were able to faithfully comply with their obligations to
each other and to their children. Aurora was shown to have taken care of her children and
remained faithful to her husband while he was away. She even joined sales activities to augment
the family income. She appeared to be a very capable woman who traveled a lot and pursued
studies here and abroad. It was only when Rodolfos acts of infidelity were discovered that the
marriage started to fail. While disagreements on money matters would, no doubt, affect the other
aspects of ones marriage as to make the wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a ground to declare a
marriage null and void. At this juncture while this Court is convinced that indeed both parties
were both found to have psychological disorders, nevertheless, there is nothing in the records
showing that these disorders are sufficient to declare the marriage void due to psychological
incapacity. Incurability was not proven. Incompatibility or irreconcilable differences could not be
equated with psychological incapacity.

143. NAJERA vs. NAJERA

G.R. No. 164817
FACTS:
On January 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage with Alternative Prayer for Legal Separation, with Application for Designation as
Administrator Pendente Lite of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains.Petitioner alleged that she and
respondent are residents of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but respondent is presently living in the
United States of America (U.S.A). They were married on January 31, 1988. They are childless.
Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage, respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of the marriage, and such
incapacity became manifest only after marriage.
On June 29, 1998, the RTC issued an Orderterminating the pre-trial conference after the parties
signed a Formal Manifestation/Motion, which stated that they had agreed to dissolve their
conjugal partnership of gains and divide equally their conjugal properties.Psychologist Cristina
Gates testified that the chances of curability of respondents psychological disorder were nil. Its
curability depended on whether the established organic damage was minimal -- referring to the
malfunction of the composites of the brain brought about by habitual drinking and marijuana,
which possibly afflicted respondent with borderline personality disorder and uncontrollable
impulses.Further, SPO1 Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan, testified
that on July 3, 1994, he received a complaint from petitioner that respondent arrived at their
house under the influence of liquor and mauled petitioner without provocation on her part, and
that respondent tried to kill her. The complaint was entered in the police blotter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of petitioners evidence was able to prove that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the
annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
RULING:
The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the totality of the evidence submitted
by petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage .The root cause of respondents alleged
psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable.

144. TE V. TE

G.R. No. 161793

FACTS:
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te and Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu- Te were a young couple who
decided to elope, with the persistence of Rowena, to Cebu. After only a month, however, their
money, accommodation and daily sustenance fast depleted, them not being able to find jobs.
When they decided to go back to Manila, respondent proceeded to her uncles house and
petitioner to his parents. Due to Rowens constant telephoning and threats of suicide, Edward
agreed to live with her at her uncles home.
Respondents uncle then brought them to court to get married. After, they both stayed in her
uncles home, petitioner being under constant threat by the uncle not to leave respondent.
Respondent, when petitioner was able to call home, suggested that petitioner get his inheritance
so they could live together on their own, to which petitioners father got mad and threatened to
disinherit him.
After a month, petitioner was able to escape from the uncles house. When petitioner and
respondent were able to talk again, not wanting to stay with the petitioners parents, respondent
said that it was better for them to live separate lives, to wit they separated. Four years after,
petitioner filed a petition before the RTC for the annulment of his marriage to respondent on the
basis of the latters psychological incapacity. A clinical psychologist who examined the petitioner
found both parties to be psychologically incapacitated. The RTC declared the marriage null and
void, which the CA reversed and set aside. Thus the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage is null and void, based of Art 36 of the FC.
RULING:
Yes it is, the marriage is declared null and void. Art. 36 of the FC provides that, a marriage
contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. By the very nature of Art. 36, courts,
despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead,
must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties. The psychological assessment produced the findings that both
parties are afflicted with personality disorders, dependent personality disorder for petitioner, and
narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder for respondent. The seriousness of the diagnosis
and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in this case, finds as decisive the
psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, rules that the marriage of the
parties is null and void on ground of both parties psychological incapacity.

145. PARAS V. PARAS

G.R. No 147824
FACTS:
On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J. Paras in Bindoy, Negros
Oriental. They begot four (4) children, namely: Raoul (deceased), Cindy Rose (deceased),
Dahlia, and Reuel. Twenty-nine (29) years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993,Rosa filed with the
Regional Trial Court a complaint for annulment of her marriage with Justo, under Article 36 of
the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. 10613. She was then a student of San Carlos
University, Cebu City. He courted her, frequently spending time at her "Botica." Eventually, in
1964, convinced that he loved her, she agreed to marry him. Their wedding was considered one
of the "most celebrated" marriages in Bindoy. Sometime in 1975, their daughter Cindy Rose
was afflicted with leukemia. It was her family who paid for her medication. Also in 1984, their
son Raoul was electrocuted while Justo was in their rest house with his "barkadas." He did not
heed her earlier advice to bring Raoul in the rest house as the latter has the habit of climbing the
rooftop. To cope with the death of the children, the entire family went to the United
States. However, after three months, Justo abandoned them and left for the Philippines. Upon her
return to the Philippines, she was shocked to find her "Botica" and other businesses heavy in debt
and he disposed without her consent a conjugal piece of land. At other times, he permitted the
municipal government to take gasoline from their gas station free of charge. His act of
maintaining a mistress and siring an illegitimate child was the last straw that prompted her to file
the present case. She found that after leaving their conjugal house in 1988, Justo lived with
Jocelyn Ching. Their cohabitation resulted in the birth of a babygirl, Cyndee Rose, obviously
named after her (Rosa) and Justos deceased daughter Cindy Rose Paras.
He also denied forging her signature in one mortgage transaction. He maintained that he did not
dispose of a conjugal property and that he and Rosa personally signed the renewal of a sugar
crop loan before the banks authorized employee. He did not abandon his family in the United
States. For his part, he was granted only three (3) months leave as municipal mayor of Bindoy,
thus, he immediately returned to the Philippines. He spent for his childrens education. At first,
he resented supporting them because he was just starting his law practice and besides, their
conjugal assets were more than enough to provide for their needs. He admitted though that there
were times he failed to give them financial support because of his lack of income. What caused
the inevitable family break-out was Rosas act of embarrassing him during his birthday
celebration in 1987. She did not prepare food for the guests. When confronted, she retorted that
she has nothing to do with his birthday. This convinced him of her lack of concern. This was
further aggravated when she denied his request for engine oil when his vehicle broke down in a
mountainous and NPA-infested area. As to the charge of concubine, he alleged that Jocelyn
Ching is not his mistress, but her secretary in his Law Office. She was impregnated by her
boyfriend, a certain Grelle Leccioness. Cyndee Rose Ching Leccioness is not his daughter.
After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision upholding the validity of the
marriage. On December 8, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in the present
case, holding that "the evidence of the plaintiff (Rosa) falls short of the standards required by law
to decree a nullity of marriage." It ruled that Justos alleged defects oridiosyncrasies "were
sufficiently explained by the evidence," Rosa contends that this Courts factual findings in A.C.

No. 5333 for disbarment are conclusive on the present case. Consequently, the Court of Appeals
erred in rendering contrary factual findings. Also, she argues that she filed the instant complaint
sometime in May, 1993
ISSUES:
a) Whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present
case;
b) Whether a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of expert testimony on the root
cause of Justos alleged psychological incapacity is necessary; and
c) Whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological incapacity on the part of
Justo.
RULING:
A reading of the Court of Appeals Decision shows that she has no reason to feel aggrieved. In
fact, the appellate court even assumed that her charges "are true," but concluded that they are
insufficient to declare the marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Justo's
alleged infidelity, failure to support his family and alleged abandonment of their family home are
true, such traits are at best indicators that he is unfit to become an ideal husband and father.
However, by themselves, these grounds are insufficient to declare the marriage void due to
an incurable psychological incapacity. These grounds, we must emphasize, do not manifest that
he was truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenants that he must assume and discharge as a
married person. While they may manifest the "gravity" of his alleged psychological incapacity,
they do not necessarily show incurability, such that while his acts violated the covenants of
marriage, they do not necessarily show that such acts show an irreparably hopeless state
of psychological incapacity which prevents him from undertaking the basic obligations of
marriage in the future.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained in
the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological -not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.

146. ZAMORA vs. ZAMORA

G.R. No. 141917
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent were married on June 4, 1970 in Cebu City. After their marriage, they
lived together at No. 50-AGorordo Avenue, Cebu City. The union did not produce any child. In
1972, private respondent left for the United States to work as anurse. She returned to the
Philippines for a few months, and then left again in 1974. Thereafter, she made periodic visits to
Cebu Cityuntil 1989, when she was already a U.S. citizen. Petitioner filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage anchored on thealleged "psychological incapacity" of private
respondent, as provided for under Article 36 of the Family Code. To support his position,he
alleged that his wife was "horrified" by the mere thought of having children as evidenced by the
fact that she had not bornepetitioner a child. Furthermore, he also alleged that private respondent
abandoned him by living in the United States and had in fact become an American citizen; and
that throughout their marriage they lived together for not more than three years.
Respondentdenied that she refused to have a child. She portrayed herself as one who loves
children as she is a nurse by profession and that shewould from time to time borrow her
husbands niece and nephews to care for them. She also faulted her husband for the breakup of
their marriage, alleging that he had been unfaithful to her. He allegedly had two affairs with
different women, and he begot at leastthree children with them. On June 22, 1995, the trial court
rendered its decision. The plaintiff consented to defendants trip to theUnited States in 1974. She
[defendant] wanted to earn money there because she wanted to help her husband build a big
house at theBeverly Hills, Cebu City. The plaintiff himself admitted that he has a child, and the
court is also convinced that he has two children.However, nothing in the evidence of plaintiff
shows that the defendant suffered from any psychological incapacity or that she failed tocomply
with her essential marital obligations. There is no evidence of psychological incapacity on the
part of defendant so that shecould not carry out the ordinary duties required in married life.
Neither has it been shown that there was an incurable defect on thepart of defendant.
ISSUES:
a) Whether or not the Court of Appeals misapplied facts of weight and substance affecting the
result of the present case;
b) Whether or not the presentation of psychologists and/or psychiatrists is still desirable, if
evidence in this case already showsthe psychological incapacity of private respondent;
c) Whether or not private respondents refusal to live with petitioner under one roof for more
than twenty (20) years, her refusalto bear children with petitioner, and her living a solitary life in
the United States for almost three (3) decades are enough indications of psychological incapacity
to comply with essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.

RULING:

The Courts merely said in that case that "the well-considered opinions of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and persons withexpertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable." However, no expert opinion is helpful or even desirable todetermine whether private
respondent has been living abroad and away from her husband for many years; whether she has a
child;and whether she has made her residence abroad permanent by acquiring U.S. citizenship.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, waspsychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if suchincapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.
A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts
showing that either or both partieswere psychologically incapacitated from complying with the
essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

147. FERRARIS vs. FERRARIS

G.R. No. 162368
FACTS:
Armida and Brix are a showbiz couple. The couples relationship before the marriage and even
during their brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all bad. During that relatively short
period of time, Armida was happy and contented with her life in the company of Brix. Armida
even admits that Brix was a responsible and loving husband. Their problems began when
Armida started doubting Brix fidelity. It was only when they started fighting about the calls
from women that Brix began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his socalled marital obligations. Brix could not understand Armidas lack of trust in him and her
constant naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Brix could not relate to her anger,
temper and jealousy. Armida presented a psychological expert (Dr. Dayan) who finds Brix to be
a schizoid and a dependent and avoidant type. This is evidenced by Brixs leaving-the-house
attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual
infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his
band mates than his family.
ISSUE:
How shall psychological incapacity be proven?
RULING:
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code, refers to aserious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanentas to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As
all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with
certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological
experts for its understanding of the human personality. However, the rootcause must be identified
as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained, which petitioner
failed to convincingly demonstrate.Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioners
evidence showed that respondents alleged failure to perform his so-called marital obligations
was not at all a manifestation of some deep-seated, grave, permanent and incurable
psychological malady. To be sure, the couples relationship before the marriage and even during
their brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all bad. During that relatively short period
of time, petitioner was happy and contented with her life in the company of respondent.
Infact, by petitioners own reckoning, respondent was a responsible and loving husband. Their
problems began when petitionerstarted doubting respondents fidelity. It was only when they
started fighting about the calls from women that respondent began towithdraw into his shell and
corner, and failed to perform his so- called marital obligations. Respondent could not

understandpetitioners lack of trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions
irrational. Respondent could not relate to heranger, temper and jealousy.At any rate, Dr. Dayan
did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that respondent has a mixed personality disorder
called"schizoid," and why he is the "dependent and avoidant type." Notably, when asked as to the
root cause of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayans answer was vague,
evasive andinconclusive. She replied that such disorder "can be part of his family upbringing"
She stated that there was a history of respondents parents having difficulties in their relationship.
But this input on the supposed problematic history of respondentsparents also came from
petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly demonstrate that there was really "a natal or supervening
disablingfactor" on the part of respondent, or an "adverse integral element" in respondents
character that effectively incapacitated him fromaccepting, and, thereby complying with, the
essential marital obligations. We find respondents alleged mixed personality disorder, the
"leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they quarreled, the violenttendencies during epileptic
attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend
moretime with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological
condition but a mere refusal orunwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
While petitioners marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without hope of
reconciliation, the remedy however isnot always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground
of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not anull and void marriage.
No less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it
decreesmarriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be"protected" by the state. Petition dismissed with
finality.

148. ANTONIO V. REYES

G.R. NO. 155800
FACTS:
Antonio and Reyes first got married at Manila City Hall and subsequently in church on
December 8, 1990. A child was born in April 1991 but died 5 months later. Antonio could no
longer take her constant lying, insecurities and jealousies over him so he separated from her in
August 1991. He attempted reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left
her for good in November 1991. Only after their marriage that he learned about her child with
another man. He then filed a petition in 1993 to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and
void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede, a psychiatrist, and Dr.
Arnulfo V. Lopez, a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that
petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the
other hand, they observed that respondents persistent and constant lying to petitioner was
abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust
and respect. They further asserted that respondents extreme jealousy was also pathological. It
reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was
having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent
was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.
The trial court gave credence to Antonio's evidence and thus declared the marriage null and void.
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. It held that the totality of evidence presented
was insufficient to establish Reyes' psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in
the 1997 Molina case had not been satisfied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Antonio has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under
Article 36 of the Family Code and, generally, under the Molina guidelines
RULING:
The factual findings of the trial court are deemed binding on the SC, owing to the great weight
accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts. As such, it must be considered that
respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and personality.
Her fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world
of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of
giving meaning and significance to her marriage.
The case sufficiently satisfies the Molina guidelines:
First, that Antonio had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity
of his wife;

Second, that the root cause of Reyes' psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically
identified that was sufficiently proven by experts, and was clearly explained in the trial court's
decision;
Third, that she fabricated friends and made up letters before she married him prove that her
psychological incapacity was have existed even before the celebration of marriage;
Fourth, that the gravity of Reyes' psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a
restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting marriage without their consent;
Fifth, that she being an inveterate pathological liar makes her unable to commit the basic tenets
of relationship between spouses based on love, trust, and respect.
Sixth, that the CA clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage
was annulled by the Catholic Church. However, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of
facts, and not of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh, that Reyes' case is incurable considering that Antonio tried to reconcile with her but her
behavior remains unchanged.
The Supreme Court granted the petition. The decision of the RTC declaring the marriage null and
void is reinstated.
In the case at bar, however, even without the experts conclusions, the factual antecedents
(narrative of events) alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point to the
inevitable conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital obligations.
The respondents pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to
perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2)
extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid money
obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family businesses; and (7)
criminal charges of estafa.
The Supreme Court granted the petition. It affirmed the decision of the trial court and declared
the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code.

149. CARATING-SIAYNGCO vs. SIAYNGCO

G.R. No. 158896
FACTS:
Juanita Carating-Siayngco was married to Manuel Siayngco. Their marriage did not produce
children however, the adopted a boy. Manuel, after being married for 24 years filed a petition to
the court seeking the nullification of their marriage by reason of psychological incapacity
exhibited through over domineering attitude and causing him embarrassment and humiliation.
The lower court denied his petition. The CA on the other hand reversed the decision relying on
the doctors findings that both parties are psychologically incapacitated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not one or both of the parties were proven psychologically incapacitated sufficient to
warrant the nullification of their marriage.
RULING:
The court ruled in the negative. Manuels relationship with another was caused merely by his
sexual infidelity which does not fall within the purview of psychological incapacity. This action
caused by his desire to have children which he himself admitted. The testimonies of the doctor
failed to show that this infidelity is caused by a psychological illness or disorder. It is necessary
that it his by reason of a psychological disorder that he will be completely unable to perform his
marital obligations. With regard to Juanita, Manuel failed to show that her actions constitute
psychological incapacity that would render her unable to perform her marital obligations and that
a doctor has in fact stated otherwise. The evidence adduced failed to show sufficiently that the
couple or either of the spouse were psychologically incapacitated, rather it showed that they were
merely having the marital trouble of becoming strangers to each other and wanting to get out of
it. The marriage thus cannot be declared null and void

151. BUENAVENTURA V. CA

G.R. No. 127358

FACTS:
July 12 1992, Noel Buenaventura filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground that he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated. The Regional Trial Court in its
decision declared the marriage entered into between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio.
The court ordered the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property; ordered
petitioner a regular support in favor of his son in the amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to
modification as the necessity arises, and awarded the care and custody of the minor to his
mother. Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals and while the appeal was pending, the
Court of Appeals, upon respondents motion issued a resolution increasing the support pendants
like to P20, 000. The Court of Appeals dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of merit and affirmed
in to the RTC decision. Petitioner motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage.
RULING:
The general rule applies, which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property
regime applicable to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership.
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court were there, both by the Regional Trial
Court and the Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same
would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties
appear to have been included or involved in said distribution.

152. REPUBLIC V. QUINTERO-HAMANO

GR No. 149498
FACTS:
Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of nullity of her marriage with
Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. She and Toshio
started a common-law relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter,
Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita then gave birth on November
16, 1987. In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a month of their
marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays
with his family. Toshio sent money for two months and after that he stopped giving financial
support. She wrote him several times but never respondent. In 1991, she learned from her friend
that Toshio visited the country but did not bother to see her nor their child.
Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued to him remained
unserved. Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of
summons by publication. The motion was granted and the summons, accompanied by a copy of
the petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his
answer. Toshio filed to respond after the lapse of 60 days from publication, thus, Lolita filed a
motion to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not abandonment by one spouse tantamount to psychological incapacity.
RULING:
The court find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshios act of abandonment
was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of
psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other
evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder.
Abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. There was no showing that the case at bar
was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. It cannot presume
psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the
celebration of the marriage. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable
of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the
obligations essential to marriage. In proving psychological incapacity, the court finds no
distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. It cannot be lenient in the application
of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be
a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were

formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for
determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.

153. DEDEL V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R.NO. 151867
FACTS:
David Dedel and Sharon Corpuz were married on September 28, 1996 and May 20, 1967 in a
civil and church wedding, respectively. They had four children. David instituted a case for the
nullity of their marriage on account of Sharons psychological incapacity to perform basic
marital obligations. He claimed that Sharon had extra-marital affairs with several men including
a dentist in the AFP, a lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command, and a Jordanian national.
Despite the treatment by a clinical psychiatrist, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with
the Jordanian, whom she married and with whom she had two children. When the Jordanian
national left the country, Sharon returned to David bringing along her two children by the
Jordanian national. David accepted her back and even considered the illegitimate children as his
own. However, Sharon abandoned David to join the Jordanian national with her two children.
Since then, Sharon would only return to the country on special occasions. Dra. Natividad Dayan
testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation of David and found him to be
conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks and projects completed
up to the final detail and who exerts his best in whatever he does.
On the other hand, Dra. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality
Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions
and had no capacity for remorse even bringing with her the two children of the Jordanian to live
with David. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts
of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of the said disorder amounting to
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. The trial court declared
their marriage null and void on the ground of the psychological incapacity of Sharon to perform
the essential obligations of marriage. While the Court of Appeals set aside the trial courts
judgment and ordered the dismissal of the petition. Davids motion for reconsideration was
denied. Hence, he appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sharons infidelity to her husband is equivalent to psychologically incapacity.
RULING:
No. Sharons infidelity is not equivalent to psychologically incapacity. Psychological incapacity
should refer to no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. The law intended to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. Sharons sexual infidelity or perversion and
abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation

of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with
psychological incapacity.
It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality, which make the
respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not
merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity. At best, the circumstances relied
upon by David are grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code not for
declaring a marriage void. The grounds for legal separation, which need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity, include physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like. Thus, the decision is
affirmed and the petition is denied.

154. REPUBLIC v. DAGDAG

G.R. No. 109975
FACTS:
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years
old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. The marriage certificate
was issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of on October 20, 1988.
Erlinda and Avelino begot two children. The birth certificates were issued by the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija also on October 20, 1988. A
week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would
disappear for months, suddenly re-appear for a few months, and then disappear again. During the
times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return
home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he
would inflict physical injuries to her.
In October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last that they heard from him. Erlinda
learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped from jail and remains at
large to-date. In July 1990, Erlinda filed with the RTC of Olongapo City a petition for judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since Avelino could
not be located, summons was served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of
general circulation. On the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel
appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law as her only witness.
The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991 to
manifest in writing whether or not he would present controverting evidence, and stating that
should he fail to file said manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for decision. The
Investigating Prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that there was no collusion
between the parties.
However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence. Without waiting
for the investigating prosecutors manifestation, the trial court declared the marriage of Erlinda
and Avelino void under Article 36. The investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside
Judgment on the ground that the decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until
January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was presenting controverting evidence. The Office of the
Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that
the same is not in accordance with the evidence and the law. Since the trial court denied the
Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the
decision of the trial court holding that Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only
because he failed to perform the duties and obligations of a married person but because he is
emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated.

RULING:
Erlinda Matias and Avelino Dagdag contracted marriage on September 7, 1975. They begot two
children. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He
would from time to time, disappear and suddenly reappear for a few months. He was always
drunk and would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and inflict physical injuries on her
if she refused. On October 1993, he left his family and was never heard from him again. Erlinda
was forced to work and learned that Avelino was imprisoned and that he escaped from jail.
Erlinda filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the grounds of psychological
incapacity. Since Avelino could not be located, summons was served by publication. Upon trial,
Erlinda presented Virginia Dagdag who attested to the psychological incapacity of Avelino. The
trial court rendered a decision in favor of respondent without waiting for the prosecutors
manifestation. The Court of Appeals affirmed trials court decision. The court contented that
Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological
incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no
psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband.
Furthermore, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently
proven. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present
controversy evidence since the trial courts decision was prematurely rendered.

155. Pesca v. Pesca

G.R. No. 136921
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent are a couple who have 4 children. Petitioner alleges that during their
marriage, respondent showed his "true color" of being an emotionally immature and
irresponsible husband. He was cruel and violent, and a habitual drinker. At one time, he chased
petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The
children themselves were not spared from physical violence. Eventually, petitioner and her
children left their conjugal home to live with her sister. Two months after, however, in the hopes
that respondent has changed, petitioner, with her children, returned home.
Sometime after, at eight in the morning, respondent assaulted the petitioner for half an hour in
the presence of the children. She submitted herself to medical examination and subsequently
filed a complaint against the respondent, to the barangay authorities for slight physical injuries.
Respondent was convicted and sentenced to 11 days in prison. After such, petitioner left the
conjugal home and filed a petition with the RTC, against the respondent for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage on the basis of psychological incapacity. The RTC rendered its decision
declaring the marriage to be null and void ab inito. The CA, however, reversed the ruling and
declared the marriage to be valid and subsisting, thus the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in its decision.
RULING:
It did not, thus the petition is denied. The term psychological incapacity, as a ground for the
declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, has been explained by
the Court in the Santos case and reiterated in the Molina case. At all events, petitioner has utterly
failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of
psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the
contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.
The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the
foundation of the family that the State cherishes and protects. While the Court commiserates
with the petitioner in her unhappy marital relationship with respondent, totally terminating that
relationship, however, may not necessarily be the fitting denouement to it.

156. MARCOS V. MARCOS

G.R. 136490
FACTS:
Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children. Alleging
that the husband failed to provide material support to the family and have resorted to physical
abuse and abandonment. Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage for psychological
incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage null and void under Article 36 which was however
reversed by the CA.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by a physician
is a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
2.
Whether or not the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological
incapacity.
RULING:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established
by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however that the respondent
should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such
declaration.
Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support
to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts
does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no
showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are
incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was
not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he
became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family
home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of
the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable,
especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show
that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.

157. ENRICO vs. HEIRS OF MEDINACELI

G.R. No. 173614
FACTS:
Spouses Uelogio Medinaceli and Trinidad Catli-medicani were married on June 14 1962. They
had seven children, herein respondents. Trinidad died on may 1 2004 and on august 26 2004,
Eulogio marries petitioner Lolita Enrico on february 10 2005. respondent filed an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage between Eulogio and Lolita on two grounds:
1) that the marriage was entered into without the requisite marriage license and
2) lack of a marriage ceremony due to Eulogio's illness.
Enrico contended that she has been living with Eulogio for 21 years hence exempt from getting a
marriage license under Art. 34 of the Family Code. More importantly, she sought the dismissal of
his action on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action
for the declaration of nullity of marriage pursuant to AM 02-11-10 SC which provides in sec. 2
(a) that the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of a void marriage may be filled solely by
the husband or the wife. The heirs invoked the ruling in the case of Ninal vs. Bayadog.
ISSUE:
a)
Whether or not the marriage between Eulogio and Enrico is exempt from securing
marriage license.
b)
Whether or not the respondent heirs can assail the validity of said marriage after the death
of Eulogio.
RULING:
Petition is dismissed.
Under Art. 34 of the family code, a man and a woman who have been living together for at least
five years without any legal impediments are exempt from securing a marriage license. The said
exemption cannot possibly apply because the second marriage contracted by Eulogio with Enrico
took place barely 3 months after Trinidad dies. Moreover, the respondent heirs have no standing
to assail the validity of the second marriage even after te death of their father, Eulogio.
While it is true that Ninal vs. Bayadog allowed the heirs therein to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of the Father's 2nd marriage after the death, the court held that the same
rule cannot be applied for the reason that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to
the effectivity of the family code.
Nonetheless, the heirs are not left without remedy. They can still protect their successional rights
as compulsory or intestate heirs of Eulogio by questioning the validity of his second marriage

with Enrico, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but in a proceeding for the settlement
of the estate deceased father filed in the regular courts.
158. AMOR-CATALAN V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 167109
FACTS:
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini,
Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became
naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April
1988. On June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan.
Petitioner contends that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting
marriage with Eusebio Bristol. She filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with
damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy?
RULING:
A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of action. A
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife. Petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be
ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. After
all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce
decree becomes absolute. We note that it was the petitioner who alleged in her complaint that
they acquired American citizenship and that respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce
decree. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence
Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to
determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law
which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree
was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlandos remarriage, then the trial court
should declare respondents marriage as bigamous and void ab initio.

159. ABLAZA V. REPUBLIC

G.R. NO. 158298
FACTS:
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed before the RTC a petition for the declaration of the
absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother
Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated
without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950. He insisted
that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him
to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a
real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the
marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due
to the marriage being void ab initio.
The RTC dismissed the petition for the following reasons: 1) petition is filed out of time (action
had long prescribed) and 2) petitioner is not a party to the marriage. The CA affirmed the
dismissal order of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek the declaration of
nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil Code
RULING:
Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of
Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15, 2003.
Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family
Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988,
but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings
commenced after March 15, 2003.
Considering that the marriage between A and B was contracted on December 26, 1949, the
applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to

initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had
absolutely no application to the petitioner.
Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior
determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate
or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresencianos surviving heir. Such
prior determination must be made by the trial court, for the inquiry thereon involves questions of
fact.
Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as the late Cresencianos
surviving wife, stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the nullification of her own marriage. She
was truly an indispensable party who must be joined herein.
The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari and reversed the decision of the Court of
Appeals. The Court returned the records to the Regional Trial Court for further proceedings, with
instructions to first require the petitioner to amend his initiatory pleading in order to implead
Leonila Honato and her daughter Leila Ablaza Jasul as parties-defendants; then to determine
whether the late Cresenciano Ablaza had any ascendants, descendants, or children (legitimate or
illegitimate) at the time of his death as well as whether the petitioner was the brother and
surviving heir of the late Cresenciano Ablaza entitled to succeed to the estate of said deceased;
and thereafter to proceed accordingly.

160. CARLOS V. SANDOVAL

G.R. NO. 179922
FACTS:
Spouses Felix Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left sixparcels of land to their
compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De DiosCarlos. Teofilo died intestate. He
was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son,Teofilo II. Upon Teofilos death,
2 parcel of land were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo
II. An action was instituted by the petitioner against respondents regarding the shares of the land
which lead to compromise agreements in relation to the divisions of proceeds in the sale of the
lands. Subsequently, in 1995, petitioner commenced an action against respondents before the
RTC for, among others, declaration of nullity of marriage of his late brother Teofilo and
respondent Felicidad in view of the absence of the required marriage license. The reason for the
action is that petitioner alleges that the marriage is null and void, thus the lands should be
reconvened to him. Respondents contended in their answer that the lack of details regarding the
requisite
marriage license did not invalidate Felicidads marriage to Teofilo. They prayed for the dismissal
of the case on the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over subject matter.
RTC rendered judgment, granting petitioners counter motion for summary judgment. Declaring
the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos null and void ab initio for
lack of the requisite marriage license. In the appeal, respondents argued, inter alia, that the trial
court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment annulling the
marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad.CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling. Basis: The Civil
Code expressly prohibit the rendition of decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of
facts or a confession of judgment. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos is a real party interest in the annulment of the
marriage between his brother Teofilo and Felicidad.
RULING:
No. Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) which became effective on March 15, 2003, the
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of
the marriage.

162. RP V. CUISON-MELGAR
G.R. No. 139676
FACTS:
On March 27, 1965, Norma and Eulogio were married before the Catholic Church in Dagupan
City. Their union begot five children. On August 19,1996, Norma filed for declaration of nullity
of her marriage on the ground of Eulogios psychological incapacity to comply with his essential
marital obligations. According to Norma the manifestations of Eulogios psychological
incapacity are his immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, laziness,
and abandonment of his family since December 27, 1985.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent is in the nature contemplated
by Article 36.
RULING:
The Supreme Court set aside and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The marriage
between Norma and Eulogio is valid. The immaturity, habitual alcoholism, laziness, jealousy and
abandonment of respondent do not constitute psychological incapacity. The Court ruled that it is
not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person;
it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so because of some
psychological, not physical, illness. In other words, proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage had to be shown. A cause has to be shown and linked with the
manifestations of the psychological incapacity.

163. MARGIE MACIAS CORPUS vs. JUDGE WILFREDO G. OCHOTORENA

A.M. No. RTJ-04-1861
FACTS:
Mrs. Macias asserts before the Court that the respondent judge's actuations constitute bias,
partiality and conduct unbecoming a judge. Moreover, according to her, what is more glaring and
conclusive from the records is that the respondent is grossly ignorant of the law and procedure.
For these administrative lapses, Mrs. Macias concludes that the Court should sanction him.
The conclusion is amply supported by the Court of Appeals' Decision which states that the
respondent judge totally disregarded Mrs. Macias' right to due process when he proceeded with
the trial on the merits of the case completely ignoring the fact that her Motion to Dismiss, which
was filed within the 30-day reglementary period, was still pending resolution.
The respondent judge disregarded the provisions of Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which states that: "After the last pleading has been served and filed, it shall be the
duty of the plaintiff to promptly move ex-parte that the case be set for pre-trial." Considering that
the last pleading was Mrs. Macias' Motion to Dismiss, the respondent judge should have first
resolved the motion and then waited for Mr. Macias' motion to set the case for pre-trial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena is found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
incompetence.
RULING:
Under Section 3 in relation to Section 10 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross ignorance of
the law is considered a serious offense, for which a penalty of either dismissal from the service
with forfeiture of benefits, suspension from office for more than three (3) months but not
exceeding six (6) months or a fine of more than Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) but not
exceeding Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) may be imposed. With this, Judge Wilfredo G.
Ochotorena is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and incompetence and is hereby
FINED the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be taken from the amount earlier
withheld from his retirement benefits. The Fiscal Management Office of the OCA is DIRECTED
to immediately release to the respondent judge the remaining balance of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) from the aforesaid retained amount, unless there are other valid reasons for its
further retention.

164. MACIAS V. MACIAS

G.R. NO.

165. FLORENCE MALCAMPO-SIN vs. PHILIPP T. SIN

G.R. No. 137590
FACTS:
On January 4, 1987, Florence and respondent Philipp Sin, a Portuguese citizen, were
married at St. Jude Catholic Parish in San Miguel, Manila. On September 20, 1994, Florence
filed with the RTC, Pasig City, a complaint for declaration of nullity of Marriage against
Philipp. Trial ensued and the parties presented their respective evidences.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in not ordering a prosecuting attorney or fiscal on behalf of the
State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.
RULING:
Article 48 of the Family Code states that in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to
appear on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take
care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial court should have ordered the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification briefly stating
his reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The records are
bereft of an evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the case thus, the case is
remanded for proper trial.
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals.

166. TUASON V. CA, ET AL.

G.R. No. 116607
April 10, 1996
FACTS:
Respondent filed with the RTC, a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage to the petitioner.
She alleged that at the time of the marriage, petitioner was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with his essential marital obligations which became manifest afterward and resulted in
violent fights between them, where one fight lead to the filing of a criminal case for physical
injuries against petitioner; that petitioner used prohibited drugs, was caught and sentenced to a
one-year suspended penalty; that petitioner was a womanizer; that petitioner gave minimal
support to the family and even refused to pay for the tuition fees of their children; that petitioner
was a spendthrift and abused his administration of the conjugal partnership; that attempts at
reconciliation were made but they all failed because of petitioners refusal to reform. In addition
to her prayer for annulment of marriage, private respondent prayed for powers of administration
to save the conjugal properties from further dissipation.
At trial, after respondent presented her evidence, petitioner failed to appear in two scheduled
hearings, because of such, the RTC rendered judgement declaring the marriage a nullity and
awarding custody to the respondent. Petitioner, through a new counsel, filed with the RTC a
petition for relief from judgment of the decision, which the RTC denied. The CA affirmed the
decision, hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for relief from judgment is warranted under the circumstances of the
case.
RULING:
It is not, the petition is denied. According to the Rules of Court, relief cannot be sought
when what is being remedied is caused by the petitioners or his counsels own inexcusable
negligence. In addition, according to Art 48, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by
default is fraught with the danger of collusion. If the defendant spouse fails to answer the
complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the
prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. However, the facts in
the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48. For one, petitioner was not
declared in default by the trial court for failure to answer. Petitioner filed his answer to the
complaint and contested the cause of action alleged by private respondent. He actively
participated in the proceedings below by filing several pleadings and cross-examining the
witnesses of private respondent. It is crystal clear that every stage of the litigation was
characterized by a no-holds barred contest and not by collusion. The role of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation proceedings is to determine
whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed
or fabricated. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a
prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the
validity
of
the
proceedings
in
the
trial
court.

167. PACETE V. CARRIAGA

232 SCRA 321
FACTS:
On October 29, 1979, Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint for the Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage between her and her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la
Concepcion, as well as for legal separation (between Alanis and Pacete), accounting and
separation of property. In her complaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete on April 30,
1938 and they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second
marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion; that she learned of such marriage only on August 1,
1979; and that reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred
to continue living with Clarita.
The defendants were each served with summons. The defendants filed an extension within which
to file an answer which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly
in communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter,
the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted.
The court received plaintiffs evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22,
1980. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17,1980. Hence,
the instant civil action of certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants has the right to file this present special civil action for certiorari to
declare the nullity of a judgment by a default issued by the lower court.
RULING:
A petition for certiorari is allowed when the default order is improperly declared, or even when it
is properly declared, where grave abuse of discretion attended such declaration. In these
exceptional instances, the special civil action for certiorari to declare the nullity of a judgment by
default is available.
In the case at bar, the lower court, in the case of non-appearance of the defendants, must have
ordered the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between the parties exists.
And if there was no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the state in order to
take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.

169. MONTANEZ VS. CIPRIANO

G.R. No. 181089
FACTS:
On April 8, 1976, Lourdes Tajolosa married Socrates Flores. On January 4, 1983 Lourdes remarried Silverio V. Cipriano. In 2001, respondent filed a Petition for the Annulment in the
Regional Trial Court in the ground of psychological incapacity as defined in Article 36 of the
Family Code. On July 8, 2003, the marriage was declared null and void. On May 14, 2004,
Silverios daughter filed a complaint of bigamy against Lourdes under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code. Lourdes then contended that sine her two marriages were contracted prior to the
Family Code, Article 40 cannot be retroactive effect because it will impair her right to remarry
without need of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. The RTC dismissed the
complaint ruling that the existing law at the time of the second marriage do not require a judicial
declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage. The
complainant then filed a motion for reconsideration but the decision rendered was again in favor
of the respondent. Hence, this petition was filed.
ISSUE:
Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code is a
valid defense for the crime of bigamy.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had
already been consummated. The Supreme Court ruled further that what is required for a crime of
bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted. Even the accused eventually secured a declaration that his first marriage is a void ab
initio, the first and second marriage was subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. Also,
Art. 40 should be applied retroactively because it does not prejudice or impair the right of
anyone. The petition is thereby granted.

170. TEVES V. PEOPLE

G.R. NO. 188775
FACTS:
On 26 November 1992, a marriage was solemnized between Cenon Teves and Thelma JaimeTeves. After the marriage, Thelma left to work abroad and would only come home to the
Philippines for vacations. In 2002, Thelma was informed that her husband had contracted
marriage with a certain Edita Calderon. Thelma then went to the National Statistics Office and
secured a copy of the Certificate of Marriage indicating that Cenon and Edita contracted
marriage on 10 December 2001 in Bulacan. In 2006, the uncle of Thelma, filed a complaint
accusing petitioner Cenon of bigamy. Petitioner was charged with bigamy under Article 349 of
the RPC on June 2006. However, during the pendency of the criminal case for bigamy, the RTC
of Caloocan City, rendered a decision dated May 2006 (one month before the case for bigamy
was decided) declaring the marriage of petitioner and Thelma null and void on the ground that
Thelma is physically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations pursuant to
Article 36, Family Code. Said decision became final by a Certification of Finality issued on 27
June 2006.
Petitioner Cenon appealed before the CA contending that the court a quo erred in not ruling that
his criminal liability had already been extinguished. Petitioner claims that since his previous
marriage was declared null and void, there is in effect no marriage at all, and thus, there is no
bigamy to speak of. Petitioner further contends that the ruling of the Court in Mercado v. Tan is
inapplicable in his case because in the Mercado case the prosecution for bigamy was initiated
before the declaration of nullity of marriage was filed. Petitioner says that in his case, the first
marriage had already been legally dissolved at the time the bigamy case was filed in court.
On 21 January 2009, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the resolution of the RTC,
finding the accused Cenon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy penalized
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner may be held guilty for the crime of Bigamy (Article 346, RPC) despite the
judicial declaration that his previous marriage with Thelma is null and void.
RULING:
The court held that it does not matter whether the case for declaration of nullity was filed before
the case for bigamy was instituted, for as long as the offender contracted a subsequent marriage
while his previous marriage is subsisting thereby not being able to secure a Declaration of
Nullity of the First marriage. His contention that he cannot be charged with bigamy in view of
the declaration of nullity of his first marriage is bereft of merit. A declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for
defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes
of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to
be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. Parties to a

marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but
must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed
to marry again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the person who
marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. A judicial declaration of nullity is required before
a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage,
reprehensible and immoral.
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the resolution of the Court of Appeals.

173. VILLANUEVA V. CA
G.R. No. 142947
FACTS:
In April 1988, Orly married Lilia before a trial court judge in Puerto Princesa. In November
1992, Orly filed to annul the marriage. He claimed that threats of violence and duress forced him
to marry Lilia. He said that he had been receiving phone calls threatening him and that Lilia even
hired the service of a certain Ka Celso, a member of the NPA, to threaten him. Orly also said he
was defrauded by Lilia by claiming that she was pregnant hence he married her but he now raises
that he never impregnated Lilia prior to the marriage. Lilia on the other hand denied Orlys
allegations and she said that Orly freely cohabited with her after the marriage and she showed 14
letters that shows Orlys affection and care towards her.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is duress and fraud attendant in the case at bar.
RULING:
The SC ruled that Orlys allegation of fraud and intimidation is untenable. On its face, it is
obvious that Orly is only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have the pending
appealed bigamy case to be dismissed. On the merits of the case, Orlys allegation of fear was
not concretely established. He was not able to prove that there was a reasonable and wellgrounded reason for fear to be created in his mind by the alleged intimidation being done against
him by Lilia and her party. Orly is a security guard who is well abreast with self-defense and that
the threat he so described done against him is not sufficient enough to vitiate him from freely
marrying Lilia. Fraud cannot be raised as a ground as well. His allegation that he never had an
erection during their sexual intercourse is incredible and is an outright lie. Also, there is a
prolonged inaction on the part of Orly to attack the marriage. It took him 4 and half years to file
an action which brings merit to Lilias contention that Orly freely cohabited with her after the
marriage.

174. ANAYA vs. PALAROAN

G.R. No. L-27930
FACTS:
Plaintiff Aurora and defendant Fernando were married on December 4, 1953; that
defendant Fernando filed an action for annulment of the marriage on January 7, 1954 on the
ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. Fernando had divulged to
Aurora that several months prior to their marriage he had a pre-marital relationship with a close
relative of his; and that the non divulgement to her of the aforementioned pre-marital secret on
the part of the defendant that definitely wrecked their marriage, which apparently doomed to fail
even before it had hardly commenced frank disclosure of which, certitude precisely precluded
her, the Plaintiff herein from going thru the marriage that was solemnized between them
constituted fraud in obtaining her consent, She prayed for the annulment of the marriage and for
moral damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with
another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage
RULING:
Non-disclosure of a husbands pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the
enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further
excluded by the last paragraph of the Article, providing that no other misrepresentation or deceit
as to chastity shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage.

175. BUCCAT V. BUCCAT

G.R. NO. 47101
FACTS:
On March 1938, Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat first met, then they came
engaged September of the same year. After few months later, on November 26, 1938, they got
married.However, after 89 days of their marriage dated February 23, 1939, Luida gave birth to a
son. After knowing this, Godofredo left Luida and never returned to married life with her. On
March 23, 1939, he filed for an annulment of their marriage on the grounds that when he agreed
to married Luida, she assured him that she was a virgin.
The Lower court decided in favor of Luida.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the annulment for Godofredo Buccats marriage can be granted on the grounds
that Luida concealed her pregnancy before the marriage?
RULING:
No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a sacred institution in
which the State is interested and where society rests.In this case, the court did not find any proof
that there was concealment of pregnancy constituting fraud as a ground for annulment. It was
unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year law student, did not suspect anything about Luidas
condition considering that she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy (highly developed physical
manifestation, ie. enlarged stomach ) when they got married.
SC affirmed the lower courts decision. Costs to plaintiff-appellant.

176. PEOPLE VS. SANTIAGO

51 P 68
FACTS:
Petitioner Gregorio Santiago caused the death of a 7year old boy by striking him with an
automobile that he was driving. Santiago was prosecuted for the crime of homicide by reckless
negligence, Santiago does not agree with the courts sentence, questioning the constitutionality of
act no. 2886 amending order no. 58 stating that all prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the
name of the U.S... Act no. 2886 stating that all prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the
name of the Philippine islands.
ISSUE:
Whether the procedure in criminal matters is incorporated in the constitution of the state?
RULING:
NO, procedure in criminal matter is not incorporated in the constitution of the states, but it is left
in the hand of the legislature, so that it falls within the realm of public statutory law.
It is limited to criminal procedure and its intention is to give to its provision the effect of law in
criminal matters.
In pursuance of the constitution of the US each state has the authority, under its police power rule
to define and punish crimes and to lay down the rules of criminal procedure.
The delegation to our government needs no demo, the crimes committed w in our territory even
before sec 2 of general orders no.58 was amended, were prosecuted and punish jurisdiction .
Act no. 2886 (feb 24 1920) criminal complainant was filed may 10 1920. The silence of congress
regarding those laws amendatory of the said general orders must be considered as an act of the
approval.

177. REYES V. ZABALLERO, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-3561

FACTS:
During the Japanese occupation the petitioner, creditor of a prewar debt, reluctantly received
Japanese military notes tendered in full payment of his credit. After liberation he sued for
recovery of the debt, contending that his acceptance of the money was invalidated by duress.
This is that suit, coming from the Court of Appeals wherein the payment was held valid and the
debt fully discharged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the payment may be invalidated by duress.
RULING:
No there was no duress, thus the decision appealed from is affirmed. According to the Civil
Code, there is duress or intimidation when one of the contracting parties is inspired by a rational
and well- grounded fear of suffering an imminent and serious injury to his person or property, or
to the person or property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants. Mere reluctance does not
detract from the voluntariness of ones acts. There must be a distinction to be made between a
case where a person gives his consent reluctantly and even against his good sense and judgment,
and where he, in reality, gives no consent at all, as where he executes a contract or performs an
act against his will under a pressure which he cannot resist. It is clear that one acts as voluntarily
and independently in the eye of the law when he acts reluctantly and with hesitation as when he
acts spontaneously and joyously. Legally speaking he acts as voluntarily and freely when he acts
wholly against his better sense and judgment as when he acts in conformity with them. Between
the two acts there is no difference in law. As it is, the important thing is that the creditor, Cesar
Reyes received the money, and executed the release. What he did afterwards without the
knowledge or consent of the debtors is entirely of no consequence. For that matter, he could have
burned the Japanese notes, or thrown them into the sea, without in the least obliterating the legal
effect of his receipt of the money. Had the creditor interposed a downright refusal, the debtors
could have made a valid consignment of the money and thus get a discharge. The creditor should
not therefore, by means of the secret protest do indirectly what he could not do directly.

178. JIMENEZ V. REPUBLIC

109 P 274
FACTS:
Plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the defendant Remedios
Caizares contracted on 3 August 1950 upon the ground that the orifice of her genitals or vagina
was too small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation; that the condition
of her genitals as described above existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist; and that
for that reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one day after they had been married.
The wife was summoned and served with a copy of the complaint. She did not file an answer.
Pursuant to the provisions of Article 88 of the Civil Code, the court directed the city attorney of
Zamboanga to inquire whether there was collusion, to see that the evidence for the plaintiff is not
a frame-up, concocted or fabricated. Thereafter, the Court entered an order requiring the
defendant to submit to a physical examination by a competent lady physician to determine her
physical capacity for copulation and to submit, within ten days from the receipt of the order, a
medical of the result thereof. The defendant again failed to comply with the courts order. She
was given an additional five days from notice to comply with warning that her failure to undergo
medical examination and submit the required doctors certificate would deemed lack of interest
on her part that the judgment upon evidence presented by her husband would be rendered.
The lower court granted the petition of the plaintiff. However, the city attorney filed a motion
for consideration upon the ground, inter alia, that the defendants impotency has not been
sufficiently established as required by law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only of the lone
testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife was and is impotent.
RULING:
In the instant case, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon sole testimony of
the husband who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of
his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have
been satisfactorily established, because for the commencement of the proceedings until the entry
of the decree, she had abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined or
failure to appear in court indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising
out of the suppression of evidence could be inferred, because women of this country are by
nature coy, and would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled by competent
authority.
A physical examination in this case is not self-incrimination. Impotency being an abnormal
condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency. The lone testimony
of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercource is insufficient to tear

asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife. The decree annulment of
their marriage is therefore SET ASIDE.

179. CALDERON V. ROXAS

G.R. No. 185595
FACTS:
Petitioner, Ma. Carminia C. Calderon and private respondent Jose Antonio F. Roxas, were
married on December 4, 1985 and their union produced four children. On January 16, 1998,
petitioner filed an Amended Complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. On May
19, 1998, the trial court issued an Order granting petitioners application for support pendente
lite. The aforesaid order and subsequent orders for support pendente lite were the subject of G.R.
No. 139337 entitled Ma. Carminia C. Roxas v. Court of Appeals and Jose Antonio F. Roxas
decided by this Court on August 15, 2001. The Decision in said case declared that the
proceedings and orders issued by the trial court in the application for support pendente lite (and
the main complaint for annulment of marriage) in the re-filed case, that is, in Civil Case No. 970608 were not rendered null and void by the omission of a statement in the certificate of nonforum shopping regarding the prior filing and dismissal without prejudice of Civil Case No. 970523 which involves the same parties. The assailed orders for support pendente lite were thus
reinstated and the trial court resumed hearing the main case. On motion of petitioners counsel,
the trial court issued an Order dated October 11, 2002 directing private respondent to give
support in the amount of P42,292.50 per month starting April 1, 1999 pursuant to the May 19,
1998 Order. On February 11, 2003, private respondent filed a Motion to Reduce Support citing,
among other grounds, that the P42,292.50 monthly support for the children as fixed by the court
was even higher than his then P20,800.00 monthly salary as city councilor. After hearing, the
trial court issued an Order9 dated March 7, 2005 granting the motion to reduce support and
denying petitioners motion for spousal support, increase of the childrens monthly support
pendente lite and support-in-arrears. Petitioners motion for partial reconsideration of the March
7, 2005 Order was denied on May 4, 2005. In her appeal brief, petitioner emphasized that she is
not appealing the Decision dated May 16, 2005 which had become final as no appeal therefrom
had been brought by the parties or the City Prosecutor or the Solicitor General. Petitioner pointed
out that her appeal is from the RTC Order dated March 7, 2005, issued prior to the rendition of
the decision in the main case, as well as the May 4, 2005 Order denying her motion for partial
reconsideration. By Decision dated September 9, 2008, the CA dismissed the appeal on the
ground that granting the appeal would disturb the RTC Decision of May 16, 2005 which had
long become final and executory. The CA further noted that petitioner failed to avail of the
proper remedy to question an interlocutory order. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the matter of support pendente lite are interlocutory or final.
RULING:
Petitioner contends that the CA failed to recognize that the interlocutory aspect of the assailed
orders pertains only to private respondents motion to reduce supportwhich was granted, and to

her own motion to increase support, which wa denied. Petitioner points out that the ruling on
support in arrears which have remained unpaid, as well as her prayer for reimbursement/payment
were in the nature of final orders assailable by ordinary appeal. SC disagrees. An interlocutory
order merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be done to resolve the
merits of the case. In contrast, a judgment or order is considered final if the order disposes of the
action or proceeding completely or terminates a particular stage of the same action. Clearly,
whether an order or resolution is final or interlocutory is not dependent on compliance or
noncompliance by a party to its directive, as what petitioner suggests.
Moreover, private respondents obligation to give monthly support in the amount fixed by the
RTC in the assailed orders may be enforced by the court itself, as what transpired in the early
stage of the proceedings when court cited the private respondent in contempt of court and
ordered him arrested for his refusal/failure to comply with the order granting support pendente
lite. A few years later, private respondent filed a motion to reduce support while petitioner filed
her own motion to increase the same, and in addition sought spousal support and support in
arrears. This fact underscores the provisional character of the order granting support pendente
lite.
Petitioners theory that the assailed orders have ceased to be provisional due to the arrearages
incurred by private respondent is therefore untenable.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil
action under Rule 65 provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
Having chosen the wrong remedy in questioning the subject interlocutory orders of the RTC,
petitioner's appeal was correctly dismissed by the CA.

180. ONG V. ONG

505 S 76
FACTS:
On February 25, 1976, Imelda Ong, for and in consideration of P1.00 and other valuable
considerations, executed a quitclaim over a parcel of land in Makati in favor of Sandra Maruzzo,
then a minor. On November 19, 1980, Imelda revoked the quitclaim and donated the property to
her son Rex. On June 20, 1983, Sandra, through her guardial ad litem Alfredo Ong, filed an
action to recover the land and to declare the donation to Rex null and void. In their responsive
pleading, petitioners claimed that the quitclaim is equivalent to a donation which requires
acceptance by the donee, and since Sandra was a minor, there was no valid acceptance. The trial
court ruled that the quitclaim is equivalent to a sale. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed
the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the quitclaim is equivalent to a deed of sale or to a deed of donation
RULING:
The execution of a deed purporting to convey ownership of a realty is in itself prima facie
evidence of the existence of a valuable consideration, the party alleging lack of consideration has
the burden of proving such allegation. Even granting that the Quitclaim deed in question is a
donation, Article 741 of the Civil Code provides that the requirement of the acceptance of the
donation in favor of minor by parents of legal representatives applies only to onerous and
conditional donations where the donation may have to assume certain charges or burdens.
Donation to an incapacitated donee does not need the acceptance by the lawful representative if
said donation does not contain any condition. In simple and pure donation, the formal acceptance
is not important for the donor requires no right to be protected and the donee neither undertakes
to do anything nor assumes any obligation. The Quitclaim now in question does not impose any
condition.

181. BAEZ V. BAEZ

374 SCRA 340
FACTS:
On September 23, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 20, decided Civil Case No.
CEB-16765, decreeing among others the legal separation between petitioner Aida Baez and
respondent Gabriel Baez on the ground of the latters sexual infidelity; the dissolution of their
conjugal property relations and the division of the net conjugal assets; the forfeiture of
respondents one-half share in the net conjugal assets in favor of the common children.
Defendant then filed a Notice of Appeal before the appellate court. Petitioner however contends
that an action for legal separation is among the cases where multiple appeals may be taken. She
concludes that respondents appeal should have been dismissed for his failure to file the record
on appeal within the reglementary period.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an action for legal separation is among the cases where multiple appeals may be
taken
RULING:
In Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals 258 SCRA 186, 194 (1996), the
Court RULING:
xxx Multiple appeals are allowed in special proceedings, in actions for recovery of property with
accounting, in actions for partition of property with accounting, in the special civil actions of
eminent domain and foreclosure of mortgage. The rationale behind allowing more than one
appeal in the same case is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and
distinct issue is resolved by the court and held to be final.
In said case, the two issues raised by therein petitioner that may allegedly be the subject of
multiple appeals arose from the same cause of action, and the subject matter pertains to the same
lessor-lessee relationship between the parties. Hence, splitting the appeals in that case would
only be violative of the rule against multiplicity of appeals.
The same holds true in an action for legal separation. The issues involved in the case will
necessarily relate to the same marital relationship between the parties. The effects of legal
separation, such as entitlement to live separately, dissolution and liquidation of the absolute
community or conjugal partnership, and custody of the minor children, follow from the decree of
legal separation. They are not separate or distinct matters that may be resolved by the court and
become final prior to or apart from the decree of legal separation. Rather, they are mere incidents
of legal separation. Thus, they may not be subject to multiple appeals.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

182. GANDIONGCO VS PENARANDA

GR No. 72984
FACTS:
Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint against herein petitioner, Froilan
Gandionco for legal separation on the ground of concubinage as a civil case. Teresita also filed a
criminal complaint of concubinage against her husband. She likewise filed an application for the
provisional remedy of support pendent elite which was approved and ordered by the respondent
judge. Petitioner moved to suspend the action for legal separation and the incidents consequent
thereto such as the support for pendent elite, in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed
against him. He contends that the civil action for legal separation is inextricably tied with the
criminal action thus, all proceedings related to legal separation will have to be suspended and
await the conviction or acquittal of the criminal case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a civil case for legal separation can proceed pending the resolution of the
criminal case for concubinage.
RULING:
Supreme Court ruled that the contentions of the petitioner were incorrect. A civil action for legal
separation on the ground of concubinage may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a
criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one to enforce the civil liability
arising from the offense, even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to
the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the
legal consequences thereof including the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody
of the children, support and disqualifications from inheriting from the innocent spouse. Decree
of legal separation may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence, where no criminal
proceeding or conviction is necessary.
Furthermore, the support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal
separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge. If in case, the petitioner finds the amount
of support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or reduce
the same.

184. ARROYO V. CA
G.R. No. 96602

FACTS:
Dr. Jorge B. Neri filed a criminal complaint for adultery against his wife, Ruby Vera Neri, and
Eduardo Arroyo committed on 2 November 1982 in the City of Baguio. Both defendants pleaded
not guilty and after trial, the RTC convicted petitioner and Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri of adultery.
According to the facts of the case, the accused Ruby Neri in the company of a friend went to
Baguio City and proceeded at Mines View Park Condominium. At 7:00 in the evening, coaccused Eduardo Arroyo entered the unit and thereafter proceeded inside the master's bedroom
where Ruby Neri and her friend was waiting. Ruby Neri's friend was thereafter instructed to
leave the room. After 45 minutes, both Ruby Neri and Eduardo Arroyo came out from the room
and joined Ruby Neri's friend at the living room.
Both Ruby Neri and Eduardo Arroyo filed a motion for reconsideration contending that a pardon
has been extended by Ruby Neri's husband and that her husband had later contracted marriage
with another woman. As proof of this, Ruby Neri showed the Affidavit of Desistance made by
Dr. Neri.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Affidavit of Desistance executed by Dr. Neri signifies pardon.
RULING:
The rule on pardon is found in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code which provides: "ART.
344. The crime of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint
filed by the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without
including both parties, if they are both alive, nor in any case, if he shall have consented or
pardoned the offenders."
While there is a conceptual difference between consent and pardon in the sense that consent is
granted prior to the adulterous act while pardon is given after the illicit affair, nevertheless, for
either consent or pardon to benefit the accused, it must be given prior to the filing of a criminal
complaint. In the present case, the affidavit of desistance was executed only on 23 November
1988 while the compromise agreement was executed only on 16 February 1989, after the trial
court had already rendered its decision dated 17 December 1987 finding petitioners guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.
It should also be noted that while Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the crime
of adultery cannot be prosecuted without the offended spouse's complaint, once the complaint
has been filed, the control of the case passes to the public prosecutor. Enforcement of our law on
adultery is not exclusively, nor even principally, a matter of vindication of the private honor of
the offended spouse; much less is it a matter merely of personal or social hypocrisy. Such
enforcement relates, more importantly, to protection of the basic social institutions of marriage
and the family in the preservation of which the State has the strongest interest; the public policy
here involved is of the most fundamental kind.

The same sentiment has been expressed in the Family Code of the Philippines in Article 149:
"The family, being the foundation of the ration, is a basic social institution which public policy
cherishes and protects." Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom,
practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect.

185. BENJAMIN BUGAYONG vs. LEONILA GINEZ

G.R. No. L-10033
FACTS:
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was married to defendant Leonila
Ginez. Immediately after their marriage, the couple lived with their sisters who later moved to
Sampaloc, Manila. After some time, Leonila Ginez left the dwelling of her sister-in-law and
informed her husband by letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in Asingan,
Pangasinan.
Afterwards, Benjamin Bugayong began receiving letters from some anonymous writers
informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. Benjamin Bugayong then went to
Asingan, Pangasinan and sought for his wife. Both husband and wife then proceeded to the
house of Pedro Bugayong, a cousin of Benjamin, where they stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1
day as husband and wife. Then they returned to the plaintiff's house and again passed the night
therein as husband and wife. On the third day, Benjamin tried to verify from his wife the truth of
the information he received that she had committed adultery but, instead of answering his query,
she merely packed up and left, which he took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed
on her. After that and despite such belief, plaintiff exerted efforts to locate her.
Benjamin then filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife, who timely filed an answer
vehemently denying the averments of the complaint and stating than she was condoned by her
husband.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was condonation in this case.
RULING:
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation. A
detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiff-husband, clearly shows that there was a
condonation on the part of the husband for the supposed "acts of infidelity amounting to
adultery" committed by defendant-wife. Admitting for the sake of argument that the infidelities
amounting to adultery were committed by the defendant, a reconciliation was effected between
her and the plaintiff. The act of the latter in persuading her to come along with him, and the fact
that she went with him and consented to be brought to the house of his cousin Pedro Bugayong
and together they slept there as husband and wife for one day and one night, and the further fact
that in the second night they again slept together in their house likewise as husband and wife
all these facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this court than that a reconciliation
between them was effected and that there was a condonation of the wife by the husband. The
reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came to know of the acts of infidelity
amounting to adultery.It has been held in a long line of decisions of the various supreme courts
of the different states of the U. S. that 'a single voluntary act of sexual intercourse by the
innocent spouse after discovery of the offense is ordinarily sufficient to constitute condonation,

especially as against the husband'. In the lights of the facts testified to by the plaintiff-husband,
of the legal provisions above quoted, and of the various decisions above-cited, the inevitable
conclusion is that there is condonation.

186. PEOPLE V. ZAPATA AND BONDOC

G.R. NO. L-3047
FACTS:
A complaint for adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc against Guadalupe Zapata, his wife, and
Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for cohabiting and having repeated sexual intercourse during
the period from the year 1946 to 1947. The complaint was filed on March 14, 1947 whereby
Dalmacio Bondoc knows his codefendant to be a married woman. The defendant wife entered
the plea of guilty and was sentenced to suffer four months which penalty she served. In the same
court, on September 17, 1948, the offended husband filed another complaint for adulterous acts
committed by his wife and her paramour from March 1947 to September 1948. Each of the
defendants filed a motion to quash the complaint of the ground that they would be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The trial court upheld the contention of the
defendants and quashed the second complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second complaint can be quashed for double jeopardy.
RULING:
A second complaint charging the commission of adulterous acts not included in the first
complaint does not constitute a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the constitution is that,
if the second complaint places the defendants twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense, the adultery committed by the male defendant charged in the second complaint, should
he be absolved from, or acquitted of, the first charge upon the evidence that he did not know that
his codefendant was a married woman, would remain or go unpunished. The defense set up by
him against the first charge upon which he was acquitted would no longer be available, because
at the time of the commission of the crime charged in the second complaint, he already knew that
this defendant was a married woman and he continued to have carnal knowledge of her.
Even if the husband should pardon his adulterous wife, such pardon would not exempt the wife
and her paramour from criminal liability for adulterous acts committed after the pardon was
granted because the pardon refers to previous and not to subsequent adulterous acts.
The order appealed from, which quashed the second complaint for adultery, is hereby reversed
and set aside, and trial court directed to proceed with the trial of the defendants in accordance
with law, with costs against the appellees.

187. JOSE DE OCAMPO vs. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO

G.R. No. L-13553

FACTS:
Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938. They begot several children who are now
living with plaintiff. In March, 1951, plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife was
betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the
defendant carrying marital relations with another man plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to
study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the
said city defendant was going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the
end of June, 1952, when defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since
then they had lived separately.
On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with another
man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for legal
separation, to which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with
adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff a petition for legal separation. Defendant
poses as defense that plaintiff condoned her adulterous acts with Nelson Orzame since plaintiff
never sought for her after having discovered her adulterous acts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not plaintiff condoned the acts of defendant.
RULING:
We do not think plaintiff's failure actively to search for defendant and take her home (after the
latter had left him in 1952) constituted condonation or consent to her adulterous relations with
Orzame. It will be remembered that she "left" him after having sinned with Arcalas and after he
had discovered her dates with other men. Consequently, it was not his duty to search for her to
bring her home. Hers was the obligation to return.
Two decisions are cited wherein from apparently similar circumstances, this Court
inferred the husband's consent to or condonation of his wife's misconduct. However, upon
careful examination, a vital difference will be found: in both instances, the husband had
abandoned his wife; here it was the wife who "left" her husband.
Wherefore, finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband's petition we hereby reverse the
appealed decision and decree a legal separation between these spouse, all the consequent effects.

188. MATUBIS V. PRAXEDES

G.R. No. L-11766
FACTS:
Plaintiff and defendant were legally married. For failure to agree on how they should live as
husband and wife, they agreed to live separately from each other. After, they entered into an
agreement to the effect that they relinquished their right over the other as legal husband and wife.
When defendant began cohabitating with another woman, they bore a child. They deported
themselves as husband and wife and were generally reputed as such in the community.
Alleging abandonment and concubinage, plaintiff filed with the CFI a complaint for
Legal Separation and change of surname against her the defendant. After the trial, without the
defendant adducing any evidence, the court a quo rendered judgment holding that the acts of
defendant constituted concubinage, it, however, dismissed the complaint. Thus this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was condonation on the part of the plaintiff allowing such act of the
defendant.
RULING:
Yes there was, the decision appealed from is affirmed. Article 102 of the new Civil Code
provides that an action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after
the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause send within five years from and
after the date when such cause occurred. The complaint was filed outside the periods provided
for by the above Article. By the very admission of plaintiff, she came to know the ground
(concubinage) for the legal separation in January, 1955. She instituted the complaint only on
April 24, 1956. It is to be noted that appellant did not even press this matter in her brief.
Condonation and consent on the part of plaintiff are necessarily the import of paragraph 6 (b) of
the agreement. The condonation and consent here are not only implied but expressed. The law
(Art. 100 Civil Code), specifically provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the
innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage. Having condoned and/or consented in writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving of
the courts sympathy.

189. PEOPLE V. SCHNECKENBURGER

73 PHIL 413
FACTS:
On March 16, 1926, the accused Rodolfo A. Schneckenburger married complainant Elena
Ramirez Cartagena and after seven (7) years of marital life, they agreed, for the reason of the
alleged incompatibility of character, to live separately from each other and executed a document
where they agreed to live separately.
On June 15, 1935, Schneckenburger, without leaving the Philippines, secured a decree of divorce
from the civil court of Juarez, State of Chihuahua, Mexico. On May 11, 1936, he contracted
another marriage with Julia Medel, in the justice of peace of court since then they lived together
as husband and wife in the City of Manila. Because of the nullity of the divorce decreed by the
Mexico Court, complainant herein instituted two actions against the accused, one for bigamy in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the other for concubinage in the Court of First Instance of
Manila. The first culminated in the conviction of the accused for the trial for the crime of
concubinage, accused interposed a plea of double jeopardy, and the case was dismissed; but upon
appeal by the Fiscal, this Court held the dismissal before trial to be premature without deciding
the question of double jeopardy, remanded the case to the trial court for the trial on the merits.
Accused was convicted of concubinage through reckless imprudence and sentenced to a penalty
of arresto mayor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in not holding accused Rodolfo Schneckenburger guilty of
the crime of concubinage through reckless imprudence.
RULING:
Supreme Court held that the accused should be acquitted of the crime of concubinage. The
document executed by and between the accused and the complainant in which they agreed to be
encompleta libertad de accion en cualqiner acto y en todos conceptos, while illegal for the
purpose of which it was executed, constitutes a valid consent to the act of concubinage. There
can be no doubt that by such agreement, each party clearly intended to forego the illicit acts of
the other. Consent, which bars the offended party from instituting a criminal prosecution in cases
of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, is that which has
been given expressly or impliedly after the crime has been committed. The offended party cannot
institute criminal prosecution without including both guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor in
any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.
As the term pardon unquestionably refers to the offense after its commission, consent
must have been intended, agreeably with its ordinary usage, to refer to offense prior to its
commission. Consent, for in both instances as the offended party has chosen to compromise with
his/her dishonor, he/she becomes unworthy to come to the court and invoke its aid in the
vindication of the wrong.

191. BENEDICTO VS. DELA RAMA

3 P 34
FACTS:
On July 5, 1902, the CFI entered a final judgment decreeing a divorce to theplaintiff (Agueda
Benedicta dela Rama) on the ground of husbands adulteryand ordered Esteban Dela Rama to
pay her P81,042.76 due her as her unpaidshare of the property belonging to the conujugal
partnership, as well as thesum of P3,200 as an allowance for their support.
ISSUE:
Whether the CFI has jurisdiction to hear divorce cases?
RULING:
The partidas recognized adultery as a ground for divorce. Therefore, according tothe civil as well
as the canonical law in force here on August 13, 1898, thecommission of that offense gave the
injured party the right to a divorce. Thatprovision of the substantive civil law was not repealed
by the change of sovereignty. The complete separation under the American Government of
churchand state, while it changed the tribunal in which this right should be enforced, couldnot
affect the right itself. The fact that the ecclesiastical courts no longer exercisesuch power is not
important. The jurisdiction formerly possessed by them is nowvested in Courts of First Instance,
by virtue of Act No. 136. Section 56, first and fifthparagraphs of that act, provides that "Courts
of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction, first, in all civil actions in which the subject of
litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation; fifth, . . . and in all such special cases and
proceedings as arenot otherwise provided for." The result is (1) that Courts of First instance have
jurisdiction to entertain a suit fordivorce; (2) that the only ground therefor is adultery; (3) that an
action on thatground can be maintained by the husband against the wife, or by the wife
againstthe husband; and (4) that the decree does not dissolve the marriage bond. TheCourt of
First Instance of Iloilo, therefore, committed no error in assuming jurisdiction of this case.(2) A
motion for a new trial having been made in the court below on the ground thatthe findings of fact
contained in the decision were not justified by the evidence, itbecomes necessary to examine that
evidence. The adultery of the defendant was duly proved. The finding that the plaintiff had not
committed adultery is, however, plainly andmanifestly against the weight of the evidence.For the
sin of each one of them is of itself a bar to an accusation against the other.Our conclusion is that
neither one of the parties is entitled to a divorce. The result makes it unnecessary to consider that
part of the judgment which relatesto the settlement of the conjugal partnership.

192. BROWN V. YAMBAO

102 PHIL. 168
FACTS:
On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to obtain
legal separation from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath that while interned
by the Japanese invaders, from 1942 to 1945, at the University of Sto. Tomas internment camp,
his wife engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby girl.
Brown learned of his wifes misconduct only in 1945, upon his release from internment.
Thereafter the spouse lived separately. Yambao however testified that after liberation, Brown
lived martially with another woman and had begotten children by her.
The court rendered judgment denying the legal separation asked, on the ground that, while the
wife's adultery was established, Brown had incurred in a misconduct of similar nature that barred
his right of action under Article 100 of the new Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant's action was already barred because Brown did not petition for legal
separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife's adultery
RULING:
The court below found, and correctly held that the appellant's action was already barred, because
Brown did not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his
wife's adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945. Under Article 102 of the
new Civil Code, action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one (1) year from and
after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date
when such cause occurred. Appellant's brief does not even contest the correctness of such
findings and conclusion.
It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense. Nevertheless, the courts can
take cognizance thereof, because actions seeking a decree of legal separation, or annulment of
marriage, involve public interest and it is the policy of our law that no such decree be issued if
any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record.
Hence, there being at least two well established statutory grounds for denying the remedy sought
(commission of similar offense by petitioner and prescription of the action), it becomes
unnecessary to delve further into the case and ascertain if Brown's inaction for ten years also
evidences condonation or connivance on his part. Even if it did not, his situation would not be
improved. It is thus needless to discuss the second assignment of error.
The Supreme Court affirmed the assailed decision of the lower court.
195. SOMOSA-RAMOS V. VAMENTA, JR.

G.R. No. L-34132

FACTS:
On June 18, 1971, petitioner filed in the sala of respondent Judge against respondent Clemente
Ramos for legal separation, on concubinage on the respondent's part and an attempt by him
against her life being alleged. She likewise sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction for the return to her of what she claimed to be her paraphernal and
exclusive property, then under the administration and management of respondent Clemente
Ramos. There was an opposition to the hearing of such a motion based on Article 103 of the
Civil Code. Thereafter, petitioner received an order of respondent Judge granting the motion of
respondent Ramos to suspend the hearing of the petition for a writ of mandatory preliminary
injunction. That is the order complained of in this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 103 of the Civil Code prohibiting the hearing of an action for legal
separation before the lapse of six months from the filing of the petition, would likewise preclude
the court from acting on a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an
ancillary remedy to such a suit.
RULING:
After a careful consideration of the legal question presented, it is the holding of this Court that
Article 103 the Civil Code is not an absolute bar to the hearing motion for preliminary injunction
prior to the expiration of the six-month period.The court where the action is pending according to
Article 103 is to remain passive. It must let the parties alone in the meanwhile. It is precluded
from hearing the suit. There is then some plausibility for the view of the lower court that an
ancillary motion such as one for preliminary mandatory injunction is not to be acted on. If it
were otherwise, there would be a failure to abide by the literal language of such codal provision.
That the law, however, remains cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial power to assert
itself are discernible from what is set forth in the following article. It reads thus: "After the filing
of the petition for legal separation, the spouse shall be entitled to live separately from each other
and manage their respective property. The husband shall continue to manage the conjugal
partnership property but if the court deems it proper, it may appoint another to manage said
property, in which case the administrator shall have the same rights and duties as a guardian and
shall not be allowed to dispose of the income or of the capital except in accordance with the
orders of the court."There would appear to be then recognition that the question of management
of their respective property need not be left unresolved even during such six-month period. An
administrator may even be appointed for the management of the property of the conjugal
partnership. The absolute limitation from which the court suffers under the preceding article is
thereby eased. The parties may in the meanwhile be heard. There is justification then for the
petitioner's insistence that her motion for preliminary mandatory injunction should not be
ignored by the lower court. There is all the more reason for this response from respondent Judge,
considering that the husband whom she accused of concubinage and an attempt against her life
would in the meanwhile continue in the management of what she claimed to be her paraphernal
property, an assertion that was not specifically denied by him.

196. SABALONES vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and GAVIOLA-SABALONES

G.R. No. 106169
FACTS:
As a member of our diplomatic service assigned to different countries during his successive tours
of duties, petitioner Samson T. Sabalones left to his wife, herein respondent Remedios GaviolaSabalones, the administration of some of their conjugal, properties for fifteen years. Sabalones
retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to his wife and their
children. Four years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot
located at #17 Eisenhower St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, belonging to the conjugal
partnership. He claimed that he was sixty-eight years old, very sick and living alone without any
income, and that his share of the proceeds of the sale to defray the prohibitive cost of his
hospitalization and medical treatment. In her answer, the private respondent opposed the
authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation.
The Court notes that the wife has been administering the subject properties for almost nineteen
years now, apparently without complaint on the part of the petitioner. He has not alleged, much
less shown, that her administration has caused prejudice to the conjugal partnership. What he
merely suggests is that the lease of the Forbes Park property could be renewed on better terms, or
he should at least be given his share of the rentals.
In her prayer, she asked the court to grant the decree of legal separation and order the liquidation
of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her husband's share therein because of his adultery.
She also prayed that it enjoin the petitioner and his agents from a) disturbing the occupants of the
Forbes Park property and b) disposing of or encumbering any of the conjugal properties. The
petitioner now assails this order, arguing that since the law provides for a joint administration of
the conjugal properties by the husband and wife, no injunctive relief can be issued against one or
the other because no right will be violated. In support of this contention, he cites Art. 124 of the
Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the injunction ha permanently installed the respondent wife as the
administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets.
RULING:
The Court has carefully considered the issues and the arguments of the parties and finds that the
petition has no merit. We agree with the respondent court that pending the appointment of an
administrator over the whole mass of conjugal assets, the respondent court was justified in
allowing the wife to continue with her administration. It was also correct, taking into account the
evidence adduced at the hearing, in enjoining the petitioner from interfering with his wife's
administration pending resolution of the appeal.
The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the conjugal properties as
clearly provided in the above-cited Article 124 of the Family Code. However, Article 61, also

above quoted, states that after a petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in
the absence of a written agreement between the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a
third person to act as the administrator.
While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been made, such designation
was implicit in the decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the conjugal
properties (and thus also disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation was in
effect approved by the Court of Appeals when it issued in favor of the respondent wife the
preliminary injunction now under challenge.

197. ESPIRITU AND LAYUG V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 115640
FACTS:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met in Iligan City where
Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse
in a local hospital. Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. Reynaldo was
sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison
officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of husband
and wife. On 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. While they were on a brief
vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the
United States, their second child, a son, this time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was born
on 1988.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate. Instead of giving their
marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the
children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but
because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his company to
Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma Layug and her family.
Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and filed the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus starting the
whole proceedings now reaching this Court. The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas
corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared
Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon
by the parties and to be approved by the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gain custody over the children be
granted.
RULING:
The SC dismissed the writ of habeas corpus petition by the mother and retain the custody of the
children to the father. The illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already caused
emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values against
the children.
The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they
prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person. The children
understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their
emotional growth by her behavior.

198. LAPUZ SY vs. EUFEMIO

G.R. No. L-30977
FACTS:
On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S.
Eufemio, alleging that they were married civilly on 21 September 1934; that they had lived
together as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned her; that
they had no child; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named
Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa Street, Manila, on or about March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a
decree of legal separation, which, among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio S.
Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.
Respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio however counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio
of his marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage,
celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok. On May
31, 1969, petitioner died in a vehicular accident. Respondent moved to dismiss the case on the
ground that the death abated the action for legal separation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation,
abate the action
RULING:
An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of
the spouses is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article
100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its
Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the
proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in
character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself
... When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for divorce, because the marriage is
dissolved. The heirs cannot even continue the suit, if the death of the spouse takes place during
the course of the suit (Article 244, Section 3). The action is absolutely dead
Marriage is a personal relation or status, created under the sanction of law, and an action for
divorce is a proceeding brought for the purpose of effecting a dissolution of that relation. The
action is one of a personal nature. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the death of one of
the parties to such action abates the action, for the reason that death has settled the question of
separation beyond all controversy and deprived the court of jurisdiction, both over the persons of
the parties to the action and of the subject-matter of the action itself. For this reason the courts
are almost unanimous in holding that the death of either party to a divorce proceeding, before
final decree, abates the action.

However, it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains (or of
the absolute community of property), the loss of right by the offending spouse to any share of the
profits earned by the partnership or community, or his disqualification to inherit by intestacy
from the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of testamentary provisions in favor of the
offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all rights and disabilities that, by the very terms
of the Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and by their nature
and intent, such claims and disabilities are difficult to conceive as assignable or transmissible.
Hence, a claim to said rights is not a claim that "is not thereby extinguished" after a party dies,
under Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, to warrant continuation of the action through a
substitute of the deceased party.

199. LAPERAL V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. L-18008
FACTS:
Petitioner filed with the CFI a petition for change of surname on the grounds that a decree of
legal separation had already been issued in her prior marriage. She prayed that she be allowed to
resume using her maiden name of Elisea Laperal. This was opposed by the City Attorney of
Baguio. The CFI also denied the petition. However, upon a motion for reconsideration, it granted
the petition. Hence, this appeal by the State.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner may use her maiden name based on a decree of legal separation.
RULING:
No she may not, the decision of the lower court is set aside and the petition is dismissed. Art. 372
of the New Civil Code reads that, When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall
continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation. Note that the
language of the statute is mandatory that the wife, even after the legal separation has been
decreed, shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation. This
is so because her married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of
the vinculum.
It is true that in the second decision which reconsidered the first it is stated that as the petitioner
owns extensive business interests, the continued used of her husband surname may cause undue
confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. This finding is
however without basis. In the first place, these were not the causes upon which the petition was
based; hence, obviously no evidence to this effect had been adduced. Secondly, with the issuance
of the decree of legal separation, the conjugal partnership between petitioner and her husband
had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. Consequently, there could be no more occasion
for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.

200. SIOCHI VS. GOZON

G.R. No. 169900
FACTS:
Alfredo and Elvira are married. Winifred is their daughter. The property involved in this case is a
30,000 sq. m. lot in Malabon which is registered in the name of Alfredo. The property regime of
the couple is conjugal partnership of gains.Elvira filed for legal separation. B filed a notice of lis
pendens over the title of the lot in Malabon. While the legal separation case was still pending,
Alfredo entered into an agreement with Mario who paid P5 million in earnest money and took
possession of the property. Title still with notice of lis pendens.
Cavite RTC granted legal separation. CPG was dissolved and liquidated. Alfredo, the guilty
spouse, did not receive his share in the net profits, which instead went to their daughter,
Winifred. Cavite RTC ruled land in Malabon as conjugal property. Alfred executed a Deed of
Donation over the property in favour of Winifred. Malabon RTC issued new TCT in the name of
Winifred without annotating the agreement between Alfredo and Mario Siochi, nor the notice of
lis pendens filed by Elvira, the wife. Then, through an SPA, Winifred gave authority to her father,
Alfred, to sell the lot. Alfred sold it to Inter-Dimensional Realty for P18 million. A TCT was
issued to Inter-Dimensional Realty. Mario filed a case with Malabon RTC (property was in
Malabon) to Annul donation to Winifred, Annul the Sale to Inter-Dimensional, and to remove
notice of lis pendens over title of land. Malabon RTC upheld original agreement to buy and sell
between Mario and Alfredo and declared void the sale by Alfredo and Winifred to InterDimensional. However, Court of Appeals said agreement between Mario and Alfredo is void
because (1) it was entered into without the consent of Elvira, Alfredos wife; and, (2) Alfredos
undivided share has been forfeited in favour of Winifred by the grant of legal separation by the
Cavite RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the agreement between Mario and Alfredo valid?
RULING:
The SC says the CA was right in declaring the sale between Mario and Alfredo as void. Under
Art 124 of the Family Code, if one of the spouses was incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers, however do not include the power to dispose or encumber the
properties which require a court order or the written consent of the other spouse. The agreement
is void in its entirety, not just to the share of the husband, Alfredo. The Court however said that
the CA erred in saying that the undivided share of Alfredo was forfeited in favour of Winifred.
As regards Marios contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected
by Elviras acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently
donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was already
withdrawn.

The Court said the CA erred in saying that Alfredo forfeited his share in the conjugal property
as a result of the grant of legal separation by the Cavite RTC. Art 63 (Effects of legal separation)
in relation to Art 43(2) (Effects of termination of subsequent marriage) provides that the guilty
spouse in legal separation forfeits his share in the net profits of the property. The Court said,
Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredos share in the conjugal partnership
property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property. Thus, as regards this
point, the CA erred. Inter-Dimensional says it is a buyer in good faith. SC says no. InterDimensional knew of the notice of lis pendens.

202. IMBONG VS. OCHOA, JR.

G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934, 204957, 204988, 205003, 205043, 205138, 205478, 205491, 205720,
206355, 207111, 207172 & 207563

FACTS:
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner
ALFI, in particular, argues that the government sponsored contraception program, the very
essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the
State is mandated to protect and promote.
ISSUES:
Whether or not RH Law is a violation of the prohibition on Riders.
RULING:
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According
to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation
violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent- to act as a
population control measure. To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is
not a birth or population control measure, and that the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and
"reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are separate.
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a
population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the
countrys population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women and children healthy, it
also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the
need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information
on the full range of modem family planning products and methods. These family planning
methods, natural or modern, however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of
births in the country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A
large portion of the law, however, covers the dissemination of information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortificient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive
healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception
pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH Law. Indeed, remove the
provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses its very
foundation. As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as skilled birth attendance,
maternal care including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and management of reproductive
tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for Women."

Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule.

203. ILUSURIO V. ILUSORIO

G.R. NO. 139789
FACTS:
Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property valued at millions
of pesos. For many years, he was the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country
Club. He was married with Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30 years and begotten 6
children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and
Shereen. They separated from bed and board in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he
was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On
the other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo City.
In 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in
Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother overdose
Potenciano which caused the latters health to deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda filed with
RTC petition for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due to the latters
advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In May 1998, after attending a
corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland
Condominium in Makati. In March 1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to
have the custody of his husband alleging that the respondents refused her demands to see and
visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued
RULING:
Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the
extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus. A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one
entitled thereto. It is available where a person continuous unlawfully denied of one or more of
his constitutional freedom. It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restrainment, as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer
Potenciano liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano is
about 86 years of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the capacity
of the individual to discern his actions.
After due hearing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no unlawful restraint on his
liberty. The Court of Appeals also observed that lawyer Potenciano did not request the
administrator of the Cleveland Condominium not to allow his wife and other children from
seeing or visiting him. He made it clear that he did not object to seeing them.

Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. In this case, the
crucial choices revolve on his residence and the people he opts to see or live with. The choices he
made may not appeal to some of his family members but these are choices which exclusively
belong to Potenciano. He made it clear before the Court of Appeals that he was not prevented
from leaving his house or seeing people. With that declaration, and absent any true restraint on
his liberty, we have no reason to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.
With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano may not be the subject
of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy.
Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional right.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

204. ARROYO vs. VASQUEZ de ARROYO

GR No. L-17014
FACTS:
Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo were married in 1910 and have lived together as
man and wife until July 4, 1920 when the wife went away from their common home with the
intention of living separate from her husband. Marianos efforts to induce her to resume marital
relations were all in vain.Thereafter, Mariano initiated an action to compel her to return to the
matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. Dolores averred by way of defense and
cross-complaint that she had been compelled to leave because of the cruel treatment of her
husband. She in turn prayed that a decree of separation be declared and the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership as well as permanent separate maintenance.The trial judge, upon
consideration of the evidence before him, reached the conclusion that the husband was more to
blame than his wife and that his continued ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient justification
for her abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of marital relations
with
him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts can compel one of the spouses to cohabit with each other
RULING:
NO. It is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the
spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property
rights of one of the pair are invalid, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But
we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforceable by process of contempt,
may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal rights of consortium. At best such
an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same
roof; and the experience of these countries where the court of justice have assumed to compel the
cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely
questionable.We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is entitled to the
unconditional and absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is
sought in the petitory part of the complaint; though he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial
declaration that his wife has presented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to
return.Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in respect both to the original complaint
and the cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo has absented herself from the
marital home without sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to return. The
plaintiff is absolved from the cross-complaint, without special pronouncement as to costs of
either instance.

206. CUENCA vs. CUENCA

G.R. No. L-72321
FACTS:
Private respondents Restituto Cuenca and Meladora Cuenca claimed ownership over the subject
parcels of land on the ground that they are the legitimate children of Agripino Cuenca and Maria
Bangahon, both deceased, owners of the subject parcels of land. They alleged that some of the
parcels are paraphernal property of Maria while all the others are conjugal properties of Maria
and Agripino They also alleged that Agripino Cuenca and Engracia Basadre were not legally
married because at the time they lived together Agripino was married to a certain Jesusa Pagar.
On the other hand, the petitioners (defendants below) Diosdidit, Baldomero, Filomeno Elpidio,
Aida, Anita and Engracia Vda.de Cuenca denied the legitimacy of the marriage between
Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon as well as the legitimacy of the plaintiffs as children of
the couple. They claimed that Agripino Cuenca and their mother Engracia Basadre were legally
married and that they are the legitimate children of the couple. They contend that the subject
parcels of lands are conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia.
That parcel of land situated in Rendon, Butuan, Agusan, planted to rice with irrigation under the
present possession of the heirs, bounded on the North by Mariano Agagdang on the East by
Clerencia Tagonsod on the South by Suatan River and on the West by Mariano Agagdang
containing an area of 1.2500 hectares, more or less, under Tax Dec. 3055, assessed at P250.00 by
the property records of Agusan.
That parcel of land situated in Rendon, Butuan, Agusan, planted to coconut, under the present
possession of the heirs, bounded on the North by Maximo Bangahon, on the East, by Sergio
Pagar, on the South, by Macaria Agagdang on the West, by Folgencio Buyan, containing an area
of 1.1722 hectares, more or less, assessed at P670.00 by Tax Dec. No. 4026 of Agusan belong to
Maria Bangahon as her inheritance from her parents. This declaration against interest is further
reiterated by Agripino Cuenca in that judicial settlement and sale executed by him on October
19, 1950. These two documents, as rightly contended by the plaintiffs, are ample proofs that the
properties in question described in par. 2 of the complaint, belong exclusively to Maria
Bangahon as her paraphernal property, a fact declared by no less than the husband himself in a
declaration against his interest. It was error for the trial court to unceremoniously brush aside the
importance of the declaration of Agripino Cuenca in the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of
Maria Bangahon. These public documents carry sufficient evidentiary weight to prove the origin
of the properties in question and the nature of their ownership as properties brought into the
marriage by Maria Bangahon to Agripino Cuenca as against the bare testimony of the defendants
and their witnesses, More importantly, Juan Buyan and former Judge Francisco Ro.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the parcels of lands are conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia
RULING:

The records show that defendant Bartolome Sanchez upon manifestation of his counsel is no
longer a necessary party as Engracia Basadre-Cuenca has repurchased that portion of the land in
question sold to Bartolome Sanchez making plaintiffs' claim against defendant Bartolome
Sanchez moot and academic.
Our review of the evidence shows that Agripino Cuenca in his lifetime expressed in the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Maria Bangahon executed on June 13, 1950 before
Notary Public Francisco Ro. Cupin (Exh. "C") that:
Parcel of agricultural land situated in Pinamangculan Butuan, Agusan, planted to coconut, under
the present possession of the heirs of Maria Bangahon, bounded on the North, Lot No. 3062,
Lucio Plaza, Lot No. 4319, A. Cuenca, portion of Lot No. 3063, in the possession of A. Cuenca,
on the south Road, on the West by Lot No. 3057, S. Dumanon 3058, B. Adormio, 3059, A.
Cuenca and east portion of Lot No. 3063, containing an area of six (6) hectares, more or less
(This is a portion of Lot No. 3063, Pls-22 of Cad. of Municipality of Butuan which parcel of land
belongs exclusively to Maria Bangahon during her lifetime and which property is separate from
the conjugal property of the marriage of said Maria Bangahon and Agripino Cuenca. Article 160
of the New Civil Code provides that "All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife," In the cases of Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, (153 SCRA 435 [August 31,
1987); Magallon v. Montejo (146 SCRA 282 [December 16, 1986]) and Maramba v. Lozano (20
SCRA 474 [June 29, 1967]) this Court ruled that the presumption refers only to the property
acquired during marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when property
alleged to be conjugal was acquired.
In the case at bar, the documents sought to be presented as newly discovered evidence do not
show that the claims to the subject parcels consisting of homestead lands were perfected during
the marriage of Agripino Cuenca and petitioner Engracia Basadre. The perfection of the
homestead claims is considered the time of acquisition of the properties. The fact that these
parcels were surveyed for Agripino Cuenca and approved during the marriage of Agripino
Cuenca and petitioner Engracia Basadre is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not the
parcels were the conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia. Moreover, the documents show
that 5 of the 8 parcels covered by the documents are titled in the name of either respondent
Meladora Cuenca or respondent Restituto Cuenca. The presumption cannot prevail "when the
title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved. Under
the circumstances of this case, the non-applicablility of the presumption should also be upheld.
In the light of these findings a new trial would only be an unnecessary exercise and ineffective.
The documents sought to be presented during a new trial would not in any way change the result.
The motion for new trial was correctly denied although not for the reason given by the
respondent court.

207. NANCY GO and ALEX GO vs COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 114791

FACTS:
In 1981, Hermogenes Ong and Jane Ong contracted with Nancy Go for the latter to film their
wedding. After the wedding, the newlywed inquired about their wedding video but Nancy Go
said its not yet ready. She advised them to return for the wedding video after their honeymoon.
The newlywed did so but only to find out that Nancy Go can no longer produce the said wedding
video because the copy has been erased. The Ongs then sued Nancy Go for damages. Nancys
husband, Alex Go, was impleaded. The trial court ruled in favor of the spouses Ong and awarded
in their favor, among others, P75k in moral damages. In her defense on appeal, Nancy Go said:
that they erased the video tape because as per the terms of their agreement, the spouses are
supposed to claim their wedding tape within 30 days after the wedding, however, the spouses
neglected to get said wedding tape because they only made their claim after two months; that her
husband should not be impleaded in this suit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nancy Go is liable for moral damages.
RULING:
Yes. Her contention is bereft of merit. It is shown that the spouses Ong made their claim after the
wedding but were advised to return after their honeymoon. The spouses advised Go that their
honeymoon is to be done abroad and wont be able to return for two months. It is contrary to
human nature for any newlywed couple to neglect to claim the video coverage of their wedding;
the fact that the Ongs filed a case against Nancy Go belies such assertion. Considering the
sentimental value of the tapes and the fact that the event therein recorded a wedding which in
our culture is a significant milestone to be cherished and remembered could no longer be
reenacted and was lost forever, the trial court was correct in awarding the Ongs moral damages
in compensation for the mental anguish, tortured feelings, sleepless nights and humiliation that
the Ongs suffered and which under the circumstances could be awarded as allowed under
Articles 2217 and 2218 of the Civil Code. Anent the issue that Nancy Gos husband should not
be included in the suit, this argument is valid. Under Article 73 of the Family Code, the wife may
exercise any profession, occupation or engage in business without the consent of the husband. In
this case, it was shown that it was only Nancy Go who entered into a contract with the spouses
Ong hence only she (Nancy) is liable to pay the damages awarded in favor of the Ongs.

208. VALINO V ADRIANO

G.R. NO. 182894
FACTS:
Atty. Adriano Adriano married respondent Rosario Adriano in 1955. The couple had 5 children
and 1 adopted child. The marriage turned sour and the couple separated. But Adriano continued
to support his wife and children.
Atty. Adriano then started living with Valino, whom he courted. Atty. Adriano died and since his
immediate family, including the respondent were in the United States, Valino took it upon herself
to bury Atty. Adriano at her family's mausoleum. In the meantime, Respondents heard about the
death and requested Valino to delay the burial so they can pay their final respects, but Valino still
buried the body.
Respondents commenced suit against Valino praying that they be indemnified for actual, moral
and exemplary damages and attorneys fees and that the remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed
and transferred to the family plot.
Valino claimed that it was Atty. Adriano's last wish to be buried at Valino's family's mausoleum
and that the respondent's knew that Atty. Adriano was already in a coma yet they still proceeded
to the US on vacation. And that as far as the public was concerned, Valino had been introducing
her as his wife for the past 20 years.
The RTC dismissed the complaint of respondents for lack of merit as well as the counterclaim of
Valino after it found them to have not been sufficiently proven.
The CA reversed the decision of the RTC and explained that Rosario, was entitled to the custody
of the remains of her deceased husband. It Cited Article 305 of the New Civil Code in relation to
Article 199 of the Family Code, it was the considered view of the appellate court that the law
gave the surviving spouse not only the duty but also the right to make arrangements for the
funeral of her husband. For the CA, Rosario was still entitled to such right on the ground of her
subsisting marriage with Atty. Adriano at the time of the latters death, not withstanding their 30year separation in fact.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents are still entitled to the remains of Atty. Adriano.
RULING:
Yes. The weight of legal provisions puts the responsibility of the burial with the respondents, as
provided in the New Civil Code of the Philippines: The duty and the right to make
arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in accordance with the order established for
support, under Article 294. In case of descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters,
the oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right.

Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall be upon the
following persons:(1) The spouse;(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;(3) The ascendants
in the nearest degree; and (4) The brothers and sisters. (Family Code, Art. 199)
No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed without the consent of the
persons mentioned in Articles 199 of the Family Code and 305. Also, in the provision of the New
Civil Code, Article 308.
As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she
was living separately from her husband and was in the United States when he died has no
controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or
impliedly, her right and duty to make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is
baseless.
It is also recognized that a corpse is outside the commerce of man. However, the law recognizes
that a certain right of possession over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and for
the exclusion of the intrusion by third persons who have no legitimate interest in it. This quasiproperty right, arising out of the duty of those obligated by law to bury their dead, also
authorizes them to take possession of the dead body for purposes of burial to have it remain in its
final resting place, or to even transfer it to a proper place where the memory of the dead may
receive the respect of the living. This is a family right. There can be no doubt that persons having
this right may recover the corpse from third persons.

209. CHAN V. CHAN

G.R. No. 179896
FACTS:
On February 6, 2006 petitioner Josielene Lara Chan (Josielene) filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 144 a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage
to respondent Johnny Chan (Johnny), the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and
the award of custody of their children to her. Josielene claimed that Johnny failed to care for and
support his family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant
drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs. Indeed, she had convinced him to undergo
hospital confinement for detoxification and rehabilitation.
Johnny resisted the action, claiming that it was Josielene who failed in her wifely duties. To save
their marriage, he agreed to marriage counseling but when he and Josielene got to the hospital,
two men forcibly held him by both arms while another gave him an injection. The marriage
relations got worse when the police temporarily detained Josielene for an unrelated crime and
released her only after the case against her ended. By then, their marriage relationship could no
longer be repaired.
During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form1 that Johnny
attached to his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a
hospital. The form carried a physicians handwritten note that Johnny suffered from
"methamphetamine and alcohol abuse." Following up on this point, on August 22, 2006 Josielene
filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to Medical
City, covering Johnnys medical records when he was there confined. The request was
accompanied by a motion to "be allowed to submit in evidence" the records sought by subpoena
duces tecum.
Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-patient
privilege. On September 13, 2006 the RTC sustained the opposition and denied Josielenes
motion. It also denied her motion for reconsideration, prompting her to file a special civil action
of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 97913, imputing grave abuse of
discretion to the RTC.
On September 17, 2007 the CA3 denied Josielenes petition. It ruled that, if courts were to allow
the production of medical records, then patients would be left with no assurance that whatever
relevant disclosures they may have made to their physicians would be kept confidential. The
prohibition covers not only testimonies, but also affidavits, certificates, and pertinent hospital
records. The CA added that, although Johnny can waive the privilege, he did not do so in this
case. He attached the Philhealth form to his answer for the limited purpose of showing his
alleged forcible confinement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum covering Johnnys hospital records on the ground that these are covered
by the privileged character of the physician-patient communication.

RULING:
Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielenes request for subpoena duces tecum is
premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum covering Johnnys hospital records. It is when those records are produced
for examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence,
but more so to their disclosure. Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence quoted above is
about non-disclosure of privileged matters.
. It is of course possible to treat Josielenes motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
covering the hospital records as a motion for production of documents, a discovery procedure
available to a litigant prior to trial. Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 1. Motion for production or inspection; order. Upon motion of any party showing good
cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and
permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any
designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things,
not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action
and which are in his possession, custody or control; or (b) order any party to permit entry upon
designated land or other property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting,
measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any designated relevant object or
operation thereon. The order shall specify the time, place and manner of making the inspection
and taking copies and photographs, and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.
(Emphasis supplied)
But the above right to compel the production of documents has a limitation: the documents to be
disclosed are "not privileged."
Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged since it
is the "testimonial" evidence of the physician that may be regarded as privileged. Section 24(c)
of Rule 130 states that the physician "cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be
examined" regarding their professional conversation. The privilege, says Josielene, does not
cover the hospital records, but only the examination of the physician at the trial. To allow,
however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital recordsthe results of tests
that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patients illness, and the advice or treatment he
gave himwould be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patients
consent. Physician memorializes all these information in the patients records. Disclosing them
would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters he gained
while dealing with the patient, without the latters prior consent. But, trial in the case had not yet
begun. Consequently, it cannot be said that Johnny had already presented the Philhealth claim
form in evidence, the act contemplated above which would justify Josielene into requesting an
inquiry into the details of his hospital confinement. Johnny was not yet bound to adduce
evidence in the case when he filed his answer. Any request for disclosure of his hospital records
would again be premature.
For all of the above reasons, the CA and the RTC were justified in denying Josielene her request
for the production in court of Johnnys hospital records.

210. ARCABA V. VDA. DE BATOCAEL

G.R. No. 146683
FACTS:
Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of various lots.
After the death of Zosima, Francisco and his mother-in-law executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her share consisting of 1/4 of the
property to Francisco. Having no children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco
asked his niece, the latters cousin, and petitioner, to take care of his house, as well as the store
inside.
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between petitioner and
Francisco. The niece and her cousin tell of them being lovers, or that petitioner was his
mistress. On the other hand, petitioner said she was a mere helper and that he was too old for her.
A few months before his death, Francisco executed an instrument denominated Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos, in which he ceded a portion of a lot, together with his house, to
petitioner. When he died, respondents filed a complaint against petitioner for declaration of
nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos, recovery of possession, and damages. They alleged that
petitioner was the common-law wife of Francisco and the donation inter vivos made by
Francisco in her favor is void under Article 87 of the Family Code. The RTC ruled in favor of the
respondents, as did the CA. Thus, the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly applied Art. 87 of the Family Code to the circumstances of this
case.
RULING:
Yes it did, the decision of the CA is affirmed. Cohabitation is the public assumption by a man
and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding
themselves out to the public as such. Petitioner admitted that she and Francisco resided under
one roof for a long time. It is very possible that the two consummated their relationship, since
she gave Francisco therapeutic massage and that they slept in the same bedroom. At the very
least, their public conduct indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of caregiver and
patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to husband and wife. There were also other indications
that petitioner and Francisco were common-law spouses. Petitioners use of Franciscos surname
for instance in an application for a business permit to operate as a real estate lessor, a sanitary
permit to operate as real estate lessor with a health certificate, and in the death certificate of
Francisco. These documents show that petitioner saw herself as Franciscos common-law wife,
otherwise, she would not have used his last name. Finally, the fact that petitioner did not demand
from Francisco a regular cash wage is an indication that she was not simply a caregiveremployee, but his common law spouse.

211. MATABUENA VS. CERVANTES

38 SCRA 284
FACTS:
Felix Matabuena owned a certain property of land and executed a deed of donation in favor of
the defendant Petronila Cervantes on February 20, 1956. The donation of land was made during
the existence of the common law relationship between defendant donee and now deceased
donor. Eventually, the donor and donee were married on March 26, 1962. Felix Matabuena died
on September 13, 1962. The plaintiff claims that the property is suppose to be in her ownership
for reasons that she is the only sister and relative of the deceased, and maintains that a donation
made while he was living without benefit of marriage to defendant was void. Further, she alleged
that a donation between common-law spouses falls within the prohibition under the law and
therefore is null and void as being contrary to public policy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the assailed donation is valid.
RULING:
While Article 133 of the civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during the
marriage, policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality
require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship.
However, the lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to defendant Petronila
Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having the exclusive right to the disputed
property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant
was legitimated by their marriage. She is therefore his widow. As provided for in the Civil Code,
she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to the other
half.

213. HARDING VS COMMERCIAL UNION

38 P 464
FACTS :In February 1916, Mrs. Harding applied for car insurance for a Studebaker she received
as a gift from her husband. She was assisted by Smith, Bell, and Co. which was the duly
authorized representative (insurance agent) of Commercial Union Assurance Company in the
Philippines. The cars value was estimated with the help of an experienced mechanic (Mr.
Server) of the Luneta Garage. The car was bought by Mr. Harding for P2,800.00. The mechanic,
considering some repairs done, estimated the value to be at P3,000.00. This estimated value was
the value disclosed by Mrs. Harding to Smith, Bell, and Co. She also disclosed that the value was
an estimate made by Luneta Garage (which also acts as an agent for Smith, Bell, and Co).
In March 1916, a fire destroyed the Studebaker. Mrs. Harding filed an insurance claim but
Commercial Union denied it as it insisted that the representations and averments made as to the
cost of the car were false; and that said statement was a warranty. Commercial Union also stated
that the car does not belong to Mrs. Harding because such a gift [from her husband] is void under
the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mrs. Harding is entitled to the insurance claim.
RULING: Yes. Commercial Union is not the proper party to attack the validity of the gift made
by Mr. Harding to his wife.
The statement made by Mrs. Harding as to the cost of the car is not a warranty. The evidence
does not prove that the statement is false. In fact, the evidence shows that the cost of the car is
more than the price of the insurance. The car was bought for P2,800.00 and then thereafter,
Luneta Garage made some repairs and body paints which amounted to P900.00. Mr. Server
attested that the car is as good as new at the time the insurance was effected.
Commercial Union, upon the information given by Mrs. Harding, and after an inspection of the
automobile by its examiner, having agreed that it was worth P3,000, is bound by this valuation in
the absence of fraud on the part of the insured. All statements of value are, of necessity, to a large
extent matters of opinion, and it would be outrageous to hold that the validity of all valued
policies must depend upon the absolute correctness of such estimated value.

214. IMANI V. METROBANK

G.R. NO. 187023
FACTS:
Imani signed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement in favour of Metrobank with 6 other cosureties binding themselves to pay whatever indebtedness Cesar P. Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI)
incurs, but not exceeding 6 Million Pesos. Later, CPDTI obtained loans of P100,000.00 and
P63,825.45, respectively. The loans were evidenced by promissory notes signed by Cesar and
Nieves Dazo. CPDTI defaulted in the payment of its loans. Metrobank made several demands for
payment upon CPDTI, but to no avail. This prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit against
CPDTI and its sureties, including herein petitioner. Metrobank won, and the sheriff levied a
property owned by Imani and filed to consolidate the title to its name.
Imani opposed, stating that it is part of her conjugal property. The RTC ruled in favour of Imani,
reasoning that the loan proceeds never redounded to the benefit of the family of Imani. RTC
annulled the sale and levy. Metrobank appealed, and the CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC erred in ruling the levy on execution and the auction sale, and for
canceling the certificate of sale that occurs in the petitioners conjugal partnership
RULING:
Indeed, all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal. However, for this presumption to
apply, the party who invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired during the
marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non to the operation of
the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. Thus, the time when the property was
acquired is material.
Petitioner takes exception to the CA ruling that she committed a procedural gaffe in seeking the
annulment of the writ of execution, the auction sale, and the certificate of sale. The issue on the
conjugal nature of the property, she insists, can be adjudicated by the executing court; thus, the
RTC correctly gave due course to her motion. She asserts that it was error for the CA to propose
the filing of a separate case to vindicate her claim.
The CA explained the faux pas committed by petitioner in this Under [Section 16, Rule 39], a
third-party claimant or a stranger to the foreclosure suit, can opt to file a remedy known as
terceria against the sheriff or officer effecting the writ by serving on him an affidavit of his title
and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor. By the terceria, the officer shall not be bound to
keep the property and could be answerable for damages. A third-party claimant may also resort to
an independent separate action, the object of which is the recovery of ownership or possession
of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages arising from wrongful seizure and
detention of the property despite the third-party claim. If a separate action is the recourse, the
third-party claimant must institute in a forum of competent jurisdiction an action, distinct and
separate from the action in which the judgment is being enforced, even before or without need of

filing a claim in the court that issued the writ. Both remedies are cumulative and may be availed
of independently of or separately from the other. Availment of the terceria is not a condition sine
qua non to the institution of a separate action.
The Supreme Court denied the petition. The decision and the resolution of the Court of Appeals
sustaining the validity of the writ of execution, the auction sale, and the certificate of sale are
affirmed.

215. NAVARRO VS JUDGE ESCOBIDO

G.R. No. 153788
FACTS:
Respondent Karen T. Go filed two complaints before the RTC for replevin and/or sum of money
with damages against Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go prayed that the RTC issue writs of
replevin for the seizure of two (2) motor vehicles in Navarros possession. In his Answers,
Navarro alleged as a special affirmative defense that the two complaints stated no cause of
action, since Karen Go was not a party to the Lease Agreements with Option to Purchase
(collectively, the lease agreements) the actionable documents on which the complaints were
based. RTC dismissed the case but set aside the dismissal on the presumption that Glenn Gos
(husband) leasing business is a conjugal property and thus ordered Karen Go to file a motion for
the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff as per Rule 4, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. Navarro
filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. According to Navarro, a complaint which failed to
state a cause of action could not be converted into one with a cause of action by mere
amendment or supplemental pleading. CA denied petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Karen Go is a real party in interest.
RULING:
YES. Karen Go is the registered owner of the business name Kargo Enterprises, as the registered
owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will directly benefit from or be injured
by a judgment in this case. Thus, contrary to Navarros contention, Karen Go is the real party-ininterest, and it is legally incorrect to say that her Complaint does not state a cause of action
because her name did not appear in the Lease Agreement that her husband signed in behalf of
Kargo Enterprises.
Glenn and Karen Go are effectively co-owners of Kargo Enterprises and the properties registered
under this name; hence, both have an equal right to seek possession of these properties.
Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of
the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not
indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be accorded
in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the
benefit of all co-owners.
We hold that since Glenn Go is not strictly an indispensable party in the action to recover
possession of the leased vehicles, he only needs to be impleaded as a pro-forma party to the suit,
based on Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules, which states:
Section 4.Spouses as parties. Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as
provided by law.

Even assuming that Glenn Go is an indispensable party to the action, misjoinder or non-joinder
of indispensable parties in a complaint is not a ground for dismissal of action as per Rule 3,
Section 11 of the Rules of Court.

217. CHING vs. CA

G.R. No. 124642
FACTS:
On September 1978, Philippine Blooming Mills Company (PBMCI) obtained a 9-million peso
loan from Allied Banking Corporation (ABC).Alfredo Ching together with two other persons
executed a continuing guarantee with ABC binding themselves jointly and severally liable for the
PBMCI obligations.The extent of their guarantee is up to 38 million pesos.
PBMCI failed to settle the loans which amounted to P12,612,972.88 (exclusive of interests,
penalties and other bank charges.)Together with the writ of preliminary attachment, the sheriff
levied (seized) the 100,000 common shares of City Corporation stocks registered solely to
Alfredo Ching.Mrs. Ching filed a petition to set aside the levy of the 100,000 common
shares.According to her, the shares were purchased out of the conjugal funds.She also argued
that the loan of PBMCI did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership (or family).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the argument of Mrs. Ching is tenable.
RULING:
Yes. ABC has the burden of proof to show that the common shares registered solely to the name
of Alfredo Ching were owned by the latter. Just because Mr. Chings name appeared as the sole
registrant of the shares in the corporate books of CityCorp, that doesnt mean that it is his
exclusive property and not to the conjugal partnership.
As held in the case of Ayala Investment and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, the
court said that signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession. It is
not embarking in a business.
For the conjugal partnership to become liable, it is important to show that the family received
benefits and advantages from the liability incurred. There is no presumption that when a husband
entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would
be benefited.
The benefits must be those directly resulting from the loan.
Therefore, Mr. Alfredo Chings common shares must not be levied because he is not the sole
owner of such stocks. The shares belong to the conjugal partnership.
Under Article 121 of the Family Code.

218. TAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 120594

FACTS:
Petitioner Chiao Liong Tan claims to be the owner of a motor vehicle, particularly described as
Isuzu Elf van, 1976 Model that he purchased in March 1987. As owner thereof, petitioner says he
has been in possession, enjoyment and utilization of the said motor vehicle until his older
brother, Tan Ban Yong, the private respondent, took it from him.
Petitioner relies principally on the fact that the van is registered in his name under Certificate of
Registration. He claims in his testimony before the trial court that the said motor vehicle was
purchased from Balintawak Isuzu Motor Center for a price of over P100, 000. 00; that he sent his
brother to pay for the van and the receipt from payment was placed in his name because it was
his money that was used to pay for the vehicle; that he allowed his brother to use the van because
the latter was working for his company, the CLT Industries; and that his brother later refused to
return the van to him and appropriated the same for himself.
On the other hand, private respondent testified that CLT Industries is a family business that was
placed in petitioners name because at that time he was then leaving for the United Stated and
petitioner remaining Filipino in the family residing in the Philippines. When the family business
needed a vehicle in 1987 for use in the delivery of machinery to its customers, he asked
petitioner to look for a vehicle and gave him the amount of P5,000.00 to be deposited as down
payment for the van, which would be available in about a month. After a month, he himself paid
the whole price out of a loan of P140, 000.00 from his friend Tan Pit Sin. Nevertheless,
respondent allowed the registration of the vehicle in petitioners name. It was also their
understanding that he would keep the van for himself because CLT Industries was not in a
position to pay him. Hence, from the time of the purchase, he had been in possession of the
vehicle including the original registration papers thereof, but allowing petitioner from time to
time to use the van for deliveries of machinery.
After hearing, the trial court found for the private respondent. Finding no merit in the appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the tiall court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner-appellant established proof of ownership over the subject motor
vehicle.
RULING:
No. Petitioner did not have in his possession the Certificate of Registration of the motor vehicle
and the official receipt of payment for the same, thereby lending credence to the claim of private
respondent who has possession thereof, that he owns the subject motor vehicle. A certificate of
registration of a motor vehicle in ones name indeed creates a strong presumption of ownership.
For all practical purposes, the person in whose favor it has been issued is virtually the owner
thereof unless proved otherwise. In other words, such presumption is rebuttable by competent
proof.

The New Civil Code recognizes cases of implied trusts other than those enumerated therein.
Thus, although no specific provision could be cited to apply to the parties herein, it is undeniable
that an implied trust was created when the certificate of registration of the motor vehicle was
placed in the name of the petitioner although the price thereof was not paid by him but by private
respondent. The principle that a trustee who puts a certificate of registration in his name cannot
repudiate the trust relying on the registration is one of the well-known limitations upon a title. A
trust, which derives its strength from the confidence one reposes on another especially between
brothers, does not lose that character simply because of what appears in a legal document.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

219. ROS AND AGUETE V. PNB LAOAG

G.R. NO. L-30977
FACTS:
Joe Ros obtained a loan of P115,000.00 from PNB Laoag Branch on October 14, 1974 and as
security for the loan, petitioner, Ros, executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel of land
with all the. Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, PNB instituted
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale, a
Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PNB, Laoag as the highest bidder. After the lapse of
one (1) year without the property being redeemed, the property was consolidated and registered
in the name of PNB, Laoag Branch on August 10, 1978.
Estrella Agueta, wife of Joe Ros claims that she has no knowledge of the loan obtained by her
husband nor she consented to the mortgage instituted on the conjugal property. On January 13,
1983, spouses Ros and Agueta filed to annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and
consolidation of the property interposing the defense that her signatures affixed on the
documents were forged and that the loan did not redound to the benefit of the family. PNB seeks
for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action, and insists that it was petitioners
own acts of omission that bar them from recovering the subject property on the ground of
estoppel, laches, abandonment and prescription.
The Trial Court ruled in favor of the petitioners declaring deed of real estate mortgage Null and
Void and ordered the Register of Deeds to rename the title of the lot to the petitioners. Upon
PNBs appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the decision of the Trial Court and dismissed the
complaint of the petitioners. The Petitioners then petitioned for review to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the debt/loan was chargeable to the conjugal property.
RULING:
Yes. At the time of the mortgage the Civil Code was the applicable law. Article 161 of the Civil
Code enumerated the instances of which the spouses-conjugal partnership shall be liable and
paragraph (1) one of the said provision states all debts and obligations contracted by the
husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the
same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership. The loan was used for
additional working capital for their family business hence, it is considered that such loan was
acquired for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and not merely for the benefit of Ros.

220. CHEESMAN vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ESTELITA PADILLA,

G.R. No. 74833

FACTS:
Thomas Cheesman and Criselda P. Cheesman were married on December 4, 1970 but have been
separated since February 15, 1981. On June 4, 1974, a Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory
Rights was executed by Armando Altares conveying a parcel of unregistered land and the house
in favor of Criselda P. Cheesman, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Thomas Cheesman,
and residing at Lot No. 1, Blk. 8, Filtration Road, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City . Thomas Cheesman,
although aware of the deed, did not object to the transfer being made only to his wife.
Thereafter, tax declarations for the property purchased were issued in the name only of Criselda
Cheesman and Criselda assumed exclusive management and administration of said property,
leasing it to tenants. This happened without any protest from Thomas. Criselda sold the property
to Estelita M. Padilla, without the knowledge or consent of Cheesman. The deed described
Criselda as being of legal age, married to an American citizen... Subsequently, Thomas filed a
suit in the CFI against Criselda and Estelita Padilla, praying for the annulment of the sale on the
ground that the transaction had been executed without his knowledge and consent. During the
Pre-trial, the sale was declared void ab initio and the the delivery of the property to Thomas as
administrator of the conjugal partnership property was ordered. However, the judgment was set
aside on a petition for relief filed by the Estrellita, grounded on "fraud, mistake and/or excusable
negligence" which had seriously impaired her right to present her case adequately. Estelita
Padilla filed a supplemental pleading as her own answer to the complaint and a motion for
summary judgment.
The Trial Court found that : The evidence on record satisfactorily overcame the disputable
presumption that all property of the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership and that the
immovable in question was in truth Criseldas paraphernal property; The legal presumption in
Article 160 could not apply because the husband-plaintiff is an American citizen and therefore
disqualified under the Constitution to acquire and own real properties; and The exercise by
Criselda of exclusive acts of dominion with the knowledge of her husband had led Estelita to
believe that the properties were the exclusive properties of Criselda and on the faith of such a
belief she bought the properties from her and for value and therefore, Thomas was estopped to
impugn the transfer.
Thomas appealed the judgment, as well as the act of the Trial Court of granting Estelitas petition
for relief and its resolution of matters not subject of said petition. IAC affirmed the Summary
Judgment and found no reversible error. Thomas Cheesman appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Thomas correctly availed of the remedy of appeal to SC.
RULING:

No. An order of the CFI granting a petition for relief under Rule 38 is interlocutory and is not
appealable. The RULE is that only questions of law, distinctly set forth, may be raised in a
petition for the review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals presented to the
Supreme Court. The appellate jurisdiction of the SC is limited to reviewing errors of law,
accepting as conclusive the factual findings of the lower court upon its own assessment of the
evidence. CA was created precisely to take away from the SC the work of examining the
evidence, and confine its task to the determination of questions which do not call for the reading
and study of transcripts containing the testimony of witnesses. The facts on record adequately
proved fraud, mistake or excusable negligence by which Estelita Padilla's rights had been
substantially impaired; that the funds used by Criselda Cheesman was money she had earned and
saved prior to her marriage to Thomas Cheesman, and that Estelita Padilla did believe in good
faith that Criselda Cheesman was the sole owner of the property in question. An order of a CFI
granting a petition for relief under Rule 38 is interlocutory and is NOT appealable. The failure of
the party who opposed the petition to appeal from said order, or his participation in the
proceedings subsequently had, cannot be construed as a waiver of his objection to the petition for
relief so as to preclude his raising the same question on appeal from the judgment on the merits
of the main case.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioner.

221. MATTHEWS V. TAYLOR, ET AL.

G.R. No. 164584
June 22, 2009
FACTS:
Respondent was married to Joselyn Taylor. While they were together, the former bought the
latter a lot in Boracay and subsequently improved such lot into a vacation and tourist resort
known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn. The title in named in Joselyns favor, and the permits
therein, to her sister. When they had a falling out, Joselyn ran away with the petitioner. Joselyn
then executed a SPA in favor of respondent, authorizing him to maintain, sell, lease, and sublease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to their Boracay property.
Subsequently, Joselyn entered into an Agreement of lease involving the Boracay lot, with
petitioner. The agreement was signed and thereafter petitioner took possession of the property
and renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort. Claiming that the Agreement was null and void
since it was entered into by Joselyn without his (respondents) consent, respondent instituted an
action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages. The RTC declared
petitioner to be in default for failure to file an answer. However, the CA set aside this decision
and ordered the RTC to allow the latter to file their answer. After trial, the RTC rendered a
decision in favor of the respondent which the CA affirmed. Hence the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract entered into by Joselyn and petitioner, without the consent of the
respondent, is valid.
RULING:
Yes it is, the decision appealed from is reversed and set aside, and the petition is granted. What is
more important to observe in this case is the applicable constitutional principle. According to
Sec. 7, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution, save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Aliens, whether individuals or
corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, by virtue
of the aforecited constitutional provision, they are also disqualified from acquiring private
lands. The primary purpose of this constitutional provision is the conservation of the national
patrimony. Our fundamental law cannot be any clearer. The right to acquire lands of the public
domain is reserved only to Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of
which is owned by Filipinos.
Thus, respondent has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner.
Respondent, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in
the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated "vendee" in the Deed of
Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain
Benjamins claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such contract
knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his
expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of
the conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity or
personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory

that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal
property.

222. SPOUSES AGGABAO V. PARULAN, JR.

G.R. No. 165803
FACTS:
Real estate broker Marta Atanacio offered 2 lots to the spouses Aggabao on January 1991. On
February 2, 1991, the petitioners met up with Elena Parulan at the site of the property and
showed them the following documents: (a.) Owners original copy of the TCT of the 2 lots; (b.)
tax declarations; (c.) a copy of the special power of attorney dated January 7, 1991 executed by
Dionisio Parulan authorizing Elena to sell the property.
On March 18, 1991, the petitioners
delivered the final amount of their balance to Elena, who executed a deed of absolute sale in their
favor. However, Elena did not turn over the owners duplicate copy of the TCT claiming that said
copy was in the possession of a relative who was then in Hongkong. She assured them that the
owners duplicate copy of TCT would be turned over after a week.
On March 19, 1991, TCT was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of the petitioners.
Elena did not turn over the duplicate owners copy of TCT as promised. Thus, on April 15, 1991,
Dionisio commenced an action vs Elena Parulan and the Aggabao spouses praying for the
declaration of the nullity of the deed of absolute sale executed by Ma. Elena, and the cancellation
of the title issued to the petitioners by virtue thereof. In turn, the petitioners, Aggabao spouses
and Elena Parulan, filed on July 12, 1991 their own action for specific performance with
damages against the respondent. On July 26, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 136,
in Makati City annulled the deed of absolute sale executed in favor of the petitioners.
ISSUE:
Which between Article 173 of the Civil Code and Article 124 of the Family Code should apply to
the sale of the conjugal property executed without the consent of Dionisio?
RULING:
The sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of the Family
Code. The proper law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is settled that
any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made during the effectivity of the Family
Code is governed by Article 124 of the Family Code.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse
to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the
date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse
may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the

third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse
or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
Next, according to Article 256 of the Family Code, the provisions of the Family Code may apply
retroactively provided no vested rights are impaired. Herein, however, the petitioners did not
show any vested right in the property acquired prior to August 3, 1988 that exempted their
situation from the retroactive application of the Family Code. Also, the petitioners failed to
substantiate their contention that Dionisio, while holding the administration over the property,
had delegated to his brother, Atty. Parulan, the administration of the property, considering that
they did not present in court the SPA granting to Atty. Parulan the authority for the
administration.

223. FUENTES VS. CONRADO ROCA

G.R. No. 178902
FACTS:
On, Oct 11, 1982, Tarciano Roca bought a 358-square meter lot in Zambales from his mother.
Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to the petitioners Fuentes spouses through
the help of Atty. Plagata who would prepare the documents and requirements to complete the
sale. In the agreement between Tarciano and Fuentes spouses there will be a Php 60,000 down
payment and Php 140,000 will be paid upon the removal of Tarciano of certain structures on the
land and after the consent of the estranged wife of Tarciano, Rosario, would be attained. Atty.
Plagata thus went about to complete such tasks and claimed that he went to Manila to get the
signature of Rosario but notarized the document at Zamboanga . The deed of sale was executed
January 11, 1989. As time passed, Tarciano and Rosario died while the Fuentes spouses and
possession and control over the lot. Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and
Rosario filed a case to annul the sale and reconvey the property on the ground that the sale was
void since the consent of Rosario was not attained and that Rosarios signature was a mere
forgery. The Fuentes spouses claim that the action has prescribed since an action to annul a sale
on the ground of fraud is 4 years from discovery.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Fuentes spouses ruling that there was no forgery, that the
testimony of Atty. Plagata who witnessed the signing of Rosario must be given weight, and that
the action has already prescribed.
On the other hand, the CA reversed the ruling of the CA stating that the action has not prescribed
since the applicable law is the 1950 Civil Code which provided that the sale of Conjugal
Property without the consent of the other spouse is voidable and the action must be brought
within 10 years. Given that the transaction was in 1989 and the action was brought in 1997 hence
it was well within the prescriptive period.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Rosarios signature on the document of consent to her husband Tarcianos sale
of their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged;
2. Whether or not the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses
already prescribed; and
3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action to
annul that sale.
RULING:
1. The SC ruled that there was forgery due to the difference in the signatures of Rosario in the
document giving consent and another document executed at the same time period. The SC noted
that the CA was correct in ruling that the heavy handwriting in the document which stated

consent was completely different from the sample signature. There was no evidence provided to
explain why there was such difference in the handwriting.
2. Although Tarciano and Rosario was married during the 1950 civil code, the sale was done in
1989, after the effectivity of the Family Code. The Family Code applies to Conjugal Partnerships
already established at the enactment of the Family Code. The sale of conjugal property done by
Tarciano without the consent of Rosario is completely void under Art 124 of the family code.
With that, it is a given fact that assailing a void contract never prescribes. On the argument that
the action has already prescribed based on the discovery of the fraud, that prescriptive period
applied to the Fuentes spouses since it was them who should have assailed such contract due to
the fraud but they failed to do so. On the other hand, the action to assail a sale based on no
consent given by the other spouse does not prescribe since it is a void contract.
3. It is argued by the Spouses Fuentes that it is only the spouse, Rosario, who can file such a case
to assail the validity of the sale but given that Rosario was already dead no one could bring the
action anymore. The SC ruled that such position is wrong since as stated above, that sale was
void from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario
despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs,
namely, the Rocas. As lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil
Code, to exclude any person from its enjoyment and disposal.

225. SPS. BAUTISTA V. SILVA

502 SCRA 334
FACTS:
A parcel of land situated in Barrio of Parada, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, containing an area of
216 square meters, more or less, was registered in the names of Spouses Berlina F. Silva and
Pedro M. Silva on August 14, 1980.
On March 3, 1988, Pedro, for himself and as attorney-in-fact of his wife Berlina, thru a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed on November 18, 1987 by Berlina F. Silva in his
favor, signed and executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the said parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. B-37189 in favor of defendants-spouses Claro Bautista
and Nida Bautista. As a consequence, TCT No. V-2765 of the Registry of Deeds for the
Valenzuela Branch was issued in the names of Spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista on
March 4, 1988.
Berlina, through Hermes Dorado as Attorney-in-Fact, a Complaint for Annulment of Deed of
Absolute Sale and TCT No. V-2765, Reconveyance and Damages filed with the RTC, Branch
171, Valenzuela, Metro Manila by against Spouses Bautista. Based on the evidence presented,
the RTC also found that the signature appearing on the SPA as that of Berlina Silva is a forgery,
and that consequently the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Pedro in favor of Spouses Bautista
is not authorized by Berlina.
The RTC rendered judgment declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale between Pedro and Spouses
Bautista null and void. The RTC ordered Spouses Bautista to reconvey the said property to the
plaintiff. Spouses Bautista filed an appeal with the CA which, in its November 21, 2001
Decision, affirmed in toto the RTC decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the nullity of the sale of conjugal property contracted by the husband without the
marital consent of the wife affects the entire property, not just the share of the wife
RULING:
To establish his status as a buyer for value in good faith, a person dealing with land registered in
the name of and occupied by the seller need only show that he relied on the face of the sellers
certificate of title. But for a person dealing with land registered in the name of and occupied by
the seller whose capacity to sell is restricted, such as by Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code
or Article 124 of the Family Code, he must show that he inquired into the latters capacity to sell
in order to establish himself as a buyer for value in good faith.[5] The extent of his inquiry
depends on the proof of capacity of the seller. If the proof of capacity consists of a special power
of attorney duly notarized, mere inspection of the face of such public document already
constitutes sufficient inquiry. If no such special power of attorney is provided or there is one but
there appear flaws in its notarial acknowledgment mere inspection of the document will not do;

the buyer must show that his investigation went beyond the document and into the circumstances
of its execution.
The SPA is a forgery is a finding of the RTC and the CA on a question of fact. The same is
conclusive upon the Court, especially as it is based on the expert opinion of the NBI which
constitutes more than clear, positive and convincing evidence that respondent did not sign the
SPA, and on the uncontroverted Certification of Dorado that respondent was in Germany
working as a nurse when the SPA was purportedly executed in 1987. The SPA being a forgery, it
did not vest in Pedro any authority to alienate the subject property without the consent of
respondent. Absent such marital consent, the deed of sale was a nullity.
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.

226. HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO,

G.R. No. 153802
FACTS:
Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr were married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage
the spouses purchased a house and lot situated at San Pablo City from a certain Dalida. The
subject property was declared for tax assessment purposes The Deed of Absolute Sale, however,
was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to the exclusion of
his wife.
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Gesmundo,
authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be
secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo
obtained a loan from petitioner. As security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real
Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner. The abovementioned
transactions, including the execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took place without the
knowledge and consent of respondent.
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a
Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one
year without the property being redeemed, petitioner consolidated the ownership thereof by
executing an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale.
In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died. In one of her visits to the subject property, Miguela
learned that petitioner had already employed a certain Brion to clean its premises and that her
car, a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property, which
was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted with the RTC San Pablo City a Civil Case for
Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages
against petitioner. In the latters Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of
the complaint on the ground that the property in question was the exclusive property of the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision declaring the said documents null and
void and further ordered the defendant is ordered to reconvey the property subject of this
complaint to the plaintiff, to pay the plaintiff the sum representing the value of the car which
was burned, the attorneys fees, moral and exemplary damages.
The appellate court affirmed the trial courts Decision, but deleted the award for damages and
attorneys fees for lack of basis. Hence, this petition

ISSUE:
1. WON THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. ON
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS CO-OWNER THEREOF IS VALID AS TO HIS UNDIVIDED
SHARE.
2. WON THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE LOAN
OBTAINED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. THE SAME HAVING REDOUNDED
TO THE BENEFIT OF THE FAMILY.
RULING:
The petition is denied.
1. NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to
both spouses jointly.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which
must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent of
one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property
pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale.
Respondent and the late Marcelino. Were married on August 8, 1967. In the absence of a
marriage settlement, the system of relative community orconjugal partnership of gains governed
the property relations between respondent and her late husband. With the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code
was made applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already established before its effectivity
unless vested rights have already been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws.
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent and the late
Marcelino even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a special
type of partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products,
fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses
through their efforts or by chance. Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the rules
on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the
rules on contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in
the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by the spouses in their marriage settlements.
Thus, the property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by
Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on
partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code
provisions on partnership apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter.

The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of
his wife, Marcelino constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part
of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the
absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or
encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.
The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who makes
the disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-ownership under Article
493 of the Civil Code does. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.
Thus, both the trial court and the appellate court are correct in declaring the nullity of the real
estate mortgage on the subject property for lack of respondents consent.
2. NO. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, [T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable for: =
Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other o the extent
that the family may have been benefited; . . . .
Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the
husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the
utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of
gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui
negat (he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove). Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the
loan obtained by the late Marcelino to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt
redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this
Court. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the
principal obligation.

228. ROXAS V. CA
GR No. 127876
FACTS:
That plaintiff is of legal age, married but living separately from husband. While defendant
Antonio S. Roxas is likewise of legal age and living separately from his wife. And other
defendant Antonio M. Cayetano is of legal age.
Plaintiff discovered that her estranged husband, defendant Antonio S. Roxas, had entered into a
contract of lease with defendant Antonio M. Cayetano sometime on March 30, 1987 covering a
portion of their conjugal lot situatedQuezon City, described without her previous knowledge,
much less her marital consent.
Plaintiff had planned to put up her flea market with at least twenty (20) stalls and mini-mart for
grocery and dry goods items for which she had filed an application for the corresponding
Mayor's Permit and Municipal License which had been approved since 1986, but when she
attempted to renew it for 1986, the same was disapproved last month due to the complaint lodged
by defendant Antonio M. Cayetano whose application for renewal of Mayor's Permit and License
for the same business of putting up a flea market, had been allegedly earlier approved. That due
to the illegal lease contract entered into between the herein defendants and the resultant unlawful
deprivation of plaintiff from operating her own legitimate business on the same lot of which she
is a conjugal owner.
ISSUE:
Whether the husband, as the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership, may legally enter into
a contract of lease involving conjugal real property without the knowledge and consent of the
wife.
RULING:
The Court remanded the case to the Regional Trial Court for further proceedings.
Under the New Civil Code (NCC), "Art. 165. The husband is the administrator of the conjugal
partnership," in view of the fact that the husband is principally responsible for the support of the
wife and the rest of the family. If the conjugal partnership does not have enough assets, it is the
husband's capital that is responsible for such support, not the paraphernal property.
Responsibility should carry authority with it.
The husband is not an ordinary administrator, for while a mere administrator has no right to
dispose of, sell, or otherwise alienate the property being administered, the husband can do so in
certain cases allowed by law. He is not required by law to render an accounting. Acts done under
administration do not need the prior consent of the wife.
But the Court held that in order to encumber or alienate the said property, the husband must still
get the consent of his wife. Art. 166 of the New Civil Code "unless the wife has been declared a
non-compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium,
the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership the wife's

consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the
same." This rule prevents abuse on the part of the husband, and guarantees the rights of the wife,
who is partly responsible for the acquisition of the property, particularly the real property.
Contracts entered into by the husband in violation of this prohibition are voidable and subject to
annulment at the instance of the aggrieved wife. (Art. 173 of the Civil Code).
The complaint, in the case at bar, indicates that petitioner's estranged husband, defendant
Antonio S. Roxas had entered into a contract of lease with defendant Antonio M. Cayetano
without her marital consent being secured as required by law under Art. 166 of the Civil Code.
Petitioner, therefore, has a cause of action under Art. 173 to file a case for annulment of the
contract of lease entered into without her consent. Petitioner has a cause of action not only
against her husband but also against the lessee, Antonio M. Cayetano, who is a party to the
contract of lease.

229. NICOLAS V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-37631
FACTS:
In 1951, respondent Anastacio Madlangsakay [a.k.a. Anastacio M. Sakay] rice dealer, married to
Lourdes Manuel bought from Felipe Garcia three parcels of land. Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-8012 was issued on October 19, 1951 in the name of Anastacio M. Sakay. At the time of
the purchase, petitioners were occupying Lot No. 8 [with an area of 6,886 square meters] as
tenants. Negotiations begun for the sale of Lot No. 8 to petitioner- tenants and in an affidavit
dated August 26, 1958, Madlangsakay promised to subdivide the land among them at P0.70 per
square meter. 2 Nothing came out of the negotiations. On April 26, 1961, petitioners filed an
amended complaint in the then Court of First Instance of Bulacan against respondent
Madlangsakay to quiet title over Lot. No. 8. Madlangsakay averred that the deeds of sale and the
affidavits of November 21, 1960 which he purportedly executed were all forgeries and that the
land in question, being conjugal property, registered under the Torrens system and mortgaged
with the Philippine National Bank, could not be alienated without his wife's consent. The trial
court upheld Madlangsakay. Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lot No. 8, a conjugal property of Anastacio Madlangsakay and his wife, may be
a subject of disposition without the consent of the other spouse.
RULING:
No. The land is a conjugal property and, as such, it could not be alienated without the conformity
of his wife. Even without going into the due execution of the aforesaid documents, it is clear that
there can be no legal transfer of ownership in favor of petitioners. One point alone the very
conspicuous absence of the wife's conforme to such disposition of the ganancial property, there
being no showing that Lourdes Manuel, whom respondent Madlangsakay married in 1927, is
legally incapacitated renders the alleged sale void ab initio because it is in contravention of
the mandatory requirement in Article 166 of the Civil Code.

230. MULLER V. MULLER

G.R. NO. 149615
FACTS:
Elena Muller, petitioner, got married in to Helmut Muller, a German national, on Hamburg dated
Sept. 22, 1989. Then they resided there in a house owned by Helmut s parents but later on
sometime 1992 they permanently resided in the Philippines. Helmut inherited the house in
Germany from his parents which he subsequently sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of
a parcel of land in Antipolo as well as for the construction of a house. That property was
registered in the name of Elena Muller. During their marriage they had some incompatibilities
and Helmut was alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment. With that, the spouses
eventually got separated. On September 26, 1994, Helmut, respondent, filed a petition for
separation of properties before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
RTC terminated the regime of absolute community of property. It ruled that the separation of
properties shall be applied between the petitioner and respondent. The RTC ordered the equal
partition of personal properties located within the Philippines, except those acquired by
gratuitous title during their marriage. In relation to the property, respondent cannot recover his
funds expensed since it was a violation of Section7, Article XII of the Constitution which
prohibits aliens from procuring private lands.
The Court of Appeals ruled that there was no provision in the Constitution which specifically
prevents Helmut from procuring private land. With that decision it also ordered Elena to
reimburse him accordingly.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Helmut Muller, respondent, is entitled to be reimbursed by Elena Muller,
petitioner, with the funds used to purchase the property in Antipolo and to construct the house.
RULING:
No, Helmut cannot seek reimbursement because it was clear that he willingly and knowingly
bought the property using the proceeds of his sold inherited property in Germany despite the
constitutional prohibition. It is provided in the Constitution that alien cant own lands here in the
Philippines and this provision is absolute only to the exception of lands here in the Philippines
inherited. With that violation he is not favored in any way in the case. Also, reimburse is
considered a fruit of the property, with that Helmut cant claim the fruits as well.

231. BEUMER V. AMORES

G.R. 195670
FACTS:
Petitioner, a Dutch national, assails the decision of CA which affirmed the decision of RTC
Negros Oriental. Petitioner and Filipina respondents marriage was nullified by basis of the
formers psychological incapacity. Petitioner thus filed for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership
praying for distribution of the properties acquired during their marriage which include 4 lots of
land acquired through purchase and 2 lots by inheritance. RTC ruled that all parcels of land be
given to the respondent, tools and equipment in favour of the petitioner and the two houses on
Lots 1 and 2142 as co-owned by the parties.
ISSUE:
Is the petitioner entitled to assail the decision of the RTC and CA?
RULING:
The petition lacks merit. Firstly, foreigners may not own lands in the Philippines. However, there
are no restrictions to the ownership of buildings or structures on lands of foreigners. As such, the
two houses on Lots 1 and 2142 are considered co-owned by the parties.

232. CRUZ, ET AL. V. CRISTOBAL, ET AL.

G.R. No. 140422
FACTS:
Petitioners claim that they are the legitimate heirs of Buenaventura Cristobal from his first
marriage. Respondents, on the other hand, also claim that they are the children of Buenaventura
from his second marriage.
When Buenaventura died, petitioners learned that the respondents executed an extrajudicial
partition of a property and had transferred its title to their names. When no settlement could be
reached, petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for Annulment of Title and Damages against
the respondents. The RTC dismissed the petition because the petitioners were unable to prove
their filiation to Buenaventura. The CA, however ruled that petitioners were able to prove their
filiation but are they are barred from their right to recover due to laches. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were able to prove their filiation.
RULING:
Yes they did, the petition is granted. Given that petitioners filiation was proven through
documents and testimonies, they now have the right to inherit from Buenaventura.
The subject property was a conjugal property of Buenaventura and his second wife. Upon their
deaths, which occurred before the enactment of the New Civil Code, all the four children of the
first marriage and the four children of the second marriage shall share equally in the subject
property in accordance with the Old Civil Code. Absent any allegation showing that
Buenaventura left any will and testament, the subject property shall be divided into eight equal
parts pursuant to Articles 921 and 931 of the Old Civil Code on intestate succession.

233. GO vs YAMANE
489 S 107
FACTS:
Lot in Baguio City is registered in the name of Muriel Yamane, wife of Leonardo Yamane. Atty.
De Guzman who handled a case for wife and her sisters levied the said property to satisfy the
lien for attorneys fees. The RTC of Baguio City held that the subject parcel of land was the
paraphernal property of Muriel Yamane and not the conjugal property of the spouses. Leonardo
Yamane, husband filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. The case was brought to
the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC. The appellate court
contends that, property acquired during marriage is presumed to be conjugal, unless the
exclusive funds of one spouse are shown to have been used for the purpose. Husbands name
appeared on the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) and the Deed of Absolute Sale. Both
documents indicate that Muriel was married to Leonardo Yamane.
ISSUE:
Whether the nature of the property is conjugal or paraphernal.
HELD:
Property purchased by spouses during the existence of their marriage is presumed to be conjugal
in nature, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. (Article
160). The nature of a property, whether conjugal or paraphernal, is determined by law and not by
the will of one of the spouses. The mere registration of a property in the name of one spouse does
not destroy its conjugal nature. Conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal
obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage of benefit is shown to have accrued
to the conjugal partnership. The CA committed no error in declaring that the parcel of land
belonged to the conjugal partnership of Spouses Muriel and Leonardo Yamane. They acquired it
from Eugene Pucay on February 27, 1967, or specifically during the marriage. We then follow
the rule that proof of the acquisition of the subject property during a marriage suffices to render
the statutory presumption operative. It is clear enough that the presently disputed piece of land
pertains to the conjugal partnership. The contract or transaction between Atty. De Guzman and
the Pucay sisters appears to have been incurred for the exclusive interest of the latter. Muriel was
acting privately for her exclusive interest when she joined her two sisters in hiring the services of
Atty. De Guzman to handle a case for them. Accordingly, whatever expenses were incurred by
Muriel in the litigation for her and her sisters' private and exclusive interests, are her exclusive
responsibility and certainly cannot be charged against the contested conjugal property. This piece
of land may not be used to pay for her indebtedness, because her obligation has not been shown
to be one of the charges against the conjugal partnership. The power of the court in executing
judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. In
this case, therefore, the property -- being conjugal in nature -- cannot be levied upon. Petition is
DENIED.

236. LUNA V. LINATOC

74 P 15
FACTS:
The wife of Agustin De Luna sold a portion of their conjugal property to R. The parcel of land
was the husbands portion of the conjugal property. The wife, with the knowledge and consent of
the husband, sold the lot to R as evidenced by the deed of sale and the deed of recognition
wherein the husband recognized and reiterated his acquiescence to the sale (Art 1416 A
conjugal property can be sold by one spouse if the other spouse consents). Such sale was
prohibited by Art 1432 because partitioning the conjugal property during marriage can only be
done if there was a judicial separation of property, or else it would be illegal and void. The sale
can only be valid if the land was sold under the name of the conjugal partnership and not of the
husband only. The Ps assail the validity of the sale to R, claiming that they do not know of such
prohibition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale may be validly annulled by the spouses
RULING:
Mistake of law does not make a contract voidable, because ignorance of the law does not excuse
anyone from its compliance (Art. 2, Civil Code). That the petitioners did not know the
prohibition against partition of the conjugal partnership property during marriage (Art. 1432,
Civil Code) is no valid reason why they should ask for the annulment of the sales made Exhibits
C and D and recognized in Exhibit I. Moreover, there is the time-honored legal maxim that no
man can take advantage of his own wrong. To repudiate the sales in question, petitioners are
setting up their own wrongful act of partitioning their conjugal property, which violated article
1432 of the Civil Code. The prohibition in said article affects public policy, as it is designed to
protect creditors of the conjugal partnership and other third persons. Petitioners shall not,
therefore, be allowed thus to rest their cause of action to recover the lands sold, upon the
illegality of the partition which they attempted to make. Otherwise, they would profit by their
own unlawful act.

239. VDA DE CONSAGUERA V. GSIS

GR L-28093
FACTS:
The late Jose Consuegra, at the time of his death, was employed as a shop foreman of the office
of the District Engineer in the province of Surigao-del Norte. In his lifetime, Consuegra
contracted two marriages,the first with Rosario Diaz, solemnized in the parish church of San
Nicolas de Tolentino, Surigao, Surigao, on 15 July 1937, out of which marriage were born two
children, namely, Jose Consuegra, Jr. and Pedro Consuegra, but both predeceased their father;
and the second, which was contracted in good faith while the first marriage was subsisting, with
Basilia Berdin, on 1 May 1957 in the same parish and municipality, out of which marriage were
born seven children, namely, Juliana, Pacita, Maria Lourdes, Jose, Rodrigo, Lenida and Luz, * all
surnamed Consuegra.
Being a member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) when Consuegra died on
26 September 1965, the proceeds of his life insurance under policy 601801 were paid by the
GSIS to Basilia Berdin and her children who were the beneficiaries named in the policy. Having
been in the service of the government for 22.5028 years, Consuegra was entitled to retirement
insurance benefits in the sum of P6,304.47 pursuant to Section 12(c) of Commonwealth Act 186
as amended by Republic Acts 1616 and 3836. Consuegra did not designate any beneficiary who
would receive the retirement insurance benefits due to him. Rosario Diaz, the widow by the first
marriage, filed a claim with the GSIS asking that the retirement insurance benefits be paid to her
as the only legal heir of Consuegra, considering that the deceased did not designate any
beneficiary with respect to his retirement insurance benefits. Basilia Berdin and her children,
likewise, filed a similar claim with the GSIS, asserting that being the beneficiaries named in the
life insurance policy of Consuegra, they are the only ones entitled to receive the retirement
insurance benefits due the deceased Consuegra. Resolving the conflicting claims, the GSIS ruled
that the legal heirs of the late Jose Consuegra were Rosario Diaz, his widow by his first marriage
who is entitled to one-half, or 8/16, of the retirement insurance benefits, on the one hand; and
Basilia Berdin, his widow by the second marriage and their seven children, on the other hand,
who are entitled to the remaining one-half, or 8/16, each of them to receive an equal share of
1/16.
Dissatisfied with the foregoing ruling and apportionment made by the GSIS, Basilia Berdin and
her children filed on 10 October 1966 a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction in the
Court of First Instance of Surigao del Norte (Special Proceeding 1720) naming as respondents
the GSIS, the Commissioner of Public Highways, the Highway District Engineer of Surigao del
Norte, the Commissioner of Civil Service, and Rosario Diaz, praying that they (Basilia Berdin, et
al.) be declared the legal heirs and exclusive beneficiaries of the retirement insurance of the late
Jose Consuegra, and that writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining implementation of
the adjudication made by the GSIS. On 7 March 1967, the court of First Instance of Surigao
rendered judgment, holding that when two women innocently and in good faith are legally united
in holy matrimony to the same man, they and their children, born of said wedlock, will be
regarded as legitimate children and each family be entitled to one half of the estate. The court
thus declared that Basilia Berdin Vda. de Consuegra and Juliana, Pacita, Maria Lourdes, Jose Jr.,
Rodrigo, Lenida and Luis, all surnamed Consuegra, beneficiary and entitled to 1/2 of the

retirement benefit in the amount of P6,304.47) due to the deceased Jose Consuegra from the
GSIS or the amount of P3,152.235 to be divided equally among them in the proportional amount
of 1/16 each. Likewise, Rosario Diaz Vda. de Consuegra is hereby declared beneficiary and
entitled to the other half of the retirement benefit of the late Jose Consuegra or the amount of
P3,152.235. Basilia Berdin and her children appealed (on purely questions of law).
ISSUE:
Whether the GSIS and the trial court are correct in ruling that each of the wives who contracted
marriage to the same man in good faith are each entitled to half of the retirement insurance
benefits.
RULING:
The Court ruled that both women are entitled half of the retirement benefits. In the case of the
proceeds of a life insurance, the same are paid to whoever is named the beneficiary in the life
insurance policy. As in the case of a life insurance provided for in the Insurance Act (Act 2427,
as amended), the beneficiary in a life insurance under the GSIS may not necessarily be an heir of
the insured. The insured in a life insurance may designate any person as beneficiary unless
disqualified to be so under the provisions of the Civil Code. And in the absence of any
beneficiary named in the life insurance policy, the proceeds of the insurance will go to the estate
of the insured. Retirement insurance is primarily intended for the benefit of the employee to
provide for his old age, or incapacity, after rendering service in the government for a required
number of years. If the employee reaches the age of retirement, he gets the retirement benefits
even to the exclusion of the beneficiary or beneficiaries named in his application for retirement
insurance. The beneficiary of the retirement insurance can only claim the proceeds of the
retirement insurance if the employee dies before retirement. If the employee failed or overlooked
to state the beneficiary of his retirement insurance, the retirement benefits will accrue his estate
and will be given to his legal heirs in accordance with law, as in the case of a life insurance if no
beneficiary is named in the insurance policy. The GSIS, therefore, had correctly acted when it
ruled that the proceeds of the retirement insurance of the late Jose Consuegra should divided
equally between his first living wife Rosario on the one hand, and his second wife Basilia Berdin
his children by her, on the other; and the lower court did not commit error when it confirmed the
action of the GSIS, it being accepted as a fact that the second marriage of Jose Consuegra to
Basilia Berdin was contracted in good faith.
"And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the second
marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was
still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the
conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of
its nullity, "[t]he only just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of
the second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and her husband, and
consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage."

240. SALVADOR V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 109910
FACTS:
Alipio Yabo was the owner of Lot No. 6080 and Lot No. 6180 situated in Barrio Bulua, Cagayan
de Oro City, whose title devolved upon his nine children, including Maria, upon his death
sometime before or during the second world war. In 1976, Pastor Makibalo, who is the husband
of Maria, filed a complaint against the spouses Alberto and Elpia Yabo for "Quieting of Title,
Annulment of Documents, and Damages." In the complaint, he alleged that he owned a total of
eight shares of the subject lots, having purchased the shares of seven of Alipio's children and
inherited the share of his wife, Maria, and that except for the portion corresponding to
Gaudencia's share which he did not buy, he occupied, cultivated, and possessed continuously,
openly, peacefully, and exclusively the two parcels of land. He then prayed that he be declared
the absolute owner of 8/9 of the lots in question.
On 8 October 1976, the grandchildren and great-grandchildren of the late Alipio Yabo lodged a
complaint for partition and quieting of title with damages against Pastor Makibalo, Enecia
Cristal, and the spouses Eulogio and Remedies Salvador. They alleged that Lot No. 6080 and Lot
No. 6180 are the common property of the heirs of Alipio Yabo, namely, the plaintiffs, defendant
Enecia Cristal, Maria Yabo and Jose Yabo, whose share had been sol d to Alberto Yabo; that after
Alipio's death, the spouses Pastor and Maria Makibalo, Enecia Cristal and Jose Yabo became the
de facto administrators of the said properties; and that much to their surprise, they discovered
that the Salvador spouses, who were strangers to the family, have been harvesting coconuts from
the lots, which act as a cloud on the plaintiffs title over the lots.
The plaintiffs then prayed that (a) they, as well as defendant Pastor Makibalo, in representation
of his wife, and Enecia Cristal, in representation of Gaudencia, be declared as the owners of the
lots; (b) the Salvador spouses be declared as having no rights thereto except as possible assignees
of their co-defendants, Pastor Makibalo and Enecia Cristal; (c) the lots be partitioned according
to law among the aforementioned co-owners; and (d) the defendants be made to pay for the value
of the fruits they harvested from the lots and for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees,
expenses of the litigation and cost of the suit.
To cut the story short, the trial court decided in favor of the plaintiffs; thus, the defendants
appealed trial courts decision to the Court of Appeals. The CA held, among others, that
prescription and laches have not run against the private respondents with respect to the 1/9 share
of Maria Yabo in the estate of her father and to her conjugal share in the portions acquired from
her brothers and sisters.
ISSUE:
Whether or not prescription and laches can be applied against the co-heirs of Pastor Makibalo?

RULING:

No. Article 494 of the Civil Code, which provides that each co-owner may demand at any time
the partition of the common property, implies that an action to demand partition is
imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches. The imprescriptibility of the action cannot,
however, be invoked when one of the co-owners has possessed the property as exclusive owner
and for a period sufficient to acquire it by prescription.
What needs to be addressed first is whether or not Pastor Makibalo has acquired by prescription
the shares of his other co-heirs or co-owners. Prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership
requires a continuous, open, peaceful, public, and adverse possession for a period of time fixed
by law. This Court has held that the possession of a co-owner is like that of a trustee and shall not
be regarded as adverse to the other co-owners but in fact as beneficial to all of them. Acts which
may be considered adverse to strangers may not be considered adverse insofar as co-owners are
concerned. A mere silent possession by a co-owner, his receipt of rents, fruits or profits from the
property, the erection of buildings and fences and the planting of trees thereon, and the payment
of land taxes, cannot serve as proof of exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by clear and
convincing evidence that he exercised acts of possession which unequivocably constituted an
ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners.
Thus, in order that a co-owner's possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or the
other co-owners, the following elements must concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts
of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or the other co-owners; (2) that such
positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or the other co-owners;
and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.
The records do not show that Pastor Makibalo adjudicated to himself the whole estate of his wife
by means of an affidavit filed with the Office of the Register of Deeds as allowed under Section
1 Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, or that he caused the issuance of a certificate of title in his name
or the cancellation of the tax declaration in Alipio's name and the issuance of a new one in his
own name. The only act which may be deemed as a repudiation by Pastor of the co-ownership
over the lots is his filing on 28 April 1976 of an action to quiet title (Civil Case No. 5000). The
period of prescription started to run only from this repudiation. However, this was tolled when
his co-heirs, the private respondents herein, instituted on 8 October 1976 an action for partition
(Civil Case No. 5174) of the lots. Hence, the adverse possession by Pastor being for only about
six months would not vest in him exclusive ownership of his wife's estate, and absent acquisitive
prescription of ownership, laches and prescription of the action for partition will not lie in favor
of Pastor.

242. VILLANUEVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 142947

FACTS:
In April 1988, Orly married Lilia before a trial court judge in Puerto Princesa. In November
1992, Orly filed to annul the marriage. He claimed that threats of violence and duress forced him
to marry Lilia. He said that he had been receiving phone calls threatening him and that Lilia even
hired the service of a certain Ka Celso, a member of the NPA, to threaten him. Orly also said he
was defrauded by Lilia by claiming that she was pregnant hence he married her but he now raises
that he never impregnated Lilia prior to the marriage. Lilia on the other hand denied Orlys
allegations and she said that Orly freely cohabited with her after the marriage and she showed 14
letters that shows Orlys affection and care towards her.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is duress and fraud attendant in the case at bar.
RULING:
The SC ruled that Orlys allegation of fraud and intimidation is untenable. On its face, it is
obvious that Orly is only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have the pending
appealed bigamy case to be dismissed. On the merits of the case, Orlys allegation of fear was
not concretely established. He was not able to prove that there was a reasonable and wellgrounded reason for fear to be created in his mind by the alleged intimidation being done against
him by Lilia and her party. Orly is a security guard who is well abreast with self-defense and that
the threat he so described done against him is not sufficient enough to vitiate him from freely
marrying Lilia. Fraud cannot be raised as a ground as well. His allegation that he never had an
erection during their sexual intercourse is incredible and is an outright lie. Also, there is a
prolonged inaction on the part of Orly to attack the marriage. It took him 4 and half years to file
an action which brings merit to Lilias contention that Orly freely cohabited with her after the
marriage.

243. MANOTOK REALTY, INC. V. CA, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-45038
FACTS:
Clara Tambunting was the owner of the subdivision where the respondent was residing on, on the
condition that he would eventually buy said lot. When she died, her entire estate, which included
the lot occupied by the respondent, was placed under custodial legis. After such death,
respondent made a deposit for the lot, which was received by the husband of the late owner.
Apart from the initial deposit, no further payments were made. Later, the husband was appointed
as a special administrator of the estate. Meanwhile the private respondent remained in possession
of the lot in question.
Subsequently, the petitioner became the successful bidder and vendee of the deceaseds
subdivision. In its effort to clear the subdivision of its squatters and occupants, the petitioner
caused the publication of several notices advising the occupants to vacate their respective
premises, otherwise, court action with damages would follow. The private respondent was one of
the many occupants who refused to vacate the lots they were occupying, such that petitioner filed
an action in court to recover said lot. The RTC and the CA dismissed the petitioner's action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is within the capacity of the husband of the deceased to dispose of the lot.
RULING:
No it is not, the decision appealed from is reversed and set aside. According to Art. 136 and 137
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, (136) The wife retains the ownership of the paraphernal
property, and (137) The wife shall have the administration of the paraphernal property, unless
she delivers the same to the husband by means of a public instrument empowering him to
administer it. In this case, the public instrument shall be recorded in the Registry of Property. As
for the movables, the husband shall give adequate security. There is nothing in the records that
shows that Don Vicente Legarda was the administrator of the paraphernal properties of Dona
Clara Tambunting during the lifetime of the latter. The sale between Don Vicente Legarda and
the private respondent is void ab initio, the former being neither an owner nor administrator of
the subject property. After the appointment of Don Vicente Legarda as administrator of the estate
of Dona Clara Tambunting, he should have applied before the probate court for authority to sell
the disputed property in favor of the private respondent. If the probate court approved the
request, then Don Vicente Legarda would have been able to execute a valid deed of sale in favor
of the respondent. Unfortunately, there was no effort on the part of the administrator to comply
with the rule of procedure nor on that of the respondent to protect his interests or to pay the
balance of the installments to the court appointed administrator.

244. ONG V. COURT OF APPEALS

204 SCRA 297
FACTS:
That on November 16, 1961, Ramon Ong filed a complaint against defendants Arsenio Camino
as Deputy Sheriff and Francisco Boix, to annul the auction sale of a parcel of land, allegedly
conjugal property with Teodora Ong.
That the plaintiffs wife conducted her own logging business. In furtherance of the business
operation, she secured from Boix a loan. Unfortunately, because of mismanagement, Teodora
defaulted in her obligation. This prompted Boix to file a complaint, based on the promissory
notes executed by Teodora to collect the sum legally due plus interest against Teodora and
Ramon, the latter being joined as husband of the former, defendant spouses were declared in
default.
Petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals to annul the auction sale allegedly irregularly
executed on the following grounds: that the property was conjugal and thus could not be held
liable for personal debts contracted by the wife and that there was no valid publication thus,
making the auction sale void.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property forms part of the conjugal property and be subjected to execution.
RULING:
The mere use of the surname of the husband in the tax declaration of the subject property is not
sufficient proof that said property was acquired during the marriage and is therefore, conjugal. It
is undisputed that the subject parcel was declared in the name of the spouses.
Furthermore, even assuming for the sake of argument that the property disputed is conjugal, the
same may still be held liable for the debts of the wife in this case. It is clear for the records that
the wife was engaged in the logging business with the husbands knowledge and apparently
without any objection on his part.

247. CASTRO V. MIAT

397 SCRA 271
FACTS:
Spouses Moises and Concordia Miat bought two (2) parcels of land during their coverture, one at
Paraaque and the other in Paco, Manila. Moises and Concordia bought the Paco property on
installment basis on May 17, 1977. On April 30, 1978, Concordia died. It was only on December
14, 1984 that Moises was able to pay its balance. He secured the title over the property in his
name as a widower. While at Dubai, United Arab Emirates, Moises agreed that the Paraaque
and Paco properties would be given to their two children, Romeo and Alexander. However, when
Moises returned in 1984, he renegotiated the agreement with Romeo and Alexander. He wanted
the Paraaque property for himself but would leave the Paco property to his two sons. Ceferino
Miat, brother of petitioner Moises, testified that even before the death of Concordia there was
already an agreement that the Paco property would go to Romeo and Alexander. This was
reiterated at the deathbed of Concordia. When Moises returned to Manila for good, the
agreement was reiterated in front of the extended Miat family members.
Romeo and Alexander lived on the Paco property. In early August 1985, Alexander and his first
wife left the house for personal reasons. In April 1988, Alexander agreed to sell to Romeo his
share in the Paco property for P42,750.00. He received a partial payment of P6,000.00 from
Romeo. Nonetheless, he never executed a deed of assignment in favor of Romeo. Later, Moises
ran into financial difficulties and he mortgaged for P30,000.00 the Paco property to the parents
of petitioner Virgilio Castro. He informed Romeo and Alexander that he would be forced to sell
the Paco property if they would not redeem the mortgage. On December 16, 1988, Romeo
received a letter from petitioner Castros lawyer asking for a conference. Romeo was informed
that the Paco property had been sold to Castro by Moises by virtue of a deed of sale dated
December 5, 1988 for ninety-five thousand (P95,000.00) pesos.
These events precipitated the case at bar. Romeo filed an action to nullify the sale between
Moises and the Castro spouses; to compel Moises and Alexander to execute a deed of
conveyance or assignment of the Paco property to him upon payment of the balance of its agreed
price; and to make them pay damages. The RTC granted the petition, and the CA affirmed the
nullification of the deed of sale.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Paco property is conjugal or capital
RULING:
Article 153(1) of the New Civil Code provides that properties acquired by onerous title during
the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership,
or for only one of the spouses are part of the conjugal partnership property. The records show
that the Paco property was acquired by onerous title during the marriage out of the common
fund. It is clearly conjugal property. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property
of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it

pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. This article does not require proof that the
property was acquired with funds of the partnership. The presumption applies even when the
manner in which the property was acquired does not appear.
The appellate court also correctly held that the petitioners-spouses Castro were not buyers in
good faith. A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property and pays a full and fair price for it
at the time of the purchase or before any notice of some other persons claim on or interest in it.
The rule is settled that a buyer of real property, which is in the possession of persons other than
the seller, must be wary and should investigate the rights of those in possession. Otherwise,
without such inquiry, the buyer can hardly be regarded as buyer in good faith.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.

250. AYALA INVESTMENT V. CA

G.R. No. 118305
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50,300,000 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment
and Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching made himself jointly
answerable to the debt as added security. Upon PBMs failure to pay the loan, AIDC filed a case
for sum of money against PBM and respondent Ching in the CFI of Pasig.
After trial, the court rendered decision in favor of AIDC ordering PBM and Alfredo Ching to
jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount of the loan with interests. Pending the
appeal of the judgment, RTC issued a writ of execution and thereafter, the deputy sheriff caused
the issuance and service upon respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on three of their
conjugal properties.
Respondent spouses then filed an injunction contending that subject loan did not redound to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. Nevertheless, a certificate of sale was issued to AIDC, being
the only bidder for the property.
ISSUE:
Whether the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is considered for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership.
RULING:
No. Petition is DENIED.
The loan obtained by the husband from AIDC was for the benefit of PBM and not for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership of Ching.
PBM has a personality which is distinct from that of Chings family despite their being
stockholders of the said company. The debt incurred by Ching is a corporate debt and the right of
recourse to respondent as surety is only to the extent of his corporate stocks.
If the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a
surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the
context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the
surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract
of surety or accommodation agreement, it is for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Proof
must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.
251. DOMINGO V. REED

G.R. No. 157701

FACTS:
[Respondent] Guillermo Reed was an overseas contract worker from 1978 to 1986 and came
home only for short vacations. He purchased from the Government Service Insurance System
[GSIS] on installment basis a 166 square meter property located at MRR Road, Mangahan,
Pasig. Because he was working abroad, it was his wife, Lolita Reed, who paid the consideration
to the GSIS. On July 9, 1986, TCT No. 58195 covering said property was issued by the Registry
of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, Metro Manila District II in the name of Lolita Reed, married
to Guillermo Reed. Guillermo Reed had allowed his brother, Dominador, and the latters wife,
Luz, to stay in the house constructed on his property.
In December, 1991, Dominador and Luz Reed were summoned to the barangay in connection
with the complaint for ejectment filed against them by Eduardo Quiteves, who claimed to be the
owner of the lot where their house stands. Dominador and Luz informed Guillermo of the
complaint filed against them. Guillermo accompanied Dominador and Luz to the barangay,
where they met Eduardo Quiteves and Alberta Domingo, who both claimed ownership of the
subject property. Guillermo denied having sold his property.
In view of the claims of Eduardo Quiteves and Alberta Domingo that they bought the subject
property, Guillermo Reed made a verification with the Register of Deeds of Pasig. Guillermo
discovered that his title over the subject property had been cancelled and he was able to secure
copies of certain documents. On March 8, 1994, Guillermo Reed filed a complaint for
reconveyance of property against herein petitioners. He alleged that that made it appear that he
authorized his wife to sell the subject property by conspiring in the causing the preparation of a
special power of attorney which in fact, he did not even sign nor did he appear before the notary
public because he was working abroad. Herein petitioners alleged good faith on their part.
Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of herein petitioners. Court of Appeals reversed RTCs
decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lolita Reed is justified in effecting a sale of their property without her husbands
consent.
RULING:
No. In addition to the fact that her rights over the property were merely inchoate prior to the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership, there was absolutely no proof to her allegations that she
used the proceeds of the sale to purchase necessities for the maintenance and support of the
family. Having failed to establish any of these circumstances, she may not unilaterally bind the
conjugal assets.
Additionally, the Civil Code provisions she cited pertain to what the conjugal partnership is
liable for. They do not specifically refer to whether the actual transactions entered into by either

spouse can validly bind the conjugal partnership. The issues addressed by this Court in this case
involve the essential formalities determining the validity of contracts entered into by either the
husband or the wife for and on behalf of the partnership.

253. CARLOS VS. ABELARDO

GR No. 146504
FACTS:
Honorio Carlos filed a petition against Manuel Abelardo, his son-in-law for recovery of the
$25,000 loan used to purchase a house and lot located at Paranaque. It was in October 1989
when the petitioner issued a check worth as such to assist the spouses in conducting their married
life independently. The seller of the property acknowledged receipt of the full payment. In July
1991, the petitioner inquired from spouses status of the amount loaned from him, the spouses
pleaded that they were not yet in position to make a definite settlement. Thereafter, respondent
expressed violent resistance to the extent of making various death threats against petitioner. In
1994, petitioner made a formal demand but the spouses failed to comply with the obligation.
The spouses were separated in fact for more than a year prior the filing of the complaint hence
spouses filed separate answers. Abelardo contended that the amount was never intended as a
loan but his share of income on contracts obtained by him in the construction firm and that the
petitoner could have easily deducted the debt from his share in the profits. RTC decision was in
favor of the petitioner, however CA reversed and set aside trial courts decision for insufficiency
of evidence. Evidently, there was a check issued worth $25,000 paid to the owner of the
Paranaque property which became the conjugal dwelling of the spouses. The wife executed an
instrument acknowledging the loan but Abelardo did not sign.
ISSUE: WON a loan obtained to purchase the conjugal dwelling can be charged against the
conjugal partnership.
RULING:
Yes, as it has redounded to the benefit of the family. They did not deny that the same served as
their conjugal home thus benefiting the family. Hence, the spouses are jointly and severally
liable in the payment of the loan. Abelardos contention that it is not a loan rather a profit share
in the construction firm is untenable since there was no proof that he was part of the stockholders
that will entitle him to the profits and income of the company.
Hence, the petition was granted and Abelardo is ordered to pay the petitioner in the amount of
$25,000 plus legal interest including moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

254. BA FINANCE CORPORATION V. CA, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-61464
FACTS:
Respondent secured a loan from the petitioner as evidenced by a promissory note he signed in his
own behalf and as representative of the A & L Industries. He presented an alleged SPA executed
by his wife who manages A & L Industries and under whose name the said business is registered,
despite the fact that respondent had already left his respondent wife and their children. When the
obligation became due and demandable, respondent failed to pay the same. The petitioner then
filed a complaint against the respondents praying for the issuance of a writ of attachment
alleging that the said spouses were guilty of fraud in contracting the debt upon which the action
was brought. The trial court issued the writ of attachment prayed for thereby enabling the
petitioner to attach the properties of A & L Industries.
Respondent wife filed a counterclaim alleging that although respondent husband and she are
husband and wife, the former had abandoned her and their children 5 months before the filing of
the complaint; that they were already separated when the promissory note was executed; that her
signature in the SPA was forged because she had never authorized him in any capacity to transact
any business for and in behalf of A & L Industries, which is owned by her as a single proprietor,
that she never got a single centavo from the proceeds of the loan mentioned in the promissory
note; and that as a result of the illegal attachment of her properties, which constituted the assets
of the A & L Industries, the latter closed its business and was taken over by the new owner. After
the trial, the RTC ruled in favor of the respondent, which the CA subsequently affirmed, thus this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not A & L Industries forms part of the conjugal partnership of the spouses and thus,
could be held liable for the obligations contracted by husband respondent, as administrator of the
partnership.
RULING:
Yes it is, the decision of the CA was reversed and set aside. There is no dispute that A & L
Industries was established during the marriage of Augusta and Lily Yulo and therefore the same
is presumed conjugal and the fact that it was registered in the name of only one of the spouses
does not destroy its conjugal nature. However, for the said property to be held liable, the
obligation contracted by the husband must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership under Article 161 of the Civil Code. In the present case, the obligation which the
petitioner is seeking to enforce against the conjugal property managed by the respondent wife
was undoubtedly contracted by respondent husband for his own benefit because at the time he
incurred the obligation he had already abandoned his family and had left their conjugal home.
Worse, he made it appear that he was duly authorized by his wife in behalf of A & L Industries,
to procure such loan from the petitioner. Clearly, to make A & L Industries liable now for the said
loan would be unjust and contrary to the express provision of the Civil Code. Thus, the petitioner
cannot enforce the obligation contracted by respondent husband against his conjugal properties
with respondent wife. Thus, it follows that the writ of attachment cannot issue against the said
properties.

255. JOHNSON & JOHNSON VS. COURT OF APPEALS

262 SCRA 298
FACTS:
On July 1, 1975, Augusto Yulo secured a loan from petitioner amounting to P591,003.59,
evidenced by a promissory note he signed as representative of their business. Augusto presented
to the petitioner a special power of attorney executed by his wife Lily, manager and registered
owner of the said business, authorizing Augusto to process the loan. Two months prior to the
loaning, Augusto already left their conjugal house, living separately with his wife. On October 7,
1975, petitioner filed a complaint against the spouses on the basis of the promissory note also
that the spouses are guilty of fraud. Petitioner alleged that they entered a contract, Deed of
Assignment in the corporations favor, that all rights, titles and interests over a construction
contract between the spouses and a certain corporation. However, the spouse failed to do so.
Instead, the proceeds went to the respondents.
The trial court issued the writ of attachment prayed for thereby, enabling the petitioner to attach
the properties of A&L Industries. The petitioner filed another motion for the examination of the
attachment debtor, alleging that the properties attached by the sheriff were not sufficient of any
judgment that may be recovered by it in the case. Lily on her counterclaim, said that she no
longer lives with Augusto, that she did not sign any special power of attorney, her signature
forged and that she never got a single centavo from the loan procured by Augusto. The trial court
rendered its decision in favor of the respondents herein. The case was brought to the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the decision of, reducing the costs to be prayed by the respondents.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the decision of the honorable trial court exonerating defendant
husband, private respondent herein from the obligation contracted by the wife in the
pursuit of her business also absolves the conjugal partnership form liability?
2. Whether or not the trial court denying private respondents third-party claim and
motion to quash levy on execution in effect amended the courts decision?
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that the decision of the trial court is final and executory. Thus, it
affirmed the lower courts decision when it charged defendant Delilah Vinluan alone to pay the
plaintiff corporation, having already declared that the defendant-husband cannot be held legally
liable for his wifes obligation. Perhaps, when it was later discovered that the defendant Delilah
Vinluan did not have sufficient property of her own to settle their obligation, the conjugal
properties of the defendant spouses became the object of levy. But in order to bind the conjugal
partnership and its properties, the New Civil Code provides that the debts and obligations
contracted by the husband or the wifes must be for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and
that the husband must consent to his wifes engaging in business. However, in this case, the

husband did not give his consent neither did the obligation redounded to the benefit of the
family. Hence, the conjugal partnership as well as the defendant cannot be held liable.
The trial court cannot in the guise of deciding the third party claim reverse its final decision. A
judgment which has acquired finality becomes immutable and untenable and hence may no
longer he modified in any respect except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes. And a sheriff
is not authorized to attack or levy on property not belonging to the judgment debtor. Wherefore
the petition is denied.

259. SPOUSES GUIANG V. COURT OF APPEAL

G.R. 125172
FACTS:
On February 14, 1983, the couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz, with plaintiff-wife Gilda Corpuz as
vendee, bought a lot from Manuel Callejo. On April 22, 1988, the couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz
sold one-half portion of their lot to the defendants-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. The
latter have since then occupied the one-half portion [and] built their house thereon. In the
absence of his wife Gilda Corpuz, defendant Judie Corpuz sold the remaining one-half portion of
the lot. The respondent filed for the nullity of the sale between her husband and the petitioners.
The court of appeals affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale of the conjugal property without the consent of the wife is valid.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the sale was void as it was done without the wifes consent.
Adopting the trial courts ruling, the Supreme Court said that Article 173 of the New Civil Code
provided that the wife may within 10 years from the transaction ask for the annulment of the
sale, but this law was not carried over in the Family Code. Hence, the alienation or encumbrance
made after August 3, 1988 is void if it is without the consent of the other spouse.
The sale cannot be even be the subject of an amicable settlement because void contract cannot be
ratified.
The Supreme Court further held that the amicable settlement before the barangay authorities
cannot be a continuing offer. It reasoned out by saying that after the sale, the petitioners filed a
complaint for trespassing against private respondent after which the barangay authorities secured
an amicable settlement and petitioners filed a motion for execution with the MTC. The
settlement did not mention a continuing offer to sell the property or an acceptance of such a
continuing offer. Its tenor was to the effect that private respondent would vacate the property.

257. ALFREDO vs BORRAS

GR. NO. 144225
FACTS:
a. Subject Land = Parcel of Land situated in Brgy. Culis, Mabiga, Hermosa, Bataan
b. Spouses Alfredo owned the parcel of land.
The Alfredo Spouses mortgaged the subject land to the DBP for P7,000.00, and in order to pay
their debt, the Alfredo Spouses sold the subject land to the Borras Spouses for P15,000.00. The
Borras pay the loan and its interest and the balance is to be paid by the Alfredos, and they
(Alfredos) delivered the Owner's Duplicate Copy of OCT No. 284 to them (Borras).
Later, Borras discovered that the the Alfredos had re-sold portiions of the land to several persons.
Borras filed an adverse claim with the Register of Deeds of Bataan, and later did they knew that
the Alfredos had secured a duplicate copy of OCT No. 284, the tax declaration and the receipts of
the reality. Alfredos filed a complaint for Specific Performance, they claimed the sale, not being
in writing, is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the contract of sale is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds.
2. Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale over the portion of the Subject Land issued to the
subsequent buyers, purchaser of good faith.
RULING:
1. No, the Statute of Frauds provides that a contract of sale of real property shall be
unenforceable unless the contract or some note or memorandum of the sale is in writing and
sebscribed by the party charged or by his agent. The existence of the receipt dated 11 March
1970, which is a memorandum of the sale, removes the transaction from the provisions of the
Statute of Frauds.
2. No, The Subsequent Buyers were deemed to have constructive notice of the adverse claim of
Borras. When the subsequent buyers purchased portions of the subject land, they were also not
registrants in good faith.

258. JARDELEZA V. JARDELEZA

347 S 10
FACTS:
Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him in comatose. Gilda, wife of the latter,
filed a petition in RTC Iloilo to be allowed as sole administrator of their conjugal property and be
authorized to sell the same as her husband is physically incapacitated to discharge his functions.
She further contest that such illness of the husband necessitated expenses that would require her
to sell their property in Lot 4291 and its improvement to meet such necessities. RTC ruled in
favor of Gilda contending that such decision is pursuant to Article 124 of Family Code and that
the proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on summary proceedings.
The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the petition
made by her mother was essentially a petition for guardianship of the person and properties of
his father. As such it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on summary
proceedings instead it should follows the ruled governing special proceedings in the Revised
Rules of Court requiring procedural due process particularly the need for notice and a hearing on
the merits. He further reiterated that Chapter 2 of the Family Code comes under the heading on
Separation in Fact between Husband and Wife contemplating a situation where both spouses
are of disposing mind. Hence, he argued that this should not be applied in their case.
During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her daughter and son in law.
Upon the appeal by Teodoro, CA reversed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gilda as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke, a cerebrovascular accident
rendering him comatose, without motor and mental faculties, may assume sole powers of
administration of the conjugal property and dispose a parcel of land with improvements
RULING:
Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to
both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy which must be availed of within five years
from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which
must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction
shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person,
and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.

Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as such administrator of the conjugal
property must observe the procedure for the sale of the wards estate required of judicial
guardians under Rule 95, 1964 Revised Rules of Court, not the summary judicial proceedings
under the Family Code.
In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the procedure under the Revised Rules of
Court. Indeed, the trial court did not even observe the requirements of the summary judicial
proceedings under the Family Code. Thus, the trial court did not serve notice of the petition to
the incapacitated spouse; it did not require him to show cause why the petition should not be
granted.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.

261. RELUCIO V. LOPEZ

GR No. 138497
FACTS:

On 1993, private respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez filed a petition for APPOINTMENT AS
SOLE ADMINISTRATRIX OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES,
FORFEITURE, ETC., against defendant Alberto Lopez and petitioner Imelda Relucio. In the
petition, private-respondent alleged that sometime in 1968, defendant Lopez, who is legally
married to the private respondent, abandoned the latter and their four legitimate children; that he
arrogated unto himself full and exclusive control and administration of the conjugal properties,
spending and using the same for his sole gain and benefit to the total exclusion of the private
respondent and their four children; that defendant Lopez, after abandoning his family, maintained
an illicit relationship and cohabited with herein petitioner since 1976.
In order to avoid defendant Lopez obligations as a father and husband, he excluded the private
respondent and their four children from sharing or benefiting from the conjugal properties and
the income or fruits there from. As such, defendant Lopez either did not place them in his name
or otherwise removed, transferred, stashed away or concealed them from the private-respondent.
He placed substantial portions of these conjugal properties in the name of petitioner Relucio.
It was also averred that in the past twenty five years since defendant Lopez abandoned the
private-respondent, he has sold, disposed of, alienated, transferred, assigned, canceled, removed
or stashed away properties, assets and income belonging to the conjugal partnership with the
private-respondent and either spent the proceeds thereof for his sole benefit and that of petitioner
Relucio and their two illegitimate children or permanently and fraudulently placed them beyond
the reach of the private-respondent and their four children.
RTC resolved in favor of defendant Alberto Lopez.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents petition for appointment as sole administratrix of the conjugal
property, accounting, etc. against her husband Alberto J. Lopez established a cause of action
against petitioner.
RULING:
The petition was granted.
The Court held that the first cause of action is for judicial appointment of respondent as
administratrix of the conjugal partnership or absolute community property arising from her
marriage to Alberto J. Lopez. Petitioner is a complete stranger to this cause of action. Article 128
of the Family Code refers only to spouses, to wit:
If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to
the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of
property, or for authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership property xxx

As the Court explains, a real party in interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment of the suit. In this case, petitioner would not be affected by any judgment in the
proceeding.
If petitioner is not a real party in interest, she cannot be an indispensable party. An indispensable
party is one without whom there can be no final determination of an action. Petitioners
participation in Special Proceedings M-3630 is not indispensable. Certainly, the trial court can
issue a judgment ordering Alberto J. Lopez to make an accounting of his conjugal partnership
with respondent, and give support to respondent and their children, and dissolve Alberto J. Lopez
conjugal partnership with respondent, and forfeit Alberto J. Lopez share in property co-owned by
him and petitioner. Such judgment would be perfectly valid and enforceable against Alberto J.
Lopez.

262. HEIRS OF IGNACIA AGUILAR-REYES vs. SPOUSES CIPRIANO MIJARES and

FLORENTINA MIJARES
G.R. No. 143826
FACTS:
In 1960, Vicente Reyes married Ignacia Aguilar but they had been separated de facto in1974.
One of their conjugal properties is Lot No. 4349 B-2 and the apartment built thereon. Thesaid lot
was registered in the name of Spouses Vicente Reyes and Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes.Vicente Reyes
filed a petition for administration and appointment of guardian with theMTC. In the said petition,
he misrepresented that his wife, Ignacia, died on March 12, 1982 andthat he and their minor
children were her only heirs. The court appointed Vicente as guardian oftheir minor children and
subsequently authorized Vicente to sell the estate of Ignacia. On March 1,1983, respondent
Spouses Cipriano and Florentina Mijares bought Lot No. 4349-B-2 for P110,000. Asa
consequence of which, the certificate of title in the name of Vicente and Ignacia Agilar-Reyes
wascancelled and a new title was issued in the name of respondent-spoues. These circumstances
werediscovered by Ignacia sometime in 1984.Ignacia then sent a letter to respondent-spouses
demanding the return of her share inthe lot. Failing to settle the matter amicably, Ignacia
instituted a complaint for annulment of saleagainst respondent-spouses and Vicente was included
as one of the defendants. In their answer, respondents claimed that they are purchasers in good
faith and that the sale was valid because thesame was duly approved by the court.After trial on
the merits, the court a quo rendered a decision declaring the sale of Lot No.4349-B-2 void with
respect to the share of Ignacia. A motion for modification of the decision wasfiled by Ignacia
praying that the sale be declared void in its entirety and that the respondents beordered to
reimburse the rentals collected on the apartments. The trial court granted the motion for
modification. Both Ignacia and respondent-spouses appealed to the Court of Appeals. Pending
theappeal, Ignacia died and was substituted by her compulsory heirs. The appellate court
reversed the decision of the court a quo, ruling that, notwithstanding the absence of Iganacias
consent to the sale, the same must be held valid in favor of respondent-spouses because they
were innocent purchasers for value.
ISSUES:
1. What is the status of the sale of Lot No. 4349-B-2 to respondent-spouses?
2. Would the sale, if voidable, be annulled in its entirety?
3. Were respondent-spouses purchasers in good faith?
RULING:
1.
VOIDABLE. Pursuant to the foregoing provisions (Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil
Code),the husband could not alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the
consent,express or implied, of the wife otherwise, the contract is voidable. Indeed, in several
cases the Court had ruled that such alienation or encumbrance by the husband is void. The better
view,however, is to consider the transaction as merely voidable and not void. This is consistent
withArticle 173 of the Civil Code pursuant to which the wife could, during the marriage and
within 10years from the questioned transaction, seek its annulment.In Spouses Guiang v. Court
of Appeals, the Court quoted with approval the ruling of thetrial court that under the Civil Code,
the encumbrance or alienation of a conjugal real property bythe husband absent the wife's

consent, is voidable and not void. Thus . . . Under Article 166 of the Civil Code, the husband
cannot generally alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the
wife's consent. The alienation or encumbrance if so made however is not null and void. It is
merely voidable. The offended wifemay bring an action to annul the said alienation or
encumbrance.In the case at bar, there is no dispute that Lot No. 4349-B-2, is a conjugal property
havingbeen purchased using the conjugal funds of the spouses during the subsistence of their
marriage. It is beyond cavil therefore that the sale of said lot to respondent spouses without the
knowledge and consent of Ignacia is voidable. Her action to annul the March 1, 1983 sale which
was filed on June 4, 1986, before her demise is perfectly within the 10 year prescriptive period
under Article 173 of the Civil Code. Even if we reckon the period from November 25, 1978
which was the date when Vicente and the respondent spouses entered into a contract concerning
Lot No. 4349-B-2, Ignacia's action would still be within the prescribed period.2.
2.
Yes. The trial court correctly annulled the voidable sale of Lot No. 4349-B-2 in its
entirety. In Bucoy v. Paulino, a case involving the annulment of sale with assumption of
mortgages executed by the husband without the consent of the wife, it was held that the
alienation or encumbrance must be annulled in its entirety and not only insofar as the share of the
wife in the conjugal property is concerned. Although the transaction in the said case was declared
void and not merely voidable, the rationale for the annulment of the whole transaction is the
same thus The plain meaning attached to the plain language of the law is that the contract, in
its entirety, executed by the husband without the wife's consent, may be annulled by the wife.
Had Congress intended to limit such annulment in so far as the contract shall "prejudice" the
wife, such limitation should have been spelled out in the statute. It is not the legitimate concern
of this Court to recast the law. As Mr. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes of this Court and Judge Ricardo C.
Puno of the Court of First Instance correctly stated, "the rule in the first sentence of Article 173
revokes Baellovs. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 213 and Coque vs. Navas Sioca, 45 Phil. 430," in which
cases annulment was held to refer only to the extent of the one-half interest of the wife.The
necessity to strike down the contract of July 5, 1963 as a whole, not merely as to the share of the
wife, is not without its basis in the common-sense rule. To be underscored here is that upon the
provisions of Articles 161, 162 and 163 of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for
many obligations while the conjugal partnership exists. Not only that. The conjugal property
iseven subject to the payment of debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, as those
forthe payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon them after the responsibilities in Article
161have been covered (Article 163, par. 3), if it turns out that the spouse who is bound
thereby,"should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient." These are
considerations that gobeyond the mere equitable share of the wife in the property. These are
reasons enough for the husband to be stopped from disposing of the conjugal property without
the consent of the wife.Even more fundamental is the fact that the nullity is decreed by the Code
not on the basis of prejudice but lack of consent of an indispensable party to the contract under
Article 166.3.
3.
No. The Court finds that respondent spouses are not purchasers in good faith. A purchaser
in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other person has a
right to, or interest in, such property and pays full and fair price for the same, at the time of such
purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property.
He buys the property with the belief that the person from whom he receives the thing was the

owner and could convey title to the property. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which
should put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith.

263. PEREZ V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 118870
FACTS:
Ray Perez is a doctor practicing in Cebu while Nerissa, his wife, (petitioner) is a registered
nurse. After six miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, Nerissa finally gave
birth to Ray Perez II in New York on July 20, 1992. Ray stayed with her in the U.S. twice and
took care of her when she became pregnant. Unlike his wife, however, he had only a tourist visa
and was not employed.
On January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only Nerissa
returned to the U.S. She alleged that they came home only for a five-week vacation and that they
all had round-trip tickets. However, her husband stayed behind to take care of his sick mother
and promised to follow her with the baby. According to Ray, they had agreed to reside
permanently in the Philippines but once Nerissa was in New York, she changed her mind and
continued working. She was supposed to come back immediately after winding up her affairs
there.
When Nerissa came home a few days before Ray IIs first birthday, the couple was no longer on
good terms. They had quarrels. Nerissa did not want to live near her in-laws and rely solely on
her husbands meager income of P5,000.00. On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here, where
he could raise his son even as he practiced his profession. He maintained that it would not be
difficult to live here since they have their own home and a car. Despite mediation by the priest,
the couple failed to reconcile.
Nerissa filed a petition to surrender the custody of their son to her. The trial court issued an Order
awarding custody to Nerissa citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code
which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless
the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. Upon appeal by Ray Perez, the Court of
Appeals reversed the trial courts order and held that granting custody to the boys father would
be for the childs best interest and welfare.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nerissa has rightful custody of a child?
RULING:
Yes. Aside from Article 213 of the Family Code, the Revised Rules of Court also contains a
similar provision. Rule 99, Section 6 (Adoption and Custody of Minors) provides: SEC. 6.
Proceedings as to child whose parents are separated.Appeal. - When husband and wife are
divorced or living separately and apart from each other, and the questions as to the care, custody,
and control of a child or children of their marriage is brought before a Court of First Instance by
petition or as an incident to any other proceeding, the court, upon hearing the testimony as may
be pertinent, shall award the care, custody, and control of each such child as will be for its best
interest, permitting the child to choose which parent it prefers to live with if it be over ten years

of age, unless the parent chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by reason of moral depravity,
habitual drunkenness, incapacity, or poverty x x x. No child under seven years of age shall be
separated from its mother, unless the court finds there are compelling reasons therefor.
The provisions of law quoted above clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age shall
not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
The use of the word shall in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Section 6 of the
Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character.
The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother
finds its reason in the basic need of a child for his mothers loving care. Only the most
compelling of reasons shall justify the courts awarding the custody of such a child to someone
other than his mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the past the
following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and
parental authority: neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness,
drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a communicable disease.
It has long been settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare
and best interest of the child. In fact, no less than an international instrument, the Convention on
the Rights of the Child provides: In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative
bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
In the case, financial capacity is not a determinative factor inasmuch as both parties have
demonstrated that they have ample means. Nerissas present work schedule is not so
unmanageable as to deprive her of quality time with her son. Quite a number of working mothers
who are away from home for longer periods of time are still able to raise a family well, applying
time management principles judiciously. Also, delegating child care temporarily to qualified
persons who run day-care centers does not detract from being a good mother, as long as the latter
exercises supervision, for even in our culture, children are often brought up by housemaids under
the eagle eyes of the mother.
Although Rays is a general practitioner, the records show that he maintains a clinic, works for
several companies on retainer basis and teaches part-time. He cannot possibly give the love and
care that a mother gives to his child.

264. In Re: BERNAS

G.R. Nos. 133583-85
FACTS:
For automatic review are decisions promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Libmanan,
Camarines Sur finding appellant Roberto Bernas y Nacario guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
three counts of rape of her two minor daughters. When first arraigned on the charges, appellant,
with the assistance of his counsel, pleaded not guilty. When the case was submitted for decision,
the prosecution moved to reopen the case to present the Birth Certificate of the victims as well as
the Marriage contract of the parents. This motion was granted over the objection of the defense
counsel. Before the prosecution presented its evidence, appellant, through his counsel, moved for
the change of his former plea of not guilty to that of guilty, a Motion which the RTC granted.
Appellant was thus rearraigned and pleaded guilty to the charges. The defense waived its right to
present evidence and submitted them for decision based on the evidence presented by the
prosecution. The RTC then rendered the assailed decisions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conviction of the accused was proper.
RULING:
NO. The Constitution guarantees the right of every person accused in a criminal prosecution to
be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. This right finds amplification and
implementation in the different provisions of the Rules of Court. Foremost among these enabling
provisions is the office of an Information. The facts stated in the body of the Information
determine the crime that the accused stands charged and for which he must be tried. This recital
of the essentials of a crime delineates the nature and cause of accusation against an accused.
Other than the allegation of carnal knowledge, no other element of rape as defined by law is
alleged in the Information. Since the Information fails to allege the essential elements of
qualified rape, appellant should not have been convicted of that crime. Otherwise, his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him would be
violated

265. LACSON V. LACSON

G.R. No. L-23482
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent are a married couple with our children. Respondent left the conjugal
home and filed a complaint against petitioner in the JDRC for custody of all their children as
well as support for them and herself. However, both parties were able to reach an amicable
settlement. After, they filed a joint petition with the CFI for the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership and a judicial separation of property. The CFI issued an order rendering judgement
approving and incorporating in toto their compromise agreement. After, the petitioner delivered
all 4 children to the respondent and remitted money for their support.
Later, the respondent spouse filed three motions in the JDRC, the first a motion wherein she
alleged that she entered into and signed the Joint Petition as the only means by which she could
have immediate custody of the minor children who are all below the age of 7, and thereafter
prayed that she be considered relieved of the agreement pertaining to the custody and visitation
of her minor children and that since all the children are now in her custody, the said custody in
her favor be confirmed pendente lite. The petitioner opposed the motion. The JDRC dismissed
the case. The second, a motion for reconsideration of the compromise judgment which the CFI
denied. Both appeals were certified by the CA to the SC since the issues revolve around a
question of law. The third, a certiorari proceeding before the CA, respondent averring that the
CFI committed grave abuse of discretion and acted in excess of jurisdiction in ordering the
immediate execution of the compromise judgment in its order, thus in effect depriving her of the
right to appeal. The CA granted this petition. Thus this consolidated petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the compromise agreement entered into by the parties and the judgment of the CFI
grounded on the said agreement, are conformable to law.
RULING:
It is. The compromise agreement and the judgment of the CFI grounded on the said agreement
are valid with respect to the separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership. The law allows separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of
their conjugal partnership provided judicial sanction is secured beforehand. Thus the new Civil
Code provides, In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the
separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of
a judicial order. In the case at bar, the spouses obtained judicial imprimatur of their separation
of property and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership. It does not appeal that they have
creditors who will be prejudiced by the said arrangements. It is likewise undisputed that the
couple have been separated in fact for at least five years - the wife's residence being in Manila,
and the husband's in the conjugal home in Bacolod City. Therefore, inasmuch as a lengthy
separation has supervened between them, the propriety of severing their financial and proprietary
interests is manifest. However, in so approving the regime of separation of property of the
spouses and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership, this Court does not thereby accord
recognition to nor legalize the de facto separation of the spouses.

266. MAXEY V. COURT OF APPEALS

129 S 187
FACTS:
Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales lived together as husband and wife in Banganga, Davao;
out of said union were born six (6) children, among them are the herein plaintiffs. During the
period of their cohabitation, or in 1911 and 1912, respectively, the late Melbourne Maxey
acquired the parcels of land which is in dispute. After the death of Regina Morales, Melbourne
Maxey, through his attorney-in-fact Julia Pamatluan Maxey, sold in favor of the defendantsspouses in 1953 the parcels of land under litigation which fact of sale was not controverted by
the parties. Since then, the defendants-spouses have taken immediate possession thereof.
Plaintiffs instituted the case on January 26, 1962, praying for the annulment of the documents of
sale covering the subject parcels of land and to recover possession thereof with damages from
the defendants-spouses, alleging, among others, that the aforesaid realties were common
properties of their parents, having been acquired during their lifetime and through their joint
effort and capital; and that the sales of the said lands in favor of the defendants-spouses in 1953,
after the death of their mother, Regina Morales, was executed by their father, Melbourne Maxey,
without their knowledge and consent; and that they came to know of the above mentioned sales
only in 1961. The defendants claim that the property is not a conjugal property but is owned
absolutely by Melbourne because it was through his efforts alone that said properties were
acquired and so, the sale of such property without the consent of the plaintiffs were not needed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contribution of spouses in acquiring a property must be an actual joint
contribution in order for such property to be considered a conjugal property.
RULING:
The Court held that the real contribution to the acquisition of property must include not only the
earnings of a woman from a profession, occupation, or business but also her contribution to the
family's material and spiritual goods through caring for the children, administering the
household, husbanding scarce resources, freeing her husband from household tasks, and
otherwise performing the traditional duties of a housewife. Regina being the wife and faithfully
performing her duty as a good wife and mother is therefore deemed to have contributed to the
acquisition of such properties, and hence the children being the heirs of their mother has the right
over the said properties in litigation. The disputed properties were owned in common by
Melbourne Maxey and the estate of his late wife, Regina Morales, when they were sold.
Technically speaking, the petitioners should return one-half of the P1,300.00 purchase price of
the land while the private respondents should pay some form of rentals for their use of one-half
of the properties.

267. VALDES VS RTC

260 SCRA 221
FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez
filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual
psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while
the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in unions without marriage. During the hearing on the
motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during
the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who
did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed
thereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.

268. DINO V. DINO

G.R. No. 178044
FACTS:
Alain M. Dio and Ma. Caridad L. Dio were childhood friends and sweethearts. They started
living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent
decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel
Aguilar of Las Pias City. Petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
against respondent. Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the
time of the filing of the petition, was already living in the United States of America. Despite
receipt of the summons, respondent did not file an answer to the petition within the reglementary
period. Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her
marriage with petitioner, which was granted by the Superior Court of California on 25 May
2001. Petitioner also learned that on 5 October 2001, respondent married a certain Manuel V.
Alcantara. The Office of the Las Pias prosecutor found that there were no indicative facts of
collusion between the parties and the case was set for trial on the merits. Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr.
Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report establishing that respondent was
suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was deeply ingrained in her system since
her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that respondent's disorder was long-lasting and by
nature, incurable. In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the
ground that respondent was psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential marital
obligations at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court made mistake when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties'
properties.
RULING:
Yes, petitioner's marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code
and not under Article 40 or 45. What governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by
petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. The property relations of parties in a
void marriage during the period of cohabitation are governed either by Article 147 or Article 148
of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be
liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Partition may be made
by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. It is not necessary to liquidate the
properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.

269. GONZALES V. GONZALES

478 S 327
FACTS:
After two years of living together, Francisco Gonzales and Erminda Gonzales got married in
1979. Four children were born from this union. During the time they lived together, they
acquired properties, and Erminda managed their pizza business.
In 1992, she filed for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage based on Mario's alleged
psychological incapacity, and for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains. During the
time they lived together, they acquired properties. She managed their pizza business and worked
hard for its development. Mario denied she was the one who managed the pizza business and
claimed that he exclusively owns the properties "existing during their marriage."
In 1997 the trial court rendered its decision declaring the marriage void ab initio, and ordered the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains and divide the conjugal properties between
Francisco and Erminda. Not satisfied with the manner their properties were divided, Francisco
appealed to the CA, which in turn affirmed the trial court decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the properties should be divided equally between the parties
RULING:
Article 147 creates a presumption that properties acquired during the cohabitation of the parties
have been acquired through their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by them in
equal shares. It further provides that a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the
other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof
if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
While it is true that all the properties were bought from the proceeds of the pizza business,
petitioner himself testified that respondent was not a plain housewife and that she helped him in
managing the business.
It appeared that before they started living together, petitioner offered respondent to be his partner
in his pizza business and to take over its operations. Respondent started managing the business in
1976. Her job was to: (1) take care of the daily operations of the business; (2) manage the
personnel; and (3) meet people during inspection and supervision of outlets. She reported for
work every day, even on Saturdays and Sundays, without receiving any salary or allowance.
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.

270. FLORA vs. PRADO, ET. AL.

G.R. No. 156879
FACTS:
The property under litigation is the northern half portion of a residential Quezon City and
covered by TCT No. 71344 issued in the name of Narcisa Prado and her children by her first
husband, Patricio Prado, Sr., namely, Roberto, Erlinda, Daniel, Gloria, Patricio, Jr. and Edna,
respondents herein. After the death of Patricio Prado, Sr., Narcisa married Bonifacio Calpatura.
In order to support her minor children with her first husband, Narcisa and her brother-in-law,
TomasCalpatura, Sr., executed an Agreement of Purchase and Sale whereby the former agreed to
sell tithe latter the northern half portion of the property for the sum of P10, 500. A Deed of
Absolute Sale was subsequently executed by the parties.In 1976, Tomas' daughter, Flordeliza
Calpatura Flora, built a two-storey duplex withfirewall on the northern half portion of the
property. Respondents, who occupied the southern half portion of the land, did not object to the
construction. Flordeliza Flora paid the corresponding taxes on the property. Likewise, Maximo
Capture, the son of Tomas' cousin, built a small house on the northern portion of the property. On
April 8, 1991, respondents filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of sale and delivery of
possession of the northern half portion of the subject property against petitioners Flordeliza
Calpatura Flora, Dominador Calpatura and Tomas Calpatura, Jr. before the RTC.Respondents
alleged that the transaction embodied in the Agreement to Purchase and Sale between Narcisa
and Tomas was one of mortgage and not of sale; that Narcisa's children tried to redeem the
mortgaged property but they learned that the blank document which their mother had signed was
transformed into a Deed of Absolute Sale; that Narcisa could not have sold the northern half
portion of the property considering that she was prohibited from selling the same within period
of 25 years from its acquisition, pursuant to the condition annotated at the back of the title; that
Narcisa, as natural guardian of her children, had no authority to sell the northern half portion of
the property which she and her children co-owned; and that only P5,000.00 out of the
consideration of P10,500.00 was paid by Tomas. In their answer, petitioners countered among
others, that Narcisa owned 9/14 of the property, consisting of as her share in the conjugal
partnership with her first husband and 1/7 ashier share in the estate of her deceased husband; and
that the consideration of the sale in the amount of P10, 500 had been fully paid as of April 1,
1968.On April 2, 1997, the RTC dismissed the complaint. It found that the sale was valid; that
the Agreement to Purchase and Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale were duly executed; and that
the sum of P10, 500.00 as selling price for the subject property was fully paid there being no
demand for the payment of the remaining balance. The CA affirmed the RTCs decision with the
modification the sale in dispute is declared valid only with respect to the one-seventh (1/7) share
of plaintiff-Narcisa Prado in the subject property. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Is the subject property conjugal or paraphernal?
2. Was the transaction a sale or a mortgage?
3. How should the property be divided among the heirs of Patricio Prado, Sr.?

RULING:
1. CONJUGAL. Article 160 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time the sale was
entered into, provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Proof of
acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non in order for the presumption in favor
of conjugal ownership to operate. In the instant case, while Narcisa testified during crossexamination that she bought the subject property from People's Home site Housing Corporation
with her own funds, she, however admitted in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and the Deed
of Absolute Sale that the property was her conjugal share with her first husband, Patricio, Sr.
2. SALE. Public or notarial documents may be presented in evidence without further proof, the
certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or
document involved. In order to contradict the presumption of regularity of a public document,
evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant. It is well-settled that in
civil cases, the party that alleges a fact has the burden of provingit. Except for the bare allegation
that the transaction was one of mortgage and not of sale, respondents failed to adduce evidence
in support thereof. Respondents also failed to controvert the presumption that private
transactions have been fair and regular. Furthermore, Narcisa, in fact did not deny that she
executed an Affidavit allowing spouses Wilfredo and Flordeliza Flora to construct a firewall
between the two-storey duplex and her house sometime in 1976. While the deed of sale between
Tomas and Narcisa was never registered nor annotated on the title, respondents had knowledge
of the possession of petitioners of the northern half portion of the property.

272. TUMLOS V. SPOUSES FERNANDEZ

GR No. 137650
FACTS:
On July 5, 1996, the said spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment
building located at ARTE SUBDIVISION III, Lawang Bato, Valenzuela, Metro Manila; that
through tolerance they had allowed Guillerma, petitioner, Toto and Gina Tumlos to occupy the
apartment building for the last seven (7) years, since 1989, without the payment of any rent; that
it was agreed upon that after a few months, defendant Guillerma Tumlos will pay P1,600.00 a
month while the other promised to pay P1,000.00 a month, both as rental, which agreement was
not complied with by the said defendants.
She averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of action against her, since she is a
co-owner of the subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that
she is a co-vendee of the property in question together with Mario Fernandez.
Mario Fernandez and Guillerma had an amorous relationship, and that they acquired the property
in question as their love nest. It was further alleged that they lived together in the said apartment
building with their two (2) children for around ten (10) years, and that Guillerma administered
the property by collecting rentals from the lessees of the other apartments, until she discovered
that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Guillerma Tumlos is the co-owner of the property by virtue of
cohabiting with Mario Fernandez who is legally married to Lourdez Fernandez.
RULING:
In the present case Article 148 of the family Code shall apply. Article 148 states that In cases of
cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule
and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall
accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage.
Guillerma Tumlos fail to present an evidence of her actual contribution to the purchase of the
property. In Article 148 did not include also administration of the property as contribution, it is
unsubstantiated.

273. MALANG V. MOSON

G.R. No. 119064

FACTS:
Hadji Abdula Malang, a Muslim, contracted marriage with Aida (Kenanday) Limba. They begot
three sons named Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis, Hadji Ismael Malindatu and Datulna, and a
daughter named Lawanbai. Hadji Abdula and Aida already had two children when he married for
the second time another Muslim named Jubaida Kado in Kalumamis. No child was born out of
Hadji Abdulas second marriage. When Aida, the first wife, was pregnant with their fourth child,
Hadji Abdula divorced her. In 1965, Hadji Abdula married another Muslim, Nayo H. Omar but
they were childless. Thereafter, Hadji Abdula contracted marriage with Hadji Mabai (Mabay) H.
Adziz in Kalumamis, Talayan, Maguindanao and soon they had a daughter named Fatima
(Kueng). Not long after, Hadji Abdula married three other Muslim women named Saaga,
Mayumbai and Sabai but he eventually divorced them. Hadji Abdula then migrated to Tambunan
where, in 1972, he married petitioner Neng Kagui Kadiguia Malang, his fourth wife, excluding
the wives he had divorced. They established residence in Cotabato City but they were childless.
On December 18, 1993, while he was living with petitioner in Cotabato City, Hadji Abdula died
without leaving a will. On January 21, 1994, petitioner filed with the Sharia District Court in
Cotabato City a petition for the settlement of his estate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is the Civil Code will govern the property relations of Muslim marriages
celebrated before the Muslim Code.
RULING:
Yes. In keeping with our holding that the validity of the marriages in the instant case is
determined by the Civil Code, we hold that it is the same Code that determines and governs the
property relations of the marriages in this case, for the reason that at the time of the celebration
of the marriages in question the Civil Code was the only law on marriage relations, including
property relations between spouses, whether Muslim or non-Muslim. Inasmuch as the Family
Code makes substantial amendments to the Civil Code provisions on property relations, some of
its provisions are also material, particularly to property acquired from and after August 3, 1988.
Which law would govern depends upon: (1) when the marriages took place; (2) whether the
parties lived together as husband and wife; and (3) when and how the subject properties were
acquired.
Article 148 of the Family Code allows for co-ownership in cases of cohabitation where, for
instance, one party has a pre-existing valid marriage, provided that the parties prove their actual
joint contribution of money, property, or industry and only to the extent of their proportionate
interest therein. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding
shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit. If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share
in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in
such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or
her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.

274. METROBANK V. PASCUAL

G.R. NO. 163744
FACTS:

275. JOSEFINA C. FRANCISCO vs. MASTER IRON WORKS

G.R. No. 151967
FACTS:
On January 15, 1983, Eduardo and Josefina Francisco got married. On August 31, 1984, Josefina
purchased two parcels of lands. The Registry of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of title in the
name of Josefina Castillo Francisco married to Eduardo G. Francisco. On January 13, 1986,
Josefina mortgaged the said property to Leonila Cando. It appears that Eduardo affixed his
marital conformity to the deed.
On June 11, 1990, Eduardo bought 7,500 bags of cement from Master Iron Works and
Construction Corporation (MIWCC) but failed to pay the same. The court issued writ of
execution levying the two parcel of land as for payment to MIWCC.
On July 3, 1994, Josefina executed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim over the two parcel of land
in which she claimed that they were her paraphernal property, and that her husband had no
proprietary right or interest over them as evidenced by his affidavit of waiver, a copy of which
she attached to her affidavit.
Before she could commence presenting her evidence against MIWCC, Josefina filed a petition to
annul her marriage to Eduardo in the RTC of Paraaque, on the ground that when they were
married on January 15, 1983, Eduardo was already married to one Carmelita Carpio.
On September 9, 1996, the RTC of Paraaque rendered judgment, declaring the marriage
between Josefina and Eduardo as null and void for being bigamous.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject properties were paraphernal property of Josefina and cannot be held
liable for the Eduardos personal obligations.
RULING:
No. The subject properties are not the paraphernal property of Josefina and can be held to answer
the liabilities of Eduardo.
Even though Eduardo and Josefinas marriage is bigamous, the properties cannot be held
conjugal, Josefina failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that she contributed money,
property or industry in the acquisition of the subject property and hence, is not a co-owner of
such. Also, the Court doubted that when she acquired the property at 23 years of age, she had
enough funds to pay for it. Her claim that the funds for the property were provided by her
mother and sister, the Court believed, was just an afterthought.

276. FRENZEL V. CATITO

G.R. No. 143958

FACTS:
Petitioner is an Australian citizen, working as a pilot with the New Guinea Airlines. He married
Teresita Santos, a Filipino citizen but, they eventually separated without obtaining a divorce.
Petitioner then met respondent, also a Filipina, who was married to one Klaus Muller. Petitioner
was so enamored with respondent that he persuaded her to stop working, return to the
Philippines, and engage in a wholesome business of her own, financed by petitioner, which
respondent agreed to. Not only this but, he was so enamored that he financed her business and
eventually bought her a house and lot, opened joint bank accounts, and bought other properties,
all registered in her name, and others entrusted to respondents relatives through an SPA.
Petitioner did so with the idea that he will eventually jointly own such properties when he
marries respondent.
When petitioner was then unable to divorce with her husband, petitioner filed three complaint to
separate RTC branches, generally for recovery of real and personal properties. In one complaint,
the RTC ruled in favor of respondent, not allowing the recovery of three parcels of land. When
the CA affirmed the decision, the petitioner instituted this case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to recovery of the properties purchased with his money.
RULING:
He is not, the petition is dismissed. Other than the fact that the actions of the petitioner are
unconstitutional, the petitioners claim that he acquired the subject properties because of his
desire to marry the respondent, believing that both of them would thereafter jointly own the said
properties, cannot benefit him. The respondent was herself married to Klaus Muller, a German
citizen. Thus, the petitioner and the respondent could not lawfully join in wedlock. The evidence
on record shows that the petitioner in fact knew of the respondents marriage to another man, but
nonetheless purchased the subject properties under the name of the respondent and paid the
purchase prices therefor.
The petitioner cannot find solace in Article 1416 of the New Civil Code which reads, When the
agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited, and the prohibition by the law is
designed for the protection of the plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby enhanced, recover
what he has paid or delivered. The provision applies only to those contracts which are merely
prohibited, in order to benefit private interests. It does not apply to contracts void ab initio. The
sales of three parcels of land in favor of the petitioner who is a foreigner is illegal per se. The
transactions are void ab initio because they were entered into in violation of the Constitution.
Thus, to allow the petitioner to recover the properties or the money used in the purchase of the
parcels of land would be subversive of public policy. Neither may the petitioner find solace on
Article 22 of the New Civil Code which reads, Every person who through an act of performance
by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of
the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. This provision does not apply
if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the pari
delicto doctrine.

277. JOAQUINO V. REYES

G.R. No. 154645
FACTS:
In the marriage between Lourdes Reyes and the deceased husband Rodolfo Reyes, Rodolfo has
an illicit relationship with Milagros Joaquino. The deceased allegedly "put into custody" some of
the couple's conjugal properties to Milagros.
On July 12,1979, there is a transfer of property in favor of the petitioner and for which Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 90293 of the Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District IV was issued
in the name of petitioner Milagros B. Joaquino. The complainant alleges that that the funds used
to purchase the property were conjugal funds and earnings of the deceased.
The complaint finally alleges that the deceased had two cars in petitioners possession and that
the real and personal properties in petitioners possession are conjugal partnership properties of
the spouses Lourdes P. Reyes and Rodolfo A. Reyes and one-half belongs exclusively to
respondent Lourdes P. Reyes and the other half to the estate of Rodolfo A. Reyes to be
apportioned among the other respondents as his forced heirs. Respondents therefore, pray that
the property covered by T.C.T. No. 90293 be declared conjugal property of the spouses Lourdes
P. Reyes and Rodolfo A. Reyes and that petitioner be ordered to reconvey the property in
respondents favor; that the two cars in petitioners possession be delivered to respondents and
that petitioner be made to pay actual, compensatory and moral damages to respondents as well as
attorneys fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the common law relationship between Milagros Joaquino and the deceases
validates her claim of ownership.
RULING:
No. Under Article 145 of the Civil Code, a conjugal partnership of gains (CPG) is created upon
marriage and lasts until the legal union is dissolved by death, annulment, legal separation or
judicial separation of property. Conjugal properties are by law owned in common by the husband
and wife. As to what constitutes such properties are laid out in Article 153 of the Code, which we
quote:
"(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the
common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the
spouses;
(2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work, or as salary of the spouses, or of
either of them;
(3) The fruits, rents or interests received or due during the marriage, coming from the
common property or from the exclusive property of each spouse."

Moreover, under Article 160 of the Code, all properties of the marriage, unless proven to pertain
to the husband or the wife exclusively, are presumed to belong to the CPG. For the rebuttable
presumption to arise, however, the properties must first be proven to have been acquired during
the existence of the marriage.
In default of Article 144 of the Civil Code, Article 148 of the Family Code has been applied.
Thus, when a common-law couple has a legal impediment to marriage, only the property
acquired by them -- through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry -- shall
be owned by them in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Milagros
likewise failed to prove that she was indeed financially capable of purchasing the house and lot,
that she actually contributed to the payments, and that she was employed any time after 1961
when the property was purchased. The Certification and Affidavits stating that she borrowed
money from her siblings and had earnings from a jewelry business were also deemed to have no
probative values, they were not cross-examined by the respondents.

279. SAGUID VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 150611
FACTS:
Gina S. Rey was married, but separated de facto from her husband, when she cohabited
with petitioner Jacinto Saguid in Marinduque, in July 1987 in a house built on a lot owned by
Jacintos father. In 1996, the couple decided to separate. On January 9, 1997, respondent filed a
complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership against the
petitioner. She alleged that from her salary as entertainer in Japan, she was able to contribute
P70,000.00 in the completion of their unfinished house. She also acquired and accumulated
appliances, pieces of furniture and household effects, with a total value of P111,375.00. She
prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these personal properties and that the amount of
P70,000.00, representing her contribution to the construction of their house, be reimbursed to
her. Moreover, she deposited part of her earnings in her savings account her Pass Book shows
that as of May 23, 1995, she had a balance of P21,046.08. She further stated that she had a total
of P35,465.00 share in the joint account deposit which she and the petitioner maintained. Gina
declared that said deposits were spent for the purchase of construction materials, appliances and
other personal properties.
On the other hand, the petitioner claimed that the expenses for the construction of their house
were defrayed solely from his income as a captain of their fishing vessel. From his income in the
fishing business, he claimed to have saved a total of P130,000.00, P75,000.00 of which was
placed in a joint account deposit with private respondent. This savings, according to petitioner
was spent in purchasing the disputed personal properties.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the Gina S. Rey. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision except that the award of moral damages was deleted for lack of basis.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts decision as to the extent
of the contribution of Gina and vesting sole ownership and making her the exclusive owner of
the personal properties.
RULING:
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts decision as to the extent of the
contribution of Gina and vesting sole ownership and making her the exclusive owner of the
personal properties. Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other because the
former was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their
property regime therefore is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to
bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage,
relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of
the same married man. Under this regime, ". . .only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in

common in proportion to their respective contributions ..." Proof of actual contribution is

required.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the
pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. The plaintiff is not automatically
entitled to the relief prayed for. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court is convinced
that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief. Decision affirmed with modification.
Private respondent Gina S. Rey was declared co-owner of petitioner Jacinto Saguid in the
controverted house to the extent of P11,413.00 and personal properties to the extent of
P55,687.50. Petitioner was ordered to reimburse the amount of P67,100.50 to private
respondent, failing which the house shall be sold at public auction to satisfy private respondents
claim.

280. JUANIZA V. JOSE

89 SCRA 306
FACTS:
In November 23, 1967, the defendant Jose, registered owner and operator of a passenger jeepney,
involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of the Philippine National Railways
which resulted in the death to seven (7) and physical injuries to five (5) of its passengers. At that
time the defendant is legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with Rosalia
Arroyo for sixteen years. The court charged the defendant and Rosalia Arroyo for damages.
Motion for reconsideration was filed by Rosalia praying that the decision be reconsidered insofar
as it condemns her to pay damages jointly and severally with her co-defendant, but was denied.
The lower court based her liability on the provision of Article 144 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rosalia can be held jointly and severally liable for damages with Eugenio
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil Code
requires that the man and the woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to
contract marriage. Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos, there is an
impediment for him to contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo. Under the provision of the Civil
Code, Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. The jeepney belongs to the conjugal
partnership of Jose and his legal wife. There is therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo for
damages arising from the death of, and physical injuries suffered by, the passengers of the
jeepney, which figured in the collision.
Rosalia Arroyo, who is not the registered owner of the jeepney can neither be liable for damages
caused by its operation. It is settled in our jurisprudence that only the registered owner of a
public service vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to
its operation, or maybe caused to any of the passengers therein.
The Supreme Court in its decision declared Rosalia Arroyo free from any liability for damages
and the appealed decision is hereby modified accordingly.

281. ADRIANO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 124118

FACTS:
On October 29, 1933, Lucio Adriano married Gliceria Dorado; they had three children, namely,
Celestina, Manolo, and Aida, private respondents in this case. On or before 1942, Lucio and
Gliceria separated. The latter settled in Laguna where she died. After their separation Lucio
cohabited with Vicenta Villa and subsequently five months after the death of Gliceria, Lucio
married Vicenta with whom he had eight children; All were petitioners except to Jose Vergel due
to his death before the inception of the proceedings. In 1972 the spouses separated.
On October 10, 1980, Lucio executed his last will and testament disposing of all his properties,
and assigning, among others his second wife Vicenta and all his children by first and second
marriages as devisees and legatees therein. The properties bequeathed in the will were a 45,000
sq. m. lot and the residential house, rice mill, warehouse and with all the equipment situated
thereon in Candelaria, Quezon. Said properties were disposed in the following manner: (1)
10,000-sq. m. of the disputed property, including the warehouse, rice mill, and equipment
situated thereon will belong to Lucios children by the first wife; (2) the remaining 35,000 sq. m.
will belong to Vicenta and his children by his second marriage, the herein petitioners; and (3) the
residential house also within the same property will belong to Lucios children by his first wife.
On February 11, 1981, Lucio died and Celestina Adriano, Lucios executrix, filed a petition for
the probate of the will immediately after the death and Vicenta opposed the said petition, but still
granted. Hence, the petitioner filed an action for the annulment of Lucio Adrianos will.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property bequeathed in the will of Lucio Adriano were conjugal property of
the latter and his second wife, Vicenta Villa-Adriano.
RULING:
The properties, which were under this issue, belong to the conjugal property of Lucio and
Gliceria. Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that a man and woman living together as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage must not in any way be incapacitated to marry.
Considering that the property was acquired in 1964, or while Lucios marriage with Gloria
subsisted, such property is presumed to be conjugal unless it will be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Because it was clearly supported that the properties
was in fact purchased by Lucio with proceeds of the conjugal fund from his first marriage.

283.MODEQUILLO V. SALINAS
GR No 86355

FACTS:
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur on
July 1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land located at
Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao del Sur also registered in the latters name. A motion to
quash was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential land is where the family home is
built since 1969 prior the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in Article
155 thereof, and that the judgment sought to be enforced against the family home is not one of
those enumerated. With regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of the
public land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a
member of a cultural minority. The residential house in the present case became a family home
by operation of law under Article 153.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property is deemed to be a family home.
RULING:
The petitioners contention that petitioner and his family should consider it a family home from
the time it was occupied in 1969 is not well taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it
provides that the provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing family residences insofar as
said provisions are applicable. It does not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall have a retroactive
effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family
homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt
from the execution for payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Code. The
said article simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the
Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the Family Code. The debt and liability, which was the basis of
the judgment, was incurred prior the effectivity of the Family Code. This does not fall under the
exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code.

284. SPOUSES FORTALEZA vs. SPOUSES RAUL LAPITAN and LAPITAN

G.R. No. 178288
FACTS:
Spouses Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza obtained a loan from spouses Rolando and Amparo Lapitan
(creditors). As security, spouses Fortaleza executed on January 28, 1998 a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over their residential house and lot situated in Barrio Anos, Municipality of Los Baos,
Laguna (subject property). When spouses Fortaleza failed to pay the indebtedness including the
interests and penalties, the creditors applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the Real Estate
Mortgage before the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Calamba City. The
public auction sale was set on May 9, 2001.
At the sale, the creditors son Dr. Raul Lapitan and his wife Rona emerged as the highest bidders.
Then, they were issued a Certificate of Salethat was registered with the Registry of Deeds of
Calamba City. The one-year redemption period expired without the spouses Fortaleza redeeming
the mortgage. Thus, spouses Lapitan executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership on
November 20, 2003 and the registration of the subject property in their names on February 4,
2004. Despite the foregoing, the spouses Fortaleza refused spouses Lapitans formal demandto
vacate and surrender possession of the subject property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Honorable court of appeals gravely erred in not holding that the petitioners
were prevented by the respondent from exercising their right of redemption over the foreclosed
property by demanding a redemption over the foreclosed property by demanding a redemption
price of a highly equitable and more than double the amount of the foreclosed property,
especially that the foreclosed mortgaged property is the family home of petitioners and their
children.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that Article 155(3) of the Family Code explicitly allows the forced sale
of a family home "for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such
constitution." In this case, there is no doubt that spouses Fortaleza voluntarily executed on
January 28, 1998 a deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property, which was even
notarized by their original counsel of record. And assuming that the property is exempt from
forced sale, spouses Fortaleza did not set up and prove to the Sheriff such exemption from forced
sale before it was sold at the public auction.

286. ALBINO JOSEF vs. OTELIO SANTOS

G.R. No. 165060
FACTS:
In Civil Case No. 95-110-MK, Petitioner Albino Josef was the defendant, which is a case for
collection of sum of money filed by herein respondent Otelio Santos, who claimed that petitioner
failed to pay the shoe materials which he bought on credit from respondent on various dates in
1994. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City found petitioner liable to respondent.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial courts decision in Toto.
Petitioner filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari, but it was dismissed in a
Resolution dated February 18, 2002. The Judgment became final and executory on May 21,
2002.
A writ of execution was issued on August 20, 2003and enforced on August 21, 2003. On August
29, 2003, certain personal properties subjects of the writ of execution were auctioned off.
Thereafter, a real property located at Marikina City was sold by way of public auction to fully
satisfy the judgment credit.
On November 5, 2003, petitioner filed an original petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, questioning the sheriffs levy and sale of the abovementioned personal and real
properties. Petitioner claimed that the personal properties did not belong to him but to his
children; and that the real property was his family home thus exempt from execution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the levy and sale of the personal belongings of the petitioners children as well as
the attachment and sale on public auction of his family home to satisfy the judgment award in
favor of respondent is legal.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family, a
sacred symbol of family love and repository of cherished memories that last during ones
lifetime. It is the sanctuary of that union which the law declares and protects as a sacred
institution; and likewise a shelter for the fruits of that union. It is where both can seek refuge and
strengthen the tie that binds them together and which ultimately forms the moral fabric of our
nation. The protection of the family home is just as necessary in the preservation of the family as
a basic social institution, and since no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family
shall be recognized or given effect, the trial courts failure to observe the proper procedures to
determine the veracity of petitioners allegations, is unjustified.
The same is true with respect to personal properties levied upon and sold at auction. Despite
petitioners allegations in his Opposition, the trial court did not make an effort to determine the
nature of the same, whether the items were exempt from execution or not, or whether they
belonged to petitioner or to someone else.

287. KELLEY, ET AL. V. PLANTERS PRODUCTS, ET AL.

G.R. No. 172263
FACTS:
Respondent filed an action for sum of money against petitioner in the RTC after petitioner was
unable to pay back the consignment made by the former. Pursuant thereto, respondent sheriff
sold on execution real property of the petitioner. A certificate of sale was issued in favor of
respondent as the highest bidder.
After being belatedly informed of the said sale, petitioners filed a motion to dissolve or set aside
the notice of levy in the RTC on the ground that the subject property was their family home
which was exempt from execution. Petitioners motion was denied for failure to comply with the
three-day notice requirement. Subsequently, petitioners filed a complaint for declaration of
nullity of levy and sale of the alleged family home with damages against respondents in the RTC.
The case was dismissed by the RTC and the CA, thus the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a family home is exempt form execution.
RULING:
Yes it is, however, the case is remanded to the RTC to determine whether or not the
property in contest is a duly constituted family home. No doubt, a family home is generally
exempt from execution provided it was duly constituted as such. Under the Family Code, there is
no need to constitute the family home judicially or extra-judicially. All family homes constructed
after the effectivity of the Family Code are constituted as such by operation of law. The rule,
however, is not absolute. The Family Code, in fact, expressly provides for the following
exceptions. Thus the petition is granted only to the extent of allowing petitioners to adduce
evidence in the trial court that the property is in fact their family home as constituted in
accordance with the requirements of law.

288. GOMEZ V. STA-INES

G.R. No. 132537
FACTS:
Purificacion dela Cruz Gomez (deceased), mother of Mary Josephine C. Gomez and Eugenia
Socorro C. Gomez-Salcedo, entrusted rice land in Nueva Vizcaya to Marietta dela Cruz Sta. Ines.
Josephine and Socorro demanded for an accounting of the produce of said rice lands while under
the management of Marietta and for the return of the Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) of the
property.
Trial court rendered judgment against Marietta and ordered her to deliver the owners copy of the
TCT and pay damages. In order to satisfy damages, a writ of execution was issued, by virtue
of which, a parcel of land in Nueva Vizcaya registered in Mariettas name was sold at a public
auction wherein Josephine was the highest bidder. Mariettas husband, Hinahon together with
their children, filed a complaint for the annulment of the sale before the RTC of Nueva Vizcaya
on the ground that said house and lot sold during the public auction is their family residence and
is thus exempt from execution under Article 155 of the Family Code. Respondents assert that the
house and lot was constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their family home from the
time they occupied it in 1972
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property can be sold.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that under article 155 of the Family Code, the family home shall be
exempt from execution, forced sale, or attachment, except for, among other things, debts
incurred prior to the constitution of the family home. While the respondent contends that the
house and lot was constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their family home in 1972, it is
not deemed constituted as such at the time Marietta incurred her debts.
Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed constituted as the family home only upon the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. The complaint against Marietta was instituted
in 1986 to for acts committed as early as 1977, thus, her liability arose years before the levied
property was constituted as the family home in 1988. The liability incurred by Marietta falls
within the exception provided for in Article 155 of the Family Code: debts incurred prior to the
constitution of the family home.

289. MANACOP vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 97898

FACTS:
Petitioner Florante F. Manacopand his wife Eulaceli purchased on March 10, 1972 a residential
lot with a bungalow, in consideration of P75,000.00.On March 17, 1986, Private Respondent E &
L Merchantile, Inc. filed a complaint against petitioner and F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc.
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila to collect an indebtedness of
P3,359,218.45. Instead of filing an answer, petitioner and his company entered into a
compromise agreement with private respondent, the salient portion of which provides: That
defendants will undertake to pay the amount of P2,000,000.00 as and when their means permit,
but expeditiously as possible as their collectibles will be collected. On April 20, 1986, the trial
court rendered judgment approving the aforementioned compromise agreement. It enjoined the
parties to comply with the agreement in good faith. On July 15, 1986, private respondent filed a
motion for execution which the lower court granted. However, execution of the judgment was
delayed. Eventually, the sheriff levied on several vehicles and other personal properties of
petitioner. In partial satisfaction of the judgment debt, these chattels were sold at public auction
for which certificates of sale were correspondingly issued by the sheriff.
On August 1, 1989, petitioner and his company filed a motion to quash the alias writs of
execution and to stop the sheriff from continuing to enforce them on the ground that the
judgment was not yet executory. They alleged that the compromise agreement had not yet
matured, as there was no showing that they had the means to pay the indebtedness or that their
receivables had in fact been collected.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the final and executory decision promulgated and a writ of execution issued
before the effectivity of the Family Code can be executed on a family home constituted under the
provisions of the said Code.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted
on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to
constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family
actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the
creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to
the spouses or head of the family who owns the home.
Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows: Art. 155. The family home shall be
exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except: (1) For nonpayment of taxes; (2) For
debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home; (3) For debts secured by mortgages
on the premises before or after such constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborer, mechanics,
architects, builders, material men and others who have rendered service or furnished material for
the construction of the building. The exemption provided, as aforestated is effective from the
time of the constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries

actually resides therein. In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not
constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It
became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is
deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988
not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988
being a leap year).

290. TANEO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

304 SCRA 308
FACTS:
As a result of a judgment in a civil case in favor of private respondent Abdon Gilig, two of
petitioners properties were levied to satisfy the judgment valued at about P5,000, one was a
parcel of land and the other was the Family home. The subject properties were sold at a public
auction to private respondent as the highest bidder consequently, after petitioner failure to
redeem the same, a final deed of conveyance was executed on February 9, 1968 selling,
transfering and conveying said properties to private respondent.
Petitioner filed a civil case to declare the deed of conveyance void to quiet title over the land
with a prayer of a writ of preliminary injunction. They alleged in their complaint that they are the
children and heirs of the deceased Pablo Taneo (+1977) and Narcisa Valaceras (1984). Upon
their death they left the subject property. Considering that the said property has been acquired
through free patent, and property is therefore inalienable and not subject to any encumbrances
for the payment of a debt, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No 141. On Feb. 9, 1968, Deputy
Provincial Sheriff Jose Yacay issued a Sheriff Deed of conveyance in favor of private respondent
over the subject property including their family home which was extra judicially constituted in
accordance with law. As a result, private respondent was able to obtain in his name over the land.
The RTC dismissed the complaint by the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the
decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the family home is exempt from execution.
RULING:
On March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo constituted the house in question, erected on the land of Plutarco
Vacalares, a family home. The instrument constituting the family home was registered on Jan.
24, 1966. Thus at the time when the debt was incurred, the family home was not yet constituted
or registered. Clearly the petitioner alleged as constituted by their father is not exempt as it falls
under the exemption of Art. 243, paragraph 2 which provides some provisions for debts incurred
before the declaration was recorded in the registry of property.
Moreover, the constitution of the family home by Pablo Taneo is even doubtful considering that
such constitution did no comply with the requirements of the law. The trial court found that the
house was erected on the land which the Taneos owned but on the land of Vacalares. By the very
definition of the law that the family home is the dwelling house under a person and his family
resides and the land on which it is situated, not on a land belonging to another. Apparently, the
constitution of a family home by Pablo Taneo in the instant case was merely an afterthought in
order to escape execution of their property but to no avail. Petition was denied.
291. GUERRERO V. RTC

229 S 274
FACTS:
Gaudencio Guerrero and Pedro Hernando are brothers in law, their respective wives being
sisters. Filed by petitioner as an accion publicana against private respondent, this case assumed
another dimension when it was dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground that the parties
being brother-in-law the complaint should have alleged that earnest efforts were first exerted
towards a compromise. On 11 December 1992, Guerrero moved to reconsider the 7 December
1992 Order claiming that since brothers by affinity are not members of the same family, he was
not required to exert efforts towards a compromise. Guerrero likewise argued that Hernando was
precluded from raising this issue since he did not file a motion to dismiss nor assert the same as
an affirmative defense in his answer.
ISSUE:
Whether brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family contemplated in the
Family Code, as well as under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of Court requiring earnest
efforts towards a compromise before a suit between them may be instituted and maintained
RULING:
The Constitution protects the sanctity of the family and endeavors to strengthen it as a basic
autonomous social institution. This is also embodied in Art. 149, and given flesh in Art. 151, of
the Family Code, which provides:
Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear
from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made,
but that the same had failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must
be dismissed.
Considering that Art. 151 herein-quoted starts with the negative word "No", the requirement is
mandatory that the complaint or petition, which must be verified, should allege that earnest
efforts towards a compromise have been made but that the same failed, so that "if it is shown that
no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed."
But the instant case presents no occasion for the application of the above-quoted provisions. The
Court already ruled in Gayon v. Gayon that the enumeration of "brothers and sisters" as members
of the same family does not comprehend "sisters-in-law". In that case, "sisters-in-law" (hence,
also "brothers-in-law") are not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as members of the
same family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code repeats essentially the same enumeration of
"members of the family", the Court finds no reason to alter existing jurisprudence on the matter.
Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling that petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of
private respondent Hernando, was required to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise before
filing the present suit.

The Supreme Court granted the petition and the appealed orders were reversed and set aside. The
Regional Trial Court was directed to continue with Civil Case with deliberate dispatch.

294. MARTINEZ VS MARTINEZ

GR No. 162084
FACTS:
Daniel Martinez Sr. and Natividad de Guzman-Martinez were the owners of a parcel of land.
The former executed a last will and testament directing the subdivision of the property into 3 lots
bequeathed to each of his sons namely Rodolfo, Manolo (designated as administrator of the
estate), and Daniel Jr. In October 1997, Daniel Sr. died. Rodolfo then found a deed of sale
purportedly signed by his father on September 1996 where it appears that the land was sold to
Manolo and his wife Lucila and was also issued to them. Rodolfo filed a complaint against his
brother Manolo and sister-in-law Lucila for the annulment of the deed of sale and cancellation of
the TCT. Spouses wrote Rodolfo demanding him to vacate the property which the latter ignored
and refused to do so. This prompted the spouses to file a complaint for unlawful detainer against
Rodolfo. This matter was referred to the barangay for conciliation and settlement but none was
reached. It was alleged in the position paper of the spouses that earnest efforts toward a
compromise had been made but the same proved futile.
ISSUE:
Whether spouses Martinez complied with the requirements of Art 151 of the Family Code.
RULING:
No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but the same have
failed.
Lucila Martinez, the respondents sister-in-law was one of the plaintiffs in the case at bar. The
petitioner is not a member of the same family as that of her deceased husband and the
respondent. Her relationship with the respondent is not one of those enumerated in Article 150.
It should also be noted that the petitioners were able to comply with the requirements of Article
151 because they alleged in their complaint that they had initiated a proceeding against the
respondent for unlawful detainer in the katarungan Pambarangay in compliance with PD 1508
and that after due proceedings, no amicable settlement was arrived at resulting in the barangay
chairmans issuance of a certificate to file action.

295. SPOUSES HONTIVEROS vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

G.R. No. 125465
FACTS:
Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against private
respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson. The petitioners alleged that they are the
owners of a parcel of land in Capiz and that they were deprived of income from the land as a
result of the filing of the land registration case.
In the reply, private respondents denied that they were married and alleged that Gregorio was a
widower while Teodora was single. They also denied depriving petitioners of possession of and
income from the land. On the contrary, according to the private respondents, the possession of
the property in question had already been transferred to petitioners by virtue of the writ of
possession. Trial court denied petitioners motion that while in the amended complaint, they
alleged that earnest efforts towards a compromise were made, it was not verified as provided in
Article 151.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court can validly dismissed the complaint due to lack of efforts exerted
towards a compromise as stated in Article 151.
RULING:
No. Supreme Court held that the inclusion of private respondent Teodora Ayson as defendant and
Maria Hontiveros as petitioner take the case out of the scope of Article 151. Under this provision,
the phrase "members of the same family" refers to the husband and wife, parents and children,
ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether full or half-blood. Religious
relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effect in this jurisdiction.
Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who is described in the complaint as the spouse of
respondent Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of
petitioner Augusto Hontiveros, are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family.

297. UY V CHUA
G.R. No. 183965
FACTS:
Joanie Surposa Uy filed on 27 October 2003 before the RTC a Petition for the issuance of a
decree of illegitimate filiation against Jose Ngo Chua. Uy alleged that Chua who was then
married, had an illicit relationship with Irene Surposa. who was then married, had an illicit
relationship with Irene Surposa. Joanie denied that he had an illicit relationship with Irene, and
that petitioner was his daughter. Hearings then ensued during which petitioner testified that
respondent was the only father she knew; that he took care of all her needs until she finished her
college education; and that he came to visit her on special family occasions. She also presented
documentary evidence to prove her claim of illegitimate filiation.
Petitioner JOANIE SURPOSA UY declares, admits and acknowledges that there is no blood
relationship or filiation between petitioner and her brother Allan on one hand and [herein
respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA on the other. This declaration, admission or acknowledgement is
concurred with petitioners brother Allan, who although not a party to the case, hereby affixes
his signature to this pleading and also abides by the declaration herein. As a gesture of goodwill
and by way of settling petitioner and her brothers (Allan) civil, monetary and similar claims but
without admitting any liability, [respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA hereby binds himself to pay the
petitioner the sum of TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00) and another TWO MILLION
PESOS (P2,000,000.00) to her brother, ALLAN SURPOSA. Petitioner and her brother hereby
acknowledge to have received in full the said compromise amount. Petitioner and her brother
(Allan) hereby declare that they have absolutely no more claims, causes of action or demands
against [respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA, his heirs, successors and assigns and/or against the
estate of Catalino Chua, his heirs, successors and assigns and/or against all corporations,
companies or business enterprises including Cebu Liberty Lumber and Joe Lino Realty
Investment and Development Corporation where defendant JOSE NGO CHUA or CATALINO
NGO CHUA may have interest or participation. Chua hereby waives all counterclaim or counterdemand with respect to the subject matter of the present petition. Pursuant to the foregoing,
petitioner hereby asks for a judgment for the permanent dismissal with prejudice of the captioned
petition. [Respondent] also asks for a judgment permanently dismissing with prejudice his
counterclaim."
ISSUE:
Whether or not filiation can be the subject of judicial settlement?
RULING:
It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a child cannot be
compromised. Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a
child. Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially
established, and it is for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will
or agreement of the parties. Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement
dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests no rights

and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The void agreement cannot be
rendered operative even by the parties' alleged performance (partial or full) of their respective
prestations.

298. SANTOS V. CA, ET AL.

G.R. No. 134787
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent are siblings. Both parties and their other siblings executed a Basic
Agreement of Partition covering properties they inherited from their parents.
Subsequently, respondents filed suit with the CFI against petitioner and two other brothers, for
recovery of inheritance. Pending the cases resolution, the sibling heirs executed another
document, denominated Deed of Partition (With More Corrections). It indicated that the share of
the respondent was adjudicated to petitioner who, however, was obligated to pay respondent a
sum of money. Thus, respondents filed another complaint against petitioner for the recovery of
her share under new Deed of Partition. The cases were consolidated and was ruled in favor of the
respondent. In time, petitioner went to the IAC, now CA, where it affirmed the CFI decision but
reduced the award of moral damages. For some reason, however, the Guerreros did not pursue
execution of the judgment.
Six years after, respondents filed a complaint for revival of the decision rendered by the RTC.
The RTC dismissed the complaint, however during reconsideration, it reversed itself and ruled in
favor of the respondents. The CA dismissed the appeal, hence the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 222 of the New Civil Code in relation to Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court has no application to the case.
RULING:
It does not, the petition is dismissed. A lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper
bitterness than between strangers. Thus, the provision making honest efforts towards a settlement
a condition precedent for the maintenance of an action between members of the same family. As
it were, a complaint in ordinary civil actions involving members of the same family must contain
an allegation that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made pursuant to Article 222 of
the Civil Code, now pursuant to Article 151 of the Family Code. Otherwise, the complaint may
be dismissed under Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. Admittedly, the complaint filed
in this case contains no such allegation. But a complaint otherwise defective on that score may
be cured by the introduction of evidence effectively supplying the necessary averments of a
defective complaint.
Petitioner cannot plausibly look to Article 222 of the Civil Code to effectively dismiss the case. It
cannot be over-emphasized in this regard that the rationale of said provision is to obviate hatred
and passion in the family likely to be spawned by litigation between and among the members
thereof. The case, however, being merely an action for revival of judgment of a dormant decision
rendered in an original action, can hardly be the kind of suit contemplated in Article 222 of the
Code.

299. MENDOZA V. COURT OF APPEALS

19 S 756
FACTS:
Luisa de la Rosa Mendoza, the private respondent instituted a complaint against petitioner. She
averred that she was married to Cecilio Mendoza on 2 September 1953; that they lived together
as husband and wife until 14 July 1954, when the husband departed for the United States to
further his studies and practice his profession; that since then, defendant Mendoza "without
justifiable cause or reason deliberately abandoned and neglected plaintiff and despite repeated
demands by plaintiff, defendant has failed and refused, and still fails and refuses, to provide for
the maintenance and support of plaintiff, who is alleged to be pregnant, sickly and without any
source of revenue, while defendant (now petitioner) is employed in a hospital in the United
States, earning an average of $200.00 a month, besides being a part-owner of lands in Muoz,
Nueva Ecija, assessed at P32,330.00 in 1955.
Defendant Cecilio Mendoza moved for dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and
improper venue. The motion having been denied, he filed an answer with counterclaim, putting
in issue the validity of his marriage to plaintiff and plaintiff (now respondent) Luisa de la Rosa
duly replied. On 3 July 1961 defendant filed a second motion to dismiss, this time predicated on
the complaint's failure to state a cause of action, because it contained no allegation that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made before the filing of the suit, and invoking the
provisions of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386) that provides:
"ART. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it
should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have
failed, subject to the limitations in article 2035."
The Court of First Instance refused to entertain his second motion to dismiss, the defendant
petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to stop the
Court of First Instance from further proceeding with the case. The Court of Appeals gave due
course to his petition and issued the preliminary writ prayed for; but, after hearing and
consideration of the merits, it denied the writ of prohibition and dissolved the injunction. His
motion for reconsideration having been denied, Cecilio Mendoza then resorted to this Court,
which gave due course to his petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the suit against a member of the family may prosper.
RULING:
The Court held that the Court of Appeals and the Court of First Instance committed no error in
refusing to dismiss the complaint, for on its face, the same involved a claim for future support
that under Article 2035 of the Civil Code of the Philippines cannot be subject of a valid
compromise, and is, therefore, outside the sphere of application of Article 222 of the Code upon
which petitioner relies. Article 2035 provides that no compromise shall be valid when it

concerns the validity of a marriage or a legal separation and future support. Thus a showing of
previous efforts to compromise them would be superfluous. It may be that the complaint asks for
both future support and support in arrears but the possibility of compromise on the latter does not
negate the existence of a valid cause of action for future support, to which Article 222 cannot
apply.

301. DE ASIS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 127578
FACTS:
On October 14, 1988, Vircel D. Andres in her capacity as the legal guardian of the minor, Glen
Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action for maintenance and support against Manuel de Asis
alleging that the defendant Manuel de Asis is the father of subject minor Glen Camil Andres de
Asis, and the former refused and/or failed to provide for the maintenance of the latter, despite
repeated demands. The petitioner argues that the said respondent was his child. On September 7,
1995, another Complaint for maintenance and support was brought against Manuel A. de Asis,
this time in the name of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, represented by her legal guardian/mother,
Vircel D. Andres.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the Complaint on the ground of res judicata, alleging that Civil Case
C-16107 is barred by the prior judgment which dismissed with prejudice Civil Case Q-88-935
which the trial court denied and was affirmed by the appellate court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lack of filiation between him and the minor child negates the right to claim
for support.
RULING:
The right to support being founded upon the need of the recipient to maintain his existence, he is
not entitled to renounce or transfer the right for this would mean sanctioning the voluntary giving
up of life itself. The right to life cannot be renounced; hence, support, which is the means to
attain the former, cannot be renounced.
In the case at bar, respondent minor's mother, who was the plaintiff in the first case, manifested
that she was withdrawing the case as it seemed futile to claim support from petitioner who
denied his paternity over the child. Since the right to claim for support is predicated on the
existence of filiation between the minor child and the putative parent, petitioner would like us to
believe that such manifestation admitting the futility of claiming support from him puts the issue
to rest and bars any and all future complaint for support.
It appears that the former dismissal was predicated upon a compromise. Acknowledgment,
affecting as it does the civil status of persons and future support, cannot be the subject of
compromise. Hence, the first dismissal cannot have force and effect and cannot bar the filing of
another action, asking for the same relief against the same defendant.

302. FERNANDEZ V. FERNANDEZ

363 S 811
FACTS:
The late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez, and Generosa A. de Venecia being childless by the death
of their son, purchased from a certain Miliang for P20.00 a one month baby boy. The boy being
referred to was later on identified as Rodolfo Fernandez, the herein appellant. Appellant was
taken care of by the couple and was sent to school and became a dental technician. He lived with
the couple until they became old and disabled. On August 31, 1989, after the death of Dr. Jose,
appellant and Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed of Extra-judicial Partition dividing and
allocating to themselves the estate left by the deceased. Same day, Generosa sold her share to
Rodolfos son, Eddie Fernandez. After learning the transaction, Romeo, Potenciano, Francisco,
Julita, William, Mary, Alejandro, Gerardo, Rodolfo and Gregorio, all surnamed Fernandez, being
nephews and nieces of the deceased Jose K. Fernandez, their father Genaro being a brother of
Jose, filed on September 21, 1994, an action to declare the Extra-Judicial Partition of Estate and
Deed of Sale void ab initio. They claimed that Rodolfo is not a legitimate nor a legally adopted
child of spouses Dr. Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia Fernandez, hence Rodolfo could
not inherit from the spouses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rodolfo is a legitimate or a legally adopted child of Jose Fernandez and
Generosa de Venecia Fernandez.
RULING:
No, Rodolfo is neither a legitimate nor a legally adopted child of Jose Fernandez and Generosa
de Venecia Fernandez. Rodolfo failed to come up with evidences to prove his filiation. The only
public document he could show was the Application for Recognition of Back Pay Rights under
Act No. 897. Such is a public document but nevertheless, it was not executed to admit the
filiation of Jose K. Fernandez with him. Rodolfo also claims that he enjoyed and possessed the
status of being a legitimate child of the spouses openly and continuously until they died. Open
and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child is meant the enjoyment by the child
of the position and privileges usually attached to the status of a legitimate child such as bearing
the paternal surname, treatment by the parents and family of the child as legitimate, constant
attendance to the child's support and education, and giving the child the reputation of being a
child of his parents. However, it must be noted that possession of status of a child does not in
itself constitute an acknowledgment; it is only a ground for a child to compel recognition by his
assumed parent. His baptismal certificate, although public documents, is evidence only to prove
the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the
statements or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk. It may be argued that a
baptismal certificate is one of the other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws of
proving filiation but in this case, the authenticity of the baptismal certificate was doubtful when
Fr. Raymundo Q. de Guzman of St. John the Evangelist Parish of Lingayen-Dagupan, Dagupan
City issued a certification on October 16, 1995 attesting that the records of baptism on June 7,

1930 to August 8, 1936 were all damaged. The pictures he presented do not also constitute proof
of filiation.
The Supreme Court affirmed with modification the assailed judgment, as follows:
1. Respondents as legitimate heirs of Dr. Jose Fernandez are entitled to the share of the conjugal
lot and building of the deceased spouses Jose and Generosa Fernandez who died childless and
intestate;
2. The deed of extra-judicial partition is nullified insofar as the share of petitioner Rodolfo in the
conjugal lot is concerned and the title issued pursuant thereto in the name of Rodolfo Fernandez;
4. Considering that the deed of sale is valid insofar as the share of Generosa sold to
petitioner Eddie Fernandez, TCT No. 54693 is cancelled and a new title should be issued
in the names of petitioner Eddie Fernandez and respondents as co-owners of the and
shares respectively in the conjugal building.

303. CONCEPCION vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 123450
FACTS:
Gerardo B. Concepcion and Ma. Theresa Almontewere married on December 29, 1989. A year
later, they begot Jose Gerardo. On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to annul his
marriage to Ma. Theresa on the ground of bigamy. This was because it was found out that Ma.
Theresa had already married a Mario Gopiao nine years before their marriage. Such marriage of
Ma. Theresa to Mario was never annulled. The trial court ruled that Gerardo and Ma. Theresas
marriage was bigamous and that her marriage to Mario is valid and subsisting. It declared the
child as being illegitimate. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts decision but on
appeal, reversed its ruling and held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo
but by Mario during her first marriage.
ISSUES:
a)
b)

Whether or not the child born out of a bigamous marriage is considered legitimate.
Whether or not Gerardo could assail Jose Gerardos legitimacy.

RULING:
Yes, a child born out of a bigamous marriage is considered legitimate. The legitimacy would
come from the validity of the first marriage and not on the bigamous marriage for that bigamous
marriage is void from the very beginning(ab initio). Ma. Theresa was married to Mario Gopiao,
and that she had never entered into a lawful marriage with the Gerardo since the so-called
marriage with the latter was void ab initio. Ma. Theresa was legitimately married to Mario
Gopiao when the child Jose Gerardo was born on December 8, 1990. Therefore, the child Jose
Gerardo under the law is the legitimate child of the legal and subsisting marriage between
Ma. Theresa and Mario Gopiao; he cannot be deemed to be the illegitimate child of the void and
non-existent marriage between Ma. Theresa and Gerardo.The status and filiation of a child
cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or
born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate.
As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the
Family Code provides that the child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
No, Gerardo is not in a position to assail Jose Gerardos legitimacy. He has no standing in law to
dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresas husband Mario or, in a proper case, his
heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife.Impugning the
legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs.
Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning; he never
became her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
305. JAO vs. CA

GR No. L-49162
FACTS:
In 1967, Arlene Salgado was introduced to PericoJao. After such introduction, Jao courted
Arlene. Not long thereafter, they had sexual intercourse and subsequently, they lived together.
1968, Arlene became pregnant. Jao paid for all the expenses related to Arlenes pregnancy but
when the child, Janice was born, Jao insisted that she could not be the father of such child. When
the case was filed with the RTC, the RTC ordered the NBI for a group blood testing. The group
blood testing result showed that Janice could not have been the possible offspring of Jao and
Arlene.
ISSUE:
Whether or not group blood testing could be conclusive evidence to impugn the legitimacy of
Janice.
RULING:
Yes, group blood testing could be admitted as conclusive evidence to impugn the legitimacy of
Janice. For the past three decades, the use of blood typing in cases of disputed parentage has
already become an important legal procedure. There is now almost universal scientific agreement
that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive as to paternity
that is, the fact that the blood type of the child is a possible product of the mother and alleged
father does not conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents; but, if the blood type of
the child is not the possible blood type when the blood of the mother and that of the alleged
father are cross matched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father.
Medical science has shown that there are four types of blood in man which can be transmitted
through heredity. Although the presence of the same type of blood in two persons does not
indicate that one was begotten by the other, yet the fact that they are of different types will
indicate the impossibility of one being the child of the other. Thus, when the supposed father and
the alleged child are not in the same blood group, they cannot be father and child by
consanguinity.

306. ANDAL V. MACARAIG

89 P 165

FACTS:
Mariano Andal, assisted by his mother Maria Dueas, as guardian ad litem, brought an action in
the CIF of Camarines Sur for the recovery of the ownership and possession of a parcel of land
situated in Camarines Sur. The complaint alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of
Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueas and that Emiliano was the owner of the parcel of land in
question having acquired it from his mother Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of a donation propter
nuptias executed by the latter in favor of the former. Emiliano was suffering from tuberculosis in
January 1941. His brother, Felix, then lived with them to work his house and farm. Emiliano
became so weak that he can hardly move and get up from his bed. Sometime in September 1942,
the wife eloped with Felix and lived at the house of Marias father until 1943. Emiliano died in
January 1, 1943 where the wife did not attend the funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria gave birth to
a boy who was, herein petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the child is considered as the legitimate son of Emiliano.
RULING:
Considering that Mariano was born on June 17, 1943 and Emiliano died on January 1, 1943, the
former is presumed to be a legitimate son of the latter because he was born within 300 days
following the dissolution of the marriage. The fact that the husband was seriously sick is not
sufficient to overcome the presumption of legitimacy. This presumption can only be rebutted by
proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the
first 120 days of the 300 days next preceding the birth of the child. Impossibility of access by
husband to wife includes absence during the initial period of conception, impotence which is
patent, and incurable; and imprisonment unless it can be shown that cohabitation took place
through corrupt violation of prison regulations. Marias illicit intercourse with a man other than
the husband during the initial period does not preclude cohabitation between husband and wife.
Hence, Mariano Andal was considered a legitimate son of the deceased making him the owner of
the parcel land.

308. BENITEZ-BADUA VS CA
GR No. 105625

FACTS:
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian were owners of various properties located in
Laguna. Isabel died in 1982 while his husband died in 1989. Vicentes sister and nephew filed a
complaint for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicentes estate in favor of the nephew,
herein private respondent. The petitioner, Marissa Benitez-Badua, was raised and cared by the
deceased spouses since childhood, though not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted. The
latter to prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses submitted documents such as
her certificate of live birth where the spouses name were reflected as her parents. She even
testified that said spouses continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the other
hand, the relatives of Vicente declared that said spouses were unable to physically procreate
hence the petitioner cannot be the biological child. Trial court decided in favor of the petitioner
as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners certificate of live birth will suffice to establish her legitimacy.
RULING:
The Court dismissed the case for lack of merit. The mere registration of a child in his or her
birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption. It does not confer
upon the child the status of an adopted child and her legal rights. Such act amounts to simulation
of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document.
It is worthy to note that Vicente and brother of the deceased wife executed a Deed of ExtraJudicial Settlement of the Estate of the latter. In the notarized document, they stated that they
were the sole heirs of the deceased because she died without descendants and ascendants. In
executing such deed, Vicente effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of the petitioner
where it appeared thathe was the petitioners father.

309. LIYAO V. TANHOTI- LIYAO

G.R. No. 138961
FACTS:
Petitioner, represented by his mother filed a case before the RTC for a petition for compulsory
recognition as the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William Liyao, against herein
respondents. It alleged that the petitioner was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the
status of the child of said William Liyao, petitioner having been recognized and acknowledged as
such child by the decedent during his lifetime. Both parties presented conflicting claims and
testimonies, the petitioners emphasizing Williams acknowledgement of petitioner as his son, and
the respondents emphasizing that their father separated with their mother and that the mother of
the petitioner would often be seen with her legal husband. The RTC renderd a decision in favor
of the petitioner however, the CA reverse the ruling. His motion for reconsideration having been
denied, petitioner filed the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner may impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of
his supposed father, William Liyao.
RULING:
He may not, the petition is denied. Under the New Civil Code, a child born and
conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. The presumption of legitimacy
of children does not only flow out from a declaration contained in the statute but is based on the
broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is
grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. The grounds
for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only
be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under
Article 262 of the Civil Code.
Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional
cases, his heirs. It is therefore clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as
guardian ad litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of
petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is
settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. We
cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law
that only the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of
a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own
filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child,
then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mothers
alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child
cannot elect the paternity of the husband who successfully defeated the presumption.

310. DE JESUS V. ESTATE OF DIZON

366 S 499
FACTS:
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was during
this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were
born, the former on 01 March 1979 and the latter on 06 July 1982.
In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and
Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus, Juan G. Dizon
died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock
in various corporations and some real property.
Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon,
including the corporations of which the decreased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the
case. On May 20, 1994, the appellate court upheld the decision of the lower court and ordered
the case to be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. On 03 January 2003, long after
submitting their answer, pre-trial brief and several other motions, respondents filed an omnibus
motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of the decedent.
RULING:
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation
in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In
the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of
the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just
a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a
separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on
other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable
statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the childs acknowledgment.
The records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents. The
certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father. The
presumption is that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption becomes
conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the
spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the
child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;

(b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse
is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual
intercourse. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and
only the father, or in exceptional instances the latters heirs, can contest in an appropriate action
the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been
successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.

311. EDGARDO A. TIJING vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 125901
FACTS:
Edgardo and BienvenidaTijing are husband and wife, they have six children, youngest of whom
is Edgardo Tijing Jr. In August 1989, Angelita Diamante fetched Bienvenida for an urgent
laundry job. Bienvenida left to Angelita her 4-month old child, Edgardo Jr. as she usually let
Angelita take care of her child while she was doing laundry. When Bienvenida returned from
work to get her son, Angelita was nowhere to be found, and despite her and her husbands
efforts, they could not locate Angelita and their childs whereabouts.
Four years later, Bienvenida read about the death of Tomas Lopez, the common-law husband of
Angelita, whose interment is in Bulacan. She went there and allegedly saw her son Edgardo Jr.,
now named John Thomas Lopez. John is now being claimed by Angelita as her own son, sired by
her common-law husband Tomas Lopez during their cohabitation. Bienvenida now alleges that
the child cannot possibly be born to Angelita and Tomas for it was the latters own brother who
admitted that Tomas was rendered sterile, caused by an accident. Tomas begot no children from
his legal marriage nor with the cohabitation with Angelita. Tomas brother even testified that
Tomas himself admitted to him that the subject child was adopted.
ISSUE:
Who among the claimants is the true parent of the subject child.
RULING:
Bienvenida. It was Bienvenida who was able to produce the competent evidences to establish the
childs filiation with her and her husband. She substantiated her claim with sufficient clinical
records, presenting the proper and credible witnesses who assisted her in her childs birth. Not to
mention the fact that it could be readily observed that Bienvenida and the child have strong
similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between a minor and
his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish parentage. Whereas, Angelita
had been known to have undergone ligation years before the alleged birth of the child and the
admission of Tomas own brother that Tomas was sterile makes it impossible that he and Angelita
could have produced subject child. More importantly, the birth certificate of the child stated
Tomas Lopez and private respondent were legally married which is false because even private
respondent had admitted she is a common-law wife. This false entry puts to doubt the other data
in said birth certificate.

312. GO KIM HUY VS. GO KIM HUY

365 SCRA 490
FACTS:
Bonifacio Go Kim Huy, herein petitioner claims hereditary rights over the mass of property
rights and assets belonging to his estate.
On May 1, 1933 petitioner came to Manila at the age of six using the name Gaw Prak. Upon
arrival he stayed with Bonifacio until he left sometimes in 1946 to study in Shanghai China. He
returned in 1949 and pursued college education in FEU. Respondent Santiago Go Kim Tian
came to Manila in 1923 at the age of 11. Both he and respondent Santiago helped in the business
and such that they formed a partnership Bonifacio Go Kim and Son.
The trial court in 1946 granted the petitioners action for change of name from Gaw Piak to Go
Kim or William Go.
While the case was pending respondent filed a letter complaint with the Ministry of Justice
attacking the certification starting that the late Bonifacio Go Kim registered petitioner as one of
his children. The BID issued a resolution canceling its easier certification and declared that the
petitioner is not a son spouse Bonifacio Go Kim and Chu Yiak.
Petitioner claims that he is a legitimate son of the decedent and as such, is entitled to acquire his
share as a legitimate heir.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner established that action of filiations to claim legitimacy.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that under the legal system, filiation could be established by the any of
the following:
1.
The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment;
2.
An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned, and in the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by the open and continuous possession of the status of the
legitimate child or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Petitioner failed to show by convincing evidence, other than the certification issued by the BID
which was later on cancelled, that indeed he was related to the decedent. Petitioner failed to raise
any substantial issue that demands consideration. In the voluminous records presented, it all boils
down to a reconsideration of the BID findings which cannot now be disturbed.
313. TECSON V. COMELEC

G.R. No. 161434

FACTS:
On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines for the
2004 national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his
date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition before the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy
upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents
were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was
a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino
citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based the
allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior
marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such
prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen
RULING:
It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen,
which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have
himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of
respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any
conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption
that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year
1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of
residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his
place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse
Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if
acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allans son to Bessie, though an American citizen,
was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondents birth
certificate. The 1935 Constitution on citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and the allegation that
respondent was born only before the assailed marriage had no bearing on respondents
citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation evidenced by the public documents
presented.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor
enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus
Election Code.

314. IN RE JULIAN LIN WANG

GR. No. 159966
FACTS:
Petitioner Julian Lin Wang a minor represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang filed a petition
dated 19 September 2002 for change of name of entry in the civil registry of Julian Lin Wang.
Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to
drop his middle name as this would help him adjust more easily to integrate himself into
Singaporean society.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the law the law provides for his middle name to be changed.
RULING:
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and reasonable cause for
which the change is sought. To justify a request for the change of name, the petitioner must show
not only some proper reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true
and official name. Among the grounds for the change of name which have been held valid are:
a.) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce. b.)
When the change results as a legal consequence
c.) When the change will avoid confusion.
d.) When one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and
was not aware of the alien parentage.
e.) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name and
f.) When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of
name was for a fraudulent purpose.

316. VERCELES vs. POSADA

GR. No. 159785
FACTS:
On November 11, 1986, at around 11:00 a.m., Verceles fetched Clarissa Posada from "My
Brothers Place" where the seminar was being held.Clarissa avers that he told her that they would
have lunch at Mayon Hotel with their companions who had gone ahead. When they reached the
place her companions were nowhere. After Verceles ordered food, he started making amorous
advances on her. She panicked, ran and closeted herself inside a comfort room where she stayed
until someone knocked. She said she hurriedly exited and left the hotel. Afraid of the mayor, she
kept the incident to herself. She went on as casual employee. One of her tasks was following-up
barangay road and maintenance projects.
On December 22, 1986, on orders of Verceles, she went to Virac, Catanduanes, to follow up
funds for barangay projects. At around 11:00 a.m. the same day, she went to Catanduanes Hotel
on instructions of petitioner who asked to be briefed on the progress of her mission. They met at
the lobby and he led her upstairs because he said he wanted the briefing done at the restaurant at
the upper floor.
Instead, Verceles opened a hotel room door, led her in, and suddenly embraced her, as he told her
that he was unhappy with his wife and would "divorce" her anytime. He also claimed he could
appoint her as a municipal development coordinator. She succumbed to his advances. But again
she kept the incident to herself.Sometime in January 1987, when she missed her menstruation,
she said she wrote petitioner that she feared she was pregnant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the filiation of Verna Aiza Posada as the illegitimate child of petitioner was
proven.
RULING:
The letters are private handwritten instruments of petitioner which establish Verna Aizas
filiation under Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. In addition, the arrays of evidence presented
by respondents, the dates, letters, pictures and testimonies, to us, are convincing, and irrefutable
evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioners illegitimate child.
Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, he himself presented no evidence of his
own. His bare denials are telling. Well-settled is the rule that denials, if unsubstantiated by clear
and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving which merit no weight in law and cannot
be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.

317. RODRIGUEZ V. LIM

G.R. No. 135817
FACTS:
Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. filed with the court a quo a complaint for cancellation of certificate of title
and injunction against the spouses Rodriguez. In his complaint, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. alleged
that his mother, Dominga Goyma, was the owner of two parcels of land (subject lots). Dominga
Goyma died on July 19, 1971 and was survived by her only son, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr., a
spurious son acknowledged and recognized by her.
The complaint also alleged that during her lifetime, Dominga Goyma exclusively possessed the
subject lots and upon her death, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. succeeded to all her rights of ownership
and possession. However, the spouses Rodriguez, despite their knowledge that Pablo Goyma
Lim, Jr., was now the owner and possessor of the subject lots, allegedly unlawfully and
fraudulently made it appear that they had purchased the subject lots from persons who were not
the owners thereof.
Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. thus prayed in his complaint that the spouses Rodriguez be permanently
enjoined from entering and occupying the subject lots; TCT No. 128607 be declared null and
void and TCT No. T-2857 in the name of Dominga Goyma be reinstated; and the spouses
Rodriguez be ordered to pay Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. damages, attorneys fees and the costs of suit.
In their Answer, the spouses Rodriguez denied the material allegations in the complaint. They
alleged that Dominga Goyma was not the mother of Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr.They averred that the
subject lots were the conjugal property of Frisco Gudani and his wife Dominga Goyma. When
the latter died, Frisco Gudani was her sole surviving heir. According to the spouses Rodriguez,
Frisco Gudani and Dominga Goyma, as husband and wife, jointly exercised acts of ownership
and possession over the subject lots.When Dominga Goyma passed away, Frisco Gudani
executed an instrument of extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased. By virtue of the
said document, Dominga Goymas share in the subject lots was adjudicated in favor of Frisco
Gudani as her sole surviving heir. The extra-judicial settlement allegedly complied with the
requirements of publication under the Rules of Court. Thereafter, Frisco Gudani allegedly sold
the subject lots to Eduardo Victa who, in turn, sold the same to the spouses Rodriguez.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr.was an illegitimate child of Dominga Goyma.
RULING:
Yes, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. was an illegitimate child of Dominga Goyma. The Court has laid
down the manner of establishing the filiation of children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, as
follows: The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the
record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous

possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in, any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is
treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that
does not require a separate action for judicial approval.
Various documentary evidence were proffered by Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. to prove that he was the
illegitimate and acknowledged son of Dominga Goyma. Among them were his certificate of birth
indicating that his mother was Dominga Goyma; statement of assets, income and liabilities for
1958 of Dominga Goyma indicating him as her son and; income tax returns for calendar years
1953 up to 1955 of Dominga Goyma where she invariably claimed personal exemption as head
of the family and stated therein that she was separated from her husband and claimed an
exemption for her son, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. These pieces of documentary evidence, whose
authenticity were not refuted by petitioners, were properly considered by the court a quo and the
appellate court to establish that Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. was acknowledged by Dominga Goyma to
be her illegitimate son.

318. CAMELO CABATANIA V. COURT OF APPEALS AND CAMELO REGODOS

G.R. No. 124814
FACTS:
Florencia is the mother of the respondent. Her husband left her in 1981 and she was hired as
petitioners household help. It was then that petitioner and Florencia had sexual intercourse.
After a month, petitioners wife noticed that Florencia is pregnant. For this reason, petitioners
wife dismissed Florencia and told her to go home. Petitioner was surprised when Florencia
demanded from him support for their alleged child. Petitioner refused, denying paternity and
claimed that Florencia was already pregnant when they had sexual intercourse. During trial,
Florencia claimed that petitioner voluntarily recognized respondent when he rented a house for
her after the dismissal and misrepresented herself as a widow when in fact her husband is still
alive. Trial court brushed this misrepresentation and used as one of its bases of its decision the
similarities on personal appearances of the petitioner and respondent and favored the
respondents claim.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent may compulsorily be recognized by petitioner.
RULING:
No. Respondent failed to show conclusive evidence as to establish his filiation with petitioner.
Aside from Florencias self-serving testimony that petitioner rented a house for her, private
respondent failed to present sufficient proof of voluntary recognition. A certificate of live birth
purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is
no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. The local
civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information
of a third person.
More importantly, the fact that Florencias husband is living and there is a valid subsisting
marriage between them, gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is
legitimate. That even though Florencia may have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress. Only the husband or in exceptional cases, his heirs may
impugned the presumed legitimacy of the child.
With regards the personal appearance of the child, the Supreme Court provided that in this age of
genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely subjective test of
physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity and
filiation before the courts of law.
Wherefore, the petition was granted. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the decision of the RTC is reversed and set aside.Lastly, the private respondents
petition for recognition and support is dismissed.

319. ROSALINA P. ECETA vs. MA. THERESA VELL LAGURA ECETA

G.R. NO. 157037
FACTS:
Isaac and Rosalina married in 1926. The begot a child named Vicente. When Isaac died, he left
behind properties to which Rosalina and Vicente were the compulsory heirs. Thereafter, Vicente
also died but he had an illegitimate daughter, Ma. Theresa. Thus, the latter is a compulsory heir
together with Rosalina. Theresa then filed for a petition that she be made co-owner of a property
which was originally owned by Isaac, passed to Rosalina and Vicente upon his death. Ma.
Theresas contention was that she should be made as co-owner by virtue of her fathers death.
During pre-trial, Rosalina already admitted that she is the grandmother of Ma. Theresa. On
appeal though, she questions the alleged filiation and whether if such could be established by
mere birth certificate and by her admission during the trial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents filiation to her alleged father could be established by the birth
certificate and by the admission made.
RULING:
Yes. Ma. Theresa successfully established her filiation with Vicente through the duly
authenticated birth certificate. Vicente himself signed respondents birth certificate thereby
acknowledging that she is his daughter. By this act alone, Vicente is deemed to have
acknowledged his paternity over Ma. Theresa, thus, the filiation of illegitimate children, like
legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall
be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court
of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the
child. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is
in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.

320. ALBERTO V. CA, ET AL.

G.R. No. 86639
June 2, 1994
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a motion for leave to intervene as oppositor, and re-open the estate proceedings
for Juan Albertos estate, praying that she be declared to have acquired the status of a natural
child and as such, entitled to share in the estate of the deceased. The motion was granted by the
probate court. Upon the presentation by the parties of their respective evidence during the trial,
the probate court was convinced that indeed, Ma. Theresa Alberto had been in continuous
possession of the status of a natural child. Thus, it rendered a decision compelling the decedents
heirs and estate to recognize her as a natural daughter and to allow her to participate in the estate
proceedings. However, the CA reversed the decision, thus this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the estate and heirs of deceased Juan M. Alberto may be ordered to recognize
petitioner as the deceaseds natural daughter on the basis of the evidence presented by petitioner
to establish her claim that she has been in continuous possession of the status of a natural child.
RULING:
Yes they may, the petition is granted. According to Art. 283 of the Civil Code, In any of
the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural child: 2) when the
child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the
latter or his family. In the case at bench, evidence is not wanting from which it may logically be
concluded that the deceased Juan M. Alberto took no pains to conceal his paternity. No less than
his younger sister, his stepmother, his priest-cousin, several relatives and close friends were
categorically informed of the relationship and they accepted the same as fact. Considering the
strait-laced mores of the times and the social and political stature of Juan M. Alberto and his
family, those who were privy to the relationship observed discreetness. But he himself openly
visited his daughter in school, had meetings with her at the MOPC on which occasions he gave
her money and introduced her proudly to his gangmates. During his lifetime, Juan M. Alberto
acted in such a manner as to evince his intent to recognize petitioner as his flesh and blood, first,
by allowing her from birth to use his family name; second, by giving her and her mother sums of
money by way of support and lastly, by openly introducing her to members of his family,
relatives and friends as his daughter. Supplementing such unmistakable acts of recognition were
those of his kin and gangmates manifesting open acceptance of such relationship. Taken
altogether, the claimed filiation would be hard to disprove.

321. DE JESUS V. ESTATE OF DIZON

366 S 499
FACTS:
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was during
this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were
born, the former on 01 March 1979 and the latter on 06 July 1982.
In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and
Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus, Juan G. Dizon
died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock
in various corporations and some real property.
Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon,
including the corporations of which the decreased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the
case. On May 20, 1994, the appellate court upheld the decision of the lower court and ordered
the case to be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. On 03 January 2003, long after
submitting their answer, pre-trial brief and several other motions, respondents filed an omnibus
motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of the decedent.
RULING:
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation
in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In
the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of
the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just
a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a
separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on
other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable
statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the childs acknowledgment.
The records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents. The
certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father. The
presumption is that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption becomes
conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the
spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the
child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;

(b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse
is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual
intercourse. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and
only the father, or in exceptional instances the latters heirs, can contest in an appropriate action
the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been
successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.

323. GOTARDO vs. BULING

G.R. No. 165166
FACTS:
On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, for compulsory recognition and support endent
lite, claiming that the petitioner is the father of her child Gliffze. In his answer, the petitioner
denied the imputed paternity of Gliffze. For the parties failure to amicably settle the dispute, the
RTC terminated the pre-trial proceedings. Trial on the merits ensued.
The respondent testified for herself and presented Rodulfo Lopez as witness. Evidence for the
respondent showed that she met the petitioner on December 1, 1992 at the Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank, Maasin, Southern Leyte branch where she had been hired as a
casual employee, while the petitioner worked as accounting supervisor.
The respondent responded by filing a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Maasin,
Southern Leyte for damages against the petitioner for breach of promise to marry. Later,
however, the petitioner and the respondent amicably settled the case. The respondent gave birth
to their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995. When the petitioner did not show up and failed to provide
support to Gliffze, the respondent sent him a letter on July 24, 1995 demanding recognition of
and support for their child. When the petitioner did not answer the demand, the respondent filed
her complaint for compulsory recognition and support endent lite.
The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for himself. He denied the imputed paternity,
claiming that he first had sexual contact with the respondent in the first week of August 1994 and
she could not have been pregnant for twelve (12) weeks (or three (3) months) when he was
informed of the pregnancy on September 15, 1994. During the pendency of the case, the RTC, on
the respondents motion, granted a P2, 000.00 monthly child support, retroactive from March
1995.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner should provide support.
RULING:
One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth appearing in
the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws. We have held that such other proof of ones filiation may be a
baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which [his] name has been entered,
common reputation respecting [his] pedigree, admission by silence, the [testimonies] of
witnesses, and other kinds of proof [admissible] under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Since
filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to
support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable

for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping
with the financial capacity of the family.
Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on the amount of
support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and
the necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the
reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person
obliged to support.

324. RIVERO V. CA
458 S 715
FACTS:
Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., a married man, had an amorous relationship with Shirley Arevalo. They
begot a son, Benedick Arevalo Dy Chiao. When Benito Sr. died, Benedick, through her natural
mother and guardian ad litem, being a minor, filed a complaint on his behalf, against the
legitimate children of the deceased for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child and that
he be given his share in the estate left by the deceased. This was opposed by Mary Jane, daughter
of the deceased, but later on signed a compromise agreement with Benedick, recognizing the
latter as illegitimate son of her father and giving him his share in the estate. Attached to the
agreement was a SPA appointing Mary Jane to represent her brothers who are confined in a
mental hospital. Such compromise agreement was approved by the court, thus requiring the
compulsory recognition of Benedick. Thereafter, the Dy-Chiao brothers, through their uncle,
assailed such compromise agreement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the recognition of Benedicks illegitimacy by Mary Jane is valid based on the
compromise agreement made.
RULING:
No. Article 2035(1) of the New Civil Code provides that no compromise upon the civil status of
persons shall be valid. As such, paternity and filiation, or the lack of the same, is a relationship
that must be judicially established, and it is for the court to determine its existence or absence. It
cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Further, such recognition is ineffectual
because under the law, the recognition must be made personally by the putative parent and not by
any brother, sister or relative.
Article 1878 of the New Civil Code provides that an SPA is required for a compromise.
Furthermore, the power of attorney should expressly mention the action for which it is drawn; as
such, a compromise agreement executed by one in behalf of another, who is not duly authorized
to do so by the principal, is void and has no legal effect, and the judgment based on such
compromise agreement is null and void. The judgment may thus be impugned and its execution
may be enjoined in any proceeding by the party against whom it is sought to be enforced. A
compromise must be strictly construed and can include only those expressly or impliedly
included therein.
As previously stated, the Court is convinced that the compromise agreement signed by Mary
Jane and Benedick was a compromise relating to the latters filiation. Mary Jane recognized
Benedick as the illegitimate son of her deceased father, the consideration for which was the
amount of P6,000,000.00 to be taken from the estate, the waiver of other claims from the estate
of the deceased, and the waiver by the Dy Chiao siblings of their counterclaims against
Benedick. This is readily apparent, considering that the compromise agreement was executed
despite the siblings unequivocal allegations in their answer to the complaint filed only two

months earlier, that Benedick was merely an impostor. Such recognition, however, is ineffectual,
because under the law, the recognition must be made personally by the putative parent and not by
any brother, sister or relative.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

325. PEOPLE VS. ABELLA, ET.AL.

G.R. No. 177295
FACTS:
It all started with an altercation during a basketball game. 3 days later, the 5 victims bodies were
found in the Pasig River. Victims were Marlon and Joseph Ronquillo, Erwin and Andres Lojero
and Felix Tamayo.
Marlons hands were tied at the back with an electric cord, he had wounds and died from a
gunshot to the head. Andres hands were also bound at the back with a rope, his genitals were cut
off and had wounds in his body as well, cause of death was asphyxia by strangulation. Josephs
hands were tied at the back with a basketball t-shirt, had wounds and died of strangulation as
well. Erwins and Felixs body had abrasions and burns, there were cord impressions on his
wrists, a fracture in his skull and died by drowning.
The accused are Abella, Granada, De Guzman, Valencia (all surnames), for MURDER, qualified
by treachery and evident premeditation. There were other accused but their names were dropped
from the information later on.
March 1992, the victims Ronquillo brothers were played 3 rounds of basketball in Sta. Mesa
Manila against the team of Joey de los Santos. The Ronquillos brothers won the first 2 rounds
but the 3rd one ended in a brawl. Later that afternoon, Joey went back to the place carrying 2
pillboxes but were apprehended. So, Joey and his brother just threw stones at the Ronquillos
house. The neighbors saw this and ran after them and mauled them.
That night, the victims were in front of the Ronquillos house. Suddenly, a white Ford Fiera
without a plate number stopped in front of the group. There were 10-13 people on board,
including Joey and his brother. The passengers in the Fiera alighted, faces covered with
handkerchiefs and they were armed. The victims tried to run but a shot was fired and Felix
(victim) was shot. They were boxed, kicked and hit and dragged into the van. They were brought
to a basement in a compound where witness Elena saw them being mauled, whipped with a gun,
beaten with steel tubes and lead pipes. They also had a blowtorch and the victims hands were
tied. The victims begged for mercy. Afterwards, they were herded back to the car, seeming
almost dead. 2 days later, their bodies were found in the Pasig river.
Accused defense was an alibi, that they are INC members and were attending a panata that
night. According to them, when they read their names in the newspapers as the perpetrators of
the crime, they consulted the INC Central Office and were then accompanied by a lawyer to go
to the police station to clear their names, They were later on identified in a police line-up. The
RTC convicted all of them for MURDER, with a penalty of reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused are entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
RULING:

No. First of all, the witnesses were able to fully establish and prove and connect the appellantsaccused to the crime. The SC is sufficiently satisfied that their guilt was proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
The killing was characterized by treachery. Though treachery should normally attend at the
inception of the aggression, the facts show that the victims were first seized and bound and then
slain, hence treachery is present. In this case, it is enough to point out that the victims hands
were tied at the back when their bodies were found floating in Pasig River. This fact clearly
shows that the victims were rendered defenseless and helpless, thereby allowing the appellants to
commit the crime without risk at all to their persons. The circumstance of abuse of superior
strength was absorbed in treachery.
The appellants move to clear their names cannot be accepted as voluntary surrender. For a
surrender to be voluntary, it must be spontaneous and should show the intent of the accused to
submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because (1) he acknowledges his guilt or
(2) he wishes to save the government the trouble and expense necessarily included for his search
and capture. When the accused goes to a police station merely to clear his name and not to give
himself up, voluntary surrender may not be appreciated.

327. PP V. MANAHAN
G.R. No. 128157
FACTS:
Victim TeresitaTibigar, then 16 yrs old was working at a canteen as stay-in waitress, and
sleeps at the 2nd floor of the canteen. Manahan is the brother-in-law of the owner of the canteen.
He and his wife lives temporarily with the owner as his wife was then pregnant. One night, as
victim was sleeping, she was suddenly awakened when she felt someone beside her. When she
opened her eyes, she saw that it was Manahan who immediately placed himself on top of her.
Victim tried to shout but accused covered her mouth. She tried to free herself but to no avail. In
her weakened state, accused succeeded in raping her. Thereafter, he left her. Within the month,
victim left the canteen and returned to her parents. The incident resulted to her pregnancy, thus,
she was forced to divulge the rape incident to her parents. They then filed a criminal complaint
against accused. The accused on his part, alleged that they were lovers and that the sexual
congress between them were consensual. The court favored the testimony of the victim and
convicted accused of rape.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused may be made to compulsorily recognize the child borne of his crime.
RULING:
No. Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of rape shall also be
sentenced to "acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from doing so," and
"in every case to support the offspring." In the case at bar, compulsory acknowledgment of the
child Melanie Tibigar is not proper there being a legal impediment in doing so as it appears that
the accused is a married man

328. NEPOMUCENO vs. LOPEZ

G.R. No. 181258
FACTS:
Respondent Arhbencel claims to be the illegitimate child of petitioner, Ben-hur. She therefore
filed a complaint for recognition. What she presents to the court as evidence is her birth
certificate which had not been signed by her alleged father as the latter allegedly refused to do
so. Another evidence that she adduced was a handwritten note by the petitioner obligating
himself to give her financial support in the amount of P1,500 on the 15th and 30th days of each
month.
ISSUE:
Whether or not evidences adduced by respondent is sufficient proof of illegitimacy.
RULING:
No. Art 175 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Thus such
is to be based on Art 172 which provides that filiation of legitimate children is established by any
of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2)
An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation
shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. In the case at bar, the
adduced evidence which is the note written by the alleged father, does not contain any statement
whatsoever about Arhbencels filiation to petitioner. It is, therefore, not a competent evidence of
illegitimate filiation as an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the
parent concerned.
Under Art 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be
effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing must
be the writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is
admitted by the putative father is considered acceptable evidence. In the present case, the note
cannot be accorded the same weight as the notarial agreement to support the child for it is not
even notarized. Further, the notarial agreement must be accompanied by the putative fathers
admission of filiation to be an acceptable evidence of filiation. Here, however, not only has
petitioner not admitted filiation through contemporaneous actions. He has consistently denied it.
Lastly, the copy of her Certificate of Birth, has no probative value to establish filiation to
petitioner, the latter not having signed the same.

329. RIVERA V. HEIRS

G.R. No. 141501
FACTS: Gonzales cohabited with Villanueva without the benefit of marriage because the latter
was married to one Amanda Musngi. They allegedly had an illegitimate daughter, respondent
Angelina. Thereafter, Gonzales died intestate. Villanueva and respondent Angelina then executed
an extrajudicial settlement of Gonzales' estate, some were allegedly acquired during the
cohabitation. In this document, Villanueva, for the amount of P30,000, conveyed his interests in
the estate to Angelina.
Petitioners who are Gonzales half-brothers contested such extra-judicial settlement and
questioned Angelinas illegitimacy.Angelina adduced her birth certificate to prove her filiation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the adduced birth certificate is able to prove Angelinas filiation.
RULING: No. A close examination of the birth certificate reveals that respondent Angelina was
listed as "adopted" by both Villanueva and Gonzales. It was previously held that the mere
registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a
valid adoption, and does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal
rights of such child.
Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts
contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there
by the interested parties. Angelina should have adduced evidence of her adoption, in view of the
contents of her birth certificate. The records, however, are bereft of any such evidence.
Lastly, Gonzales was already 44 years old and on the verge of menopausal and that she had been
living childless with Villanueva for 20 years at the time of the alleged birth. Thus, it was not
sufficiently established that respondent Angelina was Gonzales' biological daughter, nor even her
adopted daughter.
Thus, the petition was granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals are reversed and set aside.
but it annulled the extrajudicial partition with sale. it remanded the case to the court of origin for
the determination and identification of Pacita Gonzales' heirs and the corresponding partition of
her estate.

330. CAMELO CABATANIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 124814
FACTS:
Florencia is the mother of the respondent. Her husband left her in 1981 and she was hired as
petitioners household help. It was then that petitioner and Florencia had sexual intercourse.
After a month, petitioners wife noticed that Florencia is pregnant. For this reason, petitioners
wife dismissed Florencia and told her to go home. Petitioner was surprised when Florencia
demanded from him support for their alleged child. Petitioner refused, denying paternity and
claimed that Florencia was already pregnant when they had sexual intercourse. During trial,
Florencia claimed that petitioner voluntarily recognized respondent when he rented a house for
her after the dismissal and misrepresented herself as a widow when in fact her husband is still
alive. Trial court brushed this misrepresentation and used as one of its bases of its decision the
similarities on personal appearances of the petitioner and respondent and favored the
respondents claim.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent may compulsorily be recognized by petitioner.
RULING:
No. Respondent failed to show conclusive evidence as to establish his filiation with petitioner.
Aside from Florencias self-serving testimony that petitioner rented a house for her, private
respondent failed to present sufficient proof of voluntary recognition. A certificate of live birth
purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is
no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. The local
civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information
of a third person.
More importantly, the fact that Florencias husband is living and there is a valid subsisting
marriage between them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is
legitimate even though Florencia may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress. Only the husband or in exceptional cases, his heirs may impugned the
presumed legitimacy of the child.
With regards the personal appearance of the child, the Supreme Court provided that in this age of
genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely subjective test of
physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity and
filiation before the courts of law.

331. LABAGALA V. SANTIAGO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 132305
FACTS:
Respondents sued their brother, Jose T. Santiago, for recovery of 2/3 share of the property owned
by him, but fraudulently registered under only his name. The court ruled in their favor,
recognizing their right of ownership over portions of the property.
When Jose died intestate, respondents filed a complaint for recovery of title, ownership, and
possession against herein petitioner before the RTC to recover from her the 1/3 portion of said
property pertaining to Jose but which came into petitioners sole possession upon Joses death.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner, but the CA reversed the decision. Hence the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to Joses 1/3 portion of the property he co-owned with
respondents, through succession.
RULING:
Respondents are not assailing petitioners legitimate status but are, instead, asserting that she is
not at all their brothers child. The birth certificate presented by respondents support this
allegation, being that the birth certificate states that petitioner was the child of Leon Labagala
and Cornelia Cabrigas. Against such evidence, the appellee Ida could only present her testimony
and a baptismal certificate. But then, a decisional rule in evidence states that a baptismal
certificate is not a proof of the parentage of the baptized person. This document can only prove
the identity of the baptized, the date and place of her baptism, the identities of the baptismal
sponsors and the priest who administered the sacrament -- nothing more.
A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive proof of filiation. More so are the
entries made in an income tax return, which only shows that income tax has been paid and the
amount thereof. The petitioners silence concerning the absence of her birth certificate is
telling. It raises doubt as to the existence of a birth certificate that would show petitioner to be
the daughter of Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. Her failure to show her birth certificate
would raise the presumption that if such evidence were presented, it would be adverse to her
claim. Petitioners counsel argued that petitioner had been using Santiago all her life. However,
use of a family name certainly does not establish pedigree. During her testimony before the trial
court, petitioner denied knowing Cornelia Cabrigas, who was listed as the mother in the birth
certificate of Ida Labagala. In her petition before this Court, however, she stated that Cornelia is
the sister of her mother, Esperanza. It appears that petitioner made conflicting statements that
affect her credibility and could cast a long shadow of doubt on her claims of filiation.

332. LOCSIN V. LOCSIN

G.R. 146737
FACTS:
On November 11, 1991, or eleven (11) months after Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr. died intestate on
December 11, 1990, respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial Court a "Petition
for Letters of Administration" praying that he be appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate
of the deceased. He alleged, among others, (a) that he is an acknowledged natural child of the
late Juan C. Locsin; (b) that during his lifetime, the deceased owned personal properties which
include undetermined savings, current and time deposits with various banks, and 1/6 portion of
the undivided mass of real properties owned by him and his siblings, namely: Jose Locsin, Jr.,
Manuel Locsin, Maria Locsin Yulo, Lourdes Locsin and Ester Locsin; and (c) that he is the only
surviving legal heir of the decedent.
On January 10, 1992, the heirs of Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs of Maria Locsin, Manuel Locsin and
Ester Jarantilla, claiming to be the lawful heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition to
respondents petition for letters of administration. They averred that respondent is not a child or
an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin, who during his lifetime, never affixed
"Sr." in his name.
On January 5, 1993, another opposition to the petition was filed by Lucy Salinop (sole heir of the
late Maria Locsin Vda. De Araneta, sister of the deceased), Manuel Locsin and the successors of
the late Lourdes C. Locsin alleging that respondent's claim as a natural child is barred by
prescription or the statute of limitations.
The Intestate Estate of the late Jose Locsin, Jr. (brother of the deceased) also entered its
appearance in the estate proceedings, joining the earlier oppositors. This was followed by an
appearance and opposition dated January 26, 1993 of Ester Locsin Jarantilla (another sister of
Juan C. Locsin), likewise stating that there is no filial relationship between herein respondent and
the deceased.
The trial court, finding that Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and the photograph
(Exhibit "C") are sufficient proofs of respondent's illegitimate filiation with the deceased, issued
an order appointing the petitioner Juan E. Locsin, Jr. Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the
late Juan Johnny Locsin, Sr. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the order of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent sufficiently established his filiation with the deceased.

RULING:
"The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgement; or (2) an admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic
writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim
for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of
a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial
action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child's
acknowledgment."
Here, respondent, in order to establish his filiation with the deceased, presented to the trial court
his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 and a photograph taken during the burial of the deceased.
A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both the Civil Code and Article
172 of the Family Code for purposes of recognition and filiation. However, birth certificate
offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. Its
evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where there exists strong, complete and conclusive proof
of its falsity or nullity. In this case, respondent's Certificate of Live Birth entered in the records
of the Local Civil Registry has all the badges of nullity. Without doubt, the authentic copy on
file in that office was removed and substituted with a falsified Certificate of Live Birth.
At this point, it bears stressing the provision of Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court that "(d)ocuments consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty
by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." In this case, the glaring
discrepancies between the two Certificates of Live Birth (Exhibits "D" and "8") have overturned
the genuineness of Exhibit "D" entered in the Local Civil Registry. What is authentic is Exhibit
"8" recorded in the Civil Registry General.
Incidentally, respondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin
cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation.

333. ILANO v. CA
G.R. No. 104376
FACTS:
Leoncia first met petitioner Artemio G. Ilano while she was working as secretary to Atty.
Mariano C. Virata. Leoncia, then managing a business of her own as Namarco distributor, met
petitioner again. Later, he courted her more than four years. Their relationship became intimate
and with his promise of marriage, they eloped. While they were living at Makati, private
respondent Merceditas S. Ilano was born Her birth was recorded as Merceditas de los Santos
Ilano, child of Leoncia Aguinaldo de los Santos and Artemio Geluz Ilano. Inasmuch as it was
already past seven o'clock in the evening, the nurse promised to return the following morning for
his signature. However, he left an instruction to give birth certificate to Leoncia for her signature,
as he was leaving early the following morning. During the time that petitioner and Leoncia were
living as husband and wife, he showed concern as the father of Merceditas. When Merceditas
was in Grade I at the St. Joseph Parochial School, he signed her Report Card for the fourth and
fifth grading periods. CA REVERSED RTC judgment declaring plaintiff MERCEDITAS S.
ILANO as the duly acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child.
ISSUE:
W/N MERCEDITAS S. ILANO is the duly acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child.
RULING:
Petition is DENIED. CA affirmed.
Under the then prevailing provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate children or those who are
conceived and born out of wedlock were generally classified into: (1) Natural, whether actual or
by fiction, were those born outside of lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception
of the child, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other (2) Spurious, whether
incestuous, were disqualified to marry each other on account of certain legal impediments. Since
petitioner had a subsisting marriage to another at the time Merceditas was conceived, she is a
spurious child. Rights of an illegitimate child arose not because he was the true or real child of
his parents but because under the law, he had been recognized or acknowledged as such a child.
A recognition once validly made is irrevocable. It cannot be withdrawn. A mere change of mind
would be incompatible with the stability of the civil status of person, the permanence of which
affects public interest. Even when the act in which it is made should be revocable, the revocation
of such act will not revoke the recognition itself. To be sure, to establish "the open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," it is necessary to comply with
certain jurisprudential requirements. "Continuous" does not, however, mean that the concession
of status shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it
continues (De Jesus v. Syquia, 58 Phil. 866). The possession of such status means that the father
has treated the child as his own, directly and not through other, spontaneously and without
concealment though without publicity (since the relation is illegitimate). There must be a

showing of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his own, by
continuous and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care. The mere denial by defendant
of his signature is not sufficient to offset the totality of the evidence indubitably showing that the
signature thereon belongs to him. The entry in the Certificate of Live Birth that Leoncia and
Artemio was falsely stated therein as married does not mean that Merceditas is not appellee's
daughter. This particular entry was caused to be made by Artemio himself in order to avoid
embarrassment. It is difficult to believe that plaintiffs mother, who is a mere dressmaker, had
long beforehand diabolically conceived of a plan to make it appear that defendant, who claims to
be a total stranger to be a total stranger, was the father of her child, and in the process falsified
the latter's signatures and handwriting. The natural, logical and coherent evidence of plaintiff
from the genesis of the relationship between Leoncia and appellee, their living together as
circumstances of plaintiff's birth, the acts of appellee in recognizing and supporting plaintiff, find
ample support from the testimonial and documentary evidence which leaves no room to
reasonably doubt his paternity which may not be infirmed by his belated denials. Any other
evidence or proof that the defendant is the father is broad enough to render unnecessary the other
paragraphs of this article. When the evidence submitted in the action for compulsory recognition
is not sufficient to meet requirements of the first three paragraphs, it may still be enough under
the last paragraph. This paragraph permits hearsay and reputation evidence, as provided in the
Rules of Court, with respect to illegitimate filiation. As a necessary consequence of the finding
that private respondent is the spurious child of petitioner, she is entitled to support. In awarding
support to her, respondent court took into account the following: The obligation to give support
shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to recover the same needs it for
maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand.
The complaint in this case was filed on August 14, 1972. Plaintiff, having been born on
December 30, 1963, was about 9 years old at the time and was already of school age spending
about P400.00 to P500.00 a month for her school expenses alone, while defendant was earning
about P10,000.00 a month. She is therefore entitled to support in arrears for a period of 12 years,
4 months and 14 days, which is hereby fixed at P800.00 a month for the 1st 3 years; and
considering the declining value of the peso as well as her needs as she grows older, at a
graduated increase of P1,000.00 a month for the next 3 years; P1,300.00 a month for the
succeeding 3 years; and P1,500.00 a month for the last 3 years, 4 months and 14 days until she
attained the age of majority. This being an action for legal support, the award of attorney's fees is
appropriate under Article 2208 (6) of the Civil Code. Moreover, the court deems it just and
equitable under the given facts and circumstances that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation
should be recovered.

334. FERNANDEZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS

230 SCRA 130
FACTS:
Violeta alleged that private respondent Carlito Fernandez is the father of her two children, Claro
Antonio and John Paul Fernandez who were born due to their illicit sexual relationship. She also
stated that she was married to private respondent and was ignorant of the fact that her husband
was already married. From the above situation, petitioner filed a support against private
respondent, showing as evidence, the certificate of live birth of the children identifying Carlito as
their father, photographs of Carlito during the baptism of Claro and pictures of Carlito and Claro
at the home of Violeta.
The Trial Courts ruling in favor of petitioner was set aside and reversed by the Court of Appeals.
A petition was then filed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in rejecting the documentary evidence of the petitioners to
prove their filiation.
RULING:
The appellate court did not err in its judgment as ruled out by the Supreme Court. The case was
properly dismissed because of inadequate and insufficient evidence given by the petitioners and
paternity affiliation to the respondent. The photographs presented as evidence fell short of the
evidence required to prove paternity. Moreover, there was no showing that private respondent
participated in the preparation of the childrens baptismal certificate. The Supreme Court
stipulated that such is not competent evidence of the veracity of evidence with respect to the
childs paternity. This is also to the certificate of live birth of the petitioners. There was no
showing that private respondent had a hand in its preparation.

335. RODRIGUEZ V. CA
245 S 150
FACTS:
On October 15, 1986, an action for compulsory recognition and support was brought before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Baguio-Benguet, by respondent Alarito (Clarito) Agbulos against
Bienvenido Rodriguez, petitioner herein. At the trial, the plaintiff presented his mother, Felicitas
Agbulos Haber, as first witness. In the course of her direct examination, she was asked by
counsel to reveal the identity of the plaintiff's father but the defendant's counsel raised a timely
objection which the court sustained.
The plaintiff filed before the Court a petition for review on certiorari questioning the said order
of the lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not mother of the plaintiff should be allowed to testify on the identity of his father
RULING:
Under Article 172 of the Family Code, filiation of legitimate children is by any of the following:
The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1)
The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2)
An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1)
The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2)
Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. A witness can testify
only to those facts which he knows of his own knowledge, that is, which are derived from his
own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.
In Navarro v. Bacalla, 15 SCRA 114 (1965) the Court clearly stated:
We are not ruling whether the mere testimony of the mother, without more, is sufficient to prove
the paternity of the child. Neither are we ruling on the scope of Art. 280, New Civil Code which
enjoins the mother in making a separate and voluntary recognition of a child from revealing the
name of the father, specifically, as to whether the mother's testimony identifying the father is
admissible in an action to compel recognition if and when a timely objection to such oral
evidence is interposed.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court. The trial court was directed to
proceed with dispatch in the disposition of the action for compulsory recognition.

336. JISON VS. JISON

February 24, 1998
FACTS:
Monina Jison alleged that Francisco Jison had been married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison since
1940. At the end of 1945 or at the start of 1946, however, Francisco impregnated Esperanza
Amolar. As a result, Monica was born on August 6, 1946, and since childhood, had enjoyed the
continuous implied recognition as an illegitimate child of Francisco by his acts and that of his
family. Monina further alleged that Francisco gave her support and spent for her education, such
that she obtained a Masters degree, became a CPA, and eventually a Central Bank Examiner. In
view of Franciscos refusal to expressly recognize her, Monina prayed for a judicial declaration
of her illegitimate stauts and that Franciscos support and treat her such.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Monina has established her filiation as Franciscos illegitimate daughter by
preponderance of evidence?
RULING:
Monina relies upon the second paragraph of the said article which provides that to prove open
and continues possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the
manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his by
continues and clear manifestation of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to
pure charity. This, according to the court, has been sufficiently established by Monina in the light
of the evidence that Francisco fathered Monina, has recognized her as his daughter, and that
Monina has been enjoying the open and continuous possession of the status as Franciscos
illegitimate daughter.
The paternal affection and care must not be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such
a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have
and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but
continuously. In the Jison case, the following overt acts and conduct satisfy the requirement.
Like sending appellant to school, paying for her tuition fees, school uniforms, books, board and
lodging, providing her with a monthly allowance, paying for the funeral expenses of appellants
mother, acknowledging appellants paternal greetings and calling appellant hija or child,
instructing his office personnel to give appellants monthly allowance, recommending appellant
for employment at another company, allowing appellant to use his house in Bacolod and paying
for her long distance telephone calls, having appellant spend her vacation in his apartment in
Manila and also his Forbes resicence, allowing appellant to use his surname in her scholastic and
other records.
If the alleged father did not intervene in the birth certificate, e. g., supplying the information
himself, the inscription of his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is null and void; the mere
certificate by the registrar without the signature of the father is not proof of voluntary

acknowledgment on the latters part. In like manner, Franciscos lack of participation in the
preparation of the baptismal certificatesschool records renders these documents incompetent
to prove paternity, the former being competent merely to prove the administration of baptism on
the date so specified. However, despite the inadmissibility of the school records per se to prove
paternity, they may be admitted as part of MONINAs testimony to corroborate her claim that
FRANCISCO spent for her education.

338. AGUSTIN V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 162571
FACTS:
Respondents Fe Angela and her son, Martin sued Martins alleged biological father, petitioner
Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the RTC. The respondents alleged that the
petitioner impregnated her and bore a son Martin out of wedlock. The babys birth certificate was
purportedly signed by the petitioner as the father. Arnel even shouldered the prenatal and hospital
expenses but later refused Fes repeated requests for Martins support despite his adequate
financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption.
The petitioner denied having sired Martin because his affair and intimacy with Fe had allegedly
ended in 1998, long before Martins conception. He admitted that their affair started in 1993 but
theirs was an on-and-off relationship. He terminated the affair when he was unable to bear the
prospect of losing his wife and family. Finally, the petitioner claims that the signature and the
community tax certificate attributed to him in the acknowledgement of Martins birth certificate
were falsified.
The private respondents moved for the issuance of an order directing the parties to submit
themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner
opposed said motion invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination and stating that
there was no cause of action, considering that his signature on the birth certificate was a forgery
and that under the law, an illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not recognized by the
putative father.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to submit
themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. CA affirmed the trial court.
ISSUE:
a)
Whether or not the respondent court erred in denying the petitioners MTD.
b)
Whether or not the court erred in directing parties to subject to DNA paternity testing and
was a form of unreasonable search.

RULING:
No. The trial court properly denied the petitioners motion to dismiss because the private
respondents complaint on its face showed that they had a cause of action against the petitioner.
The elements of a cause of action are: (1) the plaintiffs primary right and the defendants
corresponding primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by
which the primary right and duty have been violated. The cause of action is determined not by
the prayer of the complaint but by the facts alleged.
339. HERRERA V. ALBA

G.R. No. 148220

FACTS:
On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba (respondent), represented by his mother
Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and
damages against petitioner. On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim
where he denied that he is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical
contact with respondents mother.
Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the
proceedings. In her testimony, Dr. Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and
asserted that the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.Petitioner
opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner
further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.
In an Order dated 3 February 2000, the trial court granted respondents motion to conduct DNA
paternity testing on petitioner, respondent and Armi Alba.Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the 3 February 2000 Order. He asserted that under the present circumstances,
the DNA test is compelled to take would be inconclusive, irrelevant and the coercive process to
obtain the requisite specimen, unconstitutional.In an Order dated 8 June 2000, the trial court
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
On 29 November 2000, the appellate court issued a decision denying the petition and affirming
the questioned Orders of the trial court. The appellate court stated that petitioner merely desires
to correct the trial courts evaluation of evidence. Thus, appeal is an available remedy for an
error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The appellate
court also stated that the proposed DNA paternity testing does not violate his right against selfincrimination because the right applies only to testimonial compulsion. Finally, the appellate
court pointed out that petitioner can still refute a possible adverse result of the DNA paternity
testing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation.
RULING:
Before discussing the issues on DNA paternity testing, we deem it appropriate to give an
overview of a paternity suit and apply it to the facts of this case. We shall consider the
requirements of the Family Code and of the Rules of Evidence to establish paternity and
filiation.Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a
legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support, or inheritance. The burden of
proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of
the child. There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which
parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and
physical resemblance between the putative father and child.

A prima facie case exists if a woman declares that she had sexual relations with the putative
father. In our jurisdiction, corroborative proof is required to carry the burden forward and shift it
to the putative father.There are two affirmative defenses available to the putative father. The
putative father may show incapability of sexual relations with the mother, because of either
physical absence or impotency. The putative father may also show that the mother had sexual
relations with other men at the time of conception.
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. The childs
legitimacy may be impugned only under the strict standards provided by law.Finally, physical
resemblance between the putative father and child may be offered as part of evidence of
paternity. Resemblance is a trial technique unique to a paternity proceeding. However, although
likeness is a function of heredity, there is no mathematical formula that could quantify how much
a child must or must not look like his biological father. This kind of evidence appeals to the
emotions of the trier of fact.
In the present case, the trial court encountered three of the four aspects. Armi Alba, respondents
mother, put forward a prima facie case when she asserted that petitioner is respondents
biological father. Aware that her assertion is not enough to convince the trial court, she offered
corroborative proof in the form of letters and pictures. Petitioner, on the other hand, denied Armi
Albas assertion. He denied ever having sexual relations with Armi Alba and stated that
respondent is Armi Albas child with another man. Armi Alba countered petitioners denial by
submitting pictures of respondent and petitioner side by side, to show how much they resemble
each other.
Paternity and filiation disputes can easily become credibility contests. We now look to the law,
rules, and governing jurisprudence to help us determine what evidence of incriminating acts on
paternity and filiation are allowed in this jurisdiction.

340. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS GERRICO VALLEJO

G.R. No. 144656
FACTS:
On July 10, 1999 9-year old Daisy Diolola went to her neighbors house to seek help in an
assignment. It was a Saturday. Gerrico Vallejo, the neighbor, helped Daisy in her assignment. At
5pm of the same day, Daisys mom noticed that her child wasnt home yet. She went to Vallejos
house and Daisy wasnt there. 7pm, still no word of Daisys whereabouts. The next morning,
Daisys body was found tied to a tree near a river bank. Apparently, she was raped and thereafter
strangled to death.
In the afternoon of July 11, the police went to Vallejos house to question the latter as he was one
of the last persons with the victim. But prior to that, some neighbors have already told the police
that Vallejo was acting strangely during the afternoon of July 10. The police requested for the
clothes that Vallejo wore the day Daisy disappeared. Vallejo complied and the clothes were
submitted for processing.
The person who processed the clothing was Pet Byron Buan, a Forensic Biologist of the NBI. At
the instance of the local fiscal, he also took mouth/cheek swabs from Vallejo and a vaginal swab
from Daisys body for DNA testing. Dr. Buan found that there were bloodstains in Vallejos
clothing Blood Type A, similar to that of the victim, while Vallejos Blood Type is O. Buan also
found that the vaginal swab from Daisy contained Vallejos DNA profile.
Meanwhile, Vallejo already executed a sworn statement admitting the crime. But when trial
came, Vallejo insisted that the sworn statement was coerced by tortures, beatings and threats to
his life.The trial court still convicted Vallejo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the DNA samples gathered are admissible as evidence.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the findings of Dr. Buan are conclusive. The court explained
how DNA works for purposes of identifying the suspect in a crime. The court decided that even
though DNA evidence is merely circumstantial, it can still prove that the accused considering
that it corroborates all other circumstantial evidence gathered in this rape-slay case. The Supreme
Court also elucidated on the admissibility of DNA evidence in this case and for the first time
recognized its evidentiary value in the Philippines. The DNA profile is distinct and unique. When
a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the victims body
for the suspects DNA. The evidence sample is then matched with the reference sample taken
from the suspect and the victim.
The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the evidence
sample and the reference sample. The samples collected are subjected to various chemical
processes to establish their profile.

Wherefore, the court upheld the decision of the RTC that Vallejo was guilty of rape with
homicide. The court also sentenced him to death and he is to indemnify the heirs of the victim in
an amount of 100,000 pesos for civil indemnity and 50,000 for moral damages is affirmed by the
court.

341. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT"

G.R. No. 150224 (428 SCRA 504)
FACTS:
Accused-appellant was sentenced to death for the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide,
and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim. Appellant was charged to have had carnal
knowledge of a certain Kathylyn Uba against her will, and with the use of a bladed weapon,
stabbed the latter inflicting upon her fatal injuries resulting in her untimely demise.
In the instant case, appellant raises the issue of credibility of witnesses, specifically assigning as
error on the part of the trial court, the latters giving of much weight to the evidence presented by
the prosecution notwithstanding their doubtfulness.
ISSUE:
Whether appellants contentions as regards the witnesses credibility are meritorious.
RULING:
NO. The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved against
appellant. This Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the
credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight
and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted.
Well-entrenched is the rule that the findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses are
entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent reasons are presented necessitating a
reexamination if not the disturbance of the same; the reason being that the former is in a better
and unique position of hearing first hand the witnesses and observing their deportment, conduct
and attitude. Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied
some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, the trial judges
assessment of credibility deserves the appellate courts highest respect. Where there is nothing to
show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their testimonies
are entitled to full faith and credit.
The weight of the prosecutions evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule
which provides that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as
sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the
accused committed the crime.

342. REYES, ET AL. V. MAURICIO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 175080
FACTS:
Eugenio Reyes was the registered owner of a parcel of land. Said title came from and cancelled
TCT No. T-62290 registered in the name of Eufracia and Susana Reyes, siblings of Eugenio. The
subject property was adjudicated to Eugenio by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement among the
heirs following the death of his parents. The controversy stemmed from a complaint filed before
the DARAB by respondent, now deceased, and her alleged daughter for annulment of contract
denominated as Kasunduan, and between Librada and Eugenio as parties. Respondents also
prayed for maintenance of their peaceful possession with damages.
Respondents alleged that they are the legal heirs of the late Godofredo Mauricio, who was the
lawful and registered tenant of Eugenio through his predecessors-in-interest to the subject land;
that Eugenio caused the preparation of a document denominated as Kasunduan to eject
respondents from the subject property. Respondents prayed for the declaration of nullity of
the Kasunduan and for an order for petitioner to maintain and place them in peaceful possession
and cultivation of the subject property. Petitioner averred that no tenancy relationship existed
between him and respondents. He clarified that Godofredos occupation of the subject premises
was based on the formers mere tolerance and accommodation. The DARAB ruled in favor of the
respondents. The CA affirmed the decision and resolution of the DARAB. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Leonida has legal standing.
RULING:
Her legal standing cannot be assailed in the petition, the petition is denied. Petitioner cannot
collaterally attack the status of the surviving respondent in the instant petition. It is settled law
that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked. It is stated that legitimacy and filiation can be
questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral
attack. The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made subject to a
collateral attack. Against these jurisprudential backdrop, we have to leave out the status of
Leonida from the case for annulment of the Kasunduan that supposedly favors petitioners cause.

343. ONG V. DIAZ

G.R. No. 171713
FACTS:
A Complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending litigation was filed by
minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz (Joanne), represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky C. Diaz
(Jinky), against Rogelio G. Ong (Rogelio) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City.
As alleged by Jinky in her Complaint in November 1993 in Tarlac City, she and Rogelio got
acquainted. This developed into friendship and later blossomed into love. At this time, Jinky was
already married to a Japanese national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil wedding solemnized on 19
February 1993 by Municipal Trial Court Judge Panfilo V. Valdez.
From January 1994 to
September 1998, Jinky and Rogelio cohabited and lived together. From this live-in relationship,
minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz was conceived and on 25 February 1998 was born at the Central
Luzon Doctors Hospital, Tarlac City.
Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor Joanne and Jinky home after delivery.
Rogelio paid all the hospital bills and the baptismal expenses and provided for all of minor
Joannes needs that is recognizing the child as his.
In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and stopped supporting minor
Joanne, falsely alleging that he is not the father of the child.Rogelio, despite Jinkys
remonstrance, failed and refused and continued failing and refusing to give support for the child
and to acknowledge her as his daughter, thus leading to the filing of the heretofore adverted
complaint.On 28 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion to lift the order of default and a motion for
reconsideration seeking the courts understanding, as he was then in a quandary on what to do to
find a solution to a very difficult problem of his life.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court of appeals erred when it remanded the case to the court a quo for DNA
analysis despite the fact that it is no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio G. Ong.
RULING:
As a whole, the present petition calls for the determination of filiation of minor Joanne for
purposes of support in favor of the said minor. Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to
adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship,
support, or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the
putative father is the biological father of the child. There are four significant procedural aspects
of a traditional paternity action which parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative
defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and
child.
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. As a guaranty
in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code

provides:Article 167. The children shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

344. BRIONES vs. MIGUEL

GR. No. 156343
FACTS:
On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus to obtain
custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda.The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael
Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on
September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is
now married to a Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan. The petitioner prays that
the custody of his son Michael Kevin Pineda be given to him as his biological father and has
demonstrated his capability to support and educate him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the natural father may be denied the custody and parental care of his own child in
the absence of the mother who is away.
RULING:
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of
petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly
provides that "illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This is
the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity.
Parental authority over recognized natural children who were under the age of majority was
vested in the father or the mother recognizing them. If both acknowledge the child, authority was
to be exercised by the one to whom it was awarded by the courts; if it was awarded to both, the
rule as to legitimate children applied. In other words, in the latter case, parental authority resided
jointly in the father and the mother.

345. MARQUINO vs. IAC

G.R. No. 72078
FACTS:
Respondent Bibiana Roman-Pagador filed an action for Judicial Declaration of Filiation,
Annulment of Partition, Support, and Damages against petitioner Eutiquio Marquino.Also
impleaded as defendants, were Maria Terenal-Marquino, wife of Eutiquio Marquino, and their
legitimate children Luz, Ana, and Eva, all surnamed Terenal-Marquino. The records show that
Bibiana was born on December 2, 1926 at Piapi, Dumaguete City, of Gregoria Romano and
allegedly of Eutiquio Marquino. 1 At that time, Eutiquio was still single. Bibiana became
personally known to the Marquino family when she was hired as domestic helper in their
household in Dumaguete City. She always received financial assistance from them. Thus, she
claimed that she enjoyed continuous possession of the status of an acknowledged natural child by
direct and unequivocal acts of her father and his family. The Marquinos, on the other hand,
strongly denied her allegations. During the pendency of the case she died on March 17, 1979. On
March 23, 1979, her heirs were ordered substituted for her as parties-plaintiffs. On May 17,
1983, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss. They averred that the action for recognition is
intransmissible to the heirs being a personal act.
The trial court dismissed the case. Respondents appealed to the respondent Intermediate
Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals). On August 20, 1983, Eutiquio Marquino died while the
case was pending appeal. On June 17, 1985, respondent court reversed the controverted order
and remanded the case to the Court of origin for continuation of the trial by the heirs of plaintiff
against the heirs of defendan. It ruled: "[A]fter the death of the natural child, the heirs of said
deceased natural child, cannot bring the action to compel recognition, but may however, continue
the action already filed to compel recognition
ISSUES:
1.

Whether or not the right of action to compel recognition is intransmissible in character.

2. Whether or not after the death of the putative father the action for recognition of a
child can be continued against the heirs of the former.

natural

RULING:
The right of action for the acknowledgment of natural children to which Article 285 refers, can
never be transmitted. The reason is that the code makes no mention of it in any case, not even as
an exception. Article 285 of the Civil Code provides that an action for recognition of natural
children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the
following cases: (1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case
the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his
majority; (2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which
nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.

As answer to the second issue, the Court rules against its continuance. In an action for
compulsory recognition, the party in the best position to oppose the same is the putative parent
himself. The need to hear the side of the putative parent is an overwhelming consideration
because of the unsettling effects of such an action on the peace and harmonious relationship in
the family of the putative parent. For this reason, Article 285 provides only two (2) exceptions
when an action for recognition transcends the death of the putative parent. Neither of these
exceptions obtains in the case at bench. Firstly, the death of Eutiquio did not occur during the
minority of Bibiana. In fact, she was already forty-five (45) years old when the recognition case
was filed on January 10, 1971. Secondly, no document was discovered, before unknown, in
which Bibiana was expressly acknowledged as a natural child. Consequently, the respondent
court erred in ruling that the action can still be continued against the heirs of Eutiquio.

346. TAYAG V. CA
209 S 665
FACTS:
On January 15, 2001, respondent, Felicidad A. Tayag-Gallor, filed a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration over the estate of Ismael Tayag. The respondent alleged that she is one
of the illegitimate children of the late Ismael Tayag and Ester Angeles.
On September 7, 2000, Ismael Tayag died intestate, leaving behind two real properties both of
which are in the possession of petitioner, and a motor vehicle which the latter sold on 10 October
2000 preparatory to the settlement of the decedents estate. Petitioner allegedly promised to give
respondent and her brothers P100, 000.00 each as their share in the proceeds of the sale.
However, petitioner only gave each of them half the amount she promised.
In a Motion dated August 31, 2001, petitioner reiterated her sole ownership of the properties and
presented the transfer certificates of title thereof in her name. She also averred that it is necessary
to allege that respondent was acknowledged and recognized by Ismael Tayag as his illegitimate
child. There being no such allegation, the action becomes one to compel recognition which
cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. To prevent further encroachment upon
the courts time, petitioner moved for a hearing on her affirmative defenses. The motion was
denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents petition for the issuance of letters of administration sufficiently
states a cause of action considering that respondent merely alleged therein that she is an
illegitimate child of the decedent, without stating that she had been acknowledged or recognized
as such by the latter
RULING:
The appellate court held that the mere allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child suffices.
Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for the issuance of letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person. The Court, applying the provisions of the Family Code
which had then already taken effect, ruled that since Graciano was claiming illegitimate filiation
under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, i.e., open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child, the action was already barred by the death of the
alleged father.
In contrast, respondent in this case had not been given the opportunity to present evidence to
show whether she had been voluntarily recognized and acknowledged by her deceased father
because of petitioners opposition to her petition and motion for hearing on affirmative defenses.
There is, as yet, no way to determine if her petition is actually one to compel recognition which
had already been foreclosed by the death of her father, or whether indeed she has a material and
direct interest to maintain the suit by reason of the decedents voluntary acknowledgment or
recognition of her illegitimate filiation.

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
347. REPUBLIC vs. ABADILLA
GR. No. 133054
FACTS:
Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino have been living together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage. During their cohabitation, Luzviminda begot two children,
Emerson and Rafael. In the Certificates of Birth of these two children, they were registered with
the surname Abadilla and the name of their father was entered as Herson Abadilla.
Moreover, the entry in the date and place of marriage of the childrens parents appeared as June
19, 1987 at Dingras, Ilocos Norte.
On February 5, 1997, Gerson Abadilla, Luzviminda Celestino and their two minor children,
Emerson and Rafael,filed a petition for correction of the birth certificates.The petition was
granted.
The instant petition for review on certiorari is now being interposed by the Office of the Solicitor
General on the ground that the trial court committed a reversible error when it allowed the
deletion of the date and place of marriage of parents from the birth certificates of minors
Emerson C. Abadilla and Rafael C. Abadilla but failed to order the change of the minors
surname from Abadilla to Celestino.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court committed an error in their ruling of the case.
RULING:
Yes. According to Article 176 "Illegitimate children shall use zthe surname and shall be under
the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this
Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one half of the legitime of a
legitimate child.Thus, as illegitimate children, Emerson and Rafael should bear the surname of
their mother, Luzviminda Celestino.

349. VERCELES vs. POSADA

GR. No. 159785
FACTS:
On November 11, 1986, at around 11:00 a.m., Verceles fetched Clarissa Posada from "My
Brothers Place" where the seminar was being held.Clarissa avers that he told her that they would
have lunch at Mayon Hotel with their companions who had gone ahead. When they reached the
place her companions were nowhere. After Verceles ordered food, he started making amorous
advances on her. She panicked, ran and closeted herself inside a comfort room where she stayed
until someone knocked. She said she hurriedly exited and left the hotel. Afraid of the mayor, she
kept the incident to herself. She went on as casual employee. One of her tasks was following-up
barangay road and maintenance projects.
On December 22, 1986, on orders of Verceles, she went to Virac, Catanduanes, to follow up
funds for barangay projects. At around 11:00 a.m. the same day, she went to Catanduanes Hotel
on instructions of petitioner who asked to be briefed on the progress of her mission. They met at
the lobby and he led her upstairs because he said he wanted the briefing done at the restaurant at
the upper floor.
Instead, Verceles opened a hotel room door, led her in, and suddenly embraced her, as he told her
that he was unhappy with his wife and would "divorce" her anytime. He also claimed he could
appoint her as a municipal development coordinator. She succumbed to his advances. But again
she kept the incident to herself.Sometime in January 1987, when she missed her menstruation,
she said she wrote petitioner that she feared she was pregnant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the filiation of Verna Aiza Posada as the illegitimate child of petitioner was
proven.
RULING:
The letters are private handwritten instruments of petitioner which establish Verna Aizas
filiation under Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. In addition, the arrays of evidence presented
by respondents, the dates, letters, pictures and testimonies, to us, are convincing, and irrefutable
evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioners illegitimate child.
Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, he himself presented no evidence of his
own. His bare denials are telling. Well-settled is the rule that denials, if unsubstantiated by clear
and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving which merit no weight in law and cannot
be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.

350. IN RE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

G.R. No. 148311
FACTS:
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein among others that
Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994, that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie
has been using her mothers middle name and surname, and that she is now a widower and
qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name Astorga be changed
to Garcia her mothers surname and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his
Surname.
The trial court rendered the assailed decision granting the adoption, however, the trial Court did
not allow the use of her mothers surname as her middle name. Thus, petitioner filed a motion for
clarification and reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of
her natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother, as her middle name,
when she subsequently adopted by her natural father.
RULING:
As correctly submitted by parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Notably,
the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. The Court ruled that since
no law granting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, as in this case, to use as
middle name the mothers surname, the Court found no reason why Stephanie should not
allowed to use her mothers surname Garcia as her middle name.

351. PEOPLE vs. GLABO

GR. No. 129248
FACTS:
One afternoon in October, 1991, 21-year old victim Mila Lobrico, a mental retardate, and her 11year old sister, Judith, were summoned by Justiniano Glabo, their maternal uncle, to his house.
He told them to wash the clothes of his wife. After the two sisters finished their chore, accusedappellant ordered Judith to wash the dishes in the nearby creek, about 200 meters away from his
house. When Judith was gone, accused-appellant dragged Mila from the yard, where she was
hanging the washed clothes, into the house. He pushed her to the floor and made her lie down.
He undressed the victim, and then he inserted his penis into her private organ and made push and
pull motions. Mila was overpowered by accused-appellants brute strength. She shouted for help,
but there were no neighbors nearby.
Suddenly, it started to rain hard, so Judith had to run back to the house for shelter. She went
directly under the house, which was elevated 3 feet above the ground. While underneath the
house, she heard someone crying on the floor above. She looked up through the bamboo floor
and saw accused-appellant on top of her elder sister. Both were naked. Judith went to the kitchen,
and she saw accused-appellants penis as he stood up and raised his briefs.
The two girls went home silently. They did not say a word about the incident. However, the
victim became pregnant as a result of the rape, and after six months her condition could no
longer be concealed. Severino Lobrico, Milas father, confronted her, but she said nothing. It was
her sister, Judith, who told their father that accused-appellant raped Mila. Severino brought Mila
to the police and filed a complaint for rape before the Municipal Trial Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the offspring is illegitimate.
RULING: Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds of civil liability that
may be imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgement of the offspring,
unless the law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring.
With the passage of the Family Code, the classification of acknowledged natural children and
natural children by legal fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the specie of illegitimate
children. Since parental authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family Code upon the mother
and considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses the power to
exercise parental authority over his children, no further positive act is required of the parent as
the law itself provides for the childs status. Hence, accused-appellant should only be ordered to
indemnify and support the victims child. However, the amount and terms of support shall be
determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing in accordance with Article 201 of the
Family Code.
The court held that the accused-appellant that was sentenced by the RTC to penalty of reclusion
perpetua is affirmed with some modification. first, the accused-appellant is to pay 50,000 pesos
for civil indemnity and 25,000 for exemplary damages and also 50,000 for moral

damages.further, he is to support the victims child born out of the rape, subject to the amount
and terms that would be decided by the trail court.

352. MANGULABNAN v. IAC

185 SCRA 760
FACTS:
Elena Mangulabnan, as guardian ad litem of minor Alfie Angeno Acero, filed in the RTC an
action for support, actual and moral damages for her child Alfie. Pending litigation an
application support pendente lite against Ambrosio Tan Chew Acero-opposed. The Regional
Trial Court ordered Ambrosio Tan to pay monthly support of P1,500. MOR denied. Whereas,
RTCs decision was annulled by the Court of Appeals: While the childs paternity appears to
have been established by the affidavits of Elena Mangulabnan as well as affidavit of two
witnesses, this fact alone is not sufficient to order Ambrosio to pay support. It is necessary that
Ambrosio has recognized the child. Refused to accept the birth certificate constituted voluntary
recognition since its probative value was impaired by the verified opposition of Ambrosio. He
claims that the same was spurious as it was sworn before a notary public in Manila. When the
child was born in Cavite Maternity clinic in Las Pinas Rizal. Illegitimate child to be entitled to
support must be recognized whether natural or spurious.
Petitioner claims that the child is entitled to support upon proof of filiation without the need of
acknowledgment,
RULING:
Reversed. There must be a declaration of the status of the child from which the right to support
is derived and before support can be ordered. Such a declaration may be provisional, that is by
affidavit.
The requirement for recognition by the father or mother jointly or by one of them as provision of
law refers in particular to a natural child- such a child is presumed to be natural child of the
parents recognizing it who had the legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of conception.
Thus, an illegitimate child like Alfie whose father is married and had no legal capacity to
contract marriage at the time of conception is not a natural child but an illegitimate child or
spurious child in which case recognition is not required before support can be granted.
However, under Art. 887, in all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be proved either
Voluntary or Compulsory recognition. Whereas, Voluntary Recognition is made in a) record of
birth; b) will; c) statement before a court; d) any authentic writing and Compulsory Recognition,
the child brings out his recognition when brought through court action. The affidavits, as well as
the birth certificate had provisionally established the status of the child.

353. TONOG V. CA, ET AL.

G.R. No. 122906

FACTS:
Petitioner gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate daughter with the
respondent. They cohabited for a time and lived with private respondents parents and sister in
the latters house where the infant, Gardin Faith, was a welcome addition to the family. A year
after her birth, petitioner left for the USA to work as a nurse, she left her daughter in the care of
the respondent. Later. Respondent filed for guardianship over Gardin Faith, in the RTC, which
the latter approved.
When petitioner learned of this, she filed a petition for relief from judgement, which was granted
and reversed the decision making respondent the childs legal guardian. In respondents motion
for reconsideration, the same was denied, and subsequently, petitioner filed a motion to remand
custody of Gardin Faith to her, which was granted. Due to this, respondent filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA. It was dismissed at first, but on reconsideration ruled in favor of the
petitioner. Hence, the instant case.
ISSUE:
Who should be the temporary legal guardian of the child?
RULING:
It shall depend on the choice of the child however before final judgement, guardianship shall
remain with the respondent, and thus the petition is denied. In custody disputes, it is axiomatic
that the paramount criterion is the welfare and well-being of the child. In arriving at its decision
as to whom custody of the minor should be given, the court must take into account the respective
resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents. Insofar as illegitimate
children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate children shall
be under the parental authority of their mother. Likewise, Article 213 of the Family Code
provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the
court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. It will be observed that in both provisions, a
strong bias is created in favor of the mother. If the child is, however, older than seven years of
age, he is allowed to state his preference, but the court is not bound by that choice. In the case at
bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, since it
appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not been terminated, and
no pronouncement has been made as to who should have final custody of the minor. Inasmuch as
the age of the minor, Gardin Faith, has now exceeded the statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori,
her preference and opinion must first be sought in the choice of which parent should have the
custody over her person. It should be noted that the pronouncement here should not be
interpreted to imply a preference toward the respondent father relative to the final custody of the
minor, Gardin Faith. Nor should it be taken to mean as a statement against petitioners fitness to
have final custody of her said minor daughter. It shall be only understood that, for the present
and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of the subject minor should remain with her father,
the private respondent herein pending final judgment of the trial court in Sp. Proc. No. Q-9211053.

354. REPUBLIC VS. ABADILLA

302 S 358
FACTS:
Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino have been living together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage. During their cohabitation, Luzviminda begot two children,
Emerson and Rafael. In the Certificates of Birth of these two children, they were registered with
the surname "Abadilla" and the name of their father was entered as "Herson" Abadilla.
Moreover, the entry in the date and place of marriage of the childrens parents appeared as June
19, 1987 at Dingras, Ilocos Norte.
Thereafter, an Amended Petition for Correction/Cancellation of Entries dated February 5, 19973
was filed by the spouses and their two minor children, in order to correct the childrens birth
certificates as to the deletion of the date and place of marriage of the spouses and that the first
name of petitioner Gerson C. Abadilla be corrected as Gerson instead of Herson. In February 17,
1998, the trial court granted the petition and ordered the corrections requested.
The instant petition for review on certiorari was interposed by the Office of the Solicitor General
on the ground that the trial court committed a reversible error when it allowed the deletion of the
"date and place of marriage of parents" from the birth certificates of minors Emerson C. Abadilla
and Rafael C. Abadilla but failed to order the change of the minors surname from "Abadilla" to
"Celestino."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the illegitimate children should use the surname of their father.
RULING:
The illegitimate children should not use the surname of their father.
There is no dispute that Emerson C. Abadilla and Rafael C. Abadilla are illegitimate children,
their parents, Spouses Herson and Luzviminda not being married to each other even up to now.
Article 176 of the Family Code provides that Illegitimate children shall use the surname and
shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one half of the
legitime of a legitimate child.
Thus, as illegitimate children, Emerson and Rafael should bear the surname of their mother,
Luzviminda Celestino. Resultingly, with the correction of the entries in their birth certificates
which deleted the entry in the date and place of marriage of parents, the corresponding correction
with respect to their surname should have also been made and changed to Celestino, their
mothers surname.

Decision modified. The Civil Registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte was ordered to change the
entry in the Amended Birth Certificates of Emerson and Rafael with respect to their surname,
and enter instead therein the surname "Celestino".

355. MOSSESGELD vs. COURT OF APPEALS

GR. No. 111455
FACTS:
Marissa Alfaro Mossesgeld , single, gave birth to a baby boy on December 2, 1989. The
presumed father is Eleazar Siriban Calasan, a married lawyer. The father signed the birth
certificate of the child as the informant, indicating hat the childs name is Jonathan Mossesgeld
Calasan. He also executed an affidavit admitting the paternity of the child. The person in charge
at the hospital refused to place the presumed fathers surname as the childs surname in the
certificated of live birth. Thus, petitioner himself submitted the certificate to the office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong for registration.
Again, the municipal treasurer, as officer in charge of the local civil registrars office, rejected
the registration on the basis of the Civil Registrar Generals Circular No. 4, which provides that
under Article 176 of the Family Code, illegitimate children born on or after August 3, 1988 shall
use the surname of their mother. Upon inquiring about the status of the status of the registration
of his child, Calasan was furnished with a copy of the letter of the Civil Registrar General
denying the registration of the certificate of live birth on the grounds that it is contrary to law.
Calasan, thereafter, filed a petition for mandamus with the Pasig RTC to compel the local civil
registrar to register the certificate of live birth of his illegitimate son using his surname. His
petition was denied. He filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion to for leave to amend the
petition to substitute the childs mother as the petitioner. His motion to amen was granted, but
motion for reconsideration was denied. He elevated the petition to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the RTCs decision
ISSUE:
Whether or not mandamus lies to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register thecertificate of
live birth of an illegitimate child using the alleged fathers surname where the latter admitted
paternity.
RULING:
No. Local Civil Registrar correctly refused. Illegitimate children must use the surname of their
mother, regardless of whether or not they had been acknowledged by their fathers in their record
of birth. Article 176 of the Family Code effectively repealed Article 366 of the Civil Code, which
gives a natural child the right to use the surname of his/her father where he/she has been
acknowledged by both parents. Article 176 explicitly states that illegitimate children shall use the
surname of their mother, be under her parental authority, and be entitled to support inconformity
with the provisions of the Family Code.

356. SILVA V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 114742
FACTS:
Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an unmarried local
actress, cohabited without the benefit of marriage. The union saw the birth of two children:
Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. A rift in their relationship began, according to Silva, when
Gonzales decided to resume her acting career over his vigorous objections. The assertion was
quickly refuted by Gonzales who claimed that she, in fact, had never stopped working
throughout their relationship. The two eventually parted ways. In February 1986, Gonzales
refused to allow Silva, in apparent contravention of a previous understanding, to have the
children in his company on weekends. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children
before the Regional Trial Court. The petition was opposed by Gonzales who averred that Silva
often engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which she feared could affect the moral and social
values of the children.
The trial court directed respondent to allow herein petitioner visitorial rights to his children
during Saturdays and/or Sundays, but in no case should he take out the children without the
written consent of the mother or respondent herein. Silva appeared somehow satisfied with the
judgment for only Gonzales interposed an appeal from the RTC's order to the Court of Appeals.
In the meantime, Gonzales got married to a Dutch national. The newlyweds emigrated to
Holland with Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. The appellate tribunal ruled in favor of Gonzales
and denied visitorial and/or temporary custodial rights to the father. Silva went to Court for
relief.
ISSUE:
Whether or not visitation rights of a parent over his children may be adjudged.
RULING:
Article 209, in relation to Article 220, of the Code states that it is the natural right and duty of
parents and those exercising parental authority to, among other things, keep children in their
company and to give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and
understanding. The Constitution itself speaks in terms of the "natural and primary rights" of
parents in the rearing of the youth. There is nothing conclusive to indicate that these provisions
are meant to solely address themselves to legitimate relationships. Indeed, although in varying
degrees, the laws on support and successional rights, by way of examples, clearly go beyond the
legitimate members of the family and so explicitly encompass illegitimate relationships as well.
There is no doubt that in all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare is always the
paramount consideration. The Court appreciates the apprehensions of private respondent and
their well-meant concern for the children; nevertheless, it seems unlikely that petitioner would
have ulterior motives or undue designs more than a parent's natural desire to be able to call on,
even if it were only on brief visits, his own children.

357. DAVID V. CA
250 S 82
FACTS:
Daisie David had an intimate relationship with her boss Ramon Villar, who is married, and a
father of 4 children, all grown-up. They first had a son, Christopher, who was eventually
followed by 2 more girls, Christine and Cathy Mae. The relationship became known to Villars
wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to his house and introduced him to Villar's wife. After this,
the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were even accepted by
his legal family.
Then Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then 6 years old, to go with his family to
Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give Christopher back and had
enrolled him at the Holy Family Academy for the next school year. Daisie filed a petition for
habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J. which the RTC granted, giving custody to Daisie and
ordering Villar to give temporary support of P3K a month to the 3 kids and to pay the costs of
suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not custody should be given to Daisie
RULING:
In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his
father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the child's
mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental
authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled
to have custody of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of
her child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
Rule 102, Sec. 1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from her
husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child
who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her
child. The fact that Villar has recognized the Christopher may be a ground for ordering him to
give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Article 213, FC, "no
child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise."
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and ordered private respondent
is to deliver the minor Christopher J. T. David to the custody of petitioner, and to give him
temporary support in the amount of P3,000.00, pending the fixing of the amount of support in an
appropriate action.

358. DE SANTOS vs. ANGELES

251 S 207
FACTS:
On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, which union was blessed with a
daughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. After some time, their relationship became
strained to the breaking point. Thereafter, Antonio fell in love with a fellow doctor, Conchita
Tayag, private respondent herein. Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his first marriage by
obtaining a divorce decree from a Nevada court in 1949.
Obviously aware that said divorce decree was a worthless scrap of paper in our jurisdiction,
Antonio proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in 1951 to marry private respondent, with whom he had been
cohabiting since his de facto separation from Sofia. This union produced eleven children. On
March 30, 1967, Sofia died in Guatemala. Less than a month later, on April 23, 1967, Antonio
and private respondent contracted marriage in Tagaytay City celebrated under Philippines laws.
On March 8, 1981, Antonio died intestate leaving properties with an estimated value of PhP15
million.
On March 15, 1981, private respondent went to court asking for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor in connection with the settlement of her late husbands estate. She
alleged, among other things, that the decedent was survived by twelve legitimate heirs, namely,
herself, their ten surviving children and petitioner. Petitioner in her motion to intervene argued
inter alia that private respondents children were illegitimate. This was challenged by private
respondent although the latter admitted during the hearing that all her children were born prior to
Sofias death in 1967.
The trial court declared private respondents ten children legitimated and thereupon instituted
and declared them, along with petitioner and private respondent, as the heirs of Antonio de
Santos. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
How are the offspring of the second marriage affected by the first wifes death and the ensuing
celebration of a valid marriage between her widower and his ostensible second wife?
RULING:
Article 269 of the Civil Code (now Article 77, Family Code) expressly states: Art. 269. Only
natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside wedlock of parents, who, at the time of
the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are
natural. In other words, a childs parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other
at the time of conception for him to qualify as a natural child.

In the case at bench, the marriage under question is considered void for m the beginning
because bigamous, contracted when a prior valid marriage was still subsisting. It follows that the
children begotten of such union cannot be considered natural children proper for at the time of
their conception, their parents were disqualified to marry each other due to the impediment of a
prior subsisting marriage. The petitioners children are mere natural children by legal fiction.
Natural children by legal fiction cannot be legitimized in this fashion. Our law on family
relations frowns upon illegal relations such that the benefits of legitimation under Chapter 3 of
Title VIII do not extend, nor were they intended to extend, to natural children by legal fiction.
Another point, although natural children can be legitimized, and natural children by legal fiction
enjoy the rights of acknowledged natural children, this does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that natural children by legal fiction can be legitimized. As has been pointed out,
much more is involved here than mere privilege to be legitimized. The rights of other children,
like the petitioner in the case at bar may be adversely affected as her testamentary share may be
reduced in the event that her ten surviving half siblings should be placed on par with her, when
each of them is rightfully entitled to only half of her share.
Finally, attention must be drawn to the fact that this case has been decided under the provisions
of the Civil Code, not the Family Code which now recognizes only two classes of children:
legitimate and illegitimate.
Therefore, the subsequent valid marriage of the parents of the children born out of illegal
relationship will not result into the childrens legitimation. Petitioner is declared the SOLE
LEGITIMATE CHILD of the decedent Antonio de Santos.

360. REPUBLIC V. HUGHES

G.R. No. 100835
FACTS:
James Anthony Hughes, a natural born citizen of the United States of America, married Lenita
Mabunay Hughes, a Filipino Citizen, who herself was later naturalized as a citizen of that
country. On 29 June 1990, the spouses jointly filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of
Angeles City, Branch 60, to adopt Ma. Cecilia, Neil and Maria, all surnamed Mabunay, minor
niece and nephews of Lenita, who had been living with the couple even prior to the filing of the
petition. The minors, as well as their parents, gave consent to the adoption.
RTC and CA affirmed the petition. However, petitioner assails that RTC erred in its decision
since both are not qualified to adopt because they are not Filipino citizens.
ISSUE:
Whether or not defendants, both not Filipino citizens, be allowed to adopt in the Philippines.
RULING:
The Court granted the petition.
The Court held that the respondent court, in affirming the grant of adoption by the lower court,
has theorized that James Anthony should merely be considered a "nominal or formal party" in the
proceedings. This view of the appellate court cannot be sustained. Adoption creates a status that
is closely assimilated to legitimate paternity and filiation with corresponding rights and duties
that necessarily flow from adoption, such as, but not inconsequential to the parties necessarily
confined to, the exercise of parental authority, use of surname of the adopter by the adopted, as
well as support and successional rights. These are matters that obviously cannot be considered
The Court reiterated, that they are not unmindful of the possible benefits, particularly in this
instance, that an adoption can bring not a much for the prospective adopting parents as for the
adopted children themselves. The Court also realized that in proceedings of this nature,
paramount consideration is given to the physical, moral, social and intellectual welfare of the
adopted for whom the law on adoption has in the first place been designed. When, however, the
law is clear and no other choice is given, we must obey its full mandate.

361. REPUBLIC vs. TOLEDANO

GR.No. 94147
FACTS:
Spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse who are aliens filed a petition to adopt the minor,
Solomon Joseph Alcala. They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable of
adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor. Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2,
1989 upto the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been under the care and custody of
private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a
widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educate
her son. The RTC granted the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the spouses can adopt Solomon.
RULING:
Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family Code
of the Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting
Solomon Joseph Alcala.Article 184, paragraph three of Executive Order No. 209 expressly
enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt, An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino
citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate
child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to
adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not included
in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on intercountry adoption as may be provided by law. Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other
hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph three of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a
former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for
adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a
joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads: Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly
adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate
child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. Article 185
requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along together
with Article 184.

363. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 103695

FACTS:
The petition below was filed on September 21 1988 by private respondents spouses Jaime B.
Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then fifteen years old, who
had been living with private respondent Jaime B. Caranto since he was seven years old. When
private respondents were married on January 19, 1986, the minor Midael C. Mazon stayed with
them under their care and custody. Private respondents prayed that judgment be rendered:
a) Declaring the child Michael C. Mazon the child of petitioners for all intents and purposes;
b.) Dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child; and
c) That the surname of the child be legally changed to that of the petitioners and that the first
name this was mistakenly registered as MIDAEL be corrected to MICHAEL."
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his contention that the
correction of names cannot be effected in the same proceeding for adoption. As additional
ground for his appeal, he argued that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for
adoption because in the notice published in the newspaper, the name given was "Michael,"
instead of "Midael," which is the name of the minor given in his Certificate of Live Birth.
On January 23, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. The Court
of Appeals ruled that the case of Cruz v. Republic, invoked by the petitioner in support of its plea
that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, was inapplicable because that case
involved a substantial error. Like the trial court, it held that to require the petitioners to file a
separate petition for correction of name would entail "additional time and expenses for them as
well as for the Government and the Courts."
ISSUE:
Does the trial court have jurisdiction over the present case?
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the RTC correctly granted the petition for adoption of the minor
Midael C. Mazon and the Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the trial court, correctly
did so. With regard to the second assignment of error in the petition, we hold that both the Court
of Appeals and the trial court erred in granting private respondents' prayer for the correction of
the name of the child in the civil registry. Contrary to what the trial court thought, Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court applies to this case and because its provision was not complied with, the
decision of the trial court, insofar as it ordered the correction of the name of the minor, is void
and without force or effect. The trial court was clearly in error in holding Rule 108 to be
applicable only to the correction of errors concerning the civil status of persons.

364. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. DYE, ET AL.

G.R. No. 95551

FACTS:
Respondent spouses, who were both American citizens, the wife being a former Filipino
who was naturalized, filed a petition before the RT C to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due,
ages 13 and 12 years old, respectively, younger siblings of the respondent wife. Both Maricel and
Alvin Due, as well as their natural parents, gave their consent to the adoption. After trial, the
RTC granted the petition and declared Alvin and Maricel to be the children of the spouses Dye
by adoption. The Republic filed this petition for review on a pure question of law, contending
that the spouses Dye are not qualified under the law to adopt Maricel and Alvin Due.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent spouses are qualified to adopt.
RULING:
No they are not, the petition is granted and the decision rendered by the RTC is reversed and set
aside. As a general rule, aliens cannot adopt Filipino citizens as this is proscribed under Article
184 of the Family Code. Respondent husband, who is an American and, therefore, an alien is
disqualified from adopting the minors Maricel and Alvin Due because he does not fall under any
of the three exceptions laid down by the law. He is not a former Filipino citizen who seeks to
adopt a relative by consanguinity. Nor does he seek to adopt his wife's legitimate child. Although
he seeks to adopt with his wife her relatives by consanguinity, he is not married to a Filipino
citizen, for his wife was already a naturalized American at the time the petition was filed, thus
excluding him from the coverage of the exception. The law here does not provide for an alien
who is married to a former Filipino citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a
relative by consanguinity, as an exception to the general rule that aliens may not adopt. On her
own. Respondent wife cannot adopt her brother and sister for the law mandates joint adoption by
husband and wife, subject to exceptions. Article 185 of the Family Code provides exceptions to
the joint adoption, however, none of the above exceptions applies to the respondents, for they did
not petition to adopt the latter's child but her brother and sister.
Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial court's decision favoring adoption in
the case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the proscription
against judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the matter is amended, we
cannot sustain the respondent-spouses' petition for adoption.

365. IN RE: ADOPTION OF MICHELLE LIM AND MICHAEL JUDE LIM

GR No. 168992-93
FACTS:
Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were childless.
Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown by a
certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as if they were the
parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American Citizen, Angel
Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty
given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed
separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then
25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and
her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an
affidavit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.
RULING:
Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at
bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercise parental authority. The use of the
word shall signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated
to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit
of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he must
comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552.
The requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot
likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal
adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and
development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.

366. LANDINGIN vs. REPUBLIC

GR No. 164948
FACTS:
Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the adoption of 3
minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the formers brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged
in her petition that when her brother died, the children were left to their paternal grandmother for
their biological mother went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2 children by her second
marriage and no longer communicates from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption.
After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were being supported by the petitioner
and her children abroad and gave their written consent for their adoption. A Social Worker of the
DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and narrated that Amelia, the
biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of
adoption to her children, and she voluntarily consented. However, petitioner failed to present the
said social worker as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the
adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent
to the adoption.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the adoptees
biological mother
RULING:
No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological parent(s) of the
child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the legal guardian will
suffice if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained. The general
requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental
relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to
safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. The written
consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption.
Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before
his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-establish in adoptive parents. In this case,
petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to adopt. Moreover,
abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and
support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not
such abandonment. To dispense with the requirements of consent, the abandonment must be
shown to have existed at the time of adoption.

367. CANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS

296 SCRA 128

FACTS:
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano were married and begot three children namely:
Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony. When Anna Marie learned that her husband was having
extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend, she filed a petition for legal separation with
alimony pende lite. The lower court rendered a decision granting the joint manifestation of the
Cang spouses providing that they agreed to live separately and apart from bed and board.
Petitioner left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie before State of
Nevada. The said court then issued a decree of divorce and granted sole custody of three
children to Anna Marie, reserving rights of visitation at all reasonable times and places to
petitioner.
Meanwhile, private respondents Ronald Clavano and Maria Clara Clavano, respectfully the
brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed Special Proceedings for adoption of the three Cang
children before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The petition bears the signature of then 14year-old Keith signifying consent to his adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of
consent alleging that petitioner had evaded his legal obligation to support his children; that her
brother and sister had been helping her in sustaining the children; that she will be going to the
United States to attend to a family business; and that petitioners had long forfeited his parental
rights.
Petitioner, upon learning the petition for adoption, returned to the Philippines and filed on
opposition to the petition for the adoption of his children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner had abandoned his children as to warrant dispensation of his consent to
the adoption of his children.
RULING:
In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports any
conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish
all parental claims to the child. It means neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal
obligations of care and support which parents owe their children. In the case at bar, records
disclose that petitioners conduct did not manifest a settled to purpose to forego all parental
duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to constitute abandonment. Physical
estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonement.
With regard to the absence of the consent of the petitioner to the adoption, it is clear in the
provisions of law that the written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of
the decree of adoption. However, the court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even without
the written consent of the parents or one of the parents provided that the petition for adoption
alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance therewith. Since the alleged

abandonment of the children by the petitioner was not given sufficient evidence, the petition for
adoption of the Cang children by the spouse respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano was
DENIED.

368. DSWD V. BELEN

275 S 645
FACTS:
Spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano, both of whom are naturalized
American citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of their niece, the minor Zhedell
Bernardo Ibea. Respondent Judge Belen granted the petition after finding that petitioner spouses
were highly qualified to adopt the child as their own, basing his decree primarily on the "findings
and recommendation of the DSWD that the adopting parents on the one hand and the adoptee on
the other hand have already developed love and emotional attachment and parenting rules have
been demonstrated to the minor." On these considerations, respondent judge decided and
proceeded to dispense with trial custody. He asserted that the DSWD findings and
recommendations are contained in the "Adoptive Home Study Report" and "Child Study Report"
prepared by the local office of the DSWD through respondent Elma P. Vedaa.
However, when the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea sought to obtain the requisite travel clearance
from the DSWD in order to join her adoptive parents in the United States, the DSWD found that
it did not have any record in its files regarding the adoption and that there was never any order
from respondent judge for the DSWD to conduct a "Home and Child Study Report" in the case.
Furthermore, there was no directive from respondent judge for the social welfare officer of the
lower court to coordinate with the DSWD on the matter of the required reports for said minor's
adoption.
As the adoption never passed through the DSWD, it filed the present administrative complaint
against respondent judge charging him with violating Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603
which requires, inter alia, that petitions for adoption shall be granted only after the DSWD has
conducted and submitted a case study of the adoptee, the natural parents and the adoptive
parents. It was also alleged by the DSWD that respondent Elma P. Vedaa had asked for an
undisclosed amount of money from the adopting parents in order to expedite the adoption case
with the DSWD.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a decree of adoption be granted on the basis of case study reports made by a
social welfare officer of the court
RULING:
No. Article 33 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code provides in no uncertain terms that:
No petition for adoption shall be granted unless the Department of Social Welfare, or the Social
Work and Counseling Division, in case of Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, has made a
case study of the child to be adopted, his natural parents as well as the prospective adopting
parents, and has submitted its report and recommendations on the matter to the court hearing
such petition. The Department of Social Welfare shall intervene on behalf of the child if it finds,
after such case study, that the petition should be denied. Circular No. 12, as a complementary
measure, was issued by this Court precisely to obviate the mishandling of adoption cases by

judges, particularly in respect to the aforementioned case study to be conducted in accordance

with Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 by the DSWD itself and involving the child to be
adopted, its natural parents, and the adopting parents.
The Staff Assistant V. (Social Worker) of the Regional Trial Courts, if any, shall coordinate with
the Ministry of Social Services and Development representatives in the preparation and submittal
of such case study. .The error on the part of both respondent judge and social worker is thus all
too evident. Pursuant to Circular No. 12, the proper course that respondent judge should have
taken was to notify the DSWD at the outset about the commencement of Special Proceeding No.
5830 so that the corresponding case study could have been accordingly conducted by said
department which undoubtedly has the necessary competence, more than that possessed by the
court social welfare officer, to make the proper recommendation. Moreover, respondent judge
should never have merely presumed that it was routinely for the social welfare officer to
coordinate with the DSWD regarding the adoption proceedings. It was his duty to exercise
caution and to see to it that such coordination was observed in the adoption proceedings, together
with all the other requirements of the law.
ACCORDINGLY, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future
shall be dealt with more severely by this Court, respondent Judge Antonio M. Belen of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, of Lingayen, Pangasinan is hereby censured for violating
Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 and Circular No. 12 of this Court; and respondent
Elma P. Vedaa, Social Welfare Officer II of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial
Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, is reprimanded for violating Circular No. 12.

369. TEOTICO V. VAL CHAN

G.R. No. L-18753
FACTS:
Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955. She left a will written in
Spanish which she executed in the presence of the witnesses and that she does not have
ascendants and descentans. Among the many legacies and devises made in the will was one of
P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera. To said
spouses the testatrix left the usufruct of her interest in the Calvo building, while the naked
ownership thereof she left in equal parts to her grandchildren who are the legitimate children of
said spouses. The testatrix also instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the
remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will.
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the
testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the
same testatrix, filed on September 2, 1955 an opposition to the probate of the will.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant has the right to intervene in the proceeding.
RULING:
Oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either as heir,
executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will,
because it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of
any portion of the estate.
The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca
Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the
adopter and the adopted does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted
child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created between the
adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of
the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.
"The relationship established by the adoption, however, is limited to the adopting parent, and
does not extend to his other relatives, except as expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted
child cannot be considered as a relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents,
nor of the legitimate children which they may have after the adoption, except that the law
imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the children of the
adopted considered as descendants of the adopter. The relationship created is exclusively
between, the adopter and the adopted, and does not extend to the relatives of either."
"Relationship by adoption is limited to adopter and adopted, and does not extend to other
members of the family of either; but the adopted is prohibited to marry the children of the
adopter to avoid scandal."

371. LIM LUA V. LUA

G.R. No. 175279-80
FACTS:
Petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with
respondent Danilo Y. Lua, and for support pendent lite amounting to P500,000. Respondent on
the other hand, refused and manifested that he is only willing to give as much as 75,000 as
support. RTC ruled that the amount of 250,000 support per month is sufficient, notwithstanding
the separate medical support for susan when the need arises.
However this amount was eventually reduced by the CA, citing the fact that there was no
evidence adduced to show the alleged millions of income of respondent, and that based on the
evidence presented the proper amount to paid should be 115,000. This was not assailed by any
party does it became final and executory. Issues once again arised, when respondent in
complying with its obligation paid only the amount of P162,651.90 to petitioner. Respondent
explained that, as decreed in the CA decision, he deducted from the amount of support in arrears
(September 3, 2003 to March 2005) ordered by the CA -- P2,185,000.00 -- plus P460,000.00
(April, May, June and July 2005), totalingP2,645,000.00, the advances given by him to his
children and petitioner in the sum of P2,482,348.16 (with attached photocopies of
receipts/billings).
On the other hand petitioner contends that respondent shouldnt be allowed the deductions he
made arguing that under Article 194, support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family, that in this case the cars and credit card charges are not part of
support. Once again RTC, ruled in favor of petitioner granting a writ of execution, however upon
appeal such was decision was reversed and the CA allowed the deductions made by respondent.
Hence the case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether the deductions made by respondent including the two automobile and credit card
charges are valid deductions and considered as advances.
RULING:
The Supreme Court reversed the CA, and stated that CA should not have allowed all the
expenses incurred by respondent to be credited against the accrued support pendente lite. The
amount of support which those related by marriage and family relationship is generally obliged
to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the needs
of the recipient.
Such support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
Here, the monthly support pendente lite granted by the trial court was intended primarily for

food, household expenses such as salaries of drivers and house helpers, and also petitioners
scoliosis therapy sessions. Hence, the value of two expensive cars bought by respondent for his
children plus their maintenance cost, travel expenses of petitioner and Angelli, purchases through
credit card of items other than groceries and dry goods (clothing) should have been disallowed,
as these bear no relation to the judgment awarding support pendente lite. Any amount respondent
seeks to be credited as monthly support should only cover those incurred for sustenance and
household expenses

372. MONTEFALCON V. VASQUEZ

G.R. No. 165016
FACTS:
In 1999, petitioner Dolores P. Montefalcon filed a Complaint for acknowledgment and support
against respondent Ronnie S. Vasquez before the RTC of Naga City. Alleging that her son
Laurence is the illegitimate child of Vasquez, she prayed that Vasquez be obliged to give support
to co-petitioner Laurence Montefalcon, whose certificate of live birth he signed as father.
Vasquez allegedly also refused to give him regular school allowance despite repeated demands.
Petitioner Dolores added that she and Vasquez are not legally married, and that Vasquez has his
own family.On petitioners' motion, the trial court declared Vasquez in default for failure to file an
answer despite the substituted service of summons.In 2001, the court granted petitioners' prayers,
explaining that they had no ill-motive and that Dolores gave a truthful testimony. In the same
year, Vasquez surfaced. He filed a notice of appeal to which petitioners opposed. Appeal was
granted by the court.He argued that P5,000-per-month support is excessive and exorbitant.
ISSUE:
1.
2.

Whether or not respondent Vasquez is obliged to give support to co-petitioner Laurence.

Whether or not P 5000.00 as monthly support is excessive or exhorbitant.

RULING:
1.
Yes. Co- petitioner Laurence is legally entitled to support from respondent.
Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines mandates that illegitimate filiation may be
established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Under Article 172,
the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) through record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final order; or (2) by admission of filiation in a public
document or private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned; or in default of
these two, by open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child or by any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Laurence's record of birth is an authentic, relevant and admissible piece of evidence to prove
paternity and filiation. Vasquez did not deny that Laurence is his child with Dolores. He signed
as father in Laurence's certificate of live birth, a public document. He supplied the data entered in
it. Thus, it is a competent evidence of filiation as he had a hand in its preparation. In fact, if the
child had been recognized by any of the modes in the first paragraph of Article 172, there is no
further need to file any action for acknowledgment because any of said modes is by itself a
consummated act.
2. No. P 5000.00 is neither excessive nor exorbitant. As filiation is beyond question,
support follows as matter of obligation. Petitioners were able to prove that Laurence needs
Vasquez's support and that Vasquez is capable of giving such support.She told the lower court
Vasquez was earning US$535 monthly based on his January 10, 2000 contract of employment
with Fathom Ship Management and his seafarer information sheet. That income, if converted at
the prevailing rate, would be more than sufficient to cover the monthly support for
Laurence.Under Article 195 (4) of the Family Code, a parent is obliged to support his illegitimate

child. The amount is variable. There is no final judgment thereof as it shall be in proportion to
the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or
increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient
and the resources or means of the person obliged to support. Support comprises everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Under the premises, the
award of P5,000 monthly support to Laurence is reasonable, and not excessive nor exorbitant.

374. QUIMIGING vs. ICAO

G.R. No. L-26795
FACTS:
Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in Dapitan
City and had close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married, he
succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times under force and intimidation and
without her consent. As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs supplied by defendant
and as a consequence, Carmen stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per
month, damages and attorneys fees. The complaint was dismissed by the lower court in
Zamboanga del Norte on the ground lack of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to amend the
complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court ruled that
no amendment was allowable since the original complaint averred no cause of action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the CFI erred in dismissing Carmens complaint.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a
provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article
40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The conceive child may also receive donations and be
accepted by those persons who will legally represent them if they were already born as
prescribed in Article 742.
Lower courts theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation of
parents and illegitimate children does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn violates
article 40 aforementioned.
Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman not his
wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear violation of Carmens rights. Thus, she is
entitled to claim compensation for the damage caused.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to
the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee
Felix Icao.

375. FRANCISCO V. ZANDUETA, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-43794

FACTS:
Respondent, aged two years, through his natural mother and guardian ad litem, Rosario Gomez,
instituted an action for support against the petitioner in the CFI. In that case it is alleged that the
therein plaintiff is the acknowledged son of respondent and as such is entitled to support. The
petitioner, as defendant in that case, answered by a general denial of each and every material
allegation contained in the complaint and as a special defense alleged that he never
acknowledged and could not have acknowledged the plaintiff as his son; that he was not present
at the baptism of the plaintiff and that he was married at the time it is alleged that the plaintiff
was born.
Notwithstanding this denial of paternity the RTC issued the order in favor of petitioner. When the
motion for reconsideration was denied, this special proceeding was instituted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to support from petitioner.
RULING:
No he is not yet entitled to such, thus decision is rendered null and void. Under article 143 of the
Civil Code the following are bound to support each other: (1) Husband and wife, (2) legitimate
ascendants and descendants, (3) parents and acknowledged natural children and the legitimate
descendants of the latter, (4) parents and illegitimate children not having the legal status of
natural children and (5) brothers and sisters. In all these cases it is a civil status or a juridical
relation which is the basis of the action for support, the civil status of marriage or that of
relationship. In the present case the action for support is brought by a minor, through his
guardian ad litem, who alleges that he is the son of the petitioner; therefore it is necessary for
him to prove his civil status as such son. His alleged civil status being in litigation, it is evident
that nothing can be taken for granted upon the point in issue. There is no law or reason which
authorizes the granting of support to a person who claims to be a son in the same manner as to a
person who establishes by legal proof that he is such son. In the latter case the legal evidence
raises a presumption of law, while in the former there is no presumption, there is nothing but a
mere allegation, a fact in issue, and a simple fact in issue must not be confounded with an
established right recognized by a final judgment. The civil status of sonship being denied and
this civil status, from which the right to support is derived, being in issue, it is apparent that no
effect can be given to such a claim until an authoritative declaration has been made as to the
existence of the cause. It is also evident that there is a substantial difference between the capacity
of a person after the rendition of a final judgment in which that person is declared to be in
possession of the status of a son and his capacity prior to such time when nothing exists other
than his suit or claim to be declared in possession of such a status.
The Civil Code grants the right of support to a son. This status not appearing by a final judgment,
the respondent judge was without jurisdiction to order the petitioner, as defendant in case No.
47238, to pay the plaintiff the sum of P30, or any other amount as monthly support, pendente
lite.

376. RUIZ V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 118671
FACTS:
On June 27, 1987, Hilario M. Ruiz 1 executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only
son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his
three granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria
Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. The testator named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate.
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died.
On July 28, 1993, petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed
an "Ex-Parte Motion for Release of Funds." Montes prayed for the release of the said rent
payments to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline and for the distribution of the
testator's properties, in accordance with the provisions of the holographic will.
On August 26, 1993, the probate court denied petitioner's motion for release of funds but granted
respondent Montes' motion in view of petitioner's lack of opposition. It thus ordered the release
of the rent payments to the decedent's three granddaughters. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of the
estate's debts and obligations, has the authority to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate
for the support of the testator's grandchildren.
RULING:
Article 188 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the substantive law in force at the time of the
testator's death, provides that during the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the deceased's
legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their age, civil status or gainful employment, are
entitled to provisional support from the funds of the estate. The law is rooted on the fact that the
right and duty to support, especially the right to education, subsist even beyond the age of
majority.
Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the
decedent's estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not
extend it to the deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity. It was error,
therefore, for the appellate court to sustain the probate court's order granting an allowance to the
grandchildren of the testator pending settlement of his estate.

377. LIM vs. LIM

G.R. No. 163209
FACTS:
In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim (Edward), son of petitioners.
Cheryl bore Edward three children, respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III.
Cheryl, Edward and their children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati City,
together with Edwards ailing grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband Mariano Lim (Mariano).
Edwards family business, which provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000, shouldered the
family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of income.
On 14 October 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the children with her
(then all minors), after a violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-house
midwife of Chua Giak in what the trial court described "a very compromising situation." Cheryl,
for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano (defendants) in
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140 (trial court) for support. The trial court
ordered Edward to provide monthly support of P6,000 pendente lite.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to respondents.
RULING:
By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of ascendants to provide legal support to
their descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much they limit their
petition to the narrow question of when their liability is triggered, not if they are liable. Relying
on provisions found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners
theorize that their liability is activated only upon default of parental authority, conceivably either
by its termination or suspension during the childrens minority. Because at the time respondents
sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over their children, petitioners
submit that the obligation to support the latters offspring ends with them.

378. VERCELES V. POSADA

GR. No. 159785
FACTS:
On November 11, 1986, at around 11:00 a.m., Verceles fetched Clarissa Posada from "My
Brothers Place" where the seminar was being held.Clarissa avers that he told her that they would
have lunch at Mayon Hotel with their companions who had gone ahead. When they reached the
place her companions were nowhere. After Verceles ordered food, he started making amorous
advances on her. She panicked, ran and closeted herself inside a comfort room where she stayed
until someone knocked. She said she hurriedly exited and left the hotel. Afraid of the mayor, she
kept the incident to herself. She went on as casual employee. One of her tasks was following-up
barangay road and maintenance projects.
On December 22, 1986, on orders of Verceles, she went to Virac, Catanduanes, to follow up
funds for barangay projects. At around 11:00 a.m. the same day, she went to Catanduanes Hotel
on instructions of petitioner who asked to be briefed on the progress of her mission. They met at
the lobby and he led her upstairs because he said he wanted the briefing done at the restaurant at
the upper floor.
Instead, Verceles opened a hotel room door, led her in, and suddenly embraced her, as he told her
that he was unhappy with his wife and would "divorce" her anytime. He also claimed he could
appoint her as a municipal development coordinator. She succumbed to his advances. But again
she kept the incident to herself.Sometime in January 1987, when she missed her menstruation,
she said she wrote petitioner that she feared she was pregnant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the filiation of Verna Aiza Posada as the illegitimate child of petitioner was
proven.
RULING:
The letters are private handwritten instruments of petitioner which establish Verna Aizas
filiation under Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. In addition, the arrays of evidence presented
by respondents, the dates, letters, pictures and testimonies, to us, are convincing, and irrefutable
evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioners illegitimate child.
Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, he himself presented no evidence of his
own. His bare denials are telling. Well-settled is the rule that denials, if unsubstantiated by clear
and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving which merit no weight in law and cannot
be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.

379. MANGONON V. CA
494 S 1
FACTS:
On 17 March 1994, petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor children
Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application for support
pendente lite with the RTC Makati. In said petition, it was alleged that on 16 February 1975,
petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married by then City Court Judge
Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi City, Albay. At that time, petitioner was only 21 years old while
respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage was solemnized without the required
consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was annulled on 11 August 1975 by the Quezon
City Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
On 25 March 1976, or within seven months after the annulment of their marriage, petitioner gave
birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to petitioner, she, with the assistance of her second
husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as private respondents had totally
abandoned them. At the time of the institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter
college in the United States of America (USA) where petitioner, together with her daughters and
second husband, had moved to and finally settled in. Rica was admitted to the University of
Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was accepted by the Long Island University and Western
New England College. Despite their admissions to said universities, Rica and Rina were,
however, financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education because of the following:
a) The average annual cost for college education in the US is about US$22,000/year or a total of
US$44,000.00, more or less, for both Rica and Rina.
b) Rica and Rina need general maintenance support each in the amount of US$3,000.00 per year
or atotal of US$6,000 per year.
c) Unfortunately, petitioners monthly income from her 2 jobs is merely US$1,200 after taxes
which she can hardly give general support to Rica and Rina, much less their required college
educational support.
d) Neither can petitioners present husband be compelled to share in the general support and
college education of Rica and Rina since he has his own son with petitioner and own
daughter(also in college) to attend to.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, respondent Francisco Delgado be held liable for her granddaughters educational
support
RULING:
ART. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve
upon the following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and

(4) The brothers and sisters.

An eminent author on the subject explains that the obligation to give support rests principally on
those more closely related to the recipient. However, the more remote relatives may be held to
shoulder the responsibility should the claimant prove that those who are called upon to provide
support do not have the means to do so.
The Court has, however, reviewed the records of this case and found them bereft of evidence to
support his assertions regarding his employment and his earning. Notably, he was even required
by petitioners counsel to present to the court his income tax return and yet the records of this
case do not bear a copy of said document. This, to our mind, severely undermines the
truthfulness of respondent Federicos assertion with respect to his financial status and capacity to
provide support to Rica and Rina.
From the records, the Court gleaned that prior to the commencement of this action, the
relationship between respondent Francisco, on one hand, and petitioner and her twin daughters,
on the other, was indeed quite pleasant. The correspondences exchanged among them expressed
profound feelings of thoughtfulness and concern for one anothers well-being. The photographs
presented by petitioner as part of her exhibits presented a seemingly typical family celebrating
kinship. All of these, however, are now things of the past. With the filing of this case, and the
allegations hurled at one another by the parties, the relationships among the parties had certainly
been affected. Particularly difficult for Rica and Rina must be the fact that those who they had
considered and claimed as family denied having any familial relationship with them. Given all
these, we could not see Rica and Rina moving back here in the Philippines in the company of
those who have disowned them.
Finally, as to the amount of support pendente lite, the Court take their bearings from the
provision of the law mandating the amount of support to be proportionate to the resources or
means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient.42 Guided by this principle, we hold
respondent Francisco liable for half of the amount of school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina
as support pendente lite. As established by petitioner, respondent Francisco has the financial
resources to pay this amount given his various business endeavors.

380. DE GUZMAN vs. PEREZ

G.R. No. 156013
FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent Shirley F. Aberde became sweethearts while studying law in
the University of Sto. Tomas. Their studies were interrupted when private respondent became
pregnant. She gave birth to petitioners child, Robby Aberde de Guzman, on October 2, 1987.
Private respondent and petitioner never got married. In 1991, petitioner married another woman
with whom he begot two children.
Petitioner sent money for Robbys schooling only twice the first in 1992 and the second in
1993. In 1994, when Robby fell seriously ill, petitioner gave private respondent P7,000 to help
defray the cost of the childs hospitalization and medical expenses. Other than these instances,
petitioner never provided any other financial support for his son.
In 1994, in order to make ends meet and to provide for Robbys needs, private respondent
accepted a job as a factory worker in Taiwan where she worked for two years. It was only
because of her short stint overseas that she was able to support Robby and send him to school.
However, she reached the point where she had just about spent all her savings to provide for her
and Robbys needs. The childs continued education thus became uncertain.
ISSUE:
May a parent who fails or refuses to do his part in providing his child the education his station in
life and financial condition permit, be charged for neglect
RULING:
The law is clear. The crime may be committed by any parent. Liability for the crime does not
depend on whether the other parent is also guilty of neglect. The law intends to punish the
neglect of any parent, which neglect corresponds to the failure to give the child the education
which the familys station in life and financial condition permit. The irresponsible parent cannot
exculpate himself from the consequences of his neglect by invoking the other parents faithful
compliance with his or her own parental duties.
Petitioners position goes against the intent of the law. To allow the neglectful parent to shield
himself from criminal liability defeats the prescription that in all questions regarding the care,
custody, education and property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
However, while petitioner can be indicted for violation of Article 59(4) of PD 603, the charge
against him cannot be made in relation to Section 10(a) of RA 7610 which provides:
SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Childs Development.
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or
be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the childs development including those

covered by Article 59 of PD No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty ofprision mayor in its minimum period.
The law expressly penalizes any person who commits other acts of neglect, child abuse, cruelty
or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the childs development
including those covered by Article 59 of PD 603 "but not covered by the Revised Penal Code."
The "neglect of child" punished under Article 59(4) of PD 603 is also a crime (known as
"indifference of parents") penalized under the second paragraph of Article 277 of the Revised
Penal Code. Hence, it is excluded from the coverage of RA 7610.

382. REYES vs. INES-LUCIANO

G.R. No. L-48219
FACTS:
Manuel Reyes attacked his wife twice with the intent to kill. A complaint was filed on June 3,
1976: the first attempt on March was prevented by her father and the second attempt, wherein
she was already living separately from her husband, was stopped only because of her drivers
intervention. She filed for legal separation on that ground and prayed for support pendente lite
for herself and her three children. The husband opposed the application for support on the ground
that the wife committed adultery with her physician. The respondent Judge Ines-Luciano of the
lower court granted the wife pendente lite. The husband filed a motion for reconsideration
reiterating that his wife is not entitled to receive such support during the pendency of the case,
and that even if she is entitled to it, the amount awarded was excessive. The judge reduced the
amount from P5000 to P4000 monthly. Husband filed a petition for certiorari in the CA to annul
the order granting alimony. CA dismissed the petition which made the husband appeal to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not support can be administered during the pendency of an action.
RULING:
Yes provided that adultery is established by competent evidence. Mere allegations will not bar
her right to receive support pendente lite. Support can be administered during the pendency of
such cases. In determining the amount, it is not necessary to go into the merits of the case. It is
enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the
record. [The SC on July, 1978 ordered the alimony to be P1000/month from the period of June to
February 1979, after the trial, it was reverted to P4000/month based on the accepted findings of
the trial court that the husband could afford it because of his affluence and because it wasnt
excessive.

383. SANTERO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-61700
FACTS:
Pablo Santero, the only legitimate son of Pascual and Simona Santero, had three children with
Felixberta Pacursa namely, Princesita, Federico and Willie (herein petitioners). He also had four
children with Anselma Diaz namely, Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina, and Miguel (herein private
respondents). These children are all natural children since neither of their mothers was married to
their father. In 1973, Pablo Santero died.
During the pendency of the administration proceedings with the CFI-Cavite involving the estate
of the late Pablo Santero, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court
questioning the decision of CFI-Cavite granting allowance (allegedly without hearing) in the
amount of Php 2,000.00, to private respondents which includes tuition fees, clothing materials
and subsistence out of any available funds in the hands of the administrator. The petitioners
opposed said decision on the ground that private respondents were no longer studying, that they
have attained the age of majority, that all of them except for Miguel are gainfully employed, and
the administrator did not have sufficient funds to cover the said expenses.
Before the Supreme Court could act on said petition, the private respondents filed another
motion for allowance with the CFI-Cavite which included Juanita, Estelita and Pedrito, all
surnamed Santero, as children of the late Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz, praying that a sum
of Php 6,000.00 be given to each of the seven children as their allowance from the estate of their
father. This was granted by the CFI-Cavite.
Later on, the CFI-Cavite issued an amended order directing Anselma Diaz, mother of private
respondents, to submit a clarification or explanation as to the additional three children included
in the said motion. She said in her clarification that in her previous motions, only the last four
minor children were included for support and the three children were then of age should have
been included since all her children have the right to receive allowance as advance payment of
their shares in the inheritance of Pablo Santero. The CFI-Cavite issued an order directing the
administrator to get back the allowance of the three additional children based on the opposition
of the petitioners.
ISSUE:
a)
b)

Are the private respondents entitled to allowance?

Was it proper for the court a quo to grant the motion for allowance without hearing?

RULING:
Yes, they are entitled. Being of age, gainfully employed, or married should not be regarded as the
determining factor to their right to allowance under Articles 290 and 188 of the New Civil Code.

Records show that a hearing was made. Moreover, what the said court did was just to follow the
precedent of the court which granted previous allowance and that the petitioners and private
respondents only received Php 1,500.00 each depending on the availability of funds.

385. BECKETT VS OLEGARIO SARMIENTO

A.M No. RTJ-12-2326, January 30, 2013
FACTS:
Geoffrey Beckett, an Australian was previously married to Eltesa Densing Beckett, a Filipina and
out of marriage, Geoffrey Beckett Jr. was born.
In 2006, Eltesa filed a case against Beckett in violation of R.A 7160 followed by a suit for the
declaration of nullity of marriage. For his part, Beckett commenced criminal charges against
Eltesa, one was for adultery. Both ended in sala of Judge Olegario Sarmiento Jr.
The couples legal battle ended when Judge Sarmiento rendered judgment based on a
compromise agreement and categorically agreed that Beckett shall have full and permanent
custody over Geoffrey Jr, 5 years old, subject to visitation rights of Eltesa.
Eltesa failed to return the custody of Geoffrey Jr. to Beckett prompting him to file a case against
Eltesa in violation of R.A 7160 and for the turnover of Geoffrey Jr under his custody.
After going through proceedings, Judge Sarmiento rendered a judgment granting the custody of
Geoffrey Jr to Eltesa.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Sarmiento is guilty of gross ignorance of the law in granting the custody of
Geoffrey Jr. to Eltesa.
RULING:
No. In disputes concerning post-separation custody over a minor, the well-settled rule is that no
child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise. And if already 7 years of age, the childs choice as to
which parents he prefers shall be respected, unless the parent chosen proves to be unfit. Further,
in all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social institutions,
courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interest of the child shall
be a primary consideration.
A custody agreement can never be regarded as a permanent and unbending, such that
agreement would no longer be to the childs best interest.
Thus, Judge Sarmiento is correct in granting the custody of Geoffrey Jr. to Eltesa.

386. IN RE: THORNTON

G.R. No. 154598

FACTS:
Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, are a married couple. A year later,
respondent gave birth to a baby girl whom they named Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco
Thornton. However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain housewife.
She wanted to return to her old job as a guest relations officer in a nightclub, with the freedom to
go out with her friends. In fact, whenever petitioner was out of the country, respondent was also
often out with her friends, leaving her daughter in the care of the house- help. When respondent
left the family home with her daughter Sequiera without notifying her husband, petitioner filed a
petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court. This was dismissed, presumably
because of the allegation that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner then went to Basilan to
ascertain the whereabouts of respondent and their daughter. However, he did not find them there.
Petitioner then filed another petition for habeas corpus, this time in the CA which could issue a
writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country. However, the petition was denied by the
Court of Appeals on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the case, thus this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving
custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original
jurisdiction over such petitions.
RULING:
Yes it has, the petition is granted. The CA should take cognizance of the case since there is
nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the
custody of minors. The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child. We
rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the CA and the SC of their jurisdiction over habeas
corpus cases involving the custody of minors.
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the CA and SC
to
issue
writs
of
habeas
corpus
relating
to
the
custody
of
minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are
absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the CA and the SC from issuing writs
of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA
8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 that family courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with the CA and the SC in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is
at issue.

387. MADRINAN V. MADRINAN

527 SCRA 487
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent were married, and after a bitter quarrel, petitioner left the conjugal
abode bringing with him their three sons (2 of which are minors) to Albay and to Laguna
subsequently.
Respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals for their their 2 minor sons
on the ground that petitioners act disrupted their education and deprived them of their mothers
care.
Petitioner filed a memorandum alleging that respondent was unfit to take custody of their
children and questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that under Section 5(b)
of RA 8369, family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for
habeas corpus filed by respondent.
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision asserting its authority to take cognizance and ruling,
that under the Family Code, respondent was entitled to custody of the minors.
Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the petition for habeas corpus
and insists that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family courts under RA 8369.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving custody
of minors.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in a previous jurisprudence that The Court of Appeals should has
cognizance of this case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue
writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors. RA 8369 did not divest the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the
custody of minors.
The concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court with family courts in
said cases was further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on
Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors which provides
that:

Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus
involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable
within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its
members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.

388. VANCIL vs. BELMES

G.R. No. 132223
FACTS:
Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a US Navy serviceman who died on 1986.
During his lifetime, Reeder had two children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law
wife, Helen G. Belmes. Bonifacia obtained a favorable court decision appointing her as legal and
judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie and Vincent.
On August 13, 1987, Helen submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings
asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition for guardianship before the RTC of
Pagadian City. On June 27, 1988, Helen followed her opposition with a motion for the Removal
of Guardian and Appointment of a New One, asserting that she is the natural mother in actual
custody of and exercising parental authority over the subject minors at Dumingag, Zamboanga
del Sur where they are permanently residing. She also states that at the time the petition was
filed, Bonifacia was a resident of Colorado, U.S.A. being a naturalized American citizen.
On October 12, 1988, the trial court rejected and denied Helens motion to remove and/or to
disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
rendered its decision reversing the RTC. Since Valerie had reached the age of majority at the time
the case reached the Supreme Court, the issue revolved around the guardianship of Vincent.
ISSUE:
Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian?
RULING:
Respondent Helen Belmes, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over
that of petitioner Bonifacia to be his guardian. Article 211 of the Family Code provides: "Art.
211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their
common children. In case of disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail, unless there is a
judicial order to the contrary. xxx." Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, Helen has
the corresponding natural and legal right to his custody.
"Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that the right of parents to
the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right
supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by
the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship."
Bonifacia contends that she is more qualified as guardian of Vincent. Bonifacias claim to be the
guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of substitute parental authority pursuant to
Article 214 of the Family Code, thus: "Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the
parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. xxx."

Bonifacia, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of
death, absence or unsuitability of Helen. Considering that Helen is very much alive and has
exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, Bonifacia has to prove, in asserting her
right to be the minors guardian, Helens unsuitability. Bonifacia, however, has not proffered
convincing evidence showing that Helen is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Bonifacia
merely insists that Helen is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that her live-in
partner raped Valerie several times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject of
this guardianship proceeding.
Even assuming that Helen is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still Bonifacia cannot qualify as
a substitute guardian. She is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will
not be able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian. In fact, in her
petition, she admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian by an expatriate, like
her. To be sure, she will merely delegate those duties to someone else who may not also qualify
as a guardian.
There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators
or guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory requirements upon
this question, the courts, charged with the responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased
persons, wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in complying with this duty by
appointing administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to their jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement; the courts should not consent to the
appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to the
jurisdiction of our courts here.

389. BONDAGJIY VS. BONDAGJIY

G.R. No. 140817
FACTS:
Respondent Fouzi and Sabrina were married on Febraury 3, 1988. Four months before the
marriage, Sabrina became a Muslim by conversion. However, the conversion was not registered
with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. Out of their union, they begot two
children, namely Abdulaziz and Amouaje. In December 1995, the children lived in the house of
Sabrinas mother. Fouzi alleged that he could not see his children until he got an order from the
court. Even with a court order, he could only see his children in school. Fouzi alleged that on
various occasions Sabrina was seen with different men at odd hours in Manila and that she could
not take care of their children. On March 1996, respondent filed with the Sharia District Court
an action to obtain custody of his two minor children. On November 16, 1996, the Sharis Court
rendered decision awarding the custody of the minor children to the father and ordering Sabrina
or any person having the care of said minors to turn over, relinguish and surrender the custody of
said minors to their natural father. The Sharia district court found petitioner unworthy to care for
her children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the parental authority should be given to the mother or the father.
RULING:
The Court held that the burden to prove that petitioner is unworthy to have the custody of the
children should be upon the respondent. The Court finds that the evidence presented by the
respondent was not sufficient to establish her unfitness according to Muslim law or the Family
Code. The standard in the determination of sufficiency of proof, however, is not restricted to
Muslim laws. The Family Code shall be taken into consideration in declaring whether a nonMuslim woman is incompetent. What determines her capacity is the standard laid down by the
Family Code now that she is not a Muslim. The Court do not doubt the capacity and love of both
parties for their children, such that they both want to have them in their custody. Although the
Court see the need for the children to have both a mother and a father, the Court believes that
petitioner has more capacity and time to see the childrens needs. Respondent is a businessman
whose work requires that he go abroad or be in different places most of the time. Under P.D. No.
603, the custody of the minor children, absent a compelling reason to the contrary, is given to the
mother.

390. SAGALA-ESLAO V. CA
266 S 317
FACTS:
On June 22, 1984, petitioner Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married. After
their marriage, the couple stayed with respondent Teresita Eslao, mother of the husband. Out of
their marriage, two children were begotten, namely, Leslie Eslao and Angelica Eslao. Leslie was
entrusted to the care and custody of petitioners mother while Angelica stayed with her parents at
respondents house. Reynaldo Eslao died 4 years later.
Petitioner intended to bring Angelica with her to Pampanga but the respondent prevailed upon
her to entrust the custody of Angelica to her, respondent reasoning out that her son just died and
to assuage her grief therefor, she needed the company of the child to at least compensate for the
loss of her late son.
Subsequently, petitioner was introduced to Dr. James Manabu-Ouye, a Japanese-American. Their
acquaintance blossomed into a marriage and the petitioner migrated to San Francisco, California,
USA, to join her new husband. The petitioner returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her
children and bring them to the United States. The petitioner then informed the respondent about
her desire to take custody of Angelica and explained that her present husband, Dr. Ouye,
expressed his willingness to adopt Leslie and Angelica and to provide for their support and
education; Respondent resisted the idea by way of explaining that the child was entrusted to her
when she was ten days old and accused the petitioner of having abandoned Angelica.
The lower court rendered its decision ordering respondent to cause the immediate transfer of the
custody of the Angelica to her natural mother. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts
decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Teresita Sagala-Eslao should be given the custody of the child
RULING:
The trial courts disquisition, in consonance with the provision that the childs welfare is always
the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody is enough to
convince the Court to decide in favor of private respondent.
When private respondent entrusted the custody of her minor child to the petitioner, what she
gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or
renunciation of parental authority. For the right attached to parental authority, being purely
personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship
and surrender to a childrens home or an orphan institution which do not appear in the case at
bar.
Of considerable importance also, is the rule long accepted by the courts that the right of parents
to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right

supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by
the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship.
In this case, when Maria entrusted the custody of her minor child to Teresita, what she gave to
the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of
parental authority. Thus, Teresita does not have the right to the custody of the child.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the appealed decision.
to support his assertions regarding his employment and his earning. Notably, he was even
required by petitioners counsel to present to the court his income tax return and yet the records
of this case do not bear a copy of said document. This, to our mind, severely undermines the
truthfulness of respondent Federicos assertion with respect to his financial status and capacity to
provide support to Rica and Rina.
From the records, the Court gleaned that prior to the commencement of this action, the
relationship between respondent Francisco, on one hand, and petitioner and her twin daughters,
on the other, was indeed quite pleasant. The correspondences exchanged among them expressed
profound feelings of thoughtfulness and concern for one anothers well-being. The photographs
presented by petitioner as part of her exhibits presented a seemingly typical family celebrating
kinship. All of these, however, are now things of the past. With the filing of this case, and the
allegations hurled at one another by the parties, the relationships among the parties had certainly
been affected. Particularly difficult for Rica and Rina must be the fact that those who they had
considered and claimed as family denied having any familial relationship with them. Given all
these, we could not see Rica and Rina moving back here in the Philippines in the company of
those who have disowned them.
Finally, as to the amount of support pendente lite, the Court take their bearings from the
provision of the law mandating the amount of support to be proportionate to the resources or
means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient.42 Guided by this principle, we hold
respondent Francisco liable for half of the amount of school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina
as support pendente lite. As established by petitioner, respondent Francisco has the financial
resources to pay this amount given his various business endeavors.

391. DACASIN V. DACASIN

G.R. No. 168785
FACTS:
On April 1994, petitioner and respondent got married here in the Philippines. The following year
respondent got pregnant and gave birth to a baby girl whom they named Stephanie. In June of
1999 respondent sought and obtained from the Illinois Court a divorce decree against petitioner.
In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent, awarded to
respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement
purposes. On 28th of January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract
(Agreement)for the joint custody of Stephanie. Two years after, petitioner sued respondent in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Petitioner claimed that respondent exercised sole custody
over Stephanie. Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint due to lack of jurisdiction,
since Illinois Court hold the jurisdiction in enforcing the divorce decree.
ISSUE:
1.Whether the Trial Court have the jurisdiction over the case
2.Whether the agreement or contract is valid
RULING:
Case was dismissed
Courts Rationale:
It is precluded from taking cognizance over suit considering the Illinois Courts retention
of jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree, including its order awarding sole custody of
Stephanie to respondent. The divorce decree is binding on petitioner following the nationality
rule prevailing in this jurisdiction. The agreement is void for contravening Article 2035
paragraph 5 of the Civil Codeprohibiting compromise agreements on jurisdiction

393. GUALBERTO V. GUALBERTO

G.R. No. 154994
FACTS:
Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Joycelyn w/ an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost 4 year old
son, Rafaello, whom her wife took away w/ her from their conjugal home and his school when
she left him.
The RTC granted the ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite, since the wife failed to appear
despite notice. A house helper of the spouses testified that the mother does not care for the child
as she very often goes out of the house and even saw her slapping the child. Another witness
testified that after surveillance he found out that the wife is having lesbian relations.
The judge issued the assailed order reversing her previous order, and this time awarded the
custody of the child to the mother. Finding that the reason stated by Crisanto not to be a
compelling reason as provided in Art 213 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the custody of the minor child should be awarded to the mother.
RULING:
Article 213 of the Family Code provided: Art 213. In case of separation of parents parental
authority shall be exercised by the parent des granted by the court. The court shall take into
account all relevant consideration, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age,
unless the parent chosen is unfit. No child under seven yrs of age shall be separated from the
mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise, This Court has held that
when the parents separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the custody of
their child. Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code, which reads: Art
363. In all question on the care, custody, education and property pf children, the latter welfare
shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless
the court finds compelling reason for such measure.

394. GOLANGCO V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 124724
FACTS:
A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by private respondent Lucia Carlos Golangco
against petitioner Rene Uy Golangco before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 144. The
couple had two children, Justin Rene and Stefan Rafael. During the proceedings of the case, a
hearing for custody pendente lite of the two children was held. In an order dated July 21, 1994,
the trial court awarded the two children to Lucia while Rene was given visitation rights of at
least one week in a month. Thereafter Rene questioned the order dated July 21, 1994 with the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, however, dismissed the petition and instead affirmed the
order of the trial court. Not contented, Rene appealed the resolution of the Court of Appeals
affirming the order dated July 21, 1994 before this Court, and the case was docketed as G.R. No.
120831. On July 17, 1995, the Court resolved to dismiss the petition for failure of petitioner
Rene to show that grave abuse of discretion had been committed by the appellate court.
On August 15, 1995, Lucia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration with prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.She sought redress due to an alleged incident on
July 5, 1995, in which her estranged husband physically abused their son Justin. On said date, he
allegedly went to the art class of Justin at 2167 Paraiso Street, Dasmarinas Village, Makati.
When they met, he asked his son to kiss him, but Justin refused. Irked by his sons reaction, Rene
hit him which produced contusions. The trial court granted the writ of preliminary injunction
restraining Rene from seeing his children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the issuance of the writ of injunction is proper.
RULING:
Yes. Preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to
the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a
particular act or acts.The rules provide that no preliminary injunction shall be granted without
hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined.
In the case of Bataclan v. Court of Appeals,this Court RULING:
A writ of preliminary injunction, as an ancillary or preventive remedy, may only be resorted to
by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests and for no other purpose during the
pendency of the principal action. In the issuance thereof, the courts are given sufficient discretion
to determine the necessity for the grant of the relief prayed for as it affects the respective rights
of the parties, with the caveat that extreme caution be observed in the exercise of such discretion.
Quintessentially, it is with an equal degree of care and caution that courts ought to proceed in the
denial of the writ. It should not just summarily issue an order of denial without an adequate
hearing and judicious evaluation of the merits of the application. A perfunctory and improvident
action in this regard would be denial of procedural due process and could result in irreparable
prejudice to a party.

In the case at bar, the trial court gave both parties the opportunity to present their respective
evidence and witnesses. An adequate hearing was conducted and, based on the evidence, the trial
court deemed it proper to grant the writ of preliminary injunction. The assessment and evaluation
of evidence in the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction involves findings of facts
ordinarily left to the trial court for its conclusive determination. It is a fundamental and settled
rule that conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight and should
not be disturbed on appeal, unless strong and cogent reasons dictate otherwise. This is because
the trial court is in a better position to examine the real evidence, as well as to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case.
This Court, therefore, finds no justifiable reason or exception sufficient to cause the reversal of
the trial courts declaration in granting the writ of preliminary injunction against petitioner.

396. PEREZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R.No. 118870
FACTS:
Ray Perez is a doctor practicing in Cebu while Nerissa, his wife, (petitioner) is a registered
nurse. After six miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, Nerissa finally gave
birth to Ray Perez II in New York on July 20, 1992. Ray stayed with her in the U.S. twice and
took care of her when she became pregnant. Unlike his wife, however, he had only a tourist visa
and was not employed.
On January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only Nerissa
returned to the U.S. She alleged that they came home only for a five-week vacation and that they
all had round-trip tickets. However, her husband stayed behind to take care of his sick mother
and promised to follow her with the baby. According to Ray, they had agreed to reside
permanently in the Philippines but once Nerissa was in New York, she changed her mind and
continued working. She was supposed to come back immediately after winding up her affairs
there.
When Nerissa came home a few days before Ray IIs first birthday, the couple was no longer on
good terms. They had quarrels. Nerissa did not want to live near her in-laws and rely solely on
her husbands meager income of P5,000.00. On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here, where
he could raise his son even as he practiced his profession. He maintained that it would not be
difficult to live here since they have their own home and a car. Despite mediation by the priest,
the couple failed to reconcile.
Nerissa filed a petition to surrender the custody of their son to her. The trial court issued an Order
awarding custody to Nerissa citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code
which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless
the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. Upon appeal by Ray Perez, the Court of
Appeals reversed the trial courts order and held that granting custody to the boys father would
be for the childs best interest and welfare.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nerissa has rightful custody of a child?
RULING:
Yes. Aside from Article 213 of the Family Code, the Revised Rules of Court also contains a
similar provision. Rule 99, Section 6 (Adoption and Custody of Minors) provides: SEC. 6.
Proceedings as to child whose parents are separated.Appeal. - When husband and wife are
divorced or living separately and apart from each other, and the questions as to the care, custody,
and control of a child or children of their marriage is brought before a Court of First Instance by
petition or as an incident to any other proceeding, the court, upon hearing the testimony as may
be pertinent, shall award the care, custody, and control of each such child as will be for its best
interest, permitting the child to choose which parent it prefers to live with if it be over ten years

of age, unless the parent chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by reason of moral depravity,
habitual drunkenness, incapacity, or poverty x x x. No child under seven years of age shall be
separated from its mother, unless the court finds there are compelling reasons therefor.
The provisions of law quoted above clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age shall
not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
The use of the word shall in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Section 6 of the
Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character.
The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother
finds its reason in the basic need of a child for his mothers loving care. Only the most
compelling of reasons shall justify the courts awarding the custody of such a child to someone
other than his mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the past the
following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and
parental authority: neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness,
drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a communicable disease.
It has long been settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare
and best interest of the child. In fact, no less than an international instrument, the Convention on
the Rights of the Child provides: In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative
bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
In the case, financial capacity is not a determinative factor inasmuch as both parties have
demonstrated that they have ample means. Nerissas present work schedule is not so
unmanageable as to deprive her of quality time with her son. Quite a number of working
mothers who are away from home for longer periods of time are still able to raise a family well,
applying time management principles judiciously. Also, delegating child care temporarily to
qualified persons who run day-care centers does not detract from being a good mother, as long as
the latter exercises supervision, for even in our culture, children are often brought up by
housemaids under the eagle eyes of the mother.
Although Rays is a general practitioner, the records show that he maintains a clinic, works for
several companies on retainer basis and teaches part-time. He cannot possibly give the love and
care that a mother gives to his child.

397. SAGALA- ESLAO V. CA, ET AL.

G.R. No. 116773
January 16, 1997
FACTS:
Respondent and one Reynaldo Eslao were married. Out of their marriage, two children were
begotten, namely, Leslie and Angelica. Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of
petitioners mother while Angelica stayed with her parents at respondents house. When
Reynaldo died, respondent intended to bring Angelica with her to Pampanga but the petitioner
prevailed upon her to entrust the custody of Angelica to her, reasoning out that her son just died
and to assuage her grief therefor, she needed the company of the child to at least compensate for
the loss of her late son. In the meantime, the respondent returned to her mothers house in
Pampanga where she stayed with Leslie.
Subsequently, respondent got married to one Dr. James Ouye. After, she migrated to San
Francisco, California, USA, to join her new husband. She then returned to the Philippines to be
reunited with her children and bring them to the United States, however, petitioner resisted the
idea by way of explaining that the child was entrusted to her when she was ten days old and
accused the respondent of having abandoned Angelica. Because of the adamant attitude of the
petitioner, the respondent then sought the assistance of a lawyer who wrote a letter to the former
demanding for the return of the custody of Angelica to her natural mother and when the demand
remained unheeded, the respondent instituted the present action. The RTC and CA ruled in favor
of the respondent, hence the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the actions of the mother are tantamount to abandonment.
RULING:
It is not, the petition is dismissed. Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may
not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental
authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of
adoption, guardianship and surrender to a childrens home or an orphan institution. When a
parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a
document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of
parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
Thus, in the instant petition, when private respondent entrusted the custody of her minor child to
the petitioner, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute
abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. For the right attached to parental authority,
being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption,
guardianship and surrender to a childrens home or an orphan institution which do not appear in
the case at bar. Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that the right
of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to
parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which
is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental
relationship.

398. QUITA V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 124862
FACTS:
Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May
1941. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce
in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. On July 23, 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce.
Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their
relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a
certain Wernimont.
On April 16, 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. Javier Inciong filed a petition with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of
Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to be
the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and
Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the children of Arturo Padlan opposed the petition and
prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in favor of the
latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino
Castillon. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased
Arturo, intervened.
On the scheduled hearing, the trial court required the submission of the records of birth of the
Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the
documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution.
The prescribed period lapsed without the required documents being submitted. On November 27,
1987 only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo.
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present proofs
that the recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis who
was recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in their respective records of birth.
Private respondent was not declared an heir. Although it was stated in the aforementioned
records of birth that she and Arturo were married on April 22, 1947, their marriage was clearly
void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.
ISSUES:
a) Whether or not the case should be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.
b) Who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent is one
of law which can be resolved in the present petition based on establish facts and
admissions of the parties?
RULING:
If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or
as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall
be heard and decided as in ordinary cases. Reading between the lines, the implication is that

petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This should
have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a
hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and
testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the
evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applying
the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escao. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino
citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of
this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van
Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from
Arturo.
She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo
was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning
under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can
inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship.
The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case to the court of
origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D.
Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court
modifying its previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the
Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of
Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED.
The Court however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court should be limited
to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the present
petition for forum shopping is denied.

399. SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 113054
FACTS:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession, were
married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born
July 18, 1987. From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he
had been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private respondents herein,
Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household,
where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend that through deceit and
false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his
hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental.
The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel
Santos Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as respondent. After
an ex-parte hearing on October 8, 1990, the trial court issued an order on the same day awarding
custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals. In its decision dated April 30, 1992,
respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court's order.
Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court to award custody of
his minor son to his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the ground that under Art. 214 of the
Family Code, substitute parental authority of the grandparents is proper only when both parents
are dead, absent or unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, according to him, has not been successfully
shown by private respondents.
ISSUE:
Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.
RULING:
The minor should be given to the legitimate father. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor
to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary
custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Only in case of the
parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the
surviving grandparent.
The court held the contentions of the grandparents are insufficient as to remove petitioner's
parental authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor. Private respondents'
demonstrated love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still
preferred over the grandparents.

The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the
present time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy. While petitioner's previous
inattention is inexcusable, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable
decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as
serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the bond
between parent and son. The Court also held that his being a soldier is likewise no bar to
allowing him custody over the boy. So many men in uniform, who are assigned to different parts
of the country in the service of the nation, are still the natural guardians of their children.
Also, petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws, though
unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him.

400. LIBI VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. 70890
FACTS:
Julie Ann, an 18 year old, and Wendell, between the ages of 18 and 19, were found dead at the
residence of private respondents. Due to the absence of witnesses, there was no clear showing
about the facts that surrounded the death of both. The parents of Julie Ann filed a civil case
against the parents of Wendell for recovery of damages. The trial court dismissed the case.
However, said rule was set aside by the Court of Appeals and instead rendered another judgment.
In the case, the mother of Wendell testified that her husband owns a gun which he keeps in safety
box from which both petitioners hold the key. Hers was always in her bag. She admitted that on
the day their son and Julie died, the gun was no longer in the box.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from the
criminal offense committed by their minor child.
RULING:
The Supreme Court agreed with the conclusion of respondent court that petitioners should be
held liable for the civil liability based on what appears from all indications was a crime
committed by their minor son.
It ruled that the parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from
criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control, or
who live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised on the provisions
of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex delicto caused by their
children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without
discernment; and, with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted with
discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be
imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected against the father and,
in case of his death or incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare
Code which provides that the same shall devolve upon the father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the
liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful offender.
However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such alternative
qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over the
minor offender. For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules
shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.
In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by a felony or a
quasi-delict committed by Wendell Libi, respondent court did not err in holding petitioners liable

for damages arising therefrom. The Supreme Court conjoined in its findings that said petitioners
failed to duly exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris familias to prevent such damages.

401. TAMARGO V. CA
209 S 581
FACTS:
Adelberto Bundoc 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle which resulted in her
death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed with the RTC by petitioners, parents
of Jennifer, against respondent spouses, Adelbertos natural parents with whom he was living at
the time of the tragic incident. In addition to this case for damages, a criminal information or
Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed against Adelberto, who was acquitted and
exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he had acted without discernment.
Prior to the incident the spouses Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto before
the then CFI of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was granted after Adelberto had shot and
killed Jennifer. In their Answer, respondent spouses, Adelbertos natural parents, claimed that not
they, but rather the adopting parents were indispensable parties to the action since parental
authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for
adoption was filed.
The trial court ruled against the adopting parents, who filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
was later denied for being filed beyond the reglementary period. Petitioners went to the CA on a
petition for mandamus and certiorari questioning the trial courts decision. The CA dismissed the
petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their right to appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not parental authority may be given retroactive effect so as to make adopting parents
the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against the adopted child where actual custody
was lodged with the biological parents
RULING:
Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of parents, their
parental authority which includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the child. In the case
at bar, during the shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the
natural parents. It follows that they are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages. Parents
and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental authority
in accordance with the civil code.
SC did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose
a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when they had no actual or physical
custody over the adopted child. Retroactivity may be essential if it permits accrual of some
benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. Under Article 35 of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period
of trial custody however in this case, trial custody period either had not yet begin nor had been
completed at the time of the shooting incident. Hence, actual custody was then with the natural
parents of Adelberto.

The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals. The complaint filed before the trial court is hereby reinstated and this case is remanded
to that court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

404. AQUINAS SCHOOL vs. INTON

G.R. No. 184202
FACTS:
This case is about the private schools liability for the outside catechists act of shoving a student
and kicking him on the legs when he disobeyed her instruction to remain in his seat and not
move around the classroom. In 1998, Jose Luis Inton (Jose Luis) was a grade three student at
Aquinas School (Aquinas). Respondent Sister Margarita Yamyamin (Yamyamin), a religion
teacher who began teaching at that school only in June of that year, taught Jose Luis grade three
religion class. Jose Luis left his seat and went over to a classmate to play a joke of surprising
him. Yamyamin noticed this and sent him back to his seat. After a while, Jose Luis got up again
and went over to the same classmate. Yamyamin approached the Jose Luis and kicked him on the
legs several times. She also pulled and shoved his head on the classmates seat. She also made
the child copy the notes on the blackboard while seating on the floor. Respondents Jose and
Victoria Inton (the Intons) filed an action for damages on behalf of their son Jose Luis against
Yamyamin and Aquinas before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in Civil Case
67427. The Intons also filed a criminal action against Yamyamin for violation of Republic Act
7610 to which she pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly. With regard to the action for
damages, the Intons sought to recover actual, moral, and exemplary damages, as well as
attorneys fees, for the hurt that Jose Luis and his mother Victoria suffered. The RTC dismissed
Victorias personal claims but ruled in Jose Luis favor, holding Yamyamin liable to him for
moral damages of P25,000.00, exemplary damages of P25,000.00, and attorneys fees of
P10,000.00 plus the costs of suit. They elevated the case to the CA to increase the award of
damages and hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA was correct in holding Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin for the
damages awarded to Jose Luis.
RULING:
No. The school directress testified that Aquinas had an agreement with a congregation of sisters
under which, in order to fulfill its ministry, the congregation would send religion teachers to
Aquinas to provide catechesis to its students. Aquinas insists that it was not the school but
Yamyamins religious congregation that chose her for the task of catechizing the schools grade
three students, much like the way bishops designate the catechists who would teach Religion in
public schools. Aquinas did not have control over Yamyamins teaching methods. The Intons had
not refuted the school directress testimony in this regard. Aquinas still had the responsibility of
taking steps to ensure that only qualified outside catechists are allowed to teach its young
students. In this regard, it cannot be said that Aquinas took no steps to avoid the occurrence of
improper conduct towards the students by their religion teacher. They showed records,
certificates and diploma that Yamyamin is qualified to teach. There is no question that she came
from a legitimate congregation of sisters. They provided Faculty Staff Manual in handling the
students. They pre-approved the content of the course she wanted to teach. They have a

classroom evaluation program for her unfortunately, she was new, therefore do not have
sufficient opportunity to observe her.
405. ST. JOSEPHS COLLEGE VS. MIRANDA
G.R. No. 182353
FACTS:
While inside the premises of St. Josephs College, the class where respondent Miranda belonged
was conducting a science experiment about fusion of sulfur powder andiron fillings under the
tutelage of Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the teacher and the employee, while the adviser is
Estafania Abdan.
Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without having adequately secured it
from any untoward incident or occurrence. In the middle of the experiment, Jayson, who was the
assistant leader of one of the class groups, checked the result of the experiment by looking into
the test tube with magnifying glass. The test tube was being held by one of his group mates who
moved it close and towards the eye of Jayson. At that instance, the compound in the test tube
spurted out and several particles of which hit Jaysons eye and the different parts of the bodies of
some of his group mates. As a result thereof, Jaysons eyes were chemically burned, particularly
his left eye, for which he had to undergo surgery and had to spend for his medication. Upon
filing of this case [in] the lower court, his wound had not completely healed and still had to
undergo another surgery.
Upon learning of the incident and because of the need for finances, [Jaysons] mother, who was
working abroad, had to rush back home for which she spent P36,070.00 for her fares and had to
forego her salary from November 23, 1994 to December 26, 1994, in the amount of at least
P40,000.00.
Jason and his parents suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish and wounded feelings as a result
of his injury due to the petitioners fault and failure to exercise the degree of care and diligence
incumbent upon each one of them. Thus, they should be held liable for moral damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were liable for the accident.
RULING:
Yes. As found by both lower courts, proximate cause of the Jasons injury was the concurrent
failure of petitioners to prevent to foreseeable mishap that occurred during the conduct of the
science experiment. Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of care,
caution and foresight incumbent upon the school, its administrators and teachers. "The defense of
due diligence of a good father of a family raised by [petitioner] St. Joseph College will not
exculpate it from liability because it has been shown that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in
the supervision of its teachers despite an apparent rigid screening process for hiring and in the
maintenance of what should have been a safe and secured environment for conducting dangerous

experiments. Petitioner school is still liable for the wrongful acts of the teachers and employees
because it had full information on the nature of dangerous science experiments but did not take
affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to students. Schools should not simply install safety
reminders and distribute safety instructional manuals. More importantly, schools should provide
protective gears and devices to shield students from expected risks and anticipated dangers.

406. ST. MARYS ACADEMY V. CARPITANOS

G.R. NO. 143363
FACTS: Defendant-appellant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment
drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of
schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Marys Academy,
Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group.
Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a
Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary
School, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of
the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep
turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident.
The parents of Sherwin filed a case against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and
Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Marys Academy before the RTC
of Dipolog City and claimed for damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not St. Marys Academy is liable for damages for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos.
RULING: The petition was GRANTED and REMANDED to the RTC for determination of any
liability of the school. The Court held that for the school to be liable there must be a finding that
the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because
of negligence, must have causal connection to the accident. There is no showing of such.

407. AMADORA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-47745
FACTS:
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the commencement
exercises where he would ascend the stage and in the presence of his relatives and friends receive
his high school diploma. As it turned out, though, fate would intervene and deny him that
awaited experience. While they were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San JoseRecoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his
expectations and his life as well.
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, the herein petitioners,
as the victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code
against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys,
and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective
parents. The complaint against the students was later dropped. After trial, the CIF of Cebu held
the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs. On appeal to the respondent court, however, the
decision was reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved.
ISSUE:
Whether or not teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for the death
of Alfredo Amadora.
RULING:
The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question (Art. 2180) should apply to
all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Following the canon of reddendo singular singuli,
where the school is academic, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to
the teacher in charge of such student. This is the general rule. Reason: Old academic schools, the
heads just supervise the teachers who are the ones directly involved with the students.
Where the school is for arts and trades, it is the head and only he who shall be held liable as an
exception to the general rule. Reason: Old schools of arts and trades saw the masters or heads of
the school personally and directly instructed the apprentices.
Therefore, the heads are not liable. The teacher-in-charge is not also liable because theres no
showing that he was negligent in enforcing discipline against the accused or that he waived
observance of the rules and regulations of the school, or condoned their non-observance. Also,
the fact that he wasnt present cant be considered against him because he wasnt required to
report on that day. Classes had already ceased.

408. SALVOSA, ET AL. V. IAC, ET AL.

G.R. No. 70458
FACTS:
The trial court held the petitioners and several others as jointly and severally liable to pay private
respondents, as heirs of Napoleon Castro, after a shooting incident wherein Jimmy Abon,
petitioners duly appointed armorer for its ROTC unit, shot Napoleon Castro, a student of UB,
with an unlicensed firearm which he took from the armory of the ROTC unit of the BCF. Such
shooting lead to the death of said student and the institution of the case. On appeal by petitioners,
the respondent Court affirmed with modification the decision of the Trial Court, hence the
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B. Abon.
RULING:
No they cannot, the decision appealed from is reversed in so far as it holds petitioners solidarily
liable with Jimmy B. Abon for his tortious act in the killing of Napoleon Castro. Under the
penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or heads of establishments of arts
and trades are liable for "damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody." The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains
in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis as to the student
and is called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the student.
Upon the foregoing considerations, we hold that Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have
been "at attendance in the school," or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro.
Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable
with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts.
Besides, the record shows that before the shooting incident, Roberto B. Ungos ROTC Unit
Commandant, AFP, had instructed Jimmy B. Abon "not to leave the office and to keep the
armory well-guarded." Apart from negating a finding that Jimmy B. Abon was under the custody
of the school when he committed the act for which the petitioners are sought to be held liable,
this circumstance shows that Jimmy B. Abon was supposed to be working in the armory with
definite instructions from his superior, the ROTC Commandant, when he shot Napoleon Castro.

409. PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION (PSBA) V. COURT OF

APPEALS
205 S 729
FACTS:
Carlitos Bautista died due to a stabbing incident on the second floor premises of Philippine
School of Business Administration. The parents of the deceased filed a suit at the RTC for
damages against PSBA and its corporate officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled
in the third year commerce and member of the schools academinc community but were elements
from outside the school. Petitioners sought to have the suit dismissed alleging that since they are
presumably sued under Art 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action
against them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic institutions, such as
the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore stated article.
The trial court denied the petition to dismiss which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PSBA be held liable for the death of Carlitos Bautista?
RULING:
Art 2180, in conjunction with Art 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis.
In all such cases, it had been stressed that the law plainly provides that the damage should have
been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held
liable for the acts of its students while in its custody. However, this material situation does not
exist in the present case for as earlier cited, the assailants of Bautista were not students of PSBA,
for whose acts the school could be made liable.

410. REMO vs. SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

G.R. No. 169202
FACTS:
Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine passport was
then expiring on 27 October 2000. Petitioner being married to Francisco R. Rallonza, the
following entries appears in her passport: Rallonza as her surname, Maria Virginia as her
given name, and Remo as her middle name. Prior to the expiry of the validity of her passport,
petitioner, whose marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal of her passport with the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert
to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport.
However, the petitioners request has been denied. With this reason, she filed a petition to change
her surname to her middle name in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Maria Virginia can change her surname Rallonza to her middle name Remo
in her passport.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that once a married woman opted to adopt her husbands surname
in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the cases enumerated
in section 5(d) of RA 8239. these instances are: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment,
or (4) nullity of marriage. since petitioners marriage to her husband subsists, she may not
resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. otherwise stated, a married woman's
reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the marriage.
Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the civil code, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a
special law specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of title
xiii of the civil code which is the general law on the use of surnames. a basic tenet in statutory
construction is that a special law prevails over a general law. Wherefore, the court denied the
petition andaffirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.

411. YASIN vs. SHARIA DISTRICT COURT

G.R. No. 94986
FACTS:
On May 5, 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Sharia District Court in Zamboanga City a
petition to resume the use of maiden name.
On July 4, 1990, the respondent court issued an order stating that the petitioners pleading must
be rectified accordingly.
Hatima filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid order alleging that the petition filed is
not covered by Rule 03 of the Rules of the Court but is merely a petition to resume the use of her
maiden name.
The motion was denied by the respondent court on the ground that the petition is substantially for
the change of name.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for resumption of maiden name and surname is also a petition for
change of name.
RULING:
Petitioners registered name is Hatima Centi Ysaol. In the instant petition, petitioner does not
seek to change her registered maiden name but instead prays that she be allowed to resume the
use of her maiden name in view of the dissolution of her marriage to Hadji Iris Yasin, by virtue
of a decree of divorce granted in accordance with Muslim Law.

412. IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR

CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN
CARULASAN WANG
G.R. No. 159966
FACTS:
Julian was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe
Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got married
on September 22, 1998, they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the childs name
was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
Since the couple planned to live in Singapore where Julian will study together with a sister who
was born in Singapore, Anna Lisa decided to file a petition in the Regional Trial Court seeking to
drop his middle name and have his registered name in the Civil Registry changed from Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. The reason given for the change of name sought in the
petition is that Julian may be discriminated against when he studies in Singapore because of his
middle name since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother is not
carried in a person's name.
After trial, the RTC denied the petition because the reason given did not fall within the grounds
recognized by law. The RTC ruled that since the State has an interest in the name of a person it
cannot just be changed to suit the convenience of the bearer of the name. The RTC said that
legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is
no reason why this right should be taken from Julio considering that he was still a minor. When
he reaches majority age he could then decide whether to change his name by dropping his middle
name, added the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the law the law provides for his middle name to be changed
RULING:
Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further
distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has. When
an illegitimate child is legitimated by subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the
father in a public instrument or private handwritten instrument, he then bears both his mother's
surname as his middle name and his father's surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a
legitimated child or an acknowledged natural child. The registered name of a legitimate,
legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given name, a middle name and a
surname.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is
convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean
society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle

name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to
drop it from his registered complete name.
To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or
compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the
name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid
confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino
name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase
signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the
surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for
a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition.
From the records, the Court gleaned that prior to the commencement of this action, the
relationship between respondent Francisco, on one hand, and petitioner and her twin daughters,
on the other, was indeed quite pleasant. The correspondences exchanged among them expressed
profound feelings of thoughtfulness and concern for one anothers well-being. The photographs
presented by petitioner as part of her exhibits presented a seemingly typical family celebrating
kinship. All of these, however, are now things of the past. With the filing of this case, and the
allegations hurled at one another by the parties, the relationships among the parties had certainly
been affected. Particularly difficult for Rica and Rina must be the fact that those who they had
considered and claimed as family denied having any familial relationship with them. Given all
these, we could not see Rica and Rina moving back here in the Philippines in the company of
those who have disowned them.
Finally, as to the amount of support pendente lite, the Court take their bearings from the
provision of the law mandating the amount of support to be proportionate to the resources or
means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient.42 Guided by this principle, we hold
respondent Francisco liable for half of the amount of school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina
as support pendente lite. As established by petitioner, respondent Francisco has the financial
resources to pay this amount given his various business endeavors.

415. MOORE V. REPUBLIC

GR L-18407
FACTS:
Petitioner Elaine Moore is an American citizen formerly married to Joseph Velarde, also an
American Citizen, out of whose a wedlock child, William Michael Velarde, was born. The
marriage was subsequently dissolved by a decree of divorce. Elaine Moore contracted a second
marriage with Don Moore, and thereafter the minor lived continuously with the spouses up to the
present time. She filed a petition praying that her child be permitted to change his name as to
read William Michael Velarde Moore. RTC denied her petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the child of the petitioner be allowed to use the surname of the second husband of
her mother.
RULING:
Our laws do not authorize a legitimate child to use the surname of a person who is not his father
for, as a matter of fact. Art. 364 of the New Civil Code (NCC) specifically provides that
legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their father. Mention is also made of Art.
369 of NCC which provides that in the annulment of a voidable marriage the children conceived
before the annulment shall principally use the surname of the father; and considering by analogy
the effect of divorce, it is concluded that the children who are conceived before such decree
should also be understood as carrying the surname of the real father, which in this case, is
Velarde.
If a child is born out of a lawful wedlock be allowed to bear the surname of the second husband
of the mother, should the first husband die or separated by a decree of divorce, there may result a
confusion as to his real paternity. In the long run, the change may redound to the prejudice of the
child in the community.
The order of RTC is affirmed.

416. PEOPLE vs. ESTRADA

G.R. No. 164368
FACTS:
December 27, 1994, at the St. Johns Cathedral, Dagupan City, while the sacrament of
confirmation was being performed by the Bishop, a man from the crowd walked towards the
center of the altar and sat on the Bishops chair. Crisanto Santillan, who was an assistant, saw
this. He requested the accused to vacate, but the latter refused. They called on the guard. Despite
repeated request, he did not move. As the guard was attempting to strike the victim with his
nightstick to make him leave accused-appellant drew a knife and stabbed Mararac. He repeated it
a lot. After, he got up and shouted via the mic; No one can beat me here! SPO1 Francisco saw a
man, with red stains on his shirt and a knife in one hand sitting on a chair. He advised him to
drop the knife. Accused-appellant obeyed, Mararac, the security guard, was brought to the
hospital where he expired a few minutes upon arrival.
Accused-appellant, filed a Demurrer to Evidence where he claims that: prosecution failed to
prove murder; that there was unlawful aggression by the victim; and that accused-appellant was
of unsound mind. Inspector Valdez (Jail warden) requested the court to allow accused-appellant,
to be treated at the Baguio General Hospital to determine whether he should remain in jail or be
transferred to some other institution. While motion for reconsideration was pending, counsel for
accused-appellant filed a Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric
Examination. Appellants counsel informed the court that accused-appellant had been exhibiting
abnormal behavior for the past weeks. There were 2 letters of the warden requesting the same.
The trial court denied reconsideration of the order denying the Demurrer to Evidence. Dr.
Maria Soledad Gawidan, a resident physician in the Department of Psychiatry at the Baguio
General Hospital, testified to the accused being confined and diagnosed with Schizophrenic
Psychosis, Paranoid Typeschizophrenia, paranoid, chronic, paranoid type.
The trial court rendered a decision on June 23, 1997. It upheld the prosecution evidence and
found accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged and thereby sentenced him to death,
ISSUE:
Whether or not he was indeed insane.
RULING:
When a person commits a felonious act the act is presumed to have been done voluntarily. In the
absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that every person is of sound mind and
that all acts are voluntary. An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted
during a lucid interval. In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will
not exclude imputability. Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes
insanity as an exempting circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence. There are
certain circumstances that should have placed the trial court on notice that appellant may not

have been in full possession of his mental faculties e.g. when he attacked Mararac, then went up
the microphone. Accused-appellants history of mental illness was brought to the courts.
To test whether the accused would have a fair trial there are two distinct matters to be determined
(1) whether defendant is coherent to provide his counsel with information necessary (2) whether
he is able to comprehend the significance of the trial and his relation to it. To put a legally
incompetent person on trial or to convict and sentence him is a violation of the constitutional
rights to a fair trial. The determination of whether a sanity investigation or hearing should be
ordered rests generally in the discretion of the trial court. In the case at bar, when accusedappellant moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground of accuseds mental condition,
the trial court denied the motion after finding that the questions propounded on appellant were
intelligently answered by him. The fact that accused-appellant was able to answer the questions
asked by the trial court is not conclusive evidence that he was competent enough to stand trial
and assist in his defense. The trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of
accused-appellant. The trial judge is not a psychiatrist or psychologist or some other expert
equipped with the specialized knowledge. If the medical history was not enough to create a
reasonable doubt in the judges mind of accused-appellants competency to stand trial,
subsequent events should have done so. One month after the prosecution rested its case, there
were letters requesting that accused be confined in hospital, as well as the counsels filing of
motion. And despite all the overwhelming indications of accused-appellants state of mind, the
judge persisted in his personal assessment and never even considered subjecting accusedappellant to a medical examination. To top it all, the judge found appellant guilty and sentenced
him to death.
At this late hour, a medical finding alone may make it impossible for us to evaluate appellants
mental condition at the time of the crimes commission for him to avail of the exempting
circumstance of insanity. Nonetheless, under the present circumstances, accused-appellants
competence to stand trial must be properly ascertained to enable him to participate in his trial
meaningfully. Remanded to the court a quo for the conduct of a proper mental examination on
accused-appellant, a determination of his competency to stand trial, and for further proceedings.

418. REPUBLIC vs. COSETENG-MAGPAYO

G.R. No. 189476
FACTS:
Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo (respondent)
is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as
respondents certificate of live birth shows, contracted marriage on March 26, 1972. Claiming,
however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed on July 22, 2008 at the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to change his name to Julian Edward
Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification
from the National Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique "does not appear in
[its] National Indices of Marriage. Respondent also submitted his academic records from
elementary up to college showing that he carried the surname "Coseteng," and the birth
certificate of his child where "Coseteng" appears as his surname. In the 1998, 2001 and 2004
Elections, respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon Citys 3rd District using the
name "JULIAN M.L. COSETENG."
On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC, respondent amended his petition by alleging
therein compliance with the 3-year residency requirement under Section 2, Rule 103] of the
Rules of Court. The notice setting the petition for hearing on November 20, 2008 was published
in the newspaper Broadside in its issues of October 31-November 6, 2008, November 7-13,
2008, and November 14-20, 2008. And a copy of the notice was furnished the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG).
No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general default was entered by the
trial court which then allowed respondent to present evidence ex parte. By Decision of January 8,
2009, the trial court granted respondents petition. The Republic of the Philippines (Republic)
filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court by Order of July 2, 2009,
hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged the present petition for review to the Court on pure question of
law.
ISSUE:
a)
Whether or not the petition for change of name involving change of civil status
should be made through appropriate adversarial proceedings.
b)
Whether or not the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it directed the
deletion of the name of respondents father from his birth certificate.
RULING:
The petition is impressed with merit. A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103
(CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results
as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when
one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was
unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former

alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. Respondents reason for
changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds,
however.
The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines. In Alfon,
the Court allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use the name that she had been known
since childhood in order to avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She
merely sought to use the surname of her mother which she had been using since childhood.
Ruling in her favor, the Court held that she was lawfully entitled to use her mothers surname,
adding that the avoidance of confusion was justification enough to allow her to do so. In the
present case, however, respondent denies his legitimacy.
The change being sought in respondents petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in
relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then
would not suffice to grant respondents supplication. As earlier stated, however, the petition of
respondent was filed not in Makati where his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City.
And as the above-mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent before the RTC shows,
neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties thereto.
Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct. Aside from improper venue, he failed to
implead the civil registrar of Makati and all affected parties as respondents in the case."A petition
for a substantial correction or change of entries in the civil registry should have as respondents
the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to have any interest that would
be affected thereby."
Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets of notices to different "potential oppositors." The first notice
is that given to the "persons named in the petition" and the second (which is through publication)
is that given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be
considered interested or affected parties, such as creditors. That two sets of notices are mandated
under the above-quoted Section 4 is validated by the subsequent Section 5, also above-quoted,
which provides for two periods (for the two types of "potential oppositors") within which to file
an opposition (15 days from notice or from the last date of publication). The purpose precisely of
Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the petition. The
sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section
3, Rule 108 but were inadvertently left out.

419. SILVERIO V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.

G.R. No. 174689
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the
RTC, impleading the LCR as respondent. He alleged that he is a male transsexual, and that he
had always identified himself with girls since childhood. That he underwent psychological
examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a
"woman" culminated when he underwent sex reassignment surgery. From then on, petitioner
lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married.
He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to
"Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female." Without any opposition, the RTC rendered a
decision in favor of the petitioner. After, however, respondent, thru the OSG, filed a petition for
certiorari in the CA, which it approved. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied,
hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the change of petitioners name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed.
RULING:
It is not, the petition is denied. The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals
and entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions
for change of name are controlled by statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code
provides that no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. This Civil
Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). RA 9048 now governs the
change of first name. RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name
may be allowed. Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex
reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he
transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter ones legal
capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex
reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first name for his declared
purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest. Before a
person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced
by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any
prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In addition, the determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue
and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides
that no entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. Under RA
9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court. While petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the
civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or
change of the entries in his birth certificate.

420. BALDOS V CA
G.R. No. 170645
FACTS:
Reynaldo Pillazar, alias Reynaldo Baldos, was born on 30 October 1948. However, his birth was
not registered in the office of the local civil registrar until roughly 36 years later or on 11
February 1985. His certificate of live birth indicated Nieves Baldos as his mother and Bartolome
Baldos as his father. Nieves Baldos also appeared as the informant on the certificate of live birth.
On 8 March 1995, Nieves Baldos filed in the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. 79-0-95, for cancellation of the late registration of Reynaldos birth.
She claimed that Reynaldo was not really her son. Trial Court dismissed the petition, Court of
appeals affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the late registration of Reynaldos birth is valid.
RULING:
Supreme Court dismissed the petition. Since Reynaldo was born on 30 October 1948, the late
registration of his birth is outside of the coverage of P.D. No. 651, as amended. The late
registration of Reynaldos birth falls under Act No. 3753, otherwise known as the Civil Registry
Law, which took effect on 27 February 1931. As a general law, Act No. 3753 applies to the
registration of all births, not otherwise covered by P.D. No. 651, as amended, occurring from 27
February 1931 onwards. Considering that the late registration of Reynaldos birth took place in
1985, National Census Statistics Office (NCSO) Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1983
governs the implementation of Act No. 3753 in this case.
Under NCSO A.O. No. 1-83, the birth of a child shall be registered in the office of the local civil
registrar within 30 days from the time of birth. Any report of birth made beyond the
reglementary period is considered delayed. The local civil registrar, upon receiving an
application for delayed registration of birth, is required to publicly post for at least ten days a
notice of the pending application for delayed registration. If after ten days no one opposes the
registration and the local civil registrar is convinced beyond doubt that the birth should be
registered, he should register the same.

421. LEE vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 118387
FACTS:
On 15 November 1985, a complainant for sum of money was filed by the International Corporate
Bank, Inc. against Sacoba Manufacturing Corp., Pablo Gonzales Jr., and Tomas Gonzales who,
in turn, filed a third party complaint against Alfa Integrated Textile Mills (ALFA), Ramon C. Lee
(ALFA's president) and Antonio DM. Lacdao (ALFA's vice president) on 17 March 1986. On 17
September 1987, Lee and Lacdao filed a motion to dismiss the third party complaint which the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58 denied in an Order dated 27 June 1988. On 18 July
1988, Lee and Lacdao filed their answer to the third party complaint. Meanwhile, on 12 July
1988, the trial issued an order requiring the issuance of an alias summons upon ALFA through
the DBP as a consequence of Lee and Lacdao's letter informing the court that the summons for
ALFA was erroneously served upon them considering that the management of ALFA had been
transferred to the DBP. In a manifestation dated 22 July 1988, the DBP claimed that it was not
authorized to receive summons on behalf of ALFA since the DBP had not taken over the
company which has a separate and distinct corporate personality and existence. On 4 August
1988, the trial court issued an order advising Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. to take the
appropriate steps to serve the summons to ALFA. On 16 August 1988, Sacoba Manufacturing, et.
al. filed a Manifestation and Motion for the Declaration of Proper Service of Summons which the
trial court granted on 17 August 1988.
On 12 September 1988, Lee and Lacdao filed a motion for reconsideration submitting that the
Rule 14, section 13 of the Revised Rules of Court is not applicable since they were no longer
officers of ALFA and Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. should have availed of another mode of
service under Rule 14, Section 16 of the said Rules, i.e., through publication to effect proper
service upon ALFA. On 2 January 1989, the trial court upheld the validity of the service of
summons on ALFA through Lee and Lacdao, thus, denying the latter's motion for reconsideration
and requiring ALFA to file its answer through Lee and Lacdao as its corporate officers. On 19
January 1989, a second motion for reconsideration was filed by Lee and Lacdao reiterating their
stand that by virtue of the voting trust agreement they ceased to be officers and directors of
ALFA, hence, they could no longer receive summons or any court processes for or on behalf of
ALFA. In support of their second motion for reconsideration, Lee and Lacdao attached thereto a
copy of the voting trust agreement between all the stockholders of ALFA (Lee and Lacdao
included), on the one hand, and the DBP, on the other hand, whereby the management and
control of ALFA became vested upon the DBP. On 25 April 1989, the trial court reversed itself
by setting aside its previous Order dated 2 January 1989 and declared that service upon Lee and
Lacdao who were no longer corporate officers of ALFA cannot be considered as proper service
of summons on ALFA. On 15 May 1989, Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. moved for a
reconsideration of the Order which was affirmed by the court in is Order dated 14 August 1989
denying Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al.'s motion for reconsideration.
On 18 September 1989, a petition for certiorari was belatedly submitted by Sacoba
Manufacturing, et. al. before the Court of Appeals which, nonetheless, resolved to give due
course thereto on 21 September 1989. On 17 October 1989, the trial court, not having been
notified of the pending petition for certiorari with the appellate court issued an Order declaring

as final the Order dated 25 April 1989. Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. in the said Order were
required to take positive steps in prosecuting the third party complaint in order that the court
would not be constrained to dismiss the same for failure to prosecute. Subsequently, on 25
October 1989 Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. filed a motion for reconsideration on which the trial
court took no further action. On 19 March 1990, after Lee and Lacdao filed their answer to
Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al.'s petition for certiorari, the appellate court rendered its decision,
setting aside the orders of trial court judge dated 25 April 1989 and 14 August 1989. On 11 April
1990, Lee and Lacdao moved for a reconsideration of the decision of the appellate court which
resolved to deny the same on 10 May 1990. Lee and Lacdao filed the petition for certiorari. In
the meantime, the appellate court inadvertently made an entry of judgment on 16 July 1990
erroneously applying the rule that the period during which a motion for reconsideration has been
pending must be deducted from the 15-day period to appeal. However, in its Resolution dated 3
January 1991, the appellate court set aside the aforestated entry of judgment after further
considering that the rule it relied on applies to appeals from decisions of the Regional Trial
Courts to the Court of Appeals, not to appeals from its decision to the Supreme Court pursuant to
the Supreme Court's.
ISSUE:
a)
Whether the execution of the voting trust agreement by Lee and Lacdao whereby all their
shares to the corporation have been transferred to the trustee deprives the stockholder of their
positions as directors of the corporation.
b)
Whether the five-year period of the voting trust agreement in question had lapsed in 1986
so that the legal title to the stocks covered by the said voting trust agreement ipso facto reverted
to Lee and Lacdao as beneficial owners pursuant to the 6th paragraph of section 59 of the new
Corporation Code.
c)
Whether there was proper service of summons on ALFA through Lee and Lacdao, to bind
ALFA.
RULING:
Lee and Lacdao, by virtue of the voting trust agreement executed in 1981 disposed of all their
shares through assignment and delivery in favor of the DBP, as trustee. Consequently, Lee and
Lacdao ceased to own at least one share standing in their names on the books of ALFA as
required under Section 23 of the new Corporation Code. They also ceased to have anything to do
with the management of the enterprise. Lee and Lacdao ceased to be directors. Hence, the
transfer of their shares to the DBP created vacancies in their respective positions as directors of
ALFA. The transfer of shares from the stockholders of ALFA to the DBP is the essence of the
subject voting trust agreement. Considering that the voting trust agreement between ALFA and
the DBP transferred legal ownership of the stocks covered by the agreement to the DBP as
trustee, the latter because the stockholder of record with respect to the said shares of stocks. In
the absence of a showing that the DBP had caused to be transferred in their names one share of
stock for the purpose of qualifying as directors of ALFA, Lee and Lacdao can no longer be
deemed to have retained their status as officers of ALFA which was the case before the execution
of the subject voting trust agreement. There is no dispute from the records that DBP has taken
over full control and management of the firm.

The 6th paragraph of section 59 of the new Corporation Code reads that "Unless expressly
renewed, all rights granted in a voting trust agreement shall automatically expire at the end of the
agreed period, and the voting trust certificates as well as the certificates of stock in the name of
the trustee or trustees shall thereby be deemed cancelled and new certificates of stock shall be
reissued in the name of the transferors." However, it is manifestly clear from the terms of the
voting trust agreement between ALFA and the DBP that the duration of the agreement is
contingent upon the fulfillment of certain obligations of ALFA with the DBP. Had the five-year
period of the voting trust agreement expired in 1986, the DBP would not have transferred an its
rights, titles and interests in ALFA "effective June 30, 1986" to the national government through
the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) as attested to in a Certification dated 24 January 1989 of the
Vice President of the DBP's Special Accounts Department II. In the same certification, it is stated
that the DBP, from 1987 until 1989, had handled s account which included ALFA's assets
pursuant to a management agreement by and between the DBP and APT. Hence, there is
evidence on record that at the time of the service of summons on ALFA through Lee and Lacdao
on 21 August 1987, the voting trust agreement in question was not yet terminated so that the
legal title to the stocks of ALFA, then, still belonged to the DBP.
It is a basic principle in Corporation Law that a corporation has a personality separate and
distinct from the officers or members who compose it. Thus, the role on service of processes on a
corporation enumerates the representatives of a corporation who can validly receive court
processes on its behalf. Not every stockholder or officer can bind the corporation considering the
existence of a corporate entity separate from those who compose it. The rationale of the rule is
that service must be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation sued as to make
it a priori supposable that he will realize his responsibilities and know what he should do with
any legal papers served on him. Herein, Lee and Lacdao do not fall under any of the enumerated
officers. The service of summons upon ALFA, through Lee and Lacdao, therefore, is not valid.
To rule otherwise will contravene the general principle that a corporation can only be bound by
such acts which are within the scope of the officer's or agent's authority.