S, L, C S  I  C T

ORIGINAL
Blackwell
Oxford,
The
MUWO
©
0027-4909
3
952005
Muslim ARTICLE
Hartford
UKPublishing,
WorldSeminary
Ltd.

State, Law, Civil Society

SMuslim
The , L, C S
World V
 95
I  C T
2005

and Islam in Contemporary

Turkey
Ihsan Yilmaz
University of London
London, United Kingdom

S
ome scholars have asserted that the different perceptions of Islam
throughout the world in various local contexts have led to different
‘Islams’ since “considerable disagreements are apparent over what the
fundamentals of Islam are and how they should be interpreted.”1 As one writer
strongly emphasizes, “there are as many Islams as there are situations that
sustain it.”2 In the same vein, I argue in this article that there are different
Islams in Turkey from a sociological perspective and put the spotlight on these
different types of co-existing unofficial and official Islams in Turkey.
This article looks briefly at the secularization of Turkey and argues that
despite the rhetoric, there has always been an official version of Islam in
Turkey that this study calls Lausannian Islam. Even though the Turkish state
has always desired to have only the state version of Turkish Islam, unofficial
Islam has persisted. This article will focus on two versions of the unofficial
Islam: political Islam of the Milli Görüß movement and Anatolian Islam of the
faith-based Fethullah Gülen movement.
Turkey is one of the very first Muslim countries that encountered the modern
West and attempted to respond to the challenges posed by Western power and
civilization. The questions surrounding these challenges, how to respond to
them, preventing the collapse of the Empire, modernization and transplantation
of Western institutions have always been on the agenda of Turkish intellectuals.
Thus, the first discourses regarding modernity and the West were formulated in
Turkey in the Muslim world. Until recently, practicing Muslim Turks’ discourses
on these issues have not been very positive. There has always been a reluctance
to enter into a dialogue with modernity and the West and co-operate with them.
Moreover, political Islam and the instrumentalist use of religion influenced by the
Middle Eastern experiences had existed in the socio-political sphere of the country.

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Rigid approaches, rhetoric and discourses have recently been replaced by

more analytical, flexible and tolerant ones. Fethullah Gülen and his faith-based
movement are pioneering examples in this regard. This civil movement’s
discourse and practice of Anatolian Islam have also had transformative
influences on society in general, and state Islam and political Islam, in
particular, with regard to views on the relation of religion and politics,
modernity, the West and inter-civilizational & inter-cultural dialogue.

State Islam: Lausannian Islam (Lozan Islamı)

From a sociological point of view, we can speak of the Turkish state(s)
in the plural as we do vis-à-vis Islam(s) in Turkey. From the perspective of
secularism, the attitude of the state towards religion, it is obvious that there has
not been a monolithic, uniform or linear pattern. This may be due to the fact
that different interests, power groups, elite, and segments within the state have
their different agendas, visions and ideas with regard to role of Islam within
society, if not within politics. From time to time, the emphasis of the state on
this role of Islam changes in accordance with conjecture, socio-politics and
geo-politics.
The official state religion of Islam and the folk Islam of the Anatolian
tribal people and villagers differed considerably, even in the Ottoman State.
Popular religious practices had become institutionalized in the form of Sufi
orders. As the many parts of the country were settled, the leaders of these
orders linked ordinary people to the rulers. Islam was the mediating link
between local-level society and the political structure. Local people shared
religion with the elite and “religion provided the cultural fund that shaped
political legitimacy. Thus, a universe of discourse was established through
Islam, but affiliation and, of course, Islamic practices differed for the ruling
elite and for the masses.”3
Secularist reform of republican efforts can be traced back to the Ottoman
period. The area of public life falling under Islamic religious jurisdiction was
gradually reduced, thus causing a de facto secularization of the principal
institutions of the state. The need for reform in the Ottoman state was first
recognized in the 17th century, when the state’s strength began to wane.
Reforms of that century were generally indigenous attempts, and mainly
centered on strengthening the authority of the central government. However,
after the 18th century, reform efforts took on a different tone as the Ottoman
state opened its doors to the West.
Ottoman intellectuals and statesmen came to look at Westernization
as a precondition of reform in the country. Therefore, a major shift in the
understanding of reform came into existence. Indigenous solutions were not
taken into account anymore. During the 19th century, the basic concern of

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Ottoman reformers was to Westernize the Ottoman military, educational,

legal, and political institutions. To do this, they had to overcome Islam’s all-
encompassing and omnipotent power in the country that stems from the fact
that Islam had penetrated into all substructures of the country’s socio-political
system. The reformers’ dilemma was apparent. On the one hand, an increasing
number of them came to believe that the state’s salvation rested in the
acceptance of Western technology and Western institutional forms. Yet, no one
could come up with a formula as to how Western technology and institutions
would be adapted to an Islamic society without accepting Western civilization
itself. This led to the construction of dual institutions. Rather than destroying
traditional institutions, the 19th century reforms constructed new ones that
were to co-exist alongside traditional ones.
It was after the Ottoman state’s collapse and the subsequent founding
of the Turkish Republic in 1923 that this duality was finally resolved in favor
of totally accepting Western civilization. The Republican elite’s passion for
modernization, seen as an escape from backwardness, translated itself into
a total dislike and distrust of all things associated with the ancient regime
and the old way of life. Topping the long list of suspect establishments were
religion and religious institutions. The culture associated with religion and
religiosity, such as dress code, was also deemed antithetical to contemporary
civilization.
Founders of the Republic believed that there was not enough time to
wait for the slow process of evolution. Secularism was implemented through
a series of decisive steps taken to disestablish Islam from its role in law and
education, and as the official religion of the state. Today, the preamble of
the Constitution reads:
The recognition that no protection shall be afforded to thoughts or
opinions contrary to Turkish national interests, the principle of the
indivisibility of the existence of Turkey with its State and territory,
Turkish historical and moral values or the nationalism, principles,
reforms and modernism of Atatürk and that, as required by the principle
of secularism, there shall be no interference whatsoever of the sacred
religious feelings in State affairs and politics.
Although the Turkish state called its attitude toward religion “laicism,”
an intellectual inheritance from the French Third Republic, there are certainly
some elements that make the Turkish application unique. One of the most
conspicuous of these elements is that the legal positivist Turkish state has
assumed a role of a “secular mujtahid ’” and has been interpreting Islam in
the lines of its ideological vision. I term the outcome of these secular official
ijtihads “Lozan Islamı (Lausannian Islam)’ which has been the state Islam
or official version of Islam of Turkey.

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The Republican elite have:

. . . claimed that true expression of religion could be found through
the use of Turkish prayer, a language that all could understand, through
translating the Koran into Turkish, rather than Arabic. They also drew
historical parallels, asserting that their revolution mirrors the Protestant
battles against Papism in its dislike of intermediaries and direct access
to the faith for all. Thus, it was cleansed religion, without mysticism,
without saints, and without independent religious institutions that was
aimed at. It was also one closely controlled.4

To subordinate religion to the political establishment, the state has long tried
to create its own version of Islam. In the state version of Islam, there is already
no conflict between the religion and Turkish modernity that covers the modern
nation-state, secularism, democracy and no public role for religion. The raison
d ”etre of the Directorate of Religious Affairs has been to create
a tailor-made national modern Turkish-Islam, definitely suppressing the
transnational links and role, cut off from all international and transnational ties,
specific and limited to the nation-state’s official borders that were drawn with
the Lausanne Treaty of 1924 between Turkey and the European powers. Article
27 of the Lausanne Treaty reads:

No power or jurisdiction in political, legislative or administrative matters

shall be exercised outside Turkish territory by the Turkish Government
or authorities, for any reason whatsoever, over the nationals of a
territory placed under the sovereignty or protectorate of the other
Powers signatory of the present Treaty, or over the nationals of a
territory detached from Turkey.

Although, it has been claimed that the state in Turkey has tried to make
religion a private belief that does not affect the public sphere with its adamant
secularization ideology, this is not entirely true. The state has tried to make
religion a “helping hand.”5 This idea of religion has formulated religion in
terms of its responsibility for the moral health of the nation.6 Theoretical
foundations of this mentality can be traced back to Durkheim, who influenced
Atatürk’s “intellectual mentor” Ziya Gökalp, translator of Durkheim’s works
into Turkish.
Durkheim’s main thesis was that religion plays a significant role in uniting
society. In his view, any coherent society must be at base a religious collectivity.
He conceived the integral nature of religion as the ceremonial and expressive
glue that binds any social organization together. Religion as society’s worship
of itself was Durkheim’s essential insight. He pointed out that the collective
act of worship integrates social institutions. It does this in a special way with
“collective effervescence,” which is a dynamic social force produced when

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people get together. It is the life of the group over and above the lives of the
individuals who make up the group.
Gökalp had systematically advocated the domination of Turkish culture
with forms of Western civilization rather than importing institutions as they had
developed in the West. His sociological orientation, taking a nation as a
political and cultural unity, helped him in his advocacy of Turkism. Atatürk’s
movement and Gökalp’s ideas closely interacted in that Kemalism was affected
by Ziya Gökalp in the formulation of nationalism as a principle, and Gökalp
was affected by Kemalism, which rejected any ambition beyond the borders of
the new Turkey.7
So, in this Durkhemian mentality, an approved version of Islam, “Lausannian-
Islam” (Lozan Islamı), could and should play a public role within the borders of
the Turkish Republic. Thus, the main task of the Directorate has been to control
and to shape Islam in accordance with the needs of the secular nation-state to
the effect of creating a secular, modern, national, official “Lausannian-Islam.”
The application of laicism in Turkey has taken a slightly different form in
that religious affairs in Turkey have been placed under the auspices of the state
and justification for doing so has been explained in reference to Turkey’s
“special and unique” circumstances.8 To those aware that laicism as a concept
espouses the idea that religion and state are kept distinct and separate, this
Turkish version of laicism would appear to be self-contradictory. The Kemalist
élite however, thought that if religion and state are non-separable components
in Islam, then the best way to keep Islam out of public and political life would
be to place it under the control and supervision of the state. Thus, Article
24/4 of the constitution reads:

Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted

under State supervision and control. Instruction in religious culture and
moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of primary and
secondary schools. Other religious education and instruction shall be
subject to the individual’s own desire, and in the case of minors, to the
request of their legal representatives.

As a result, religious institutions were linked to state bureaucracy. Then,

the state started to interfere in religious affairs during the Republican era. One
of the instruments of this interference and control has been the Directorate
of Religious Affairs. Rona Aybay explains why there was a need for the
establishment of this state apparatus:

. . . the fact that the Office of Religious Affairs, which deals only with
Islam, is made a constructional organ raises some doubts about this
neutrality. It should be mentioned, however, that the existence of such
an Office incorporated in the General Administration may be justified

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by certain peculiarities of Turkish society, such as the fact that the

overwhelming majority of the population is Muslim together with the
economic and moral power possessed by the religious foundations
which were inherited from the Ottoman Empire.9

The Directorate of Religious Affairs was established in 1923 at the instigation

of the members of the Grand National Assembly as a replacement of the
Ottoman Ministry of Religion. In later constitutions prepared after the coup
d ”etats of 1960 and 1980, its place in the system was re-confirmed. Now, the
1982 constitution provides that the Directorate is directly responsible to the
Prime Minister and has no direct contact with daily politics.10 Article 136 of
the Constitution reads:
The Department of Religious Affairs, which is within the general
administration, shall exercise its duties prescribed in its particular law, in
accordance with the principles of secularism, removed from all political
views and ideas, and aiming at national solidarity and integrity.

Soon after the establishment of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, the state
tried to put all Islamic activities under the auspices of this organ. As a result,
religious institutions are linked to state bureaucracy, and lack autonomy. As
Shankland portrays it, the Republican elite believe their “ultimate task (is) to
preserve the Republic and its borders. This means that, if necessary, it is fully
prepared to use orthodox Islam as a bulwark against communism or as a
means of achieving harmony in the community.”11 The establishment of the
Directorate of Religious Affairs with a substantial budget and over 80 thousand
employees is a result of the understanding of this Turkish type of laicism.
The Directorate has an extensive organization. It controls all 86,000
mosques and employs the imams, muftis and muezzins, who are then salaried
employees of the state. The mufti acts as a local link between the believer
and the state; he also administers the imams attached to every mosque and
distributes sermons and other materials sent to them from above. The imams
are not just part of an administrative structure; they are also ideologically
subject to the decisions made by their superiors in the announcements that
they make and the sermons that they preach. This tight supervisory structure
leaves “imams with little leeway to create their own interpretation of religion.”12
The teachers, textbooks, and curricula of all religious schooling are under the
direct supervision of the Director-General of Religious Education, a separate
office of the Ministry of Education.

Official Ijtihads in a Secular State

Since the adoption of Islam by Turks, a religious authority was established
at the top of the state to advise the Sultan on religious issues. The Ottoman

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state formed a judicial system based on Islamic principles as well. The judiciary,
organized as a network of judges (qadi) was one of the essential powers of
the Ottoman regime.
Later, this practice was institutionalized and the position of Sheikh al-Islam
emerged as an authority that approved or refused the Sultan’s rulings according
to Islamic principles. Sheikh al-Islam issued fatwas to determine the policies
of the Ottoman administration.
Albeit secular, the Turkish Republic has set up an ijtihad committee, the
Directorate of Religious Affairs High Council of Religious Affairs, HCRA. The
pervasiveness of Islamic law in Turkish society is so evident that the state
needed to respond to its socio-legal reality by establishing this committee. This
organ of the state has a somewhat awkward status. While the state does not
officially recognize Muslim law and arguing for its application is a criminal
offense, the HCRA bases its arguments on officially non-recognized Islamic
legal and jurisprudential sources. This committee endeavors to produce fatwas
to the questions put to it. The HCRA responds to the socio-legal reality by
exercising ijtihad and also by employing takhayyur.
The Diyanet published a book of fatwas in 1995: Fatwas on Contemporary
Problems. This book by the HCRA is an important indication of the extension
of the religious domain to the social domain. It is a consequence of the fact
that the Diyanet itself could not limit its functions as before to the
administration of religious personnel of the secularist state. It thus began to
extend its functions to advise the public on problems of daily life through
fatwas. In its introduction, the authors justify their book by referring to the
constitution of the Religious Affairs Administration:
. . . in order to prevent the misguidance of our society by those with
insufficient knowledge, and hence preventing the exploitation of society’s
religious feelings for various purposes, the duty and authority for the
religious enlightenment of society and the resolution of the religious
problems of daily life, is given to the (HCRA).

Obviously, HCRA fatwas look like an attempt by the state to regain religious
control over the public. A fatwa website of the HCRA is in service, too: the
Directorate of Religious Affairs Fatwa Site.13
When a financial crisis erupted last year, the Directorate prepared a Friday
sermon to discourage the faithful from using U.S. dollars and this sermon was
delivered as it is obligatory by imams in the 86,000 or so mosques of Turkey.
Kürßat Bumin of Yeni Íafak made fun of the state’s move by making reference
to Article 24 of the Turkish constitution, which states,
No one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religious feelings,
or things held sacred by religion, in any manner whatsoever, for the

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purpose of personal or political influence, or for even partially basing

the fundamental, social, economic, political, and legal order of the State
on religious tenets.

One can cite several examples of the state’s attitude. In every Friday sermon,
there is another official concern that needs to be underlined. In Eid al-adha,
the faithful are not allowed to donate the skin of the animal that they sacrifice
to anyone they want. According to the state’s ijtihad, they have to give it to the
state’s Turkish Air Institution. It is a punishable offense to donate the skin to
non-state organizations.14

The Survival of Unofficial Civil Islam in the Public

Sphere
The state under the reins of the Kemalists assumed that cultural change
could be imposed from above through the force of law. One of the major
expected changes was the secularization of society. In Republican epistemology,
religion is imprisoned in the conscience of the individual and in places of
worship in society and is not allowed to mix with and interfere in public life.15
Article 24 of the constitution says:

Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religious belief and

conviction. Acts of worship, religious services, and ceremonies shall
be conducted freely, provided that they do not violate the provisions
of Article 14.
No one shall be compelled to worship, or to participate in religious
ceremonies and rites, to reveal religious beliefs and convictions, or
be blamed or accused because of his religious beliefs and convictions.
Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted
under State supervision and control. Instruction in religious culture
and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of primary
and secondary schools. Other religious education and instruction shall
be subject to the individual’s own desire, and in the case of minors, to
the request of their legal representatives.
No one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religious
feelings, or things held sacred by religion, in any manner whatsoever,
for the purpose of personal or political influence, or for even partially
basing the fundamental, social, economic, political, and legal order of
the State on religious tenets.

However, it is now recognized that the place and influence of civil Islam in
Turkish social life has not changed a great deal. With Atatürk’s death in 1938,
a transitional period began and by the early 1940s the ruling elite had to give
in to the pressures of democratization. In 1950 Atatürk’s founding Republican
People’s Party lost the election and Turkey started experiencing a surge of

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renewed Islamic sentiment. Competitive political parties meant that different

interests could be voiced in the public sphere, which also meant giving
concessions to Islamic revivalism. Islamic schools were opened and private
religious instruction was allowed.16
Even though civil Islam has been officially removed from public life, it is
still deeply rooted in the minds and hearts of the Turkish people. Although the
state has kept an eye on former religious leaders, their successors and religious
functionaries, they have regained something of their influence in public life by
attracting the masses into their religious atmosphere.17 The Kemalist ideology,
which had national, secular and modern elements, could not fill the gap that
civil Islam was supposed to have forcefully vacated. The state, through its
secular policies and programs of Westernization, threatened the value system
of the Muslim people in the country without providing, at the same time, a
satisfactory and all-encompassing ideological framework that would have mass
appeal and was capable of replacing civil Islam.18 Bifurcation between the élite
and the masses made it difficult for the Kemalists to carry out their reforms
from above.19
Atatürk wanted to make religion a private concern, but unanticipated
social consequences soon caught up with him. As the boundaries of the
private enlarged in Turkey, an unforeseen development occurred. Private
everyday life has increasingly been given new richness and variety; religion
has become a central focus of life and acquired a new power. Religion has
received a new lift from the privatizing wave; private religious instruction,
Islamic fashion in clothes, manufacturing and music, Islamic learned journals,
all of them aspects of private life, have made Islam pervasive in a modern
sense in Turkish society, and have worked against religion becoming a private
belief.20
As a recent study on Turkey reconfirmed “(t)he vibrancy of Islam is
remarkable in almost all areas of Turkish life . . . This Islam is neither a
replacement for, nor an alternative to, the modern world: it is an integral part
of life.”21 Even though the Kemalist system has survived, “the situation today
differs in this, and other ways, from that future envisioned by many of the
Republic’s founders.”22 It was the introduction of democracy in late 1940s that
provided the key link between rulers and ruled. “As campaigning for votes
began, in spite of the repeated emphasis on ensuring that politics and religion
were henceforth to be separate, politicians were hardly able to resist the offer
to support for Islamic mores as a way of attracting votes.”23
The changes observed at the social level are even more significant. One
of them is the recourse among the Islamic circles to fatwas. Fatwa books
are bestsellers. These fatwas cover almost all conceivable issues: working
in Europe, madhhabs, using amplifiers when reciting adhan (call to prayer),

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Friday prayer and work, dar al-Islam, fasting and traveling by train, the stock
exchange, taxes, haläl meat, marrying non-Muslims, †alaq, court divorce,
polygamy, nationalism, unemployment benefits, inflation, interest, customs
taxes, bribery, depositing money in banks in non-Muslim countries, selling
alcohol in non-Muslim countries, gambling in dar al-harb, sterilization, plastic
surgery, using perfumes, abortion, ijtihad, military service, organ transplantation,
prayers (salät) on buses, VATs, mortgages, European Union, golden teeth,
alcohol in medication, eau de cologne, interest, inflation, insurance, feminism,
nikah, and fertility clinics. In addition to fatwa books, many newspapers have
fatwa columns. Recently, the number of Turkish fatwa sites on the internet has
increased. Also, through various popular newsgroups and e-mail discussion
lists, Turkish Muslims solicit information about what ‘Islam’ says about any
particular issue.
With the explosive growth of Islam in society in recent decades, some
indicators suggest that it is practically impossible to keep the distance between
the civic domain and the religious any longer. The growing popularity of
officially unrecognized Islamic orders and communities in every segment of
society in recent decades is one of these indicators. In this regard, it is also
worth mentioning that a recent survey found that 14.1% of Turkish people
have accounts with interest-free Islamic finance institutions, despite the fact
that such financial institutions carry no state guarantee for any losses, as
opposed to mainstream banks.24

Civil Islam: Gülen and His Movement

Fethullah Gülen is an Islamic scholar, thinker, writer, and poet. He has
inspired many people in Turkey to establish educational institutions that
combine modern sciences with ethics and spirituality. His efforts have resulted
in the emergence of the Gülen movement, a faith-inspired collectivity whose
boundaries are extremely loose and difficult to specify. The actual numbers of
Gülen’s millions of followers and sympathizers is not exactly known, but it is
agreed that it is the largest civil movement in the country. Gülen is now
described as an opinion leader in Turkey.25 Most importantly, it is claimed,
“Gülen has made himself a most likely candidate for religious leader of the
new Turkey.”26 Indeed, he is at times referred to in newspapers as the
unofficial civil religious leader of Turkey.27
Gülen’s discourse has had and will have major influences on the future shape
of Turkey and its region. His discourse’s transformative influences firstly and
mainly can be observed in his movement. At a second level, this transformation
affects the surrounding wider society in la longe duree. There has been a
change in Turkish society on certain issues and this change has been towards
the discourse that Gülen has been advocating for the last three decades.

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Gülen sees diversity and pluralism as natural facts. He wants those

differences to be explicitly professed. He believes that the dissemination of
faith through persuasion is the only method to spread it to the civilized world.
Tolerance is the magic word and practice.28
Gülen is of the firm opinion that Turks have interpreted and applied these
concepts in such a way that it could be called Turkish Islam.29 He states that:
The Hanafi understanding and Turkish interpretation dominates more
than three-fourths of the Islamic world. This understanding is very dear
to me. If you like you can call this Turkish Islam. Just as I see no serious
canonical obstacle to this, I don’t think it should upset anyone.30 The
Turkish nation interpreted Islam in the areas open to interpretation . . . it
attained a very broad spectrum and became the religion of great states.
For this reason, I think the Turkish Muslimness is appropriate. Another
aspect of this is that in addition to profound devotion to the Qur’an and
Sunnah, the Turks always have been open to Sufism, Islam’s spiritual
aspect.31 Turkish Islam is composed of the main, unchanging principles
of Islam found in the Qur’an and Sunnah, as well as in the forms that its
aspects open to interpretation assumed during Turkish history, together
with Sufism . . . This is why Turkish Islam always has been broader,
deeper, more tolerant and inclusive, and based on love.32

By making reference to the Turkish-Islam of the Seljuks and Ottomans and

their practices of religious pluralism, he underlines that:
(T)he Muslim world has a good record of dealing with the Jews: there
has been almost no discrimination, and there has been no Holocaust,
denial of basic human rights, or genocide. On the contrary, Jews have
always been welcomed in times of trouble, as when the Ottoman State
embraced them after their expulsion from Andalusia.33

A legally pluralist system existed at these times as well. Gülen is also

tolerant of internal Muslim legal and cultural pluralism. In this context, for
instance, he posits that “Alawis definitely enrich Turkish culture” and
encourages Alawis to move from an oral culture to a written culture in order
to preserve their identities.34 He stresses that “Alawi meeting or prayer houses
should be supported. In our history, a synagogue, a church, and a mosque
stood side by side in many places.”35
In Gülen’s philosophy, secularism is not understood as a non-Muslim way
of life. The separation between the sacred and profane and its projection onto
social life is accepted. The rejection of the sacred is not accepted. Gülen argues
that Islam and the secularity of the state could be compatible. He emphasizes
that such an understanding of secularism existed in the Seljuk and Ottoman
eras: they employed ijtihad in worldly matters, enacted laws and decrees to
respond to challenges in their times.

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Gülen argues that democracy, in spite of its shortcomings, is now the only
viable political system, and people should strive to modernize and consolidate
democratic institutions in order to build a society where individual rights and
freedoms are respected and protected, where equal opportunity for all is more
than a dream. According to Gülen, mankind has not yet designed a better
governing system than democracy.36
Gülen also maintains that as a political and governing system, democracy
is at present the only alternative left in the world. His understanding of
democracy in its current shape is not an ideal that has been reached but
a method and a process “that is being continually developed and revised.”37
He argues that “(i)t’s a process of no return that must develop and mature
. . . Democracy one day will attain a very high level. But we have to wait for
the interpretation of time.”38 Gülen powerfully states that:
Democracy has developed over time. Just as it has gone through many
different stages, it will continue to go through other stages in the future
to improve itself. Along the way, it will be shaped into a more humane
and just system, one based on righteousness and reality. If human
beings are considered as a whole, without disregarding the spiritual
dimension of their existence and their spiritual needs, and without
forgetting that human life is not limited to this mortal life and that all
people have a great craving for eternity, democracy could reach its peak
of perfection and bring even more happiness to humanity. Islamic
principles of equality, tolerance, and justice can help it do just that. 39
He does not see a contradiction between “Islamic administration” and
democracy. “As Islam holds individuals and societies responsible for their own
fates, people must be responsible for governing themselves. The Qur’an
addresses society with such phrases as: ‘O people!’ and ‘O believers!’ The duties
entrusted to modern democratic systems are those that Islam refers to society
and classifies, in order of importance, as ‘absolutely necessary, relatively
necessary, and commendable’ to carry out. People cooperate with one another
in sharing these duties and establishing the essential foundations necessary to
perform them. The government is composed of all of these foundations. Thus,
Islam recommends a government based on a social contract. People elect the
administrators, and establish a council to debate common issues. Also, society
as a whole participates in auditing the administration.”40
Islam, for Gülen, is not a political project to be implemented. It is a
repository of discourse and practices for the evolution of a just and ethical
society. He strongly states that:

Islam does not propose a certain unchangeable form of government

or attempt to shape it. Instead, Islam establishes fundamental principles
that orient a government’s general character, leaving it to the people

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to choose the type and form of government according to time and

circumstances.41
Because he is critical of the “instrumentalization” of religion in politics, he
constantly criticizes discourses, rhetoric, practices and policies of “political
Islam” in Turkey.
Thus, Gülen, while encouraging everybody to participate in elections,
does not name specific parties or candidates. He gives guidelines by which
to judge candidates, such as honesty, being truly democratic, being suitable
for the job, the socio-political conditions and so on. In any party, one could
find such candidates. At the end of the day, if every voter behaves in this
manner, all the elected will be in tune with Gülen’s ideals, regardless of party
affiliation. Most importantly, as he does not categorically affiliate with any
of the parties, they will always be hopeful and will try to earn his sympathy.
Moreover, his supra-party discourse could easily attract people from all walks
of life.
Regarding an Islamic state, Gülen is in favor of a bottom-up approach and
desires to transform individuals, an ideal that cannot be fulfilled by force or
from the top.42
As noted above, he advocates an Anatolian-Islam or Anatolian-Sufism that
puts an emphasis on tolerance and Turkish modernity as an alternative to
Saudi or Iranian versions or images, emphasizing that this discourse of Islam
is not in contradiction to the modern world. His discourse represents a kind of
“moderate Islam,” even though he strongly rejects such a definition, as in his
view, Islam is already moderate.
In a written response to questions from The New York Times, he said, “he
was not seeking to establish an Islamic regime but did support efforts to
ensure that the government treated ethnic and ideological differences as a
cultural mosaic, not a reason for discrimination.”43 Gülen’s discourse utilizes
Mustafa Kemal as a commonly appreciated Turkish figure and polishes
Kemal’s aspects that are in tune with Gülen’s ideal of a ‘golden’ generation.
Democratic Leftist Prime Minister, as he then was, Bülent Ecevit has been
supportive of Gülen and his activities, going so far as to praise them on occasion.
When he attended the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2000, he emphasized
in his speech the importance of Gülen schools all over the world and how these
schools contribute to Turkish culture.44 When receiving the Journalists and
Writers Foundation’s representatives at his office, he reiterated that he supports
these schools because he believes that they are spreading Turkish culture to
an extent not even accomplished by the 600 year old Ottoman State.45
The atmosphere of tolerance and mutual understanding has influenced the
founding party of the Republic as well, the Republican People’s Party (CHP).
This party has undergone a transformation in the last few months. After losing

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the elections heavily, Deniz Baykal quit as the leader; some time later he
returned to politics saying that he and his discourse had changed and he
was re-elected leader. Now he defends an Anatolian tolerance, pays respect to
the Ottomans and religious scholars of the past, and speaks warmly regarding
issues of religion.46 He argues that “he wants to come to power in this world
while desiring to go to heaven in the hereafter.”47 He says he admires the
understandings of Rumi, Yunus Emre, Hacı Bektaß, and Yesevi and finds their
ideas progressive and revolutionary.48 Baykal calls his new politics “Anatolian
leftism” in an interview by liberal Hürriyet columnist Cüneyt Ülsever at a
program of the Gülen movement’s Samanyolu TV on April 24, 2001. It is
obvious that most of these ideas are what Gülen has been promoting for
more than 30 years. Baykal, when asked if he had been saying these before,
replied that “(the ideology of) social democracy has come to this point very
recently.”49 Indeed, this transformation process began some ten years ago at
the grassroots level. Ordinary people had already left their ideological camps
of the pre-1980s and had been tolerant of each other; this is what has forced
Baykal to change as a receptive leader.
Most scholars agree that “Gülen continues a long Sufi tradition of seeking
to address the spiritual needs of people, to educate the masses, and to provide
some stability in times of turmoil. Like many previous Sufi figures (including
the towering thirteenth-century figure, Jalal al-Din Rumi), he is suspected of
seeking political power. However, any change from this apolitical stance will
firstly harm his movement.”50 Even though Gülen consistently reiterates that he
has no political agenda, that he is against the instrumentalist use of religion in
politics, that his emphasis is on the individual and so on, the militarist elite
who see themselves as the staunch guardians of the regime regard Gülen and
his movement as a potential threat to the state. Those fears seemed confirmed
two years ago when television stations broadcast excerpts from videocassettes
in which he seemed to urge his sympathizers to “patiently and secretly”
infiltrate the government.51 He had also made some vague statements that
were somewhat critical of the Turkish establishment. Gülen said his words had
been taken out of context, and some altered; he said he had counseled
patience to sympathizers faced with corrupt civil servants and administrators
intolerant of workers who were practicing Muslims.52 “Statements and words
were picked with tweezers and montaged to serve the purposes of whoever
was behind this,” he said.53 The militarist elite remains suspicious and claims
that he seeks to gain political power over state institutions, including the army.
The reason why Gülen employs such vague language on certain issues is
understandable given that the authoritarian state does not tolerate any rivals
in the social sphere, one of the major reasons for Turkish civil society’s
immaturity and weakness in the face of the almighty state.

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To sum up, Gülen has achieved autonomy from state power and been able
to mobilize a large segment of society; he is of Islamic background with which
the laicist state has felt uneasy, and he will always be depicted as a potential
threat by some.54
As we already noted above, Gülen sees diversity and pluralism as natural
facts; he wants those differences to be explicitly professed. Gülen is an
adamant supporter and promoter of inter-faith dialogue. He argues that there
is no rule requiring that the style used in the Qur’an (in order to express the
obstinacy and enmity of some Jews and Christians toward ‘truth’) should also
be used for every Jew or Christian in every era; “the verses condemning and
rebuking the Jews and Christians are either about some Jews and Christians
who lived in the time of the Prophet Muhammad or their own Prophets.”55
In his view, believers must communicate with all kinds of thought and
systems. Like Rumi’s compass, “such a person is like a compass with one foot
well-established in the center of belief and Islam and the other foot with
people of many nations.”56 To this end, Gülen pioneered the establishment of
the Journalists and Writers Foundation in 1994, the activities of which promote
dialogue and tolerance among all strata of society.
Gülen has been quick to respond to the challenges and opportunities of
globalization and his dialogical efforts should be evaluated in this context as
well. He has been supportive of Turkey’s accession to the European Union.57
He says, “If both Europe and Turkey could come to a mutually acceptable
agreement, the future could be promising. But this demands intelligent people
with one eye on the larger world and one eye on their own world.”58
He has also encouraged Turkish people to migrate to these countries in
order to be honorary representatives and ambassadors of Turkey. In Gülen’s
discourse, realism has an important place. He frequently states that the United
States of America is currently the leader in the international arena and is a
better alternative compared to other non-democratic countries, such as Russia
or China.59

The Influence of Gülen’s Discourse

Gülen’s discourse is not only rhetoric; in praxis too he encourages all his
followers to realize his ideals. After espousing Gülen as an intellectual leader,
his followers adapt themselves to his discourse and follow his ijtihads, even
though he does not label them as ijtihad.
Gülen’s followers have established many educational charitable trusts
and foundations and some have companies that provide educational services.60
Businessmen who follow Gülen’s message are very active in education – this
is especially true outside of Turkey. They built up “a vast educational empire
that now counts nearly 300 schools in over 50 countries.”61

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The Gülen movement is generally deemed to be moderate and “can be

considered ‘modern’ in the sense that it espouses a worldview centered
around the self-reflexive and politically participant individual’s ability to realize
personal goals while adhering to a collective identity, and seeks to shape local
networks and institutions in relation to global discourses of democracy, human
rights, and the market economy.”62 In stressing the links between Islam,
reason, science, and modernity, and the lack of an inherent clash between East
and West, the Gülen movement promotes education at all levels and appeals
to a growing number of Turks.63
The movement tries to bring in all scholars and intellectuals regardless of
their ethnic, ideological, religious and cultural backgrounds. The Journalists
and Writers Foundation also works as a think-tank for related issues. The
Abant Platform is a result of the attempt to find solutions to Turkey’s problems
by bringing together scholars and intellectuals of all colors. This platform is the
first of its kind in recent Turkish history, where intellectuals could agree to
disagree on such sensitive issues as laicism, secularism, religion, and reason
relations. The Foundation organizes Abant Conventions annually. Every
convention ends with a declaration. In 1998, the theme was “Islam and
secularism”; in 1999 “Religion and state relations” and in 2000, the topic was
“The democratic state within the framework of rule of law.”
The 1998 Abant Declaration attempts to redefine the meaning of laicism in
accordance with the way it is practiced in Anglo-Saxon cultures. Moreover, the
Declaration reinterprets Islamic theology to respond to modern challenges. It
was underscored in the declaration that revelation and reason do not conflict;
individuals should use their reason to organize their social lives; the state
should be neutral on beliefs and faiths prevalent in society; governance of the
state cannot be based on the dominance of one religious tradition; secularism
should expand individual freedoms and rights and should not exclude any
person from the public sphere.
Gülen’s discourse and practice have received the support of a number
of well-known liberal intellectuals, such as the journalists Mehmet Altan, Ali
Bayramoglu, Mehmet Barlas, Etyen Mahcupyan, Mehmet Ali Birand, Gulay
Gokturk, Taha Akyol, Cuneyt Ulsever and Cengiz Candar, who argue that the
solution to Turkey’s problems depends on reaching a consensus. Moreover,
scholars who were deemed “radical Islamists” now fully support Gülen’s
thought and practice.
The movement’s schools are virtually the only Turkish presence in many
countries, a fact acknowledged by the Turkish intelligentsia. Özdem Sanberk,
director of the Economic and Social Studies Foundation and former Turkish
ambassador to London, summarizes the liberal democratic Turkish intellectual
approach to the schools: “Strategically speaking, the schools are something

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that should be supported by the state because you have a Turkish presence in
these countries.” 64 It must be noted that until the movement established these
schools, there was no mention of such an international project, even in theory,
by the state, think tanks, research centers, or academics.65

Changes in Political Islam: From Milli GörüS to

AK Parti
Erkakan’s Milli Görüß (The National Outlook Movement) has been the
notable representative of “political Islam” in Turkey.66 This movement successively
established the National Order (26 Jan 1970– 14 Jan 1971), the National
Salvation (11 Oct 1972– 12 Sept 1980), the Welfare (19 July 1983– 16 Jan 1998),
the Virtue (17 Dec 1997– 22 June 2001) and Felicity (Saadet) Parties (20 July
2001–present). With the exception of the existing Felicity (Saadet) Party, all
others were shut down by the Kemalist establishment.
Until 1998, the Movement was under the influence of Middle Eastern
political Islam to a certain extent, and its ideology was based on the binary
opposition of West versus East. Its perception of the West was influenced by
elements such as colonialism, injustice, oppression and Christianity. An especially
strong emphasis on the West’s Judeo-Christian heritage was an important part
of the movement’s discourse. The political and economic worldview of the
movement was heavily centralist.
The movement was initially opposed to Turkey’s European Union
membership, saying that Turkey was more attached to the Islamic countries
and the European Union was a “Christian Club.”67 The Movement’s leader,
Erbakan, used to belittle supporters of Turkey’s EU membership as “naïve
imitators of the West.” The movement had opposed Turkey’s European
Union membership for three decades. The National Salvation Party argued
in the 1970s that “Turkey should not attempt to join the European Economic
Community, since this would merely perpetuate its role as an economic
underling of ‘Western-Christian capitalism.’” 68 The Welfare Party that was
established in 1983 and closed by the Constitutional Court in 1998 emphasized
that it will end close association with the West, starting closer cooperation with
the surrounding Islamic states.69 Erbakan even sought to implement these
policies during his brief tenure as prime minister in 1997.
Over the years, the Milli Görüß movement has been transforming itself and
during the last decade it has been observed that the party of the movement,
first Welfare and after its closure Virtue, has moved from the religious right
to the center right, representing the interests of the periphery that includes
pious practicing Muslims, a new emerging Anatolian middle class bourgeoisie,
the urban poor and Kurds. The movement’s ideology has been a mixture of
Ottomanism, nationalism, modernism and Islamism. The worldview of Milli

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Görüß puts a special emphasis on faith, morality and virtue, claiming that new
generations had to be patriotic and self-sacrificing people equipped with the
latest know-how so that Turkey would carry the torch in the scientific,
technological and civilizational races.70 As the Popes underline in their book
Turkey Unveiled, very few if any of the senior members of the movement and
its party are clerics; most are young Western-educated intellectuals.71
After the post-modern coup of February 28, 1997, the Movement evolved
into the Virtue Party; this party emphasizes democracy, the rule of law and
advocates joining the European Union.72 The party has been forced to
reconsider modernity, democracy and multiculturalism as universal values
rather than seeing them as extensions of Western domination.73 In parallel with
the emergence of a new “Anatolian capitalist class”74 and with efforts to evolve
into a mass political party, slogans now include “pluralist society,” “basic rights
and liberties,” “more democracy,” “privatisation,” “decentralization” and
“globalisation.”75 The party completely eliminated its discourse against Western
values and institutions, though it did not employ an Erbakan-style anti-Western
discourse.76 In its election manifesto of April 18, 1998, the party pledged that
accomplishing the goal of Turkey’s accession to the European Union is
fundamental.77 Moreover, the party’s chairman stated that strategic and defense
relations with the U.S. should continue, extending to economic cooperation
and investment.78
The Virtue party was socially conservative, culturally nationalistic, free-
market oriented, not anti-Western, and was seeking a centrist image.79 Party
representatives frequented Western capitals to convince the Western power
elite that they are more democratic than the Islamists and that they were in
favor of the European Union.80
The fundamental incompatibility between secular and religious worldviews
is no longer automatically assumed in Millli Görüß circles.81 An Anglo-Saxon
discourse of secularism is now espoused: “religion will not interfere in the
affairs of the state while the state will not interfere with religion.” The chairman
of the Virtue Party, M. Recai Kutan, admits that they did not seek dialogue and
co-operation with other groups in society. He also declares that Islam will not
be a source for legislation; instead, logic and science will mold public
policies.82 Virtue Party members include highly educated, upper-class modern
female members of the parliament, such as Nazlı Ilıcak and Prof. Oya
Akgönenç, who do not wear headscarves. This has never been the case with
parties that preceded the Virtue.
These younger generations, in spite of the movement’s tradition, argue that
the Welfare Party made a mistake by openly using religion. They believe the
motto of the party should be “democracy and secularism for everybody.” For
instance, Tayyip Erdogan underlines in a newspaper interview that the state

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could not and should not have a religion; it is individuals that have religious
affiliation. He further emphasizes the importance of democracy, a free market
economy and human rights.83 Another yenilikçi, Bulent Arinc, underlines
that “respect for other people’s views and beliefs is the gist of democracy.” He
argues that the Virtue needs to further democratize the process as opposed
to focusing on religion.84 Abdullah Gül, who ran against (for the first time ever
in the history of the movement) Erbakan-supported Recai Kutan for the Party
Chair, concurs with these new ideas and firmly emphasizes that our demand
is religious freedom, not an Islamic state. He underlines that the best kind
of government is a democracy, as it is a system that does not stop its search
for good.85
Indeed, prominent Muslim intellectual Ali Bulaç affirms that “if the meaning
of political Islam is to establish a theocratic state, it is finished,” pointing
out that once a cause for conflict and polarization, Islam is now a base for
reconciliation.86 Now it is argued that the Virtue Party or the movement has the
potential to evolve into a Muslim democrat party, very similar to the Christian
democrat parties of Europe.87
On June 22, 2001, the Constitutional Court ruled the closure of the
Fazilet (Virtue) party for being a “center of Islamic fundamentalism and a
mere successor of the outlawed Welfare Party.” It furthermore ordered the
confiscation of the party’s assets, the toppling from the Turkish Grand National
Assembly of two of its MPs and the banning of three further members from
political activities for five years. Indeed, all of these closed parties had been
accused of violating the constitutional provision that the Turkish Republic is
a secular state.
The Felicity Party was founded on July 20, 2001 by members of the Virtue
Party. This provoked debate within the ranks of Milli Görüß with the gelenekçiler
or traditionalists remaining true to the Turkish Islamist movement’s traditional
Islamic fundamentalism, and the yenilikçiler or renewers, led by current Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, seeking to adopt Islamist politics to a secular
democratic system. The Felicity Party has not been particularly successful
electorally, polling just 2.5% of the vote in the November 3, 2002 general
elections, thereby failing to pass the 10% threshold necessary to gain
representation in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. It was slightly
more successful in the local elections of March 29, 2004, winning 4.1% of
the vote and a number of mayoralties, although none are of any particular
significance.
Even though the Milli Görüß movement “has been more reactive and
less imaginative in regard to societal transformation than have the Nurcus,”88
their new discourse after the closure of the Welfare and Virtue Parties and
the emergence of yenilikçiler and today’s ruling AKP has shown that they are

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changing and transforming as well, coming closer to Nursi and Gülen’s line on
the issues of state-religion-society relations.

Changes in State Islam: Post-Lozan Islamı

(Post-Lausannian Islam)
Inter-religious dialogue at the state level has only started taking place
after the criticisms made against the Directorate by ‘laicist’ circles on the basis
that while an unofficial leader with no authority, i.e., Fethullah Gülen, was
dealing with inter-religious dialogue and even paying a visit to the Pope in the
Vatican, the Directorate was ultimately inactive.89 The underlying psychology
of this reaction was that Republican laicists did not want religion to be out of
control.90 After a while, the Directorate totally renewed its discourse and
started including elements of inter-religious dialogue. Before, although there
was not anything counter to these themes in the discourse of the Directorate,
there was not any mention of them either. These themes were irrelevant for
the state-sponsored “Turkish religion.” Only recently did the Directorate
establish a unit for inter-religious dialogue. It is true that the Directorate has
had a division dealing with extra-territorial affairs, but this division’s activities
only cover Turkish citizens in the West. Very rarely would imams sent abroad
help Turkish citizens learn the language, let alone the culture, of the respective
country, making dialogue with people other than Turks virtually impossible.
Another factor that forced the Directorate to change its vision is Turkey’s bid
to join the European Union. It is expected that the Directorate could add a
Turkish flavor to European Islam and adapt Turkish Islam to the new polity.
The Directorate is currently trying to get ready for the European Union,
and are aware that they will have the mission of representing a moderate
and tolerant Islam.91 Moreover, authorities voice their desire to reinterpret
Islam in the face of the challenges of modernity, new developments of the age,
Muslims living in non-Muslim Western territories, inter-religious dialogue, and
peaceful co-existence and emphasize that the Directorate’s future activities will
address such issues.92
The Directorate has a very busy schedule of activities with regard to dialogue.
In 1998, while there was only one session regarding dialogue in the Second
Religion Congress (Ikinci Din Surasi) in the year 2000 (other than establishing
a “Directorship for Inter-religious Dialogue”), the Directorate organized two
major programs on the theme: “International European Union Congress” May
2–7 in Istanbul and “Religion Meeting In the Year 2000 Faith and Tolerance
Age” May 10 –11 in Tarsus (one of the former centers of Eastern Christianity).93
Then, from June 14 –18, 2000, a committee headed by the then Director of the
Religious Affairs Mehmet Nuri Yilmaz paid a visit to the Vatican and on June
16, 2000, Mehmet Nuri Yilmaz had a private meeting with the Pope.94 This event

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attracted impressive media attention in Turkey, with headlines such as “First

Ever in History!” Columnists emphasized that it was a good idea to enter into
dialogue with other religions, an idea that never occurred to the Kemalist elite
until Fethullah Gülen took the lead and threatened the assumed public
monopoly of the state on religious matters.

Opposition to the Transformation and ‘Westophobia’

A vast majority of people in Turkey are eager to join the European Union,
are open to dialogue with other people from different cultural and religious
backgrounds and do not see a clash between Islam and modernity; only a
marginal minority do not share these views. This opposing minority is not
monolithic; they are of different extreme ideological backgrounds, such as
laicists, ultra-leftists, ultra-traditionalists, and ultra-nationalists. Even though
their argumentation style and conceptualizations change from one group to
another, they generally concur with the view that the West is Turkey’s enemy,
that entering the European Union will cause Turkey to disintegrate, and that
the idea of dialogue between civilizations is a plot by the Papacy to engulf
Islam. Due to the lack of space, I will only briefly mention some examples.
Mehmet Sevket Eygi, chief writer of the daily Milli Gazete, has reiterated
many times his allegation that “the Papacy has ‘bought’ some community
(movement) in Turkey to produce an adulterated, reformed and renewed
Islam without Shari”a, fiqh, Sunnah and laws.”95 Whatever topic Eygi writes
about in his column, he connects (if not skillfully) his argument on this issue
and strongly and somewhat fiercely alleges that some groups are the secret
agents of the Papacy in Turkey. He also repeatedly claims that some secret
agreements between “a group” and the Papacy and also the Orthodox Church
have been reached, that Heybeliada (Christian) seminary will be re-opened
and when the conditions are right, and that some Greeks (Rum) will immigrate
to Turkey.96 To Eygi, the leader of this movement has agreed with the “deep
state (derin devlet)” to create an adulterated Islamic humanism instead of real
Islam. For legal reasons, knowing that he is not able to prove his allegations,
Eygi does not pronounce any specifics. Yet, it is clear that the only group or
community that will fall within the ambit of his allegations is Gülen’s
community. While Sevket Eygi is alone in his adamant fight against the Papacy,
the European Union and their “secret agents,” almost all columnists in the
marginal daily Yeni Mesaj at some time allow themselves to ‘discuss’ the issue
of inter-religious dialogue. Their arguments are no different from Eygi’s. They
strongly reiterate that Muslims who advocate dialogue with Christians and
Europeans are either naïve, ignorant or, worse, traitors.97 Indeed, an extreme
leftist daily regularly claims that Gülen is a man of the Korean-originated Moon
Church.98 An ultra-nationalist activist argues that “CIA agents such as Graham

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Fuller and Paul Henze are pupils (murid ) of Gülen.”99 It is also alleged by Yeni
Hayat journal that Anatolia will be Christianized and that Gülen’s group is
helping the Christians in this mission.
In the same context, the main theme of a book written by a retired general
is that entering the European Union is a plot to disintegrate Turkey.100 This view
is supported by a marginal Maoist weekly, Aydinlik, which nowadays seeks to
ally itself with the army. The weekly regularly raises the issue and claims that
entering the European Union will only help reactionary forces and Kurdish
separatists. On September 22, 2000, the chief writer of the daily, Dogu Perincek,
alleged again that entering the European Union means a divided Turkey.101
As Yavuz rightly underlines, the state-invented “Sevres syndrome” (that the
West is about the partition of the country) is still ‘used’ in some circles.102 As
a result, from time to time, liberal democrat individuals such as Meral Gezgin
Eris, Chairwoman of the Economist Development Foundation (IKV), need
to urge anti-EU people to give up their “paranoia” that the EU will divide
the country.103 Several influential columnists in the Turkish mainstream media
keep writing about the virtues of joining the EU, hoping to convince “the deep
state” circles.104

Concluding remarks: Transformation of Turkish

Islams
Kemalist criticism of Ottoman Islam basically stemmed from an understanding
that religion had played a negatively conservative role in the socio-political
structure of the Ottoman Empire. Another rationale of these criticisms has its
roots in the perception of the structural relationship between religious and
political authority in traditional societies. Religious institutions have often
stood as symbols of the former regimes in the eyes of revolutionary leaders.
Said more precisely, they have conceived of religion as a threat to their
modernist movement and revolutions. Surprisingly, the roles have recently
changed. Now, most practicing Muslims advocate Turkey’s accession to the
European Union, once perceived to be a “Christian club,” and believe that “the
Copenhagen criteria” are amr bil ma“rüf (ordering the good),105 while the role
of conservatism is now left to the Kemalist and “deep state” elite.
Moreover, activist Muslims either take the lead, as in the example of
the Gülen’s faith-based movement, or adapt themselves to the new Muslim
discourse on these issues, as in the example of the political Islam of Milli
Görüß. Even the state gives a response for whatever reason, unknowingly
transforming itself in the lines of the civil discourse. This is very observable
regarding issues of inter-religious dialogue. A civil movement has played a
transformative role in the whole of society, directly or not, even affecting the
ideological stand of the state.

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As sociologist Nilufer Göle aptly puts it, Muslim identity is in a process

of normalization, making the transformation from being Islamist to Muslim,106
strongly showing that “buzzwords such as ‘fundamentalism,’ and catchy
phrases such as Samuel Huntington’s rhyming ‘West versus Rest’ and Daniel
Lerner’s alliterative ‘Mecca or merchanization’ are of little use in understanding
this reformation.”107 Factors such as enthusiasm for joining the EU, civil society’s
growth, the independent media, telecommunications technology, satellites, the
internet, globalization, foreign encouragement and support, and the role of
religious leaders are all dynamically interlinked and intertwined in transforming
Turkish society, despite the resistance of the “forces of conservatism.” Further,
the “renewal” of the religious or faith-based discourse has a major role to play.

Endnotes
1. Michael King, “Introduction.” In Michael King (ed) God’s law versus state
law: The construction of Islamic identity in Western Europe (London: Grey Seal, 1995),
1–15, 3.
2. Aziz Al-Azmeh, Islams and modernities. 2nd ed. London (New York: Verso,
1996), 1.
3. June Starr, Law as metaphor: From Islamic courts to the palace of justice (New
York: State University of New York Press, 1992), 5–6.
4. David Shankland, Islam and Society in Turkey (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press,
1999), 23.
5. Michael King, op. cit., 91–114, 105.
6. Ibid., 106.
7. Emre Kongar, “Turkey’s cultural transformation.” In Günsel Renda and C. Max
Kortepeter (eds) The transformation of Turkish culture, the Atatürk legacy (The Kingston
Press. Inc: Princeton, New Jersey, 1986), 19–68. http://www.kongar.org/aen_tr.php
8. Ali Yaßar Sarıbay, “Kemalist ideolojide modernleßmenin anlamı: Sosyo-ekonomik
bir çözümleme denemesi.” In Ersin Kalaycıoglu and Ali Yaßar Sarıbay (eds) Türk siyasal
hayatının gelißimi. (Istanbul: Beta, 1986), 189–204, 200.
9. Rona Aybay, ‘Administrative Law’. Ansay T. and Wallece D. (eds) Introduction to
Turkish Law, (Ankara, 1978), 53–84, 58.
10. Shankland, op. cit., 29.
11. Ibid., 9.
12. Ibid., 29.
13. www.diyanet.gov.tr/dinibilgiler/dinibil.html.
14. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupc/ca/cag/Part2.htm; www.yenisafak.com.tr/
kbumin.html on 8/28/2001.
15. Íerif Mardin, “Turkey: Islam and westernization”. In: Carlo Caldorola (ed)
Religions and societies: Asia and the Middle East (Berlin et al.: Mouton Publishers, 1982),
171–198, 180.
16. Starr, op. cit., 17–18.
17. Erwin I. J., Rosenthal, Islam in the modern national state (Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 1965), 61.
18. Javaid Saeed, Islam and modernization: A comparative analysis of Pakistan,
Egypt, and Turkey (Westport, Connecticut. London: Praeger, 1994), 165.
19. Ibid., 172.

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20. Íerif Mardin, Religion and social change in modern Turkey: The case of
Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 229.
21. Shankland, op. cit., 15, 54–51.
22. Ibid., 17.
23. Ibid., 35.
24. See ‘Anar Anketi March 2001’, www.anararastirma.com.tr.
25. Enis Berberoglu, Hurriyet, 10 August 2000.
26. Bülent Aras, “Turkish Islam’s Moderate Face”, Middle East Quarterly,
September 1998, 27.
27. Avni Özgürel, Radikal, 2 March 2001.
28. Ali Ünal and Alphonse Williams, Advocate of Dialogue: Fethullah Gülen (Fairfax,
VA: The Fountain, 2000), 254–268.
29. Ibid., 54–58.
30. Ibid., 52.
31. Ibid., 56.
32. Ibid., 43.
33. Ibid., 243.
34. Ibid., 67–70.
35. Ibid., 67–70.
36. See in detail, Ihsan Yilmaz, Muslim laws, politics and society in modern
nation-states, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), chapter 8.
37. Fethullah Gülen, “A Comparative Approach to Islam and Democracy”, SAIS
Review, Volume XXI, No. 2 Summer-Fall 2001, 133–138, 134.
38. Ünal and Williams, op. cit., 150.
39. Ibid., 137.
40. Gulen, op. cit., 135–136.
41. Ibid., 134.
42. Ebru Altınoglu, Fethullah Gülen’s Perception of State and Society (Istanbul:
Bosphorus University, 1999), 102.
43. Douglas Frantz, New York Times, 25 August 2000.
44. Zaman, 23 February 2000.
45. Ibid.
46. Baykal, Aksiyon, 7 April, 2001.
47. Zaman, 7 February 2001.
48. Aksiyon, 7 April 2001.
49. Ibid.; On the other hand, this change was found so radical by some party
members that they were very quick to leave the party, encouraged and led by Ismet Inonu’s
son Erdal Inonu.
50. Altınoglu, op. cit., 102.
51. Frantz, Douglas, New York Times, 25 August 2000.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. On this the Economist reported, “Turkey’s generals, who consider themselves the
guardians of their country’s secular tradition, have their doubts. In the powerful National
Security Council, where they can often squeeze Turkey’s elected politicians into reversing
decisions, they have repeatedly growled that Mr. Gülen’s main goal is to overthrow the
secular order brought about by Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey, 77 years ago.
Mr. Gülen, they say, wants an Islamic regime; his schools are his main recruiting ground.
The generals are annoyed by the refusal of Turkey’s left-of-centre prime minister, Bulent
Ecevit, to take action against them. Ironically, it was the generals who, after they last

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stepped in against a civilian government in 1980, urged Islamic groups to resist extreme
left-wingers. Mr. Gülen was then touted as a moderate fellow who combined his religion
with a healthy dose of Turkish nationalism and capitalist spirit. Through his schools, Iran’s
influence in the former communist Muslim republics could be stemmed. Mr. Gülen was even
received by Pope John Paul in 1998,” ‘Islamic Evangelists’, The Economist, Vol. 356,
Issue 8178 (7 August 2000), 52.
55. Unal and Williams, op. cit., 260.
56. Ibid., 206.
57. Ibid., 189.
58. Ibid., 58.
59. Ibid., 192.
60. “Europe: Islamic evangelists,” The Economist, 8 July 2000.
61. Nicole Pope, “An Ottoman empire of the mind”, www.turkeyupdate.com/
merv.htm, 1998.
62. Hakan Yavuz, “The assassination of collective memory: The case of Turkey,”
The Muslim World, 89:3–4, 1999, 195.
63. Dale F. Eickelman, “Inside the Islamic Reformation,” Wilson Quarterly 22,
No. 1, Winter 1998, 82.
64. Douglas Frantz, New York Times, 25 August 2000. The Economist also
reports that “Now the brotherhood is spreading its wings beyond Turkey and the
former Soviet republics, where it already has nearly 300 schools. It also has Africa,
South Asia and even Australia on the list. Mustafa Kemal Sirin, who runs the schools
in Russia, says that, since opening four years ago, they have won a string of inter-school
competitions in English and physics. There are no religious classes in our schools,’ he adds
firmly. ‘We promote Turkey and Turkish culture.’ Last week, a report circulating within the
government that collated the views of Turkish ambassadors in former Soviet Central Asia
said that the schools did indeed enhance Turkey’s role abroad,” “Islamic Evangelists,” The
Economist, op. cit., 52.
65. The movement’s potential importance in strengthening Turkey’s position in the
international arena has been noted by scholars. In this regard, Fuller and Candar propose
that the Gülen movement can play a strong and important role “of positively representing
Turkey in the Muslim world, and demonstrating the moderate character of Turkish Islam
and Islamism that denies neither democracy or good ties with the West,” Cengiz Candar;
Graham E. Fuller, “Grand geopolitics for a new Turkey”, Mediterranean Quarterly,
V. No. 1 Winter 2001, 22–38). They also put that “Turkish Islamists can assist in moderating
other Islamist movements in the region and in supporting reconciliation through its own
successful mode,” ibid.
66. This being said, it must be underlined that the political Islam of this
movement is specific to Turkey and could be regarded as ‘moderate’ when compared with
the other representations of political Islam in the Muslim world, see Sahin Alpay, 19
September 2000.
67. Ergil Ergil, “Identity crises and political instability in Turkey.” Journal of
International Affairs. Fall 2000.
68. Serif Mardin, “Religion and politics in modern Turkey.” James P. Piscatori (ed)
Islam in the political process (Cambridge: Cambridge UP), 152.
69. Hakan Yavuz, “Search for a new social contract in Turkey: Fethullah Gülen, the
Virtue Party and the Kurds.” SAIS Review 19:1, 127.
70. Metin Heper, ‘Islam, nationalism and the military: Prospects for the consolidation
of democracy in Turkey’, 2000.
71. Nicole and Hugh Pope, Turkey Unveiled, 2000.

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72. See for instance, http://www.iviews.com/scripts/articles/stories/default.cfm?id=

7188&category_id=40. Cengiz Candar describes this military’s intervention as a post-modern
coup, Cengiz Candar, Sabah, 28 June 1997.
73. Yavuz “Cleansing,” op. cit.
74. Cuneyt Ulsever, one of the prominent liberal thinkers in Turkey and a columnist
of the daily Hurriyet, contends that pioneers of the transformation within the practicing
Muslim section of society are these “Anatolian capitalists” and the followers of Gülen,
Interview with Cuneyt Ulsever, 4 June 2000, Zaman.
75. See in detail the party’s election pledges on these issues, Fazilet Partisi: Secim
beyannamesinde ilkeler-hedefler, (Principles and goals in the election manifesto) 18 April
1999. Ankara: Virtue Party.
76. Ergil, op. cit.
77. Fazilet Partisi: Secim beyannamesinde ilkeler-hedefler, (Principles and goals in
the election manifesto) 18 April 1999. Ankara: Virtue Party, 17.
78. M. Recai Kutan, Fazilet Partisi Genel Baskani M. Recai Kutan”in secim
beyannemsi basin toplantisi (The Virtue Party Chairman M. Recai Kutan’s press conference
on the election manifesto), March 20 1999, (Istanbul: The Virtue Party), 23.
79. Yavuz , “Search,” op. cit., 127.
80. Ergil, “Identity,” see for such a recent visit by the Party Chairman Kutan and his
colleagues to the European capitals, Turkish dailes, last week of September 2000; see for
example Yeni Safak, 23 September 2000 at www.yenisafak.com.tr/p3.html.
81. Heper, “Islam,” op. cit. These changes come into reality in spite of the movement’s
charismatic and natural leader, Necmettin Erbakan. Recent comments and discussions in the
Turkish media shows that while there has been a consensus that Erbakan and his discourse
have not changed, people in his movement do not now share his worldview and discourse
in toto and that they openly criticize his discourse, if not he as person. This is most
observable in the tensions between yenilikciler (renewers) and gelenekciler (traditionalists,
Erbakan’s very close circle), see Turkish dailies 18–20 September 2000.
82. Heper, “Islam,” op. cit.
83. Interview with Eyup Can, Zaman.
84. Yavuz, “Search,” op. cit., 128.
85. Nese Duzel, “Interview with Abdullah Gul,” Radikal, 5 May 2000 at
http://mirror.radikal.com.tr/2000/06/05/turkiye/01ben.shtml
86. Ali Bulac, Zaman, 4 June 2000.
87. See for such a comment, Sahin Alpay, “Siyasal Islam,” Milliyet, 19 September 2000.
88. Yavuz, “Search,” op. cit., 129.
89. See for such a criticism levelled against Gülen, Necip Hablemitoglu, Yeni Hayat,
N. 52.
90. See for such a comment, Asim Yenibahar, “Diyanet Baskani neden papayi ziyaret
etti?” (Why the Director of Religious Affairs visited the Pope?), Akit, 20 June 2000. Yenibahar
suggests that it is not difficult to conceive that “some power elite” sent the Director to the
Vatican in response to Gülen’s visit.
91. Interviews with Abdullah Ayan, Responsible Member of Interreligious Dialogue
of the Directorate High Council for Religious Affairs (Din Isleri Yuksek Kurulu) and Yusuf
Kalkan, Head of Foreign Affairs, as he then was, Ankara, August 16, 2000.
92. I had an opportunity to have a long discussion with Yusuf Kalkan on these issues
and the role of the Directorate in the future. He sincerely says that their intention is not to
export any ideology but to play their part to shape the future face of Islam in Europe and
in the world, with an emphasis on tolerance and dialogue, interview with Yusuf Kalkan,
Head of Foreign Affairs (Dis Iliskiler Daire Baskani), Ankara, August 16, 2000.

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93. See in detail Diyanet, Aylik Dergi, N. 114, June 2000, 32–39.
94. Detailed information can be found in the Turkish dailies of the time of visit or in
Diyanet, Aylik Dergi, N. 115, July 2000, 6–17. On the front cover, the journal features a
picture of Mehmet Yilmaz shaking hands with the Pope. See also Diyanet Avrupa. N. 15,
15 June−15 July 2000.
95. Mehmet Sevket Eygi, “Turkic world,” Milli Gazete, 5 May 2000.
96. Eygi, “Secret agreement with papacy,” Milli Gazete, 26 May 2000.
97. See several issues of Yeni Mesaj, www.yenimesaj.com.tr. Without any
exaggeration, one is likely to read such a ‘comment’ in any issue of the daily. See for
examples, September 23, 2000, May 6, 2000, June 7, 2000, June 8, 2000, June 17, 2000, June
29, September 23, 2000. As the same arguments are repeated, scanning these issues will give
the reader an accurate picture.
98. Cumhuriyet, December 3, 2000.
99. Hablemitoglu Necip, Yeni Hayat, N. 52.
100. Suat Ilhan (2000) Avrupa Birligi”ne neden hayir? (Why “no to European Union”).
(Istanbul: Otuken). (This publishing house is known to have ultra-nationalist tendencies).
101. www.aydinlik.com.tr/perincek.html.
102. Hakan Yavuz, “Towards an Islamic liberalism? The Nurcu movement and
Fethullah Gülen.” In: V. 53 N. 4 The Middle East Journal, 1999, 584; for a very recent
example, see all dailies in Turkey, October 3, 2000: In an opening ceremony of a military
school, one of the top generals declared that “if the West forces us to decide between
the EU and unity of our country, we will choose our country’s unity.”
103. Zaman, September 15; A recent survey conducted in 17 cities on 2027 people
shows that while 68.7% of the Turkish population supports joining the EU, only 9.9%
opposes it, Sukru Elekdag “Our mind is in Europe,” Milliyet, 21 September 2000.
104. See for example, Hasan Cemal, “Europe is not a plot, it is Atatürk’s way,” Sabah,
21 September 2000.
105. Bulaç, Ali, Zaman, 4 June 2000.
106. Nilufer Göle, Zaman, 4 June 2000.
107. Eickelman, ‘Inside . . .’, op. cit., 82.

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