U lu s lar ara s ı H uk uk v e P o litika

Cilt 5, Sayı: 18 ss.133-147, 2009©

An Islamist Party, Constraints, Opportunities and

Transformation to Post-Islamism: The Tajik Case
Ihsan YILMAZ*

Abstract
Tajikistan is the only Central Asian state to politically include an Islamist political
party—Hizbi Nahzati Islomii Todjikiston (the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan—
IRPT) and to allow it to participate at the electoral process. This study argues that a
combination of political opportunity structures together with constraints imposed by
the constitutional framework and repressive attitudes of the semi-authoritarian regime
towards political pluralism has been a decisive factor, among others, that has brought
about the transformation of the Tajik Islamism to Tajik post-Islamism. The case of
the IRPT shows that the Islamists are inclined to ideological moderation provided that
political opportunity structures are available to them and they are politically
included, even if the politico-legal framework is semi-authoritarian or liberalized
autocracy. The IRPT has calculated the impact of its forms of activism and discourse
according to political circumstances and changes, to opportunities and disincentives,
while their normative frameworks, doctrine and discourses take on a subordinate role
and remain subject to transformation.
Keywords: Semi-Authoritarianism, Liberalized Autocracy, Political Inclusion,
Political Islam, Post-Islamism, Tajikistan

INTRODUCTION
When analyzing the Islamists’ ideological moderation, political process
approach underscores the importance of the structure of their groups, their
cognitive frames, and the political opportunity structures available to them and
thus sees the ideological moderation as a result of both strategic calculation
and political learning. This approach has been verified by some recent studies
of Islamist political activity in a number of Arab states that have demonstrated
that even limited political openings in liberalized autocracies or semi-
authoritarian constitutional frameworks can encourage Islamists to moderate
their discourses to exploit the new opportunities for electoral participation

*
Assistant Prof. Dr., Department of Public Administration, Fatih University.

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İ. Yılmaz

created by democratization, whilst simultaneously to tackle state repression.1

Limited democratization and electoral participation can be adequate to
generate strategic incentives for moderation and create opportunities for
political learning, or experience-driven change in the discourses and core values
of political leaders.2
Support for political Islam does not involve a rejection of democracy and
that those with a more favorable view of Islamist movements and platforms are
no less likely than others to favor political competition and to desire
mechanisms to hold leaders accountable. Thus, in the popular mind, at least,
there is no necessary incompatibility between democracy and Islamic
governance. Rather, deeply discontented with existing political arrangements,
many may favor an alternative that incorporates both the democratic principles
of choice and accountability and the Islamic principles of justice and protection
of the weak.3 Islamists seem to be open to act in a compromising, flexible, and
pragmatic way. They calculate the impact of their forms of activism according to
political circumstances and changes, to opportunities and disincentives, while
their doctrine and discourses take on a subordinate role and remain, more often
than not, subject to quick changes and turnarounds.4
Ideological moderation can be driven in part by strategic calculation but may
also be a result of political learning, that is, of change in its leaders' core values
and beliefs. Secondly, value change can be facilitated by the interaction of
Islamists and secular opposition leaders in pursuit of common goals in the face
of the repressive authoritarian state. Thirdly, the institutional opportunities and
incentives for such interaction can possibly be created by a mix of regime
accommodation and constraints imposed upon the Islamists.5 Political inclusion
and participation may work to “moderate” extremist parties in three ways: first,
by causing them to converge toward a (presumably) mild-mannered median
voter; second, by redirecting their focus from recruiting militants to recruiting
able bureaucrats and party-builders; and third, by forcing them to spend time
and energy fixing potholes rather than preaching intolerance.6
In the Turkish case, the increasing moderation of the Islamist movement and
its eventual transformation to non-Islamism has been the result of several
institutional factors, among others. First, the movement has been given the
freedom to make strategic choices in a political system that rewards political

1
Wickham, Carrie, ‘The Path to Moderation. Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt’s
Wasat Party’, Comparative Politics, Vol.36, No.2 (2004), pp.205–228, p. 205.
2
Ibid.
3
Tessler, Mark, ‘Islam and Democracy in the Middle East: The Impact of Religious Orientations on
Attitudes toward Democracy in Four Arab Countries’, Comparative Politics, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Apr.,
2002), pp. 337-354, 349.
4
Albrecht, Holger and Wegner, Eva, ‘Autocrats and Islamists: Contenders and containment in
Egypt and Morocco’,The Journal of North African Studies, Vol, 11, No. 2 (2006), pp. 123-141, p. 136.
5
Wickham , ‘The Path to Moderation. Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt’s Wasat
Party’, p. 207.
6
Berman, Sheri ‘Taming Extremist Parties: Lessons from Europe,’ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 19
(January 2008), pp. 5–18.

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 An Islamist Party, Constraints, Opportunities and Transformation to Post-Islamism: The Tajik Case

entrepreneurship with credible opportunities for power. Second, the state and
elements of civil society have imposed public institutional constraints on the
movement’s behaviour. Third, iterated interaction between Islamist leaders,
their constituency and the state have provided the movement with increased
information about its potential appeal and strategic options over time.7
Tajikistan is the only Central Asian country to officially register an Islamic
political party—Hizbi Nahzati Islomii Todjikiston (the Islamic Revival Party of
Tajikistan— IRPT).8 This study argues that a combination of political opportunity
structures together with constraints imposed by the constitutional framework
and repressive attitudes of the semi-authoritarian regime towards political
pluralism has been a decisive factor, among others, that has brought about the
transformation of the Tajik Islamism to Tajik post-Islamism.9 We first concisely
look at the emergence of Tajik Islamism and the Islamic Revival Party of
Tajikistan (IRPT), followed by a discussion of the civil war in the country, the
IRPT’s role in the war and subsequent political inclusion, if limited, of this party
to the power structures.

TAJIK ISLAMISM AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL

PARTY OF TAJIKISTAN (IRPT)
According to Tajikistan’s State Committee on Religious Affairs, 97% of the Tajik
population is Muslim and an estimated 30–40% of the rural population and 5–
10% of the urban population are observant Muslims who are served by 3224
mosques, 19 madrassas and an Islamic university.10 Most people in Central Asia
are Sunni and they follow Hanafi school of law. Sufism is also widespread.11
Russian colonialists allowed local peoples to preserve their customary laws and
religious practices.12 But after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, a full-scale
assault on Islam was launched and seventy years of the Soviet regime
endeavoured to diminish Islam’s social role in society.13 Shari’a courts and

7
Mecham, R. Quinn ‘From the ashes of virtue, a promise of light: the transformation of political
Islam in Turkey’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2004), pp. 339–358, p. 339.
8
For detailed analysis of the IRPT, see Haghayeghi, M., Islam and Politics in Central Asia. (New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 1995) and Rashid, A., The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism?
(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994).
9
This study’s understanding of post-Islamism denotes a departure, albeit in diverse degrees, from
an Islamist ideological package that is characterized by universalist claims, monopoly of truth,
exclusivism, intolerance, and obligation, towards acknowledging ambiguity, multiplicity, inclusion
and compromise. Post-Islamism represents an endeavor to fuse religiosity with rights, faith and
freedoms, Islam and civil liberties and focuses on rights instead of duties, plurality instead of
singular authority, historicity rather than fixed and rigid interpretation of scriptures, and the
future rather than the past, Bayat, Asef, Islam and Democracy: What is the Real Question?, ISIM
Papers, No. 8, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007), p. 18.
10
Karagiannis, Emmanuel, ‘The Challenge of Radical Islam in Tajikistan: Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami’,
Nationalities Papers, Vol. 34, No. 1, March 2006, pp. 1-20, p. 1.
11
Olcott, Martha Brill, Sufism in Central Asia: A Force for Moderation or a Cause of Politicization? Carnegie
Papers, Number 84 (2007), pp. 2-5.
12
Walker, Edward W., ‘Islamism and Political Order in Central Asia’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol.
56, No. 2 (2003), pp. 21-41, p. 24.
13
Ibid.

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İ. Yılmaz

religious schools were closed down, ulama were persecuted, and religious
endowment lands (waqf) were confiscated.14 The campaign intensified during
Stalin's era, the majority of mosques were destroyed and the ulama were
decimated.15 However, the Second World War considerably changed the Soviet
policy of repression on Islam, and the ‘era of relative liberalism’ began to secure
greater support for the war efforts among Soviet Muslims. In the 1960s a new
Soviet foreign policy of supporting certain regimes in the Middle East to
counterbalance the USA brought about a better Soviet treatment to their own
Muslims.16 The anti-Islamic drive slowed down, some mosques were even
restored and reopened. Also two official madrassas were opened in Tashkent
and Bukhara, and an Islamic Institute in Tashkent was established to educate
students of religion.17 A Muslim Religious Board was established in Tashkent for
the entire Central Asia. The official clergy was given considerable autonomy over
religious matters. At the same time, Central Asians and their ulama adapted
Islamic practices to Soviet conditions.18 Being unsatisfied with the sterile official
version of Islam, Muslims organised their religious activities “illegally within the
so-called `parallel Islam’, which functioned through a network of underground
schools, mosques and structures of Sufi (mystical) orders centred around local
sheikhs”.19 Khrushchev’s policies opened the door for more interactions
between Central Asian Muslims and the Muslim world.20 About 70 new mosques
were opened in Central Asia in a very short time (bringing their total number to
112 in 1962).21 The spread of religious texts was also stimulated by the Soviet’s
opening to the peoples of Asia and Africa. Khrushchev’s foreign policies
brought also opportunities for some Muslims to study in the seminaries of the
Middle East.22 The Soviet-era ulama who received foreign training were exposed
to the literalist Salafi teaching of as well as to the teachings of the other
classical schools of Islamic jurisprudence, all of which were more conservative
than the Hanafi school of law.23 Some members of the repressed ulama had
begun to lose contact with the traditional Hanafi school of Islam and had begun
to be influenced by literalist and puritanist Salafi-Deobandi-Wahhabi thought.24
Between 1970 and the late 1980s, relatively less repressive Soviet rule enabled
the puritanists to recruit more disciples and teach them privately at
underground madrassas. Parallel to the limited number of formal Islamic

14
Tazmini, Ghoncheh, ‘The Islamic Revival in Central Asia: A Potent Force or a Misconception?’,
Central Asian Survey, Vol. 20, No. 1 (2001), pp. 63-83, p. 64.
15
Walker, Islamism and Political Order, op. cit, 24.
16
M. Turgut Demirtepe, Creating the Uzbek Nation: Ethnie, Identity and Politics, Unpublished PhD Thesis,
Manchester University, 2004, pp. 189–189.
17
Ruzaliev, Odil, ‘Islam in Uzbekistan: Implications of 9/11 and Policy Recommendations for the
United States’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2005), pp. 14-15, p. 15.
18
Walker, Islamism and Political Order, op. cit, 24.
19
Zelkina, Anna ‘Islam and Security in the New States of Central Asia: How Genuine is the Islamic
Threat?’, Religion, State & Society, Vol. 27, Nos. 3/4 (1998), pp. 355-372, p. 357.
20
Olcott, Martha Brill, Roots of Radical Islam in Central Asia, Carnegie Papers No. 77 (2007), p. 7.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid, 8.
24
Olcott, Roots of Radical Islam in Central Asia, p. 10.

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 An Islamist Party, Constraints, Opportunities and Transformation to Post-Islamism: The Tajik Case

learning institutions, there was also a growing number of underground Islamic

circles, especially in the Ferghana Valley.25 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
1979 contributed both to the radicalization of the Islamic movement and to the
extension of the links with the Muslim world under the influence of the
mujahedin.26 In 1980s, thousands of Uzbeks and Tajiks joined Afghan
mujahedeen and they interacted with Islamism during that period. Many of
these Uzbeks and Tajiks, attended scriptualist Deobandi madrassas in Pakistan
and fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan. They were hoping to establish an
Islamic state after returning back to their countries.27 With the launching of the
Gorbachev reforms and especially with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991,
the region began to undergo an Islamic revival.28 The political void, ideological
vacuum and identity crisis following the collapse have brought about a desire to
learn about Islam. Meanwhile, the Hanafi ulama, their puritanist rivals and even
some Sufis became politicized to define how the void would be filled.29 The
post-Soviet republic of Tajikistan was the first country in Central Asia to
experience an Islamic resurgence.30
In September 1990, some Northern Caucasian, Tatar, Tajik, and Uzbek
Muslims established the last Soviet political party in Astrakhan, Russia: the
Islamic Revival Party (IRP). The party established branches in Uzbekistan and in
Tajikistan, the latter being led by Sharif Himmatzade and Dawlat Osman, but the
party was not given official recognition from local authorities. The political
ideology of the IRP was close to that of the Arab Muslim Brothers: to establish
an Islamic state.31 The declared aim of IRP was to create by constitutional
means conditions for Soviet Muslims to live according to the principles of the
Quran.32 The new party claimed to represent the interests of Soviet Muslims
which had been long ignored by the Russians. In the winter of 1991, the IRP split
into national branches. The Tajik branch established its own party, headed by
Sharif Himmatzade, Dawlat Osman, and Mullah Nuri. The Tajik IRP (the Islamic
Revival Party of Tajikistan, IRPT) found most of its domestic constituency among
the Gharmis, the inhabitants of the Gharm Valley.33 When the IRPT first applied
for registration as a political party, its request was rejected by the Tajik
authorities on the grounds that no political parties based on religion were
allowed. In Moscow, though, the liberal factions led by Boris Yeltsin were
growing stronger and they had an interest in using local movements elsewhere

25
Ibid.
26
Roy, Olivier, ‘Qibla and the Government House: The Islamist Networks’, SAIS Review, Vol. 21, No.
2 (Summer-Fall 2001), pp. 53-63, p. 55.
27
Rashid, A., Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002),
pp. 44-45. See also, M. Turgut Demirtepe, ‘Orta Asya’da Radikalizm, Otokrasi ve Terör’, in Ihsan
Bal (Ed.), Terörizm: Terör, Terörizm ve Küresel Terörle Mücadelede Ulusal ve Bölgesel Deneyimler, (Ankara:
USAK Yayınları, 2006), pp. 259-260.
28
For Sufi revival after independence, see Olcott, Sufism in Central Asia, p. 23.
29
Olcott, Roots of Radical Islam in Central Asia, p. 18.
30
Karagiannis, ‘The Challenge of Radical Islam in Tajikistan: Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami’, p. 2.
31
Roy, ‘Qibla and the Government House: The Islamist Networks’, p. 56.
32
Karagiannis, ‘The Challenge of Radical Islam in Tajikistan: Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami’, p. 2.
33
Roy, ‘Qibla and the Government House: The Islamist Networks’, p. 57.

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İ. Yılmaz

in the Soviet Republics to weaken the ruling Communist Party. Thus on October
26, 1991 the IRPT was allowed officially to hold its founding congress in the
Tajik capital Dushanbe when Muhammad Sharif Himatzada was elected
chairman and Dawlet Usman and Said Ibrahim Gado were elected deputies.34
The IRPT’s roots could be traced back to the above-mentioned “parallel,” or
underground, Islamic clergy of the 1970s. Said Abdullo Nuri, a young and
charismatic person active in the informal Islamic sector, emerged as a
prominent leader of the nascent Islamic organization in the 1980s. The party
claimed twenty thousand members when it received legal registration in
December 1991.35 Its core was the densely populated Gharm and Karategin
Valley region—the base of Nuri’s regional and kinship network and of Sufi
brotherhoods—and “Gharmis” or “Karateginis” living in other regions.
From March to May 1992 the IRPT succeeded in mobilizing several thousand
followers in sustained popular protests against the communist regime of
Rahmon Nabiyev.36 In 1992, as part of the short-lived coalition, the Government
of National Reconciliation, some IRPT leaders sought to remove the word
“secular” from Tajikistan’s constitution. When the civil war erupted, the IRPT
resorted to violence, a dramatic turn for the party.37 More radical elements had
greater influence and called for an Islamic state, although without defining what
that meant in concrete terms. In this way, it could be said that the IRPT used
Islam to justify its actions without having a core religious ideology.38

CIVIL WAR, CLAN POLITICS AND ISLAMISTS

The roots of civil war (1992-97), which sharpened regional divisions and brought
the significant role of regional and personal affiliations to the fore are complex
and multi-faceted and a mono-causal explanation fails to capture the different
dynamics operating at different levels.39 But the main factor is the social,
economic and political deprivation of certain clans and regions while the other
clans have hegemonically dominated the scene with the Russian support.40
The Tajik regions are diverse in ethnic, topographic, linguistic, cultural,
economic and religious terms. This diversity, given the economic and political
deprivation of some of the groups, has been both the cause and the
consequence of historical, geographic, political, and economic rivalries,
tensions and conflicts. The northern regions of the country, basically Khojend

34
Hunter, Shireen T., ‘Religion, Politics, and Security in Central Asia’, SAIS Review, Vol. 21, No. 2
(Summer-Fall 2001), pp.65-89, p. 74.
35
Collins, Kathleen N., ‘Networks, and Islamist Movements: Evidence from Central Asia and the
Caucasus’, World Politics Vol. 60 (October 2007), pp. 64–96, p. 85.
36
Ibid.
37
Ibid., 87.
38
Ibid.
39
Fumagalli, Matteo, ‘Framing Ethnic Minority Mobilisation in Central Asia: The Cases of Uzbeks in
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 59, No. 4 (June 2007), pp. 567 – 590, p. 575.
40
Kuzmin, A. I., ‘Tajikistan: The Causes and Lessons of the Civil War’, Alexei Vassiliev (Ed.), Central
Asia: Political and Economic Challenges in the post-Soviet Era, (London: Saqi Books, 2001), p. 176.

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 An Islamist Party, Constraints, Opportunities and Transformation to Post-Islamism: The Tajik Case

(formerly Leninabad) had both political power and most of the country’s
investment.41 From 1946 to 1991, the Khojent clan had controlled most levers
of political and economic power in the country. The Khojentis delegated some
power to its “little brother clan” from Kulyab.42 The Khojentis, assured of
Moscow’s continued patronage, had no incentive to share its political power
with other clans. They continued their hegemonic control and the imbalance of
clan power continued.43 The south generally remained agricultural and
impoverished with comparatively less roads and other facilities of
transformation and communication.44
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the IRPT emerged as the most
powerful opposition party. On the eve of the Soviet collapse, the IRPT and the
Democratic Party of Tajikistan (DPT), which drew significant support from Garm
and Qurqhonteppe as well as the intelligentsia in Dushanbe, challenged the
legitimacy of the ruling Communist Party (CPT), which was, as mentioned above,
closely aligned with the Khojent clan.45 During the antigovernment
demonstrations in the spring of 1992, the IRPT played the leading role. Most of
the demonstrators were the IRPT supporters.46 Following these tensions, the
civil war erupted in May 1992. The IRPT emerged as the leader of the newly
formed United Tajik Opposition (UTO), a coalition of opposition groups
advocating nationalism, democracy, and Islamism and fighting for a political and
economic inclusion. The Khojenti rulers together with the Kulyab clan mounted
an effective military challenge to the coalition of the IRPT/DPT forces.47 With the
victory of the ruling Communist Party, the UTO went into exile in Afghanistan.
The IRPT leaders were aided by the Afghani Islamists Rabbani and Masoud, and
Afghan mujahidin trained the IRPT’s militia. Iran also provided a haven for IRPT
leaders.48 The war contributed to the radicalization and militarization of Tajik
Islamists, especially by forcing them to seek refuge in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
to a lesser extent Iran.49 Minimal stability returned during the 1994 transitional
presidential election, when Russia backed Emomali Rakhmon(ov), a figure from
a minor Kulyabi clan. Russia has subsequently played the role of the Kulyabi
external patron, similar to Soviet patronage of the Khojentis.50 The Tajik civil war

41
Akcali, ‘Nation-State Building in Central Asia: A lost Case?’, Perspectives on Global Development and
Technology, Vol. 2, Nos. 3-4 (2003), pp. 409-429; p. 421; Fumagalli ‘Framing Ethnic Minority
Mobilisation in Central Asia: The Cases of Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan’, p. 575.
42
Collins, Kathleen N. ,’The Logic of Clan Politics: Evidence from the Central Asian Trajectories’,
World Politics Vol. 56 ( January 2004), pp. 224–61, p. 242
43
Ibid., p. 243.
44
Akcali, ‘Nation-State Building in Central Asia: A lost Case?’, p. 422.
45
Akbarzadeh, Shahram, ‘Geopolitics versus Democracy in Tajikistan’, Demokratizatsiya (2006), pp.
563-578, p. 565.
46
Akcali, ‘Nation-State Building in Central Asia: A lost Case?’ , p. 419.
47
Akbarzadeh , ‘Geopolitics versus Democracy in Tajikistan’, p. 565.
48
Collins, ‘Networks, and Islamist Movements: Evidence from Central Asia and the Caucasus’, p.
85.
49
Hunter, ‘Religion, Politics, and Security in Central Asia’, p. 76.
50
Collins, ‘The Logic of Clan Politics: Evidence from the Central Asian Trajectories’, p. 255.

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İ. Yılmaz

had devastating results, with an estimated 20,000–40,000 victims, 600,000

internally displaced persons (IDP) and at least 100,000 refugees.51
In June 1997 the signing of an internationally brokered peace agreement
bolstered Rakhmon’s government. The deal guaranteed 30 percent of power to
the opposition and involvement of the IRPT in government. Tajikistan became
the only Central Asian state to allow an Islamist party to operate within the
constitutional framework. But the Rakhmon regime was never forced to comply
with its agreement. The war and the subsequent peace agreement did not
eradicate clan behavior either. Rakhmon has run an openly clan-based regime,
stacked with his own Kulyabi clan. He has made little attempt to divide political
power and economic resources beyond his clan-based network. He has
increasingly defied key provisions of the peace deal.52 Because of increased
Russian patronage, Rakhmon’s strategy has become increasingly exclusionary;
he has used his clan first and foremost to control the key power ministries.53
The internationally sponsored elections in 1999 and 2000 were intended to
promote a postconflict transition to democracy. But Rakhmon used the
elections instead to fill the new parliament with members of his Kulyabi clan. He
has also created a presidential party, the People’s Democratic Partyof Tajikistan
(PDPT) that is dominated by also his clan. The regime continues to exclude not
only the Khojentis but also most Garmi, Pamiri, Hissari, Lakhai, and ethnic
Uzbek clans.54

ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL INCLUSION IN A SEMI-AUTHORITARIAN

REGIME
Several political parties have taken advantage of the opening up of the political
sphere to mobilize and stake a claim on the political landscape. There have
been several formal opportunities for elecetoral competition, as Tajikistan held
two constitutional referendums (1999 and 2003), three parliamentary elections
(1998, 2000, and 2005), and three presidential elections (1994, 1999, 2006). Yet
there are serious questions regarding the democratic integrity of the system.
When the 2003 referendum reintroduced the two-term presidency, it was widely
seen as giving Rakhmon the opportunity to rule until 2020.55 The February 2005
parliamentary elections resulted in an allegedly engineered victory for the ruling
PDPT while the 2006 presidential elections reconfirmed Rahmonov for another
term, with Rahmon getting 79.3% of to the votes while, Olimzon Boboyev
received 6.2% and others 14.5%. The OSCE criticized the lack of political
pluralism and expressed its concerns about the absence of effective
competition in the presidential race.56 But it must also be noted that Rakhmon

51
Lynch, Dov, ‘Separatist States and Post-Soviet Conflicts’, International Affairs (Royal Institute of
International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 78, No. 4 (Oct., 2002), pp. 831-848, p. 832.
52
Collins, ‘The Logic of Clan Politics: Evidence from the Central Asian Trajectories’, p. 255.
53
Ibid., p. 256.
54
Ibid.
55
Akbarzadeh, ‘Geopolitics versus Democracy in Tajikistan’, p. 565.
56
Oliva, Fabio, ‘Between contribution and disengagement: Postconflict elections and the OSCE
role in the normalization of armed groups and militarized political parties in Bosnia and

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 An Islamist Party, Constraints, Opportunities and Transformation to Post-Islamism: The Tajik Case

has become a symbol of post-war stability. Most Tajik voters considered him as
a wise man who succeeded in bringing all parties of the civil war on the table,
and unify and consolidate the state. Another reason for his large-based support
is most voters’ view that Rahmanov was carrying out a wide range of reforms
and should be allowed to implement them for one more term.57 The Tajikistanis
preferred to have the country’s regions controlled by the stable central
government rather than former warlords, as had been the case during and after
a few years of the civil war.58
Despite his semi-authoritarian rule and repression of the opposition,
Rakhmon cannot afford to fully exclude either the IRPT or the representatives of
the northern clans from the political process and thus he has to allow the IRPT
to have a symbolic presence in the parliament and the government to foster his
image as a democratic leader.59 This seems necessary if he is to continue to
receive international humanitarian and development aid. Rakhmon also
recognizes that tensions would increase if the IRPT were completely excluded
from the political domain. With both sides calculating their capabilities against
each other, the Tajik political system today represents a balance between a
strong government and a weak opposition that for now remains passive.60

MODERATION OF THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL PARTY OF TAJIKISTAN

Before 1992, the IRPT espoused political Islam as its ideology, condemning
communism and atheism and after the start of the civil war, the party joined the
armed opposition and became a guerilla force, implicitly fighting for the
establishment of an Islamic state but since the signing of the 1997 peace
agreement, however, the IRPT has become a modern political party that almost
resembles Turkey’s post-Islamist Justice and Development Party.61
For the last 11 years, Tajikistan has had an official, legal Islamic party that
participates in all political processes, including parliamentary and presidential
elections. The party has deputies in the Tajik parliament. As stated above,
under the terms of the post-civil war agreement, 30 percent of the UTO -for the
most part, members of IRPT- joined the government. Then, the IRPT
participated in the elections for the Tajik Parliament in 2000 and 2005, and in
both cases, it surpassed the 5 percent threshold and gained two seats in the

Herzegovina, Tajikistan, and Kosovo’, Helsinki Monitor: Security and Human Rights No. 37 (2007), pp.
192-207, p. 202.
57
Demirtepe, M. Turgut, ‘6 Kasım 2006 Tacikistan Başkanlık Seçimleri: Rahmanov İktidarının
Pekiştirilmesinde Yeni Bir Evre (mi?)’, Orta Asya ve Kafkasya Araştırmaları, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2006, p.
170.
58
Marat, Erica, ‘Imagined Past, Uncertain Future: The Creation of National Ideologies in Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan’, Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 55, No. 1 (January/February 2008), pp. 12–24, p.
20.
59
Ibid., p. 22.
60
Ibid.
61
Karagiannis, ‘The Challenge of Radical Islam in Tajikistan: Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami’, p. 12; Vitaly V.
Naumkin, Radical Islam in Central Asia: Between Pen and Rifle (Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2005), pp. 250–256.

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İ. Yılmaz

legislature. At present, the IRPT is the primary political opposition in the

parliament.
As the civil war continued in 1996–97, Nuri had become more moderate. His
new deputy chairman, Muhiddin Kabiri—a scholar and IRPT newcomer—
advocated a liberal, nonviolent Islamism that was compatible with democracy.
Upon signing the peace accord, the IRPT agreed to become a democratic
Islamic party. Since then the party’s platform has moderated even more. The
IRPT now sees itself as a religious party similar to Christian democratic parties in
Europe. On democracy, Kabiri declares that:
“The IRPT still does not have such special work on the issues of democracy
and Islam and that is one of the shortcomings of its activities... Nevertheless, in
its program documents, statements and interviews, the IRPT tries to show the
position of the party on the issue of democracy and its attitude to the future of
Tajikistan as well as the links this issue has with Islam. Some think that the use
of such terms as “democracy”, “pluralism” and “human freedom” by the IRPT is
only a cover, and they are confident that the leadership of the party is using
them only to attract the masses. Such conjecture is unfounded, as the IRPT,
unlike Hizb ut-Tahrir, believes that the future of Tajikistan must include
democratic development. Naturally, bringing democratic norms into harmony
with Islam requires theological inquiry, and that task, above all, falls on the
shoulders of all theologians, although Hizb ut-Tahrir tries to prove the opposite.
One possible solution would be to develop a “democratic-Islamic project” with
a progressive Islamic movement where not only the IRPT will participate... the
IRPT thinks that democracy may be linked to Islam and Islam itself contributes
to the achievement of true democracy from the point of view of its ideology and
practical experience.”62
A reorientation of political Islam took place in Tajikistan as the IRPT
switched to a moderate position, declaring the creation of an Islamic state to be
a goal for the remote future.63 In signing the 1997 deal, IRPT chose to alter its
position from one of militancy to one of peaceful opposition and it no longer
speaks of the creation of an Islamic state and focuses on attempting to attain
power within the constitutional framework.64 It is no longer an anti-systemic
party. Nuri and Kabiri explicitly rejected an Iranian-style Islamic republic,
Taliban-style sharia, and a caliphate.65 The IRPT’s new charter avoids any
suggestion that Tajikistan should move towards becoming an Islamic state.
Instead, it aims at the “development of Islamic, national and human values in

62
Kabiri, Muhiddin, ‘HT and Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan’, in Baran, Zeyno (ed) The Challenge of
Hizb ut-Tahrir: Deciphering and Combating Radical Islamist Ideology, (Washington DC: The Nixon Center,
2004), pp. 75-81, pp/ 78-79.
63
See also on this, Yaacov, Ro’i’, ‘Islam, State, and Society in Central Asia’, Helsinki Monitor, No. 3
(2003), pp. 242-253, p. 253.
64
Shozimov, Pulat, ‘Social Science Research Isolation and Tajikistan’, SAIS Review, Vol. 25, No. 2
(Summer-Fall 2005), pp. 19-26, p. 22.
65
Collins, ‘Networks, and Islamist Movements: Evidence from Central Asia and the Caucasus’, pp.
87-88.

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 An Islamist Party, Constraints, Opportunities and Transformation to Post-Islamism: The Tajik Case

the Tajik society.” Moreover, according to its political program, “application of

the Islamic philosophy in the political and economic development of the
country can become the basis for the strengthening of state foundation and
maintenance of peace and unity.”66 The IRPT perceives the role of Islam in
Tajikistan as a factor promoting national and cultural awakening, rather than the
radical reconstruction of society. The IRPT presents itself as a party that fights
for justice and equality, and aims at increasing its appeal even among secular-
minded Tajiks.67 Kabiri stated in 2004 that:
Do slogans about the establishment of Islamic state or “Islamic society” that
the IRPT sometimes proclaimed during the armed insurgency have something in
common with the ideas of establishing of the Caliphate? I think not. Above all,
an insurgency requires radical slogans that help to mobilize the population for
radical action (war, revolt, protest, and so on). When the United Tajik
Opposition (UTO) began the insurgency, the IRPT was one of its most important
components. The IRPT was able to mobilize its followers due partially to radical
ideas and slogans. But slogans about the establishment of the “Islamic republic”
were unique to the period of insurgency. After the beginning of the peace
process and the commencement of the IRPT’s official activities, these slogans
were eliminated from the IRPT’s vocabulary. However, it is necessary to mention
that the IRPT had agreed to the establishment of a secular state in Tajikistan
and proclaimed the formation of “human, democratic and legal society” as its
goal. While it is true that the IRPT leadership has yet to explicitly disavow that it
intends to establish an Islamic state, it is obvious that such a declaration from
today’s IRPT leaders would be politically shortsighted. On the other hand, the
IRPT is different from Hizb ut-Tahrir since it is not a transnational party and it
frames its activities only within Tajikistan and the framework of the current
constitution.68
According to Kabiri, the IRPT’s chairman since Nuri’s death in 2006, the
party has an “Islamic ideology” but recognizes that due to pre-Soviet and Soviet
traditions, “it is impossible to set up an Islamic state or republic in Tajikistan in
the foreseeable future... Our ultimate goal is to create a free, democratic, and
secular state.”69 He puts that “the main freedoms that are acknowledged today
by the international community are in accordance with the ideas and norms of
Islam and have no serious contradictions”.70
According to Kabiri, the methods of groups such as the IMU (Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan) are not in keeping with the best way to promote Islam
and politics; the rise of such extremist groups, whose methods he does not
agree with, can be attributed as a reaction to the repressive nature of the

66
Karagiannis, ‘The Challenge of Radical Islam in Tajikistan: Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami’, p. 12.
67
Ibid.
68
Kabiri, ‘HT and Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan’, p. 77.
69
Collins, ‘Networks, and Islamist Movements: Evidence from Central Asia and the Caucasus’, p.
88.
70
Kabiri, ‘HT and Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan’, p. 79.

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İ. Yılmaz

Central Asian regimes.71 In Kabiri’s view, the more open and democratic the
regimes become, the less influence that radical movements will have. Kabiri
sees his party as a “buffer” between more radical “Islamic groups and the
government, working through a “democratic process” which he sees is the only
acceptable way to promote the values and principles of Islam that will be
sustainable for the long term”.72
It is obvious that the IRPT has become more pragmatic in its views since
1997, when its members started participating in the Tajik government.73 Another
factor in the IRPT’s moderation is the Rakhmon regime’s semi-authoritarian
rule.74 The IRPT’s leadership has kept a low profile and has adopted pragmatic
views on social and economic problems. As a result, it is hard to distinguish the
IRPT from secular parties ideologically. But it must be noted that the de-
Islamization of IRPT has produced an ideological vacuum among some religious
Tajiks that has been filled by Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT). Its radical ideas have
penetrated some religious factions within the society, which are looking for an
alternative source of religious guidance.75
The IRPT’s rejection of violence and its participation in both government and
electoral politics lost it support from its radical wing. Despite Rakhmon regime’s
failure to honour the terms of the agreement fully, the IRPT leadership refused
to resume the war. Radicals have perceived the peace deal as a sell-out. Many
abandoned the IRPT for the IMU while some others, disavowing violence but
remaining committed to an Islamic state, joined the HT.76 “Moderates” also split
among themselves, with some advocating conservative social positions, such as
legalized polygamy. Himmatzoda called for an “Islamic state” that excluded
women from politics. Akbar Turajonzoda, head of the official Islamic hierarchy,
meanwhile, split with the IRPT and joined the regime.77
Although the IRPT lacked experience in the political game and a fair
environment in which to conduct its political activities, it persisted, taking on
the PDPT in televised debates, at election fairs, and in all-party round tables.
While the party’s civil war history was exploited by the regime to frighten away
voters, the party began to show its maturation and its willingness to work the
democratic process.78 In spite of the weak showing in the 2000 elections, and
clear indications that the IRPT faced an uneven playing field, Nuri continued to
renounce a return to violence though on several occasions referred obliquely to

71
Bowyer, Interview with Dr. Muhiddin Kabiri, Chairman of the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan,
May 5, 2008 cited in Bowyer, ‘Islamic Movements and Democracy in Central Asia: Integration or
Isolation?’, CSID 9th Annual Conference, Political Islam and Democracy - What do Islamists and Islamic
Movements Want?, Conference Proceedings (May 2008), pp. 173-197, p. 192.
72
Ibid.
73
Karagiannis, ‘The Challenge of Radical Islam in Tajikistan: Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami’, p. 13.
74
Ibid., p. 17.
75
Ibid.
76
Collins, ‘Networks, and Islamist Movements: Evidence from Central Asia and the Caucasus’, p.
88.
77
Ibid. 88.
78
Bowyer, ‘Islamic Movements and Democracy in Central Asia: Integration or Isolation?’, p. 189.

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the possibility. In the run-up to the 2005 parliamentary elections the party
distributed newsletters, held town hall meetings, sent its members to western-
sponsored political party trainings, and strengthened its women and youth
subcommittees.79 Now 2010 elections “are being targeted by the IRPT as their
best opportunity to re-assert their political influence and enshrine Islamic
values in the political and cultural fabric of the country”.80 Moreover, the new
leader, Kabiri, who has continued to re-orient the party into an almost western-
style political organization, has been mentioned as a possible candidate to
oppose President Emomali Rahmon in 2013, showing the IRPT’s intention of
sticking to the rules of democracy in the country, however semi-authoritarian it
is.81

CONCLUSION
The case of the IRPT shows that the Islamists are inclined to ideological
moderation provided that political opportunity structures are available to them
and they are politically included, even if the politico-legal framework is semi-
authoritarian or liberalized autocracy. The IRPT has moderated its discourses to
exploit the new opportunities for electoral participation created by
democratization, whilst simultaneously tackling state repression. Tajik Islamists,
similar to some of their brethren in the other parts of the world such as Turkey
and Egypt, have acted in a compromising, flexible, and pragmatic way. They
have calculated the impact of their forms of activism according to political
circumstances and changes, to opportunities and disincentives, while their
normative frameworks, doctrine and discourses take on a subordinate role and
remain subject to transformations.

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