Deep Offshore Technology (DOT) International2012

The Hazards of High Pressure MEG in Offshore Oil and Gas

Industries
Mr Shivas Lindsay
KBR / Granherne Oil and Gas Consultants
ABSTRACT
As the oil and gas industry moves to exploit fields in locations further offshore and in ever
greater depths the challenges involved in producing the reservoir fluids increase. For
deepwater gas developments hydrate management is an integral consideration due to the low
water temperatures at depth that wellheads and export pipelines are exposed to. Most
deepwater gas developments inhibit the formation of hydrates by the continuous injection of
Mono Ethylene Glycol (MEG) or methanol. The volumes of MEG required can be significant
and beyond the practicable storage volumes available offshore. Long pipelines may be run
from shore requiring significant pumping pressures with the potential for additional pressure
boosting offshore. Guidance on the flammable nature of MEG is usually restricted to stating
that it is a combustible fluid which is relatively difficult to ignite. The hazard potential from
MEG leaks has therefore traditionally been characterised as a low intensity pool fire rather
than as a potential jet fire or explosion and the overall hazard potential has therefore been
considered minor when compared to the normal array of hydrocarbon fluids experienced
offshore and certainly not of Major Accident Event potential. As the industry has sought to
exploit finds at remote and deep locations the pressures associated with MEG systems have
increased into ranges well into the several hundred of bar. However the perception of the low
flammability nature of MEG has remained. As a result of this perception, HP MEG may end
up located within utility areas or other areas considered safe on a facility, and thereby closer
to ignition sources, higher occupancy areas or sensitive equipment areas.
This paper considers the impact that atomisation of a MEG release potentially has on its
flammability and hence its potential to result in a Major Accident Event (MAE) offshore.
The paper also makes recommendations on how the potential hazard should be evaluated and
what mitigation measures may be considered to ensure that the risks to personnel and the
producing asset are suitably addressed and reduced to as low as reasonably practicable
(ALARP).

Deep Offshore Technology (DOT) International2012

HAZARD DEFINITION
MEG Flammability Normal Conditions
MEG is classified as a Class IIIB Combustible liquid and as such is a liquid which is
considered relatively difficult to ignite. The Flash point of MEG is 111oC and hence under
normal ambient conditions a flammable atmosphere is not possible. MEG fires can occur but
only as a result of being heated to above its flash point with an ignition source present. This
has previously only been considered in the event of a major fire escalating to MEG
inventories such as large storage tanks onshore.
The flammability of MEG is influenced significantly by its water content. Literature searches
indicate that once the water content reaches >20% the flammability is greatly reduced such
that ignition is highly unlikely. As an example Glycol/water mix with a 60/40 proportion has
been utilised as a fire resistant replacement for hydraulic oil in some services. [Ref 1]
MEG Flammability Pressurised Releases
High flashpoint liquids, such as MEG or diesel (normally considered non-hazardous in the
context of area classification) can, if released under pressure, atomise to produce a flammable
aerosol. The paper Pressurised Atomisation Of High Flashpoint Liquids Implications For
Hazardous Area Classification [Ref 4] concluded that the possibility of creating aerosols
which may result in flammable atmospheres cannot be disregarded for commonly handled
high-flashpoint liquids. The concerns raised in the paper have been formalised within the
Area Classification Code IP15 [Ref 2] which states the following:

Flammable atmospheres may also be formed where flammable fluids handled below their
flash point are released in the form of a mist or spray. Such materials normally regarded as
non-hazardous, should be treated as hazardous when they are pumped or under pressure and
are capable of producing a mist or spray due to the possibility of a release from a small hole
or flange leak. They should be regarded as a Category C fluid generating a hazardous area
as appropriate.
The paper Combustion hazards posed by pressurized atomization [Ref 5] notes that the UK
HSE showed that a mist of a high flashpoint liquid (liquid not named) could ignite when
atomized at 11oC, some 60oC below its flashpoint. The paper goes on to state that high

Deep Offshore Technology (DOT) International2012

flashpoint liquids, when in dispersed states, can exhibit ignition and flammability
characteristics comparable to those associated with the same fuel but in a pre-vaporised state.
Separate HSE work, not published, has indicated that a MEG fire, once lit, would sustain a
fire.
Atomisation of MEG
The diameter of droplets released has a significant impact on the energy required to ignite an
aerosol. The paper Pressurised Atomisation Of High Flashpoint Liquids Implications For
Hazardous Area Classification [Ref 4] provides a methodology for predicting the mean
diameter of droplets arising from an unimpinged release. Two formulae are suggested within
the paper.

Or,

The range of applicability of the above formula is in line with the physical properties of
MEG. Utilising these formula it may be seen that the pressure drop across the orifice can
result in droplet diameters in the low hundreds of m. The formulae assume clean edges and
no impingement. In reality the break point is likely to promote further atomisation of the
fluid.
In addition to the above formulae, Shells FRED (Fire, Release, Explosion and Dispersion)
modelling package has a model for predicting the amount of liquid that will rain out in the
event of a release of a specified liquid. As part of the calculation FRED determines droplet
diameters including the SMD. This paper provides example outputs from the FRED
modelling which demonstrates the range of droplet sizes that may be encountered in an
atomised release.
The paper Combustion hazards posed by pressurized atomisation states that more efficient
atomisation, i.e. smaller droplets, will occur in the event of an uneven orifice and jet
impingement. Predicting, in a plant environment, whether a release is likely to atomise such
that it becomes a hazard is difficult. The level of atomisation is highly dependent on the hole

Deep Offshore Technology (DOT) International2012

size, the release pressure, the fluid temperature, the composition and whether the spray jet
will impinge on any other equipment. The larger the hole size or the lower the pressure and
temperature the larger the droplets that will be formed and hence the spray fire risk is
reduced.
Ignition Mechanisms
Under normal storage conditions i.e. ambient temperature with low pressure, MEG does not
readily ignite due to its relatively high flash point. Flash point temperatures are, however, not
a reliable indication of the potential for ignition of a liquid dispersed under pressure into
droplets. As discussed above research and testing has demonstrated that pressurised releases
of high flash point fluids can be ignited at temperatures significantly below their flash point.
This paper considered the available literature to identify whether the ignition sources typically
found offshore provide an ignition threat. Potential mechanisms include; naked flames, hot
surfaces, electrical spark and static build up. It is important to note that the following assumes
that the MEG is a lean state i.e. water content is <20%.
A methodology has been developed which considers the flammability of sprays of industrial
fluids. The Approved Standard 6930 methodology [Ref 9] assigns a Spray Flammability
Parameter (SFP) value where the higher the SFP the higher the burning rate. It has been noted
that water glycol mixes are assigned a low number and hence classified as difficult to ignite
and are thus used as a fire resistant hydraulic fluid. It is unknown as to whether the higher
MEG concentrations will result in higher SFP values however the following indicates that
MEG sprays could be considered flammable in an atomised state.
Naked Flames / Hot surfaces
Experiments involving MEG sprays/ mists have demonstrated that MEG can ignite when
sprayed onto a substantial pre-existing ignition source (open flame or hot surface) which
allows glycol to reach its vapour flash points. Ignition of anti freeze solutions in building
sprinkler systems has occurred and is recognised as a hazard within that field [Ref 6]. MEG
mists, if impacting a naked flame will burn thereby increasing the aggregate heat output of
the existing fire.
MEG mists have the potential to auto-ignite when exposed to hot surfaces in excess of 300
C to 400oC. The Process Safety Beacon notes in its May 2012 issue [Ref 3] a Glycol fire

Deep Offshore Technology (DOT) International2012

which ignited following a spray release onto a reboiler with a resultant significant amount of
damage.
Electrical Ignition
MEG in its gaseous state is ignitable via an electric spark. The paper Spark Ignition of
Underhood Fluids [Ref 7] has determined that the minimum ignition energy of MEG
vapour is around 1.2mJ. An unshielded electrical spark may have energies orders of
magnitude above this and could therefore potentially result in ignition of MEG vapour. As
noted above MEG has the potential to atomise to a fine level. Aerosols with fine enough
droplet sizes (<40 m) will act in a similar manner to vapours at temperatures above their
flashpoint. Ignition of a high pressure spray via low energy ignition sources such as static
discharges, intermittent sparks/arcs should therefore be considered a possibility.
Static Flow Build Up
The flowing movement of finely powdered substances or low conductivity fluids in pipes or
through mechanical agitation can build up static electricity. When there is a static discharge
in a dust or vapor cloud, explosions have occurred. In the petrochemical industry, 50 pS/m is
the recommended minimum value of electrical conductivity for adequate removal of charge
from a fluid. MEG has a electrical conductivity value orders of magnitude higher than this
value and hence self static discharge is not considered a credible ignition mechanism.
Fire Characteristics
In the event of a MEG aerosol igniting the initial fire is likely to be similar to a flash fire.
Any personnel caught within this fire are likely to suffer fatal injuries. It is unclear as to
whether this cloud would burn back and result in a sustained jet fire or compartment type
fire. It is understood however that small scale experiments conducted by the Health and
Safety Laboratory in the UK have resulted in sustained fires following initial ignition. At
time of writing this work is not available for publication.
Dispersion modelling utilising droplets is not easily modelled however fire modelling
software FRED predicts theoretical 95% MEG jet fire lengths of ~14m from 5mm hole sizes
at a 400bar discharge pressure.
A MEG spray release that is not ignited whilst it is in an aerosol state will eventually rain
out out of the air and potentially form pools. Normally these pools will be of minimal

Deep Offshore Technology (DOT) International2012

concern from a fire perspective as the high flash point will minimise the ignition likelihood
at ambient temperature conditions.
In the event the pools formed on hot surfaces or are heated by an external flame a pool fire
may occur. The duration and severity of these fires will depend on the volume of MEG
deposited.
Smoke Hazards
In the event of a sustained fire smoke generated by a MEG fire is likely to be smoky which
may present visibility problems for personnel attempting to escape an area where a MEG
fire is ongoing.
Glycol burning produces carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide and nitrogen oxides combustion
products. Exposure to glycol smoke may cause short lived coughing and breathing
difficulty, especially where individuals have pre-existing medical conditions such as asthma.
Short term exposure to MEG smoke presents a minor, short term risk to health; there is no
impact if breathing apparatus is worn.
Explosion Risk
It is not known and no examples have been identified of MEG explosions. Explosions are
not considered likely in an open offshore plant type environment.
Non-flammable Hazards Stored potential energy
The release of any high pressure fluid has the potential to cause significant harm or even kill
personnel physically impacted by the release. Serious injury including skin cuts and
lacerations are likely. It must be considered a possibility for personnel to be fatally injured
depending on which part of the person is impacted. Pressurised injection of high pressure
fluids through skin has been known to occur with failed hydraulic systems and hence this
hazard should also be considered. As well as the physical trauma caused by the injury,
injected MEG has the potential to result in damage to organs and the nervous system.
It is important to consider that the potential for harm from the high pressure equipment is
considerable and is of more significance that from a typical ancillary hydraulic system.

Deep Offshore Technology (DOT) International2012

Short term exposure to glycol leaks, even in spray form, do not present a risk to health
although it is noted in the MSDS as a potential skin and eye irritant. There is no risk from
glycol if breathing apparatus is worn.

Deep Offshore Technology (DOT) International2012

FORMAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT

The regulatory regime governed by NOPSEMA within Australian waters requires that events
that may result in multiple fatalities (deemed Major Accident Events, MAEs) be identified
and the risks of such events are reduced to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).
Glycol fires have traditionally been discounted as initiating events due to the high flash point.
This paper has demonstrated that a loss of containment involving high pressure MEG may be
considered flammable under very particular circumstances and hence the potential for a MAE
should be considered. A Fire Hazard Analysis taking into account the local conditions should
hence be carried out where inventories of high pressure MEG are involved.
In determining the potential fire scenario in question, the key question is whether the MEG is
likely to be atomised to a degree such that it may be considered ignitable via sparks or hot
surfaces. The level at which a high flash point fluid such as MEG can be considered
potentially flammable is around 40m [Ref 4]. Utilising the Pressurised Release Model
within FRED will allow the modeller to input the required process conditions. Inspection of
the Rain Out results tab will present the values calculated for the SMD.
FRED predicts the level of atomisation assuming an unimpinged release and hence the droplet
diameter should be considered an upper bound. In the event that the jet were to impinge on
neighbouring equipment or structures the jet is likely to be atomised further and approach the
40m range. It is conservatively suggested that where the SMD is predicted to be <500m
then the release should be considered as a potential fire hazard.

Deep Offshore Technology (DOT) International2012

Table 1, 2 & 3 present example tables which demonstrate the change in droplet diameter in
relation to the release pressure and the predicted hole size. It can be seen that once the hole
size reaches a particular diameter atomisation is no longer possible and hence the fire hazard
phenomenon is removed. These results have not been verified by experimental means
however it is suggested that this should be done.
Table 1 400bar 95% 60oC MEG Release
Hole Size
1mm
SMD
Droplet 154
Diameter (m)

Flowrate (kg/s)
Predicted
Flame
Length (m)

0.14
3.7

Table 2 200bar 95% 60 oC MEG Release

Hole Size
1mm
SMD
Droplet 192
Diameter (m)

Flowrate (kg/s)
Predicted
Flame
Length (m)

0.10
3.2

Table 3 100bar 95% 60 oC MEG Release

Hole Size
1mm
SMD
Droplet 203
Diameter (m)

Flowrate (kg/s)
Predicted
Flame
Length (m)

0.07
2.9

5mm
308

20mm
FRED predicts only
partial atomisation
and hence not likely
represent
a
flammable hazard

3.48
14

N/A
N/A

5mm
384

20mm
FRED predicts only
partial atomisation
and hence not likely
represent
a
flammable hazard

2.45
12

N/A
N/A

5mm
480

20mm
FRED predicts only
partial atomisation
and hence not likely
represent
a
flammable hazard

1.728
10

N/A
N/A

50mm
FRED
predicts
only
partial
atomisation and
hence not likely
represent
a
flammable hazard
N/A
N/A

50mm
FRED
predicts
only
partial
atomisation and
hence not likely
represent
a
flammable hazard
N/A
N/A

50mm
FRED
predicts
only
partial
atomisation and
hence not likely
represent
a
flammable hazard
N/A
N/A

It should also be that the composition and temperature of the MEG have a significant bearing
on the size of droplets formed. The above is produced for example purposes only.
Any analysis of the hazards presented by a release of HP MEG should take account of the
mechanical energy stored within the fluid. Injury or death to personnel in the area as well as
escalation to nearby equipment should be considered at an early design stage.

Deep Offshore Technology (DOT) International2012

IMPLICATIONS FOR DESIGN

The information and research available indicates that HP lean MEG can generate an atomised
spray and that this fluid may be ignitable. There is considerable uncertainty and no direct
examples have been identified in industry (although examples have been identified in the fire
suppression industry). However, it is considered prudent to apply the precautionary principle
and assume that a release, especially within an enclosed space, of HP lean MEG is flammable
and hence appropriate hazard control measures should be considered. The hazard identified is
unlikely to present intolerable risks however operators within Australia and in significant
other areas of the world operate in a goal setting regulatory regime where risks to personnel
and the environment should be reduced to levels considered ALARP.
Hazardous Area Classification
The Area Classification Code, IP15 considers the hazard presented by high flash point fluids
atomised in a release. Section 1.3.3 of the code recommends that the fluid be treated as a
Class C fluid with the hazardous areas determined as appropriate. It should be noted that the
IP15 code is designed to prevent ignition of relatively small leaks that may arise from flanges
or vent locations. It is not designed to prevent the ignition of large releases caused by gross
failure of equipment. In the case of a MEG release gross failure is not likely to generate a
spray and hence following the code should minimise the potential for ignition sources.
At present the areas around MEG facilities are often unclassified however this should be
revisited in light of this paper. The areas surrounding equipment containing pressurised lean
MEG (water cut <20%) should be subject to area classification with the MEG considered a
Class C substance.
It is noted that MEG remains difficult to ignite and its already low propensity for ignition
reduces significantly as its concentration is reduced by water content. Literature searches
have revealed that MEG that has a water content above 20% can be considered to be non
flammable until such time as the water content has evaporated off. Equipment that contains a
high water percentage is therefore not required to be classified.
IP 15 suggest the provision of spray guards around potential leak paths. The theory being that
the spray would coalesce back into bulk liquid and the MEG would return to its more benign
state as normally associated with a high flash point fluid. This will need to be considered

Deep Offshore Technology (DOT) International2012

carefully as the inclusion of a barrier could result in further atomisation which may exacerbate
the concern.
Detector Requirements
Detecting the loss of containment of MEG may be difficult. Process monitoring is not
considered sensitive enough to detect the pressure drop that would be associated with the
small hole sizes typical of those that would present a spray fire hazard.

Gas Detection
Conventional gas detection would not detect a MEG spray release and hence is not
recommended.
Oil Mist Detection
Oil Mist detection may be relevant for this service, however, it is probably only useful for
enclosed areas. This would assist with the prevention of escalation as well as protecting
personnel from entering an area that may have an ongoing leak.
Acoustic Leak Detection
Acoustic leak detection is usually used for gas releases and its applicability to MEG releases
is dubious. Research has been carried out by the UK HSE [8] which indicates that liquid
leak detection is possible using acoustic detection however the low levels of ultrasound may
result in the signature being swamped by background noise. It is also noted that acoustic
detection is not normally used to initiate executive actions.
Fire Detection
Detection of a MEG spray fire may be key to preventing further escalation. Installation of
heat or flame detection should be considered in areas where escalation could occur. The
detector will require careful consideration as spray may affect detector vision via deposition
of the mist on the detector.
Ventilation
A release of HP MEG should be assessed/ treated as though it would result in a flammable
atmosphere, especially in an enclosed space. Ventilation should be considered as a hazard
mitigation measure.
Active Fire Protection
Active Fire Protection may be considered for areas where HP MEG is utilised. Water fog or
fine spray would cool the area, dilute the release and potentially assist the droplets coagulate

Deep Offshore Technology (DOT) International2012

such that the droplet diameter would increase such that the high flash point nature of the
MEG would dominate the flammability characteristics. .
Passive Fire Protection
Passive Fire Protection (PFP) is unlikely to be of benefit however the requirement or
otherwise should be considered as part of the FSA process.
Inventory Minimisation
Consideration should be given to minimising the releasable inventory via use of isolations. It
is recognised however that the likely isolatable inventories associated with high pressure
MEG systems will be large. Isolating from the main pipeline inventory would assist greatly in
reducing the release duration. This may take some time if detection is slow in occurring. A
release through hole size such that atomisation is possible is likely to continue for a
significant period considering the relatively small flowrates involved although it is recognised
that the fluid is incompressible and hence the pressure should equalise fairly quickly.
Isolations
Normally a MEG system would require a single isolation to allow maintenance. However,
due to the potential flammability and the significant mechanical energy implicit in a high
pressure system a companys permit to work system may require a higher level of isolation. It
is noted that this may have a significant impact on operations and maintenance.
Physical Protection
Fluids released at high pressure have significant energies associated with them. The
equipment and pipework associate high pressure MEG systems will most likely include
significant diameter pipework and associated flanges. A release from a high pressure MEG
system could result in serious or even fatal injuries of personnel in the area of a release.
Pipework and associated fittings should therefore be suitable for the high pressure service
intended with leak paths minimised. Protection or minimising occupancy of areas where
personnel could be directly impacted by a high pressure release should be considered. This
may take the form of physical barriers around potential leak sites such as flanges of pump
connections.

Deep Offshore Technology (DOT) International2012

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMENDATIONS

MEG is normally considered a combustible but not particularly flammable material under
normal ambient pressure and temperatures. Separate research has identified that high flash
point fluids such as Diesel or Tetraline can become hazardous in the event of atomisation. The
concern is raised that a similar phenomenon may exist for MEG at the elevated pressures
encountered presently and planned for the future.
This paper has demonstrated that:

Fine atomisation of MEG releases is possible at the high pressures utilised in the
offshore industry at present;

Ignition of MEG vapours should be considered a possibility from electrical equipment

with discharge energies of 1.2mJ or more;

Hot surfaces or naked flames could ignite a MEG release.

The inventories involved and potential for sustained fires should be considered for
MAE potential.

In order that the risks from pressurised MEG releases can be minimised the following is
recommended:

Equipment containing high pressure MEG (>100bar) should be classified using IP15
Area Classification Code (or similar) defining MEG as a Class C substance;

Enclosed areas should consider the use of some form of detection equipment as a
small diameter release may not be picked up by process monitoring;

This paper recognises that there is a significant amount of uncertainty surrounding the issue
of MEG spray fires. The available research has been utilised and extrapolated upon however
the following is recommended:

Further research or testing is recommended to identify if the scale of the hazard

estimated within this paper is credible;

Deep Offshore Technology (DOT) International2012

NOMENCLATURE
Symbols
D
SMD
U
P
m

Diameter of a droplet (m)

Sauter mean diameter (m)
Jet exit velocity at orifice (m/s)
Pressure differential across orifice (N/m2)
10-6metres
Kinematic Viscosity
Density (kg/m3)
Surface Tension (N/m)
Dynamic Shear Viscosity (kg/(ms)

REFERENCES
1. http://www.hydraulicspneumatics.com/200/Issue/Article/False/6484/Issue
2. IP15, Area Classification Code for Installations Handling Flammable Substances, 3rd
Edition
3. http://sache.org/beacon/files/2012/05/en/read/2012-05-Beacon-s.pdf
4. Pressurised Atomisation of High Flashpoint Liquids Implications for Hazardous Area
Classification, P.J. Bowen and L.C. Shirvill, Shell Research Ltd, 1995
5. Combustion hazards posed by pressurized atomization, P.J. Bowen and L.C. Shirvill.
Journal of Loss Prevention, Vol 7, No. 3, 1994
6. Antifreeze Solutions in Home Fire Sprinkler Systems, Literature Review and Research Plan,
Code Consultants,
7. Spark Ignition of Underhood Fluids, SAE Technical Paper Series, Leleand E. Shields et al,
2005-01-1559
8. Measurement of Acoustic Spectra from Liquid Leaks, Health and Safety Laboratory,
RR658, 2007.
9. Approval Standard 6930 Flammability Classification of Industrial Fluids