‘

c
 c ‘ default judgment was ordered. This was because of the blizzard at that time
this agent was stuck in back up traffic that made him late.‘
‘

Ê ‘ (udge Moore should have given a half hour grace period before ruling default
judgment. Since it would have allowed plaintiff¶s defense to be considered with the
trail brief filed with the clerk at Ê Ê
pm. Since the judge had left the court room when
defendant¶s agent arrived to file the trial brief.

3 ‘
mproper notice, (udge Moore ruled on the Ê3rd of February to deny 96 page motion,
filed (anuary to justify that in very least an adjournment was appropriate.

4 ‘ Misleading posting on case disposition site of the (udical court. Specifically, the trial on
the Êth was posted twice, where before one of the dates stated ³continuance.´ This
mislead defendant to believe the motion for continuance was granted. Consequently, it
was only the day before that defendant learned the trial was not going to be adjorned.

 ‘ laintiff is without funds that would have not made it possible to have paid for travel if
he wanted to attend and this fact of being impoverished was brought to the attention of
the judges in his papers.

Wherefore, defendant has standing to have the case restored to the docket pursuant to C.G.S. §ÊÊcÊ.
pening defaultupon default or nonsuit;¶Š
ŠŠ
Š

Ú
‘ ³Any judgment rendered. . . upon a default. . . in the superior court may be set aside,
within four months following the date on which it was rendered . . . , and the case reinstated on
the docket, on [$
costs . . . , upon . . . written motion of any party or person prejudiced
thereby, showing . . . good cause of . . . defense in whole . . . existed at the time of the rendition
of the judgment . . . , and that the . . . defendant was prevented by mistake, accident or other
reasonable cause from prosecuting the action or making the defense.

Ê
 Ú
‘ The . . . written motion shall be verified by the oath of the complainant . . . , shall state in
general terms the nature of the claim or defense and shall particularly set forth the reason why
the plaintiff or defendant failed to appear.
Ú
‘ The court shall order reasonable notice of the pendency. . . written motion to be given to
the adverse party, and may enjoin him against enforcing the judgment or decree until the
decision upon the complaint or written motion.´

³A party moving for the opening of a judgment must make a two part showing that (c a
good defense existed at the time an adverse judgment was rendered; and (Ê the defense
was not at that time raised by reason of mistake, accident or other reasonable
cause.´(ôŠ
   (c998
Ê
A.Êd Ê

, 4 Conn.Supp. 63, affirmed
Ê

A.Êd ÊÊ9, Ê Conn.App. 360 .

F
ST 
T, DE
AL F AD(MET WAS EASABLE

Wherefore the court acted unreasonably and in clear abuse of its discretion by rejecting the
³good cause´ presented by defendant to adjourn the case for six weeks when he could appear.
Since the facts shown in the papers established good cause to justifythat the court should not
adhere to its initial ruling on (an Êth Ê0c0. Whereas, in this ruling (udge Grogins stated that the
possibility of an adornment was contingent upon the payment of defendant of the se &
ccupancy¶ by February cstand a letter from a current treating physician.
³Conn. Gen.Stat.9‘
‘Continuance on account of absent or nonresident defendant. Ex
ceptions (a ¶Every civil action in which the  
‘  ‘
‘  

‘ ‘  ‘ 
‘ ‘  ‘

  ‘ ‘‘ 
‘
‘‘  ‘‘‘
 ‘
‘   ‘‘‘
  ‘  ‘

‘ ‘  ‘ 
, without having entered any appearance therein, shall be continued or
postponed for thirty days by order of the court.
f the defendant does not then appear and no

‘
 ‘ ‘  ‘‘‘
, judgment by default may be rendered against him.´‘

Accordingly, special reason was shown by defendant¶s doctors that he was medically advised not

to travel at this time and defendant requested the hearing to be adjourned for another 6 weeks.

This was established by letters from defendant¶s pulmonary specialist (the head of the dept. at

É
Greenwich Hospital (exh that was faxed to the
n addition to the doctor who had been treating

him with having defendant due to a recent injury he sustained in an auto accident. This doctor

required defendant to attend physical therapy three times a week (the appointment sheet was

faxed to (udge Grogins in midFebruary .‘

Moreover, in plaintiff¶s motions filed on the Ê, Ê6, and Ê9th of (anuary, defendant brought to the
court¶s attention that the law states that the & is unenforceable, due to plaintiff¶s misconduct
of  ‘ . Further, that the court had letters from defendant¶s doctors to justify he
was unable to travel at this time.
³nder Connecticut law,a

 
  tothe l a n d lo r d
b a s e d o n t h e    ,whichariseswhen t h e l a n d lo r d
n o t physicallydispossessingthetenantfromthepremises,
whichrendersthepremisesuntenantable. (

Š 9 Conn. App. 68, 666, 89

A.Êd
c0 (Ê006 .Whetherthe pre mise s are
u n t e n a nt a b l e isaquestionoffactforthetrier.( 
  c90 Conn. Ê (Conn.
c983 .F o r t he u nt e n a nt a b i l it yh a s beenestablished,thetenantmustallegeall of t h e
fo l l o w i n g fo u r elements ( c theuntenantableconditionwascausedby the landlord;
(Ê the tenant vacated the premises because of that specific condition; and (3 the tenant
did not vacate until affording the landlord an opportunity to remedy the
condition.´(Š




, 6c Conn. App. 3Ê9 (Conn. App. Ct. Ê00c .

n addition it was brought to the court¶s attention that the & ¶ obtained from (udge Moore by
a false declaration of fact by plaintiff¶s lawyer Kaelin is afruit¶ from a poisoned tree.
Specifically, Kaelin refuted his own entry into the evidence the May Ê
thagreement to validate
his claim of 0% ownership; albeit based on fraud. Consequently, Kaelin is judiciously estopped
from his own declaration by collateral estoppel as he has refuted his own declaration. Thus,
Kaelin¶s statement of c00% ownership was a false representation of a material fact crucial to the
issue being decided by a new (udge (Moore who first heard the case.

j

n effect, the dispute between parties was based on the issue of who possesses paramount title as
corresponding to the pivotal issue to be decided. Thus, if Kaelin informed the court that it was
going by the May Ê
agreement that they based their claim of 0% ownership,thiswould have of
deprived the court from having the jurisdiction of affirming dominant rights and privileges of
one party over the other with a 00 partnership of ownership in the disputed property.
oteworthy, is thatDefendant¶s lawyer, Mark Katz, did not rebut Kaelin¶s perjury, as in
accordance to his palpable and pervasive pattern of affirming the legal agenda of the opposition.

³Trial court's action in deciding motion to open and vacate judgment will not be

disturbed on appeal unless it

‘ 

‘
‘ ‘
‘
 ‘‘ ‘  .

( 
  (Ê003 8Ê
A.Êd
43,
8 Conn.App. 466, certification denied 83

A.Êd 4
4, Ê66 Conn. 9ÊÊ .

SED 
T DEFEDAT A
SED
SSE LA
T
FF D
D T W THE ETY

˜
  was only ‘ allege and ‘   of the subject property
and for possession in a summary process action.´ . . .³9

 a party a party
seeking summary process to allege and ‘   ‘ ‘ ‘  ‘
.´(pŠ Š  Š  Š        

 ŠŠ
  
(Ê00 8
0 A.Êd ccc6, 88 Conn.App. 66c, certification denied 8
6 A.Êd cÊ00, Ê
4 Conn.
90
.

˜
‘ 
‘ ‘
 , which is special proceeding, relationship of 
‘
‘

‘ ‘  ‘
‘  ‘  ‘ 
‘  ‘  ‘ ‘ 
 .´(



Šô! "
 (c948 c6 Conn.Supp. 46 .

Accordingly, the disputed issue between parties of who has legal right and privledge of
ownership of the subject properties is known to the court. Therefore, as in accordance to


³9

 requires a party a party seeking summary process to allege and ‘  ‘‘
‘  ‘.´ As defendant sets forth a demand that plaintiff ³‘  ‘‘‘
 ‘´ at the scheduled hearing on this matter.

Trial court abused its discretion in refusing to open default judgment without  ‘  

‘
 ‘ ‘

‘  ‘. . . in ruling on motion was dependent on  ‘

‘
 ‘‘
, and thus, due process required that court hold evidentiary hearing on issue. (p

"
#

 (Ê003 8Ê8 A.Êd 68c,
8 Conn.App. 684, certification denied 833 A.Êd
468, Ê66 Conn. 9c
.

³Defendant who filed motion to vacate default judgment on the grounds' that ‘


!‘   ‘ ‘ ‘   , that service was not made in accordance with

applicable statutes, that action was brought in court of improper and illegal venue and

that action was barred had  ‘ ‘  ‘


 ‘  
 ‘  ‘  .

($#

 (c9
6 36Ê A.Êd 40, 33 Conn.Supp. 4

TH
D 
T,  LADLD TEAT ELAT
SH
 BETWEE A
T
ES

³Trial court had   ‘

‘
‘
‘‘‘ ‘
‘  ‘
 ‘‘  
‘   , and thus property owner's failure to
timely file motion to open judgment did not preclude court from opening judgment in
condemnation action that was brought by city's urban redevelopment commission;
property owner alleged that ‘
!‘   ‘‘ ‘  ‘for
commission because commission acted without statutory authority in obtaining
property.´(!
   "Š"$ŠŠ
" 
%
ŠŠ (Ê004 860 A.Êd
cÊ33, 86 Conn.App. Ê36. Eminent Domain <3= c
Ê; Eminent Domain ®=> Ê43(c

³The law says under Conn. Gen Statues § 4
ac (
, a ³tenant´ is defined as ³the lessee,
sub lessee, or person entitled under a rental agreement to occupy a dwelling unit or

S
 premises to the exclusion of others or as defined by law. nder C. G.S.§ 4
ac (d , a
³landlord´ is defined as ³the owner, lessor or sublessor of a dwelling unit, the building
of which is a part of the premises.´
t is a well settled in Conn. that a landlord/ tenant
relationship arises from an agreement, either oral or written, whereby one person, the
tenant, enters into possession of land possessed by another, the landlord ( 



Š

, 4 Conn. App. 608, 49 A.Êd ccÊÊ (c98 .´

³The agreement, commonly referred to as a lease, transfers an estate in real property to a

tenant for a stated period.
ts distinguishing characteristic is the surrender of possession
of land or tenement by the landlord to the tenant so that he may occupy the land or
tenement leased to the exclusion of landlord himself. (&
'
 
 



ô
Š
, c39 Conn. 98, 60c, 96 A Êd Êc
(c93 . ³A lease transfers an estate in real
property to a tenant for a stated period, with a reversion to the owner after the expiration
of its lease. ³ (
 (Š #

ô)
, c
0 Conn. 69, 368 AÊd 6
(c9
6 .

Accordingly in no manner or form, could business relationship between parties be based on the

³agreement´ (exh A ever to be justified to be legally viewed as a landlord and tenant

relationship. either can a contractual promise based on a breachedoption to buy the property

with a provision of my contributing towards the taxes make it so.

ather, at best the Court considered an unsubstantiated claim of plaintive being 00 owners

with defendant; that plaintiff is named as the manager of the property;and is the executive

manager of the LLCs with 00 ownership between parties. This still is with 00 ownership

of title that means neither party can overrule the other party to enforce their will. Such an act is

unlawful, since it changes the statusquo from when the alleged 00 partnership was

established, and disrupts the equal rights to benefits implied with a 00 ownership.

²
 ³nder the common law, a judgment rendered by a court can subsequently be opened, . .
. if it is shown that the  ‘ 
‘ 
 ‘ ‘ 
‘ "‘ "‘ "‘ #‘  ‘  
‘

 ‘ ‘   ‘
‘  ‘ !‘ ‘  ‘ 
  ‘
‘ "‘ (©


*Š (Ê004 846 A.Êd 9Ê3, 8Ê Conn.App.
c0 .

F0TH 
T, LAW STATES LA
T
FF DES T W SB(ECT ET
ES

³nder Connecticut law, essential elements of "fraud" are the following (c false
representation was made as statement of fact; (Ê it was untrue and known to be untrue by
party making it; (3 it was made to induce other party to act on it; and (4 latter did so act
on it to his injury. # oberti, Ê0c B.. 6c4.

nder Connecticut law, "constructive trust" is formula through which conscience of

equity finds expression; when property has been acquired in such circumstances that
holder of legal title may not in good conscience retain beneficial interest, equity converts
him to trustee.²# adcliffe, 3c
B.. 8c (Ê004 .

A "constructive trust" arises when legal title to property is obtained in violation of some
duty owed to the one who is equitably entitled to the title, and property thus obtained is
held in hostility to his beneficial rights of ownership, and all constructive trusts may be
referred to fraud as to their final source. (+
('
p, 33 A.Êd 339, c30 Conn.
Ê89 (c943 .

An act of "conversion" is an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of

ownership over goods belonging to another, to the exclusion of the owner's rights, and is
an act of dealing with the property rights of that person in a manner adverse to him,
inconsistent with his right of dominion and to his harm.²Falker v. Samperi, 46c A.Êd
68c, c90 Conn. 4cÊ (c983 .²Trover c.

A co nst ruct ive t rust arises. . . when a per son who ho lds t it le t o propert y
is subject to an equit able dut y t o conve y it t o anot her on t he ground t hat

d
 he would be unjust ly enr iched if he were per mit t ed t o ret ain it ." (Cadle Co.
v. Gabel, 69 Co nn. App. Ê
9, Ê88,
94 A.Êd c0Ê9 (Ê00Ê .

Conversion is defined in Conn. Gen. Stat. § Ê

± Conversion

"Conversion is some unauthorized act which deprives another of his property

permanently or for an indefinite time; some unauthorized assumption and exercise of the
powers of the owner to his harm. The essence of the wrong is that the property rights of
the plaintiff have been dealt with in a manner adverse to him, inconsistent with his right
of dominion and to his harm." (
!Š"

(
"
""
Ê
0 Conn. Ê9c, 3Ê9
(Ê004 .

To establish a cause of action for conversion, a plaintiff must demonstrate that

c ‘ The defendant, without authorization;
Ê ‘ assumed and exercised ownership over property belonging to another;
3 ‘ to the exclusion of the owner's rights. (©*("

'Š#&Š#
V

86
Conn. App. Ê
(Ê004 , aff'd, Ê
6 Conn. 3c0 (Ê00 .

³nder ew York law, "conversion" is an unauthorized exercise of dominion of control

over property by one who is not THEowner of the property which interferes with and is in
defiance of a superior possessory right of anotherin the property. (Steinmetz v. Toyota
Motor Credit Corp., 963 F.Supp. cÊ94 (.Y. c99
.

³Conversion" is an act of willful interference with the personal property of another that is
without justification or that is inconsistent with the rights of the person entitled to the use,
possession, or ownership of the property. (Š

,
'
p( Š
,

nc.,
39, F.Supp. c34Ê (Minn. c990 .

³ConnApp. c99. roof by "fair preponderance of the evidence" is proof by the better
evidence, evidence having greater weight, more convincing force in fact finder's

<
 mind.´(State v. Haggood, 63 A.Êd Êc6, 36 Conn.App.
3, certification denied 6
A.Êd
644, Ê33 Conn. 904, postconviction relief denied c999 WL Ê33843.²Crim Law 60.

Accordingly, plaintiff paid no money for ownership of the subject, only had obtained signatures

from defendant by statutory forgery to create a bad title a bad tile for both KD Ventures.

Wherefore the ³niform Fraudulent Transference Act¶ establishes that the deed naming

KD ventures is 
Š subject to being set aside. Since no reasonable consideration¶ was paid

out by plaintiff to obtain the transference of title to the KD Ventures LLC¶s. Essentially

plaintiff¶s transference of ownership is based on being identified as being the lender on the

mortgage to a $40,000.00 on defendant¶s own property. Essentially, committing bank fraud by

fraudulently claiming sole ownership to property achieved under false pretense to have a two

million dollar lean fraudulently placed on someone else¶s property does not make you the owner

(exhs. b,c d

F
FTH 
T, CT HAS  (
SD
CT
 VE MATTE  AT
ES

³Statute governing opening of judgments relates not to jurisdiction over subject matter,
but in jurisdiction over person or parties. (

  Š  
Š (c99
69Ê A.Êd
cÊ90, 44, C o nn.App.

c, certification denied 696 A.Êd c40, Ê4c Conn. 9c6 .

³While courts have inherent power to open, correct and modify judgments, duration of
this power is restricted by statute and rule of practice. (  ŠŠ

 *  (c99 66Ê A.Êd c340, 38 Conn.App.
4, certification granted in part 66

A.Êd cÊ
0, Ê3 Conn. 933, .illumed and remanded 68 A.Êd cc08, Ê39 Conn, 3
 . ‘

Trial Court improperly denied motion of transferee, who was conveyed real property by
fraudulent transfer, to open and set aside money judgment against her for underlying promissory
note debt owed solely by transferor, ‘ ‘
‘ ; judgment against transferee

c

was a result of judicial error, in that she could not be responsible for the underlying debt, and ‘
‘ ‘  
‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ 
‘
‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ 
‘ ‘ 
. Connecticut
Sav. Bank v. benauf (Ê000
8 A.Êd

S
TH 
T, CT HAS (ST CASE T E DEFALT (DGMET

³This section governing opening of default judgments is remedial, but it is intended to confine
opening to  ‘ 
 . (
Š 
Š 
 #

 
) (c984 4
4 A.Êd 46, c93
Conn. cÊ8. (udgment ©=> c4(Ê

³rocedure for opening a default judgment is contained exclusively in G.S. § ÊÊcÊ and
ractice Book § 3

, which provides that a default may be set aside, where reasonable cause
exists, upon written motion of any party within four months of default judgment. (p* 
,' 
,  
Š
(c98 493 A.Êd 86Ê, c96 Conn. 3 .

SEVETH 
T LA
T
FF FA
LS T CMLYW
TH STATY STADAD

³Failure to comply with statutory requirements deprives court of jurisdiction to hear summary
process action. (Š,  Š
,
!&-
Š#
(c988 48 A.Êd
44, c6
Conn.App. 
4, certification denied Ê A.Êd 43Ê, Ê09 Conn. 8Ê6 .

˜
‘‘‘‘ 
‘ 

 in summary process action deprives court of juris
diction to hear action. (Windsor roperties,
nc. v. Great Atlantic and ac. Tea Co.,
nc. (c9
9
408 A.Êd 936, 3 Conn.Supp. Ê9
.

³As a condition precedent to a summary process action, proper notice to quit is a jurisdictional
necessity. ( 
"
Š


+
' (c999
Ê6 A.Êd 600, Ê Conn.App.
3
.

WHEFE, defendant prays for the final judgment on default to be vacated.

cc
 The manner in which discretion is exercised by trial court in granting or denying motion to open judgment will not be
disturbed so long as the court could reasonably conclude as it did.
n re Travis . (Ê004 838 A.Êd c000, 80 Conn. App.



, certification denied 84 A.Êd 409, Ê68

Generally speaking, an order to open a judgment is not immediately appealable, but there is an
exception to the rule where an appeal challenges the authority of the court to open or to set aside
the judgment. (

,  Š"

Š -

(Ê003 8Ê A.Êd c3,


Conn.App. 690, certification granted 83Ê A.Êd
c, Ê66 Conn. 906, certification granted 83Ê A.Êd

Ê, Ê66 Conn. 90
.

cÊ