G.R. No.

196435

January 29, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
JOEL CRISOSTOMO y MALLIAR,1 Accused-Appellant.
When the offended party is under 12 years of age, the crime committed is
"termed statutory rape as it departs from the usual modes of committing
rape. What the law punishes is carnal knowledge of a woman below 12 years
of age. Thus, the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and
whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does
not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years.
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since
when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she
says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been
committed. When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts
are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not
only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be
exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity
are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Considering her tender age, AAA
could not have invented a horrible story. x x x "
Pursuant to Article 266-B of the RPC, the penalty for statutory rape (Criminal
Case No. 99-16237) is death when the victim is a child below seven years
old. There is no dispute that at the time the rape was committed on April 8,
1999, "AAA" was only six years old, having been born on April 4, 1993.
However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, 31 the penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed on the appellant but without eligibility for
parole.32 The CA thus correctly imposed the said penalty on appellant.
On the other hand, rape by sexual assault committed against a child below
seven years old is punishable by reclusion temporal. 33 Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no other aggravating or
mitigating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty shall be prision
mayor34 as minimum, to reclusion temporal,35 as maximum. The CA thus
correctly imposed the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day ofprision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each count of sexual assault.
G.R. No. 188653

January 29, 2014

LITO LOPEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
In the prosecution of drug cases, it is of paramount importance that the
existence of the drug, the corpus delicti of the crime, be established beyond
doubt. To successfully prosecute a case involving illegal drugs, the identity
and integrity of the corpus delicti must definitely be shown to have been
preserved. This requirement necessarily arises from the illegal drug's unique
characteristic that renders it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily
open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or otherwise.
Thus, to remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the
seized drug, evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in
1

court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from the accusedpetitioner.13
In both cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
prosecution must show the chain of custody over the dangerous drug in
order to establish the corpus delicti, which is the dangerous drug itself. 14 The
chain of custody rule comes into play as a mode of authenticating the seized
illegal drug as evidence. It includes testimony about every link in the chain,
from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into
evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the
chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure
that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
Indeed, it is from the testimony of every witness who handled the evidence
from which a reliable assurance can be derived that the evidence presented
in court is one and the same as that seized from the accused. 15 This step
initiates the process of protecting innocent persons from dubious and
concocted searches, and of protecting as well the apprehending officers from
harassment suits based on planting of evidence and on allegations of
robbery or theft.16
The rule requires that the marking of the seized items should be done in the
presence of the apprehended violator and immediately upon confiscation to
ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually
the ones offered in evidence.17
Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital
that the seized contraband is immediately marked because succeeding
handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of
the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all
other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the
accused until they are disposed at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating
switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence.18
There are occasions when the chain of custody rule is relaxed such as when
the marking of the seized items immediately after seizure and confiscation is
allowed to be undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of
arrest for as long as it is done in the presence of an accused in illegal drugs
cases.21 However, even a less-than-stringent application of the requirement
would not suffice to sustain the conviction in this case. There was no
categorical statement from any of the prosecution witnesses that markings
were made, much less immediately upon confiscation of the seized items.
There was also no showing that markings were made in the presence of the
accused in this case.
We have consistently held that failure of the authorities to immediately mark
the seized drugs raises reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus
delicti and suffices to rebut the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duties. Failure to mark the drugs immediately after they were
seized from the accused casts doubt on the prosecution evidence, warranting
acquittal on reasonable doubt.22

A substantial gap in the chain of custody renders the identity and integrity of
the corpus delicti dubious.
G.R. No. 201156, January 29, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee, v. JOSELITO
MORATE Y TARNATE, AccusedAppellant.
In this case, the accusedappellant never questioned the chain of custody
during trial. Specifically, the records show that the accusedappellant never
assailed the propriety and regularity of the process of marking and inventory
of the seized items during the prosecutions presentation of evidence on that
matter during the testimony of PO1 Manamtam. 26
Also, when the
prosecution formally offered the Certification of Inventory as evidence for the
purpose of proving the immediate and accurate inventory, marking and
packing of the purchased and the seized marijuana to maintain and preserve
[their] identities and integrity and the four sachets of marijuana as evidence
for the purpose of proving the identities and integrity of the purchased and
the seized marijuana as those were immediately inventoried, marked and
documented/recorded,27 the accusedappellants comment was simply
Denied as to the purposes for which they are being offered for being
self[]serving pieces of evidence28 and said nothing about noncompliance
with
the
chain
of
custody
requirement.
The chain of custody is basically the duly recorded authorized stages of
transfer of custody of seized dangerous drugs, from their seizure or
confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory for examination to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. 31 The function of the
chain of custody requirement is to ensure that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary doubts
as to the identity of the evidence are removed. 32 Thus, the chain of custody
requirement has a twofold purpose: (1) the preservation of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items, and (2) the removal of unnecessary
doubts
as
to
the
identity
of
the
evidence.
The law recognizes that, while the presentation of a perfect unbroken chain
is ideal, the realities and variables of actual police operation usually makes
an unbroken chain impossible.33 With this implied judicial recognition of the
difficulty of complete compliance with the chain of custody
requirement,34substantial compliance is sufficient as long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending
police
officers.35
Illegal sale of dangerous drugs is committed when the sale transaction is
consummated,45 that is, upon delivery of the illicit drug to the buyer and the
receipt of the payment by the seller. In this case, the RTC and the Court of
Appeals both found beyond reasonable doubt that the accusedappellant, as
seller, sold 1.0291 grams of marijuana to the poseurbuyer, PO1 Manamtam,
for P100.00. The former handed the latter three sachets of marijuana after
the latter paid the P100.00 consideration for the sale. Under Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 9165, such illegal sale of dangerous drugs, regardless of
quantity, is punishable with the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a
fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million
Pesos (P10,000,000.00). In light of the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9346,
otherwise known as An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines, the imposition of the supreme penalty of death has been
3

proscribed. Consequently, the penalty applicable to the accusedappellant

shall only be life imprisonment, without eligibility for parole, and fine. 46
Thus, the accusedappellant was correctly meted the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
G.R. No. 201860

January 22, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff -Appellee,

vs.
MARCELINO DADAO, ANTONIO SULINDAO, EDDIE MALOGSI
(deceased) and ALFEMIO MALOGSI,*Accused-Appellants
In fine, the pivotal issue raised by appellants in questioning the validity of
their conviction for the crime of murder is whether or not the eyewitness
testimonies presented by the prosecution, specifically that of the two
stepsons (Ronie and Edgar Dacion) and the widow (Nenita Yacapin) of the
deceased victim, Pionio Yacapin, are credible enough to be worthy of belief.
We have consistently held in jurisprudence that the resolution of such a
factual question is best left to the sound judgment of the trial court and that,
absent any misapprehension of facts or grave abuse of discretion, the
findings of the trial court shall not be disturbed. In People v. De la Rosa, 11 we
yet again expounded on this principle in this wise:
[T]he issue raised by accused-appellant involves the credibility of [the]
witness, which is best addressed by the trial court, it being in a better
position to decide such question, having heard the witness and observed his
demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These are the
most significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in
unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies.
Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be
expected to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to
accept and which witness to believe. Verily, findings of the trial court on such
matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances
of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to
materially affect the disposition of the case. x x x.
With regard to appellants assertion that the negative result of the paraffin
tests that were conducted on their persons should be considered as sufficient
ground for acquittal, we can only declare that such a statement is misguided
considering that it has been established in jurisprudence that a paraffin test
is not conclusive proof that a person has not fired a gun. 16 It should also be
noted that, according to the prosecution, only Eddie and Alfemio Malogsi
held firearms which were used in the fatal shooting of Pionio Yacapin while
Marcelino Dadao and Antonio Sulindao purportedly held bolos. Thus, it does
not come as a surprise that the latter two tested negative for powder burns
because they were never accused of having fired any gun. Nevertheless, the
evidence on record has established that all four accused shared a community
of criminal design. By their concerted action, it is evident that they conspired
with one another to murder Pionio Yacapin and should each suffer the same
criminal liability attached to the aforementioned criminal act regardless of
who fired the weapon which delivered the fatal wounds that ended the life of
the victim.

There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement

concerning the commission of a felony and then decide to commit it. It arises
on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the
felony and forthwith decide to pursue it. Once established, each and every
one of the conspirators is made criminally liable for the crime actually
committed by any one of them. In the absence of any direct proof, the
agreement to commit a crime may be deduced from the mode and manner
of the commission of the offense or inferred from acts that point to a joint
purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. As such, it
does not matter who inflicted the mortal wound, as each of the actors incurs
the same criminal liability, because the act of one is the act of all.
Flight is indicative of guilt, but its converse is not necessarily true. Culprits
behave differently and even erratically in externalizing and manifesting their
guilt. Some may escape or flee a circumstance strongly illustrative of guilt
while others may remain in the same vicinity so as to create a semblance of
regularity, thereby avoiding suspicion from other members of the
community.18
Time and again, we have declared that treachery is present when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. 20Furthermore, we have also held that
the essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning,
done in a swift and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. 21 In the case at bar, the
manner by which Pionio Yacapin was killed carried all the indubitable
hallmarks of treachery. We quote with approval the following discussion of
the Court of Appeals on this matter, to wit:
Anent the award of damages, it is jurisprudentially settled that when death
occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex
delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3)
moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases.24
G.R. No. 202122, January 15, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee, v. BERNABE PAREJA Y
CRUZ, AccusedAppellant.
When the issue of credibility of witnesses is presented before this Court, we
follow certain guidelines that have overtime been established in
jurisprudence. In People v. Sanchez,20 we enumerated them as follows:
First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTCs evaluation of the
testimony of the witnesses, considering its unique position in directly
observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its vantage point,
the trial court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of
witnesses.
Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of
the RTCs assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally
bound by the lower courts findings, particularly when no significant facts
5

and circumstances, affecting the outcome of the case, are shown to have
been
overlooked
or
disregarded.
And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with
the RTC. (Citations omitted.)
The recognized rule in this jurisdiction is that the assessment of the
credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge because
of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the
witness stand; a vantage point denied appellate courtsand when his
findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally
binding and conclusive upon this Court.21 While there are recognized
exceptions to the rule, this Court has found no substantial reason to overturn
the identical conclusions of the trial and appellate courts on the matter of
AAAs
credibility.
Rape is a painful experience which is oftentimes not remembered in detail.
For such an offense is not analogous to a persons achievement or
accomplishment as to be worth recalling or reliving; rather, it is something
which causes deep psychological wounds and casts a stigma upon the
victim, scarring her psyche for life and which her conscious and subconscious
mind would opt to forget. Thus, a rape victim cannot be expected to
mechanically keep and then give an accurate account of the traumatic and
horrifying experience she had undergone.
Since human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions,
accuracy in a testimonial account has never been used as a standard in
testing the credibility of a witness. 24 The inconsistencies mentioned by
Pareja are trivial and nonconsequential matters that merely caused AAA
confusion when she was being questioned. The inconsistency regarding the
year of the December incident is not even a matter pertaining to AAAs
ordeal.25 The date and time of the commission of the crime of rape becomes
important only when it creates serious doubt as to the commission of the
rape itself or the sufficiency of the evidence for purposes of conviction. In
other words, the date of the commission of the rape becomes relevant only
when the accuracy and truthfulness of the complainants narration
practically hinge on the date of the commission of the crime. 26 Moreover,
the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the
crime.27

The peculiar designation of time in the Information clearly violates Sec. 11,
Rule 110, of the Rules Court which requires that the time of the commission
of the offense must be alleged as near to the actual date as the information
or complaint will permit. More importantly, it runs afoul of the
constitutionally protected right of the accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. The Information is not sufficiently
explicit and certain as to time to inform accusedappellant of the date on
which the criminal act is alleged to have been committed.
Moreover, there are discernible defects in the complaining witness
testimony that militates heavily against its being accorded the full credit it
was given by the trial court. Considered independently, the defects
might not suffice to overturn the trial courts judgment of
6

conviction, but assessed and weighed in its totality, and in relation to the
testimonies of other witnesses, as logic and fairness dictate, they exert a
powerful compulsion towards reversal of the assailed judgment. 31 (Emphasis
supplied.)

In People v. Ignacio, we took judicial notice of the interesting fact that among
poor couples with big families living in small quarters, copulation does not
seem to be a problem despite the presence of other persons around them.
Considering the cramped space and meager room for privacy, couples
perhaps have gotten used to quick and less disturbing modes of sexual
congresses which elude the attention of family members; otherwise, under
the circumstances, it would be almost impossible to copulate with them
around even when asleep. It is also not impossible nor incredible for the
family members to be in deep slumber and not be awakened while the
sexual assault is being committed. One may also suppose that growing
children sleep more soundly than grownups and are not easily awakened by
adult exertions and suspirations in the night. There is no merit in appellants
contention that there can be no rape in a room where other people are
present. There is no rule that rape can be committed only in seclusion. We
have repeatedly declared that lust is no respecter of time and place, and
rape can be committed in even the unlikeliest of places.
A person accused of a serious crime such as rape will tend to escape liability
by shifting the blame on the victim for failing to manifest resistance to sexual
abuse. However, this Court has recognized the fact that no clearcut
behavior can be expected of a person being raped or has been raped. It is a
settled rule that failure of the victim to shout or seek help do not negate
rape. Even lack of resistance will not imply that the victim has consented to
the sexual act, especially when that person was intimidated into submission
by the accused. In cases where the rape is committed by a relative such as
a father, stepfather, uncle, or common law spouse, moral influence or
ascendancy takes the place of violence.38 In this case, AAAs lack of
resistance was brought about by her fear that Pareja would make good on his
threat
to
kill
her
if
she
ever
spoke
of
the
incident.

[A] medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission of rape, as

even a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a
prosecution for rape. Expert testimony is merely corroborative in character
and not essential to conviction.
Therefore, the absence of testimony or medical certificate on the state of
AAAs anus at the time she was examined is of no consequence. On the
contrary, the medical examination actually bolsters AAAs claim of being
raped by Pareja on more than one occasion, and not just by anal
penetration. However, as the prosecution failed to capitalize on such
evidence and prove the incidence of carnal knowledge, Pareja cannot be
convicted of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266A of the Revised Penal
Code.
This Court has held time and again that testimonies of rape victims who are
young and immature deserve full credence, considering that no young
woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow
7

an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being

subject to a public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to
obtain justice for the wrong committed against her. Youth and immaturity
are generally badges of truth. It is highly improbable that a girl of tender
years, one not yet exposed to the ways of the world, would impute to any
man a crime so serious as rape if what she claims is not true. (Citations
omitted.)

Evidently, no woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of defloration,

allow examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or
ridicule if she has not, in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek
justice for the wrong done to her being. It is settled jurisprudence that
testimonies of childvictims are given full weight and credit, since when a
woman or a girlchild says that she has been raped, she says in effect all
that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed.

G.R. No. 195064

January 15, 2014

NARI K. GIDWANI, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
The elements of a violation of B.P. 22 are the following:15
1) making, drawing and issuing any check to apply on account or for
value;
2) knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue
he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and
3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor of the check for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank
to stop payment.
In convicting petitioner of two counts of violation of B.P. 22, the CA applied
Tiong v. Co,16 in which we said:
The purpose of suspending the proceedings under P.D. No. 902-A is to
prevent a creditor from obtaining an advantage or preference over another
and to protect and preserve the rights of party litigants as well as the
interest of the investing public or creditors. It is intended to give enough
breathing space for the management committee or rehabilitation receiver to
make the business viable again, without having to divert attention and
resources to litigations in various fora. The suspension would enable the
management committee or rehabilitation receiver to effectively exercise
its/his powers free from any judicial or extrajudicial interference that might
unduly hinder or prevent the "rescue" of the debtor company. To allow such
other action to continue would only add to the burden of the management
committee or rehabilitation receiver, whose time, effort and resources would
be wasted in defending claims against the corporation instead of being
directed toward its restructuring and rehabilitation.
8

Whereas, the gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of
making and issuing a worthless check; that is, a check that is dishonored
upon its presentation for payment. It is designed to prevent damage to
trade, commerce, and banking caused by worthless checks. In Lozano v.
Martinez, this Court declared that it is not the nonpayment of an obligation
which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a
debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of
penal sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless checks. Because of
its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the
law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an
offense against public order. The prime purpose of the criminal action is to
punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the
same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, to reform and
rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. Hence, the criminal
prosecution is designed to promote the public welfare by punishing offenders
and deterring others.
Considering that there was a lawful Order from the SEC, the contract is
deemed suspended. When a contract is suspended, it temporarily ceases to
be operative; and it again becomes operative when a condition occurs or a
situation arises warranting the termination of the suspension of the
contract.18
In other words, the SEC Order also created a suspensive condition. When a
contract is subject to a suspensive condition, its birth takes place or its
effectivity commences only if and when the event that constitutes the
condition happens or is fulfilled.19 Thus, at the time private respondent
presented the September and October 1997 checks for encashment, it had
no right to do so, as there was yet no obligation due from petitioner.
Moreover, it is a basic principle in criminal law that any ambiguity in the
interpretation or application of the law must be made in favor of the
accused. Surely, our laws should not be interpreted in such a way that the
interpretation would result in the disobedience of a lawful order of an
authority vested by law with the jurisdiction to issue the order.
Consequently, because there was a suspension of GSMC s obligations,
petitioner may not be held liable for the civil obligations of the corporation
covered by the bank checks at the time this case arose. However, it must be
emphasized that her non-liability should not prejudice the right of El Grande
to pursue its claim through remedies available to it, subject to the SEC
proceedings regarding the application for corporate rehabilitation.
G.R. No. 200915

February 12, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
MERLITA PALOMARES y COSTUNA, Appellant.
To secure conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the identity of the
prohibited drug seized from the accused must be proved with moral
certainty. The prosecution must establish with such measure of certitude that
the substance bought or seized during the buy-bust operation is the same
substance offered as evidence in court.11 Proof of the chain of custody from
the time of seizure to the time such evidence is presented in court ensures
the absence of doubt concerning the integrity of such vital evidence. 12 This
9

requires as a minimum that the police mark the seized item (1) in the
presence of the apprehended violator and (2) immediately upon confiscation.

G.R. No. 190178

February 12, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
FELIMON PATENTES y ZAMORA, Accused-Apellant.
A conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond
reasonable doubt, which means a moral certainty that the accused is guilty;
the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution. 33 In the case at bar, the
prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of establishing with moral
certainty the truthfulness of the charge that appellant had carnal knowledge
of AAA against her will using threats, force or intimidation.
The testimony of the offended party in crimes against chastity should not be
received with precipitate credulity for the charge can easily be
concocted.34 Courts should be wary of giving undue credibility to a claim of
rape, especially where the sole evidence comes from an alleged victim
whose charge is not corroborated and whose conduct during and after the
rape is open to conflicting interpretations.35 While judges ought to be
cognizant of the anguish and humiliation that a rape victim undergoes as she
seeks justice, they should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to
render justice based on the law.
G.R. No. 199268

February 12, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
AURELIO JASTIVA, Accused-Appellant.
At this point, it is worthy to recall the three guiding principles in rape
prosecutions: (1) an accusation of rape is easy to make, and difficult to
prove, but it is even more difficult to disprove; (2) bearing in mind the
intrinsic nature of the crime, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with utmost care and caution; and (3) the evidence of the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits; and cannot draw strength
from the weakness of the defense. So, when a woman says that she has
been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that the crime of
rape was committed. In a long line of cases, this Court has held that if the
testimony of the rape victim is accurate and credible, a conviction for rape
may issue upon the sole basis of the victims testimony. This is because no
decent and sensible woman will publicly admit to being raped and, thus, run
the risk of public contempt unless she is, in fact, a rape victim.
Moreover, such prevarication was devoid of any persuasion due to its being
easily and conveniently resorted to, and due to denial being generally
weaker than and not prevailing over the positive assertions of an eyewitness.
It has been held that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must
10

prove the following: (i) that he was present at another place at the time of
the perpetration of the crime; and (ii) that it was physically impossible for
him to be at the scene of the crime during its commission. Physical
impossibility involves the distance and the facility of access between the
crime scene and the location of the accused when the crime was committed;
the accused must demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have
been physically present at the crime scene and its immediate vicinity when
the crime was committed.56
Case law, however, shows numerous instances of rape committed under
indirect and audacious circumstances.63The lust of a lecherous man respects
neither time nor place. Neither the crampness of the room, nor the presence
of people therein.
Art. 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article
shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two
or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
But the imposition of death penalty has been prohibited by Republic Act No.
9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines;" thus, the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, properly
imposed upon appellant Jastiva the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
G.R. No. 189833

February 5, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JAVIER MORILLA Y AVELLANO, Accused-Appellant.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 20 To
determine conspiracy, there must be a common design to commit a felony. 21
In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together
and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The
assent of the minds may be and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually
inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together,
indicate that they are parts of some complete whole. 22 In this case, the
totality of the factual circumstances leads to a conclusion that Morilla
conspired with Mayor Mitra in a common desire to transport the dangerous
drugs. Both vehicles loaded with several sacks of dangerous drugs, were on
convoy from Quezon to Manila. Mayor Mitra was able to drive through the
checkpoint set up by the police operatives. When it was Morillas turn to pass
through the checkpoint, he was requested to open the rear door for a
routinary check. Noticing white granules scattered on the floor, the police
officers requested Morilla to open the sacks. If indeed he was not involved in
conspiracy with Mayor Mitra, he would not have told the police officers that
he was with the mayor.
G.R. No. 195525

February 5, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
WILFREDO GUNDA alias FRED, Accused-Appellant.
11

Based on the above narrations, we find no cogent reason to depart from the
findings of the trial court as affirmed by the CA, that appellant is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. Two prosecution witnesses
positively identified him as the person who waylaid the victim, and with the
help of his conspirators, stabbed the victim several times. According to the
postmortem findings, the victim suffered 12 stab wounds which caused his
death. There is also no doubt in our mind that the attack on the victim was
attended by treachery. The victim was unarmed and had no inkling of the
impending attack on his person. In fact, he was just on his way home
together with his son Eladio Jr. The victim was attacked by appellant from
behind with a blow to his head with a wooden pole. His cohorts then held the
victims arms rendering him helpless and immobile. In such position, there is
no opportunity for the victim to escape or even offer a feeble resistance.
Appellant then delivered the coup de grce by stabbing the victim multiple
times. Undoubtedly, treachery qualified the killing to murder. "There is
treachery when the offender commits [a crime] against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make." 14 As regards
conspiracy, the CA correctly ruled that it is not a circumstance which would
aggravate or qualify the crime.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder is
reclusion perpetua to death.1wphi1 There being no other aggravating
circumstance other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the CA
correctly held that the proper imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, the
lower of the two indivisible penalties. "It must be emphasized, however, that
[appellant is] not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No.
9346 which states that persons convicted of offenses punished with
reclusion perpetua, or whose sentence will be reduced to reclusion perpetua
by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180,
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."15
G.R. No. 168539

March 25, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
HENRY T. GO, Respondent.
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions
of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to
be unlawful:
xxxx
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the
public officer profited or will profit thereby.
The elements of the above provision are:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;

12

(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the

government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.11
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when
acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty,
held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in
consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain
acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt
practices act or which may lead thereto. 12 This is the controlling doctrine as
enunciated by this Court in previous cases, among which is a case involving
herein private respondent.13
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of
Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person must be
alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however,
does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together
with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no
longer be charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer
has already died, the private person may be indicted alone.
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment
for conspiracy.15 If two or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done
by any of them pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the
act of each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor. 16 This means
that everything said, written or done by any of the conspirators in execution
or furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to have been said, done,
or written by each of them and it makes no difference whether the actual
actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at the time of trial. 17 The death of one
of two or more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the survivor
or survivors.18 Thus, this Court held that:
x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot
conspire alone. The crime depends upon the joint act or intent of two or
more persons. Yet, it does not follow that one person cannot be convicted of
conspiracy. So long as the acquittal or death of a co-conspirator does not
remove the bases of a charge for conspiracy, one defendant may be found
guilty of the offense.19
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Generally,
conspiracy is not a crime except when the law specifically provides a penalty
therefor as in treason, rebellion and sedition. The crime of conspiracy known
to the common law is not an indictable offense in the Philippines. An
agreement to commit a crime is a reprehensible act from the view-point of
morality, but as long as the conspirators do not perform overt acts in
furtherance of their malevolent design, the sovereignty of the State is not
outraged and the tranquility of the public remains undisturbed.
While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the mere act of
conspiring to commit a crime unless the statute specifically prescribes a
penalty therefor, nevertheless the existence of a conspiracy to commit a
crime is in many cases a fact of vital importance, when considered together

13

with the other evidence of record, in establishing the existence, of the

consummated crime and its commission by the conspirators.
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are
liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their
respective active participation in the commission of the crime or crimes
perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law
the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound
principle that "when two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal
object, whether through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding
severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contributes
to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though
performed by himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for
acts other than his own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire to
commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others, done in
furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy." The imposition of collective
liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one case where this
Court held that x x x it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each
(conspirator) without taking into consideration the close and inseparable
relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the commission of which
they all acted by common agreement x x x. The crime must therefore in view
of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the x x x
accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party created by them, and
they are all equally responsible x x x
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and
confederated in the commission of the felony proved, collective liability of
the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and the court
shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of
participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. Of
course, as to any conspirator who was remote from the situs of aggression,
he could be drawn within the enveloping ambit of the conspiracy if it be
proved that through his moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators
the latter were moved or impelled to carry out the conspiracy.
A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that once
conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators who acted in furtherance of the
common design are liable as co-principals. This rule of collective criminal
liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The concerted
action of the conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a
patent display of their evil partnership, and for the consequences of such
criminal enterprise they must be held solidarily liable.22
When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by
virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of
his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the
courts jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives
bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the
merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person.
G.R. No. 196960

March 12, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
ERWIN TAMAYO y BAUTISTA, Appellant.

14

Assuming that the prosecution witnesses failed to identify exactly who

inflicted the fatal wounds on Joey during the commotion, Erwins liability is
not diminished since he and the others with him acted with concert in
beating up and ultimately killing Joey. Conspiracy makes all the assailants
equally liable as co-principals by direct participation.
Since about 15 men, including accused Erwin, pounced on their one helpless
victim, relentlessly bludgeoned him on the head, and stabbed him on the
stomach until he was dead, there is no question that the accused took
advantage of their superior strength.
G.R. No. 199689

March 12, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
HERMANOS CONSTANTINO, JR. y BINAYUG, a.k.a. "JOJIT," AccusedAppellant.
Admittedly, denial is an inherently weak defense, consistently viewed with
disfavor by the courts, being a self-serving negative evidence. In view,
however, of the constitutional presumption that an accused is innocent until
the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt, the burden lies on the
prosecution to overcome such presumption by presenting the required
quantum of evidence. In so doing, the prosecution must rest on its own
merits and must not rely on the weakness of the defense.18
In a prosecution for the sale of a dangerous drug, the following elements
must be proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and
the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor. Simply put, "[in] prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu, what is
material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled
with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence." 19 And in the
prosecution of these offenses, the primary consideration is to ensure that the
identity and integrity of the seized drugs and other related articles have
been preserved from the time they were confiscated from the accused until
their presentation as evidence in court.20
Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized
dangerous drugs or other related items immediately after they are seized
from the accused, for the marking upon seizure is the starting point in the
custodial link that succeeding handlers of the evidence will use as reference
point. Moreover, the value of marking of the evidence is to separate the
marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence
from the time of seizure from the accused until disposition at the end of
criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting" or contamination of
evidence. A failure to mark at the time of taking of initial custody imperils
the integrity of the chain of custody that the law requires.1wphi1
The failure of the prosecution to establish the evidences chain of custody is
fatal to its case as the Court can no longer consider or even safely assume
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated dangerous drug
were properly preserved.31
G.R. No. 205230

March 12, 2014

15

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ERNESTO VENTURA, SR., Accused-Appellant.
In the Information21 filed before the RTC on March 31, 2005, Ventura was
charged with rape of a demented person under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d)
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), to wit:
From the foregoing, all that needs to be proven are the facts of sexual
congress between the rapist and his victim, and the latters mental
retardation.26 This Court has repeatedly held that "mental retardation can be
proven by evidence other than medical/clinical evidence, such as the
testimony of witnesses and even the observation by the trial court." 27 The
trial judges assessment of the credibility of witnesses testimonies is
accorded great respect on appeal in the absence of grave abuse of discretion
on its part, it having had the advantage of actually examining both real and
testimonial evidence including the demeanor of the witnesses. 28 The rule
finds an even more stringent application where the said findings are
sustained by the appellate court.
In the present case, the prosecution was able to establish that AAA is,
indeed, a mental retardate through the testimony of BBB and the medico
legal officer, and the trial courts observation. It is also worthy to note that
the defense did not dispute but even admitted the fact that AAA is suffering
from mental retardation. Though AAA proceeded with much difficulty in
describing the sexual abuse made on her, no convincing reason can be
appreciated to warrant a departure from the findings of the trial court with
respect to the assessment of her testimony, the same being straightforward,
candid, and worthy of belief. This Court is also convinced that AAA has no illmotive to manufacture such a tale if it were not true.
The fact that no consummated rape happened on March 24, 2005 based on
the testimonies of BBB and the medico legal officer, as well as the absence
of lacerations on AAAs vagina, pointed to by Ventura cannot work in his
favor. The absence of hymenal lacerations on AAAs vagina upon medical
examination does not negate the fact of rape. A freshly broken hymen is not
also an essential element of rape.29 In the context it is used in the RPC,
carnal knowledge does not necessarily require that the vagina be penetrated
or that the hymen be ruptured.30
AAAs failure to recall the exact date of the first rape and the number of
times she was sexually assaulted by Ventura prior to March 24, 2005, does
not militate against her credibility since rape victims are not expected to
cherish in their memories an accurate account of the dates, number of times
and manner they were violated. 31This is especially true in the case of AAA
who obviously cannot be expected to act like an adult who would have the
courage and intelligence to disregard the threat to her life and complain
immediately that she had been sexually assaulted. AAAs testimony was
clear that every time Ventura would rape her, he would threaten her against
revealing the offense. Given AAAs mental condition, it can well substitute for
violence and intimidation enough to cow her into submission.
The Court had repeatedly held that the exact date when the victim was
sexually abused is not an essential element of the crime of rape, 32 for the
gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. Indeed, the
precise time of the crime has no substantial bearing on its commission. As
16

such, the time or place of commission in rape cases need not be accurately
stated.33 Inconsistencies and discrepancies as to minor matters which are
irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be considered grounds for
acquittal.34 Hence, the allegation in the information under Criminal Case No.
05-0366, which states that the rape was committed on or about March 24,
2005, is sufficient to affirm the conviction of Ventura in the said case.
Lastly, the trial court had observed that Venturas actions were detested by
his family because despite having a large kin, 35 none of them testified for
Venturas defense or did anything to support his case. They did not even
bother to visit him while he was in jail.36
In sum, the defense of denial as well as the points advanced by Ventura
miserably failed to cast doubt on his culpability. The prosecution was able to
prove that Ventura is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8353. Taking into consideration the presence of the special
qualifying circumstance of Venturas knowledge of AAAs mental deficiency,
the same being properly alleged in the Information charging the appellant of
the crime of rape and proven during trial, this Court has no option but to
impose on the appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua in accordance with
Section 2 ofR.A. No. 9346.

G.R. No. 193768, March 05, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee, v. JERRY CARANTO Y
PROPETA, AccusedAppellant.
The builtin danger for abuse that a buybust operation carries cannot be
denied. It is essential therefore, that these operations be governed by
specific procedures on the seizure and custody of drugs. We had occasion to
express this concern in People v. Tan,15 when we recognized that by the very
nature of antinarcotic operations, the need for entrapment procedures, the
use of shady characters as informants, the ease with which illegal drugs can
be planted in the pockets or hands of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the
secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of abuse is
great. Thus, the courts have been exhorted to be extra vigilant in trying drug
cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe
penalties for drug offenses.16
Moreover, we have time and again recognized that a buybust operation
resulting from the tip of an anonymous confidential informant, although an
effective means of eliminating illegal drug related activities, is susceptible
to police abuse. Worse, it is usually used as a means for extortion.17 It is for
this reason, that the Court must ensure that the enactment of R.A. No. 9165
providing specific procedures to counter these abuses is not put to naught.18
This Court recognizes that the strict compliance with the requirements of
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 may not always be possible under field
conditions, many of them far from ideal. For this reason, the Implementing
Rules provide that noncompliance with the strict directive of Section 21 is
not necessarily fatal to the prosecutions case because courts recognize the
possible occurrence of procedural lapses. However, we emphasize that these
17

lapses must be recognized and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds

and the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be
shown to have been preserved.19 In the present case, the prosecution did not
bother to present any explanation to justify the nonobservance of the
prescribed procedures. Therefore, the nonobservance by the police of the
required procedure cannot be excused. It likewise failed to prove that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the items adduced were not tainted.
Chain of Custody
To secure a conviction for the illegal sale of shabu, the following elements
must be present: (a) the identities of the buyer and seller, the object of the
sale, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment for the thing. It is material to establish that the transaction actually
took place, and to bring to the court the corpus delicti as evidence.20 In the
prosecution of a drug case, the primary consideration is to ensure that the
identity and integrity of the seized drugs and other related articles have
been preserved from the time they were confiscated from the accused until
their
presentation
as
evidence
in
court.21
The chain of custody requirement ensures that doubts concerning the
identity of the evidence are removed. In a long line of cases, we have
considered it fatal for the prosecution when they fail to prove that the
specimen submitted for laboratory examination was the same one allegedly
seized from the accused. The case of Malillin v. People22 is particularly
instructive on how we expect the chain of custody to be maintained. As a
method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that
the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims to be. It
would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the
item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that
every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it
was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which
it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in
the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to
have possession of the same.23 An unbroken chain of custody becomes
indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is susceptible to
alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. 24
The chain of custody rule requires that the marking of the seized items
to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are
eventually the ones offered in evidence should be done (1) in the presence
of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation. This step
initiates the process of protecting innocent persons from dubious and
concocted searches.25Marking means the placing by the apprehending
officer or the poseurbuyer of his/her initials and signature on the item/s
seized.
This Court previously held26 that the following links must be established in
the chain of custody in a buybust operation: first, the seizure and marking,
if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
18

examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal
drug
seized
from
the
forensic
chemist
to
the
court.
Even assuming that the physical inventory contemplated in R.A. No. 9165
subsumes the marking of the items itself, the belated marking of the seized
items at the police station sans the required presence of the accused and the
witnesses enumerated under Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 9165, and absent a justifiable ground to stand on,
cannot be considered a minor deviation from the procedures prescribed by
the law. We note that other than the allegation that a marking was done at
the police station, there was no proof that such marking was actually
undertaken at all. From the time it was placed inside the pocket or wallet of
PO2 Arago, it surfaced again only at the marking of exhibits. In fact, there
was no statement from any of the witnesses that markings were made on
the seized item in the presence of any of the persons mentioned in Section
21 (a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165. Moreover,
the prosecution even failed to present an accomplished Certificate of
Inventory.30
Another gap in the chain of custody is apparent from the lack of evidence
presented by the prosecution to prove that the sachet of shabu, which was
entrusted by PO2 Arago to the investigator, is the same sachet that was
delivered to the forensic chemist. The records are wanting of testimonies
showing the manner of handling of the evidence, precautions taken and
other significant circumstances surrounding this essential transfer of custody.
The prosecution did not take the testimony of the investigator, nor did they
adduce evidence on what the investigator did with the seized shabu, how
these got to the forensic chemist, and how they were kept before being
adduced in evidence at trial. In fact, the identity of such investigator was not
even mentioned nor was there any mention of a marking made on the seized
item.
In People v. Santos, Jr.,36 we held that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of
innocence nor constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. 37 It should be noted
that the presumption is precisely just that a presumption. Once challenged
by evidence, as in this case, it cannot be regarded as binding truth. 38
We recognize that the evidence proffered by the defense is far from strong;
the appellant merely denied the occurrence of a buybust operation and
failed to present impartial witnesses who were not interested in the case. In
our jurisdiction, the defense of denial or frameup, like alibi, has been viewed
with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common defense ploy in
most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 39 It should be
emphasized, however, that these weaknesses do not add any strength to the
prosecutions cause. Thus, however weak the defense evidence might be,
the prosecutions whole case still falls. As the wellentrenched dictum goes,
the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense. 40
G.R. No. 203605

April 23, 2014

P/C INSP. LAWRENCE B. CAJIPE, P/C INSP. JOELL. MENDOZA, P/C INSP.
GERARDO B. BALATUCAN, PO3 JOLITO P. MAMANAO, JR., P03
19

FERNANDO REYS. GAPUZ, PO2 EDUARDO G. BLANCO, PO2 EDWIN

SANTOS and PO1 JOSIL REY I. LUCENA, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
In case of permissible appeals from a final order in a criminal action, the
public prosecutor who appears as counsel for the People in such an action
and on whom a copy of the final order is thus served, may file a notice of
appeal within the appropriate time since it is a notice addressed to the RTC
and not to the CA. Only the Office of the Solicitor General, however, may
pursue the appeal before the CA by filing the required appellant's brief or
withdraw the same.
In special civil actions such as that taken by the OSG before the CA, the
public prosecutor's duty, if he believes that a matter should be brought by
special civil action before an appellate court, is to promptly communicate the
facts and his recommendation to the OSG, advising it of the last day for filing
such an action. There is no reason the OSG cannot file the petition since the
People is given sixty days from notice to the public prosecutor within which
to file such an action before the CA or this Court.
Since the OSG filed its petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on behalf of the
People 112 days from receipt of the dismissal order by the city prosecutor of
Paraaque, the petition was filed out of time. The order of dismissal is thus
beyond appellate review.
Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information is defined as such
facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be
held for trial.18 The prosecution evidence fails to establish probable cause
against petitioner HPG officers.

G.R. No. 208760

April 23, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
FLORO BUBAN BARCELA, Accused-Appellant.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases where the Court ruled that questions on
the credibility of witnesses should best be addressed to the trial court
because of its unique position to observe that elusive and incommunicable
evidence of the witnesses deportment on the stand while testifying which is
denied to the appellate courts.12 The trial judge has the advantage of
actually examining both real and testimonial evidence including the
demeanor of the witnesses. Hence, the judges assessment of the witnesses
testimonies and findings of fact are accorded great respect on appeal. In the
absence of any substantial reason to justify the reversal of the trial courts
assessment and conclusion, as when no significant facts and circumstances
are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded, the reviewing court is
generally bound by the formers findings. 13 The rule is even more stringently
applied if the appellate court has concurred with the trial court.
Behavioral psychology teaches us that, even among adults, people react to
similar situations differently, and there is no standard form of human
20

behavioral response when one is confronted with a startling or frightful

experience.15 Let it be underscored that these cases involve victims of tender
years, and with their simple, unsophisticated minds, they must not have fully
understood and realized at first the repercussions of the contemptible nature
of the acts committed against them. This Court has repeatedly stated that no
standard form of behavior could be anticipated of a rape victim following her
defilement, particularly a child who could not be expected to fully
comprehend the ways of an adult.16 At any rate, it is not inconceivable that
the victims continuously slept with Barcela despite the sexual molestations
as it was undisputed that everybody in the victims family slept in one room.
The absence of hymenal laceration on AAA and the finding of a shallow
vaginal laceration on BBB are not fatal to the cause of the prosecution. The
Court has repeatedly held that the presence of hymenal rapture, vaginal
laceration or any genital injury is not indispensable because the same is not
an element of the crime of rape. 17 In the same breath, an intact hymen does
not negate the finding that the victim was raped. 18 The alleged
inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and BBB cannot exculpate him
either. Obviously, the inconsistencies referred to are trivial and only
pertained to inconsequential matters that do not alter the essential fact of
the commission of rape. What is decisive in a rape charge is that the
commission of rape has been sufficiently proven. Inconsistencies and
discrepancies as to minor matters which are irrelevant to the elements of the
crime cannot be considered grounds for acquittal.19
To sustain a conviction for qualified rape, the following elements must
concur: a) the victim is a female over 12 years but under 18 years of age; b)
the offender is a parent, ascendant, step parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim; and c) the offender has carnal knowledge
of the victim either through force, threat or intimidation; or when she was
deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or by means of fraudulent
machinations or grave abuse of authority.23
In the crime of rape, the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her
relationship with the offender is a special qualifying circumstance and raises
the penalty to the supreme penalty of death. It is essential that this
circumstance must be alleged in the criminal complaint or information and
must be proved conclusively and indubitably as the crime itself; otherwise,
the crime shall be considered simple rape warranting the imposition of the
lower penalty of reclusion perpetua.24
Being regarded as the "tatay," Barcela had gained such moral ascendancy
over AAA and BBB that any resistance normally expected from girls their age
could not have been put up by them. His moral ascendancy and influence
over them substituted for actual physical violence and intimidation as an
element of rape. This made them easy prey for his sexual advances.
Barcelas moral and physical dominion of AAA and BBB are sufficient to cow
them into submission to his beastly desires. No further proof is needed to
show lack of consent of the victims to their own defilement. Further, record
shows that threat and intimidation were indeed employed by Barcela to
consummate the purpose which he had in mind. The threat of death he
communicated to AAA and BBB produced fear in their minds which made
them yield to his bestial demands. In any event, the prosecution need not
prove that Barcela employed force, threat or intimidation against AAA

21

because rape is committed when the offender had carnal knowledge of the
offended party who is under 12 years of age.
There being no qualifying circumstance attendant to the commission of rape
in Criminal Case No. 5517-SPL, Barcela should be convicted of simple
statutory rape and should suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
award of damages should also be modified in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.28 AAA is thus awarded the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
The Court also upholds Barcelas conviction in Criminal Case No. 5527-SPL of
Acts of Lasciviousness committed against a child under Section 5(b), Article
III of R.A. No. 7610, which reads:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male
or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed upon the following:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: x x
x. (Italics supplied)
The elements of sexual abuse under the above provision are as follows:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct;
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse; and
3. The child whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.31
(h) "Lascivious conduct" means the intentional touching, either directly or
through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or
buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth,
of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with intent to abuse,
humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any
person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or
private area of a person.

G.R. No. 188052

April 21, 2014

JEAN D. GAMBOA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

22

It must be noted that delivery to a third person by an agent of the thing

entrusted to her, by itself, does not constitute misappropriation. In the
following case, the High Court extensively discussed the rationale behind
such principle:
Petitioner did not ipso facto commit the crime of estafa through conversion
or misappropriation by delivering the jewelry to a subagent for sale on
commission basis. We are unable to agree with the lower courts conclusion
that this fact alone is sufficient ground for holding that petitioner disposed of
the jewelry "as if it were hers, thereby committing conversion and clear
breach of trust."
It must be pointed out that the law on agency in our jurisdiction allows the
appointment by an agent of a substitute or sub-agent in the absence of an
express agreement to the contrary between the agent and the principal. In
the case at bar, the appointment of Labrador as petitioners sub-agent was
not expressly prohibited by Quilatan, as the acknowledgement receipt,
Exhibit B, does not contain any such limitation. Neither does it appear that
petitioner was verbally forbidden by Quilatan from passing on the jewelry to
another person before the acknowledgement receipt was executed or at any
other time. Thus, it cannot be said that petitioners act of entrusting the
jewelry to Labrador is characterized by abuse of confidence because such an
act was not proscribed and is, in fact, legally sanctioned.
Rule 133, Section 2 of the Rules of Court reciting constitutional mandate,
exacts acquittal absent proof beyond reasonable doubt. The universal test is
moral certainty in ascertaining the guilt of the accused, obtained only by
proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
In this case, the elements of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph
1(b) of the Revised Penal Code sought to be established by the prosecution
are as follows:
1. That money, goods or other personal properties are received by the
offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to 2. That
there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by
the offender or denial on his part of such receipt;
3. That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the
prejudice of another; and
4. That there is a demand made by the offended party on the
offender.10
The first and fourth elements were readily admitted by Gamboa while she
categorically disputed the second and third elements by declaring in her
letter-explanation to TFS dated 27 February 1999, and at the stage of
preliminary investigation, that:
1. her cash advances were distributed to her staff for purposes of
processing the renewal of the required permits and licenses;
2. she [had] surrendered all the necessary liquidation papers; and

23

3. all of TFS branches licenses were already completely paid on 20

January 1999 as per schedule, hence, no additional penalty was
incurred therefor.11
It is well-settled that the credibility of witnesses is best determined by the
trial judge, who has the direct opportunity and unique advantage to observe
at close range their conduct and deportment on the witness stand. The
general rule is that findings of fact of the trial court, its assessment of the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, and the probative weight
thereof, as well as its conclusions based on said finding, are accorded by the
appellate court utmost respect, if not conclusive effect, and can only be set
aside upon a clear showing that it overlooked, ignored, misconstrued and
misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, would
alter the outcome of the case.

G.R. No. 193856

April 21, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
SUKARNO JUNAIDE y AGGA, Appellant.
In a prosecution for the sale and possession of the prohibited drugs known as
shabu, the State does not only carry the heavy burden of proving the
elements of the offense. It also bears the obligation to prove the corpus
delicti, failing in which the State would not have proved the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.2
And, to prove the corpus delicti, it is indispensable for the prosecution to
show that the dangerous drugs subject of the sale and examined in the
police laboratory are the same drugs presented in court as evidence. 3 The
first stage in the chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or
related items.4 Marking is the affixing of the initials or other identifying signs
on the seized items by the arresting officer or the poseur-buyer. This must be
done in the presence of the accused shortly after arrest.

G.R. No. 196753

April 21, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ERWIN LALOG, ROOSEVELT CONCEPCION, EDWIN RAMIREZ, and
RICKY LITADA, Accused-Appellants.
To avail of self-defense as a justifying circumstance so as not to incur any
criminal liability, it must be proved with certainty by satisfactory and
convincing evidence which excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on
the part of the person invoking it. It cannot be entertained where it is not
only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but is also
doubtful. If the accused fails to discharge the burden of proof, his conviction,
shall of necessity follow on the basis of his admission of the killing (People v.
Suyum et. al. G.R. No. 137518, March 6, 2002).

24

G.R. No. 194446

April 21, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
HERMENIGILDO DELEN y ESCO BILLA, Accused-Appellant.
It is a fundamental rule that the trial courts factual findings, especially its
assessment of the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great weight and
respect and binding upon this Court, particularly when affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. This Court has repeatedly recognized that the trial court is in the
best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies
because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and
incommunicable evidence of the witnesses deportment on the stand while
testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts. Only the trial
judge can observe the furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation,
flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an
oath. These are significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses, in
the process of unearthing the truth. The appellate courts will generally not
disturb such findings unless it plainly overlooked certain facts of substance
and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case. (Citations
omitted.)
In the instant case, the prosecution was able to establish that the accusedappellant had carnal knowledge of AAA on January 17, 2005. AAA narrated in
a straightforward manner the harrowing details of how the accused-appellant
had sexual intercourse with her. Again, the RTC found credible and
convincing AAAs testimony on this matter. Likewise, the Court finds no
cogent reason to disbelieve AAAs testimony, which was corroborated by the
medical findings of Dr. Rivamonte and Dr. Arellano that the victims hymen
had "complete healed lacerations at 1, 3, 6, 9 oclock position[s]." We held in
People v. Oden19 that the "eloquent testimony of the victim, coupled with the
medical findings attesting to her non-virgin state, should be enough to
confirm the truth of her charges." As to the manner by which the rape was
committed, the accused-appellants moral ascendancy over AAA takes the
place of the force and intimidation that is required in rape cases.20
To exculpate himself from the charges of child abuse and rape, the accusedappellant merely denied the accusations of AAA. The Court finds that the RTC
and the Court of Appeals were correct in rejecting the accused-appellants
bare denials. Undeniably, the accused-appellant did not present any clear
and convincing evidence to substantiate his claims that another person with
mental defect could have raped AAA and that her injuries were caused when
she fell in a canal beside their house. The accused-appellant also failed to
present any evidence to prove that AAA was impelled by ill motive to testify
against him. Settled is the rule that where no evidence exists to show any
convincing reason or improper motive for a witness to falsely testify against
an accused, the testimony deserves faith and credit.21
For the charge of rape in Criminal Case No. 13932, the qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship attended the commission of the
crime. Not only were the said circumstances specifically alleged in the
information, the same were sufficiently proved during the trial of the case.
The fact that AAA was only 12 years old when she was raped by the accusedappellant on January 17, 2005 was established by the certification 22 issued
25

by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of x x x, Batangas, which stated that
AAA was born on March 29, 1992. Moreover, said certification stated that
AAAs biological father is none other than the accused-appellant
Hermenigildo Delen. The accused-appellant likewise admitted this fact when
he testified in court. Still, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 266-B of
the Revised Penal Code, the RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly held that
the appropriate penalty that should be imposed upon the accused-appellant
is reclusion perpetua. This is in accordance with the provisions of Republic
Act No. 9346, which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty.
For the charge of child abuse in Criminal Case No. 13870, the RTC found the
accused-appellant guilty of violating Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act
No. 7610, which states:
SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other
Conditions Prejudicial to the Childs Development.
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or
exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the childs
development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No.
603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. (Emphasis
ours.)
The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the RTC, which imposed against the
accused-appellant an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment ranging from
4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 6 years,
8 months and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum. The trial court imposed
the above penalty as it found no modifying circumstance that attended the
commission of the aforestated crime charged.1awp++i1
The Court, however, disagrees. We find that the penalty imposed by the trial
court needs to be modified since, as previously discussed, the alternative
circumstance of relationship, i.e., that the accused-appellant is the father of
AAA, has been duly established by the prosecution.
In this case, the imposable penalty is prision mayor minimum, the range of
which is from 6 years and 1 day to 8 years. In the imposition of the penalty
herein, Section 31(c), Article XII of Republic Act No. 7610 24 expressly provides
that the penalty provided therein shall be imposed in its maximum period
when the perpetrator is a parent of the victim. Now then, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law and taking into consideration the circumstance
of relationship, the maximum term of the sentence shall be taken from the
maximum period of prision mayor minimum, which is 7 years, 4 months and
1 day to 8 years. The minimum term of the sentence shall be taken from the
penalty next lower in degree, which is prision correccional maximum, the
range of which is from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years. Thus, in
Criminal Case No. 13870, considering the gravity of the physical abuse
committed against AAA, the Court imposes upon the accused-appellant the
indeterminate sentence of imprisonment ranging from 6 years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of prision mayor, as maximum.

G.R. No. 196735

May 5, 2014

26

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DANILO FELICIANO, JR., JULIUS VICTOR MEDALLA, CHRISTOPHER
SOLIVA, WARREN L. ZINGAPAN, and ROBERT MICHAEL BELTRAN
ALVIR, Accused-appellants.
An
when
apprised
him
his defense

to

information
the
of
enable

is
accused
the
him

is
charge
to

sufficient
fully
against
prepare

It is enshrined in our Bill of Rights that "[n]o person shall be held to answer
for a criminal offense without due process of law." 111 This includes the right of
the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty and "to be informed
of the nature and accusation against him."112
Upon a finding of probable cause, an information is filed by the prosecutor
against the accused, in compliance with the due process of the law. Rule 110,
Section 1, paragraph 1 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:
A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused;
the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended pary;
the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where
the offense was committed.
The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it enables a person of
common understanding to know the charge against him, and the court to
render judgment properly. x x x The purpose is to allow the accused to fully
prepare for his defense, precluding surprises during the trial.114
It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being alleged
must be stated in the information. Failure to state an aggravating
circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as
such.115 It was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the
aggravating circumstance of "wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise"
in the information in order for all the evidence, introduced to that effect, to
be admissible by the trial court.
In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like
nighttime, it allows the accused to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as
he carries out his crimes.
The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to
prove that the accused were masked but the masks fell off does not prevent
them from including disguise as an aggravating circumstance. 116 What is
important in alleging disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that there
was a concealment of identity by the accused. The inclusion of disguise in
the information was, therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise the accused
that in the commission of the offense they were being charged with, they
tried to conceal their identity.
Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the
credibility of witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect. For, the trial
court has the advantage of observing the witnesses through the different
27

indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted

assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of
a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply;
or the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the
sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn,
the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity
of an oath, the carriage and mien.119
There are, of course, recognized exceptions to this rule. In People v. Leticia
Labarias,120 this court stated that:
It is the policy of this Court to sustain the factual findings of the trial court on
the reasonable assumption that it is in a better position to assess the
evidence before it, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, who reveal
much of themselves by their deportment on the stand. The exception that
makes the rule is where such findings arc clearly arbitrary or erroneous as
when they are tainted with bias or hostility or are so lacking in basis as to
suggest that they were reached without the careful study and perceptiveness
that should characterize a judicial decision.121 (Emphasis supplied)
It would be in line with human experience that a victim or an eyewitness of a
crime would endeavor to find ways to identify the assailant so that in the
event that he or she survives, the criminal could be apprehended. It has also
been previously held that:
It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to see
the looks and faces of their assailants and observe the manner in which the
crime was committed. Most often the face of the assailant and body
movements thereof, creates a lasting impression which cannot be easily
erased from their memory.129
As a general rule, "[a] witness can testify only to the facts he knows of his
personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, x x
x."140 All other kinds of testimony are hearsay and are inadmissible as
evidence. The Rules of Court, however, provide several exceptions to the
general rule, and one of which is when the evidence is part of res gestae,
thus:
Section 42. Part of res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a
starting occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent
thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence
as part of res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act
material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as
part of the res gestae.141
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus
admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the
following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a
startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had
time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.
The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the
undersigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible
when illustrative of such act." In a general way, res gestae refers to the
28

circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and
serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and
contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation
and fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and
statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the
crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a
spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the
occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to
fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of
the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is
so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also
whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
testimony.143
It is well-entrenched that alibi and denial are inherently weak and have
always been viewed with disfavor by the courts due to the facility with which
they can be concocted. They warrant the least credibility or none at all and
cannot prevail over the positive identification of the appellant by the
prosecution witnesses. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that
appellant was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must also
demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Unless substantiated by
clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and
undeserving of any weight in law. Denial, like alibi, as an exonerating
justification[,] is inherently weak and if uncorroborated regresses to blatant
impotence. Like alibi, it also constitutes self-serving negative evidence which
cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.
[T]reachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender
arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender
arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence
of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift,
deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. For treachery to be
considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of
execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend
themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or
consciously adopted.
Conspiracy, once proven, has the effect of attaching liability to all of the
accused, regardless of their degree of participation, thus: Once an express or
implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals
regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation
in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the
conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all.
The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that "when two or
more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the
29

physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each

individual whose evil will actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in law
responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by himself alone."
Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than his own,
"when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is
responsible for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the
agreement or conspiracy." The imposition of collective liability upon the
conspirators is clearly explained in one case where this Court held that
... it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator)
without taking into consideration the close and inseparable relation of each
of them with the criminal act, for the commission of which they all acted by
common agreement ... The crime must therefore in view of the solidarity of
the act and intent which existed between the ... accused, be regarded as the
act of the band or party created by them, and they are all equally
responsible.

G.R. No. 207774

June 30, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
CARLOS ALHAMBRA y MASING, Accused-Appellant.
It is well-settled that, in a criminal case, factual findings of the trial court are
generally accorded great weight and respect on appeal, especially when
such findings are supported by substantial evidence on record. It is only in
exceptional circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked material
and relevant matters, that this Court will re-calibrate and evaluate the
factual findings of the court below.16 The Court sees no reason to depart from
the foregoing rule.
Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 provides that:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether
male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to
the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed upon the following:
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse;
Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3 for rape and
Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or
lascivious conduct, as the case may be; Provided, That the penalty for
lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) yeas of age shall be
reclusion temporal in its medium period; and
xxxx
30

Sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 has three
elements: (1) the accused commits an act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child is below 18 years old.

G.R. No. 207763

June 30, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ROLANDO RONDINA, Accused-Appellant.
Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of
the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious,
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or
is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned
above be present;
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting
his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument
or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
The constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused demands no less
than a moral certainty of his guilt free of reasonable doubt. Moreover, the
prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense. The testimony of
the victim must be scrutinized with utmost caution, and unavoidably, her
own credibility must also be put on trial.21
It has been held that when the victims testimony is corroborated by the
physicians finding of penetration, there is sufficient foundation to conclude
the existence of the essential requisite of carnal knowledge; that laceration,
whether healed or fresh, is the best physical evidence of forcible
defloration.25 The Court, however, finds no physical evidence of sexual
penetration and no corroboration of other vital details in AAAs narration of
the rape.
Time and again, the Court has emphasized that a womans conduct
immediately after the alleged assault is of critical value in gauging the truth
of her accusations.43 One important test is that it must coincide with logic
and experience.44 If indeed she was raped, AAAs utter failure not only to
resist Rondinas advances but also to shout for help before, during or after
the rape are truly baffling, and defy the ordinary standards of human
31

behavior. A stranger suddenly materialized who obviously had unholy

intentions, he quickly placed himself on top of her and raped her, yet AAA
did not shout for help, knowing that the neighbors were just nearby.
Incomprehensibly, too, after the dastardly rape, which went on for a "long
time," AAA stayed half naked and supine, and with her face looking up she
carried on a hushed conversation with her supposed attacker, who just sat
still beside her, also half-naked like her. While a rape victim is not expected
to resist until death, it is contrary to human experience that AAA did not
even make an outcry or put up a resistance, 45 particularly since throughout
her ordeal, her hands were free of restraint, and Rondinas knife lay by her
side most of the time, if indeed he had a knife.

G.R. No. 207664

June 25, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
GIL SALVIDAR y GARLAN, Accused-Appellant.
In cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Law, appellate courts
tend to rely heavily on the trial courts assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, because the latter had the unique opportunity, denied to the
appellate courts, to observe the witnesses and to note their demeanor,
conduct, and attitude under direct and cross-examination. Hence, its factual
findings are accorded great respect, even finality, absent any showing that
certain facts of weight and substance bearing on the elements of the crime
have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied.
In the instant appeal, the RTC and CA uniformly found that PO3 Galvezs and
PO2 Hipolitos testimonies anent the conduct of the buy-bust operation were
categorical, detailed, and credible.34 Moreover, the accused-appellant had
not ascribed any ill motive against the two police officers which could have
otherwise induced them to fabricate the charges.
As the first issue, the accused-appellant claimed that it was highly
improbable for him to peddle and possess marijuana right in front of his
house and within public view. This allegation fails to persuade especially in
the light of the courts observation that of late, drug pushers have turned
more daring and defiant in the conduct of their illegal activities.35
Anent the second issue, the Court finds the chain of custody over the
evidence seized from the accused-appellant as unbroken and that there was
sufficient compliance with Section 21 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165.
PO3 Galvez positively testified that he marked the ten (10) plastic sachets
containing marijuana and the pieces of white paper while still in the place
where the accused-appellant was arrested, and in the presence of the
latter.36PO2 Hipolito did the same relative to the plastic container with
marijuana likewise found in the accused-appellants possession. 37 When the
members of the buy-bust team arrived in the police station, they turned-over
the person of the accused-appellant and the items seized from him to SPO1
Moran, who in turn, prepared the Evidence Acknowledgment Receipt and
letter request for laboratory examination.38 Thereafter, PCI Arturo conducted
the laboratory examinations and found the specimens to be

32

marijuana.39 These were the same items identified by the prosecution

witnesses and presented to the trial court as evidence.
The accused-appellant lamented that the evidence seized were not
photographed and inventoried in the presence of a member of the media, a
representative from the DOJ, and an elective government official. While this
factual allegation is admitted, the Court stresses that what Section 21 of the
IRR of R.A. No. 9165 requires is "substantial" and not necessarily "perfect
adherence,"40 as long as it can be proven that the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved as the same would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 41
The accused-appellant attempted to establish that there was a breach in the
chain of custody over the evidence seized from him by pointing out that
SPO1 Moran twice delivered the items to the crime laboratory at first to a
certain PO1 Bolora and later, to PCI Arturo. 42 The Court notes that despite the
foregoing allegation, the defense agreed with the prosecution to dispense
with the testimonies of SPO1 Moran and PCI Arturo. The parties entered into
stipulations and admissions of facts as regards the participation of the
aforementioned two. This is no less than an admission on the part of the
defense that there was nothing irregular in SPO1 Moran and PCI Arturos
performance of their duties relative to preserving the integrity of the
evidence which fell in their custody. Had the accused-appellant sincerely
believed that there was indeed a breach in the chain of custody over the
seized items, he would have insisted on putting SPO1 Moran and PCI Arturo
on the witness stand for cross-examination.

G.R. No. 195668

June 25, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
MA. HARLETA VELASCO y BRIONES, MARICAR B. INOVERO, MARISSA
DIALA, and BERNA M. PAULINO,Accused,
MARICAR B. INOVERO, Accused-Appellant.
The essential elements of illegal recruitment committed in large scale are:
(1) that the accused engaged in acts of recruitment and placement of
workers as defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or in any prohibited
activities under Article 34 of the same Code; (2) that the accused had not
complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment with respect to the requirement to secure a license or authority
to recruit and deploy workers; and (3) that the accused committed the
unlawful acts against 3 or more persons. In simplest terms, illegal
recruitment is committed by persons who, without authority from the
government, give the impression that they have the power to send workers
abroad for employment purposes. In Our view, despite Inoveros
protestations that she did not commit illegal recruitment, the following
circumstances contrarily convince Us that she was into illegal recruitment.
It is basic that the Court, not being a trier of facts, must of necessity rely on
the findings of fact by the trial court which are conclusive and binding once
affirmed by the CA on intermediate review. The bindingness of the trial
courts factual findings is by virtue of its direct access to the evidence. The
33

direct access affords the trial court the unique advantage to observe the
witnesses demeanor while testifying, and the personal opportunity to test
the accuracy and reliability of their recollections of past events, both of
which are very decisive in a litigation like this criminal prosecution for the
serious crime of illegal recruitment committed in large scale where the
parties have disagreed on the material facts. The Court leaves its confined
precinct of dealing only with legal issues in order to deal with factual ones
only when the appellant persuasively demonstrates a clear error in the
appreciation of the evidence by both the trial and the appellate courts. This
demonstration was not done herein by the appellant. Hence, the Court
upholds the CAs affirmance of the factual findings by the trial court.
Denial, essentially a negation of a fact, does not prevail over an affirmative
assertion of the fact.1wphi1 Thus, courts both trial and appellate have
generally viewed the defense of denial in criminal cases with considerable
caution, if not with outright rejection. Such judicial attitude comes from the
recognition that denial is inherently weak and unreliable by virtue of its being
an excuse too easy and too convenient for the guilty to make. To be worthy
of consideration at all, denial should be substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence. The accused cannot solely rely on her negative and
self-serving negations, for denial carries no weight in law and has no greater
evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.13 It is no different here.
G.R. No. 159031

June 23, 2014

NOEL A. LASANAS, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Article 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon
any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1) that the offender has
been legally married; (2) that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or,
in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he or she contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
This Court concedes that the marriage between accused-appellant Lasanas
and private complainant Patingo was void because of the absence of a
marriage license or of an affidavit of cohabitation. The ratificatory religious
wedding ceremony could not have validated the void marriage. Neither can
the church wedding be treated as a marriage in itself for to do so, all the
essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage should be present. One of
these requisites is a valid marriage license except in those instances when
this requirement may be excused. There having been no marriage license
nor affidavit of cohabitation presented to the priest who presided over the
religious rites, the religious wedding cannot be treated as a valid marriage in
itself.

34

But then, as the law and jurisprudence say, petitioner should have first
secured a judicial declaration of the nullity of his void marriage to private
complainant Patingo before marrying Josefa Eslaban. Actually, he did just
that but after his marriage to Josefa Eslaban. Consequently, he violated the
law on bigamy.
The first and second elements of bigamy were present in view of the absence
of a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage between the accused and
Socorro. The requirement of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage prior to contracting a subsequent marriage is found in Article 40 of
the Family Code, to wit:
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. (n)
The reason for the provision was aptly discussed in Teves v. People: 29
x x x The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting
jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a
marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for
defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is
a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.

G.R. No. 193478

June 23, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
RODOLFO P. FERNANDEZ, NELSON E. TOBIAS, and FRANK R.
BAAY, Accused,
NELSON E. TOBIAS, Accused-appellant.
The rule on the chain of custody under R.A. 9165, 36 together with its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR), 37expressly demands the
identification of the persons who handled the confiscated items for the
purpose of duly monitoring the authorized movements of the illegal drugs
and/or drug paraphernalia from the time these items were seized from the
accused until the time they were presented in court.38
The rule also requires that the presentation and admission of the seized
prohibited drug as an exhibit be preceded by evidence to support a finding
that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. 39 This
requirement is essential to obviate the possibility of substitution, as well as
to ensure that doubts regarding the identity of the evidence are removed.
The rule is meant to ensure the monitoring and tracking of the movements
and custody of the seized prohibited item from the accused, to the police,
to the forensic laboratory for examination, and finally to its presentation in
evidence in court. Ideally, the custodial chain would include testimony about
every link in the chain or movement of the illegal drug, from the moment it is
seized until itis finally adduced in evidence. 40 It cannot be overemphasized,
however, that testimony supporting a perfect chain is almost always
impossible to obtain.41
35

We have held that the failure of the prosecution to show compliance with the
procedural requirements provided in Section 21 of Article II of R.A. 9165 and
its IRR is not fatal.42 What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized
in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 43 As long as the
chain of custody remains unbroken, the guilt of the accused will not be
affected.
The links of the chain of custody ofthe illegal drug are all accounted for by
the testimonies of the police officers who formed the buy-bust team: from
the confiscation of the cocaine from petitioner Tobias by the poseur-buyer,
SPO1 Padua; its turnover to the buy-bust team leader, P S/Insp. Bona, who
gave it to SPO1 Gonzales, the investigator, and eventually to SPO3 Barbero
who made the marking; to the forwarding of the seized item to the crime
laboratory for a forensic examination; up to the presentation of the results to
the court by P/Insp. Antonietta Abillonar. It is clear, then, that the chain-ofcustody requirement was properly observed by the police officers and proven
by the prosecution.

G.R. No. 199208

July 30, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
TRINIDAD A. CAHILIG, Appellant.
Article 310, in relation to Article 308, of the Revised Penal Code defines the
crime of Qualified Theft:
Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of theft shall be punished by the
penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the
next preceding articles, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave
abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or
large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation,
fish taken froma fishpond or fishery, orif property is taken on the occasion of
fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular
accident or civil disturbance.
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. - Theft is committed by any person who,
with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor
force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latters
consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lostproperty, shall fail to deliver the
same to the local authorities or to its owner;

36

2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of

another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or objects of the
damage caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where
trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another and without the
consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather
fruits, cereals, or other forest or farm products.
Thus, the elements of Qualified Theft, committed with grave abuse of
confidence, are as follows:
1. Taking of personal property;
2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owners consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation
against persons, nor of force upon things;
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.8
It is clear that all the elements ofQualified Theft are present in these cases.
Cahilig took money from WPESLAI and its depositors by taking advantage of
her position. Her intent to gain is clear in the use of a carefully planned and
deliberately executed scheme to commit the theft.
Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of Qualified Theft, "must be the
result of the relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance,
between the appellant and the offended party that might create a high
degree of confidence betweenthem which the appellant abused."9
Cahiligs position was one reposed with trust and confidence, considering
that it involves "handling, managing, receiving, and disbursing" money from
WPESLAIs depositors and other funds of the association.1wphi1 Cahiligs
responsibilities as WPESLAI cashier required prudence and vigilance over the
money entrusted into her care.
However, instead of executing her duties, she deliberately misled the board
of directors into authorizing disbursements for money that eventually ended
up in her personal account, a fact that Cahilig did not deny.

G.R. No. 209373

July 30, 2014

JOEL YONGCO and JULIETO LAOJAN, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x-----------------------x

37

G.R. No. 209414

ANECITO TANGIAN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Article 310, in relation to Art. 308,of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) defines
Qualified Theft, thusly:
ART. 308. Who are liable for theft.Theft is committed by any person who,
with intent to gain but without violence, against, or intimidation of persons
nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the
latters consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the
same to the local authorities or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of
another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or objects of the
damage caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where
trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another and without the
consent of its owner, shall hunt or fishupon the same or shall gather
fruits, cereals, or other forestor farm products.
xxxx
ART. 310. Qualified Theft.The crime of theft shall be punished by the
penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the
next preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave
abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or
large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation,
fishtaken from a fishpond or fishery or if property is taken on the occasion of
fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular
accident or civil disturbance. (emphasis added)
Synthesizing the foregoing provisions, the elements of Qualified Theft,
committed with grave abuse of discretion, can simply be enumerated as
follows:
1. Taking of personal property;
2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owners consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation
against persons, nor of force upon things; and
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.5

38

As correctly observed by the appellatecourt, all of the elements of Qualified

Theft are present in this case, viz:
There is no dispute that the items (transmission, boom arm, differential
assembly, and I-beam) which are the subject matter of this case belong to
the CEO of Iligan City.1wphi1 There is no dispute that these items, although
considered "heap of scrap," have not yet been declared unserviceable or
waste by the proper authority or office. Nor have they been marked for
proper disposal. Unless properly disposed in accordance with Section 379 of
the Local Government Code, these items are still government properties or
owned by the City of Iligan.
There is also no dispute that these items were taken away from the CEO and
were already under completeand effective control of the persons taking the
same. This is because these items were loaded onto the garbage truck
driven by Tangian and brought to Tominobo at the Delfin Junk Store.
Apparently, the taking of these items was without the consent of the CEO of
Iligan City because there was no gate pass issued to that effect. Evidence
shows that when the garbage truck left the premises of the CEO, no gate
pass was surrendered by Tangian. Yongco did not bother to ask for a gate
pass on the pretext that there was another guard on duty at the gate.
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from the
unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject to asportation. Actual
gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. Since
these items werebrought to the junk store, intent to gain becomes obvious.
The presumption of animus lucrandihas not been overturned.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning a felony and decide to commit it. 7 Well-settled is the rule that in
conspiracy, direct proof of a previousagreement is not necessary as it may
be deduced from the mode, method, and manner by which the offense was
perpetrated.8 It may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during,
or after the commission of the crime which, when taken together, would be
enough to reveal a community of criminaldesign, as the proof of conspiracy
is frequently made by evidenceof a chain of circumstances.9
In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Once conspiracy is established,
all the conspirators are answerable as co-principals regardless of the extent
or degree of their participation.13 The guilt of one is the guilt of all. It is
common design which is the essence of conspiracyconspirators may act
separately or together in different manners but always leading to the same
unlawful result. The character and effect of conspiracy are not to be
adjudged by dismembering it and viewing its separate parts but only by
looking at it as a wholeacts done to giveeffect to conspiracy may be, in
fact, wholly innocent acts.14 Applying this doctrine in the case at bench, it
can reasonably be concluded that despite Laojans lack of physical
participation in hauling the items to Tangians truck and bringing them to the
junk shop, he can still be liable for Qualified Theft via conspiracy. All told,
there is no cogent reason for us todisturb the findings of the appellate court,
affirmatory of those of the trial court.

G.R. No. 200334

July 30, 2014

39

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent-Appellee,

vs.
VICTOR COGAED y ROMANA, Accused-Appellant.
The right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined by implication in our
Constitution. It has many dimensions. One of its dimensions is its protection
through the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures in Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determinedpersonally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
This provision requires that the court examine with care and diligence
whether searches and seizures are "reasonable." As a general rule, searches
conducted with a warrant that meets all the requirements of this provision
are reasonable. This warrant requires the existence of probable cause that
can only be determined by a judge.56 The existence of probable cause must
be established by the judge after asking searching questions and
answers.57 Probable cause at this stage can only exist if there is an offense
alleged to be committed. Also, the warrant frames the searches done by the
law enforcers. There must be a particular description of the place and the
things to be searched.58
However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when
warrantless.59 In the Rules of Court, searchesincidental to lawful arrests are
allowed even without a separate warrant.60 This court has taken into account
the "uniqueness of circumstances involved including the purpose of the
search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in
which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the
character of the articles procured."61 The known jurisprudential instances of
reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. . . ;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," . . . ;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the
vehicles inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially
when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a
criminal activity;
4. Consentedwarrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.62 (Citations omitted)

40

Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to
conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a
hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in
light of the police officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant
the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about
him.93 (Emphasis supplied, footnotes omitted)
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People,94 Justice Bersamin reminds us that police
officers must not rely on a single suspicious circumstance. 95 There should be
"presence of more than oneseemingly innocent activity, which, taken
together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity." 96 The
Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures." 97 Certainly,
reliance on only one suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in a
reasonable search.98
[A] "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of
effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition
that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more
pressing interest of safety and self-preservationwhich permit the police
officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is
not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against the police officer.99 (Emphasis supplied)
The "stop and frisk" searchwas originally limited to outer clothing and for the
purpose of detecting dangerous weapons.100 As in Manalili,101 jurisprudence
also allows "stop and frisk" for cases involving dangerous drugs.
Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures] shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.135
Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine, this constitutional provision originated from Stonehill v.
Diokno.136 This rule prohibits the issuance of general warrants that encourage
law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained through
unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence because it is "the only
practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures."137 It ensures that the fundamental
rights to ones person, houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed
upon and are upheld.
G.R. No. 188707

July 30, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
MANUELITA AMPATUAN y GONZALES, ET AL., Accused,
MASTOR SARIP y MARUHOM and WARREN TUMOG y
SAMPARADO, Accused-Appellants.
Elements of Illegal Sale of ShabuDuly Established
The elements necessary for the prosecution of the illegal sale of drugs are as
follows: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and payment
41

therefor.6 The prosecution, to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, must

present in evidence the corpus delictiof the case. The corpus delictiis the
seized illegal drugs.
The duty of the prosecution is not merely to present in evidence the seized
illegal drugs. It is essential that the illegal drugs seized from the suspect is
the very same substance offered in evidence in court as the identity of the
drug must be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that
required to make a finding of guilt.7
The absence of marked money does not run counter to the presented proof
of illegal sale of shabu.1wphi1 Lack of marked money is not an element to
the crime of illegal sale of shabu. 8 The marked money used in the buy-bust
operation, although having evidentiary value, is not vital to the prosecution
of the case. It is merely corroborative in nature. What is material to the
prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the illegal sale
actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delictias evidence.9 In the case at bar, the prosecution duly established both.
Relative to the required proof of anunbroken chain of custody of the seized
illegal shabuand shabuparaphernalia, the parties agreed to stipulate on the
relevant testimony of the witnesses, the requestfor laboratory examination,
machine copy blotter, inventory, photographs, and affidavits, all attesting to
the fulfillment of the requirement.10Indeed, the defense never raised as
defense any break in the chain of custody of the seized shabu and drug
paraphernalia.
It is elementary that entrapmentand instigation are different. In instigation,
the instigator induces the would-be-defendant into committing the offense,
and himself becomes a co-principal. In entrapment, the means originates
from the mind ofthe criminal. Otherwise stated, the idea and the resolve to
commit the crime come from the criminal. While in instigation, the law
enforcer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests the same to
the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution.11
Section 33. Immunity from Prosecution and Punishment. Notwithstanding
the provisions of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure and the provisions of Republic Act No. 6981 or the Witness
Protection, Security and Benefit Act of 1991, any person who has violated
Sections 7, 11, 12, 14, 15, and 19, Article II of this Act, who voluntarily gives
information about any violation of Sections 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 13, and 16, Article
II of this Act as well as any violation of the offenses mentioned if committed
by a drug syndicate, or any information leading to the whereabouts,
identitiesand arrest of all or any of the members thereof; and who willingly
testifies against such persons as described above, shall be exempted from
prosecution or punishment for the offense with reference to which his/her
information of testimony were given, and may plead or prove the giving of
such information and testimony in bar of such prosecution: Provided,That the
following conditions concur:
(1) The information and testimony are necessary for the conviction of
the persons described above;
(2) Such information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the
State;

42

(3) Such information and testimony can be corroborated on its material

points;
(4) the informant or witness has notbeen previously convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude, except when there is no other direct
evidence available for the State other than the information and
testimony of said informant or witness; and
(5) The informant or witness shall strictly and faithfully comply without
delay, any condition or undertaking, reduced into writing, lawfully
imposed by the State as further consideration for the grant of
immunity from prosecution and punishment.

G.R. No. 178115

July 28, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JOJO SUMILHIG, RICARDO SUMILHIG alias CARDING SUMILHIG, PASOT
SALOLI, ERIC ENOC, WARLITO MONTEBON,* and CIO
LIMAMA, Accused,
JOJO SUMILHIG, RICARDO SUMILHIG alias CARDING SUMILHIG, and
PASOT SALOLI, Accused-Appellants.
"[C]onspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." 21 It is not
necessary to adduce evidence of a previous agreement to commit a
crime.22"Conspiracy may be shown through circumstantial evidence, deduced
from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred
from the acts of the accused themselves when such leadto a joint purpose
and design, concerted action, and community of interest."23
"There is treachery whenthe offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods orforms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure the execution, without risk to himself
arising from [any] defense which the offended party might make."25
Treachery is evident in this case as the suddenness and unexpectedness of
the assault deprived the victims of an opportunity to resist it or offer any
defense of their persons. This is considering that the victims were unaware
that they would be attacked by appellants with a hailof bullets from their
firearms fired at close range. Indeed, "[t]he suddenness of the attack,
without the slightest forewarning thereof, placed the [victims] x x x in such a
position that they could not have defended themselvesfrom the aggression x
x x."

G.R. No. 208623

July 23, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
VIRGILIO ANTONIO y RIVERA, Accused-Appellant.

43

"It is a fundamental rule that the trial courts factual findings, especially its
assessment of the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great weight and
respect and binding upon thisCourt, particularly when affirmed by the [CA].
This Court has repeatedly recognized that the trial court is in the best
position to assess the credibilityof witnesses and their testimonies because
of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable
evidence of the witnesses deportment on the stand while testifying, which
opportunity is denied tothe appellate courts. Only the trial judge can observe
the furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering
tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath. These are
significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses, in the process of
unearthing the truth. The appellate courts will generally not disturb such
findings unless it plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value
that, if considered, mightaffect the result of the case."19
"For conviction to be had in the crime of rape, the following elements must
be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that the accused had carnal
knowledge of the victim; and (2) that said act was accomplished (a) through
the use of force or intimidation; or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason
or otherwise unconscious; or (c) when the victim is twelve years of age, or is
demented."20
"[I]n rape through force or intimidation, the force employed by the guilty
party need not be irresistible. Itis only necessary that such force is sufficient
to consummate the purpose for which it was inflicted. Similarly, intimidation
should be evaluated in light of the victims perception at the time of the
commission of the crime. Itis enough that it produced the fear in the mind of
the victim that if she did not yield to the bestial demands of her ravisher,
some evil would happen to her at that moment or even thereafter. Hence,
what is important is that because of force and intimidation, the victim was
made to submit to the will of the appellant."21
Discrepancies referring only to minordetails and collateral mattersnot to
the central fact of the crimedo not affect the veracity or detract from the
essential credibility of witnesses declarations, as long as these are coherent
and intrinsically believable on the whole. For a discrepancy or inconsistency
in the testimony of a witness to serve as a basis for acquittal, it must
establish beyond doubt the innocence of the appellant for the crime charged.
It cannot be overemphasized that the credibility of a rape victim is not
diminished, let alone impaired, by minor inconsistencies in her testimony.

G.R. No. 207818

July 23, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ALEX DE LOS SANTOS, Accused-Appellant.
Basic is the rule that the matter of assigning values to declarations on the
witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge,
who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess
their credibility by the various indicia available but not reflected on the
record. Hence, the corollary principle that absent any showing that the trial
court overlooked substantial facts and circumstances that would affect the
final disposition of the case, appellate courts are bound to give due
44

deference and respect to its evaluation of the credibility of an eyewitness

and his testimony as well as its probative value amidst the rest of the other
evidence on record.13
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the
justifying circumstance ofself-defense. Without it, there can be no selfdefense, whether complete or incomplete, that can validly be
invoked.17"There is an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when he
puts in actual or imminent danger the life, limb, or right of the person
invoking self-defense. There must be actual physical force or actual use of a
weapon."18 "It is present only when the one attacked faces real and
immediate threat to ones life."19
"There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specifically to ensure the execution of the crime without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. To establish treachery, two elements must concur: (a) that at the time
of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) that
the offender consciously adopted the particular means of attack
employed."22
"The essence of treachery lies in the attack that comes without warning, and
the attack is swift, deliberate and unexpected, and affords the hapless,
unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape, thereby
ensuring its accomplishment without the risk to the aggressor, without the
slightest provocation on the part of the victim. What is decisive is that the
execution of the attack madeit impossible for the victim to defend himself or
to retaliate."23
Treachery qualifies the killing to murder. Under Article 248 of the RPC, the
penalty for murder is reclusion perpetuato death. The two penalties being
both indivisible and there being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance
to consider, the lesser of the two penalties which is reclusion perpetuashould
be imposed pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 63 of the
RPC.24 Hence, the courts a quo correctly sentenced the accused-appellant to
reclusion perpetua.
The accused-appellant shall not be eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9346 which states that "[p]ersons convicted of offenses
punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to
reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole
under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as
amended."

G.R. No. 208170

August 20, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
PETRUS YAU a.k.a. "John" and "Ricky" and SUSANA YAU y SUMOGBA
a.k.a. "Susan", AccusedIt has been an established rule in appellate review that the trial courts
factual findings, such as its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses,
45

the probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions drawn from
the factual findings, are accorded great respect and have even conclusive
effect. Such factual findings and conclusions assume even greater weight
when they are affirmed by the CA17
In every criminal case, the task ofthe prosecution is always two-fold, that is,
(1) to prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged;
and (2) to establish with the same quantumof proof the identity of the person
or persons responsible therefor, because, evenif the commission of the crime
is a given, there can be no conviction without the identity of the malefactor
being likewise clearly ascertained.18 Here, the prosecution was able to
satisfactorily discharge this burden.
The elements of Kidnapping For Ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659, are asfollows: (a) intent on the part of the
accused to deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the
victim of his liberty; and (c) motive of the accused, which is extorting ransom
for the release of the victim.24
All of the foregoing elements were duly established by the testimonial and
documentary evidences for the prosecution in the case at bench. First, Petrus
is a private individual. Second, Petrus kidnapped Alastair by using sleeping
substance which rendered the latter unconscious while inside a taxicab
driven by the said accused-appellant. Third, Petrus took and detained
Alastair inside the house owned by him and Susana Yau in Bacoor, Cavite,
where said victim was handcuffed and chained, and hence, deprived of his
liberty. Fourth, Alastair was taken against his will. And fifth, Petrus made
demands for the delivery of a ransomin the amount of US$600,000.00 for the
release of the victim.
Anent the criminal liability of eachaccused-appellant, there is no doubt that
Petrus is liable as principal of the crime of kidnapping for ransom. Susana, on
the other hand, is liable only as an accomplice to the crime as correctly
found by the lower courts. It must be emphasized that there was no evidence
indubitably proving that Susanaparticipated in the decision to commit the
criminal act. The only evidence the prosecution had against her was the
testimony of Alastair to the effect that he remembered her as the woman
who gave food to him or who accompanied his kidnapper whenever he would
bring food to him every breakfast, lunch and dinner. Jurisprudence 25 is
instructive of the elements required, in accordance with Article 18 of the
RPC, in order that a person may be considered an accomplice, namely, (1)
that there bea community of design; that is, knowing the criminal design of
the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;
(2) that he cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with
the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime
in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a relation between the acts done
by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.

G.R. No. 200987

August 20, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
RONALDO BAYAN y NERI, Accused-Appellant.

46

Failure to present the buy-bust money is not fatal to the prosecutions cause.
It is not indispensable in drugcases since it is merely corroborative evidence,
and the absence thereof does not create a hiatus inthe evidence for the
prosecution provided the sale of dangerous drugs is adequately proven and
the drug subject of the transaction ispresented before the court. Neither law
nor jurisprudence requires the presentation of any money used in the buybust operation.11
In every prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be
sufficiently proved: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and
the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor.12 Indeed, all these elements were duly established.
Furthermore, the prosecution was ableto preserve the integrity and
evidentiary value of the said illegal drugs.1wphi1The prosecution was able
to sufficiently establish the following circumstances showing an unbroken
chain of custody over the shabuthat was seized from herein
accusedappellant: (1) P02 Mendoza, who acted as the poseur-buyer during
the buybust operation, was the one who received the transparent plastic
sachet containing shabu from the appellant; 14 (2) the said transparent plastic
sachet was then brought by PO2 Mendoza to the police station where he
placed his initials "EM";15 (3) thereafter, said sachet was brought to the crime
laboratory for examination;16 and (4) the laboratory examination was
conducted by Police Inspector Abraham Verde Tecson.17
The result of the laboratory examination confirmed the presence of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride on the white crystalline substance inside
the plastic sachet confiscated from appellant. The delivery of the illicit drug
to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money
successfully consummated the buy-bust transaction.
Generally, factual findings of trial courts especially those which revolve
matters of credibility of witnesses deserve to be respected when no glaring
errors bordering on a gross misapprehension of the facts, or where no
speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions, can be gleaned from
such findings.20 The evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnessesdeportment, demeanor, conduct and
attitude under grilling examination.

G.R. No. 200645

August 20, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
WENDEL OCDOL y MENDOVA, EDISON TABIANAN, AND DANTE
BORINAGA, Accused.
WENDEL OCDOL y MENDOVA, Accused-Appellant.
At the outset, for conviction in the crime of rape, the following elements
must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that the accused had carnal
knowledge of the victim; and (2) that said act was accomplished: (a) through
the use of force or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason

47

or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim is under 12 years of age or

is demented.17
The "sweetheart theory" is an admission of carnal knowledge of the victim
and consequently places on the accused the burden of proving the supposed
relationship by substantial evidence.19 Otherwise called as the "sweetheart
defense," it is an oft-abusedjustification that rashly derides the intelligence
of this Court and sorely tests our patience.20 The defense cannot just present
testimonial evidence in support of the theory, as in the instant case.
Independent proof is required such as tokens, mementos, and
photographs.21 Appellant presented no such evidence to substantiate his
claim.
First and foremost, in adjudging rape cases, the Court is guided by the
following principles: (a) an accusation ofrape can be made with facility; it is
difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent,
to disprove; (b) in view of the nature of the crime in which only two persons
are involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
extreme caution; and (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall
on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense.23
Again, by way of emphasis, we adhere to the rule that due to its intimate
nature, rape is usually a crime bereft of witnesses, and, more often than not,
the victim is left to testify for herself. Thus, in the resolution of rape cases,
the victims credibility becomes the primordial consideration. It is settled that
when the victims testimony is straightforward, convincing, and consistent
with human nature and the normal course of things, unflawed by any
material or significant inconsistency, it passes the test of credibility, and the
accused may be convicted solely on the basis thereof. Inconsistencies in the
victims testimony do not impair her credibility, especially if the
inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of
the commission of rape. The trial courts assessment of the witnesses
credibility is given great weight and is even conclusive and binding. 26
It is well settled that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is a matter bestundertaken by the trial court because of its
unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their
demeanor, conduct, and attitudeunder grilling examination. These are
important in determining the truthfulness of witnesses and in unearthing the
truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies.1wphi1 For, indeed,
the emphasis, gesture, and inflection of the voice are potent aids in
ascertaining the witness credibility, and the trial court has the opportunity
and can take advantage of these aids. These cannot be incorporated in the
record so that all that the appellate court can see are the cold words of the
witness contained in transcript of testimonies with the risk that some of what
the witness actually said may have been lost in the process of transcribing.
As correctly stated byan American court, "There is an inherent impossibility
of determining with any degree of accuracy what credit is justly due to a
witness from merely reading the words spoken by him, even if there were no
doubt as to the identity of the words. However artful a corrupt witness may
be, there is generally, under the pressure of a skillful cross-examination,
something in his manner or bearing on the stand that betrays him, and
thereby destroys the force of his testimony. Many of the real tests of truth by
which the artful witness is exposed in the very nature of things cannot be

48

transcribed upon the record, and hence they can never be consideredby the
appellate court."

G.R. No. 181541

August 18, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES, Plaintiff/Appellee,

vs.
MARISSA MARCELO, Accused/Appellant.
Elements for the Prosecution of Illegal Sale of Shabu.
In a prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must concur:
"(1) [the] identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor. x x x What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs is the proof that the transaction or saleactually took place, coupledwith
the presentation in court of the corpus delicti"13 or the illicit drug in evidence.
Moreover, the "findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and
which involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring errors; gross
misapprehension of facts; orspeculative, arbitrary,and unsupported
conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The reason for this is that
the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility ofwitnesses,
having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner
of testifying during the trial. The rule finds an even more stringent
application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals".18
Appellants defenses of denial and frame-up do not deserve credence. Denial
cannot prevail over the positive testimony of prosecution witnesses. 24 On the
other hand, frame-up is viewed with disfavor since it can easily be fabricated
and is a common ploy in prosecution for violations of the Dangerous Drugs
Law. For this defense to prosper, it must be proved with clear and convincing
evidence. There must also be evidence that the police officers were inspired
by improper motive.25
In the absence of evidence that the prosecution witnesses were impelled by
improper motive to testify falsely, appellant failed to overturn the
presumption that the arresting officers regularly performed their duties.
There is, therefore, no basis to suspect the veracityof their statements.

G.R. No. 208469

August 13, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
SAMUEL "TIW-TIW" SANICO, Accused-Appellant.
We are aware that the Information specifically charged petitioner with Acts of
Lasciviousness under the RPC, without stating therein that it was in relation
to R.A. No. 7610. However, the failure to designate the offense by statute or
to mention the specific provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous
specification of the law violated, does not vitiate the information if the facts
alleged therein clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged. The
49

character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the

information nor by the specification of the provision of law alleged to have
beenviolated, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances inthe
complaint or information.
In the instant case, the body of the Information contains an averment of the
acts alleged to have been committed by petitioner and unmistakably
describes acts punishable under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No.
7610.45(Citation omitted)
In the accused-appellants case beforethe Court, the Information even
specifically mentions R.A. No. 7610. The accused-appellant, therefore, was
fairly apprised that he was being charged with violation of R.A. No. 7610 as
well. Further, it was shown that the requisites of Section 5(b) of the statute
are present. The CA thus inferred that it could not be precluded from
imposing the proper penalty provided for in R.A. No. 7610.
The CA aptly declared that when an appeal isfiled in a criminal action, it
opens the entire matter for review and that the requisites of sexual abuse
under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 are present in the accused-appellants
case. However, grounds exist compelling us to reinstate the penalty and
damages imposed by the RTC in Criminal Case No. 12021.
It bears stressing that the case before the Court involves two separate
Informations filed one for rape and another for lascivious conduct.
People v. Francisco46 involved the issue ofunder which appellate jurisdiction
the crimes of rape and lascivious conduct fall. The court, however, had the
occasion to explain that:
Nor can we widen the scope of our appellate jurisdiction on the basis of the
fact that the trial court heard two (2) distinct and separate cases
simultaneously. Such procedure [referring to the conduct of a joint trial]
adopted by the trial court cannot and did not result in the merger of the two
(2) offenses. In fact, a cursory reading of the assailed decision of the court a
quoreveals with pristine clarity that each case was separately determined by
the trial judge, as each should be separately reviewed on appeal. x x x.47
In the case at bench, the commission of lascivious conduct was admitted by
the accused-appellant in his testimony. No issue regarding his conviction for
lascivious conduct had been raised in his appeal before the CA as well.
Despite the fact that the appeal filed was captioned as one with reference to
Criminal Case Nos. 12021 and 12022, the body stated in no uncertain terms
that what was being assailed was merely the conviction for rape. Effectively
then, it was as if no appeal was filed relative to Criminal Case No. 12021.
Hence, the penalty imposed by the RTC for lascivious conduct should not be
disturbed anymore.Necessarily then, the CA cannot impose upon the
accused-appellant a graverpenalty and increase the amount of damages
awarded to AAA at least relative to Criminal Case No. 12021. This is the path
more in accord with the general rule that penal laws are to be construed
liberally in favor of the accused.48 Criminal Case No. 12022
It is a fundamental rule that the trial courts factual findings, especially its
assessment of the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great weight and
respect and binding upon this Court, particularly when affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. This Court has repeatedly recognized that the trial court is in the
50

bestposition to assess the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies

because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and
incommunicable evidence of the witnesses deportment on the stand while
testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts. Only the trial
judge can observe the furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation,
flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an
oath. These are significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses, in
the process of unearthing the truth. The appellate courts will generally not
disturb such findings unless it plainly overlooked certain facts of substance
and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case.
Moreover, "[w]e have repeatedly held that when the offended parties are
young and immature girls, as in this case, courts are inclined to lend
credence to their version of what transpired, considering not only their
relative vulnerability, but also the shame and embarrassment to which they
would be exposed if the matter about which they testified were not true."50
The foregoing doctrines apply with greater force in the instant case where
the accused-appellant cannot ascribe any ill-motive against AAA in accusing
him of the offenses charged,and where the factual findings of the RTC
coincide with those of the CA.
"For conviction to be had in the crime of rape, the following elements must
be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that the accused had carnal
knowledge of the victim; and (2) that said act was accomplished (a) through
the use of force or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason
or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim is twelve years of age, or is
demented."

G.R. No. 203048

August 13, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
RUSTY BALA, Accused-Appellant.
Section 1 of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, as
amended by Board Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990, provides that all
prohibited and regulated drugs shall be physically inventoried and
photographed in the presence of the accused who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof, to wit:
Section 1. All prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments, apparatuses and
articles specially designed for the use thereof when unlawfully used or found
in the possession of any person not authorized to have control and
disposition of the same, or when found secreted or abandoned, shall be
seized or confiscated by any national, provincial or local law enforcement
agency. Any apprehending team having initial custody and control of said
drugs and/or paraphernalia, should immediately after seizure or confiscation,
have the same physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of
the accused, if there be any, and/or his representative, who shall be required
to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. Thereafter,
the seized drugs and paraphernalia shall be immediately brought to a
properly equipped government laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative
examination.
51

The apprehending team shall: (a) within forty-eight (48) hours from the
seizure inform the Dangerous Drugs Board by telegram of said seizure, the
nature and quantity thereof, and who has present custody of the same, and
(b) submit to the Board a copy of the mission investigation report within
fifteen (15) days fromcompletion of the investigation.
This rule is now incorporated asSection 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165 that
repealed Republic Act No. 6425.
The alleged procedural infirmity pointed out by appellant does not prove
fatal to the prosecutions case.
In People v. Gratil,16 a case wherein appellant therein claimed that proper
procedure for taking custody of the seized prohibited drugs was not faithfully
followed, we ruled that:
In People v. De Los Reyes, a case which also involved an objection regarding
the non-compliance with the chain of custody rule, we held that:
The failure of the arresting police officers to comply with said DDB Regulation
No. 3, Series of 1979 is a matter strictly between the Dangerous Drugs Board
and the arresting officers and is totally irrelevant to the prosecution of the
criminal case for the reason that the commission of the crime of illegal sale
of a prohibited drug is considered consummated once the sale or transaction
is established x x x and the prosecution thereof is not undermined by the
failure of the arresting officers to comply with the regulations of the
Dangerous Drugs Board.
Non-compliance with [Section 21, 19 Article II of Republic Act No. 9165] is not
fatal and will not render an accused's arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. In People v. Del Monte, this Court
held that what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized
in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. x x x.
The ponenteof Agulaywould further observe in a separate opinion that the
failure by the buy-bust team to comply with the procedure in Section 21(a),
Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165,
which replicated Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165, did not overcome
the presumption of regularity accorded to police authorities in the
performance of their official duties, to wit:
First, it must be made clear that in several cases decided by the Court,
failure by the buy-bust team to comply with said section did not prevent the
presumption of regularityin the performance of duty from applying.
Second, even prior to the enactment of R.A. 9165, the requirements
contained in Section 21(a) were already there per Dangerous Drugs Board
Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979. Despite the presence of such regulation and
its non-compliance by the buy-bust team, the Court still applied such
presumption. x x x.
Pertinently, it is the preservation ofthe integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items which mustbe proven to establish the corpus delicti.

52

G.R. No. 201644

September 24, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE C. GO and AIDA C. DELA ROSA, Respondents.
It is undisputed that in their petition for certiorari before the CA, respondents
failed to implead the People of the Philippines as a party thereto. Because of
this, the petition was obviously defective. As provided in Section 5, Rule 110
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, all criminal actions are
prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.
Therefore, it behooved the petitioners (respondents herein) to implead the
People of the Philippines asrespondent in the CA case to enable the Solicitor
General to comment on the petition.30
While the failure to implead an indispensable party is not per sea ground for
the dismissal of an action, considering that said party may still be added by
order of the court,on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage
of the action and/orsuch times as are just, 31 it remains essential as it is
jurisdictional that any indispensable party be impleaded in the proceedings
before the court renders judgment. This is because the absence of such
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void
for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to
those present. As explained in Lotte Phil. Co., Inc. v. Dela Cruz:32
An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as
plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory.
The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with
jurisdiction, which is "the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right
to act in a case." Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to a
suit or proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The
absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the
court null and void for want of authorityto act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present.

G.R. No. 208716

September 24, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ELADIO B. LUMAHO alias "ATTUMPANG," Accused-Appellant.
Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code describes how rape is
committed:
Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of
the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious;
53

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of

authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or
is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned
above be present. (Emphasis ours).
Rape is qualified if the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim.19
The liberality of the trial court is not equated to diminished credibility. In
straightforward, positive narration, she was able to convey, despite her
tender age, the essential details to convict the accused. Jurisprudentially
settled is the principle that if a victim's testimony is straightforward,
convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of
things, unflawed by any material or significant inconsistency, it passes the
test of credibility and the accused may be convicted solely on the basis
thereof.22 Putting more emphasis, the factual findings of the trial court,
especially on the credibility of the rape victim, are accorded great weight and
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.23
An evidence is considered hearsay if its probative value is not based on
personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of some other
person not on the witness stand.24 A witness can testify only to those facts
which he knows of his personal knowledge and derived from his own
perception.25
Time and again, this Court has consistently held that alibi is an inherently
weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable.
In criminal law jurisprudence, alibi cannot prevail over the positive and
categorical testimony and identification of the complainant. For alibi to
prosper, it must be supported by credible corroboration from disinterested
witnesses.28 Evidently, Bennog is not a disinterested witness as he is a friend
of the accused. Aside from Bennog, no additional witness was presented by
the defense to corroboratethe physical absence of Lumaho in the scene of
the crime. It is worth stressing that even Lumaho himself failed to testify in
court to personally deny the accusations against him.
Positive and categorical identification of AAA, without any showing of illmotive on her part, prevails over an unsubstantiated alibi.1wphi1 An alibi,
without any clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving
evidence undeserving of weight in law. It cannot be given greater evidentiary
value over the testimony ofAAA who testified on affirmative matters.29
The penalty prescribed for qualified rape is death. As prescribed under Art.
266-B of the Revised Penal Code, death penalty shall be imposed if the crime
of rape is committed by a parent against his child under eighteen (18) years
of age. As conclusively proven by the prosecution, accused Lumaho had
carnal knowledge of his 7-year-old child AAA through force and intimidation.
However, in viewof Republic Act No. 9346 or the AntiDeath Penalty Law, the
penalty of reclusion perpetuawithout the eligibility of parole 30 shall be
imposed in lieu of the imposition of death penalty.

54

G.R. No. 205561

September 24, 2014

DIONISIO B. COLOMA, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
At the outset, it bears stressing that in appeals from the Sandiganbayan, as
in this case, only questions of law and not questions of fact may be raised.
Issues brought to the Court as to whether the prosecution was able to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt; or whether the
presumption of innocence was sufficiently debunked; or whether or not
conspiracy was satisfactorily established; or whether or not good faith was
properly appreciated, are all, invariably, questions of fact. 7
Settled is the rule that the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan in cases
before this Court are binding and conclusive in the absence of a showing that
they come under the established exceptions, such as: (1) when the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is a
grave abuse of discretion; 4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of
facts; (5) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; and (6) the findings of fact of the
Sandiganbayan are premised on the absence of evidence on record. 8
Coloma was charged with the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 which has the following essential elements: (a) the accused must be a
public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (b) he
must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence; and (c) his action caused any undue injury to any
party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. As
observed by the Sandiganbayan, all these elements exist in this case.
It is irrefutable that the first element is present. Coloma was undisputably
the Director of the PNPA at the time material to the charge against him.
Apart from this, he never denied his designation as the Special Assistant and
Action Officer to the Director of the LIS-PPSC. From the task of selecting the
site for RTS 9 to the dealings with the contractors for the project, this latter
position signifies Colomas task to oversee and administer the construction
of RTS 9. His claims that he had no participation in the construction of the
facilities do not, in any way, strip him of both his powers and duties related
to the implementation of the project.
As to the second element, Colomas argument is basically a denial of bad
faith on his part. He claims that his statements as to the completion of the
projects land development; the 90% completion of the administration
buildings construction; and the commencement of the construction of the
50-capacity barracks were his personal factual observations, thereby
negating the charge that he was guilty of misrepresentation in his official
report.

55

The second element of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed in
three ways, that is, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. Proof of anyof these three in connection with the
prohibited acts mentioned in Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 is enough to
convict.9
On the meaning of "partiality," "badfaith," and "gross negligence," the Court
has elucidated:
"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and
report mattersas they are wished for rather than as they are." "Bad faith
does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of
sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature
of fraud." "Gross negligence has been so defined as negligence characterized
by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where
there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally with a
conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be
affected. It is the omission of that care which eveninattentive and
thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property."10
In a catena of cases, the Court has held that there are two ways by which a
public official violates Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the performance of his
functions, namely: (1) by causing undue injury to any party, including the
Government; or (2) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference. The accused may be charged under either mode or
both. The disjunctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. 13 In other words, the presence of
one would suffice for conviction. Further,the term "undue injury" in the
context of Section 3(e) of the R.A. No. 3019 punishing the act of "causing
undue injury to any party," has a meaning akin to that civil law concept of
"actual damage." Actual damage, in the context of these definitions, is akin
to that in civil law.14
As explained by the Sandiganbayan, the undue injury caused by Coloma to
the government is based on two grounds: 1) as a co-signatory in the current
accounts created for the payment of creditors, 15 Coloma reserved to himself
control over the deposits to and withdrawals therefrom, and 2) the cost of
the RTS 9 as declared by Coloma in his report was significantly higher than
the actual cost computed after inspection.
The undue injury caused to the government is evident from Coloma's
statement of a cost of RTS 9 higher than that discovered upon inspection. It
bears stressing that the Sandiganbayan accorded credence on Engr. Vacnot's
testimony that the cost of the facilities constructed in RTS 9 only cost P3,
180,000.00, more or less, lower than what was reported by Coloma. Contrary
to Coloma's claim, this information was supported by detailed costings and
was unequivocally testified on during trial. Despite the opportunity to crossexamine the witness, Coloma failed to controvert the evidence against him.
This fact, taken together with the showing that no 50-capacity barracks was
ever built on the site as opposed to Coloma 's reportage, established that the
construction of RTS 9 was replete with irregularities. Otherwise stated, the
public funds disbursed for the project were not utilized in strict accord to its
purpose. Thus, the worth of public funds spent for the project does not match
the meager benefit to be derived therefrom.

56

G.R. No. 198314, September 24, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD GUINTO Y
SAN ANDRES, Accused-Appellant.
In illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish the identity
of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration of the sale and the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. 23 Hence, to establish a
concrete case, it is an utmost importance to prove the identity of the narcotic
substance itself as it constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and
the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction. It is
therefore imperative for the prosecution to first establish beyond reasonable
doubt the identity of the dangerous drug before asserting other arguments.
In People v. Roble,37 the Court ruled that generally, the evaluation of the trial
court of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to
great weight and generally not disturbed upon appeal. However, such rule
does not apply when the trial court has overlooked, misapprehended, or
misapplied any fact of weight or substance. In this present case, the
contradictions, numerous and material, warrant the acquittal of accusedappellant.38cralawlawlibrary
Similarly, one of the means used by the Court in determining the credibility
of the prosecution witnesses is the objective test. Following this test, in order
to establish the credibility of prosecution witnesses regarding the conduct of
buy-bust operation, prosecution must be able to present a complete picture
detailing the buy-bust operationfrom the initial contact between the
poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment
of the consideration, until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of
the illegal subject of sale. The manner by which the initial contact was made,
the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the buy-bust money, and the
delivery of the illegal drug must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to
insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an
offense.39 In light of these guiding principles, we rule that the prosecution
failed to present a clear picture on what really transpired on the buy-bust
operation.
True, the absence of ill motive or ill will is ordinarily considered by this Court
as proof that the statements of the police officers is credible. As maintained
by the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, in the absence of
any improper motive, presumption of regularity of performance of duty
prevails. However, it must be similarly noted that the presumption of
regularity in the performance of duty of public officers does not outweigh
another recognized presumption - the presumption of innocence of the
accused
until
proven
beyond
reasonable
doubt.

G.R. No. 189850

September 22, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
57

REYNALDO TORRES, JAY TORRES, BOBBY TORRES @ ROBERTO

TORRES y NAVA, and RONNIE TORRES, Accused,
BOBBY TORRES @ ROBERTO TORRES y NAVA, Accused-Appellant.
"Robbery with homicide exists when a homicide is committed either by
reason, or on occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery
with homicide, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the
taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent togain; (3)
with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the
occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as usedin its
generic sense, was committed. A conviction requires certitude that the
robbery is the main purpose and objective of the malefactor and the killing
ismerely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking
of human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery."28
The weapons are not the corpus delicti.
Corpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to
the body or substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer to the
ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom or to the body of the
person murdered or, in this case, [the weapons used in the commission of
robbery with homicide]. Since the corpus delictiis the fact of the commission
of the crime, this Court has ruled that even a single witness uncorroborated
testimony, if credible may suffice to prove it and warrant a conviction
therefor. Corpus delictimay even be established by circumstantial
evidence."32
In this case, the corpus delictiwas established by the evidence on record. The
prosecution eyewitnesses testified that appellant and his cohorts used knives
to perpetrate the crime. Their testimonies on the existence and use of
weapons in committing the offense was supported by the medical findings of
Dr. Salen who conducted the post-mortem examination. Dr. Salen found that
Espino sustained several stab wounds with varying measurements which
were caused by sharp bladed instruments. Appellant is therefore mistaken in
arguing that the failure to present the weapons used in killing Espino was
fatal to the cause of the prosecution.
We have always ruled that alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and
must be brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively
ascertained the identity of the accused. Moreover, it is only axiomatic
thatpositive testimony prevails over negative testimony.37
"There is abuse of superior strength when the offenders took advantage of
their combined strength in order to consummate the offense." 38 Here,
appellant and his four companions not only took advantage of their
numerical superiority, they were also armed with knives. Espino, on the other
hand, was unarmed and defenseless. While Ronnie was wrestling with
Espino, appellant and his coaccused simultaneously assaulted the latter. The
unidentified companion locked his arm around the neck of Espino while
appellant and his co-accused stabbed and hacked him several times. While
Espino was lying defenseless on the ground, they divested him of all his
valuables. Thereafter, they immediately fled the scene of the crime. 39 It is
clear that they executed the criminal act by employing physical
superiorityover Espino.

58

G.R. No. 182424, September 22, 2014

NENITA CARGANILLO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
the offense of estafa committed with abuse of confidence requires the
following elements:
(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender
in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same[;]
(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property
by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt[;]
(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and
(d) there is demand by the offended party to the offender.13
It is settled that the agreement or contract between the parties is the formal
expression of the parties rights, duties, and obligations and is the best
evidence of the parties intention. Thus, when the terms of an agreement
have been reduced into writing, it is considered as containing all the terms
agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in
interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.14 However, this rule, known as the Parol Evidence Rule, admits of
exceptions.
Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that a party to a written
agreement may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of
the agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading the following:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors
in interest after the execution of the written agreement.
For fraud to vitiate consent, the deception employed must be the
causal (dolo causante) inducement to the making of the contract,19 and must
be serious in character. 20 It must be sufficient to impress or lead an ordinarily
prudent person into error, taking into account the circumstances of each
case.
G.R. No. 192912

June 4, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
DEMOCRITO PARAS, Accused-Appellant.
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;

59

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
Inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the
elements of the crime are not grounds for acquittal. As long as the
inaccuracies concern only minor matters, the same do not affect the
credibility of witnesses. Truth-telling witnesses are not always expected to
give error-free testimonies considering the lapse of time and treachery of
human memory. Inaccuracies may even suggest that the witnesses are
telling the truth and have not been rehearsed.
Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child
which the rape victim bore was fathered by the accused, or by some
unknown individual, is of no moment. What is important and decisive is that
the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim against the latter's will or
without her consent, and such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful
manner. (Citation omitted.)
[P]eople react differently under emotional stress. There is no standard form
of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident, especially if the
assailant is physically near. The workings of the human mind when placed
under emotional stress are unpredictable. In a given situation, some may
shout, others may faint, and still others may be frozen into silence.
Consequently, the failure of complainant to run away or shout for help at the
very first opportunity cannot be construed consent to the sexual intercourse.
(Citations omitted.)
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, whenever the
crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death. In this case, the accused-appellants use of a
gun in the commission of the rape against AAA was both specifically alleged
in the information and proven during the trial of the case. Considering that
there was neither any mitigating nor aggravating circumstance in the
commission of the offense, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua was
properly imposed.

G.R. No. 196315, October 22, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEONARDO
CATAYTAY Y SILVANO, Accused-Appellant.
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following
circumstances:
a)
Through
force,
threat
or
intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above
be present.
60

The term demented refers to a person who has dementia, which is a

condition of deteriorated mentality, characterized by marked decline from
the individual's former intellectual level and often by emotional apathy,
madness, or insanity. On the other hand, the phrase deprived of reason
under paragraph 1 (b) has been interpreted to include those suffering from
mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation. Thus, AAA, who was clinically
diagnosed to be a mental retardate, can be properly classified as a person
who is deprived of reason, and not one who is demented.

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
x
x
x
x
10. When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder
and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission
of the crime.
Since the accused-appellants knowledge of AAAs mental retardation was
alleged in the Information and admitted by the former during the trial, the
above special qualifying circumstance is applicable, and the penalty of death
should have been imposed. With the passage, however, of Republic Act No.
934636 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty
of reclusion
perpetua shall
instead
be
imposed.
The RTC sentenced accused-appellant to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of twenty years and one day to forty years of reclusion perpetua. The Court
of Appeals correctly modified the penalty to be simply reclusion perpetua.
Since reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty, the Indeterminate
Sentence Law cannot be applied.
G.R. No. 183700

October 13, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
PABLITO ANDAYA y REANO, Accused-Appellant.
To secure the conviction of the accused who is charged with the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs as defined and punished by Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002), the State must establish
the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (a) that the transaction
or sale took place between the accused and the poseur buyer; and ( b) that
the dangerous drugs subject of the transaction or sale is presented in court
as evidence of the corpus delicti.10
We reiterate that a buy-bust operation is a valid and legitimate form of
entrapment of the drug pusher. 11 In such operation, the poseur buyer
transacts with the suspect by purchasing a quantity of the dangerous drug
and paying the price agreed upon, and in turn the drug pusher turns over or
delivers the dangerous drug subject of their agreement in exchange for the
price or other consideration. Once the transaction is consummated, the drug
pusher is arrested, and can be held to account under the criminal law. The
justification that underlies the legitimacy of the buy-bust operation is that
the suspect is arrested in jlagranti delicto, that is, the suspect has just
committed, or is in the act of committing, or is attempting to commit the
61

offense in the presence of the arresting police officer or private person. 12 The
arresting police officer or private person is favored in such instance with the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.
Proof of the transaction must be credible and complete. In every criminal
prosecution, it is the State, and no other, that bears the burden of proving
the illegal sale of the dangerous drug beyond reasonable doubt. 13 This
responsibility imposed on the State accords with the presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused, who has no duty to prove his innocence
until and unless the presumption of innocence in his favor has been
overcome by sufficient and competent evidence.

G.R. No. 201565, October 13, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EX-MAYOR CARLOS
ESTONILO, SR., MAYOR REINARIO REY ESTONILO, EDELBRANDO
ESTONILO A.K.A. EDEL ESTONILO, EUTIQUIANO ITCOBANES A.K.A.
NONONG ITCOBANES, NONOY ESTONILO-AT LARGE, TITING BOOCAT LARGE, GALI ITCOBANES-AT LARGE, ORLANDO TAGALOG
MATERDAM A.K.A. NEGRO MATERDAM, AND CALVIN DELA CRUZ
A.K.A. BULLDOG DELA CRUZ, Accused,
EX-MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR., MAYOR REINARIO REY
ESTONILO, EDELBRANDO ESTONILO A.K.A. EDEL ESTONILO,
EUTIQUIANO ITCOBANES A.K.A. NONONG ITCOBANES, AND CALVIN
DELA CRUZ A.K.A. BULLDOG DELA CRUZ, Accused-Appellants.
The age-old rule is that the task of assigning values to the testimonies of
witnesses on the witness stand and weighing their credibility is best left to
the trial court which forms its first-hand impressions as a witness testifies
before it. It is, thus, no surprise that findings and conclusions of trial courts
on the credibility of witnesses enjoy, as a rule, a badge of respect, for trial
courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they
testify.
To successfully prosecute the crime of murder, the following elements must
be established:53 (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him
or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4)
that the killing is not parricide or infanticide. 54chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In this case, the prosecution was able to clearly establish that (1) Floro was
killed; (2) Ex-Mayor Carlos, Sr., Rey, Edel, Nonong, and Calvin were five of the
nine perpetrators who killed him; (3) the killing was attended by the
qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation as testified to by
prosecution eyewitnesses, Servando and Antipolo, as well as treachery as
below discussed; and (4) the killing of Floro was neither parricide nor
infanticide.
Of the four elements, the second and third elements are essentially
contested by the defense. The Court finds that the prosecution
unquestionably
established
these
two
elements.
62

For the second element, the prosecution presented pieces of evidence which
when joined together point to the accused-appellants as the offenders.
Foremost, there is motive to kill Floro. It was Floros support for Vicente
Cotero, who was Reys opponent for the position of mayor in Placer, Masbate.
Second, the prosecution was able to establish that the accused-appellants
planned to kill Floro on two separate occasions. The prosecution witness,
Servando, was present in Mayor Carlos, Sr.s house when they were plotting
to kill Floro. He also heard Mayor Carlos, Sr. say ipatumba si Floro Casas.
Third, Antipolo was an eyewitness to the killing. His testimony was
corroborated by another witness, Serapion, who testified having seen the
accused-appellants leaving the school a few minutes after he heard the
gunshots. Serapion also recounted having heard one of them said mission
accomplished sir, after which, Mayor Carlos, Sr. ordered them to leave.
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of
facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference. 55 It
consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the
existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common
experience.56 Here, the circumstantial evidence consists of the testimonies
of Servando and Serapion. Servando was present when Mayor Carlos, Sr.
ordered his men to kill Floro. Whether this order was executed can be
answered by relating it to Antipolos eyewitness account as well as
Serapions
testimony.
Treachery also attended the killing of Floro. For treachery to be present, two
elements must concur: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a
position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately
adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by
him. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without
warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless,
unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. In this
case, accused-appellant Nonoy and accused Negro successively fired at Floro
about seven times and the victim sustained 13 gunshot wounds all found to
have been inflicted at close range giving the latter no chance at all to evade
the attack and defend himself from the unexpected onslaught. Accusedappellants Edel and Nonong were on standby also holding their firearms to
insure the success of their mission without risk to themselves; and three
others served as lookouts. Hence, there is no denying that their collective
acts
point
to
a
clear
case
of
treachery.
The twin defenses of denial and alibi raised by the accused-appellants must
fail in light of the positive identification made by Antipolo and Serapion. Alibi
and denial are inherently weak defenses and must be brushed aside when
the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the
accused as in this case. It is also axiomatic that positive testimony prevails
over negative testimony.57 The accused-appellants alibis that they were at
different places at the time of the shooting are negative and self-serving and
cannot be given more evidentiary value vis--vis the affirmative testimony of
credible witnesses. The accused-appellants, the victim, and the prosecution
witnesses reside in the same municipality and are, therefore, familiar with
one another. More so, that the two principal accused in this case are
prominent political figures. Therefore, the prosecution witnesses could not
have been mistaken on the accused-appellants identity including those who
remained
at
large.

63

Further, it has been held that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused
must prove the following: (i) that he was present at another place at the
time of the perpetration of the crime; and (ii) that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime during its commission.
Physical impossibility involves the distance and the facility of access
between the crime scene and the location of the accused when the crime
was committed; the accused must demonstrate that he was so far away and
could not have been physically present at the crime scene and its immediate
vicinity when the crime was committed. 58 Here, the accused-appellants
utterly failed to satisfy the above-quoted requirements. In fact, Mayor Carlos,
Sr. and his other co-accused, except for Nonong, admitted that they were
near the school before the incident and at the school minutes after the killing
took place. Certainly, the distance was not too far as to preclude the
presence of accused-appellants at the school, and/or for them to slip away
from
where
they
were
supposed
to
be,
unnoticed.
When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in
authority for that matter, there arises the complex crime of direct assault
with
murder
or
homicide.
The offense is a complex crime, the penalty for which is that for the graver
offense, to be imposed in the maximum period. Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides for the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death for the felony of murder; thus, the imposable
penalty should have been death. Plus the fact that there exists an
aggravating circumstance, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code, the proper penalty is death. But the imposition of death penalty
has been prohibited by Republic Act No. 9346, entitled An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines; thus, the RTC, as affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, properly imposed upon accused-appellants the penalty
of reclusion
perpetua.

G.R. No. 208169, October 08, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDWARD ADRIANO Y
SALES, Accused-Appellant.
In prosecutions for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following two (2)
elements must be duly established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale
took place; and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit
drug
as
evidence.11
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors
and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition
in
the
following
manner:
64

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;chanrobleslaw
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous
drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for
a
qualitative
and
quantitative
examination;chanrobleslaw
(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall
be done under oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued
within twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of the subject item/s:
Provided, That when the volume of the dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not
allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory
examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities
of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided,
however, That a final certification shall be issued on the completed forensic
laboratory examination on the same within the next twenty-four (24) hours;
However, it has been repeatedly noted by the Court, the Implementing Rules
of R.A. No. 9165 offer some measure of flexibility through the proviso, "noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and custody over said items". Otherwise stated, noncompliance does not invalidate the seizure or render the arrest of the
accused illegal or the items seized from him as inadmissible as long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved.
To prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
preserved, the Implementing Rules allow the prosecution to establish an
unbroken chain of custody of the seized item, which in this case, has been
duly established by the prosecution. "Chain of custody" means the duly
recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. 13 details of
the unbroken chain of custody as found by the CA:
The first link in the chain of custody is from the time PO1 Morales took
possession of the plastic sachet of shabu from accused-appellant and
marked the same with the initials "EAS", to the time the plastic sachet of
shabu was brought to the Police Station. The Certificate of Inventory for the
items seized from accused-appellant was signed by PO1 Morales, PO2 Ronnie
Fabroa,
and
the
accused-appellant.
The second link in the chain of custody is from the time the plastic sachet of
shabu was brought from the Police Station, to the PNP Crime Laboratory. A
letter-request was made for the laboratory examination of the contents of
the plastic sachet of shabu seized from accused-appellant. The letter65

request, and plastic sachet of shabu, were delivered to the PNP Crime
Laboratory by PO2 Del Rosario. Per Chemistry Report No. D-334-08 prepared
by Police Senior Inspector Yelah Manaog, the contents of the plastic sachet
tested positive for shabu.14chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Thus, despite the arresting officers' failure to strictly observe the
requirements of Section 21 on the custody and disposition of the seized
items, the violation of the CDDA of 2002 was duly proven. The arresting
officers duly recorded the movements and custody of the seized items from
the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt by the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping
up
to
presentation
in
court.
A buy-bust operation is "a form of entrapment, in which the violator is
caught in flagrante delicto and the police officers conducting the operation
are not only authorized but duty-bound to apprehend the violator and to
search him for anything that may have been part of or used in the
commission of the crime."15 In People v. Agulay,16 we discussed buy-bust
operation as a form of a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug
pushers:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been
accepted as a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. In a
buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender,
without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. If carried
out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust
operation deserves judicial sanction.17chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Finally, the arresting officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their official duties. The presumption may be overcome by
clear and convincing evidence. However, in the case at bar, the defense
failed to present any proof to substantiate its imputation of ill-motive on the
part of the arresting officers. Contrarily, the prosecution duly proved the
existence of the two elements of the crime of illegal sale of shabu and
established the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. The
presumption of regularity in favor of the arresting officers prevails.

G.R. No. 196005

October 1, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
CHARLIE FIELDAD, RYAN CORNISTA, and EDGAR
PIMENTEL, Appellants.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and speciallyto insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might take.18
There is treachery when the following essential elements are present, viz: (a)
at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself;
and (b) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular
means, method or form of attack employed by him. The essence of treachery
is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting
victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby
66

ensuring its commission withour risk of himself. Treachery may also be

appreciated even if the victim was warned of the danger to his life where he
was defenseless and unable to flee atthe time of the infliction of the coup de
grace. In the case at bar, the victim suffered six wounds, one on the mouth,
another on the right ear,one on the shoulder, another on the right breast,
one on the upper right cornea of the sternum and one above the right iliac
crest. Juan and Victor were armed with handguns. They first disarmed SPO1
Manio, Jr. and then shot him even as hepleaded for dear life. When the victim
was shot, he was defenseless. He was shot at close range, thus insuring his
death.20
In the case of People v. Tabaco,21 treachery was appreciated in the killing of
three peace officers, one of whom was armed and assigned to maintain the
peace and order. They were attending an event where many armed peace
officers were present to maintain peace and order. In that case, the victims
were completely taken by surprise and had no means of defending
themselves against the sudden attack.
It is a settled rule that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its
unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their
demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination. 23 Positive
identification of the accused is entitled to greater weight than the bare denial
and explanation by the accused.24
As to the paraffin test to which the appellant was subjected to he raises the
question, under the sixth assigned error, that it was not conducted in the
presence of his lawyer. This right is afforded to any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense whose confession or
admission may not be taken unless he is informed of his right to remain
silent and to havecompetent and independent counsel of his own choice. His
right against self incrimination is not violated by the taking of the paraffin
test of his hands. This constitutional right extends only to testimonial
compulsion and not when the body of the accused is proposed to be
examined as in this case. Indeed, the paraffin test proved positively thathe
just recently fired a gun. Again, this kind of evidence buttresses the case of
the prosecution.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 39 Conspiracy
can be inferred from and established by the acts of the accused themselves
when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest.40 Once conspiracy is shown the act of one is the act of
all the conspirators.
Since treachery qualified the killingsto murder and there being no
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua
was properly imposed. However, it must be stated that Fieldad is not eligible
for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty.
Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, the trial court correctly ordered
appellant to pay to the heirs of each deceased the amounts of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages; however, the amount of
exemplary damages must be increased to P30,000.00.41 Exemplary damages

67

are recoverable due to the presence of the qualifying aggravating

circumstance of treachery in the commission of the crimes.42
The award of actual damages for the expenses incurred in connection with
the funerals of JO2 Gamboa and JO1 Bacolor in the amounts of P47,845.00
and P87,349.45, respectively, are supported by receipts and are in order.
The trial court awarded the amounts of P153,028.00 and P178,500.00 to the
heirs of JO2 Gamboa and JO1 Bacolor, respectively, for loss of earning
capacity, applying the formula
Net earning capacity =

{2/3 x [80 age at the time of death] x [gross

annual income reasonable and necessary living
expenses]}43

Elements of Carnapping
Carnapping is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to
another without consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, or by using force upon things. 44 The elements of the crime of
carnapping are that: (1) there is an actual taking of the vehicle; (2) the
offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle; (3) the vehicle
belongs to a person other than the offender himself; and (4) the taking is
without the consent of the owner thereof, or it was committed by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. 45
Intent to gain or animus lucrandiis an internal act, presumed from the
unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the
important consideration is the intent to gain. The term "gain" is not merely
limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other
sense may be derived orexpected from the act which is performed. Thus, the
mere use of the thing which was taken without the owners consent
constitutes gain.

G.R. No. 190834, November 26, 2014

ARIEL T. LIM, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
While we agree with the private respondent that the gravamen of violation of
B.P. 22 is the issuance of worthless checks that are dishonored upon their
presentment for payment, we should not apply penal laws
mechanically. We must find if the application of the law is consistent with
the purpose of and reason for the law. Ratione cessat lex, el cessat
lex. (When the reason for the law ceases, the law ceases.) It is not the
letter alone but the spirit of the law also that gives it life. This is
especially so in this case where a debtor's criminalization would not
serve the ends of justice but in fact subvert it. The creditor having
collected already more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the
checks for payment of rentals, viaauction sale, we find that holding the
debtor's president to answer for a criminal offense under B.P. 22 two years
after said collection is no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable
considerations.

68

In sum, considering that the money value of the two checks issued
by petitioner has already been effectively paid two years before the
informations against him were filed, we find merit in this petition.
We hold that petitioner herein could not be validly and justly
convicted or sentenced for violation of B.P. 22. x x x8(Emphasis
supplied)
In the more recent case of Tan v. Philippine Commercial International
Bank,9 the foregoing principle articulated in Griffith was the precedent cited
to justify the acquittal of the accused in said case. Therein, the Court
enumerated the elements for violation of B.P. Big. 22 being "(1) The accused
makes, draws or issues a check to apply to account or for value; (2) The
accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have
sufficient funds in, or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the
check in full upon its presentment; and (3) The check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would
have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any
valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." 10 To facilitate proving the
second element, the law created a prima facie presumption of knowledge of
insufficiency of funds or credit, which is established when it is shown that the
drawer of the check was notified of its dishonor and, within five banking days
thereafter, failed to fully pay the amount of the check or make arrangements
for its full payment. If the check, however, is made good or the drawer pays
the value of the check within the five-day period, then the presumption is
rebutted. Evidently, one of the essential elements of the violation is no
longer present and the drawer may no longer be indicted for B.P. Blg. 22.
Said payment within the period prescribed by the law is a complete defense.
Generally, only the full payment of the value of the dishonored check during
the five-day grace period would exculpate the accused from criminal liability
under B.P. Blg. 22 but, as the Court further elaborated in Tan:
In the present case, PCIB already extracted its proverbial pound of flesh by
receiving and keeping in possession the four buses - trust properties
surrendered by petitioner in about mid 1991 and March 1992 pursuant to
Section 7 of the Trust Receipts Law, the estimated value of which was "about
P6.6 million." It thus appears that the total amount of the dishonored
checks - P1,785,855.75 -, x x x was more than fully satisfied prior to the
transmittal and receipt of the July 9,1992 letter of demand.In keeping
with jurisprudence, the Court then considers such payment of the dishonored
checks to have obliterated the criminal liability of petitioner.
It is consistent rule that penal statutes are construed strictly against the
State and liberally in favor of the accused. And since penal laws should not
be applied mechanically, the Court must determine whether the application
of the penal law is consistent with the purpose and reason of the law. x x
x11 (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, although payment of the value of the bounced check, if made beyond
the 5-day period provided for in B.P. Blg. 22, would normally not extinguish
criminal liability, the aforementioned cases show that the Court
acknowledges the existence of extraordinary cases where, even if all the
elements of the crime or offense are present, the conviction of the accused
would prove to be abhorrent to society's sense of justice. Just like
in Griffith and in Tan,12 petitioner should not be penalized although all the
elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are proven to be present. The fact that
69

the issuer of the check had already paid the value of the dishonored check
after having received thesubpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor should
have forestalled the filing of the Information in court. The spirit of the law
which, for B.P. Big. 22, is the protection of the credibility and stability of the
banking system, would not be served by penalizing people who have
evidently made amends for their mistakes and made restitution for damages
even before charges have been filed against them. In effect, the payment of
the checks before the filing of the informations has already attained the
purpose
of
the
law.
It should be emphasized as well that payment of the value of the bounced
check after the information has been filed in court would no longer
have the effect of exonerating the accused from possible conviction for
violation of B.P. Big. 22. Since from the commencement of the criminal
proceedings in court, there is no circumstance whatsoever to show that the
accused had every intention to mitigate or totally alleviate the ill effects of
his issuance of the unfunded check, then there is no equitable and
compelling reason to preclude his prosecution. In such a case, the letter of
the
law
should
be
applied
to
its
full
extent.
Furthermore, to avoid any confusion, the Court's ruling in this case should be
well differentiated from cases where the accused is charged with estafa
under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, where the fraud is
perpetuated by postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an
obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds
deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. In
said case of estafa, damage and deceit are the essential elements of the
offense, and the check is merely the accused's tool in committing fraud. In
such a case, paying the value of the dishonored check will not free the
accused from criminal liability. It will merely satisfy the civil liability of the
crime
but
not
the
criminal
liability.

G.R. No. 190322

November 26, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
VIRGILIO AMORA y VISCARRA, Accused-Appellant.
The Court finds that appellants assertion is a mere speculation that
deserves scant consideration. His explanation is neither supported by
evidentiary proof nor buttressed by established facts. We have consistently
ruled that positive identification by credible witnesses prevails over selfserving statements of the accused. Such statements cannot be given greater
evidentiary weight over affirmative declarations of eyewitnesses.
Finally, appellant claims that at the time of the commission of the crime, he
was working at a construction site 8 to 9 kilometers away from the scene of
the crime. He argues that it was thus impossible for him to be the person
who stabbed and killed Romeo.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, "the accused must prove(a) that he was
present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b)
that it was physically impossible for him tobe at the scene of the
crime"16during its commission. "Physical impossibility refers to distance and
70

the facility of access between the situs criminisand the location of the
accused when the crime was committed. He must demonstrate that he was
so far away and could not have been physically present at the scene of the
crime and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed."17
In any case, eyewitnesses positively identified the appellant to be present at
the scene of the crime. "Time and again, this Court has consistently ruled
that positive identification prevails over alibi since the latter can easily be
fabricated and is inherently unreliable."18
Paragraph 16, Article 14 of the RPC provides that"[t]here is treachery when
the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make." Thus in order for the
qualifying circumstance of treachery to be appreciated, the following
requisites must be shown: (1) the employment of means, method, or manner
of execution would ensure the safety of the malefactor from the defensive or
retaliatory acts of the victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to
defend himself or to retaliate, and (2) the means, method, or manner of
execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. "The
essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a
swift,deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed,
and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape."19
It is of no consequence that appellant was in front of Romeo when he thrust
the knife to his torso. Records show that appellant initially came from behind
and then attacked Romeo from the front. In any event, "[e]ven a frontal
attack could be treacherous when unexpected and on an unarmed victim
who would be in no position to repel the attack or avoid it," 21 as in this case.
Undoubtedly, the RTC and CA correctly held that the crime committed was
murder under Article 248 of the RPC by reason of the qualifying circumstance
of treachery.

G.R. No. 176102, November 26, 2014

ROSAL HUBILLA Y CARILLO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of reclusion
temporal for homicide. Considering that the petitioner was then a minor at
the time of the commission of the crime, being 17 years, four months and 28
days old when he committed the homicide on March 30, 2000,8 such minority
was a privileged mitigating circumstance that lowered the penalty to prision
mayor.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate
sentence should be within the penalty next lower than the imposable
penalty, which, herein, was prision correccional (i.e., six months and one day
to six years). For the maximum of the indeterminate sentence, prision
mayor in its medium period - eight years and one day to 10 years -was
proper because there were no mitigating or aggravating circumstances
present. Accordingly, the CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of
71

imprisonment of six months and one day of prision correccional, as

minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum.
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC10 (Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law) provides
certain guiding principles in the trial and judging in cases involving a child in
conflict with the law. One of them is that found in Section 46 (2), in
conjunction with Section 5 (k), whereby the restrictions on the personal
liberty of the child shall be limited to the minimum.11 Consistent with this
principle, the amended decision of the CA imposed the ultimate minimums of
the indeterminate penalty for homicide under theIndeterminate Sentence
Law. On its part, Republic Act No. 9344 nowhere allows the trial and
appellate courts the discretion to reduce or lower the penalty further, even
for the sake of enabling the child in conflict with the law to qualify for
probation.
Conformably with Section 9(a) of Presidential Decree 968, 12 which disqualifies
from probation an offender sentenced to serve a maximum term of
imprisonment of more than six years, the petitioner could not qualify for
probation. For this reason, we annul the directive of the CA to remand the
case to the trial court to determine if he was qualified for probation.
Although Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 allows the suspension of the
sentence of a child in conflict with the law adjudged as guilty of a crime, the
suspension is available only until the child offender turns 21 years of age,
pursuant to Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344, to wit:
Section 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. -If the court
finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child
in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with
the law has wilfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition
or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought
before
the
court
for
execution
of
judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age
while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to
discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of
sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period
or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
We note that the petitioner was well over 23 years of age at the time of his
conviction for homicide by the RTC on July 19, 2006. Hence, the suspension
of his sentence was no longer legally feasible or permissible.
A review of the provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 reveals, however, that
imprisonment of children in conflict with the law is by no means prohibited.
While Section 5 (c) of Republic Act No. 9344 bestows on children in conflict
with the law the right not to be unlawfully or arbitrarily deprived of their
liberty; imprisonment as a proper disposition of a case is duly recognized,
subject to certain restrictions on the imposition of imprisonment, namely: (a)
the detention or imprisonment is a disposition of last resort, and (b) the
detention or imprisonment shall be for the shortest appropriate period of
time. Thereby, the trial and appellate courts did not violate the letter and
spirit of Republic Act No. 9344 by imposing the penalty of imprisonment on
the petitioner simply because the penalty was imposed as a last recourse
after holding him to be disqualified from probation and from the suspension
72

of his sentence, and the term of his imprisonment was for the shortest
duration
permitted
by
the
law.
A survey of relevant international agreements13 supports the course of action
taken herein. The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the
Administration of Juvenile Justice (Beijing Guidelines),14 the United Nations
Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (Riyadh Guidelines) and
the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of
Liberty15 are consistent in recognizing that imprisonment is a valid form of
disposition, provided it is imposed as a last resort and for the minimum
necessary
period.

G.R. No. 205144, November 26, 2014

MARGIE BALERTA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Chua-Burce is instructive anent what constitutes mere material possession,
on one hand, and juridical possession, on the other, for the purpose of
determining whether the first element of estafa is present in a particular
case, viz:
Have the foregoing elements been met in the case at bar? We find the first
element absent. When the money, goods, or any other personal property is
received by the offender from the offended party (1) in trust or (2)
on commission or (3) foradministration, the offender acquires both material
or physical possession and juridical possession of the thing received. Juridical
possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the
thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner. In this case,
petitioner was a cash custodian who was primarily responsible for the cashin-vault. Her possession of the cash belonging to the bank is akin to that of a
bank
teller,
both
being
mere
bank
employees.
In People v. Locson, the receiving teller of a bank misappropriated the money
received by him for the bank. He was found liable for qualified theft on the
theory that the possession of the teller is the possession of the bank. We
explained in Locson that
The money was in the possession of the defendant as receiving teller of the
bank, and the possession of the defendant was the possession of the bank.
When the defendant, with grave abuse of confidence, removed the money
and appropriated it to his own use without the consent of the bank, there
was the taking or apoderamiento contemplated in the definition of the crime
of theft.
In the subsequent case of Guzman v. Court of Appeals , a travelling sales
agent misappropriated or failed to return to his principal the proceeds of
things or goods he was commissioned or authorized to sell. He was, however,
found liable for estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code,
and not qualified theft. In the Guzmancase, we explained the distinction
between possession of a bank teller and an agent for purposes of
determining criminal liability
The case cited by the Court of Appeals (People vs. Locson, 57 Phil. 325), in
support of its theory that appellant only had the material possession of the
73

merchandise he was selling for his principal, or their proceeds, is not in

point. In said case, the receiving teller of a bank who misappropriated money
received by him for the bank, was held guilty of qualified theft on the theory
that the possession of the teller is the possession of the bank. There is an
essential distinction between the possession by a receiving teller of funds
received from third persons paid to the bank, and an agent who receives the
proceeds of sales of merchandise delivered to him in agency by his principal.
In the former case, payment by third persons to the teller is payment to the
bank itself; the teller is a mere custodian or keeper of the funds received,
and has no independent right or title to retain or possess the same as
against the bank. An agent, on the other hand, can even assert, as against
his own principal, an independent, autonomous, right to retain money or
goods received in consequence of the agency; as when the principal fails to
reimburse him for advances he has made, and indemnify him for damages
suffered without his fault(Article 1915, [N]ew Civil Code; Article 1730,
old).51 (Citations omitted, underscoring ours and italics in the original)
Fundamental is the precept in all criminal prosecutions, that the constitutive
acts of the offense must be established with unwavering exactitude and
moral certainty because this is the critical and only requisite to a finding of
guilt.
Concededly, the evidence of the defense is weak and uncorroborated. This,
however, cannot be used to advance the cause of the prosecution as the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot
be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense. Moreover,
when the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this
case, such that one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence
and the other is compatible with guilt, the presumption of innocence must
prevail
and
the
court
must
acquit. 57chanrobleslaw
In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is
shown beyond doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a
degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty.
Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces
conviction
in
an
unprejudiced
mind. 58chanrobleslaw
In the case at bar, however, the paltry evidence for the prosecution,
consisting merely of Timoneras testimony, casts doubts anent the guilt of
the petitioner, and does not amply rebut her right to be presumed innocent
of
the
crime
charged.
G.R. No. 194068

July 9, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
BENJIE CONSORTE y FRANCO, Accused-Appellant.
In the first place, appellant relies on alibi for his defense. As invariably held
by this Court, however, alibi is an inherently weak defense and has always
been viewed with disfavor by the courts due to the facility with which it can
be concocted.10 Indeed, denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be
buttressed withstrong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. 11 For
alibi to prosper, appellantmust prove not only that he was at some other
place when the crime was committed but that it was physically impossible
74

for him to be at the locus criminisat the time of its commission. 12 In the case
at bench, the defense failed to present convincing evidence to reinforce
appellants denial and alibi. It is significant to note that the distance between
Binangonan (the scene of the crime) and Antipolo (where appellant claimed
hewas at the time of the incident in question) is only about twenty (20)
kilometers.
"Physical impossibility in relation toalibi takes into consideration not only the
geographical distance between the scene of the crime and the place where
accused maintains he was, but more importantly, the accessibility between
these points. In this case, the element of physical impossibility of appellants
presence that fateful night at the crime scene has not been established."15
In any case, the positive identification of the appellant by witnesses destroys
the defense of alibi.1wphi1 Alibi warrants the least credibility, or none at all
and cannot prevail over the positive identification of the appellant by the
prosecution witnesses.17 Absent any ill motive on the part of witnesses, their
positive identification of the appellantas the perpetrator of the crime prevails
over the defense of denial or alibi.18
Indeed, no prosecution witness has actually seen the commission of the
crime. But jurisprudence tells us that direct evidence of the crime is not the
only matrix from which a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of
guilt. The rules on evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial
evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. 19The lack of direct evidence does
not ipso facto bar the finding of guilt against the appellant. As long as the
prosecution establishes the appellantsparticipation in the crime through
credible and sufficient circumstantial evidence that leads to the inescapable
conclusion that the appellant committedthe imputed crime, the latter should
be convicted.20 In the case at bar, those circumstances were enumerated by
the CA in its decision, as follows:
First. Appellant had an axe to grind against Elizabeth for filing a robbery case
against him. Elizabeth got murdered the night before the initial hearing of
the case;
Second. Rolando saw appellant near the jeepneys left rear, holding a gun,
right after he heard a gunshot;
Third. Right before the incident, Aneline saw appellant holding something in
his hand wrapped in a black cloth, which looked like a gun;
Fourth. Immediately after Aneline entered her house, she heard a gunshot
and when she peeped through the window, she saw appellant standing by
the side of the jeepney where Elizabeths lifeless body was sprawled. Shortly
after, Aneline saw appellant running towards the direction of Elizabeths
house. x x x;
Fifth. Notably, appellant himself did not accuse Rolando and Aneline of any
[ill] motive to falsely testify against him and cause his damnation for such a
serious crime of murder. Although he claims their loyalty belonged to the
victim and her family, loyalty does not equate with perjury, let alone,
persecution of an innocent peron [sic]. Settled is the rule that when there is
no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive why the
prosecution witnesses should testify falsely against the accused or implicate
him in a serious offense, their testimonies deserve full faith and credit.
75

"[C]ircumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if (i) there is

more than one circumstance; (ii) the facts from which the inference is
derived are proven; and (iii) the combination of all circumstances is such as
to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. All the foregoing elements
were sufficiently established in this case."

G.R. No. 207175, November 26, 2014

EDUARDO MAGSUMBOL, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
It is a time-honored rule that the assessment of the trial court with regard to
the credibility of witnesses deserves the utmost respect, if not finality, for
the reason that the trial judge has the prerogative, denied to appellate
judges, of observing the demeanor of the declarants in the course of their
testimonies. Though it is true that the trial courts evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great respect and
will not be disturbed on appeal, this rule, however, is not a hard and fast one.
The exception is observed if there is a showing that the trial judge
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of
weight and substance that would have cast doubt on the guilt of the
accused.9 The said exception apparently exists in the case at bench.
Art.

308. Who

are

liable

for

theft.:

xxxx

Theft is likewise committed by:

xxxxx;
1. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the
property of another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or
object of the damage caused by him; and xxx.
Hence, we must reckon with a dictum of the law, in dubilis reus est
absolvendus. All doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused.
G.R. No. 190349, December 10, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRANCASIO
DELFIN, Accused-Appellant.

The elements of rape under par. 1(a), Article 266-A of the RPC are present in
this
case.
Under par. 1(a) Article 266-A of the RPC, rape is committed as follows:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following
circumstances:
a.

Through

force,

threat
76

or

intimidation;

xxxx
Pertinently, the elements of rape under [the above-mentioned provision] are
the following: (1) that the offender is a man; (2) that the offender had carnal
knowledge of a woman; and, (3) that such act is accomplished by using force
or
intimidation15 These
elements
are
present
in
this
case.
Indeed, the inconsistencies in AAAs statements are trivial matters that do
not involve the essential elements of the crime. It has been held that
inconsistencies on matters of minor details do not detract from the actual
fact
of
rape.17
Besides, said inconsistencies cannot affect AAAs credibility especially so
when the RTC and the CA have already held that her testimony was
straightforward, credible, and spontaneous. The rule is well-settled that
factual findings of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are
accorded great weight and respect especially if affirmed by the CA. 18 The
reason behind this is that trial courts have firsthand account of the
witnesses demeanor and deportment in court during trial. 19 The Court shall
not supplant its own interpretation of the testimonies for that of the trial
judge since he is in the best position to determine the issue of
credibility20 of witnesses being the one who had face-to-face interaction
with the same. [I]n the absence of misapprehension of facts or grave abuse
of discretion of the court a quo, and especially when the findings of the judge
have been adopted and affirmed by the CA, [as in this case,] the factual
findings
of
the
trial
court
shall
not
be
disturbed. 21
G.R. No. 192232, December 10, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSE ESTALIN
PRODENCIADO, Accused-Appellant.
In People v. Sanchez,16 we reiterated the guidelines laid down by this Court in
addressing the issue of credibility of witnesses on appeal, viz:
First , the Court gives the highest respect to the RTCs evaluation of the
testimony of the witnesses, considering its unique position in directly
observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its vantage point,
the trial court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of
witnesses.
Second , absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of
the RTCs assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally
bound by the lower courts findings, particularly when no significant facts
and circumstances, affecting the outcome of the case, are shown to have
been
overlooked
or
disregarded.
And third , the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with
the RTC.17
Here, the trial court found AAAs testimony to be credible as it was made in
a simple and consistent manner. Notably, the CA agreed with the RTC on this
point and saw no reason to overturn the same. And upon perusal of the
records of this case, this Court likewise sees no reason to depart from the
lower courts assessment of AAAs testimony. Indeed, her statements
pertaining to the identity of Prodenciado as her violator and the perverse
77

acts he visited upon her were straightforward and categorical. Moreover,

[t]estimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since
when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she
says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been
committed. When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts
are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not
only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be
exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity
are
generally
badges
of
truth
and
sincerity. 18
In rape cases, the date of commission is not an essential element of the
offense.
Time and again, the Court has repeatedly held that it is not incumbent upon
the victim to establish the date when she was raped for purposes of
convicting the perpetrator. This is because [i]n rape cases, the date of
commission is not an essential element of the offense; what is material is its
occurrence,19 which in this case, was sufficiently established by AAA.
AAAs failure to immediately report the rape incidents does not detract
from the fact that they were committed; neither does AAAs resumption of
a
normal
life
after
the
incidents
negate
rape.
Clearly, AAA did not reveal to anyone what Prodenciado was doing to her
out of fear that he might make good his threats to kill her and her family.
Indeed, in one case, we have recognized that [t]he fear of [the victim] that
her father would kill her and the other members of her family, should she
report the incident to her mother or the police, is not so unbelievable nor is it
contrary to human experience. 30 Besides, the failure of the victim to
immediately report the rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge and
does not detract from the fact that rape was committed. 31
It has been held that different people react differently to different situations
and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is
confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience, 33 such as rape.
Verily, some victims choose to suffer in silence; while others may be moved
to action out of a need to seek justice for what was done to them. Then there
are those who opt not to dwell on their experience and try to live as though it
never happened. To the Courts mind, this is how AAA tried to cope with the
harrowing experience that befell her. Moreover, since she was just a young
girl when all these rapes were committed against her, AAA simply knew no
other
way
of
life
than
what
she
was
accustomed
to.
While it is true that the result of AAAs medical examination only supports
the fact that AAA has already had sexual intercourse and does not by itself
establish that it was her father, Prodenciado, with whom she had sex, this
does not divest the results of medical examination of any relevance.
InPeople v. Cial35 it was explained that:
[T]he examining physician was presented to testify only on the fact
that he examined the victim and on the results of such examination.
He is thus expected to testify on the nature, extent and location of
the wounds. Dr. Arnulfo Imperial (Dr. Imperial) found, among others, that
AAA suffered hymenal lacerations. This refers to the location and nature of
the wounds suffered by the victim. Dr. Imperial could not be expected to
78

establish the cause of such lacerations with particularity because he

has no personal knowledge of how these hymenal lacerations were
inflicted on AAA. He could only surmise that the lacerations could have
been caused by activities like cycling, horseback riding x x x or the insertion
of a hard object into the vagina of the victim x x x such as the penis.
Clearly, the result of the medical examination and the testimony of the
examining physician thereon are essential to establish only the nature,
extent and locations of the wounds and not the cause thereof. Verily, AAAs
medical certificate reveals that she sustained hymenal lacerations. The
examining physician, Dr. Viray, testified as to the location and nature of the
same. However, Dr. Viray did not state on the said medical certificate or in
his testimony the exact cause of said lacerations as he has no personal
knowledge as to how they were inflicted on AAA. He could only theorize
that they may have been caused by the insertion of a hard object, such as an
erected penis.37 It is only AAA herself who can positively state the source of
her hymenal lacerations. And as shown by the overwhelming evidence for
the prosecution, she has sufficiently demonstrated that it was her own
father, Prodenciado, who caused the same when he repeatedly raped her.
The medical report is by no means controlling. This Court has repeatedly
held that a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in the
prosecution for rape, and no law requires a medical examination for the
successful prosecution thereof. The medical examination of the victim or the
presentation of the medical certificate is not essential to prove the
commission of rape as the testimony of the victim alone, if credible, is
sufficient to convict the accused of the crime. The medical
examination of the victim as well as the medical certificate is merely
corroborative in character.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman
unconscious; and

is

deprived

of

reason

or

otherwise

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is

demented.
The

crime

of

rape

shall

be

punished

by reclusion

perpetua.

xxxx
As such, the CA was correct in upholding Prodenciados conviction for
statutory rape and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.45 However, in view of Republic Act No. 9346 46 (RA 9346), he is not
eligible
for
parole.
For the rape in 1995 (second rape), Article 335 of the RPC as amended by RA
7659 was already the pertinent law in rape cases. The relevant portions
thereof provide:

79

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman
unconscious; and

is

deprived

of

reason

or

otherwise

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is

demented.
The

crime

of

rape

shall

be

punished

by reclusion

perpetua.

The death penalty shall x x x be imposed if the crime of rape is committed

with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and
the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree,
or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
x
Article
x

266-B. Penalty.

x
x

x
x

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is

committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying
circumstances:
l) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law
spouse
of
the
parent
of
the
victim;
xxxx
As such, his penalty therefor shall also be reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole for each of the two counts of qualified rape.

G.R. No. 206162, December 10, 2014

ALEX M. VALENCERINA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

80

In all criminal cases, the prosecution is burdened with the duty of

establishing with proof beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of an
accused.12 The determination of whether the prosecution has fulfilled such a
heavy burden is left to the trial court, which, in turn, must be satisfied with
moral certainty that an accused has indeed committed the crime on the
basis of facts and circumstances to warrant a judgment of
conviction.13 Otherwise, where there is reasonable doubt, acquittal must then
follow.14The premise is that an accused is presumed innocent until the
contrary
is
proved.15
In finding Valencerina guilty of giving undue advantage or preference to
Ecobel, in violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
the Sandiganbayan was convinced that the elements of the crime were duly
established. These elements, as enumerated by the Court inBautista v.
Sandiganbayan,16 are as follows:
(1) the offender is a public officer;
(2) the act was done in the discharge of the public officers official,
administrative or judicial functions;
(3) the act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence; and
(4) the public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the
Government,or gave
any
unwarranted
benefits,
advantage
or
preference.
Being the Vice-President for Marketing and Support Services of GSIS,
Valencerina was no doubt a public officer, and the alleged acts complained of
were
done
while
he
was
in
office.
The Court also believes that the third and last constitutive elements were
established. The Sandiganbayan correctly relied on the testimonies of the
witnesses, which were based primarily on the January 27, 1998
Memorandum, and the Certifications, dated March 30, 1998 and January 14,
1999, issued by Valencerina himself. These documents purportedly showed
his resignation to favor Ecobel in the issuance of the subject bond as well as
his alleged participation in the negotiation of the loan sought to be
guaranteed under the bond, thus, making him guilty of the offense charged.
The third element of the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
may be committed in three ways, that is, through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Proof of any of these three in
connection with the prohibited acts mentioned in Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 is enough to convict.17 The Court expounds:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[As defined], [p]artiality is synonymous with bias which excites a
disposition to see and report matters as they are wished for rather than as
they are. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it
imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of
a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it
partakes of the nature of fraud. Gross negligence has been so defined as
negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting
to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully
and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as
other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even
inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property. 18

81

In this case, Valencerina clearly extended, with evident bad faith, undue
advantage to Ecobel in the process of issuing and negotiating the subject
bond. His act of endorsing Ecobels application to the PGM despite his
knowledge that the obligee of the loan was not PVB but a foreign lender,
clearly shows his disregard for the policy of GSIS requiring the existence of
governmental interest in the transaction. In the observation of the GSIS audit
team, as it appeared in a report before the Sandiganbayan, PVB was merely
used to show that GSIS has an insurable interest in the loan. The truth,
however, is that BSIL was the funder and obligee of the credit sought to be
guaranteed
by
the
bond.

Indeed, these documents serve as the bedrock of the prosecutions position

that he violated Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. It is
true that these were mere photocopies and, as a general rule, if the original
copy cannot be produced, a photocopy, can only be admitted in evidence if it
is shown that the original is unavailable 21 by proving (1) the existence or due
execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the
reason for its non-production in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the
absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be
attributed.22 The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution,
loss,
and
contents.23
There are two ways by which Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be violated
first by causing undue injury to any party, including the government and
second, by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference. Although neither mode constitutes a distinct offense, an accused
may be charged under either mode or both. In the amended information, the
prosecution charged him for both. A perusal of the same simply yields no
other conclusion that Valencerina, together with the other accused, was
charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 for [w]ilfully,
unlawfully and criminally, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality,
participat[ing], or contribut[ing] to, the release or issuance of Surety Bond
GIF NO. 029132 xxxx hereby affording unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference
to
Ecobel
Land
Incorporated.

G.R. No. 211703, December 10, 2014

EDELBERT C. UYBOCO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court states that petitions for review on
certiorari shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth,
as held by this Court in Microsoft Corp. v. Maxicorp, Inc.,4 to wit:
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover only
questions of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable. A question of law
exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set of facts. A
question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts.
82

Findings of fact made by a trial court are accorded the highest degree of
respect by an appellate tribunal and, absent a clear disregard of the
evidence before it that can otherwise affect the results of the case, those
findings should not be ignored.5 Absent any clear showing of abuse,
arbitrariness or capriciousness committed by the lower court, its findings of
facts, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and
conclusive
upon
this
Court.6
This rule admits of exceptions, as follows: (1) where the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) where
the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) where there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) where the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and
(5) the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are premised on the absence of
evidence
and
are
contradicted
by
evidence
on
record. 7
Even if the foregoing rules were to be relaxed in the interest of substantial
justice, this Court nevertheless finds no reason to disagree with the factual
findings of the Sandiganbayan. A meticulous scrutiny of the records of the
case persuades Us to conclude that the Sandiganbayan did not err in its
finding that petitioner is guilty of the crime charged. The evidence on record
amply supports the findings and conclusions of the Sandiganbayan and
petitioner has shown no cause for this Court to apply any of the foregoing
exceptions.
Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 provides:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared
to
be
unlawful:
x

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross in excusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
For accused to be found liable under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, the following
elements must concur:
1) The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or
official
functions;
2) He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable
negligence;
and
3) That his action caused undue injury to any party, including the
government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his functions.8
Based on the records of the case, the elements of the crime charged exist in
the
present
case.
On the first element, accused Valencia was a public officer at the time the
83

acts in question were committed. Thus, while petitioner was a private

individual, he was found to have been in conspiracy with accused Valencia.
This is in accord with the rule that private persons may be charged in
conspiracy with public officers, as We held in People of the Philippines v.
Henry T. Go:9
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when
acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty,
held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in
consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain
acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt
practices act or which may lead thereto. This is the controlling doctrine as
enunciated by this Court in previous cases, among which is a case involving
herein private respondent.
The Sandiganbayan found that petitioner and accused Valencia acted in
conspiracy to commit the crime charged, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The records show that conspiracy existed by and between accused Rodolfo
Valencia and Edelbert Uyboco, president of Gaikoku, considering that the
procurement of the subject dump trucks for an overpriced amount of
PhP6,994,286.00 could not have been possible without each others
participation and cooperation, as evidenced by their execution and approval
of the purchase order No. 4979 dated March 1993, and Gaikokus proforma
invoice.10
Petitioner failed to dispute any of the documentary evidence presented by
the prosecution and relied upon by the Sandiganbayan. Thus, there appears
to
be
no
reason
for
this
Court
to
review
such
finding.
As to the second element, accused Valencia entered into a negotiated
contract
with
Gaikoku
without
authority
from
the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan (SP). In fact, Valencia had already approved the purchase
request for the dump trucks as early as March 1993, prior to any SP
resolution
approving
such
direct
acquisition.
The Sandiganbayan correctly ruled, and respondents aptly pointed out, that
accused Valencia failed to comply with the requirements of Section 369 of
the Local Government Code on negotiated purchase, which required that
there must have been at least two failed public biddings before a contract for
a negotiated purchase may be entered into. The defense failed to present
any substantial evidence of the two failed biddings. In fact, it was proved by
presented evidence that the alleged failed biddings were merely simulated.
The present case is similar to the case of Plameras v. People,11 wherein this
Court upheld the conviction of the accused, to wit:
As correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan, certain established rules,
regulations and policies of the Commission on Audit and those mandated
under the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) were knowingly
sidestepped and ignored by the petitioner which enabled CKL
Enterprises/Dela Cruz to successfully get full payment for the school desks
and armchairs, despite non-delivery an act or omission evidencing bad
faith
and
manifest
partiality.
It must be borne to mind that any procurement or acquisition of supplies or
property by local government units shall be through competitive public
bidding. This was reiterated in the Local Government Code of 1991 on
procurement of supplies which provides:
84

Sec. 356. General Rule in Procurement or Disposal. Except as otherwise

provided herein, acquisition of supplies by local government units shall be
through competitive public bidding. x x x
The petitioner admitted in his testimony that he is aware of such
requirement, however, he proceeded just the same due to the alleged advice
of the unnamed DECS representative that there was already a negotiated
contract a representation or misrepresentation he willfully believed in,
without any verification. As a Governor, he must know that negotiated
contract can only be resorted to in case of failure of a public bidding. As it is,
there is no public bidding to speak of that has been conducted. Intentionally
or not, it is his duty to act in a circumspect manner to protect government
funds. To do otherwise is gross inexcusable negligence, at the very least,
especially so, that petitioner acted on his own initiative and without
authorization from the Provincial School Board. This can be proved by his
failure to present even a single witness from the members of the Board
whom he consulted as he claimed.12
Finally, the third element of the crime is also present since it had been
proven that an overpayment was made for the dump trucks, since these
were directly imported by the Provincial Government from the distributor in
Japan. With this direct importation, the Provincial Government should have
only paid the tax-free amount of P4,594,119.85. Instead, accused Valencia
had already authorized and caused the disbursement of P6,994,286, or an
excess of P2,400,166.15, in favor of petitioners company, Gaikoku. This has
clearly
caused
undue
injury
to
the
government.
The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his
counsel in the realm of procedural technique. The basis is the tenet that an
act performed by counsel within the scope of a general or implied authority
is regarded as an act of the client. While the application of this general rule
certainly depends upon the surrounding circumstances of a given case, there
are exceptions recognized by this Court: (1) where reckless or gross
negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when its
application will result in outright deprivation of the clients liberty or
property; or (3) where the interests of justice so require.

G.R. No. 170046, December 10, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MAXIMO A. BORJE, JR.,
BURT B. FAVORITO, FLORENDO B. ARIAS, ERDITO Q. QUARTO,
AGERICO C. PALAYPAY, NAPOLEON S. ANAS, DANILO C. PLANTA,
LUISITO S. DELA ROSA, ROGELIO L. BERAY, NORMA A. VILLARMINO,
RICARDO M. JUAN, JR., NELSON UMALI, MARIA LUISA T. CRUZ,
MELISSA T. ESPINA, VIOLETA R. TADEO, JESSICA J. CATIBAYAN,
VIOLETA C. AMAR, RONALDO G. SIMBAHAN, FELIPE A. SAN JOSE,
ROLANDO C. CASTILLO, CONCHITA N. DELA CRUZ, JANETTE A.
BUGAYONG, JESUS D. CAPUZ, RODELIA R. UY, ROMEO C. FULLIDO,
NONETTE H. FULLIDO, VICTORIA M. GO, CARMELITO V. EDEM,
AUGUSTO C. CAPUZ,+ VICENTE SANTOS, JR., JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES, AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION), Respondents.
It is well to recall that there are two kinds of determination of probable
85

cause: executive and judicial. On the one hand, executive determination of

probable cause ascertains whether a criminal case must be filed in court. 11 It
is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a
broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge
those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and
should be held for trial.12 On the other hand, judicial determination of
probable cause ascertains whether a warrant of arrest should be issued
against the accused. It is one made by a judge who must satisfy himself that
based on the evidence presented, there is necessity in placing the accused
under custody so that the ends of justice will not be frustrated. 13
Verily, as far as crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan are concerned, the
determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation, or
reinvestigation for that matter, is a function that belongs to the Office of the
Ombudsman, which is empowered to determine, in the exercise of its
discretion, whether probable cause exists, and to charge the person believed
to
have
committed
the
crime
as
defined
by
law. 14
It is well settled that courts do not interfere with the discretion of the
Ombudsman to determine the presence or absence of probable cause
believing that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof necessitating the filing of the corresponding information with
the appropriate courts.15 This rule is based not only on respect for the
investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the
Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. If it were otherwise,
the functions of the Court will be seriously hampered by innumerable
petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by
the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in
much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped with cases
if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of
the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an
information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. 16
The Office of the Ombudsman, in this case, found probable cause which
would warrant the filing of an information against respondents. For purposes
of filing a criminal information, probable cause has been defined as such
facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and that respondents are probably guilty thereof. It is such
set of facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the Information, or any
offense included therein, has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested.17 A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was
committed by the suspect. It need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of
guilt.18 Thus, unless it is shown that the Ombudsmans finding of probable
cause was done in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
evidencing a clear case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, this Court will not interfere with the same. 19
The Ombudsman in this case, however, was merely performing his duty as
mandated by the Constitution 23 and by law.24 Filing an Information against
respondents in this case based on sufficient ground to engender a wellfounded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondents are
86

probably guilty thereof cannot be said to be whimsical or despotic. As

effectively shown by evidence, the Ombudsmans charge was not at all
baseless for the link between the respondents and the anomalous
transactions herein has been satisfactorily established. In the absence,
therefore, of any showing that the questioned acts of the Ombudsman were
done in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment evidencing a clear
case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
this Court will not interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise of his
constitutionally
mandated
powers.

G.R. No. 193670, December 03, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VENERANDO DELA
CRUZ Y SEBASTIAN,Accused-Appellant.

In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, [such as shabu], the

following elements must be duly established: (1) the identity of the buyer
and seller, the object, and the consideration, and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment therefor. The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseurbuyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully
consummate the buy-bust transaction.4 Here, the prosecution submitted
evidence that duly established the elements of illegal sale of shabu. It
positively identified appellant as the seller of the seized illegal substance
which turned out to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride
commonly known as shabu, a dangerous drug. Appellant sold and delivered
the drug for P1,500.00 to Ebio, a police asset who acted as poseur-buyer.
Verily, all the elements of the sale of illegal drugs were established to
support
appellants
conviction
of
the
said
offense.
Chain of custody is the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to
receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction.5 It eliminates doubts concerning the proper preservation of the
identity and integrity of the corpus delicti or the shabu in this case. Marking
of the seized shabu is the initial stage in the chain of custody in buy-bust
operations. As requisites, the marking must be made in the presence of the
apprehended offender and upon immediate confiscation, and this
contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending
team.6chanrobleslaw
.
Anent appellants defense of frame-up, such is inherently weak and viewed
with disfavor for it can be easily concocted. 8 For this defense to succeed, it
must be proven with strong and convincing evidence. 9 Appellant failed in this
regard.

87

88