ASSIGNMENT NO.

4- CASE DIGESTS
JAYSON ABABA

MESINA V. IAC
FACTS:
Jose Go purchased from Associate Bank a Cashiers Check, which he left on
top of the managers desk when left the bank. The bank manager
then had it kept for safekeeping by one of its employees.
The
employee was then in conference with one Alexander Lim. He left the check
in
his
desk
and upon his return, Lim and the check were gone.
When Go
inquired about his check, the same couldn't be found and Go was advised to
request for the stoppage of payment which he did. He executed also an
affidavit
of
loss
as
well
as
reported
it
to
the
police.
The bank then received the check twice for clearing. For these two times,
they dishonored the payment by saying that payment has been
stopped. After the second time, a lawyer contacted it demanding
payment. He refused to disclose the name of his client and threatened to
sue.
Later,
the
name of Mesina was revealed. When asked by the police on how he
possessed the check, he said it was paid to him Lim. An information for
theft
was
then
filed
against
Lim.
A case of interpleader was filed by the bank and Go moved to participate as
intervenor in the complaint for damages.
Mesina moved for the
dismissal of the case but was denied.
The trial court ruled in the
interpleader case ordering the bank to replace the cashiers check in favor of
Go.
ISSUE: did IAC go beyond the scope of its certiorari jurisdiction by making
findings of facts in advance of trial.
HELD:
The records of the case show that respondent bank had to resort to details
in support of its action for Interpleader. Before it resorted to Interpleader,

respondent bank took an precautionary and necessary measures to bring out

the truth. On the other hand, petitioner concealed the circumstances known
to him and now that private respondent bank brought these circumstances
out in court (which eventually rendered its decision in the light of these
facts), petitioner charges it with "gratuitous excursions into these nonissues." Respondent IAC cannot rule on whether respondent RTC committed
an abuse of discretion or not, without being apprised of the facts and
reasons why respondent Associated Bank instituted the Interpleader case.
Both parties were given an opportunity to present their sides. Petitioner
chose to withhold substantial facts. Respondents were not forbidden to
present their side-this is the purpose of the Comment of respondent to the
petition. IAC decided the question by considering both the facts submitted
by petitioner and those given by respondents. IAC did not act therefore
beyond the scope of the remedy sought in the petition.

G.R. No. L-5552 January 28, 1954

ANTONIO DELUMEN, ET AL vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts: On October 9, 1951, Antonio, Juan and Julito, surnamed Delumen,

filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Samar, alleging that they are
legitimate children of Pacencia Pua, a Filipino woman, and Mariano Delumen
who was declared a Filipino citizen by the same court in an order dated
August 7, 1950, and praying said court to determine whether they are
Filipino citizens and to declare their corresponding rights and duties. It is
further alleged in the petition that the petitioners have continuously resided
in the Philippines since their birth, have considered themselves as Filipinos,
had exercised the right to vote in the general elections of 1946 and 1947,
and were registered voters for the elections in 1951. The Solicitor General,
in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, filed an answer alleging that the
petition states no cause of action, there being no adverse party against
whom the petitioners have an actual or justiciable controversy. After
hearing, the Court of First Instance of Samar rendered a decision declaring
the appellees to be Filipinos by birth and blood. From this decision the
Solicitor General has appealed.
Issue: does the petition state cause of action?
Held: Under the first assignment of error, the appellant cites our decision
in Hilarion C. Tolentino vs. The Board of Accountancy, et al. * G.R. No. L-

3062, September 28, 1951, wherein we held that: "A petition for declaratory
relief must be predicated on the following requisites: (1) there must be a
justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose
interest are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a
legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue invoked must be ripe for
judicial determination."chanrobles virtual law library
While the Solicitor General contends that the justiciable controversy is one
involving " an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side and a
denial thereof on the other concerning a real, and not a mere theoretical
question or issue (1 C.J.S., p. 1026)," and that in the present case "no
specific person was mentioned in the petition as having or claiming an
adverse interest in the matter and with whom the appellees have an actual
controversy," the appellees argue that, by virtue of the answer filed by the
Solicitor General opposing the petition for declaratory relief, a justiciable
controversy thereby arose. We are of the opinion that the appellant's
contention is tenable, since there is nothing in the petition which even
intimates that the alleged status of the appellees as Filipino citizens had in
any instance been questioned or denied by any specific person or authority.
Indeed, the petition alleges that the appellees have considered themselves
and were considered by their friends and neighbors as Filipino citizens, voted
in the general elections of 1946 and 1947, and were registered voters for
the elections of 1951, and it is not pretended that on any of said occasions
their citizenship was controverted. It is not accurate to say, as appellees do,
that an actual controversy arose after the filing by the Solicitor General of an
opposition to the petition, for the reason that the cause of action must be
made out by the allegations of the complaint or petition, without the aid of
the answer. As a matter of fact, the answer herein alleges that the petition
states no cause of action. In essence, the appellees merely wanted to
remove all doubts in their minds as to their citizenship, but an action for
declaratory judgment cannot be invoked solely to determine or try issues or
to determine a moot, abstract or theoretical question, or decide claims which
are uncertain or hypothetical. (1 C.J.S., p. 1024.) And the fact that the
appellees' desires are thwarted by their "own doubts, or by fears of others . .
. does not confer a cause of action." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, 1952 ed., Vol. II, p. 148, citing Willing vs. Chicago Auditorium Assn.,
277 U.S., 274, 289, 48 Sup. Ct., 507, 509.)chanrobles virtual law library
In view of what had been said, it becomes unnecessary to discuss either the
second contention of the Solicitor General that the trial court erred in holding
that the petition for declaratory relief may be utilized to obtain a judicial
pronouncement as to appellees' citizenship, or his third contention that the
evidence does not support the conclusion in the appealed decision that the

appellees are Filipino citizens.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual

law library
Wherefore, the appealed decision is reversed and the petition dismissed
without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered

OLADDA VS CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts: Felipe B. Ollada is a certified public accountant, having passed the
examination given by the Board of Accountancy, and is duly qualified to
practice his profession. On July 22, 1952, his name was placed in the rolls of
certified public accountants authorized and accredited to practice
accountancy in the office of the Central Bank of the Philippines. In
December, 1955, by reason of a requirement of the Import-Export
Department of said bank that CPAs submit to an accreditation under oath
before they could certify financial statements of their clients applying for
import dollar allocations with its office, Ollada's previous accreditation was
nullified.
On April 16, 1956 the Central Bank filed a motion to dismiss the petition for
Declaratory Relief for lack of cause of action. Its main contention was that
the Central Bank has the responsibility of administering the Monetary
Banking System of the Republic and is authorized to prepare and issue,
through its Monetary Board, rules and regulations to make effective the
discharge of such responsibility; that the accreditation requirement alleged
in the petition was issued in the exercise of such power and authority; that
the purpose of such requirement is not to regulate the practice of
accountancy in the Philippines but only the manner in which certified public
accountants should transact business with the Central Bank.
On May 3, 1956, petitioner Ollada applied for a writ of preliminary injunction
to restrain the respondent Central Bank of the Philippines from enforcing the
accreditation requirement aforesaid until final adjudication of the case. In a
memorandum submitted by said respondent opposing the issuance of the
writ, it manifested that it was willing to delete paragraph 13 from its CB-IED
Form No. 5 (Application for accreditation of certified public accountants),
which required CPAs to answer the query whether they agreed, if accredited
with the Import-Export Department, Central Bank of the Philippines, to
follow strictly the rules and regulations promulgated by the Philippine
Institute of Accountants

Finally, on July 31, 1956, the lower court, resolving the motion to dismiss
filed by respondent, dismissed the complaint.
Issue: whether or not the facts alleged in the petition for Declaratory Relief
and others elicited from the parties and made of record by them prior to the
issuance of the order appealed from, this case was properly dismissed.
Held:
Petitioner commenced this action as, and clearly intended it to be one for
Declaratory Relief under the provisions of Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. On
the question of when a special civil action of this nature would prosper, we
have already held that the complaint for declaratory relief will not prosper if
filed after a contract, statute or right has been breached or violated. In the
present case such is precisely the situation arising from the facts alleged in
the petition for declaratory relief. As vigorously claimed by petitioner himself,
respondent had already invaded or violated his right and caused him injury
all these giving him a complete cause of action enforceable in an
appropriate ordinary civil action or proceeding. The dismissal of the action
was, therefore, proper in the light of our ruling in De Borja vs. Villadolid, 47
O.G. (5) p. 2315, and Samson vs. Andal, G.R. No. L-3439, July 31, 1951,
where we held that an action for declaratory relief should be filed before
there has been a breach of a contract, statutes or right, and that it is
sufficient to bar such action, that there had been a breach which would
constitute actionable violation. The rule is that an action for Declaratory
Relief is proper only if adequate relief is not available through the means of
other existing forms of action or proceeding (1 C.J.S. 1027-1028).
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed,
without prejudice to the aggrieved party seeking relief in another
appropriate action. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by Us on
November 5, 1956 is hereby set aside, and the motion for contempt filed by
petitioner on September 30, 1957 is denied. With costs against appellant.

MALANA VS TAPPA
G.R. No. 18130; September 17, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioners filed before the RTC their Complaint for Reivindicacion, Quieting
of Title, and Damages against respondents alleging that they are the owners
of a parcel of land situated in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan. Petitioners inherited
the subject property from AnastacioDanao (Anastacio), who died
intestate. During the lifetime of Anastacio, he had allowed Consuelo Pauig to
build on and occupy the southern portion of the subject property. Anastacio
and Consuelo agreed that the latter would vacate the said land at any time
that Anastacio and his heirs might need it.
Petitioners claimed that respondents, Consuelos family members, continued
to occupy the subject property even after her death, already building their
residences thereon using permanent materials. Petitioners also learned that
respondents were claiming ownership over the subject property. Averring
that they already needed it, petitioners demanded that respondents vacate
the same. Respondents, however, refused to heed petitioners demand.
Petitioners
referred
their
land
dispute
with
respondents
to
the LupongTagapamayapa of
Barangay
Annafunan
West
for
conciliation. During the conciliation proceedings, respondents asserted that
they owned the subject property and presented documents ostensibly
supporting their claim of ownership. According to petitioners, respondents
documents were highly dubious, falsified, and incapable of proving the
latters claim of ownership over the subject property; nevertheless, they
created a cloud upon petitioners title to the property. Thus, petitioners were
compelled to file before the RTC a Complaint to remove such cloud from
their title. However, such complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The RTC referred to Republic Act No. 7691, amending Batas PambansaBlg.
129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, which
vests the RTC with jurisdiction over real actions, where the assessed value of
the property involved exceeds P20,000.00. It found that the subject property
had a value of less than P20,000.00; hence, petitioners action to recover the
same was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned RTC
Order dismissing their Complaint. They argued that their principal cause of
action was for quieting of title; the accionreivindicacion was included merely
to enable them to seek complete relief from respondents. Petitioners
Complaint should not have been dismissed, since Section 1, Rule 63 of the

Rules of Court states that an action to quiet title falls under the jurisdiction
of the RTC.
In an Order dated 30 May 2007, the RTC denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. It reasoned that an action to quiet title is a real
action. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691, it is the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) that exercises exclusive jurisdiction over real actions where the
assessed value of real property does not exceed P20,000.00. Since the
assessed value of subject property was P410.00, the real action involving the
same was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Petitioners filed another pleading, simply designated as Motion, in which they
prayed that the RTC Orders dated 4 May 2007 and 30 May 2007, dismissing
their Complaint, be set aside. They reiterated their earlier argument that
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court states that an action to quiet title
falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. They also contended that
there was no obstacle to their joining the two causes of action, i.e., quieting
of title and reivindicacion, in a single Complaint. And even if the two causes
of action could not be joined, petitioners maintained that the misjoinder of
said causes of action was not a ground for the dismissal of their Complaint.
The RTC issued an Order dated 31 October 2007 denying petitioners
Motion. It clarified that their Complaint was dismissed, not on the ground of
misjoinder of causes of action, but for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC dissected
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested
under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or
whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation
may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights
or duties, thereunder.
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet
title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to
consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may
be brought under this Rule.
The RTC differentiated between the first and the second paragraphs of
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The first paragraph refers to an
action for declaratory relief, which should be brought before the RTC. The

second paragraph, however, refers to a different set of remedies, which

includes an action to quiet title to real property. The second paragraph must
be read in relation to Republic Act No. 7691, which vests the MTC with
jurisdiction over real actions, where the assessed value of the real property
involved does not exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila and P20,000.00 in all
other places.
Hence, the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or Rule 63, Section 1 (declaratory relief) is properly invoked in the
instant case.
HELD:
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a
deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are
affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The
relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and
determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial
declaration of the parties rights or duties thereunder.
As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in
Tax Declaration No. 02-48386 is only P410.00; therefore, petitioners
Complaint involving title to and possession of the said property is within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC
Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has
been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising
thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure
an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under
a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or
compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach
thereof, it may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the
statute, deed, or contract to which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief
gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the
state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need
for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a
repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of
wrongs.
Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of
an action for declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction

over the action. In other words, a court has no more jurisdiction over an
action for declaratory relief if its subject has already been infringed or
transgressed before the institution of the action.
In the present case, petitioners Complaint for quieting of title was
filed after petitioners already demanded and respondents refused to vacate
the subject property. In fact, said Complaint was filed only subsequent to the
latters express claim of ownership over the subject property before
the LupongTagapamayapa, in direct challenge to petitioners title.
Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already
been deprived of the possession of their property, the proper remedy
for
them
is
the
filing
of
an accionpubliciana or
an accionreivindicatoria,
not
a
case
for
declaratory
relief. An accionpubliciana is a suit for the recovery of possession, filed one
year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful
withholding of possession of the realty. An accionreivindicatoria is a suit that
has for its object ones recovery of possession over the real property as
owner.
Petitioners
Complaint
contained
sufficient
allegations
for
an accionreivindicatoria. Jurisdiction over such an action would depend on
the value of the property involved. Given that the subject property herein is
valued only at P410.00, then the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over an
action to recover the same. The RTC, therefore, did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing, without prejudice, petitioners Complaint in Civil
Case No. 6868 for lack of jurisdiction.

ENG VS LEE

FACTS:
Nixon Lees father passed away on June 22, 1992 in Manila and left a
holographic will, which is now in the custody of petitioner UyKiaoEng, his
mother. Nixon Lee filed, on May 28, 2001, a petition for mandamus with
damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, to compel his
mother to produce the will so that probate proceedings for the allowance
thereof could be instituted.
Allegedly, Lee had already requested his mother to settle and liquidate
the patriarchs estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective
inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason.
KiaoEng traversed the allegations in the complaint and posited that the
same be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, for lack of cause of
action, and for non-compliance with a condition precedent for the filing
thereof. She denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will
and that she knew of its whereabouts. She, moreover, asserted that
photocopies of the will were given to Lee and to his siblings.
The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of
respondent Lees evidence, petitioner KiaoEng demurred, contending that
her son failed to prove that she had in her custody the original holographic
will.
She asserted that the pieces of documentary evidence presented,
aside from being hearsay, were all immaterial and irrelevant to the issue
involved in the petition and that they did not prove or disprove that she
unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoined as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, for the court to
issue the writ of mandamus.
RTC denied the demurrer but granted the same upon motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was
denied and the case was dismissed.
Aggrieved, Lee appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which
was denied or lack of merit. However, it was granted when respondent
moved
for
reconsideration.
The
appellate
court
amended
its
decision, granted the motion, set aside its earlier ruling, issued the writ, and
ordered the production of the will anchored on the basis that this time
respondent was able to show by testimonial evidence that his mother had in
her possession the holographic will.
KiaoEng moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Left with
no other recourse KiaoEng brought the case before the Supreme Court is a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing

Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals in denying her motion for

reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for mandamus is the proper remedy
RULING:
NO. The first paragraph of Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
pertinently provides that
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of
an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from
the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time
to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to
protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages
sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
respondent.
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent
jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some
inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring
the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results
from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from
operation of law. This definition recognizes the public character of the
remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the
purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no
interest. The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a
public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially
when the public right involved is mandated by the Constitution. As the
quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation,
board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.
The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to
do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to
give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. Nor will
mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to
which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a mere technical

question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is

meritorious. As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the
following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom
the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or
[b] that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded
petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he
is entitled. On the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ
of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded
and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act
required.
Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus
cannot be used to enforce contractual obligations. Generally, mandamus will
not lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and will not lie against
an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public
duty is imposed. The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right against
an individual The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act,
when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in
cases relating to the public and to the government; hence, it is called a
prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not
used for the redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the
public.
Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is
that there should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law other than the remedy of mandamus being invoked. In other
words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual modes of
procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief. Although
classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its
issuance is generally controlled by equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of
the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court.
In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining
whether the obligation involved here is the production of the original
holographic will is in the nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the
remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there
lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.
There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law for the production of the subject will, the remedy of

mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state that respondent Lee lacks
a cause of action in his petition.
The petition for review on certiorari was granted.

Planters Development Bank vs. James Ng, et. al.

G.R. No. 187556
May 5, 2010
Facts: James Ng and his brother Anthony (respondents) obtained loans from
petitioner amounting to P25,000,000.00 to secure which they mortgaged
two parcels of land situated in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City and
covered by TCT Nos. 79865 and 79866 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City.
Respondents failed to settle their loan obligation; hence, petitioner instituted
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage before Notary Public Stephen Z.
Taala.The Notice of Auction Sale scheduled the sale of the properties covered
by the mortgage at the Main Entrance of the Hall of Justice Building
in Quezon City.The Notice was published in Metro Profile, a newspaper of
general circulation.
The highest bidder at the auction sale was petitioner to which was issued a
Certificate of Sale that was registered with the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City.
As respondents failed to redeem the mortgage within one year, petitioner
filed an ex-parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession, lodged
before RTC-QC, Branch 77.
In the meantime, respondents instituted an action for Annulment of
Certificate of Sale, Promissory Note and Deed of Mortgage, raffled to RTCQC, Branch 221 which issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining
petitioner from consolidating its title to the properties and committing any
act of dispossession that would defeat respondents right of ownership.
RTC-QC, Branch 77 denied the issuance of a writ of possession.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the decision having been denied, it
filed, before this Court, the present petition for review on certiorari on pure
questions of law, in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue: Whether the denial of the issuance of the writ of possession is valid
Held: It is settled that questions regarding the validity of a mortgage or its
foreclosure as well as the sale of the property covered by the mortgage
cannot be raised as ground to deny the issuance of a writ of possession. Any
such questions must be determined in a subsequent proceeding as in fact,
herein respondents commenced an action for Annulment of Certificate of
Sale, Promissory Note and Deed of Mortgage.
The court a quo denied the issuance of the writ as it credited respondents
opposition to petitioners petition for the issuance of a writ of possession.
By crediting
empted its
respondents
respondents

respondents opposition, Branch 77 of the court a quo preco-equal branch, Branch 221, to which jurisdiction over
annulment petition was laid, from determining the merits of
claim-basis of said petition.

Section 33 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption
period; by whom executed or given. If no redemption be made within one
(1) year from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale, the
purchaser is entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property; x xx
Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or
redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest
and claim of the judgment obligor to the property as of the time of the levy.
Since respondents failed to redeem the mortgage within the reglementary
period, entitlement to the writ of possession becomes a matter of right and
the issuance thereof is merely a ministerial function.
The judge to whom an application for a writ of possession is filed need not
look into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure. Until
the foreclosure sale is annulled, the issuance of the writ of possession is
ministerial.
In fact, even during the period of redemption, the purchaser is entitled as of
right to a writ of possession provided a bond is posted to indemnify the
debtor in case the foreclosure sale is shown to have been conducted without
complying with the requirements of the law. More so when, as in the present
case, the redemption period has expired and ownership is vested in the
purchaser.

In fine, it was grievous error for QC-RTC, Branch 77 to deny petitioners

motion for the issuance of a writ of possession.

G.R. No. 160208; June 30, 2008

MARTELINO VS NATIONAL HOME MORTGAGE FINANCE
CORPORATION and HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND
FACTS:
The case stemmed from the petition for declaratory relief and prohibition
with urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction filed before the RTC of Caloocan City, by petitioners
against the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) and the
Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF), herein respondents, and Sheriff
Alberto A. Castillo.Petitioners alleged that they obtained housing loans from
respondents who directly released the proceeds thereof to the subdivision
developer, Shelter Philippines, Inc. (Shelter).
However, Shelter failed to complete the subdivision according to its
representations and the subdivision plan. They were thus compelled to
spend their own resources to improve the subdivision roads and alleys, and
to install individual water facilities. Respondents, on the other hand, failed to
ensure Shelters completion of the subdivision. Instead, respondents ignored
their right to suspend amortization payments for Shelters failure to complete
the subdivision, charged interests and penalties on their outstanding loans,
threatened to foreclose their mortgages and initiated foreclosure
proceedings against petitioner Rafael Martelino. Hence, they prayed that
respondents be restrained from foreclosing their mortgages.
Moreover, petitioners specifically sought a declaration from the RTC that their
right as house and lot buyers to suspend payment to Shelter for its failure to
fully develop the subdivision also applied to respondents who released their
loans directly to Shelter; and that during the suspension of payment,
respondents should not assess them accrued interests and penalties.
Petitioners further prayed that they be allowed to pay their housing loans
without interest and penalties.
In its June 17, 1998 Order, the RTC set the preliminary injunction hearing,
On July 9, 1998, the RTC ordered that a writ of preliminary injunction be

issued restraining the respondents from foreclosing the mortgages on

petitioners houses.The writ was issued on July 14, 1998.
On August 10, 1998, the NHMFC filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss
the Petition on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over its person or
over the subject matter of the case.
In dismissing the case, the RTC ruled that the issue of non-completion of the
subdivision should have been brought before the HLURB. It also ruled that
no judicial declaration can be made because the petition was vague. The RTC
assumed that the subject of the petition was Republic Act No. 8501 or the
Housing Loan Condonation Act of 1998 which was cited by petitioners. But
the RTC pointed out that petitioners failed to state which section of the law
affected their rights and needed judicial declaration. The RTC also noted
that, as stated by petitioners, respondents still foreclosed their mortgages, a
breach of said law which rendered the petition for declaratory relief
improper. The proper remedy was an ordinary civil action, the RTC
concluded
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Order.
ISSUE.
Whether declaratory relief is not the proper remedy
HELD
Yes, declaratory relief is not the proper remedy.
under Section 1, Rule 63, a person must file a petition for declaratory
relief before breach or violation of a deed, will, contract, other
written instrument, statute, executive order, regulation, ordinance
or any other governmental regulation. In this case, the petitioners had
stated in their petition that respondents assessed them interest and
penalties on their outstanding loans, initiated foreclosure proceedings
against petitioner Rafael Martelino as evidenced by the notice of extrajudicial sale and threatened to foreclose the mortgages of the other
petitioners, all in disregard of their right to suspend payment to Shelter for
its failure to complete the subdivision. Said statements clearly mean one
thing: petitioners had already suspended paying their amortization
payments. Unfortunately, their actual suspension of payments defeated the
purpose of the action to secure an authoritative declaration of their supposed
right to suspend payment, for their guidance. Thus, the RTC could no longer
assume jurisdiction over the action for declaratory relief because its subject
initially unspecified, now identified as P.D. No. 957 and relied upon -correctly or otherwise -- by petitioners, and assumed by the RTC to be Rep.

Act No. 8501, was breached before filing the action. As we said in
Tambunting, Jr. v. Sumabat:
. . . The purpose of the action [for declaratory relief] is to secure
an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the
parties under a statute, deed, contract, etc. for their guidance in
its enforcement or compliance and not to settle issues arising
from its alleged breach. It may be entertained only before the
breach or violation of the statute, deed, contract, etc. to which it
refers. Where the law or contract has already been
contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory
relief, the court can no longer assume jurisdiction over
the action. Under such circumstances, inasmuch as a
cause of action has already accrued in favor of one or the
other party, there is nothing more for the court to explain
or clarify short of a judgment or final order

DARIO vs MISON
176 SCRA 84
FACTS: On March 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino promulgated
Proclamation No. 3, "DECLARING A NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE
REFORMS MANDATED BY THE PEOPLE, PROTECTING THEIR BASIC RIGHTS,
ADOPTING A PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION, AND PROVIDING FOR AN
ORDERLY TRANSITION TO A GOVERNMENT UNDER A NEW CONSTITUTION.
Among other things, Proclamation No. 3 provided:
SECTION 1. The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the
mandate of the people to:
(a) Completely reorganize the government, eradicate unjust and oppressive
structures, and all iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime.
Actually, the reorganization process started as early as February 25, 1986,
when the President, in her first act in office, called upon "all appointive
public officials to submit their courtesy resignations beginning with the
members of the Supreme Court." Later on, she abolished the
BatasangPambansa and the positions of Prime Minister and Cabinet under
the 1973 Constitution.
On May 28, 1986, the President enacted Executive Order No. 17,

"PRESCRIBING RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF

SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF THE FREEDOM CONSTITUTION." Executive Order
No. 17 recognized the "unnecessary anxiety and demoralization among the
deserving officials and employees" the ongoing government reorganization
had
generated,
and
prescribed
several
grounds
for
the
separation/replacement of personnel.
Specifically, she said on May 28, 1986: WHEREAS, in order to obviate
unnecessary anxiety and demoralization among the deserving officials and
employees, particularly in the career civil service, it is necessary to prescribe
the rules and regulations for implementing the said constitutional provision
to protect career civil servants whose qualifications and performance meet
the standards of service demanded by the New Government, and to ensure
that only those found corrupt, inefficient and undeserving are separated
from the government service. Noteworthy is the injunction embodied in the
Executive Order that dismissals should be made on the basis of findings of
inefficiency, graft, and unfitness to render public service.
The Presidents Memorandum of October 14, 1987 should furthermore be
considered. We quote, in part: Further to the Memorandum dated October 2,
1987 on the same subject, I have ordered that there will be no further layoffs this year of personnel as a result of the government reorganization.
On January 30, 1987, the President promulgated Executive Order No. 127,
"REORGANIZING THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE." Among other offices,
Executive Order No. 127 provided for the reorganization of the Bureau of
Customs and prescribed a new staffing pattern therefor.
Three days later, on February 2, 1987, the Filipino people adopted the new
Constitution.
On January 6, 1988, incumbent Commissioner of Customs Salvador Mison
issued a Memorandum, in the nature of "Guidelines on the Implementation
of Reorganization Executive Orders," prescribing the procedure in personnel
placement. On the same date, Commissioner Mison constituted a
Reorganization Appeals Board charged with adjudicating appeals from
removals under the above Memorandum. On January 26, 1988,
Commissioner Mison addressed several notices to various Customs officials.
A total of 394 officials and employees of the Bureau of Customs were given
individual notices of separation. A number supposedly sought reinstatement
with the Reorganization Appeals Board while others went to the Civil Service
Commission. The first thirty one mentioned above came directly to this
Court. The records indeed show that Commissioner Mison separated about

394 Customs personnel but replaced them with 522 as of August 18, 1988.
On June 30, 1988, the Civil Service Commission promulgated its ruling
ordering the reinstatement of the 279 employees. On July 15, 1988,
Commissioner Mison, represented by the Solicitor General, filed a motion for
reconsideration. Acting on the motion, the Civil Service Commission, on
September 20, 1988, denied reconsideration. On October 20, 1988,
Commissioner Mison instituted certiorari proceedings with this Court.
On November 16, 1988, the Civil Service Commission further disposed the
appeal (from the resolution of the Reorganization Appeals Board) of five
more employees. On January 6, 1989, Commissioner Mison challenged the
Civil Service Commissions Resolution in this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 127, which provided for the
reorganization of the Bureau of Customs is valid
RULING: Yes. There is no question that the administration may validly carry
out a government reorganization insofar as these cases are concerned,
the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs by mandate not only of the
Provisional Constitution, supra, but also of the various Executive Orders
decreed by the Chief Executive in her capacity as sole lawmaking authority
under the 1986-1987 revolutionary government. It should also be noted that
under the present Constitution, there is a recognition, albeit implied, that a
government reorganization may be legitimately undertaken, subject to
certain conditions.
RATIO:Reorganizations have been regarded as valid provided they are
pursued in good faith.
TOMATIC ARATUC VS COMELEC
G.R. No. L-49705-09
February 8, 1979
Facts:
Petitioners are independent candidates for representatives to tile Interim
BatasangPambansa who had joined together under the banner of the
Kunsensiya ng Bayan. They complained of alleged irregularities in the
election records in all the voting centers in the whole province of Lanao del
Sur, and eleven towns in Sultan Kudarat, by reason for which, petitioners
had asked that the returns from said voting centers be excluded from the
canvass. The Regional Board of Canvassers issued a resolution, over the
objection of petitioners, declaring all eight KBL candidates elected.

Appeal was taken by the petitioners to the COMELEC. The COMELEC issued
its questioned resolution declaring seven KBL candidates and one KB
candidate as having obtained the first eight places, and ordering the
Regional Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winners. Petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari with restraining order and preliminary injunction
alleging that the COMELEC committee grave abuse of discretion, amounting
to lack of jurisdiction.
Issue:
WON certiorari is the proper remedy
Ruling:
This is as it should be. A review includes digging into the merits and
unearthing errors of judgment, while certiorari deals exclusively with grave
abuse of discretion, which may not exist even when the decision is otherwise
erroneous. certiorari implies an indifferent disregard of the law, arbitrariness
and caprice, an omission to weight pertinent considerations, a decision
arrived at without rational deliberation. While the effects of an error of
judgment may not differ from that of an indiscretion, as a matter of policy,
there are matters that by their nature ought to be left for final determination
to the sound discretion of certain officers or entities, reserving it to the
Supreme Court to insure the faithful observance of due process only in cases
of patent arbitrariness.
We hold, therefore that under the existing constitution and statutory
provisions, the certiorari jurisdiction of the Court over orders, and decisions
of the Comelec is not as broad as it used to be and should be confined to
instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial
denial of due process. Accordingly, it is in this light that We the opposing
contentions of the parties in this cases.

EMELINDA ABEDES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: Sometime in 1996, respondent ReliaQuizonArciga filed an action
before the RTC of Pasig City against Wilfredo, husband of herein petitioner
EmelindaAbedes, seeking support for her daughter, Dannielle Ann Arciga. A
Decision was therein rendered, declaring Wilfredo the natural father of
Danielle Ann. Wilfredo was similarly ordered by the RTC of Pasig City to
support Danielle Ann. A writ of execution was issued. Unfortunately, the
Sheriff's Return showed that no personal property of Wilfredo could be levied
upon to satisfy the judgment. Later, a real property was discovered to be

allegedly registered in the name of Wilfredo in the Province of Tarlac. Herein

petitioner filed a Third Party Claim. Petitioner alleged that the property
belongs exclusively to her, and Wilfredo had no present and existing right
thereto. Therefore, it may not be utilized to satisfy the judgment rendered
against her husband Wilfredo. Notwithstanding the adverse claim, a Notice
of Sheriff's Sale was made announcing the sale to the public and to the
highest bidder. For such purpose, a public auction was scheduled. Petitioner
filed a Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and TRO which was also granted.
The RTC of Tarlac City opined that the property is petitioner's paraphernal
property. As her exclusive property, it may not be made liable for the
obligations of Wilfredo. Even assuming that the property is part of the
conjugal partnership, it may not be held liable for the support of Danielle
Ann who is an illegitimate child of Wilfredo. Hence, the RTC enjoined
respondent Sheriff RonbertoValino from conducting the public sale of the
property. However, CA reversed the decision. Abedes filed a motion for
reconsideration raising issue of lack of jurisdiction.
Issue: WON petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is proper
Held: No. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper if a tribunal, board
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. However, the proper remedy
is an ordinary appeal to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45. An
appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is a continuation of
the judgment complained of, while that under Rule 65 is an original or
independent action. We have underscored that the remedy of certiorari is
not a substitute for lost appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are
mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. In the case at bar, the
Resolution of the appellate court which denied reconsideration of its Decision
was received by petitioner on 2 August 2005. She had until 17 August 2005
within which to perfect her appeal. However, none was made. Instead, she
comes to this Court via a petition for certiorari in an effort to salvage her lost
appeal. Evidently, appeal was available to petitioner. It was also the speedy
and adequate remedy under the circumstances. Petitioner was unable to
show that there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. Petition is dismissed.

G.R. NO. 165001

January 31, 2007

NEW FRONTIER SUGAR CORPORATION vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,

BRANCH 39, ILOILO CITY and EQUITABLE PCI BANK
FACTS: New Frontier Sugar Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged
in the business of raw sugar milling. Foreseeing that it cannot meet its
obligations with its creditors as they fell due, petitioner filed a Petition for
the Declaration of State of Suspension of Payments with Approval of
Proposed Rehabilitation Plan under the Interim Rules of Procedure on
Corporate Rehabilitation. RTC issued a Stay Order appointing Manuel B.
Clemente as rehabilitation receiver, ordering the latter to put up a bond, and
setting the initial hearing on the petition.
One of petitioners creditors, the Equitable PCI Bank filed a
Comment/Opposition with Motion to Exclude Property, alleging that
petitioner is not qualified for corporate rehabilitation, as it can no longer
operate because it has no assets left. Respondent bank also alleged that the
financial statements, schedule of debts and liabilities, inventory of assets,
affidavit of general financial condition, and rehabilitation plan submitted by
petitioner are misleading and inaccurate since its properties have already
been foreclosed and transferred to respondent bank before the petition for
rehabilitation was filed, and petitioner still owes respondent bank deficiency
liability.
RTC issued an Omnibus Order terminating the proceedings and dismissing
the case.Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion but this was denied by the RTC.
Petitioner then filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari, which was
denied by the CA by sustaining the findings of the RTC that since petitioner
no longer has sufficient assets and properties to continue with its operations
and answer its corresponding liabilities, it is no longer eligible for
rehabilitation. The CA also ruled that even if the RTC erred in dismissing the
petition, the same could not be corrected anymore because what petitioner
filed before the CA was a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court instead of an ordinary appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed
before it as improper, appeal being an available remedy.
RULING: No. The CA did not err in upholding the RTCs dismissal of the
petition for rehabilitation in view of the fact that the titles to petitioners
properties have already passed on to respondent bank and petitioner has no
more assets to speak of, specially since petitioner does not dispute the fact
that the properties which were foreclosed by respondent bank comprise the
bulk, if not the entirety, of its assets.

The Interim Rules was enacted to provide for a summary and nonadversarial rehabilitation proceedings. This is in consonance with the
commercial nature of a rehabilitation case, which is aimed to be resolved
expeditiously for the benefit of all the parties concerned and the economy in
general.
As provided in the Interim Rules, the basic procedure is as follows:
1) The petition is filed with the appropriate Regional Trial Court;
2) If the petition is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the
trial court shall issue a Stay Order, which shall provide, among others,
for the appointment of a Rehabilitation Receiver; the fixing of the
initial hearing on the petition; a directive to the petitioner to publish
the Order in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines once
a week for two (2) consecutive weeks; and a directive to all creditors
and all interested parties (including the Securities and Exchange
Commission) to file and serve on the debtor a verified comment on or
opposition to the petition, with supporting affidavits and documents.
3) Publication of the Stay Order;
4) Initial hearing on any matter relating to the petition or on any
comment and/or opposition filed in connection therewith. If the trial
court is satisfied that there is merit in the petition, it shall give due
course to the petition;
5) Referral for evaluation of the rehabilitation plan to the rehabilitation
receiver who shall submit his recommendations to the court;
6) Modifications or revisions of the rehabilitation plan as necessary;
7) Submission of final rehabilitation plan to the trial court for
approval;\
8) Approval/disapproval of rehabilitation plan by the trial court;
In the present case, the petition for rehabilitation did not run its full course
but was dismissed by the RTC after due consideration of the pleadings filed
before it. On this score, the RTC cannot be faulted for its summary dismissal,
as it is tantamount to a finding that there is no merit to the petition. This is
in accord with the trial courts authority to give due course to the petition or
not under Rule 4, Section 9 of the Interim Rules. Letting the petition go
through the process only to be dismissed later on because there are no

assets to be conserved will not only defeat the reason for the rules but will
also be a waste of the trial courts time and resources.
The CA also correctly ruled that petitioner availed of the wrong remedy when
it filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
Certiorari is a remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of
judgment. It is an original and independent action that was not part of the
trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained
of. More importantly, since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for
certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court
prior to an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or any
plain, speedy or adequate remedy. A petition for certiorari should be filed not
later than sixty days from the notice of judgment, order, or resolution, and a
motion for reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing of a
petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct
the alleged errors.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs VILMA ALMENDRAS y ZAPATA ET.

AL.
(G.R. NO. 145915 April 24, 2003)
FACTS:
Respondent spouses Almendras were arrested by the PNP NARCOM of
Calamba, Laguna for selling Shabu at the Mountain View Resort Restaurant
in Pansol between the hours of three to six in the morning of June 18, 1998.
The prosecution rested its case and reception of defense evidence was
then set for for May 12, 13, and 17, 1999.
On May 10, 1999, defense counsel move for leave to a Motion for
Demurrer to Evidence and the admission of said Demurrer with alternative
prayer for bail. The trial court denied the Demurrer to Evidence and ruled
that what is material in a prosecution for sale of an illegal drug is proof that
both the marked money and the shabu were presented in open court.
The defense then filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction before the Court of Appeals alleging

that the trial court gravely abused its judicial disretion in denying their
demurrer to evidence and their prayer for bail.
On March 20, 2000, defense counsel moved to suspend proceedings of
the trial court pending the final disposition by the Court of Appeals on their
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus.
The trial court resumed and promulgated its judgment finding
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced to death.
ISSUE:
Whether trial court erred in proceeding to resolve the case without
awaiting the resolution of CA in the appellants petition for certiorari?
RULING:
The case for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Preliminary
Injunction, which was filed by the defense counsel with the CA to assail the
trial courts denial of their demurrer to evidence, did not interrupt the course
of the principal action nor the running of the reglementary periods involved
in the proceedings.
Settled is the rule that to arrest the course of the principal action
during the pendency of certiorari proceedings, there must be restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction from the appellate court directed to
the lower court. There was none in the instant case.
Case remanded to the trial court for reception of defense evidence.

BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS and MORTGAGE BANK vs. COURT OF

APPEALS
Facts:
Banco Filipino Filipino had reached the allowable limit in branch
site holdings but contemplated further expansion of its operations and
Consequently, it unloaded some of its holdings to Tala Realty. Banco Filipino
thereafter leased the same branch sites from Tala Realty which was
conceived and organized precisely as a transferee corporation by the major
stockholderof Banco Filipino. After the issuance of
the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) to TalaRealtys certificate of registration, the
board of directors of Banco Filipino authorized negotiations for the sale of
some of its branch sites, through a Board Resolution with other numerous
real properties owned by the former being treated the same to the latter.
The instant case originated from the sale by Banco Filipino to Tala Realty of
four (4) lots in Iloilo City, covered and described in the aforementioned TCT
Nos. 62273 and 62274, for two million one hundred ten thousand pesos
(P2,110,000.00) Tala Realty then leased them back to Banco Filipino for a
monthly rental of twenty one thousand pesos (P21,000.00) /for a period of
twenty (20) years and renewable for another twenty (20) years. The lease
contracts of the other branch sites sold to Tala Realty have substantially
similar terms and conditions, except for the amount of the rent.
Tala Realty demanded payment of increased rentals, deposits and goodwill
from Banco Filipino, with a threat of ejectment in case of failure to comply
thereto. Due to Banco Filipinos failure to comply with TalaRealtys terms, the
latter carried out its threat by filing numerous ejectment suits against Banco
Filipino This prompted Banco Filipino to file, on August 16, 1995, an action
for recovery of real properties before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo,
Branch 28, on the ground of breach of trust.
The court rendered judgment in favor of Tala Realty to wit;
A thorough and careful perusal was made by the undersigned
Presiding Judge of the arguments of opposing counsels,
ventilated in their respective memoranda. Opposing counsels
cited the pertinent Supreme Court Circulars, provisions of the
Rules of Court and related Decisions of the Supreme Court in
support of their arguments.
After weighing the foregoing, this Court is of the opinion and so
holds that the contention of the defendants in their motions to
dismiss, etc., is meritorious.

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the defendants separate

motions to dismiss are hereby granted Therefore, let this case
be, as it is hereby Dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
the trial court denied Banco Filipinos motion for reconsideration.Banco
Filipino received a copy of said order of denial July 5, 1996 but instead of
filing an appeal, it filed, on July 24, 1996, a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 before the Court of Appeals the Court of Appeals dismissed Banco
Filipinos petition on the ground, among others, that the "[p]etitioners
recourse to Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is patently malapropos.
Banco Filipinos failure to appeal by writ of error within the reglementary
period and its belated recourse to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was
interpreted by the Court of Appeals as a desperate attempt by Banco Filipino
to resurrect what was otherwise already a lost appeal
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in failing to
correct by certiorari the dismissal order by the rtc and that respondent court
gravely erred in ruling that a writ of error should be the proper remedy
instead of a petition for certiorari under rule 65
HELD: Banco Filipinos proper remedy from the adverse resolutions of the
Court of Appeals is an ordinary appeal to this Court via a petition for review
under Rule 45 and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 A petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper if a tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.We have said time and again that for
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari to lie by reason of grave abuse of
discretion, the abuse of discretion, must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law, or where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal
hostility.
Nothing in the record of this case supports Banco Filipinos bare assertion
that the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed resolutions with grave abuse
of discretion.
The availability to Banco Filipino of the remedy of a petition for review from
the decision of the Court of Appeals effectively foreclosed its right to resort
to a petition for certiorari. This Court has often enough reminded members

of the bench and bar that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
lies only when there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. Certiorari is not allowed when a party to a case
fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy. The
remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative
or successive.
Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for the lapsed or lost remedy of
appeal. Banco Filipinos recourse to a special civil action for certiorariwas
borne not out of the conviction that grave abuse of discretion attended the
resolution of its petition before the Court of Appeals but simply because
of its failure to file a timely appeal to this Court.
It is true that this Court may treat a petition for certiorari as having been
filed under Rule 45 to serve the higher interest of justice, but not when the
petition is filed well beyond the reglementary period for filing a petition for
review and without offering any reason therefor.
Banco Filipino from the order of the RTC, it filed its petition
for certiorari some fourteen (14) days after the lapse of the
reglementary period to appeal to the Court of Appeals. Likewise, when
it filed
its petition for certiorari before this Court, forty five (45) days
have already passed since the end of the fifteen (15) day
reglementary period for filing an appeal to the Supreme Court.
Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure should be an
effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to at least explain its failure
to comply with the rules. There must be exceptional circumstances to justify
the relaxation of the rules, we cannot find any such exceptional
circumstances in this case and neither has Banco Filipino endeavored to
prove the existence of any. Another elementary rule of procedure
applies and that is the doctrine that perfection of an appeal within
the reglementary period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional
so that failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and
executory, and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter
the final judgment, much less to entertain the appeal

Felix Uy Chua vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 121438
October 23, 2000
FACTS:
Sometime in July 1984, a probate court allowed the sale of the lot located in
Cebu for P200,000.00 to the spouses Enriquez. Later, the spouses and Aida,
the heir of the decedent, agreed to rescind the said sale. On January 1988,
the probate court again issued an order allowing the re-sale of said lot, the
proceeds of which shall be used to pay the P200,000.00 already paid by the
Enriquez spouses. On April 1991, a Deed of Absolute Sale thereof was
executed in favor of Sofia Sanchez, herein private respondent, for
P1,000,000.00 payable with a down payment of P500,000.00 and the
balance to be paid after the lot was cleared of squatters.
On July 1991, IntervenorSagrario Morelos, filed a motion for reconsideration
opposing the sale alleging that the sale was prejudicial to the minor heirs of
he decedent. He claimed that the lot could be sold for P1.5 million pesos.
Judge Abarquez held a conference in chambers attended by Aida and her
counsel Atty. Recto de Dios, Atty. Rodolfo M. Morelos, counsel of Sagrario
Morelos, and Atty. Federico Cabilao, another intervenor who represented
undisclosed clients interested to purchase the land. During the conference,
Atty. Cabilao revealed that he offered P2 million pesos for the lot with the
seller undertaking the eviction of the present occupants, or P1.5 million with
the buyer shouldering the expenses to clear the lot of its present occupants.
Aida objected to Atty. Cabilao's statement. She explained that the latter's
offer was made only after the sale to Sanchez was already approved by the
court.
On August 1991 Atty. Cabilao, on instructions of Judge Abarquez, filed his
Proposal to Purchase the Property. In her comment and opposition to the
proposal of Atty. Cabilao, Aida Morada said that the court's order approving
the sale to Sofia Sanchez had already become final and executory, and that
she had bought the land from the administratrix in good faith and for value.
She added that she should not suffer whatever missteps were committed by
the administratrix.
On November 1991, Judge Abarquez issued an order revoking his approval
of the sale and declared void and without effect the deed of absolute sale he
had earlier approved on the basis that the Administratrix deliberately
concealed from the Court the fact that Sanchez had extended to her a loan
of P300,000.00 before the execution of the Deed of Sale and that the said
amount was already deducted by Sanchez from the down payment of
P500,000.00 where the procedure jointly resorted to by the Administratrix

and by Sanchez was tantamount to a foreclosure of their loose mortgage

agreement, a procedure that is not allowed to take place in a probate court.
Almost immediately after his order, Judge Abarquez also approved the
proposal of Atty. Cabilao to purchase the property for P1.5 million.
On January 1992, Sanchez filed a motion for reconsideration and made a
counter-offer of P1.6 million, a hundred thousand pesos more than the
amount offered by Atty. Cabilao. The motion was denied in an order dated
February 25, 1992. The court said that the Order approving the sale to Atty.
Cabilao had become final and executory and that the counter offer was not a
compelling reason for the court to vacate its order. As it turned out, the
property was bought by Felix Uy Chua, Roberto Iping Chua and Richard Uy
Chua, the clients of Atty. Cabilao who are now petitioners before this Court.
Sanchez filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals alleging
that respondent Judges Abarquez and Alio-Hormachelos abused their
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when they issued the questioned
orders.
The appellate court granted the petition in favor of private respondent
Sanchez and the Deed of Absolute Sale in her favor was affirmed and
reinstated. Reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the proper remedy for respondent was to appeal under Rule
45?
HELD:
The Court held in the negative. The Court held the proper remedy was to
appeal under Rule 65. Petitioners allege that the proper remedy for
respondent was to appeal under Rule 45 under which private respondent was
already time-barred and the Court of Appeals should not have taken
cognizance of the petition. Petitioners misread the applicable law, Rules and
precedents.

A special civil action for certiorari challenging the RTC with grave abuse of
discretion may be instituted either in the Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court. Both have original concurrent jurisdiction. Certiorari is an
extraordinary remedy available only when there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. While ordinarily,

certiorari is unavailing where the appeal period has lapsed, there are
exceptions. Among them are (a) when public welfare and the advancement
of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires;
(c) when the writs issued are null and void; (d) or when the questioned
order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. As early
as Crisostomo vs. Endencia, we held:
". . . The remedy by certiorari may be successfully invoked both in
cases wherein an appeal does not lie and in those wherein the right to
appeal having been lost with or without the appellant's negligence, the
court has no jurisdiction to issue the order or decision which is the
subject matter of the remedy."
The questioned orders of the probate court nullifying the sale to Sanchez
after it approved the sale and after its order of approval had become final
and executory amount to oppressive exercise of judicial authority, a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

ROMYS FREIGHT SERVICE, vs. CASTRO

G.R. No. 141637
June 8, 2006
FACTS:
Private respondent Castro and Veloria were hired by petitioner as a mechanic
and as a carpenter , respectively. Castro suffered a stroke while Veloria
suffered an accident when the overheated water coming from the radiator of
a car he was repairing spurted onto his face, burning it.
Both received show cause letters requiring them to explain why they should
not be disciplined. Petitioner filed complaints for estafa and qualified theft
against Castro and charged Veloria for qualified theft of the missing tools.
Because of petitioners acts against them, both joined in filing a case for
illegal constructive dismissal against petitioner.
For its part, petitioner denied that private respondents were dismissed from
their employment, asserting that private respondents abandoned their work.
Executive Labor Arbiter JesselitoLatoja ruled that petitioner was
guilty of illegal dismissal and ordered it to pay private respondents the
total amount of P352,944.90, representing 13th month pay, backwages,
separation pay, premium pay for work rendered on rest days and holidays,
and attorneys fees.

Private respondents moved for the clarification of the decision, specifically on

the award of backwages in their favor. While the decision discussed their
entitlement to backwages, it was not included in the computation of the
judgment award in the dispositive portion of the decision. The labor arbiter,
in his order, recognized his inadvertence and granted the motion. He
amended the decision and increased the award to P985,529.20 to include
backwages.
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC which, in its decision, reversed and set
aside the labor arbiters ruling. It found private respondents guilty of
abandonment of work and dismissed their complaint for illegal dismissal
against petitioner.3
Aggrieved, private respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals (CA). They ascribed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the NLRC for not finding that they were constructively dismissed by
petitioner.
The appellate court granted the petition. It ruled that, since the findings of
the labor arbiter were supported by substantial evidence, it should be
respected by appellate tribunals. Petitioner failed to overcome the burden of
proving the existence of just cause for dismissing private respondents,
hence, it was guilty of illegal dismissal.
The CA held that the respondents failure to report for work was for
justifiable reasons and that they had no intention to sever their employment.
As a consequence, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the NLRC.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the appellate courts decision but
the same was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA is correct that the petition for certiorari of private
respondents should have been dismissed outright for failure to file a motion
for reconsideration with the NLRC before filing the petition for certiorari with
the CA.
HELD:
Yes. SC affirmed the CA decision.

As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration is needed before a petition

for certiorari under Rule 65 can be resorted to. However, there are well
recognized exceptions to this rule. Private respondents petition for certiorari
before the CA was covered by the exceptions.
The issue raised in the certiorari proceeding before the appellate court, i.e.,
whether private respondents were constructively dismissed without just
cause, was also the very same issue raised before the NLRC and resolved by
it. Moreover, the employer-employee relationship between petitioner and
private respondents was impressed with public interest. Thus, it was proper
for the appellate court to take cognizance of the case even if no motion for
reconsideration had been filed by private respondents with the NLRC.
The sole object of the writ is to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse
of discretion. The phrase grave abuse of discretion has a precise meaning in
law, denoting abuse of discretion "too patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or act in contemplation of law, or where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal
hostility." It does not encompass an error of law. Nor does it include a
mistake in the appreciation of the contending parties respective evidence or
the evaluation of their relative weight.
The sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of
jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction, and does not include the review of public respondents
evaluation of the evidence and the factual findings based thereon. Therefore,
the present petition for certiorari fails insofar as it questions the affirmation
by the CA of the factual finding of the labor arbiter that private respondents
were illegally dismissed, entitling them to an award of backwages, unpaid
benefits, separation pay and attorneys fees.

VANGIE BARRAZONA VS REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,

BRANCH 61, BAGUIO CITY and
SAN-AN REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, herein
represented by RODRIGO CHUA TIU
FACTS:
San-an Realty and Development Corporation, respondent, owns a building
located at Naguilian corner Asin Road, Baguio City. VangieBarrazona,
petitioner, has been leasing portions of the building identified as Units 203 A

and B at the second floor. The period of the lease is for two (2) years,
commencing July 15, 2001 and ending June 30, 2003. The monthly rental
is P400.00 per square meter for Unit 203 A and P500.00 per square meter
for Unit 203 B.
Starting August 2001, petitioner defaulted in the payment of the monthly
rentals and failed to pay despite demands by respondent. Thus, on May 14,
2002, respondent filed with the RTC, Branch 61, Baguio City, a Complaint for
Collection of Sum of Money with Damages.
On June 3, 2002, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground, among others, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint
considering that the allegations therein clearly indicate that the action is one
for ejectment (illegal detainer) which is under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC).
The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit. Barroza, petitioner,
filed the instant Petition for Certiorari alleging that: (1) the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
denying her Motion to Dismiss; and (2) the Resolution denying her Motion to
Dismiss is unconstitutional as it does not state its legal basis.
On the other hand, respondent RTC Baguio City, in praying for the dismissal
of the petition, contends that (1) the complaint is for the collection of unpaid
rentals as there is absolutely no allegation that its intent is to eject petitioner
from the premises; (2) petitioner should have first filed a motion for
reconsideration before resorting to the extraordinary suit of certiorari; and
(3) the assailed order denying petitioners motion to dismiss is interlocutory
and, therefore, cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
(1)
Whether Motion for reconsideration should have been filed prior
to filing certiorari;
(2)
Whether denial of motion to dismiss which is an interlocutory
order be subject of a petition for certiorari
RULING:
(1)
YES.
While the complaint is captioned Collection of Sum of Money with
Damages, the allegations therein show that respondents action is for

ejectment. All ejectment cases are within the jurisdiction of the MTC.
Hence, the RTC of Baguio has no jurisdiction over the case.
While an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and non
appeallable, however, if the denial is without or in excess of
jurisdiction, certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies from such
order of denial.
In Time, Inc. v. Reyes, this Court, speaking through Justice J.B. L.
Reyes, held: The motion to dismiss was predicated on the respondent
courts lack of jurisdiction to entertain the action; and the rulings of
this Court are that writs of certiorari or prohibition, or both, may issue
in case of a denial or deferment of an action or on the basis of a
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
Verily, the writ of certiorari is granted to keep an inferior court within
the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
(2)
YES.
The Supreme Court cannot go along with respondents contention that
petitioner should have first filed a motion for reconsideration before
resorting to the remedy of certiorari. While the rule is that before
certiorari may be availed of, petitioner must first file a motion for
reconsideration with the lower court of the act or order complained
of, however, such rule is not without exception.
The SC have, in several instances, dispensed with the filing of a motion
for reconsideration of a lower courts ruling, such as:
a. where the proceedings in which the error occurred is a patent
nullity;
b. where the question is purely of law;
c. when public interest is involved;
d. where judicial intervention is urgent or its application may cause
great and irreparable damage; and
e. where the court a quo has no jurisdiction, as in this case

Militante vs. Court of Appeals

330 SCRA 318
Facts: Petitioner PiloMilitante is the registered owner of 3 contiguous parcels
of land with an aggregate area of 1,590 square meters in Balintawak,

Caloocan City. The three parcels are covered by TCT Nos. 53066-A, 53067
and 53068, all derived from TCT No. 71357 issued by the Register of Deeds
of Caloocan City. Twenty-four (24) squatter families live in these lots.
President Marcos issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1315expropriating
forty (40) hectares of land in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, covered by TCT
Nos. 70298, and 73960, and portions of TCT Nos. 71357, 2017 and 2018.
The land expropriated was identified in the decree as a slum area that
required the upgrading of basic facilities and services and the disposal of the
lots to their bona fide occupants in accordance with the national Slum
Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) Program and the Metro Manila Zonal
Improvement Program (ZIP).It set aside P40 million as the maximum
amount of just compensation to be paid the landowners.
The NHA, as the decrees designated administrator for the national
government, undertook the implementation of P.D. 1315 in 7 phases called
the Bagong Barrio Project (BBP). The properties covered by Phases 1 to 6
were acquired in 1978 and 1979. BBP Phase 7, which includes petitioners
land, was not among those acquired and paid for in 1978-1979.
Proclamation No. 1893 declared the entire Metropolitan Manila area as Urban
Land Reform Zone. Proclamation No. 1893 was amended by Proclamation
No. 1967 which identified 244 sites in Metropolitan Manila as Areas for
Priority Development and Urban Land Reform Zones.
P.D. No. 1396 created the Department of Human Settlements (DHS) and
placed the NHA under the supervision of said Department.Executive Order
No. 648 transferred the regulatory functions of the NHA to the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), a quasi-judicial body attached
to the DHS.
Petitioner wrote the HSRC seeking a declaration of non-coverage from the
Urban Land Reform Program of the government. HSRC Commissioner
Raymundo R. Dizon, Jr. issued a certificate declaring petitioners lots "outside
the declared Urban Land Reform Zone."
With this certificate, petitioner asked the NHA to relocate the squatters on
his land. Acting on the request, General Gaudencio Tobias, NHA General
Manager, sent a letter to Mayor MacarioAsistio, Jr., of Caloocan City, to
conduct a census of the families occupying petitioners lots.
The NHA called the squatters for a dialogue "to look into the possibility of
amicably settling the eviction problem and/or to find out why a clearance
should be issued or not for the removal/ demolition of all the illegal

structures in the said property."The squatters did not attend the meeting. In
view of their failure to attend, Joaquin Castano, Acting Division Manager,
Resettlement Division, NHA, wrote a memorandum to the Department
Manager, Resettlement Department, NHA, recommending the issuance of a
demolition clearance.
NHA General Manager Tobias granted clearance to dismantle and remove all
illegal structures on petitioners property within three (3) months from
receipt of the order. Clearance was also granted for the relocation of the 24
families to the SapangPalay Resettlement Project.
The demolition did not take place. In a letter dated September 16, 1982,
General Tobias inquired from Mayor Asistio whether Caloocan City had plans
of developing petitioners properties in the Bagong Barrio Project. Mayor
Asistio replied that "considering the said properties are private in character,
the City has no plans presently or in the immediate future to develop or
underwrite the development of said properties."
BBP Phase 7 was listed as among the priority projects for implementation
under the governments Community Self-Help Program.The NHA, through
General Tobias, approved an emergency fund of P2 million for the acquisition
of petitioners lots. NHA started negotiations with petitioner. Petitioner,
through an authorized representative, made an initial offer of P200.00 per
square meter. The NHA made a counter-offer of P175.00 per square meter.
Petitioner increased his price to P1,000.00 and later to P3,000.00. NHA
General Manager Raymundo R. Dizon, Jr. informed petitioner that NHAs
maximum offer was P500.00. This was rejected by petitioner, through his
lawyer.
Petitioner, through counsel, requested for a revalidation of his demolition
clearance and relocation of the squatters.
NHA General Manager Monico Jacob revalidated the demolition clearance and
informed Mayor Asistio that the NHA was making available enough serviced
home lots in BagongSilang Resettlement Project for the 24 families.
Respondent Annabelle Carangdang, NHA Project Manager in Bagong Barrio,
refused to implement the clearance to eject the squatters on petitioners
land. Carangdang claimed that petitioners land had already been declared
expropriated by P.D. 1315.
Petitioner then filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a "Petition for
Prohibition
and
Mandamus with
Declaration
as
Inexistent
and
Unconstitutional Presidential Decree No. 1315" against the NHA and
Carangdang.

The respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and held that
petitioner failed to overcome the presumption of the decrees
constitutionality.Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Issue: Whether the petitioner is entitled to a writ of prohibition. Whether
the petitioner is entitled to a writ of mandamus
Held: Petitioner is not entitled to the writ of prohibition. Section 2 of Rule 65
provides:
"Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. When the proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, or person, whether exercising functions judicial or
ministerial, are without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant
to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein.
x xx."
Prohibition is a preventive remedy.It seeks for a judgment ordering the
defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived
to be illegal.
In the case at bar, petitioner does not pray that respondent Carangdang
should be ordered to desist from relocating the squatters. What petitioner
challenges is respondent Carangdangs refusal to implement the demolition
clearance issued by her administrative superiors. The remedy for a refusal to
discharge a legal duty is mandamus, not prohibition.
The petitioner is not also entitled to a writ of mandamus. Section 3, Rule 65
provides:
"Sec. 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board, or
person, unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office
to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act
required to be done to protect the rights of petitioner, and to pay the

damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the

defendant."
Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, or person to
do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use
and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being
no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that he has a well-defined, clear and
certain right to warrant the grant of the writ of mandamus.He failed to
discharge this burden. The records show that there is no direct order from
the NHA General Manager addressed to respondent Carangdang to evict the
squatters and demolish their shanties on the subject property. The NHA
demolition clearance issued by General Tobias was addressed to Mayor
Asistio, the mayor of Caloocan City. The clearances revalidation by NHA
General Manager Monico Jacob was likewise addressed to Mayor Asistio.
Furthermore, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that may be availed of
only when there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. A petition for mandamus is premature if there are
administrative remedies available to the petitioner.
If superior
administrative officers could grant the relief prayed for, special civil actions
are generally not entertained.In the instant case, petitioner has not
exhausted his administrative remedies. He may seek another demolition
order from the NHA General Manager this time directly addressed to
respondent Carangdang or the pertinent NHA representative. In fact, the
Government Corporate Counsel asserts that petitioner should have brought
Carangdangs inaction to the attention of her superiors. There is therefore no
extreme necessity to invoke judicial action as the administrative set-up could
have easily corrected the alleged failure to act.The General Manager, as
Chief Executive Officer of the NHA, has the power of supervision over the
operations and internal affairs of NHA.