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that

infringes

property

rights.

The Due Process Clause


(1st part of Sec. 1, Art. III)
Held:
Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such purposes are
permissible under the police power. The police power of the City of
Manila to enact Ordinance No. 532 is based on Section 2444,
paragraphs (l) and (ee) of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act
No. 2744, authorizes the municipal board of the city of Manila, with the
approval
of
the
mayor
of
the
city:

1. Definition
2. Elements

Person
CASE: Villegas v. Hiu Chong, 86 SCRA 270-Emelie
Diez

(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following:
xxxx
xxxxxlaundries
xxxx.

Political Law Delegation of Powers Administrative Bodies

(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the
sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the
promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience,
and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants.

Pao Ho is a Chinese national employed in the City of Manila. On 27


March 1968, then Manila mayor Antonio Villegas signed Ordinance No.
6537. The said ordinance prohibits foreign nationals to be employed
within the City of Manila without first securing a permit from the Mayor
of Manila. The permit will cost them P50.00. Pao Ho, on 04 May 1968
filed a petition for prohibition against the said Ordinance alleging that
as a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and
non-useful occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit,
which is out of proportion to the cost of registration and that it fails to
prescribe any standard to guide and/or limit the action of the Mayor,
thus, violating the fundamental principle on illegal delegation of
legislative powers. Judge Arca of Manila CFI ruled in favor of Pao Ho
and he declared the Ordinance as being null and void.

The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No. 532 was to
avoid disputes between laundrymen and their patrons and to protect
customers of laundries who are not able to decipher Chinese
characters from being defrauded. (Considering that in the year 1920s,
people of Manila are more familiar with Spanish and maybe English.)
In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court held that the
ordinance invades no fundamental right, and impairs no personal
privilege. Under the guise of police regulation, an attempt is not made
to violate personal property rights. The ordinance is neither
discriminatory nor unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all public
laundries without distinction, whether they belong to Americans,
Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality. All, without exception, and
each every one of them without distinction, must comply with the
ordinance. The obvious objection for the implementation of the
ordinance is based in sec2444 (ee) of the Administrative Code.
Although, an additional burden will be imposed on the business and
occupation affected by the ordinance such as that of the appellant by
learning even a few words in Spanish or English, but mostly Arabic
numbers in order to properly issue a receipt, it seems that the same
burdens are cast upon the them. Yet, even if private rights of person or
property are subjected to restraint, and even if loss will result to
individuals from the enforcement of the ordinance, this is not sufficient
ground for failing to uphold the power of the legislative body. The very
foundation of the police power is the control of private interests for the
public
welfare.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Mayor of


Manila.
HELD: The decision of Judge Arca is affirmed. Ordinance No. 6537
does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the
exercise of his discretion. It has been held that where an ordinance of
a municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to
guide or limit the mayors action, expresses no purpose to be attained
by requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal,
and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary
and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building
permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited
delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity per se lawful.
Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or suggest any
standard or criterion to guide the mayor in the exercise of the power
which has been granted to him by the ordinance. The ordinance in
question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of
the Constitution.

Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed, and the


petition for a preliminary injunction is denied, with costs against the
appellants.

Deprivation

Life

Liberty

Property

3. Aspects

Substantive Due Process


CASES:
Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, 41 Phil 103-Nikka
Oquias
Facts:
Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other Chinese laundrymen who
has general and the same interest, filed a complaint for a preliminary
injunction. The Plaintiffs also questioned the validity of enforcing
Ordinance No. 532 by the city of Manila. Ordinance No. 532 requires
that the receipt be in duplicate in English and Spanish duly signed
showing the kind and number of articles delivered by laundries and
dyeing and cleaning establishments. The permanent injunction was
denied by the trial court. The appellants claim is that Ordinance No.
532 savors of class legislation; putting in mind that they are Chinese
nationals. It unjustly discriminates between persons in similar
circumstances; and that it constitutes an arbitrary infringement of
property rights. They also contest that the enforcement of the
legislation is an act beyond the scope of their police power. In view of
the foregoing, this is an appeal with the Supreme Court.

Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no, 532 is an act
beyond
the
scope
of
police
power
(2) Whether or Not the enforcement of the same is a class legislation

Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500-Jennylin


Maluya
History:
The sales tax has been in force in the Philippines for a number of
years. Our law provides for privilege taxes to be levied on certain
businesses and occupations. These percentage taxes on business are
payable at the end of each calendar quarter in the amount lawfully due
on the business transacted during the past quarter. It is made the duty
of every person conducting a business subject to such tax, within the
same period as is allowed for the payment of the quarterly installments
of the fixed taxes without penalty, to make a true and complete return
of the amount of the receipts or earnings of his business during the
preceding quarter and pay the tax due thereon. All merchants not
specifically exempted must pay a tax of one and one-half per cent on
the gross value in money of the commodities, goods, wares,
merchandise sold, bartered, exchanged, or consigned abroad by them,
such tax to be based on the actual selling price or value of the things in
question at the time they are disposed of or consigned
The income tax has also been established here for sometime, first
pursuant to an Act of Congress and later pursuant to an Act of the
Philippine Legislature (Act No. 2833, as amended by Act No. 2926).
The customary returns are required from individuals and corporations.
The tax is computed and the assessments are made by the Collector
of Internal Revenue and his agents.
The Spanish Code of Commerce, which was in force at that time,
requires that merchants shall keep: A book of inventories and
balances; (2) a daybook; (3) a ledger; (4) a copying book for letters
and telegrams; and (5) the other books required by special laws.
However, it was silent as to the language which the books must be
kept
CIR issued a Circular Letter requiring that the record of sales of
merchants subject to the merchants tax must either be in English or
Spanish
Challenged in the case of Young vs. Rafferty
SC: CIR is not empowered to designate the language which the
entries in the books should be made. Such initiative should not be
taken by the CIR, arguing that it is to protect the govt against evasion
Facts:
On 1921, Act No. 2972 or the Chinese Bookkeeping Law was passed,
regulating that the account books should not be in any other language
exc. English, Spanish or any dialect, otherwise a penalty of fine of not

more than 10K or imprisonment for not more than 2 years will be
imposed
fiscal measure intended to facilitate the work of the government
agents and to prevent fraud in the returns of merchants, in conformity
with the sales tax and the income tax
On March 1923, BIR inspected the books of account of Yu Cong Eng
where it was found out that it is not in accordance with Act 2972
A criminal case was filed against Yu Cong Eng before the CFI Manila
for keeping his books of account in Chinese
Yus defense:
Yu Cong Eng et al are Chinese merchants, claiming that they
represent the other 12K filed a petition for prohibition and injunction
against the CIR, questioning the constitutionality of Act No. 2972 or the
Chinese Bookkeeping Law
Issue: W/N Act No. 2972 is constitutional?

Ruling:
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised in
the lower court and that court must be given an opportunity to pass
upon the question before it may be presented to the appellate court for
resolution
Power of taxation
strongest of all the powers of government, practically absolute and
unlimited
It is a legislative power. All its incidents are within the control of the
legislature. It is the Legislature which must questions of state
necessarily involved in ordering a tax, which must make all the
necessary rules and regulations which are to be observed in order to
produce the desired results, and which must decide upon the agencies
by means of which collections shall be made
The power to tax is not judicial power and that a strong case is
required for the judiciary to declare a law relating to taxation invalid. If,
of course, so great an abuse is manifest as to destroy natural and
fundamental rights, it is the duty of the judiciary to hold such an Act
unconstitutional
The Chinese petitioners are accorded treaty rights of the most
favored nation
Their constitutional rights are those accorded all aliens, which means
that the life, liberty, or property of these persons cannot be taken
without due process of law, and that they are entitled to the equal
protection of the laws, without regard to their race
Act No. 2972 is a fiscal measure which seeks to prohibit not only the
Chinese but all merchants of whatever nationality from making entries
in the books of account or forms subject to inspection for taxation
purposes in any other language than either the English or Spanish
language or a local dialect
the law only intended to require the keeping of such books as were
necessary in order to facilitate governmental inspection for tax
purposes
The Chinese will not be singled out as a special subject for
discriminating and hostile legislation since there are other aliens doing
business in the Phils. There will be no arbitrary deprivation of liberty or
arbitrary spoliation of property. There will be no unjust and illegal
discrimination between persons in similar circumstances. The law will
prove oppressive to the extent that all tax laws are oppressive, but not
oppressive to the extent of confiscation
Act No. 2972 as meaning that any person, company, partnership, or
corporation, engaged in commerce, industry, or any other activity for
the purpose of profit in the Philippine Islands, shall keep its account
books, consisting of sales books and other records and returns
required for taxation purposes by regulations of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, in effect when this action was begun, in English, Spanish, or
a local dialect, thus valid and constitutional
Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil 1155- Caincay
Ichong vs Hernandez
FACTS:
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail
Business). Its purpose was to prevent persons who are not citizens of
the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the peoples economic life.
a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or
corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by Filipinos,
from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade
aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are
allowed to continue their business, unless their licenses are forfeited in
accordance with law, until their death or voluntary retirement. In case
of juridical persons, ten years after the approval of the Act or until the
expiration of term.
Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from
this Act.
provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business
for violation of the laws on nationalization, economic control weights
and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce
and industry.
provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually
engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail
business
Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents,
corporations and partnerships affected by the Act, filed an action to
declare it unconstitutional for the ff: reasons:

it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and


deprives them of their liberty and property without due process
the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title
the Act violates international and treaty obligations
the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their
retail business thru hereditary succession
ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the
laws.
HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny
the aliens the equal protection of the laws. There are real and actual,
positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen,
which
fully justify the
legislative
classification
adopted.
RATIO:
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among
residents. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred
and
liabilities
enforced.
The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one
class
are
treated
alike.
The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis
for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power.
Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and
control by alien of the retail trade. It is this domination and control that
is the legislatures target in the enactment of the Act.
The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between
the alien and the national as a trader. The alien is naturally lacking in
that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the Phil. where he temporarily
stays and makes his living. The alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to
the State, and the State cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or
emergency.
While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to
the needs of the country, the alien may become the potential enemy of
the
State.
The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and
the people on whom he makes his profit. Through the illegitimate use
of pernicious designs and practices, the alien now enjoys a
monopolistic control on the nations economy endangering the national
security in times of crisis and emergency.

Procedural Due Process


twin requirements: notice and hearing
CASE: Vinta Maritime Co., Inc. v. NLRC, 284
SCRA 656- Carla Colaljo

Facts:
Leonides Basconsillo, private respondent, filed a complaint with the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration IPOEA) for illegal
dismissal against Vinta Maritime Co. Inc. and Elkano Ship
Management, Inc. petitioners alleged that Leonides was dismissed for
his gross negligence and incompetent performance as chief engineer
of
the
M/V
Boracay.
The POEA ruled that private respondent was illegally dismissed. On
appeal, the NLRC affirmed the POEA. Likewise, the NLRC denied the
motion
for
reconsideration.
Hence,
this
petition.
Issue:
Whether

or

not

private

respondent

is

illegally

dismissed.

Held:
The absence of a valid cause for termination in this case is apparent.
For an employees dismissal to be valid, (1) the dismissal must be for a
valid cause and (2) the employee must be afforded due process.
Petitioners allege that private respondent was dismissed because of
his incompetence, enumerating incidents in proof thereof. However,
this is contradicted by private respondents seamans book which
states that his discharge was due to an emergency leave. Moreover,
his alleged incompetence is belied by the remarks made by petitioners
in the same book that private respondents services were highly
recommended and that his conduct and ability were rated very good
. Petitioners allegation that such remark and ratings were given to
private respondent as an accommodation for future employment fails
to persuade. The Court cannot consent to such an accommodation,
even if the allegation were true, as it is a blatant misrepresentation. It
cannot exculpate petitioners based on such misrepresentation. When
petitioners issued the accommodation, they must have known its
possible
repercussions.
Due process, the second element for a valid dismissal, requires notice
and hearing. Before the employee can be dismissed under Art. 282,
the Code requires the service of a written notice containing a
statement of the cause/s of termination and giving said employee

ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. A notice of


termination in writing is further required if the employees dismissal is
decided upon. The employer must furnish the worker with two written
notices before termination of employment can be legally effected: (1)
notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions
for which his dismissal is sought and (2) subsequent notice which
informs the employee of the employers decision to dismiss. The twin
requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of
due process, and neither of these elements can be eliminated without
running
afoul
of
the
constitutional
guaranty.
Illegally dismissed workers are entitled to the payment of their salaries
corresponding to the unexpired portion of their employment where the
employment is for a definite period. Conformably, the administrator and
the NLRC properly awarded private respondent salaries for the period
of
the
effectivity
of
his
contract.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed. The challenged
decision and resolution are affirmed.

no award of relief not prayed for


Judicial Due Process
o Impartial and Competent Court
CASES:
Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659- Baroman

Facts:
Petitioner transported 6 caracbaos from Masbate to Iloilo in 1984 and
these wer confiscated by the station commander in Barotac, Iloilo for
violating E.O. 626 A which prohibits transportation of a carabao or
carabeef from one province to another. Confiscation will be a result of
this.
The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of
P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court
sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no
longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court
also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as
raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed
validity.
The same result was decided in the trial court.
In the Supreme Court, he then petitioned against the constitutionality of
the E.O. due to the outright confiscation without giving the owner the
right to heard before an impartial court as guaranteed by due process.
He also challenged the improper exercise of legislative power by the
former president under Amendment 6 of the 1973 constitution wherein
Marcos was given emergency powers to issue letters of instruction that
had the force of law.
Issue: Is the E.O. constitutional?
Holding: The EO is unconstitutional. Petition granted.
Ratio:
The lower courts are not prevented from examining the constitutionality
of a law.
Constitutional grant to the supreme court to review.
Justice Laurel's said, courts should not follow the path of least
resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is
questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply,
to relieve the abscess, and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is
really presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely
implementing an existing law due to the grant of legislative authority
over the president underAmendment number 6.
Provisions of the constitution should be cast in precise language to
avoid controvery. In the due process clause, however, the wording was
ambiguous so it would remain resilient. This was due to the avoidance
of an iron rule laying down a stiff command for all circumstances.
There was flexibility to allow it to adapt to every situation with varying
degrees at protection for the changing conditions.
Courts have also refrained to adopt a standard definition for due
processlest they be confined to its interpretation like a straitjacket.
There must be requirements of notice and hearing as a safeguard
against arbitrariness.
There are exceptions such as conclusive presumption which bars
omission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based
on human experience or rational connection between facts proved and
fact presumed. An examplesis a passport of a person with a criminal
offense cancelled without hearing.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of police
power which both restrains and is restrained by dure process. This
power was invoked in 626-A, in addition to 626 which prohibits
slaughter of carabos with an exception.
While 626-A has the same lawful subjectas the original executive
order, it cant be said that it complies with the existence of a
lawful method. The transport prohibition and the purpose sought has a
gap.
Summary action may be taken in valid admin proceedings as
procedural due process is not juridical only due to the urgency needed
to correct it.
There was no reason why the offense in the E.O. would not have been
proved in a court of justice with the accused acquired the rights in the
constitution.

The challenged measure was an invalid exercise of police power


because the method toconfiscate carabos was oppressive.
Due process was violated because the owener was denied the right to
be heard or his defense and punished immediately.
This was a clear encroachment on judicial functions and against the
separataion of powers.
The policeman wasnt liable for damages since the law during that time
was valid.
Javier v. COMELEC, 144 SCRA 194- Kim
Hornales
Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were
rivals to be members of the Batasan in May 1984 in Antique. During
election, Javier complained of massive terrorism, intimidation, duress,
vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under
duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated
by the armed men of Pacificador. COMELEC just referred the
complaints to the AFP. On the same complaint, the 2nd Division of the
Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers
of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the
proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. On June 7,
1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the board to immediately
convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome
of the case before the Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the
proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as
premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of
appeal, which the Javier had seasonably made. Javier pointed out that
the irregularities of the election must first be resolved before
proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of the Commissioners
should inhibit himself as he was a former law partner of Pacificador.
Also, the proclamation was made by only the 2 ndDivision but the
Constitute requires that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In
Feb 1986, during pendency, Javier was gunned down. The Solicitor
General then moved to have the petition close it being moot and
academic by virtue of Javiers death.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in the
proclamation of Pacificador.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gens
tenor. The SC has repeatedly and consistently demanded the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge as the indispensable imperative of due
process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must
not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added
assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are
entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights
are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They
must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must
believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his
judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in
invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring
compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair
play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice
where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party
and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized
after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal
hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not
orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the
motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script.
There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his
conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are
filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.

Paderanga v. Azura, 136 SCRA 266Christian Montefalcon


Mayor Miguel Paderanga v. Judge Cesar Azura, 136 SCRA 266 Facts:
Petitioner was the mayor of Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental. He
petitioned that Judge Azura inhibits himself from deciding on pending
cases bought before him on the following grounds: 1. Loss of trust and
confidence; 2. Entertaining tax suits against the city and issuing TROs
on the sales of properties when it is clearly provided for by law (Section
64 of P.D. 464) that the remedy to stop auction is to pay tax 3. Bias,
oppressive dispensation of justice, and abuse of his power of contempt
in ordering the arrest of petitioner and the members of the
Sangguniang Panglunsod of Gingoog City; and 4. Issuing of Orders
against the interests of the City of Gingoog.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Azura should inhibit himself from the trial.

Ruling: Yes, Judge Azura should inhibit himself from the trial. As
decided in Pimentel vs. Salanga, all the foregoing notwithstanding,
this should be a good occasion as any to draw attention of all judges to
appropriate guidelines in a situation where their capacity to try and
decide fairly and judiciously comes to the fore by way of challenge
from any one of the parties. A judge may not be legally prohibited from
sitting in a litigation; but when suggestion is made of record that he
might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice
against a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of
inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful selfexamination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the
people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. In this case,
Judge Azura failed to maintain his position in such a manner that will
beget no suspicion of his fairness and integrity because of the
antagonistic positions taken by the parties in their respective
pleadings, and, particularly, the seriousness of the imputations made
by petitioner, which prompted him and others to file administrative
charges against respondent Judge. Hence, Judge Azura is hereby
ordered to inhibit himself from hearing the cases and the cases are
hereby transferred to the different Regional Trial Courts of Cagayan de
Oro.
o Jurisdiction
1. how acquire
a. in actions in personam
b. in actions in rem or quasi in rem
o Notice and Hearing
CASES:
David v. Aquilizan, 94 SCRA 707-Aleria
David has a large parcel of land in Polomolok, Cotabato. He let
Felomeno Jugar and Ricardo Jugar tend and caretake separate
portions of his land in 1971. The land is estimated to be yielding 60-70
cavans of corn cobs an dthe share agreed upon is 50-50. In 1973,
David withdrew the land from the brothers and has not allowed them to
go back there. The brothers prayed for reinstatement but David
refused to do so. David denied that the borthers were his tenants. He
said that Ricardo was his tractor driver before but he resigned to take
care of his dad and to work for DOLE. Fewlomeno on the other hand
surrendered the portion of the land he was tending to continue his faith
healing. J Aquilizan handled the case filed by the brothers against
David and after three months he rendered a decision in favor of the
brothers without any hearing. David averred he was denied due
process. J Aquilizan admitted that there was indeed no hearing
conducted but he said the decision has already become final and
executory as the period for appeal has already lapsed.

Anzaldo v. Clave, G.R. No. L-54597, Dec


15, 1982- Comedido
Better Buildings v. NLRC, G.R. No. 109714,
Dec 15, 1997 -Cornejo
Carag v. NLRC, G.R. No. 147590, April 2,
2007- De Paz

11The Equal Protection Clause


(2nd part of 1, Art. III)
1. Definition
CASES:
Quinto v. Comelec, G.R. No. 189698, Dec 1, 2009, dissent
of CJ Puno - Degamo
Ichong v. Hernandez, supra- (Lumukso)
2. Subjects of Protection

natural persons

artificial persons property only


3. Classification

Requirements
CASES:
Victoriano v. Elizalde, G.R. No. L-25246 Sept 12,
1974- Durana
Biraogo v. Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935,
December 7, 2010, particularly the concurrence of CJ
Corona and dissent of J. Sereno - Mahinay

ISSUE: Whether or not David is entitled to an appeal.


HELD: The SC ruled in favor of David. A decision rendered without a
hearing is null and void and may be attacked directly or collaterally.
The decision is null and void for want of due process. And it has been
held that a final and executory judgment may be set aside with a view
to the renewal of the litigation when the judgment is void for lack of due
process of law. In legal contemplation, it is as if no judgment has been
rendered at all.

Substantial Distinctions
CASES:
Ichong v. Hernandez, supra (Milan)
Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392 (Read also
the dissent of J. Teehankee) - Escobia
Ceniza v. COMELEC, 96 SCRA 763 - Esolana
Nunez v. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433 (Read
also the dissent of J. Makasiar) - Estimo
PASE v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386 - Faller
Intl. School Alliance of Educators v.
Quisumbing, 333 SCRA 13 - Friolo
DECS v. San Diego, 180 SCRA 533 - Tejas
Phil Judges Assn. v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703Ceniza
Tatad v. Secretary, GR No. 124360, November
5, 1997- Oclinara

Relevant/Germane to the Purpose of the Law


CASES:
Pp v. Cayat, supra- (Monino)
Dumlao v. COMELEC, supra (Nipangue)
PASEI v. Drilon, supra- (Pagatpat)
Ichong v. Hernandez, supra- (Salazar)
Quinto v. COMELEC, supra, December 1, 2009
Decision, per J. Nachura; February 22, 2010
Resolution, per CJ Puno- (Salgado)

Duration
CASES:
Pp. v. Cayat, supra- (Sulitas)
Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc. v. Treasurer of Ormoc
City, 22 SCRA 603-Gresunes
Tatad v. Secretary, supra- (Gador)

Applicability to All
CASES:
Villegas v. Hiu Chiong, supra- (Tudtud)
Tatad v. Secretary of Energy, supra- (Verallo)

DBP v. Bautista, 26 SCRA 366-Almirol


Lorenzana v. Cayetano, 78 SCRA 485Baliguat
Pp. v Beriales, 70 SCRA 361- Lloyd Canete
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 239 SCRA 529
- Basilisco
1. Right to Appeal
a. GR: not essential to the right to a
hearing
b. EXC
i. if the law allows appeal
ii. cases under the minimum
appellate jurisdiction of the SC
CASE: Calano v. Cruz, 94
Phil. 230 Ariane Paralisan
2. Exceptions to Requirements of Hearing
a. abatement of nuisance per se
b. in
cases
where
statutory
presumptions are applicable
o Judgment
1. must be based on the facts and the
law (14, Art. VIII, Constitution)
2. must conform to and be supported
by the pleadings and evidence
CASE: Diona v. Balangue, GR
No. 173559, Jan 7, 2013 -Castor
Administrative Due Process
o Requisites
CASE: Ang Tibay v. CIR, 60 Phil 635Gatab
o review of decision by the same officer who
rendered it previously in a different capacity
CASES:
Zambales Chromite v. CA, G.R. No. L49711, Nov 7, 1979- Chavez

4. For More In-Depth Analysis of the Equal Protection Clause

Levels of Scrutiny in Equal Protection Analysis


CASE: Biraogo v. Truth Commission, February 22,
2010 Resolution, dissent of J. Nachura - Gumulon

Classification vs. Prioritization


CASE: Biraogo v. Truth Commission, supra,
December 7, 2010 Decision, dissents of JJ. Sereno
and Carpio- (Pampilo)

The Inclusiveness Trap


CASES:
Biraogo v. Truth Commission, supra, G.R. No.
192935, December 7, 2010, ponencia of J. Mendoza, J
and concurring and dissenting opinion of J. Nachura(Agramon)
Abakada Guro v. Ermita, GR 168056, 9/1/05
(Decision); 10/18/05 (Resolution)- Pagatpat

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